

Yamāri, Dignāga and the Scope of Dharmakīrti's Work¹

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1. Dignāga (ca. 480–540)² and Yamāri (ca. 1000–1060)³ can be seen to mark the beginning and the end of the development of the Buddhist logical–epistemological tradition in South Asia. It may thus be interesting to ascertain how the latter, in the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Suparīśuddhā* or *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha*, his extensive commentary on Prajñākaragupta's magnum opus *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārabhāṣya*,⁴ evaluated Dignāga's philosophical accomplishments and the standing of his oeuvre within the tradition. In this respect, Yamāri's little-studied work, written in an independent and critical spirit, harbors a few surprises. Yamāri's estimation of Dignāga's role and importance is a far cry from the respectful reverence one would expect in general from a traditional Buddhist commentator, as well as from the perception of Dignāga's position in modern scholarship on the logical–epistemological tradition of Buddhism, starting with the “classics.” Already Giuseppe Tucci, in the introduction to his translation of Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*, states: “I do not need to insist upon the importance of Dignāga and the place

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2 We are following the date suggested as a working hypothesis by Frauwallner (1961: 134–137).

3 Ono 2000: xxiii–xxiv. For a critical discussion of this date, see Matsuoka forthcoming a, Introduction.

4 On the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha*, its title, textual sources and critical edition in progress, see Matsuoka forthcoming a, with a bibliography of partial diplomatic editions of the text and studies on selected issues by Junjie Chu, Eli Franco, Xuezu Li, Karin Preisendanz and Matsuoka herself in Section 3.1; on Yamāri's teacher and region of activity, see Matsuoka forthcoming a, Section 1.2. On Prajñākaragupta's date, see Franco 2019. In this paper, Franco dated him between approximately the second half of the eighth century and the end of the ninth century. In fact, a slightly later date is conceivable, depending on the dates of Bhāsarvajña (see most recently Muroya 2010) and Jitāri.

he occupies in the history of Buddhist logic.”⁵ The cardinal importance he accords to Dignāga is also seen in the very title of his 1929 book *Pre-Dinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from the Chinese Sources*. More explicitly, the first sentence in Theodore Stcherbatsky’s foundational *Buddhist Logic* reads: “Under Buddhist Logic we understand a system of logic and epistemology created in India in the VI–VIIth century A.D. by two great lusters of Buddhist science, the masters Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.”⁶

Similarly, in his awe-inspiring paper “Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung,” Erich Frauwallner, the pioneering and most influential historian of the logical–epistemological tradition, says:⁷ “Eingehende Forschung zeigt, daß der Ruhm Dignāga’s als Begründer der logisch-erkenntnistheoretischen Schule des Buddhismus voll berechtigt ist. Er hat in der Tat, was vor ihm an Ansätzen vorhanden war, die Dialektik Vasubandhu’s, die Erkenntnislehre des Sāṃkhya, die Anregungen, die ihm die Sprachphilosophie der Grammatiker bot, zu einem großen Gebäude zusammengefaßt, von dem die ganze spätere Schule abhängt.”⁸ Numerous evaluations in this vein can be found elsewhere in the literature. Dignāga has been described as Vasubandhu’s “brilliant pupil” and “quite the greatest Indian logician” by J.M. Bocheński,⁹ and is *inter alia* rightly said to have brought about the turn from dialectics to systematic epistemology in Buddhist philosophy.¹⁰

To these evaluations in modern scholarship, one can add Dignāga’s appreciation in traditional Buddhist biographies, or rather hagiographies, such as in Bu Ston’s “History of Buddhism” which speaks specifically of the composition of the first verse of Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* almost as if it were a cosmic event: “As he thus wrote down his salutation and that which he intended to expound, the earth trembled, a light blazed forth, a tremendous sound of thunder was heard, the legs of the heretical teachers became stiff like wood,

5 Tucci 1930: 1.

6 Stcherbatsky 1932: 1.

7 Frauwallner 1959: 83.

8 “In-depth research shows that Dignāga’s fame as the founder of the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism is fully justified. He has, in fact, combined what existed before him in the way of beginnings, the dialectics of Vasubandhu, the epistemology of Sāṃkhya, the suggestions offered to him by the philosophy of language of the grammarians, into a great edifice on which the whole later school depends.”

9 See Bocheński 1961: 418; for the German original, see Bocheński 1956: 483: “[...] sein [i.e., Vasubandhu’s] genialer Schüler – wohl der größte Logiker Indiens – Dignāga [...]”

10 See Eltschinger 2013: 230 and 232.

and many other ominous signs appeared.”¹¹ A similar description is found in Tārānātha's “History.”¹²

2. An examination of what Yamāri has to say about Dignāga can conveniently begin with a look at his explanation of Prajñākaragupta's first *maṅgalaśloka* in the PVABh, whose first half repeats the first half of the *maṅgalaśloka* of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*:

*pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣiṇe praṇamiya śāstre sugatāya tāyine |
kutarkasambhrāntajanānukampayā pramāṇasiddhir vidhivad vidhīyate* ||¹³

Having bowed before [the Buddha] who is actually a means of knowledge, who desires the benefit of the world, the teacher, the fully enlightened one (*sugata*), the protector, the establishment of the means of knowledge is being accomplished in due form (*vidhivat*) [by me in this treatise] with (or: because of) compassion for people who have become thoroughly confused by bad logicians.

One would naturally understand that the implicit subject of the predicate *vidhīyate* is the author of the verse, namely Prajñākaragupta, and the literary location of the establishment of the means of knowledge is his *Pramāṇavārttikālanākārabhāṣya*; thus the addition “[by me in this treatise].” It therefore comes as a surprise that according to Yamāri this verse had indeed been composed by Prajñākaragupta, but on behalf of Dharmakīrti.¹⁴ Following Yamāri's

11 Obermiller 1932: 150.

12 Chimpa – Chattopadhyaya 1970: 183: “When he had written this with a piece of chalk [on the rock], the earth shook, a light blazed forth and a thunderous sound was heard.”

13 PVABh 1,2–5.

14 See PVAN 8a4: *ādau tarhi śāstrapravrṛtyākṣepakaṃ vākyam ucitaṃ svayaṃ vā śāstrakārasyeti cet. na, svayaṃ vā brūyāt tatpratīnidhir vā, na kaścid viśeṣaḥ, yathā “atha śabdānuśāsanam” iti. vyākhyātmātrasya vacanaṃ krīḍārthaṃ sambhavet, na tūpāyakārasyeti. tenāpy ādivākyasyeraṇe na kaścid doṣaḥ.* PVAN₁ P 220b5–6 = D 184a5–7: ‘o na ni dang por bstan bcos byed pa rang nyid kyi ‘jug pa ‘phen pa ‘i ngag (P : dag D) rigs so zhe na ma yin te rang nyid dam de ‘dra ba gzhan gyis kyang rung ste | khyad par ‘ga ‘ yang med (P : mang D) do || dper na sgra rjes su bstan pa ‘i dbang du byas te zhes bya ba bzhin no || ‘chad pa po ‘ba ‘ zhid gi tshig ni rtse ba ‘i don du srid (P : sred D) kyi | ‘grel pa byed pa ‘i ni ma yin pas | des (P : nges D) ngag dang po (ngag dang po em. : drag po P D) byas pa la yang skyon ci yang med do ||.

creative interpretation, one would thus rather have to add here “[by Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārttika*].”¹⁵

Less unexpectedly, Yamāri glosses *kutarka*, understood as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, with *uddiyotakarakumārīlādih*,¹⁶ which shows that he was aware of the fact that Prajñākaragupta’s wording probably amounts to a repute to Uddyotakara’s *maṅgalaśloka* to his *Nyāyavārttika* where the latter implicitly refers to Buddhist logicians, foremost his main opponent Dignāga, as bad logicians (*kutārkika*).¹⁷ Consequently, one would expect the adverb *vidhivat*, which Yamāri glosses with *yathāvat*, to characterize the announced accomplishment of the establishment of the means of knowledge *vis à vis*, or actually in contrast to the efforts of these bad logicians. However, in Yamāri’s interpretation *vidhivat* used by Prajñākaragupta distinguishes the accomplishment of Dharmakīrti’s work as interpreted and explained by himself, that is, Prajñākaragupta, as well as the accomplishment of his own work, from that of Dignāga:

*etat tu syāt — nanu yathābhimate pramāṇe tanmukhe vā prameyarāśāv ācāryadignāgasāstram evāstīti. kim anena? iti vaiyarthyam āsaṅkyāha — vidhivad iti. yathāvad ity arthaḥ. nācāryadignāgavat paraprahārāvakaśadāyiduhśliṣṭapadapaddhatinā kramṇeti yāvat. taddoṣato hi pūrvasya sato ’py asadaviśeṣāt kuto vaiyarthyam aśya?*¹⁸

However, one may object as follows: ‘Is it not the case that there already exists the authoritative body of expert knowledge [established] by Ācārya Dignāga [in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and his other works] on

15 This issue is being discussed at some length in Matsuoka forthcoming b.

16 PVAN 10a6: *kutarka uddyotakarakumārīlādih*. PVAN_T P 225b6 = D 188b2: *snang byed dang gzhon nu ma len pa* (P : om. D) *la sogs pa | rtog ge ngan pa*.

17 Cf. *Nyāyavārttika* (NV) 1,3–4: *yad akṣapādaḥ pravaro munīnām śamāya śāstram jagato jagāda | kutārkikājñānanivṛttihetuḥ kariṣyate tasya mayā nibandhaḥ ||*. Vācaspati Mīśra clarifies in *Nyāyavārttikātātparyāyikā* (NVT_†) 2,4–5: [...] *tathāpi dignāgaprabhṛtibhir arvacīnaiḥ kuhetusantamasasamutthāpanenācchāditaṃ śāstram na tattvanirṇayāya paryāptam iti* [...]; see also NVT_† 2,15: *kutārkikair dignāgaprabhṛtibhir āhitam ajñānam kutārkikājñānam iti*.

18 PVAN 10a5–6. PVAN_T P 225b3–4 = D 188a7–188b2: *yang ’di snyam du ci ltar mngon par ’dod pa ’i tshad ma dang | de la rag las pa ’i gzhai bya ’i tshogs la slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po ’i bstan bcos nyid yod pa ma yin nam | ’dis ci zhig bya zhes don med par dogs* (D : dgongs P) *pa la | tshul bzhin zhes gsungs te ci lta ba bzhin du zhes bya ba ’i don to ’di ni phyogs kyi glang po bzhin du gghan gyi klan ka ’i go skabs ’byed pa | ’brel dka’ ba ’i tshig gi lam gyi tshul gyis ma yin no zhes bya ba ’i tha tshig go || nyes pa des ni sngar yod pa yang med pa dang ’dra ba ’i phyir don med par ga la ’gyur ||*.

the means of knowledge as accepted [by us Buddhists] or on the multitude of objects of knowledge accessed through them (i.e., the means of knowledge)? What, therefore, is the use of this [announced accomplishment of the establishment of the means of knowledge in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārabhāṣya*]?’

Dreading that [the two treatises] may thus [turn out to] be useless, [Prajñākara Gupta] says “in due form” (*vidhivat*). The meaning [of “in due form”] is “correctly” (*yathāvat*), that is, not like Ācārya Dignāga [who only attempted to establish the means of knowledge, namely] by a procedure whose series of ill-joined steps (or: words) offers room (i.e., opportunity) for blows (i.e., criticism and refutation) by opponents. Evidently (*hi*), because of this fault [with Dignāga’s procedure this] earlier [alleged authoritative body of expert knowledge on the means of knowledge, etc.] (i.e., the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and other works by Dignāga), even though it exists, does not differ from something that does not exist (i.e., is practically inexistent). Therefore, how would it (i.e., the announced accomplishment of the establishment of the means of knowledge in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārabhāṣya*) be useless?

Unfortunately, Yamāri does not go into details here. One may guess that the flawed procedure or method that gives opponents an opportunity to criticize the Buddhist doctrine has to do with Dignāga’s theory of the triple form of a logical reason (*trairūpya*), which allowed sophisms like the *sadvitīyaprayoga* and inferences that were detrimental to crucial Buddhist doctrines, for instance the inference that the Buddha had desires or that the Self (*ātman*) exists.¹⁹ However, this must remain a matter of speculation. What one can clearly observe in the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha*, though, here and elsewhere, is a consistent move to dissociate Dharmakīrti’s work from that of Dignāga by means of the claim that the *Pramāṇavārttika* is not a commentary (*vārttika*) on Dignāga’s work. This issue has already been touched upon by Franco when discussing Yamāri’s view on the order of chapters in the *Pramāṇavārttika*.²⁰ Indeed, the two

19 Cf. Franco 2017: 72ff. for sophisms and 80ff. for inferences directed against Buddhist religious doctrines.

20 Cf. Franco 2018.

issues overlap and intertwine, and it is difficult to discuss the one without the other.

The main purpose of the present paper is to look at Yamāri's arguments for the dissociation of the *Pramāṇavārttika* and Dignāga's work in more detail, with the aim to gain some insight into the way Yamāri perceived Dignāga's work and its relation to Dharmakīrti's oeuvre. Towards this aim, one also has to examine what Yamāri has to say on Dharmakīrti and his commentators, especially Devendrabuddhi and Dharmottara. The central question in this connection is on what work the *Pramāṇavārttika* is supposed to comment. For Yamāri admits that it is a *vārttika*, as is obvious from its title. So if the *Pramāṇavārttika* is not a commentary on Dignāga's work, specifically on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, then on what does it comment? Yamāri's answer is that it comments on the Buddha's word (*pravacana*). It has been pointed out by Motoi Ono already in 1997 that Yamāri was not the first Buddhist scholar to hold this view.²¹ Thus, on this point the traditional Buddhist commentaries show a wider variety of interpretation than is acknowledged in modern scholarship even after Ono's observation.²² Furthermore, modern scholarship invariably takes it for granted that the *Pramāṇavārttika*, with the possible exception of the chapter on inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*), was composed as a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.²³

3. Yamāri's main problem in connection with his above claim is how to account for Devendrabuddhi's testimony. Here Yamāri has to fight an uphill battle, for he admits that Devendrabuddhi was Dharmakīrti's personal disciple and considered the *Pramāṇavārttika* to be a commentary on Dignāga's work, specifically the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. But how could a personal disciple misunderstand his own teacher's work in such a fundamental matter? To further exacerbate things, Yamāri accepts and even defends Devendrabuddhi's opinion on the order of chapters in the *Pramāṇavārttika*, according to which the chapter on inference for oneself is its first, and not third chapter. How could it

21 Cf. Ono 1997 and, more recently, Franco 2018.

22 See, e.g., Kellner 2010: 161: "Traditionally regarded as a commentary on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the PV [...]"

23 Cf., however, the characterization of the *Pramāṇavārttika* as a work "highly independent in argument and language" from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the apposite description of its rather loose relationship to Dignāga's work in Kellner, loc.cit.

then be explained that Devendrabuddhi was right about the order of chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, but wrong about its scope and subject matter? A closer look at the discussion is thus required.

3.1 The discussion begins in the context of the issue of the chapter order. An opponent draws an analogy from Devendrabuddhi's error about the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika* to a presumed error of his about the order of its chapters: just as according to Yamāri Devendrabuddhi was mistaken about the scope, he should also have been wrong about the order of chapters, on which topic Yamāri actually agrees with him. In arguing for such an analogy, the opponent objects to Yamāri's position that Devendrabuddhi could not have erred in an obvious matter such as the order of chapters, which is explicitly indicated in the *Pramāṇavārttika* by the designation of the chapters as "first chapter," "second chapter," etc. As already mentioned, the discussions of the two issues are thus intimately connected:

*yady api ca teṣām atibhūyasī bhrāntir upalabdḥā, tathāpi gambhīre
'bhidheyādaḥ na tāvatā lipimātraparicayavato 'pi gocare sambhāvyaḥ.*

*yady evam, abhidheyabhrāntir eva katham ācāryadevendrasya
sākṣācchrāviṇaḥ, bālasyāpi "idam anena vyākhyāyate" iti grahaṇa-
sāmarthyāpracyuteḥ?*²⁴

[Objection:] And even if an exceedingly grave error on the part of these [earlier commentators]²⁵ has been perceived [elsewhere concerning some difficult matter], nevertheless by that much it is not imaginable [that an error has occurred] concerning a deep (i.e., not deep at all) [matter], such as the topic (i.e., scope) and so on, [which is] an area of activity (*gocara*) (i.e., easily within the range) even of someone who possesses familiarity merely with the script.

24 PVAN 7a2. PVAN_T P 218b1–3 = D 182a7–182b1: *yang gal te brjod bya la sogs pa zab mo la de dag gi 'khrul pa shin tu chen po dmigs pa de ltar na yang | de tsam gyis yi ge tsam la byang ba 'i spyod yul la dogs par bya ba ni ma yin no || gal te de lta na yang brjod bya la 'khrul pa nyid slob dpon lha dbang blo dngos su nyan pa la ji ltar 'gyur te | 'dis 'di bshad do zhes 'dzin pa 'i nus pa ni byis pa la yang mi nyams pa 'i phyir ro ||.*

25 The anaphoric pronoun *teṣām* refers to *pūrve* in the preceding sentence.

If so, [one may ask] how there could be precisely an error with regard to the topic (i.e., scope) on the part of Ācārya Devendra, as a direct disciple [of Dharmakīrti], because even a simpleton is not deprived of the capacity to understand that [in the context of the relation between two specific works in question] this one here (i.e., work *x*) is being explained by this one here (i.e., work *y*, its commentary)?

Before moving on to the continuation of this objection, we would like to briefly address the difference between the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts here for the sake of illustrating and substantiating the methodology adopted in editing Yamāri's text.

The sentence *yady api ca teṣām atibhūyasī bhrāntir upalabdḥā, tathāpi gambhīre 'bhidheyādaḥ na tāvatā lipimātraparicayavato 'pi gocare sambhāvyate* is translated by rNgog blo ldan shes rab and Sumatikīrti as follows:

*yang gal te brjod bya la sogs pa zab mo la de dag gi 'khrul pa shin tu
chen po dmigs pa de ltar na yang | de tsam gyis yi ge tsam la byang ba 'i
spyod yul la dogs par bya ba ni ma yin no ||.*²⁶

It is clear that the two translators construed the words *gambhīre 'bhidheyādaḥ* as part of the concessive clause starting with *yady api*, and not with the following main clause introduced by *tathāpi*. Should one therefore move these two words ahead in the Sanskrit text and change it to read **yady api ca teṣām atibhūyasī bhrāntir upalabdḥā gambhīre 'bhidheyādaḥ, tathāpi [...]*?

At first sight this seems reasonable, for one expects an exceedingly grave mistake to occur about a deep, that is, difficult matter. However, from the following reference to the range of understanding (*gocara*) that can be presupposed even for a person who is not a scholar, but merely able to read (*lipimātraparicayavat*), and from the subsequent second sentence starting with *yady evam*, it becomes clear that grasping the scope is not at all a difficult matter. The occurrence of a mistake about it should therefore not be assumed, certainly not for a direct disciple of Dharmakīrti's like Devendrabuddhi. In fact, not even a simpleton would be unable to grasp that a certain work *x* is being explained by work *y*, its commentary:

26 See above, n. 24.

yady evam, abhidheyabhrāntir eva katham ācāryadevendrasya sāksācchrāviṇaḥ, bālasyāpi "idam anena vyākhyāyate" iti grahaṇa-sāmarthyāpracyuteḥ?

Therefore, it emerges that the word *gambhīra* in the first sentence was used ironically, and that the irony must have been lost on the translators. They therefore moved *gambhīre 'bhidheyādau* to the sentence starting with *yady api*, which refers to a grave mistake that could be explained by the difficulty of the matter. Thus, they could also not grasp that *lipimātraparicayavato 'pi gocare* actually refers to *gambhīre 'bhidheyādau* and did not translate *api*, which results in a quite different, disconnected meaning.

One therefore does not have to assume that the exemplar of the *Pramāṇavārttikālankāranibandha* used by the translators was corrupt or that they misinterpreted the allocation of some corrective addition made in it.

This instance thus illustrates and substantiates a major methodological assumption in critically editing the text of the *Pramāṇavārttikālankāranibandha*, namely, that the text of the Sanskrit manuscript, in spite of occasional mistakes and slips, is closer to Yamāri's original text than the Tibetan translation.²⁷

The above objection continues:

*tat katham "dignāgo 'nena vyākhyāyate" ity ācaṣṭe? tato yatheha bhrāntir atisthūle tathā paricchadakrame 'pi kiṃ na? iti cet.*²⁸

Thus, how is it possible [in your opinion] that [Devendrabuddhi wrongly] clarifies that Dignāga (i.e., the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*) is being explained by this one here (i.e., by the *Pramāṇavārttika*)?²⁹ Therefore, just as [according to you] here (i.e., in connection with the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika*) an error [on the part of Devendrabuddhi has occurred] about an extremely crude (i.e., obvious) [matter] (i.e., the scope of the

27 For a detailed discussion, see Franco & Preisendanz 2022.

28 PVAN 7a2–3. PVAN_T P 218b3–4 = D 182b1–2: *des na 'dis phyogs kyi glang po 'chad par byed do zhes ci ltar brjod | de bas na ji ltar shin tu rags pa 'di la 'khrul pa de bzhin du | le 'u'i go rim (P : rims D) la yang ci ltar mi 'gyur zhe na |*.

29 We were not able to trace such an explicit statement in the Tibetan translation of Devendrabuddhi's commentary.

Pramāṇavārttika), in the same manner why [should] there not [have occurred] an error [on his part] also about the order of the chapters?

3.2 Yamāri replies:

*tad etad amedhyenāmedhyakṣālanam. na hi sāksācchrāviṇaḥ “idam anena vyākhyāyate” iti niścayo vipaścitanāmno³⁰ durlabhaḥ, yato dṛṣṭāntaḥ syāt.*³¹

[Reply:] This is washing off dirt with dirt (i.e., an attempt to get rid of one flaw by means of another, even graver flaw?). For it is not the case that the determination that this one here (i.e., work *x*) is being explained by this one here (i.e., work *y*) [would have been] hardly obtainable for a direct disciple [of the author of work *y*], [especially] for one who was supposedly a zealous one, by virtue of which it would be an [appropriate] example.

Just because Devendrabuddhi made a mistake about the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, this does not imply that he also made a mistake about the order of its chapters. Why is that so? Yamāri presupposes here that in order to draw a valid analogy from an error in one matter to an error in another matter, some common property of the analogon and the subject of the analogy, namely the two errors in question, must be present. In the present case, the fact that some determination would have been hardly obtainable for a person like Devendrabuddhi could serve as such a common property, and thus his error concerning the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika* could serve as an example, that is, an analogon, in the analogy offered by the opponent. However, inasmuch as the determination of the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika* would not have been hardly obtainable for somebody like Devendrabuddhi, the analogy does not work.

If one would like to draw a valid analogy, Yamāri says, one may argue as follows:

30 One would expect *vipaścinnāmno* here. The PW records *vipaścita* only as a metrical variant of the *upapadasamāsa* *vipaścīt* (i.e., *vipas* + $\sqrt{\text{cit}}$), with a single reference to a verse in the *Harivaṃśa* (no. 9164 in the Calcutta edition, not included in the *Critical Edition*). The DCS records an occurrence in the *Garuḍapurāṇa* (Venkatesvara Steam Press ed. 1.18.16d).

31 PVAN 7a3. PVAN_† P 218b4–5 = D 182b2–3: *de ni mi gtsang bas mi gtsang ba (mi gtsang bas mi gtsang ba D : mi gtsang bas P) 'khrū (em. : 'khrul P D) bar byed pa yin te | dngos su nyan pa mkhas pa'i ming can la | 'di 'dis 'chad par byed do zhes bya (D : ci P) ba'i nges pa yang rnyed par dka' ba ma yin na (P : no D) || gang las dper 'gyur |.*

*yadi tu "yathedam asambhavi "pravacane vārttikam" iti brūte balīyān ācāryaprajñākaraguptaḥ, tathedam apy ānupūrvīvaimatyam" iti matam, tadā na kācid dṛṣṭāntakṣatiḥ, nirvyūḍhāntā³² bhāṣyavyākhyāśaktis tatrabhavatām.*³³

But if one thinks: "Just as this is impossible, [namely that] the mighty Ācārya Prajñākaragupta says: 'This (i.e., the *Pramāṇavārttika*) is a *vārttika* on the Buddha's word,' in the same manner [his] having a different opinion [than Devendrabuddhi's] about the order [of chapters is not possible]," then there does not [result] any impairment of the example (i.e., the example cannot be objected to and disposed of as faulty), [but] His Honor's competency to explain the *Bhāṣya* has come to a point of perfect culmination (i.e., the opponent has thoroughly missed the whole point about Prajñākaragupta's deliberations, which link the *Pramāṇavārttika* to fundamental religious matters addressed by the Buddha himself)!

The two positions argued for by means of an analogy are very different. In the first case, the opponent argues that Devendrabuddhi should also have been wrong in the matter of the order of chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, just as, according to Yamāri, he was wrong on its scope. By implication, the opponent's own position would thus be that Devendrabuddhi was wrong in both matters, which would precisely be Jayanta's position.³⁴ In the second case, if we understand correctly, the opponent may argue that Prajñākaragupta could not have had a different opinion than Devendrabuddhi on the order of chapters, just as he could not have stated that the *Pramāṇavārttika* is a commentary on the Buddha's word. The position of the opponent would thus be that Prajñākaragupta agrees with Devendrabuddhi on both matters, and by implication

32 Em. *nirvyūḍhāntā* : *nirvyūḍhāntar* Ms. This emendation is also suggested by Prof. Lambert Schmithausen. It would seem that the heavy syllable *tā* was replaced by the equally heavy syllable *tar* in the memory of the scribe when he wrote down the sequence of words. Unlike an emendation to *nirvyūḍhānta-* which would result in a nominative – (dative-like) genitive nominal construction, this emendation is supported by the syntax of the Tibetan translation.

33 PVAN 7a3–4. PVAN_T P 218b5–7 = D 182b3–4: *gal te yang stobs dang ldan pa 'i slob dpon shes rab 'byung gnas sbas pa 'di ltar 'di gsung rab kyi rnam 'grel yin no zhes brjod par mi srid pa de bzhin du | go rim (P : rims D) kyi log par rtogs pas 'di la yang ngo (D : po P) zhes 'dod na de 'i tshe dpe nyams pa ci yang med do || der khyod kyi bshad pa 'chad pa nus pa ni shin tu mthar phyin pa yin no ||.*

34 See Ono 1997: 710–714.

that Devendrabuddhi must have been right on both of them. This is definitely not Jayanta's position, but its opposite; thus the valid analogy adduced by Yamāri seems to be a merely hypothetical one.

In the second analogy, the common property of the analogon and the subject of the analogy, namely the two impossibilities in question, is not made explicit, but could possibly be hinted at by the qualification of Prajñākaragupta as mighty: it would be his very mightiness that would have prevented him from disagreeing with Devendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti's direct disciple, on the matter of the order of chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, just as it would make it inconceivable that he had assumed that the *Pramāṇavārttika* comments upon the Buddha's word.

3.3 However, even if it is admitted that one cannot simply draw an analogy from the erroneousness of Devendrabuddhi's stance on the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika* to the erroneousness also of his position on the order of its chapters, the problem of the assumed contradiction between Devendrabuddhi's and Prajñākaragupta's views on the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika* remains to be solved. The two commentators cannot both be right, and this puts a subsequent traditional commentator in a somewhat awkward position.

The following question formulated by Yamāri probably reflects a genuine puzzlement that had arisen within the commentarial tradition of the *Pramāṇavārttika*:

*kaḥ punar atra paramārthaḥ? na hi śakyam etāvati sthūle*³⁵ 'rthe
 "dignāgo 'nena vyākhyāyate" ity evaṃrūpe devendraṃ³⁶ sākṣāc-
 chrāvīṇam apramāṇayitum, pramāṇe vā³⁷ bhāṣyakārasyākīrtim ud-
 dhartum.³⁸

35 The Tibetan translation suggests *atisthūle* here, as before in the relative clause [...] *yatheha bhrāntir atisthūle* [...] (see p. 9 above). This could point at a minor eye-skip or mental skip on the part of the scribe of the Sanskrit manuscript. However, as the Sanskrit text is perfectly intelligible, we do not suggest an emendation here.

36 Em. *devendraṃ* : *devendra* Ms. This emendation has been kindly suggested by Prof. Schmithausen.

37 Em. *pramāṇe vā* : *pramāṇam eva* Ms.

38 PVAN 7a4–5. PVAN_T P 218b7–8 = D 182b4–5: 'dir don dam pa gang zhig yin | de tsam du shin tu rags (D : rig P) pa 'i don phyogs kyi glang po 'dis bshad do zhes bya ba de lta bu 'i rang bzhin la | lha dbang dngos su nyan pa tshad ma ma yin no zhes brjod pa 'am | tshad mar byed na yang bshad pa 'i byed (P : byad D) pa 'i grags pa ma yin pa la (P : om. D) bsal par mi nus so zhe na |. The Tibetan translators have chosen a slightly different wording in their translation of the bipartite answer to the question: "With regard to an exceedingly

What then is the final truth in this [matter]? For it is impossible, with regard to a crude (i.e., obvious) matter of such an extent, which has the form (i.e., can be briefly expressed as) “Dignāga (i.e., the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*) is being explained by this one here (i.e., by the *Pramāṇa-vārttika*),” to turn Devendra, [Dharmakīrti's] direct disciple, into somebody who is not an authority [with regard to this matter], or, if [he may still be considered as] an authority [with regard to it], to extirpate the ill-repute [that would result in this case] for the author of the *Bhāṣya*.

3.4 Before answering this question, Yamāri turns to another work of Dharmakīrti's, the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, and brings forth the opinion of certain commentators or other scholars whom we could not yet identify:

*tadanu kecid ācakṣate — “tannītir uddyotyate’ ity anyathāpi nirvoḍḍhum śakyatvāt pravacanavārttikatvapratijñānam prauḍhimātrāviṣkaraṇam, na tu dignāge vārttikatvam anabhipretam evālaṅkārasya. tato na doṣaḥ” iti.*³⁹

After that (i.e., in response to that?), some explain: ‘Because [the words at the beginning of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, namely] “His method is illuminated [here in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*,]” can be brought out (i.e., interpreted) also in a different way (i.e., as referring to the Buddha's method), for (i.e., according to) the *Alaṅkāra* the [resulting] announcement that [the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*] is a *vārttika* on the Buddha's word⁴⁰

crude (i.e., obvious) matter of such an extent, which has the form (i.e., can be briefly expressed as) ‘Dignāga (i.e., the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*) is being explained by this one here (i.e., by the *Pramāṇavārttika*),’ either one says that [Dharmakīrti's] direct disciple Devendra is not an authority [with regard to this matter], or if, on the other hand, one turns [him] into an authority [with regard to it], the ill-repute [that would result in this case] for the author of the *Bhāṣya* cannot be extirpated.’ This does not point at a different text of the Sanskrit manuscript of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha* available to them, except for the possible case of **atisthūle* (*shin tu rags pa*) instead of *sthūle* (see n. 35).

39 PVAN 7a5–6. PVAN_T P 218b8–219a2 = D 182b5–6: ‘*dir kha cig smra ba* (P : *smras pa* D) *ni de’i lugs ni gsal* (D : *bsal P*) *bya zhes bya ba gzhan du yang drang bar nus pa’i phyir rgyan gyi gsung rab kyi rnam ’grel du dam bca’ ba ni rang nyid mkhas par gsal ’debs pa tsam du zad* (D : *zas P*) *kyi | phyogs kyi glang po’i rnam ’grel nyid du mi ’dod pa ni ma yin te | des nyes pa med do zhes zer ro ||*.

40 Later on, in PVAN 9a4–5, Yamāri returns to the *Pramāṇaviniścayālaṅkāra* and the interpretation of the anaphoric pronoun *tat* in *tannīti* as referring to the Buddha: “*tannītir uddyotyate’ iti svayam eva pratijñānam iti cet. śrīmān āryo bhagavān yaṃ lokaṃ svayam anujagrāha, ayaṃ lokas tasya padaṃ na vettīty artho vyākhyātaḥ pramāṇaviniścayālaṅkāre.*

[would] manifest the full measure of self-confidence [on Dharmakīrti's part], but [, again according to the *Alaṅkāra*, this] does not [mean that the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*] was not intended [by Dharmakīrti also] to be a *vārttika* on Dignāga. Therefore, there is no fault.'

The absence of a fault here probably refers to the absence of a contradiction between the stances of Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta in the parallel case of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. That is, according to the unnamed commentators or scholars, because the quoted brief statement in the beginning of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* can be interpreted to refer also to Dignāga's method, not only to the Buddha's, the author of the *Alaṅkāra* maintains, or at least silently acknowledges, that its further being a commentary on Dignāga was not unintended by Dharmakīrti. It is, however, clear that – at least in the interpretation of these commentators or scholars – for the author of the *Alaṅkāra* the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* is primarily a commentary on the Buddha's word, and only secondarily on Dignāga. In the same way, the *Pramāṇavārttika* could be seen as both as a commentary on the Buddha's word and as a commentary on Dignāga. Prajñākaragupta's alleged position would be that it is primarily a commentary on the Buddha's word and only secondarily on Dignāga, whereas Devendrabuddhi would have taken the opposite position. Thus, even though this would amount to a clear difference, there would be no contradiction between their positions.

This passage throws entirely new light on the commentarial tradition of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. So far, thanks primarily to Ono's pioneering study,⁴¹ awareness has been raised to the commentarial discussion whether the *Pramāṇavārttika* is a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* or on the Buddha's word. It has now emerged that a similar discussion went on about the scope of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, and that opinions diverged in a similar manner, namely, that some scholars, notably Jñānaśrībhadrā in the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, considered it a commentary on Dignāga,⁴² and some, like the

ataḥ pravacana eva tadvārttikatvaṃ pratijñātam (em. : *pratijñānam* Ms.). PVAN_T P 222b4–5 = D 185b7–186a1: *de'i lugs ni gsal bar bya* (D : *byed P*) *zhes rang nyid kyis dam bcas so zhe na | dpal ldan 'phags pa bcom ldan 'das kyis* (D : *kyi P*) *'jig rten gang rjes su bzung ba'i 'jig rten 'dis de'i tshig mi rtogs so zhes bya ba'i don du tshad ma rnam nges kyi rgyan du bshad do || des na 'di gsung rab kyi rnam 'grel du dam bcas pa yin no ||.*

41 See Ono 1997.

42 PVin_T P 210a8–210b1 = D 178b2: *de zhes bya ba ni phyogs kyi glang po'i zhal snga nas te | de'i lugs ni gsal bar bya ba'o zhes bya bar 'brel to |.*

author of the *Pramāṇaviniścayālaṅkāra*, at least in the eyes of the not yet identified commentators or scholars quoted here by Yamāri, a commentary on both the Buddha's word and Dignāga. Interestingly, the position that the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* is an independent scholarly work of Dharmakīrti's, as invariably assumed by modern scholars who are possibly all following Frauwallner on this point, seems to be adopted also by Yamāri.⁴³ It should also be noted that the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha* is the only work known to us that refers to an otherwise undocumented *Pramāṇaviniścayālaṅkāra*, or in short: *Alaṅkāra*.

3.5 The above attempt to reconcile Devendrabuddhi's and Prajñākaragupta's opinions on the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika* did not prove satisfactory, not only to Yamāri, but also to other commentators or scholars whom he quotes in the following passage:

*anye tv etan na sahante — “tad asya hṛdayam’ iti hi lekhanād avadhāryate, anyatrāpy anāśvāsāt” iti.*⁴⁴

Others, however, do not put up with this [and say]: “Evidently, it is being determined that it (i.e., Dignāga's work) is the heart of this one here (i.e., the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*) from the [mentioned] writing [at the beginning of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*] (i.e., ‘His method is illuminated [here in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*]’), because one cannot rely on something else (i.e., on any other statement than the quoted sentence of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*) [for finding out Dharmakīrti's intention].”

We were not able to locate the statement *tad asya hṛdayam* anywhere in Dharmakīrti's works.⁴⁵ For lack of a better explanation, we assume that it explicates the quote *tannītir uddyotyate* from the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. In other words, the *iti* sentence forms the subject of the sentence and has to be separated from the following ablative *lekhanāt*; probably for this reason, Yamāri inserted the particle *hi* between the two.

43 See PVAN 7a7, quoted on p. 16 below.

44 PVAN 7a6. PVAN₁ P 219a2 = D 182b6–7: *gzhan dag ni 'di mi (P : mi ma D) zod pas 'di 'di'i yin no zhes (P : zhes 'dod pa yin no zhes D) gzhung 'di nyid las nges par bya ste | gzhan du yang yid brtan du med pa 'i phyir ro zhe na (P : 'o D) ||*.

45 In this connection it has to be noted that the Tibetan translation does not have an equivalent of *hṛdayam*, but merely a nominative–genitive construction. Possibly, the word *yid* was used here as an admittedly very rare equivalent of *hṛdaya*, as in *yid 'oñ = hṛdayaṅgama* (TSD p. 2151a s.v. *yid 'oñ*) and *yid du 'oñ ba = hṛdayagrāhaka* (TSDN Vol. 13, p. 5812b s.v. *yid 'oñ*), which would have occasioned an eye-skip from *yid* to *yin* resulting in the loss of *yid*.

3.6 In his response, Yamāri takes us back from the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* to the *Pramāṇavārttika*. He says:

*yuktaṃ caitat. kevalaṃ sa doṣas tadavastha eva — evaṃ tarhi vārttikakāravat pravacana eva bhāṣyakāro 'py astu svātantryeṇa. ācāryavyākhyāsvikāre hi tadīyānanuvartanadoṣaḥ.*⁴⁶ *svātantrye tu sa eva guṇaḥ, prācyaprameyānuvādasya vaktuṃ śakyatvād viniścaye ca dignāgād ācāryākaraṣaṇam ātmīye tathāsambhavinam eva dṛḍhīkartum iti kim anupapannam?*⁴⁷

And this is reasonable. Alone, this [very] fault (i.e., the fault that Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta contradict each other on the issue of the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika*) remains just the same. [If] so, then let it be accepted that also the author of the *Bhāṣya* (i.e., Prajñākaragupta) is [a commentator] precisely on the Buddha's word independently (of the *Pramāṇavārttika*), just like the author of the *Vārttika* (i.e., Dharmakīrti) [is a commentator on the Buddha's word independently of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*]. For if one accepts [that the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* is] an explanation of the Ācārya (i.e., Dharmakīrti), the fault of not following his (i.e., Dharmakīrti's) [explanation would occur for Prajñākaragupta]. But if [one assumes] independence [of Prajñākaragupta from Dharmakīrti], precisely this is an asset [and the above fault that Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta contradict each other on the issue of the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika* does not occur], because [then] one can speak of [mere] reference [on the part of Prajñākaragupta] to [certain] earlier objects of knowledge (*prameya*) (i.e., objects of knowledge stated earlier on by Dharmakīrti, in order to discuss them critically) and [can] confirm that borrowing on the part of the Ācārya (i.e., Dharmakīrti) from Dignāga in the *Viniścaya* is indeed possible in the same way (i.e., as a mere reference) in his (i.e., Dharmakīrti's) own [work that is independent from Dignāga]. Thus, what is not appropriate [here]?

46 Note that the negation is missing in the Tibetan translation.

47 PVAN 7a6–7. PVAN_r P 219a2–5 = D 182b7–183a2: *de ni rigs (P : rig D) mod kyi 'on kyang nyes pa de ni son gnas pa nyid do || de lta na ni 'o na rnam 'grel mdzad pa bzhin du | rnam bshad mdzad pa yang rang dbang du gsung (D : gsungs P) rab nyid kyi (P : kyis D) 'gyur ro || slob dpon gyi (P : gyis D) bshad par khas blangs na ni | de 'i 'dod pa 'i rjes su 'jug pa skyon yin la | rang rgyud la ni de nyid yon tan yin te | sngon gyi gzhal bya rjes su brjod par (D : par bya ba P) ni smra nus pa 'i phyir ro || rnam nges su phyogs kyi glang po (em. : po 'i P D) las bdag nyid kyi la slob dpon drangs pa ni de lta bur gyur pa nyid brtan par bya ba 'i phyir ro zhes bya ba (P : bya ba la D) mi 'thad pa ci yod ||.*

The key term in this passage is *anuvāda*. When Yamāri maintains that the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, and the *Pramāṇavārttika* for that matter, and the *Pramāṇavārttikāṅkāra* are not commentaries on Dignāga, especially his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, and the *Pramāṇavārttika*, respectively, he does not deny that frequent literal quotations from Dignāga's work and the *Pramāṇavārttika*, respectively, occur in them, or that they contain close paraphrases of individual passages in these works. However, these are not simply repetitions of something somebody else has already said. As is well known, *anuvāda*, in contradistinction to *punarukta* or *punarukti*, does not refer to a mere repetition in a scholarly discussion, which in a formal scholarly debate would amount to a grave fault leading to defeat. The technical term refers to the reference to something said before, by oneself or somebody else, in order to discuss it critically, that is, to corroborate, refine or even reject it. And although it is not stated here explicitly, one may assume that according to Yamāri Dharmakīrti proceeded in just this way whenever he drew from Dignāga's work. This would also match the observation in ongoing modern research on Dharmakīrti that he often departs from Dignāga in crucial issues.

3.7 Yet another consideration is now advanced by Yamāri, and it is not clear whether it is his own deliberation or whether he refers to the deliberation of yet another commentator or scholar. We would argue for the latter, because the usage of the derived term *ācāryīya*, which here clearly refers to what belongs to Dignāga, seems to differ from Yamāri's exclusive usage of the term *ācārya* by itself, without an immediately following name, to refer to Dharmakīrti:⁴⁸

*syād etat — yadi yathā vārttikakāreṇācāryīyaṃ kvacit kvacid eva tadakṣaram utkalitam, tathā vārttikam api bhāṣyakṛtā, tadā saṃsyandanamātram abhidhīyate. yadā tu prārabdhaparicchetrayaṃ tadakṣaram tatkrāmam ullikhati, tadā prakṛtadoṣasamarthanāsāmarthyam evāvaśīsyate, na tu svātantryakhyātīḥ.*⁴⁹

48 See also below, p. 23

49 PVAN 7a7–b1. PVAN_T P 219a6–7 = D 183a2–3: 'di snyam du gal te ci ltar rnam 'grel mdzad pas slob dpon gyi yi ge de nyid 'ga' nyid du bris pa de bzhin du rnam 'grel yang rnam bshad mdzad pa yin pa de 'i tshe | khungs tsam du brjod pa yin no || gang gi tshe brtsams pa 'i le 'u gsum yi ge dang rim pa des bris pa de 'i tshe skabs kyi nyes pa spang bar (D : spangs par P) mi nus pa nyid lus kyi rang rgyud ston pa ni ma yin no ||.

The following may [in this case] be [considered]: If, just as what belongs to the Ācārya (i.e., Dignāga), [namely] words of his no matter where [they appear in his works], has been expanded upon by the author of the *Vārttika*, in the same manner also the *Vārttika* [has been expanded upon] by the author of the *Bhāṣya*, then a mere flowing together (i.e., convergence of the *Vārttika* with Dignāga’s work, and of the *Bhāṣya* with the *Vārttika*) is being stated [and not that the respectively former work is a commentary on the respectively latter work]. But when the triad of chapters undertaken (i.e., begun, but not brought to completion) [by Dharmakīrti] (i.e., chapters 2–4 of the *Pramāṇavārttika* that have no auto-commentary) brings out (i.e., clarifies) words of his (i.e., Dignāga’s) in his order, precisely the impossibility of setting right the fault in question remains, but the declaration of independence [from Dignāga as argued for above] does not [remain] (i.e., has been shown to be untenable).

The argument seems to run as follows: On the one hand, one may argue that Dharmakīrti’s and Prajñākaragupta’s works expand on the respectively earlier work in question only with random references taken from various places as the occasion arises. Thus, they are not commentaries, but rather, to keep the metaphor of “flowing together,” three independent rivers that eventually merge. If, on the other hand, one considers that chapters 2–4 of the *Pramāṇavārttika* explain certain phrases or statements of Dignāga in the order in which they appear in his work, specifically the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, then, because of this dependence, these chapters have to be understood as a commentary on it and the problem remains that the issue in question, namely the discrepancy between Devendrabuddhi’s and Prajñākaragupta’s views on the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, cannot be solved. At the same time, the independence of the *Pramāṇavārttika* from Dignāga’s work as described before can no longer be proclaimed. Even though Yamāri does not explicitly argue against this reasoning, it is clear that he does not endorse it.

The above consideration is in consonance with observations in modern scholarship on Dharmakīrti going back to Frauwallner, because by asserting that chapters 2–4 of the *Pramāṇavārttika* are commentaries on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* one implies that its first chapter is not a commentary on it. This would thus be opposed to Śākyabuddhi’s position that precisely the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* is to be understood as a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, whereas the second one is to be considered a

commentary on the Buddha's word for which the ground has been prepared in the first chapter.⁵⁰

3.8 Finally, Yamāri lets the cat out of the bag and presents an ingenious solution to the problem:

*tad ayam atra paramārthaḥ — na khalu vārttikakārād vārttikam sākṣād ācāryadevendreṇa śrutam, api tu dignāga eva. tadartham evācāryam asāv anusṛtaḥ. tatra ca tasyābhiniveśāvasāyino niratisayapraudhivāridher vārttikakārasya vyākhyānād ācāryadevndras tathā saṃskāra-viśeṣam adhijagāma, yathā vārttikakārasya dignāgābhiniveśam vārttikē copadeśānapekṣabodhābhimānaṃ cāropya dignāgadoṣadālanāni ca sthānasthānāni samīkṣya tadvārttikatvam eva niścitya granthakaraṇam utsehe. [...] tasmād devendre sampradāyasaṅkrānter abhāvād abhidheye 'yukto yuktaḥ. abhrame 'pi vā dignāgābhiniveśāt tatraiva yojayed vārttikam.*⁵¹

Therefore, the following is the final truth in this [matter] here: One should realize that Ācārya Devendra did not directly study the *Vārttika* with the author of the *Vārttika* (i.e., Dharmakīrti), but rather [studied] Dignāga

50 Cf. Ono 1997: 705–706. See also Franco 2018: 253–254.

51 PVAN 7b1–5. PVAN_T P 219a7–219b2 & 219b5–6 = D 183a3–5 & 183b1–2: *des na 'dir don dam pa ni slob dpon lha dbang blos rnam 'grel mdzad pa las rnam 'grel ni dngos su ma thos kyi | 'on kyang phyogs kyi glang po nyid do || de 'i don gyis slob dpon rjes su bstan pa yin no || de la de 'i mngon zhen nges pa tsam phul du dbyung du med pa mkhas pa 'i rgya mtsho (P : mtshos D) rnam 'grel mdzad pa 'i bshad pa las slob dpon lha dbang blos (D : blos de P) de lta bu 'dus byas pa 'i khyad par thob ste | ji ltar rnam 'grel (em. rnam 'grel: om. P D) mdzad pa la phyogs kyi glang po la mngon par zhen pa dang | rnam 'grel la yang nye par bstan pa la mi bltos (P : ltas D) par rtogs pa 'i rlom (D : rloms P) pas sgro btags shing | phyogs kyi glang po 'i skyon spang ba (P : spangs pa D) yang gnas dang gnas su mthong nas | de 'i rnam 'grel nyid du bsams te | gzhung byed par spro ba yin no || [...] de 'i phyir lha dbang blo la nye bar bstan pa brgyud pa med pa 'i phyir brjod bya la 'khrul par rigs so || yang na ma 'khrul na yang phyogs kyi glang po la mngon par zhen pas (P : om. D) de nyid kyi rnam 'grel du sbyor bar byed pa yin gyi |* The passage PVAN 7b1–3 has been briefly paraphrased in Franco 2018: 257–258 where it has been split into two independent sentences (see notes 23 and 24). However, they should be considered as a syntactical whole, as done here and in the Tibetan translation. For a paraphrase of the conclusion in PVAN 7b4–5, see Franco 2018: 259.

[with him]. He (i.e., Devendra) has followed⁵² the Ācārya (i.e., Dharmakīrti) (i.e., became his disciple) only for this purpose (i.e., to study Dignāga with him).⁵³ And there (i.e., in this situation), Ācārya Devendra obtained a special mental formation (*saṃskāra*) due to the explanation [of Dignāga] on the part of him, the author of the *Vārttika* who is an ocean of unsurpassed self-confidence that ends in (i.e., borders on) stubborn attachment, in such a way that, having mounted upon (i.e., transferred to) himself the stubborn attachment to Dignāga of the author of the *Vārttika*⁵⁴ as well as, with regard to the *Vārttika*, the conceit of understanding [it] independently of instruction [by its author], and having taken into account various places [in the *Pramāṇavārttika*] which dispel⁵⁵ (i.e., where Dharmakīrti dispels) faults (i.e., errors) of Dignāga, having [then] decided that [the *Pramāṇavārttika*] is a *vārttika* on him

- 52 The Tibetan translators seem to have read *anuśiṣṭaḥ* here and do not translate *eva* and *asau*, which results in the sentence “With this purpose the Ācārya has been instructed (i.e., by Dharmakīrti).” However, even though the Tibetan does not have an instrumental here, one would rather expect “With this purpose [he] has been instructed by the Ācārya (i.e., Dharmakīrti),” as if the Sanskrit text had a compound **ācāryānuśiṣṭaḥ*, inasmuch as Yamāri does not refer to Devendrabuddhi just as Ācārya, without adding his name to the title. See again below, p. 23.
- 53 Cf. also PVAN 9a2–3: *dignāgadvāreṇaiva tu tattvato 'sau* [i.e., Devendrabuddhi] *śiṣyaḥ*. PVAN₁ P 222b1 = D 185b4–5: *'di de kho nar phyogs kyi glang po 'i sgo nas slob ma yin gyi* |.
- 54 According to the Tibetan translation one would rather understand that Devendrabuddhi transferred a stubborn attachment to Dignāga to Dharmakīrti (*rmam 'grel mdzad pa la*). However, we take both accusatives in this absolute phrase as objects of the causative gerund with a retroflex meaning (cf. Apte p. 353b s.v. *ā-ruh*, *Caus.* 2).
- 55 The rare word *dālana*, derived from the causative of the intransitive root *dal*, “to burst open, split, crack,” with the meaning “to cause to burst open,” etc., “to tear asunder,” “to dispel, drive away,” is mainly attested as a masculine noun that refers to a specific disease of the teeth. According to the BHSD (p. 264a s.v. *dālana*) and the DCS, the neuter action noun (“causing to burst open, splitting,” etc.) is attested in Buddhist Sūtra-s, namely, the *Gaṇḍavyūha* and the *Laṅkāvatāra*. However, they also point to a passage of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* where the word is used as an adjective, as in the present case; see LAS 5,14–16: *eṣa laṅkādhīpate abhisamayo mahāyogināṃ parapravādamathanānāṃ akuśaladr̥ṣṭidālanānāṃ ātma-dr̥ṣṭivṃyārtanakuśalānāṃ sūkṣmam abhi[sic]vijñānaparāvṛttikuśalānāṃ jinaputrānāṃ mahāyānacaritānāṃ*. This passage further illustrates that it is rather improbable that here *dālana* means “tearing apart” in the sense of “devastatingly criticizing,” namely Dignāga’s faults. Prof. Schmithausen kindly points out to us that the strange sequence *sūkṣmam abhivijñāna-* in the passage should rather be read as *sūkṣmamativijñāna-*, as suggested by Franklin Edgerton in the BHSD p. 416bf. s.v. *mativijñāna* following the Tibetan translation and Suzuki, i.e., Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki in the glossary s.v. *sūkṣma* in his *Studies in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1930, and in his *Index to the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Nanjio Edition)*. Kyoto: The Sanskrit Buddhist Text Publishing Society 1934.

(i.e., Dignāga, specifically his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*), ventured to produce a treatise (i.e., the *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā*). [...] Therefore, because a tradition [on the *Pramāṇavārttika*] has not passed over [from Dharmakīrti] to Devendra, [his] incorrect [transference of being a *vārttika* on Dignāga]⁵⁶ to the topic (i.e., scope) [of the *Pramāṇavārttika*] is correct (i.e., the assumption that this transferal is incorrect is correct). Or even if he did not err [on this issue], because of his stubborn attachment to Dignāga he related the *Vārttika* only to him [and not also to the Buddha's word].

First of all, the negative connotation of the term *abhiniveśa*, which refers to a stubborn and persistent attachment based on false conceptual constructions, has to be pointed out here. According to Yamāri, both Dharmakīrti and Devendrabuddhi were subject to it. Being instructed on Dignāga by an overly self-confident, almost obsessed teacher such as Dharmakīrti and highly influenced by him on Dignāga, Devendrabuddhi took on Dharmakīrti's strong attachment to Dignāga. Combined with his observation that in the *Pramāṇavārttika* Dharmakīrti again and again addresses errors committed by Dignāga and sets them right, this strong attachment led Devendrabuddhi to believe that the *Pramāṇavārttika* was a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Furthermore, Dharmakīrti's great self-confidence was also impressed on Devendrabuddhi in the course of being instructed by him, to the effect that he developed the proud and erroneous assumption that he was able to understand the *Pramāṇavārttika* even without instruction by its author. In a way, it thus was also Dharmakīrti's fault that Devendrabuddhi misunderstood the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika* although he was actually a student of its author.

Yamāri claims that Dharmakīrti was even aware of this misconception of Devendrabuddhi's about the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. However, inasmuch as his mental capacity had become impaired by old age, he not only neglected the composition of the remaining commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*

Actually, Bunyiu Nanjio already notes in his 1923 *editio princeps* of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* the reading *sūkṣmamativijñāna*-reconstructed from the Tibetan translation (LAS_N p. 10, n. 9), which was overlooked by P.L. Vaidya in his 1963 re-edition.

56 See *dignāge ca vārttikaivārohaḥ* in the immediately preceding sentence in PVAN 7b4, quoted below in n. 58.

beyond its chapter on inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*),⁵⁷ but, especially, he came to lack the mental energy even to entrust Devendrabuddhi (or anyone else) with setting about to transmit his *magnum opus*. What mattered to him was that in the first place the means of knowledge admitted in the Buddhist tradition would eventually be proven through it. If, in addition, Devendrabuddhi erroneously ascribed to it the nature of a *vārttika* on Dignāga, this would not be an obstacle in the way of this aim.⁵⁸

So far, we have failed to find any reference elsewhere to this remarkable account of the circumstances that led to Devendrabuddhi’s misrepresentation of the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Was the above scenario made up by

57 This may seem to contradict the hypothesis that the *Pramāṇavārttika* was an early work of Dharmakīrti’s, which is supported by a few cross references in Dharmakīrti’s works: the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* refers to the *Pramāṇavārttika*, and the *Hetubindu* to the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (see Ono et al. 2020 p. 1258, s.v. *vārttika*, and p. 1276, s.v. *vinīścaya*). If Dharmakīrti was already too old to compose a commentary on the three remaining chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, how could he have gone on to compose further important works such as the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Hetubindu*? One solution to this problem is to assume that these references were introduced at a later time, either by the author himself or someone else. Raniero Gnoli points out the curious case of two works of Abhinavagupta that contain mutual references (1960: XVII, n. 2). However, Isabelle Ratié has noted that one of these references is inconclusive and that it is thus not necessary to assume an interpolation (Ratié 2021: p. 5, n. 15). In the present case, even though the possibility that the five references to the *Pramāṇavārttika* found in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* have been interpolated cannot be excluded, we do not consider this to be very likely. Rather, to reconcile the occurrence of these cross references with Yamāri’s statement about Dharmakīrti’s old age as an obstacle to the continuation of the commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, one may assume that the verses of the *Pramāṇavārttika* had been composed at an earlier date, after which the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Hetubindu* were composed, and finally the commentary to the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*. The Buddhist tradition itself, at least as reflected in the work of Bu Ston, suggests precisely that: “After that [i.e., after he had moved to the court of King Utphallapūṣpa] (Dharmakīrti) composed his seven treatises and, finally, the auto-commentary on the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*” (Obermiller 1932: 154). Frauwallner, it may be reminded, maintains the contrary, namely that the auto-commentary was written at the same time as the verses of the first chapter, and that the two formed Dharmakīrti’s first work; see below p. 27.

58 PVAN 7b3–4: *vārttikakāreṇa jarasopahataśaktinā śeṣabhāṣyakaraṇaṃ tāvad upekṣitam, viśeṣeṇa sampradāyagrāhaṇe ’py ālasyam evācaritam. ayaṃ cābhiprāyaḥ — abhimat-āpamānasādhanam tāvad bhaviṣyaty eva mukhyakrameṇa. dignāge ca vārttikatvāropo ’dhiko na bādhaḥ*. PVAN_T P 219b2–4 = D 183a5–7: *rnam ’grel mdzad pa rga bas* (em. *rga bas* : ’grel pas P D) *nus pa nyams pas | lhag ma ’i* (D : pa ’i P) *bshad pa byed pa ni re zhiḡ btang snyoms su byas la | nye bar bstan pa ’i khyad par ster ba la yang btang snyoms su byas so || bsam pa ni ’di yin te* (P : no D) | *mngon par ’dod pa ’i tshad ma sgrub pa ni re zhiḡ gtso bo ’i tshul gyis ’byung bar ’gyur ba nyid do || phyogs kyi glang po ’i rnam ’grel nyid du sgro ’dogs pa lhag pa* (em. : ma P D) *yang gnod byed* (gnod byed D : gdon no P) *ma yin no ||*.

Yamāri himself? Or did he rely on some oral tradition? We assume that the former is the case.

3.9 The presented passages do not exhaust Yamāri's discussion and arguments on the scope of the *Pramāṇavārttika*,⁵⁹ but they are sufficient to demonstrate his endeavor to dissociate the *Pramāṇavārttika* from Dignāga's work and his rather distanced and critical attitude towards Dignāga. On the one hand, he mentions faults of Dignāga that were dispelled by Dharmakīrti,⁶⁰ and his ill-joined steps or words that gave occasion to attacks of his method by opponents;⁶¹ on the other hand, he has nothing appreciative to say about him. He certainly does not present Dignāga as the highly esteemed founder of a logical–epistemological tradition within Buddhist scholarship and even speaks of Dharmakīrti's stubborn attachment to him.⁶² Yamāri's distanced attitude towards Dignāga is also reflected in the fact that – even though at one place he speaks of Ācāryadignāgapāda in the respectful plural⁶³ – Yamāri, unlike Kamalaśīla and others, does not use the honorific term *ācārya* by itself, without subsequent mention of the name (“the Honorable Teacher”), to refer to Dignāga: he reserves this distinctive honor for Dharmakīrti.⁶⁴

4. Yamāri's attitude towards Dignāga and the role of his oeuvre is part of Yamāri's larger perception of the logical–epistemological tradition of Buddhism and its proponents, and is supplemented by his attitude towards other commentators of Dharmakīrti besides Prajñākaragupta. Yamāri is not content with playing down the connection between Dharmakīrti's thought and the work of Dignāga; he also belittles the work of Devendrabuddhi, Dharmottara and other unnamed commentators, so that in the final analysis the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra* remains the single valid interpretation of Dharmakīrti's oeuvre. When commenting on Prajñākaragupta's second *maṅgalaśloka* where

59 For a further study, focusing on folios 8 and 9 of the PVAN, see Chu 2023.

60 See p. 20 above.

61 See p. 5 above.

62 See again p. 20 above.

63 See PVAN 9b2: *ācāryadignāgapādaiḥ* [...]. PVAN_T P 223a7 = D 186b1–2: *slob dpon phyogs kyi glang po 'i zhal snga nyid kyis* [...].

64 A similar usage is found in the European Middle Ages where Aristotle is simply referred to as “the Philosopher.” Cf. also the reference to Homer as “the Poet” in ancient Greek literature.

already Prajñākaragupta emphasizes the necessity of composing yet another commentary on Dharmakīrti's work,⁶⁵ Yamāri says:

*yady evam, astīha bhāge 'grāśiṣya ācārya devendro vṛttikāraḥ, ṭīkākārāś ca śhānasthāneṣu dharmottaraprabhṛtayaḥ. tat kim āsvādyam*⁶⁶ *adhikam bhavet? iti cet.*

*“bahavaḥ santi. te tu na dṛśyante ye vānmanasayor adoṣeṇa nākulayanty ācāryamatam” iti [...].*⁶⁷

[Objection:] If so (i.e., if it is pertinent to turn to the *Pramāṇavārttika*), there is indeed the author of a *vṛtti* here, on part [of Dharmakīrti's oeuvre] (i.e., on the *Pramāṇavārttika*), [namely his] foremost disciple, the Ācārya Devendra, and there are [furthermore] authors of *ṭīkās* [who not only comment on another part of Dharmakīrti's oeuvre, such as the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, but also] on various places [in the *Pramāṇavārttika*], [namely] Dharmottara and others. Therefore, one may ask why something to be savored (i.e., commentarial literature to be relished) should be produced additionally.

[Answer:] “[Admittedly,] there are many [commentators]. But such are not seen who, [being] without fault of speech and mind, are not confounding the thought of the Ācārya.” [...]

65 PVABh 1,6–9: *prāyaḥ prastutavastuṣṭarabhṛto nekṣyanta evoccakair vaktāraḥ paramārthasaṅgrahadhīyā vyādhūtaphalgukramāḥ | tenāsmīn viralakramavyapagamād atyantaśuddhāṃ dhīyaṃ dhanyānām vidadhātum uddhataadhīyāṃ dhīḥ saṃvide dhīyate ||*. For a tentative translation of this verse, together with some philological remarks and references to Yamāri's commentary on it, see Chu et al. 2020: 39–41.

66 Em. *āsvādyam* : *ādyam* Ms. This convincing emendation has been suggested by Prof. Schmithausen on the basis of the Tibetan translation *ro bro ba* which in the *Mahāvīyutpatti* (no. 6984) corresponds to *āsvāda* (see also TSD p. 2281a s.v. *ro bro ba med pa*). He also refers us to the TSDN where equivalents are found under three lemmata; see TSDN Vol. 14, p. 6520a.

67 PVAN 13a1. PVAN_T P 230b8–231a2 = D 192b4–5: *gal te de ltar na cha 'di la 'grel pa byed pa slob ma'i dangs ma (P D : dang po em.?) slob dpon lha dbang blo gnas dang gnas dag tu (D : dge du P) 'grel bshad byed pa slob dpon chos mchog la sogs pa yod pa ma yin nam | des na ro bro ba ci zhig yod ce na | mang du yod mod kyi ngag dang yid kyi skyon med pas (D : pa P) slob dpon gyi bzhed pa ma 'khrul par byed pa gang yin pa de dag ni ma mthong ngo (D : ba P) zhes [...].*

Yamāri does not specify here what exactly is wrong with their writings, but later on we get a clear statement from him:

*samudāyasyābhidheyaṃ tāvad vṛttikāraḥ pramāṇasamuccayaṃ manyate, śīkākāras tu pramāṇaṃ mukhyam, ānuṣaṅgikaṃ tu pramāṇasamuccayasamarthanam*⁶⁸. *pramāṇaṃ ca sāmvyavahārikam eva, na tu lokottaraṃ bhagavadrūpam, prayojanaṃ ca vañcanāvinākṛtāṃ pānāvagāhādiprāptim, na punar abhyudayaniḥśreyasayoḥ prāptim manyate.*⁶⁹

To begin with, the author of the [above-mentioned] *vṛtti* (i.e., De-vendrabuddhi) thinks that the topic (i.e., scope) of the whole [of the *Pramāṇavārttika*] is the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*; an author of *śīkā-s* [on other works of Dharmakīrti and on selected passages in the *Pramāṇavārttika*] (i.e., Dharmottara), however, [thinks that] the means of knowledge is the main [topic], whereas the setting right of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is a closely related [topic]. And [the latter] thinks that the means of knowledge [discussed by Dharmakīrti in the *Pramāṇavārttika*] is only the one that appertains to everyday practice, but not the one that is beyond this world, which has the form of the Buddha, and that the purpose [of the *Pramāṇavārttika*] is the successful realization of [efficient actions like] drinking, bathing, etc., which has been brought about without deception (i.e., by a means of knowledge), not however the successful realization of uplift (i.e., a better form of rebirth) and the highest good (i.e., liberation).

It is difficult to miss Yamāri's irony about Dharmottara's position here.

68 It has to be noted that there is no correspondence to *-samarthanam* in the Tibetan translation.

69 PVAN 13b1–2. PVAN_r P 231b8–232a3 = D 193b1–3: *tshogs pa 'i ni re zhig brjod par bya ba 'grel pa byed pas tshad ma kun las btus pa yin par sems la | 'grel bshad byed pas ni tshad ma ni gtso bo yin zhing tshad ma kun las btus (D : btud P) pa ni zhar la yin no || tshad ma yang kun tu tha snyad pa yin gyi | bcom ldan 'das kyi rang bzhin 'jig rten las 'das pa ni ma yin no zhes bya ba dang | dgos pa yang (D : om. P) slu ba (em. slu ba : sru ba D : de bzhin P) dang bral ba btung ba dang bkru ba la sogs pa thob (P : 'thob D) pa yin gyi mngon par mtho ba (mtho ba D : 'thob P) dang nges par legs pa (em. with N 229a2 : par P : pa dag D) thob pa ni ma yin no.*

5. In what sense could it be claimed that the *Pramāṇavārttika* is a *vārttika* on the Buddha's word?⁷⁰ On the one hand, the *Pramāṇavārttika* obviously does not follow, as a commentary in the narrower sense of the word, in structure or content any collection of the Buddha's sermons (*sūtra*) or monastic rules (*vinaya*), or even of scholastic treatises (*abhidharma*) which some Buddhist schools also considered part of the Buddha's word. On the other hand, the connection of a *vārttika* to the text it relates to may be quite loose.⁷¹ In his *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*, Hemacandra (12th c.) defines that a *vārttika* "reflects on matters that have been said, have not been said and have been badly said [in some other work it relates to]" (*uktānuktaduruktārthacintākāri tu vārttikam*).⁷² Yamāri offers his own definition. Explaining two kinds of explanation, Yamāri first mentions commentaries called *vṛtti*, etc., which are devoted to the words of their reference text and, after having quoted individual words, comment upon them following their order in the reference text. The second kind, which is called *vārttika*, is described as follows: [...] *arthaparamam ca padāny anirvadhyā tatkrāmānapekṣam ākṣepaparīhāraviśeṣavyākhyānamātralakṣaṇam vārttikam iti*.⁷³ "[...] and [the kind of explanation] that is completely devoted to the meaning [of the reference text], [i.e.,] the *vārttika* [kind], which, not having chopped up (i.e., analyzed in detail) the [individual] words, disregards their sequence [and] is characterized by objections, [their] rejection and only explanation of specific [points]." From this perspective, the *Pramāṇavārttika*, especially its second chapter, may indeed be considered a

70 On *vārttika*, see the important contributions by Wezler (1974: 443–447) and Bronkhorst (1990).

71 Kumāri's *Śloka-vārttika*, the first part of his extensive three-part commentary on Śābarasvāmin's commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, may serve as a prominent example, also as regards its literary form as a versified composition (cf. Bronkhorst 1990: 142–143, with further examples).

72 *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* 2.170ab referred to by Bronkhorst (1990: 127, n. 3). Nāgojībhāṭṭa's (18th c.) similar characterization of the nature of a *vārttika* (*vārttikatva*) as "reflecting on what has not been said and what has been badly said in the *Sūtra*" (*sūtre 'nuktaduruktacintākaratvam*), with reference to Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* on Pāṇini's *sūtra*-s, quoted in Wezler 1974: 447 and Bronkhorst loc.cit., probably goes back to the *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*. For *uktānuktaduruktacintana* as a more closely related description of Kātyāyana's procedure according to the *Prakriyākaumudīvimarśa*, a modern Sanskrit work, see Wezler 1974: 443, with n. 20.

73 PVAN 8b1–2. PVAN_T P 221a6–7 = D 184b5: [...] *dang tshig ma bkrol bar de'i rim pa la ma bltos* (P : *ltos* D) *par brgal ba* (P : *pa* D) *dang lan dang | bshad pa'i khyad par tsam gyi mtshan nyid can rnam 'grel zhes* (D : *ces* P) *brjod pa |*. There is no correspondence to *arthaparamam* in this translation.

vārttika on the Buddha's word. However, one could also argue on the basis of Yamāri's definition that it is a *vārttika* on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.

In this connection, attention should be paid to the usage of the term *abhidheya*. In the context of the analysis of initial statements in scholarly works, called *ādivākya* by some Buddhist commentators, and similarly elsewhere in the context of the tetrad of linking elements of a scholarly work (*anubandhacatuṣṭaya*), it is usually translated as "topic," literally "that which is to be stated or expressed" by the work. This translation works reasonably well in many cases. However, *abhidheya*, at least as used by Yamāri, has a broader meaning. Here, it is better understood as referring to what a scholarly work is actually about. This would not only refer to its topic in a narrower sense, but also to its scope and larger purpose, or its *raison d'être*. Bearing in mind this usage of *abhidheya*, one can understand why Yamāri and others before him say that the topic, i.e., scope, of the *Pramāṇavārttika* is the Buddha's word.⁷⁴

6. As an implication of the above investigation we need to address a further aspect of Yamāri's approach to the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Both Yamāri and modern scholars, who invariably follow Frauwallner,⁷⁵ consider it to be an unfinished work. It is important to emphasize, however, that the latter understand this incompleteness in a very different way than Yamāri. Unlike Frauwallner, Yamāri considers the *Pramāṇavārttika* incomplete because three of its chapters lack an auto-commentary.⁷⁶ Frauwallner, on the other hand, assumes that the *Pramāṇavārttika* was conceived as a comprehensive commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, that is, on all its six chapters, and that work on it was interrupted when Dharmakīrti had reached the middle of the commentary on Dignāga's chapter on inference for another (*parārthānumāna*).⁷⁷

74 For further details on Yamāri's deliberations on the *abhidheya* of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, see Matsuoka forthcoming b.

75 See Frauwallner 1954: 148ff.

76 See PVAN 7b3, paraphrased on p. 21 above and quoted in n. 58. Presumably, Yamāri's point of view is not unique in the commentarial tradition on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, as it also appears in his presentation of an argument advanced by another commentator or scholar. Cf. PVAN 7b1, quoted above p. 17, where the "triad of chapters undertaken (i.e., begun, but not brought to completion) [by Dharmakīrti]" is mentioned.

77 Frauwallner 1954: 152–153. According to Ono (1999: 312–313), Dharmakīrti interrupted his work on the *Pramāṇavārttika* because as a result of his reinterpretation of Dignāga's concept of the specific inconclusive (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) pseudo-reason he was not yet able to satisfactorily reconsider his proof of momentariness as presented in the auto-commentary to the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*.

Frauwallner also presupposes that the verses of chapters 2–4 were not meant to be accompanied by a prose auto-commentary, perhaps having in mind Kumāriḷa’s *Ślokavārttika* as a model. What according to Frauwallner eventually became the first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* on inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) is viewed by him as an earlier independent work of Dharmakīrti’s on this topic together with an auto-commentary, to which Frauwallner gave the generic title *Hetuprakaraṇa*. This work was not meant to comment on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* at all and was merely placed by its author at the beginning of the actual *Pramāṇavārttika*’s three versified chapters after Dharmakīrti had preliminarily postponed and then abandoned a commentary on the chapter on inference for oneself in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.⁷⁸ However, none of these assumptions are based on any evidence in the *Pramāṇavārttika* itself or are found in the rich commentarial tradition on Dharmakīrti’s work, including the commentary by Devendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti’s direct disciple.

It is perhaps time to gain some distance from Frauwallner’s ingenious psychological sketch of Dharmakīrti and his enticing speculations on the genesis of his works, mainly the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Looking at the *Pramāṇavārttika* from Yamāri’s perspective, one obtains a fresh viewpoint. For him, the work consists of four investigations on topics that are only loosely or superficially connected to a few verses of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*; its actual scope, however, is not the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, but the word of the Buddha. To what extent can one follow him, and other commentators such as Jayanta before him, in this interpretation?

Concerning the chapter on inference for oneself, modern scholarship in the wake of Frauwallner does not consider it to be a commentary on the corresponding chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Further, in the second chapter which deals with the proof of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇasiddhi*), or more precisely, with the proof of the Buddha as a means of knowledge, Dharmakīrti uses Dignāga’s *maṅgalaśloka*, with its five epithets of the Buddha,

78 See Frauwallner 1954: 153: “Das Kapitel über den Schluß [i.e., the chapter on inference for oneself scheduled as part of his *Pramāṇavārttika*] hatte er zunächst beiseite gelassen, weil darin zu viel zu wiederholen war, was er bereits im *Hetuprakaraṇam* gesagt hatte. Augenblicklich arbeitete er gerade am Kapitel über den Beweis. Nun machte er kurz ein Ende. Die Lehre vom Grund, die nicht wegbleiben konnte, fasste er noch in einer knappen Darstellung kurz zusammen. Anstelle des fehlenden Kapitels über den Schluß stellte er sein altes *Hetuprakaraṇam* an die Spitze des Werkes. Und mit ein paar bitteren Versen am Anfang und am Ende machte er einen Strich unter dieses Werk, das so kühn geplant und so hoffnungsvoll begonnen worden war.”

merely as a programmatic device⁷⁹ or convenient starting point for his own wide-ranging reflections on the Buddha as a means of knowledge or reliable person.⁸⁰ Thus, the chapter on *pramāṇasiddhi* can also not be considered a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* in any common sense of the word. The two remaining chapters on perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference for another (*parārthānumāna*) do not cover the entire discussion in the corresponding two chapters of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Dharmakīrti's chapter on perception relates only to the part of the chapter on perception in which Dignāga clarifies his own view (*svamata*), that is, to 12 out of 44 verses with a brief auto-commentary; the larger part of this chapter, with the discussion of the views of other philosophical traditions at Dignāga's time (*paramata*), is not referred to by Dharmakīrti. If one would adopt Frauwallner's perspective of the *Pramāṇavārttika* planned as a comprehensive commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*,⁸¹ there would be no cogent reason why Dharmakīrti had left this part of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* uncommented and directly moved on to the chapter on inference for another. Frauwallner himself is silent on this issue. In his following chapter on inference for another, Dharmakīrti takes the first two verses only of Dignāga's chapter as a starting point for a broad investigation of the topic in 188 verses. The rest of the chapter contains a treatment of his own theory of reasons in 96 verses with no apparent relation to Dignāga's chapter on inference for another. Thus, the fourth chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* can also not be considered a commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. One could rather assume that Dharmakīrti considered the first two verses of Dignāga's chapter on inference for another as programmatic for his own presentation, similar to the case of the second chapter on *pramāṇasiddhi* where he uses the epithets of the Buddha mentioned in Dignāga's *maṅgalaśloka* as a

79 As pointed out by Franco on a different occasion (Franco 2014: 3, n. 7), the composition of programmatic verses is a conspicuous characteristic of Dharmakīrti's work. Such verses can be found at the beginning of the *svārthānumāna* chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, the *Hetubindu* and the *Vādanyāya*. Programmatic verses can also be seen to introduce thematic sections within the chapters of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, such as the discussions on the number of the means of knowledge and on the pseudo-reasons (*hetvābhāsa*).

80 Dharmakīrti also clearly departs from Dignāga's use of the epithets, for instance in his interpretation of the epithet *śāstrī* as referring to someone who prepares himself to teach, as opposed to someone who is actually a teacher. Further, the temporal and logical sequence construed by Dharmakīrti on the basis of the order of epithets is not apparent from Dignāga's verse or his short auto-commentary on it. See further Franco 2021, chapter 1.

81 See Frauwallner 1954: 152: "Als nächstes faßte er den Entschluss, einen umfassenden Kommentar zu Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* zu schreiben, das *Pramāṇavārttikam*."

program for his reflections on the Buddha's reliability and authoritativeness. There is no evidence that Dharmakīrti had planned to actually comment on Dignāga's entire chapter on inference for another and then abruptly interrupted his work.⁸² Nor is there evidence that a commentary on the remaining three chapters of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* was initially envisaged by Dharmakīrti and the plan abandoned later on.

In the final analysis, in spite of an undeniable relation to the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, it is perhaps more accurate to say that in the *Pramāṇavārttika* Dharmakīrti looks back and reacts to Dignāga, rather than that he comments on him. In terms of its substance, the *Pramāṇavārttika* was not composed in order to comment on Dignāga's work, however much the latter may have been appreciated by Dharmakīrti; its *raison d'être* was rather to defend and substantiate the Buddhist doctrine on crucial issues such as the authority of the Buddha, the denial of a Self (*ātman*), karma and rebirth, the four noble truths and the momentariness of all things, *vis à vis* the criticism voiced by proponents of the rival traditions of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya, most prominently Kumāriila and Uddyotakara, as well as by materialist philosophers. In this sense, the *Pramāṇavārttika* may well be said to be a *vārttika* on the Buddha's word.

Abbreviations

- Apte Vaman Shivaram Apte, *The Practical Sanskrit–English Dictionary*. Revised and enlarged edition by P.K. Gode and C.G. Karve. Poona: Prasad Prakashan 1957.
- BHSD Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*. Vol. II: *Dictionary*. New Haven: Yale University Press 1953.
- D Derge edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka, ed. Jikido Takasaki, Zuiho Yamaguchi and Noriaki Hakamaya: *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan 'gyur Preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*. Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kankō Kyōkai 1977–1981.

82 See Frauwallner 1954: 149 and 153 (quoted in n. 78).

- DCS “Digital Corpus of Sanskrit,” created and maintained by Oliver Hellwig: <http://www.sanskrit-linguistics.org/dcs/> (last accessed April 11, 2024).
- LAS *Laṅkāvatārasūtra: Saddharmalaṅkāvatārasūtram*. Ed. P.L. Vaidya. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 3. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning 1963.
- LAS_N *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*. Ed. Bunyiu Nanjio. Bibliotheca Otaniensis 1. Kyoto: Otani University Press 1923.
- Ms. Sanskrit manuscript of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha*
- N Narthang edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka. Block print preserved in the Library of Tibet House, New Delhi, digitized in 2003 by the Buddhist Digital Resource Center, New York City.
- NV *Nyāyavārttika: Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika of Bhāradvāja Uddyotakara*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Nyāyacaturgranthikā 2. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1997.
- NVTṬ *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā: Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā of Vācaspatimiśra*. Ed. Anantalal Thakur. Nyāyacaturgranthikā 3. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1996.
- P *The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto*. Ed. by Daisetz T. Suzuki. Tokyo – Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute 1955–1861.
- PVABh *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārabhāṣya* of Prajñākaragupta on *Pramāṇavārttika* II 1–7. In: Ono 2000.
- PVAN *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha* of Yamāri: Critical edition of the Sanskrit text by Eli Franco, Junjie Chu and Hiroko Matsuoka. Forthcoming.
- PVAN_T Tibetan translation of the *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāranibandha* of Yamāri by rNgog blo ldan shes rab and Sumatikīrti: P no. 5723, D no. 4226, N no. 4510.
- PVinT_T Tibetan translation of the *Pramāṇavinīścayaṭikā* of Jñānaśrībhadrā by Chos kyi brtson ’grus and Jñānaśrībhadrā: P no. 5728, D no. 4228.
- PW Otto Böhtlingk und Rudolph Roth, *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*. St. Petersburg: Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften 1855(1852)–1875.

- TSD Lokesh Chandra, *Tibetan–Sanskrit Dictionary*. Compact edition in one volume. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co. 1982. Repr. of Śata-
piṭaka (Indo–Asian Literatures) 3. New Delhi: International
Academy of Indian Culture 1959–1961.
- TSDN J.S. Negi, *Tibetan–Sanskrit Dictionary*. 16 vols. Sarnath, Varanasi:
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