


In Between Dreams – Re:Actions from the African continent

A conversation with Adams Bodomo

Adams Bodomo, Linda Ammann ,
Daniel Kossmann, and John Njenga Karugia
Edited by Linda Ammann

Introduction

This interview was recorded as part of the De:link//Re:link Podcast, a podcast that explores local insights and new knowledges.

For the podcast episode, we invited Ghanaian academic and professor for African linguistics and literature, Adams Bodomo. We talked about language and identity, Africa–China–Europe relations, narratives about the Belt and Road Initiative, and cultural diplomacy. The following are excerpts from the transcribed podcast interview edited by Linda Ammann.

Linda Ammann Welcome, Adams Bodomo.

We are very happy that you could join us for this podcast episode today. You are a professor for African linguistics and literature at the University of Vienna, and you have done pioneering research in many disciplines—amongst others, in African linguistics, diaspora studies, and Africa–China–Europe relations. You were born in Ghana and studied at the University of Ghana before moving to Norway, where you earned your PhD degree from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim.



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Podcast “In Between Dreams – Re:Actions from the African continent: A conversation with Adams Bodomo” by Adams Bodomo, Linda Ammann, Daniel Kossmann, and John Njenga Karugia

You lived and taught all around the globe, including the US, China, Germany, and Austria. You have written 20 books and more than 100 journal articles, are on the editorial board of many journals, won awards, speak a lot of languages, are a poet and mentor, and on top of everything, you are also good at sports. I am sure there is something important that I forgot to mention right now, so please, Adams, feel free to add.

Adams Bodomo No, there is nothing to add. Linda, John, and Daniel, I am very happy to be here with you in this studio. I am really very glad, very honored to be here and talking and sharing ideas with you. Thank you very much!

Linda Ammann The BRI is not only a gigantic trans-regional infrastructure project but also comes with an ideological, political concept—the Chinese Dream—and lots of different narratives. Let’s take your home country, Ghana, as an example. Do you have the impression that the citizens of Ghana are being introduced to parts of the Chinese Dream through the BRI projects? And what kinds of BRI narratives are communicated by the government of Ghana?

Adams Bodomo Okay, thank you very much. This is a complex question that needs to be looked at in different ways.

First of all, you mentioned that the BRI has been linked to the Chinese Dream. That’s a very good beginning. It’s a very good way to start to look at it.

When Xi Jinping arrived on the scene in 2013, this idea of the Chinese Dream was introduced, and then the BRI. To me, it seems like the Chinese Dream is like the software of this whole thing, the ideological underpinnings.

The BRI is then the infrastructure that implements this kind of software—I mean, this kind of ideological underpinning—both in China, but also outside China and onto the world.

Now, coming back to the idea of the BRI in Ghana: in Ghana, of course, not many Ghanaians know what the BRI is, but they are getting the effect of it in various ways. The government, of course, knows what the BRI is, as far as building, mining, and the like is concerned. So yes, the government is getting Ghanaians to understand that China is coming in and China is doing this and that, and the people understand that, yes, China is doing something in Ghana.

But the people of Ghana are also understanding that the relationship is not all that rosy, that there are several things. For example, if you look at what in Ghana is called *galamsey*,¹ that is, surface mining. Surface mining is a very big problem for the average Ghanaian. Ghanaians know that some Chinese firms are involved

1 *Galamsey* is derived from the English phrase “gather them and sell” and refers to small-scale and often illegal surface mining in Ghana (cf. e.g. <https://news.mongabay.com/2023/02/>

in this surface mining and that surface mining actually pollutes the environment. It pollutes our waterways.

In sum, the BRI project effects in Ghana are both positive and negative. If you ask the average Ghanaian, positive in the sense that we know of infrastructure being built; negative in the sense that we know of some wayward Chinese companies spoiling the environment, which affects especially rural Ghanaians. Don't forget that in much of rural Ghana, we don't have running tap water. We depend on the streams that flow through our villages, and so if you pollute, if you put something into the water upstream, definitely downstream people are going to drink it. That's not good for them and they know this.

Thus, the BRI in Ghana is a double-edged sword, so to speak. That's how I summarize it. It's a double-edged sword from the perspective of the average Ghanaian.

Linda Ammann But do you have the impression that in the communication of the government to the citizens about these projects, there is a little bit of this Chinese Dream narrative coming through? Or is this not at all communicated in Ghana?

Adams Bodom Not really. Again, the average Ghanaian doesn't know anything about the Chinese Dream. In a way, university students would know, people who study at Confucius Centers, and people who study Chinese; and then intellectuals, of course, know of what the Chinese Dream is. It's an attempt by China to rejuvenate. It's an attempt by China to rehabilitate its institutions. It's an attempt by China to revitalize its state institutions and to take on the world. They know this.

They also know about the American dream and what it is about. They know people are dreaming. I've actually critiqued this idea that when two big powers are dreaming, we need to be careful about those dreams. We, in Africa, have to be careful. So yes, the average intellectual, Ghanaian intellectual, knows about the Chinese Dream. The masses are not aware of this. They just know that there's a Chinese craze, if I may say. There's a Chinese craze in terms of trade, in terms of investment, in terms of building infrastructure projects. There is no consciousness about the *Chinese Dream*, but there's consciousness about the *Chinese craze* in terms of engagement in Ghana.

John Njenga Karugia China is financing various Belt and Road Initiative projects through long-term loans. There have been allegations that these loans are unsustainable, as well as suspicions of debt trap diplomacy. What is your take on this?

[mechanization-of-illegal-gold-mining-threatens-ghanas-forests/](#), accessed 17 Nov. 2023) (editor's remark).

Adams Bodomo Well, thank you, John. The debt trap debate is something that has just come in the way of so many things happening. Sometimes, when two people are engaged in something, having policies, debating policies, and trying to come up with some idea of helping each other and win-win relations, and then somebody drops in something, and it has ripple effects. We've had how many FOCAC group meetings now? More than five or six now. While all this was happening, two or three years ago, somebody just got up and invented the idea that there was this debt trap, that the amount of loans China is giving to Africa—and also, by the way, other Asian countries like Sri Lanka—is creating a situation of debt trap, what does it mean? That because I give you so much, I lend so much to you, if you cannot pay, then I'm able to control the structures of your institutions, I mean, or your institutional structures. You depend on me. If I tell you to do something, you will do it and therefore control you. So that's the idea of debt trap.

Well, this is what I have to say. I'm not going to deny that a lot of African countries owe China, but let us go back into the past. Actually, I want to contend that African countries owe the Bretton Woods institutions more money than they owe China. Why? Because the Bretton Woods institutions have been there for long. The Bretton Woods includes the IMF, the World Bank, and many other things. So, the African countries, African governments, owe these institutions a lot of money. In addition to that, there's what France has been doing in Africa.

After France colonized the African countries, when it was going back, it said that it's going to get the African countries to pay for all that they did in African countries. So, there's this idea of the colonial debt as well. African countries are paying France about \$500 billion a year, according to one former African Union ambassador, Dr. Chihombori. African countries pay France every year \$500 billion US dollars as colonial debt. I'm putting this in perspective.

Now, come back to the idea of China's debt diplomacy or *China's debt trap*. When you begin to focus on these kinds of things, what is the strategy here? The strategy here is to say that, well, forget about what you already owe us. The question now becomes China being a bad participant, a bad actor in the African world, when, indeed, Africa doesn't owe China as much as the old West and Bretton Woods institutions. This is the perspective under which I want us to understand the whole so-called debt trap. The debt trap is not something that should stand in the way of Africa-China relations. My take on that is that we as Africans should understand that owing somebody compromises our independence, and we should be careful what we use this money for. Everybody owes somebody. I guess there was a recent post showing how even the G7 countries, each of them, owes somebody. Owing somebody is not a bad thing, per se, in the economic situation. I wouldn't put the debt trap as some kind of albatross on the neck of Africa that

we should avoid. We should owe China, but we should be careful of what we use that money for. We should invest well so that, in the future, we can pay back China and also pay back the Bretton Woods institutions so that we can be independent.

I think that's how I look at it. The debt trap is there, but it shouldn't be something we should discuss and just put aside all the good things that we can do together with China. The debt trap is just something thrown in by somebody somewhere to confuse or to confound or to create problems between Africa and China.

Daniel Kossmann Professor Bodomo, we were already talking about one part of China's diplomacy, the debt trap diplomacy. Let's talk about a different aspect. I would like to talk about education aid and China's cultural diplomacy. Both are very important in China's strategy. According to data from China's Ministry of Education presented in a Global Times article on China's, October 18th, 2021, there were more than 80,000 African students in China in 2018.² This makes China the second most popular study destination for African students, with France being still the number one. How come China is that popular amongst African students? What motivates these students to study in China? And is it already clear which effects the COVID-19 pandemic has had in this regard?

Adams Bodomo Thank you very much, Daniel, for this wonderful question about the exchanges between Africa and China on the question of education. It's not just something that happened recently. It's always been there. In fact, don't forget that China was part of this whole "Eastern sphere." So, as many students went to the Soviet Union, some of them also went to China. This whole idea of exchange, of having students go to China, is not a new thing.

But since the year 2000, when the Forum for African China Corporation was established, particular attention was paid to training young Africans. That's when this whole thing got renewed and got revamped and so many students are in China now.

To answer your question, why is it like this? A number of issues. One, they are getting direct government-to-government scholarships. You just have to go to your embassy or some kind of institution in your country and then apply, and if the position is there, you get it. It's quite transparent, I must say, even though it differs from country to country. Secondly, Africans are also going there because of some of the things that they can't get in the West. I've interviewed some African students who went there to study Chinese medicine, for example. And by the way, it's not only government-sponsored Africans who go to China to study but also private people who go to China to study. I have interviewed a lot of these

2 <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202110/1236570.shtml> (accessed 21 Nov. 2023).

students who go to study things like Chinese medicine, Chinese language, et cetera. Third reason why they go there is that they can mingle education with trade. Many of the people I have interviewed in China, actually, were people who came to study but who started a business in trading. And so, therefore, it became lucrative. They build up a business and they could get other opportunities that they couldn't get in the West.

These are three reasons, but a fourth reason can also be that it's the novelty of it. Young people are very curious. We already know a lot about the West. There's been these years and years of exchange between Africa and the US, Africa and Europe. But young people also want to look at other cultures. And I think that's a fourth reason why this whole program of exchange, of sending students from Africa to China, is popular.

By the way, it's not only students. It's also government workers who go there to train, for short-term periods of training. Middle-level government workers, civil servants, have also gone to China to train. These are some of the reasons, to answer your question, why it is quite popular.

Daniel Kossmann As we have heard, educational cooperation with Africa does hold a key role in Sino-African relations. Another aspect of China's educational aid and cultural diplomacy is the establishment of Confucius Institutes. The first one on the African continent opened in 2005. By now there are already 61 Confucius Institutes in Africa. That's an amazing growth rate, I think. These institutes, however, have not been criticized by Africans as much as they have been criticized in the US or Europe. Does the narrative of mutuality and friendship really work in the African context? And on another note, is there less asymmetry in cultural diplomacy between China and Africa than there is between countries of the Global North and Africa?

Adams Bodomo Okay. Thank you very much, Daniel, for your question. The Confucius Institutes have come to stay. The Confucius Institutes are there. Some of us welcome the Confucius Institutes, because they are part of China's cultural exportation to the world. You cannot want to have Chinese investment at the level of economics, and not want to have Chinese culture. It depends on what we do with it, right?

The Confucius Institutes have a role to play. They help us understand who we are trading with. They help us understand who we are dealing with. They teach us their language and they teach us their culture through these institutes. They invest in them. This is not different from what happens with our Western partners. So even though there are differences, the Confucius Institute is not entirely different from the British Council. The Confucius Institute is not entirely different from the Alliance Française. The Confucius Institute is not entirely different from the

Goethe Institute. They all have the goal of teaching Africans their languages and cultures in various countries. So, in that sense, they are not different. They may be structured differently, but they have the same goal. So again, the Confucius Institute is not an exception, not an exceptional thing.

What do Africans say about it? Of course, there are noises about why they are teaching Chinese. However, anybody who doesn't criticize the presence of the Goethe Institute in Africa, or the Alliance Française in Africa, or the British Council in Africa, but criticizes the Confucius Institute, is being hypocritical. We need to look at it in this context.

Now, you talk about asymmetry, and I think it's a very important point you make, and I have also been making that point. So that's the other side of the equation, that the Chinese come and teach us their culture and their language on our continent. What are we doing? If it is supposed to be a win-win or symmetrical relationship, which it is not at this point, why aren't Africans or African governments teaching the Chinese African languages in China, or on the Asian continent? Why isn't somebody teaching them African culture in China?

Of course, I know private institutions and private individuals in China teaching Chinese African culture, like dance, and music, and the like. That has happened, but at the government level, we're not seeing that.

So, there is a clear asymmetry. It is clearly asymmetrical, and you are right, and we need to do something about it. The asymmetries cut across all aspects of the relationship—political, economic, cultural, and linguistic as well, of course. We need to recognize this rather than criticizing the presence of the Confucius Institutes. We need to say, okay, maybe the African Union can even symbolically start some African cultural institution in China, but also, of course, in the West. We need to address the asymmetry. I don't know if there's some other part of your question I forgot to address.

Daniel Kossmann It actually has to do with your answer. I was also asking about the narrative of mutuality and friendship in the African context, if it worked. But I think your answer provides that even though there is the narrative of mutuality and friendship in practice, there's still some asymmetry. So, the practical aspect of mutuality, especially on the African side, is still missing.

Adams Bodomo Yes, let me talk about the discourse of mutuality. The discourse is pervasive. You can get this narration, you can get these discourses in the policy texts. They are there in the FOCAC agreement texts. Every three years, these guys meet and the narration is there. The discourse is plenty. It is just discourse, but the action is lacking. In terms of government-to-government relations, the narration, the discourse is plenty. The discourse is pervasive. In terms of people-to-people narration, it's there partially. But again, coming back to the average African, to

the average Ghanaian, to the average Kenyan, to the average South African, to the average Ugandan, to the average Senegalese: this discourse of mutuality is not there, they just worry about Chinese presence. That's where you see the discourse coming that, "oh wow, these guys are coming in, they're taking things." So that narration, at that level, you will see it. But the more refined narration of mutuality, you can find at the government-to-government level. That's what I have to say.

Daniel Kossmann This discourse of mutuality, if I may comment on that, I think is also lacking then on the European side, isn't it? Because European partners are also many times telling the African audience that their work is actually happening on an eye level, but in reality, it's nevertheless criticized as much as the Chinese approach is criticized.

Adams Bodomo Yes, we forgot to address the European aspect of your question. Yes, the discourse of mutuality. Again, there's a stark difference between the Africa-China discourse and the Africa-Europe discourse, because of the long history of contact with our traditional partners, the Europeans. The Africa-China discourse, again, at the government-to-government level, is more of talking about mutuality, talking about people in the same shoe; we've all gone through colonialism, and so therefore, we are brothers and sisters, we should help each other. That discourse is there.

The discourse between Africa and Europe, I must say, because of the colonial legacy, it's a paternalistic discourse. It has to change.

And it's also a discourse that says that, well, we, the Europeans, did this in Africa. We did this bad, and it's our duty to go back there and solve the problem. So therefore, it is paternalistic in that sense. Well, we need to take care of Africa. We need to right the wrongs we did, so therefore, the Europeans have always gone there for the purpose of aid, not so much for the purpose of trade. And so that discourse, because of the colonial legacy, is a discourse that is not a discourse like the Chinese discourse. It's a discourse that is as if there is a relation not between equals. It's between people who perpetrated something and people who are victims, and so therefore, something needs to be done about it. And I think that my advice, I've said this many times, that if Europe wants to get back into the game... By the way, let me say something. I always say this at the end of my interviews. Africa is a very vast continent. There's room for everybody, whether China or Korea or Japan or Germany or America. There's room for everybody. You just have to be a good player. It's always said that in my father's or in my mother's house, there's room for everybody. So, Africa welcomes anybody who wants to get involved with the level of politics or economics or culture. But this discourse of paternalism must change. And if it doesn't change, it's going to make the African think that, "okay, China listens to us more than Europe listens

to us.” And I think that there’s a lot of asymmetry on that part. I don’t know if I’ve answered your question well, but this is how I see it. I’m a little bit critical on this. It has to change. And how do we change it? By European countries, the EU, for example, seeing the African Union as a partner. In fact, the EU used to neglect the African Union. The EU used to say that they would not engage the African Union, that they will engage individual African countries. It is some of us who have criticized this approach, and we just made it possible for the EU and the African Union to meet at that level. So that discourse, that feeling, that approach of aid and not trade, must change.

Linda Ammann Adams, you are also an expert on Africa–China–Europe relations, and you have been traveling the African continent quite a lot, from what I understand. I am deeply curious to hear from your experience: how is the BRI perceived on the African continent, and how have the perspectives on the BRI changed in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic?

Adams Bodomo Okay. The BRI, again, is an intellectualist conceptualization. The BRI belongs to the elites. The idea of a BRI, if you walk into the streets of Kumasi, which is our second largest city, and you say: “Do you know anything about the BRI?” Nobody is going to say anything. People are going to say: “What are you talking about?” So, the BRI is known in intellectualist circles. It is known at the universities. It is known within the government circles. It is known among journalists, but it is not known among the vast majority of masses in the markets of Accra, in the markets of Kumasi, in the markets of Johannesburg, in the markets of Nairobi. It is not known, but they feel the effect.

So, for now, I will stay then at that level of intellectualism. Yes, the BRI is known. By the way, it doesn’t mean that all the institutions or all the projects we call BRI came after 2013, when the BRI was officially started. Many of China’s projects and investments were there before the BRI came. But when the BRI came, they were collectively part of the BRI. It’s a collective term for Chinese investment, so, for example, even one of the most well-known BRI-projects in Africa, the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) in Kenya, was also just put under the name BRI. So, just in terms of that, the Africans, even including the people I mentioned in the market, they know that there are BRI projects going on. They know that it is affecting them. They know that China is constructing roads. China is constructing railways. China is constructing stadia. But the people do not know the term BRI. They just know that China is working. So, if we discuss at that level, then we can say that yes, the discourse is there. They know of it and they evaluate it. Not just only knowing of it: the people of Africa, including governments, evaluate it on a daily basis, evaluate its pros and cons. They talk about the positives of this investment, of this engagement, but they are also very careful, they are also very

critical about what they consider to be the negatives of this engagement, including the pollution that I mentioned earlier. In Ghana, we call it *galamsey*. Once people hear about the term *galamsey*, which is illegal surface mining, people talk about the Chinese. That is, on a semantic camp, linguistically speaking, *galamsey* always triggers China. Thank you.

Daniel Kossmann Professor Bodomo, in 2009, already some years ago, in your article “Africa–China relations: Strengthening symmetry with soft power”,³ you suggested that, and I quote, “prominent economies on the African continent such as South Africa, Egypt, and Nigeria have an important role to play in ensuring a symmetrical relationship in which Africa can also take part in a symmetrical cultural diplomacy with China, such as in the setting up of pan-African cultural institutes in China.” What has changed since then?

Adams Bodomo Nothing, I must say. In terms of establishing the diplomatic institutions, cultural institutions—nothing. Well, I won’t say nothing. Since 2018, the African Union has a center in China. There is an African Union center in China which brings together all the African ambassadors, and they have a place. They can come there. I had a wonderful situation of addressing all 55 ambassadors from the various African countries in that center. So yes, at a political level, something has happened, but at a cultural institutional level, nothing has happened. There’s no African cultural institute there, and I think that this must happen. Now, the background to me writing that article was a certain kind of euphoria that took place when the BRIC economic group, Brazil, Russia, India, and China, admitted South Africa into the group and then called it the BRICS. South Africa was the only African country there, and it’s meant to be representing all of Africa. So there was a certain kind of euphoria at the time I wrote the article that, yes, the major economies of the various regions in Africa, South Africa representing Southern Africa, Kenya representing Eastern Africa, Nigeria representing West Africa, and Egypt representing North Africa, should take leadership roles in promoting African affairs, in trying to create a certain kind of symmetry between us and the partners that we engage with, whether China or Europe or America. So, that was the context in which I wrote that article. But in terms of assessment of what has happened within the approximately ten years since I wrote the article: not much besides the establishment of the AU Centre in Beijing.

3 <https://www.pambazuka.org/global-south/africa-china-relations-strengthening-symmetry-soft-power> (accessed 7 Mar. 2022). If not accessible, cf. almost identical article Bodomo (2009): “Africa–China Relations: Symmetry, Soft Power and South Africa,” *China Review*, vol. 9, no. 2, *Special Issue: Religious Studies in China*, pp. 169–178.

Daniel Kossmann So, there is still no joint African cultural diplomacy?

Adams Bodomo You mean joint African cultural diplomacy, when we deal with other partners...

Daniel Kossmann ... for example, through the African Union?

Adams Bodomo No, not that I'm aware of. Of course, the African Union has a section on social engagement (they don't even mention the word culture) they call ECOSOCC.⁴ The ECOSOCC promotes African culture, but they haven't established any institution. Do you hear about ECOSOCC promoting an African institution in Germany here? No. Do you hear about ECOSOCC promoting an African institution in America? No. They also haven't done anything the like in China. The African Union needs to understand that it is not only at the level of politics, international relations, and economy that they need to be active. They need to understand that. We need to be active. We need to promote African culture. No emerging country goes into the world promoting other people's cultures. Africans have to take their culture along with them as they emerge into the world. There's no reason why South Africa or other African countries shouldn't promote their languages in China.

I recently examined a PhD thesis from Bayreuth University, which is titled *Language and Interaction in the Chinese Community in Cameroon – A Sociolinguistic Profile*.⁵ It was a wonderful thesis, a great thesis. But I was struck by something that the ordinary Cameroonians interviewed were asking the candidate: "Why is it that the Chinese come here and they don't learn our language?" and by "their language" they meant French. "And why do they like our money but they don't like our language?" talking about French, and I was struck by that. Why would you demand the Chinese to learn French in Cameroon? Why shouldn't you tell them to learn at least one Cameroonian language? You know, so that is what I mean by Africa mustn't neglect its cultural institutions, linguistic and cultural institutions, as it emerges into the world. It must take along these institutions. Thank you.

John Njenga Karugia I don't know whether you would agree, yet there have been some people who have suggested that English as a language has been decentered. It does not belong to the British anymore, and it has gone into the world and many things have happened to it. Thus, there are all these Englishes, and maybe there

4 ECOSOCC is the Economic, Social & Cultural Council of the African Union, cf. <https://ecosocc.au.int/> (accessed 17 Nov. 2023) (editor's remark).

5 Kenne Kenne, Jocelyne. *Language and Interaction in the Chinese Community in Cameroon – A Sociolinguistic Profile*. 2023. PhD dissertation. Beiträge zur Afrika-Forschung. Berlin, Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf.

is also French which has been decentered, and there are many Frenches. I mean, maybe this person has felt very close to French in that sense. I do not know what your response would be.

Adams Bodomo Well, well, John, isn't it interesting that it is only former colonial languages that have been decentered? Has anybody ever thought of decentering Swahili? Has anybody ever thought of decentering Hausa? There lies the problem. Nobody is against learning other languages. We are all world citizens, but everybody should worry about learning his or her language. I don't believe in the idea that English is an African language. I disagree completely. French is not an African language. English is not an African language. The Europeans will never say that Swahili is a European language. Until the Europeans agree that Swahili is a European language, I will never agree that English is an African language. Until the Chinese agree that Swahili or Hausa are Chinese languages, I will never agree that Chinese is an African language. Do you see my point? This is where I am coming from. I think that, like your own countryman, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, it is part of colonizing the mind. It is only when our minds are colonized that we begin to think like this, to say that English is now an African language, that French is now an African language.

Linda Ammann Adams, you have been working and publishing on different issues of identity. Can you tell us what insights you gained on the connection between language and identity in general? And does language as an identity-forming factor increase when people are living abroad?

Adams Bodomo Thank you very much, Linda. You are a linguist and I'm a linguist. We know how important language is when it comes to unpacking the individual. Language is not only a means of communicating, it is not only just a code whereby we try to get meaning out of things. Language is, indeed, as important as other physical features such as our skin color, our hair, everything. Language is that important.

If you disagree with me, just go to a place and open your mouth to speak. Whatever language you speak, through that, people will have an idea of where you come from. Thus, language is that important.

And identity, what is identity? It is just a package of different variables that define us. And I have an idea that I call identity packaging. People package who they are differently from place to place.

How I introduce myself in my hometown is different from how I introduce myself in the capital of Ghana, in Accra, or from how I introduce myself as I come here to your wonderful city of Berlin as a research fellow.

The way you introduce yourself is about identity packaging, and language goes along with it. So that leads into your question about what is the role of identity

when you are in your country and when you are a migrant or when you are an immigrant. That identity becomes very important. It meets other languages. Your language comes along with you. In your hometown, it's probably the only language or main language, but as you travel and as you live abroad, your language now is in the vicinity, is in the same space as other languages. How you deal with this depends on what you want. In some cases, even just because you are in a foreign land and because it is part of your identity, you want to project it as much as possible to show who you are. In other cases, because you are in a foreign country, you want to live outside your language so that you can learn the language of your host and progress in life. Different situations make you handle your language in different ways. But whatever the case, your language and other languages you speak are always going to be an important part of who you are, of your identity. Thank you.

Linda Ammann Okay, I think this was our last question. Thank you very much for joining us today, Adams Bodomo, it was a pleasure talking to you. I think we gained a lot of insights from speaking to you.

Adams Bodomo Thank you for having me.

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