


Gotelind MÜLLER
Nikolay SAMOYLOV (eds.)

Chinese Perceptions of Russia and the West

Changes, Continuities,
and Contingencies
during the
Twentieth Century



Chinese Perceptions of Russia
and the West

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Changes, Continuities, and Contingencies
during the Twentieth Century

Edited by

Gotelind Müller and Nikolay Samoylov



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Technical Notes

In general, Cyrillic is transliterated according to the Library of Congress system (ALA-LC), Chinese with Pinyin, but for established ways of writing in English or established transliterations in non-mainland Chinese areas. For the reader's convenience, the standardized transliteration is added at first occurrence in a chapter. Character use depends on the context and source and thus comes accordingly in traditional or abbreviated form, reflecting the respective original. Japanese is transliterated according to the revised Hepburn system. Since word order in names changes over languages, surnames have been marked by small caps. With illustrations, copyright has been cleared by the individual authors to the best of their knowledge. In case of doubt, please refer to the authors via the editors.

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Gotelind MÜLLER

Introduction

Abstract. The introduction outlines the main ideas behind this book, its genesis, and the relationship with extant scholarship. Before presenting a tour through the book, it discusses the different viewpoints on Russia and its relation to Europe or “the West” as articulated in “the West” and in Russia herself as a background for studying the Chinese views on the topic. Since the latter were also intertwined with Japan to some degree, the role and impact of Japanese perceptions of Russia and “the West” are also briefly recalled. Similarly, the concept of “the West” itself is not a set and fixed given, but needs to be problematized. The book’s main aim consists of looking closer into the changes, continuities, and contingencies of Chinese perceptions of Russia and the West during the 20th century, focusing on three areas: official normative views as reflected in Chinese school history textbooks; creative imaginary approaches in literature; and visual and material manifestations in everyday life. Acknowledging “Greater China” as representing “Chinese” perceptions, beyond mainland China also Taiwan, and to some degree Hong Kong and Macau, are addressed. Taking the 20th century with its many historical shifts and reconfigurations of entities in political, social, and economic terms as the longitudinal line, the book presents a multilayered discussion of “Chinese” perceptions of what “Russia” and “the West” meant for whom, when, and why; where “frontlines” between them were acknowledged; and under which circumstances, by whom, and to which end, the entities as such were constructed, questioned, reconfigured, merged, or even dissolved.

Keywords. Russia, the West, Europe, Greater China, Japan.

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This book aims at investigating changes and continuities in Chinese perceptions of Russia and the West during the 20th century, paying heed to the fact that the respective ascriptions and “frontlines” were historically contingent: who and what represented “Russia” or “the West” at a given time and at a given place? Was “Russia” seen as part of “the West”, or not? And if it was, in which regard? Which factors, foreign or indigenous, led to changes in Chinese perceptions and representations and why? Such questions have been in mind when this book was taking shape, growing out of a German-Russian project funded by the DFG and the RFBR, the respective national research foundations.

The German-Russian research team from Heidelberg University and St. Petersburg State University worked on exploring the topic, concentrating on three major areas. The first area is the field of socialization in schools via a look into normative descriptions of Russia and the West in Chinese textbooks which define official images of the “other/s” from childhood on in an authoritative setting. Without going here into the large field of academic studies from various disciplinary perspectives about “self” and “other” (or “Other” in the Lacanian sense of radical alterity), suffice it to say that school history teaching is mostly concerned with the nationalized “self” (for which the “non-self”, either framed as “the foreign” or as “the world”, is needed in terms of counter distinction). In practice, when actively teaching on the subject of “others”, these are dealt with in a primarily nationalized way, too, and thus “the West” is often broken down into national cases. Still, the legacy of the broader concept of “Western history” (*xiyangshi* 西洋史) applied in China with the attempts at designing a national school system in the early 20th century, did not disappear. This concept assumed some commonness between several national cases, usually intending some (Western) European countries and North America or, as some scholars term it, “Greater Europe” which were deemed particularly relevant for China. In summary, the look into school history curricula and textbooks over time and space provides the official view the respective Chinese regime wanted to inculcate into its young citizens, and it is in this context that the normative view on “Russia” and “the West” is investigated here.

The second area is the field of literature and Chinese fictional representations of Russia and the West consumed by a Chinese reading public, which created, reinforced, or challenged an *imaginaire* of what “Russia” / “the West” embodied. While the history textbooks concentrate on (chosen) facts, mostly connected to national politics, albeit presenting them at times in an emotionalized language to imbue the “facts” with value judgements, but still basically aiming at “knowledge content”, literature rather focuses on the cultural and personal, being also interested in the *mentalité* in all its complexities. While school education with its exams is (in tendency at least and increasingly over the century) mandatory, the reading

of Russian / Western literary works in translation, or of Chinese creative works presenting their own images of foreigners, is usually situated in a leisure setting and also optional. While Chinese translations “cut a window through to Europe” (to take up the famous phrase of PUSHKIN (1799–1837) on Peter the Great’s bronze horseman statue in St. Petersburg) and, mutatis mutandis, on Russia, Chinese authors well read in foreign literature at times also mirror the Chinese “self” by using Russian / Western “others” creatively as a device for Chinese introspection. In other words, the “self” and “other/s” intersect in the *imaginaire* in multiple ways in the field of literature.

The third and final area is the field of visual and material manifestations which define images of “others” in their own medial way and make them accessible also to a public far from purely discursive levels. While school education is something willed from above, and the consumption of literature usually a personal decision, visual and material manifestations, for example posters or architecture, also confront those who do not necessarily look for them actively, with representations of “the other/s” by simply being a publicly visible part in daily life. This level, thus, also leads to the broader field of societal practice. In the above threefold way, we move through the topic from discourse and imagination to the visual and tangible.

The chosen timeframe of the whole 20th century bridges important developments, i.e. from Tsarist Russia to the Soviet Union to post-Soviet Russia; the Chinese transition from imperial China to the Republic and finally the People’s Republic (PRC) vis-à-vis the Chinese Republic on Taiwan (ROC); the two World Wars, the Cold War, its division of Europe and how this impacted upon the image of “the West”; the Sino-Soviet split, the end of the Cold War, and the new constellation in the world after 1989 with its effects on mainland China/Taiwan/Hong Kong/Macau. The focus on “Chinese” perceptions, in turn, intends not only mainland China in the 20th century but also (post-1945) Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, i.e. what has often been termed “Greater China”. These two choices in terms of spatial and temporal coverage were intended to lead to a fruitful and multifaceted research on how “Chinese” perceptions of “Russia” and “the West” (and what the latter precisely meant at which given time, where and for whom, and in how far Russia was conceived of as part of the latter or precisely not) shifted, and where possible continuities might be detected. To do this, a variety of media and societal target groups were to be considered. To enrich the “outsider” perspective of the German-Russian research team of Heidelberg University and St. Petersburg State University to which a further German scholar also contributed, Chinese colleagues from the PRC and Taiwan were integrated at a later stage as well, joining in the main conference in Heidelberg. This book, edited by the German side, is the outcome of the collective effort.

In the views of “the West”, but also in Russian self-perception, Russia has always been an ambivalent entity: either seen as “a part of Europe”, or rather as different, i.e. “apart from Europe”.¹ The issue is a longstanding debate. For example, viewing Russia from the outside, the famous German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm LEIBNIZ (1646–1716) who met Peter the Great (1672–1725) several times in the early 18th century, expressed his hope for Russia, a positively understood “tabula rasa”, to serve as a “bridge” between Europe and China.² Some decades later the German scholar Johann Gottfried HERDER (1744–1803) claimed her to be geographically mainly in Asia, but with her “heart” still in Europe.³ But even for those who unequivocally agreed to Russia’s being “European”, her “location” in the mental mapping of Europe remained to be ascertained. While she was seen by those posing as representatives of “Europe’s heart” in discourse as a part of “Northern Europe” at first, she was slowly shifted to “Eastern Europe” during the first half of the 19th century. This configuration became problematic again in the late 20th century after the end of the Cold War when other parts of “Eastern Europe” tried to emancipate themselves from Russia (and, for example, repositioned themselves as Central or Middle Eastern European etc.).⁴

But even if Russia was acknowledged as a part of “Europe”, this did not necessarily imply her being acknowledged as a part of “the West”,⁵ an entity in itself of a considerable malleability, historically, and ideologically.⁶ As one scholar put

1 Cf. international relation scholar Vladimir BARANOVSKY’s apt article title: “Russia: a part of Europe, or apart from Europe?”. In: *International Affairs* vol. 76, no. 3 (July 2000), pp. 443–458.

2 See Dieter GROH: *Rußland im Blick Europas: 300 Jahre historische Perspektiven* (Russia in Europe’s view: 300 years of historical perspectives), Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1988, pp. 41–53.

3 Johann Gottfried HERDER: *Andrastea* vol. 3, Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch 1802, p. 76.

4 For a succinct outline of the issue, see Manfred HILDERMEIER: “Osteuropa als Gegenstand vergleichender Geschichte” (Eastern Europe as a subject of comparative history). In: Gunilla BUDDE, Sebastian CONRAD, Oliver JANZ (eds.): *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien* (Transnational history: themes, tendencies and theories), Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2006, pp. 117–136.

5 See Olga MALINOVA: “Russia and ‘the West’ in the 2000s: Redefining Russian Identity in Official Political Discourse”. In: Ray TARAS (ed.): *Russia’s Identity in International Relations: Images, Perceptions, Misperceptions*, London and New York: Routledge 2013, pp. 73–90, there p. 74.

6 For a historical discussion, see Heinrich August WINKLER: *Geschichte des Westens: Von den Anfängen in der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* (History of the West: From the Beginnings in Antiquity through the 20th Century), Munich: C.H. Beck 2016 (1st ed. 2009). For an approach concentrating on the “ideological” side: Alastair BONNETT: *The Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2004. For a political

it, “Europe” was less than “the West” and also more than it.⁷ Even parts of Europe, which during Cold War times were clearly in the “Western” camp, had not seen themselves to be part of it earlier, notably (West) Germany whose “march to the West” was seen by some as her greatest achievement after WWII and the “Western-critical” Nazi era,⁸ although Germany’s self-distancing from “the West”, perceived as mainly France and Britain and later also the U.S., was much older than the Nazis. “The West” as an ideological concept expanded enormously over time,⁹ taking in large parts of the globe, but being constantly reconfigured by the various “uses” it was put to,¹⁰ not only by those supposedly being part of “the West”, but decidedly also by those seeing themselves as not being part of it.¹¹ Regarding Russia’s belonging to “the West” or not, the ambivalence of non-Russians came in various forms: in a widespread “Western” perspective, the “Tartar beneath the surface” was “othering” Russians,¹² referring to the Mongol invasion, while intermarrying courts in Europe suggested a commonness and familiarity, if only for the noble elites. Catherine the Great (1729–1796), for one, herself German by birth, defined Russia explicitly as a “European power”, but considered it necessary nevertheless to convert from (Western) Protestantism to Eastern Orthodoxy for her own “Russification” to narrow the gap with the people she now governed.

In fact, Eastern Orthodoxy marked large parts of Eastern Europe off the “Latin” ones in the West in Christian contexts, namely after the ecclesiastic Great Schism of 1054 and even more so after the sack of Constantinople in 1204 by the “Latins” during the Fourth Crusade. Finally, the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 led to the rise of Moscow in the orthodox world as the self-declared “Third Rome”. This famous claim formulated by Philotheus of Pskov (1465–1542) in 1510 referred back to the marriage of the Muscovite ruler Ivan III (1440–1505) with the niece of the last Byzantine emperor in 1472. It should be noted that the Russian

studies perspective, see Gunther HELLMANN and Benjamin HERBORTH (eds.): *Uses of the West: Security and the Politics of Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2017.

7 See Austrian historian Gerald STOURZH, cited in WINKLER: *Geschichte des Westens* (2016), p. 19.

8 This has been voiced, among others, by Jürgen HABERMAS. However, also before the Nazi era, Germany located “the West” beyond her borders. Cf. again WINKLER: *Geschichte des Westens* (2016), pp. 17–18.

9 See the “seven versions of the West” by LEWIS and WIGEN, reproduced in BONNETT: *The Idea of the West* (2004), pp. 9–10.

10 Cf. HELLMANN/HERBORTH: *Uses of the West* (2017), p. 4.

11 This point has been made very strongly by BONNETT: *The Idea of the West* (2004) with reference to “the West” in Soviet or different varieties of Asian eyes, both critical and favorable.

12 The saying: “grattez le Russe et vous trouverez le Tartare” (scratch the Russian and you will find the Tartar) is usually attributed to Napoleon and became proverbial also in English.

self-identification at that time was rather framed in religious terms, i.e. as Christians, while “nationality” and “Russianness” became an issue only much later. In this regard, Russia remained clearly connected to “the West” via the common Christian faith, especially pronounced as long as the “common threat” of Islam was the key concern.¹³ In other words, the issue at stake determined the configuration of entities.

Seen from Russia herself, she had a long history of arguing about her self-perception as part of “the West” or as decidedly different from it as well, searching for “the Russian soul”, the Slavic heritage etc., or going for “Westernization” in the style of Peter the Great, culminating in the Slavophiles vs. Westernizers debates of the 19th century.¹⁴ Some even saw Russia as a “third space”,¹⁵ being “Eurasian” in essence, no matter how that was defined in turn.¹⁶ And the fact that the Tsarist empire as well as the later Soviet Union covered not only ethnic Russians, but many ethnicities, throws into profile the additional problem of the category “Russian”, in fact better reflected in Russian than in Western languages by the differentiation between the ethnic-linguistic *russkii* and the civic *rossiiskii*. For example, the Ukraine or Belarus as “Little Russia” were a long-term part first of the Tsarist empire, and then of the Soviet Union, not to mention the problem of the Poles or the Baltic region. In addition, the Muslim central Asian and the Caucasian ethnicities differed in language, religion, and custom as much as those ethnicities living in Siberia and the Russian Far East. From the various ethnicities’ perspective all over the Tsarist empire and later the Soviet Union, identity issues had always presented themselves quite differently than in the St. Petersburg / Moscow-based “Russian” dominant view, and became ever more critical with the end of the Soviet Union.

13 For some of the “Western” perceptions of Russia, see Martin MALIA: *Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum*, Cambridge/Mass.: Belknap 1999. See also Mark B. SMITH: *The Russia Anxiety: And How History Can Resolve It*, New York: Oxford University Press 2019, esp. chapter 6.

14 For a more general overview of identity constructions in Russia, see Nicholas V. RIASANOVSKY: *Russian Identities: A Historical Survey*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005. On various cultural aspects, see Simon FRANKLIN and Emma WIDDIS (eds.): *National Identity in Russian Culture: An Introduction*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004. The latter also point to the additional fact that much of “Russian discourses of identity have been formed in an implied dialogue with outsiders” (FRANKLIN/WILLIS p. 5), thus reconnecting Russian discourse with the one about Russia from “the West”.

15 Cf. the notion of “third space” of Homi BHABHA in his *The Location of Culture*, London et al.: Routledge 2004.

16 This idea, proposed with some vigor in the early 1920s, became again fashionable after the end of the Soviet Union. Cf. RIASANOVSKY: *Russian Identities* (2005), pp. 234–235.

While in “Western” somewhat condescending, and at the same time fearful, views, Russia was often seen as backward but in tendency aggressive (the “barbarian at the door”), in a widespread Russian self-perception, Russia was not inherently aggressive, but always only reacting to the treatment she received from “the West”: cooperating when accepted and honored as part of the club, though with her distinct features; or staying aloof if not, only becoming more assertive when being (or perceiving herself to be) in a position of strength.¹⁷ Here, the socio-psychological concept of the “significant other” impacting in decisive ways on a subject comes in. While “the West” was certainly not just some “other”, but a “significant other” to Russia, this also worked vice versa,¹⁸ namely since the 19th century when Russia played an increasingly important role in international politics, and even more so in the 20th century,¹⁹ culminating in the systemic confrontation with the “capitalist West” by the creation of the first socialist-communist state in history, i.e. Soviet Russia. When the Soviet Union was falling apart, at first Russia and the West seemed to reintegrate, and “Europe” was reconfigured due to the end of the Cold War.²⁰ But soon this was followed again by a move toward renewed distinction and potential rivalry.

To China, both Russia and the West were “significant others” at various times, namely in the modern era, but before turning to China herself, one factor that cannot be left out of the picture is Japan. Although the rest of the pages will focus on *Chinese* perceptions of Russia and the West, Japan is often the elephant in the room, as since the late 19th century discourses and practices in China were largely influenced by the “Japan factor”, albeit in various ways.

Japan herself had a complicated relationship with both Russia and “the West” as her own “significant others”. Since Meiji times (1868–1912), Japan tried to associate with the “advanced West”, using Tsarist Russia as a negative contrast, not the least out of rivalry, given the geographical vicinity and intersecting interests on the Asian continent. In Japan, this led to a perception and representation of

17 Cf. the “three patterns of Russia’s relation with the West” as proposed by Andrei P. TSYGANKOV: *Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, chapter 1.

18 Cf. Iver B. NEUMANN: *Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1999, especially chapter 3 which is concerned with Russia as Europe’s “other”, though it was not the only “other” of Europe in history. Notably, NEUMANN does not consider East Asia here, but focuses on the Turkish-Ottoman and the Russian roles in “making Europe”.

19 For some foreign relations perspectives with a special focus on mutual perceptions, see the already referred-to edited volume by TARAS: *Russia’s Identity in International Relations* (2013).

20 Cf. GORBACHEV’s idea of a “common European home” already in the late 1980s, and the 1990s’ endeavors under YELTSIN (ЕЛЬЦИН) to switch to “Western” economic methods.

Russia as the “barbaric Orient of the West”,²¹ although this rhetoric was in itself basically derived from “Western” models, primarily Anglo-Saxon and secondarily German ones, and driven by Japan’s ambition to join the “Western club” herself. With the regime change to the Soviet Union, Russia could no longer be conceptualized as “backward”. But given the challenge and perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union and its new socioeconomic system, in Japan the negative evaluation simply shifted to a new form of Russian “otherness”, while after WWII and during the Cold War Japan squarely (re)settled in the “Western” camp herself.²² These developments had an at least intermediary reflection also in China, be it during the late 19th and early 20th century when many Japanese sources were used as information and reference by Chinese intellectuals, sometimes re-evaluating them according to their own interest, and sometimes also seeing Japan as a model in the sense of a “first step” for an Asian country toward “the West”; be it in Republican times (1912–1949); be it in Manchuria where the Japanese were the real masters behind the Manchukuo regime (1932–1945); or be it in Taiwan when the latter was a Japanese colony (1895–1945).

Although foreign policy or economic rivalry, security concerns, and geopolitical considerations certainly are decisive factors for the relations between countries, the cultural area, including mutual perceptions and representations, are no less patent and influential. Again taking Japan as an example, mutual images in Japan and Russia have proven a fertile ground in scholarship to explore bilateral relations in a broader perspective,²³ though “Russia” was taken here as a singular entity not further problematized via its relation to “the West”.

Now turning to the Chinese side, perceptions of Russia’s ambivalent position in Europe (part or not part) and in relation to “the West” oscillated over time as well.²⁴ While, for example, early world-historical representations in China’s school textbooks saw Russia primarily as a, somewhat special, part of “the West”, and the Christian element as discussed, for example, in literature marked Russia as an (if again somewhat special) part of “Europe” and “the West”, too, in the

21 See Ilya KHARIN: *After Nicholas: Self-Realization of the Japanese Orthodox Church, 1912–1956*, Gloucester: White Margin 2014, p. xiv.

22 For more on the role of Russia as Japan’s “other”, see Alexander BUKH: *Japan’s National Identity and Foreign Policy: Russia as Japan’s “Other”*, London and New York: Routledge 2010.

23 Yulia MIKHAILOVA and M. William STEELE (eds.): *Japan and Russia: Three Centuries of Mutual Images*, Folkestone: Global Oriental 2008.

24 It might be briefly noted that in Chinese this understanding of “Europe” vs. “the West” in relation to Russia differed somewhat from the one in Russia herself as can be seen, for example, by the fact that the Russian “Westernizers” (*zapadniki*) of the 19th century are translated into Chinese in various ways, i.e. similarly as “Westernizers” (*xifang pai* 西方派), but also as “West-European-izers” (*xi-Ou pai* 西欧派).

sociopolitical area the “otherness” of Russia was usually highlighted. This could be defined via “Tsarist autocracy” or via the Soviet (no less authoritarian) system, while “the West” was understood in terms of the Anglo-Saxon “democracy model” (which, needless to say, was not historically representative of all of Europe over the 20th century).²⁵ In terms of economy, in turn, the notion of “the West” was connected to the concepts of free market and capitalism, which Russia / the Soviet Union did not subscribe to. This way of understanding was reflected accordingly in visual and material representations. For the conceptualization of “Russia” this made for a split image emerging during the 20th century. In tendency, while Tsarist Russia and later the “Whites” who often ended up in China after having lost the Civil War in Russia (1917–1922) were rather seen and represented as somehow “European”, the Soviet Union and the “Reds” were perceived as clearly distinct and opposed to “the West”. In consequence, also two “types” of Russians emerged. In terms of power politics, though, even the Soviet Union could appear in China as part of the Great Powers associated with “the West” (which at times also included Japan, as it does today, clearly far from any geographical meaning of the word). Thus, the “frontline” in between very much depended on the criterion chosen or the issue focused upon.

In terms of a diplomatic historical perspective, one often speaks of the “special” Russian-Chinese relations,²⁶ and in Chinese (and Russian) views of the “Western” colonial empires and supremacy aspirations, Russia seemed to stand out positively, at least for the earlier times when treaties were still concluded without “Western” “gunboat diplomacy”. This figure of argument has gained some currency again in recent years in the context of improving Sino-Russian relations, although this view was never uncontroversial, even in China. As a result of the systemic change in Russia to the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the Chinese Communist revolution on the other subsequently, the “gap” between Russia and “the West” in Chinese perception was deepened significantly due to systemic competition (and “Europe” as a category became even more problematic due to the Cold War, dividing “Europe” roughly into two camps). On the other hand, the increasingly confrontational relationship of the PRC with the former “socialist brother” since the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the PRC’s “foreign policy turnaround” in the early 1970s with a new rapprochement with the U.S. and its allies, along with growing integration into international organizations, quite naturally also had an

25 One may, once again, recall the most outstanding case to the contrary of Nazi Germany, but also the many other dictatorial-authoritarian regimes extant in various European countries at different times during the 20th century.

26 Critical to this: Sarah C.M. Paine: *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (1858–1924)*, Armonk: Sharpe 1996.

effect on the Chinese perceptions, usually in opposite ways on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, of Russia / the Soviet Union, and “the West”. After the end of the Soviet Union, in spite of several argumentative shifts in the PRC where this event and the changes throughout Eastern Europe were watched with great concern, the idea of a far-reaching difference between Russia and “the West” remained, albeit now in a slightly different form and with a reconfigured “Europe”.

So far, research interest in Western and Russian scholarship has either concentrated on the China-Russia²⁷ or the China-“West” (mostly intending individual countries, mainly the U.S. and UK)²⁸ relationship (which may also be due to the respective language competences required). This specialization on the study of either China-Russia or China-West calls for the still lacking combination of the two perspectives, and the question of changing “frontlines” breaks up those presumed fixed entities. In a sense, the contrary direction of inquiry has been taken by TREADGOLD once by looking into the reception of Western ideas in Russia and China comparatively, though here “the West” has been seen as one given entity moving through time, just “influencing” Russia and China in various “waves” in different intellectual forms.²⁹ The basic point of departure in this case seems to have been that both countries, Russia and China, had ended up, at the time TREADGOLD was writing, as the main (rivaling) representatives of the Communist “camp” during the Cold War, i.e. with an ideology which had its Marxist basis

27 On Russia-China in general, see e.g. Aleksandr LUKIN (ed.): *Rossiia i Kitaĭ: chetyre veka vzaimodeĭstviâ: Istoriiâ, sovremennoe sostoianie i perspektivy razvitiâ rossiisko-kitaĭskikh otnoshenii* (Russia and China: 400 years of exchange: history, the present day, and the perspectives of development of Russian-Chinese relations), Moskva: Ves' Mir 2013; for the phase 1858–1924: PAINÉ: *Imperial Rivals* (1996); on the Soviet Union-China: as a documentary basis, see Heng-yü KUO and M. TITARENKO: *RKP(B), Komintern und die national-revolutionäre Bewegung in China: Dokumente*, vol. 1 (The Comintern and the national-revolutionary movement in China: documents), Paderborn: Schöningh 1996; and Mechthild LEUTNER and M. TITARENKO: *KPdSU, Komintern und die national-revolutionäre Bewegung in China: Dokumente*, vol. 2 (The Comintern and the national-revolutionary movement in China: documents), Paderborn: Schöningh 1998; for the early Cold War phase: Austin JERSILD: *The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2014; and subsequently Lorenz M. LÜTHI: *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2008.

28 In this rather vast literature, see on China-U.S., e.g., Dong WANG: *The United States and China: A History From the Eighteenth Century to the Present*, Lanham: Rowman&Littlefield 2013. On China and Britain, see, e.g., Robert BICKERS and Jonathan J. HOWLETT (eds.): *Britain and China, 1840–1970: Empire, Finance, and War*, New York: Routledge 2016.

29 Donald W. TREADGOLD: *The West in Russia and China: Religious and Secular Thought in Modern Times. Vol. I: Russia, 1472–1917; vol. II: China, 1582–1949*, Cambridge: At the University Press 1973. The spectrum covers Christianity to Marxism in content.

originally in the West. This merited the question as to how this came about, and it foregrounded the logic that these two countries and cultures could and should be compared. In the present volume, though, the somewhat static view on set entities (if as such internally changing over time by intellectual “fashions”, as TREADGOLD acknowledged in his approach) influencing other set entities is not the guiding principle, but rather the eye of the beholder is understood as the site where commonness and difference is perceived, creating entities. Thus, the question as to how something constructed as “the West” or as “Russia” / the Soviet Union was perceived, and where in Chinese eyes frontlines were or were not set between them and under which temporal, local, and further circumstances, are at stake.

Some of the individual aspects have most definitely been examined previously. Still, in addition to themes like diplomacy,³⁰ ideology transfer,³¹ or translation questions,³² a focus on the images and perceptions as reflected in different Chinese media and societal groups during the course of this turbulent century aims at exploring new ways of ascertaining changes and continuities in those perceptions, and the shifting of boundaries in the respective attribution.

30 For the early post-WWII down-turn of PRC-U.S. relations, see Simei QING: *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945–1960*, Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press 2007. On China’s shifting alliances in the Cold War, see beyond the works cited above for Russia/Soviet Union-China: Zhihua SHEN and Danhui Li: *After leaning to one side: China and its Allies in the Cold War*, Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center 2011.

31 See, e.g., several contributions in Thomas P. BERNSTEIN and Huayu LI (eds.): *China Learns From the Soviet Union, 1949–Present*, Lanham et al.: Lexington Books 2010, for Soviet Union-China.

32 On the field of literature between Russia and China, see, e.g., Leonid CHERKASSKII: *Russkaiā literatura na Vostoke: Teoriā i praktika perevoda* (Russian Literature in the Orient: Theory and practice of translation), Moskva: Nauka 1987; Mark GAMSA: *The Chinese Translation of Russian Literature*, Leiden: Brill 2008; and Mark GAMSA: *The Reading of Russian Literature in China: A Moral Example and a Manual for Practice*, London: Palgrave MacMillan 2010. On Chinese translations of Western literature and their interrelatedness with Chinese creative writing, see Shouhua Qi: *Western Literature in China and the Translation of a Nation*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012. More general on global translation processes with a focus on China: Lydia LIU: *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity, China 1900 – 1937*, Stanford: Stanford U.P. 1995. On the translation of Marxist terminology: Wolfgang LIPPERT: *Entstehung und Funktion einiger chinesischer marxistischer Termini: der lexikalisch-begriffliche Aspekt der Rezeption des Marxismus in Japan und China* (Formation and function of some Chinese Marxist terms: the lexical-terminological aspect of the reception of Marxism in Japan and China), Wiesbaden: Steiner 1979. On the Chinese reception of Western scientific terminology: Michael LACKNER et al. (eds.): *New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China*, Leiden: Brill 2001.

While not only Western, but also Russian, views on China have been studied more thoroughly, Chinese views on Russia have only recently received more attention,³³ whereas the Chinese modern image of “the West” or “Westerners” as such remains rather understudied,³⁴ since this is usually broken down to country-specific detailed studies easier to grasp and less ambiguous.³⁵ Therefore, a study of the facets and variations of the Chinese image of Russia and “the West” (which for all the country-based specificities is still a commonly “used” concept, frequently referred to in ideological terms as well as in societal practice) in different contexts during the 20th century, pursued in international cooperation, should be a welcome addition to existing scholarship.

The concept of “perception” is deliberately chosen here, since it conceptually, albeit not necessarily temporally in some cases, precedes the formation of a fixed and coherent “image”. In a most immediate sense, bodily perception via the senses is represented in the brain to form an image. In a more general sense, as used here, the concept of “perception” also allows for the consideration of historically powerful elements that have not condensed into a single “image” of “the

33 Nikolai SAMOLOV: *Rossiā i Kitai v XVII – nachale XX veka: tendentsii, formy i stadii sotsiokul'turnogo vzaimodeistviia* (Russia and China from the 17th through the early 20th century: tendencies, forms and phases of sociocultural interaction), Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatel'skiĭ dom Sankt-Peterburgskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 2014; Li Suian 李隨安: *1949–2009 Zhongguo de Eluosi xingxiang 1949–2009 中国的俄罗斯形象 1949–2009* (China's image of Russia, 1949–2009), Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe 2012; see also S. L. TIKHVINSKII: *Vospriiatie v Kitae obraza Rossii* (The perception of the image of Russia in China), Moskva: Nauka 2008, for an overview.

34 E.g., see part 1 in Hua MENG and Sukehiro HIRAKAWA (eds.): *Images of Westerners in Chinese and Japanese literature*, Amsterdam: Rodopi 2000; as well as Chinese “Occidentalism”: Xiaomei CHEN: *Occidentalism: a Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China*, New York: Oxford U.P. 1995; and, as a genealogy in a historical long-term perspective based on the shifting category “West” in the general sense of “west of China”: Mingming WANG: *The West as the Other: a Genealogy of Chinese Occidentalism*, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press 2014.

35 For a bibliographical account of the Chinese image of Germany, see, e.g., Wolfgang BAUER et al.: *Das chinesische Deutschlandbild der Gegenwart: eine Bibliographie* (The contemporary Chinese image of Germany: a bibliography), Stuttgart: Steiner 1989–1992. For a recent publication on France, see the printed roundtable by Nicolas ROUSSEAU et al.: *Images croisées France-Chine* (Crossed images France-China), Paris: Fondation Victor Segalen 2014; for the more political image of America, e.g. Carola MCGIFFERT (ed.): *Chinese Images of the United States*, Washington: CSIS Press 2005; Hong ZHANG: *America Perceived: The Making of Chinese Images of the United States, 1945–1953*, Westport: Greenwood Press 2002; David SHAMBAUGH: *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–1990*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991; or more culturally – via translated excerpts – David ARKUSH and Leo Ou-fan LEE (transl. and ed.): *Land without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present*, Berkeley: University of California Press 1989.

“Westerner” or “the Russian”.³⁶ Rather, it is precisely through the consideration of the changing “frontlines” and historically contingent attributions that the numerous fractures in the constructions of the “other”, which are always subject to genre and group-specific negotiation processes, should become visible. The notion of “representation”, in turn, is used here when the focus is on the presentational side (which does not necessarily reproduce a social “image” only, but rather often attempts to form, or influence, social “images” in a targeted manner in the first place.) In this sense, conceptually, there is a need to distinguish between perception, image, and representation.

Tour through the book

In the first part of the book, the normative views on Russia and the West, as defined by the Chinese state via curricula and spelled out in textbooks for transmission in school, are addressed. Starting with the late imperial and Republican times (DMITRENKO), it becomes evident that Russia and the West are treated somewhat differently between discussions embedded in the subject of “Chinese” or “national” history on the one hand, and in the context of “foreign” / “world” history (which, in fact, often made use of foreign textbooks for content, by this adding a further layer to the interpretation) on the other hand. In classes on “Chinese history” which focus on the relation of the “others” to China, a more critical view of the “others” prevails, while the positive achievements of these “others” are, rather, discussed in the context of “world history”. A further distinction results from the period under review in a textbook chapter; while earlier historical periods are usually less emotionally charged, the 19th and early 20th century closer to the writing time and connected to the traumatic loss of international standing of the Chinese “self” are more sensitive to frame in an official narrative. While Tsarist Russia since Peter the Great is mostly depicted as “associated” (though “not equal”) with “the West” in the sense of great power politics, in fact as the “worst” of aggressors and outstanding troublemaker, the subsequent Soviet Union comes up as a topic in school history only in the 1930s and is treated rather carefully. In the end, Russia is China’s direct neighbor. “The West”, though, remains ambivalent in evaluation,

36 Such full-fledged national images and stereotypes as reflected in literature and their coming into being have been discussed, e.g., by Manfred BELLER and Joep LEERSSEN (eds.): *Imagology: the Cultural Construction and Literary Representation of National Characters; a Critical Survey*, Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi 2007.

acknowledging its contributions to “modernity” and thus figuring as a “model” for China, but on the other hand it is perceived as aggressive toward the rest of the world through its excessive colonialism, imperialism, and an exploitative capitalist system. It should be noted that the treatment in history classes through the first half of the 20th century rather restricts the discussion to politics and partly economy, while culture, for example, is barely touched upon, and religion, i.e. Christianity, is criticized as something opposed to “modernity”. In terms of a historical approach, the “great men” view of the late imperial era is followed by a territorial preoccupation during Republican times, also visually expressed in the extensive use of maps. This bespeaks the increasingly nationalist political agenda of the Chinese government at the time, which also attempted to “prove” in the 1930s China’s contribution to “world history”, not only referring to important technical inventions, but even laying claims to the significant historical role of the “Chinese Mongols” and their one-time world empire. This way, the Chinese “self” was to reassert itself also internationally, at least for the eyes of the young generation at home, which was supposed to become more patriotic by studying the textbooks.

We then move into the post-WWII times with a more specific attention to the PRC and Taiwan and the respective views on Russia and the Soviet Union provided by official school history. In the PRC (YANG) the view on Russia was largely narrowed down to the history of the Soviet Union in terms of politics and economy, and the way this was, and is, treated also reveals much about the changing policies in the PRC at particular times. While the history of other countries was considered less important, the Soviet Union was perceived as the most “significant other” for the early PRC. Focusing on the portrayal of key topics like the October Revolution, Stalinism, WWII, but also the more “delicate” post-STALIN economic reforms of KHRUSHCHEV (1894–1971) treated only more recently in school history, the shifts in political agendas in mainland China as reflected in curricula and textbooks from the 1950s to today become evident. The international context with the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations as well as the foreign policy easing of relations with “the West” since the 1970s also impacted directly on textbook contents. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, finally, challenged the Chinese reading of Soviet history to provide explanations to pupils of what to learn from the Soviet “errors” to avoid a similar outcome at home, and to prove that the Chinese government had taken the right measures to develop socialism in a more successful direction. However, the “reappearance” since the 1990s of sovereign states formerly integrated in the Soviet Union implicitly reopened the sensitive question as to the legitimacy of rule over areas culturally distinct.

In the case of Taiwan (CHANG), the issue of legitimacy of rule is pertinent from the opposite side. Historically speaking, while the PRC textbooks, especially

during the 1950s, geared toward the Soviet Union, the ROC textbooks rather downplayed the topic of Russia, while Taiwan itself had hardly any “Russian connection”. In fact, prior to the end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945, very few Russians ever appeared on the island, and after the GMD (Guomindang 國民黨, National People’s Party) took over, it simply exported its anti-Soviet stance from the mainland to Taiwan, always connected to its antagonism with the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), its main concern. Politically, though, the U.S. were the “significant other” of postwar Taiwan, and Europe an above all cultural entity. While GMD textbooks continued to reveal the Republican era preoccupation with Tsarist Russia’s “aggression” toward China and the territorial gains this had implied, the Soviet Union was portrayed as a new form of “imperialism”, and the CCP as lackeys of the Soviets. Only beginning with the split between the PRC and the Soviet Union, the anti-Soviet element was toned down in Taiwan, and after the end of the Soviet Union, the changed international setting, the newly started Russo-Taiwanese relations, as well as the democratization in Taiwan which impacted on the education system, too, allowed for a more relaxed treatment of “Russian” history. By interviews with Taiwanese teachers of two generations on the topic of teaching Russian history in Taiwanese schools, the chapter also provides a rare glimpse into the inner working of schooling regarding a topic largely new to teachers as well as pupils. It also makes clear that from the perspective of the pupils the teaching of history has to be seen in relationship to other subjects like geography, where knowledge about “others” is transmitted, too. Furthermore, it shows that shifts in the historiographical approach, like the present focus on transnational global history, also lead to new forms in history education content and teaching methods, for example moving beyond chronology to more project-based topic-focused ones, especially on the senior secondary level. Notably, such approaches have also been tested in PRC history education in the 2000s.

On the basis of these two specialized studies on the PRC’s and Taiwan’s dealing with Russian/Soviet history, we take a comparative look between both systems’ dealing with Russia and the West in curricula and textbooks, at first for the period of the Cold War (MÜNNING). While both systems used history education as a tool to inculcate their respective ideologies, the PRC shifted decidedly more during the time, given the ups and downs in ideological orientation, whereas Taiwan under GMD rule remained largely in the trail set in Republican times on the mainland. On a general level, while the concept of “class” was central to the PRC up to the 1980s, GMD-Taiwan accentuated the concept of “nation”. In Taiwan, the evaluation of both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union was equally negative, whereas the PRC clearly differentiated between the “aggressive” Tsarist Russia and the “best times” of the Soviet Union, intending the times under LENIN (1870–1924)

and STALIN (1878/79–1953). Conversely, the image of “the West” was much more positive in Taiwan, if acknowledging also the dark sides of imperialism and colonialism, whereas the PRC found much less of a “model” in this context and only carefully introduced some positive elements during the post-Cultural Revolution reform period. By focusing on some historical topics through the ages discussed in textbooks on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the chapter presents the different outlooks on “world history” during the Cold War times in Taiwan and the PRC as presented to the pupils, thus forming their respective worldview, and the shifts visible therein. In general, though, while the West was “appropriated” in Taiwan, it was “deconstructed” in the PRC; and while Russia was “demonized” in GMD-Taiwan, the Soviet Union was “idolized” in the (early) PRC. In this setting, it is the perception of Russia that has undergone the greatest shifts, due to the political changes both in Russia and in the PRC or Taiwan, while “the West” has remained more stable in representation.

The final chapter (RYSAKOVA) in this part again links both Taiwan and the PRC, now for the most recent times, looking into the representation of Western countries and Russia in history textbooks and curricula since the Cold War. It shows how the newer trend of writing global history is made to serve as a tool for national identity construction via teaching. While in Taiwan, due to democratization, the curricula are an issue broadly and hotly debated throughout society where different points of view can be voiced, in the PRC the careful pluralization of the 1990s has been recently withdrawn in the name of a strengthened “patriotism”. Here, the opposition to “others” outside the borders, i.e. moving beyond the earlier inter-party (GMD vs. CCP) rivalry, serves as a catalyst to improve societal cohesion (and rules out the divisive “class struggle” rhetoric of former times). The chapter also argues that in Taiwan, “Western” scholarship is taken up in the writing of “global history” by using the latter’s inherent anti-Eurocentrism, namely by authors caring about a more “Taiwanese” approach, for their own agenda. This often includes also a distancing from mainland China by paralleling the latter with “equally external” Europe, and thus puts “China” in the category of “world history” distinct from the local Taiwanese one. In the PRC, in turn, “world history” is now proactively used to claim the Chinese point of view as the new “master narrative” on a global scale in the name of an international “balancing out” of the “right to speak”. This also shows that school history is not only closely linked to larger historical debates, but even more so to foreign policy concerns. Historians at times try to find a way out by redesigning issues. The category of “the West”, for example, is at times rephrased as “developed countries” on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, by this making “development” and “modernity” into the key criteria without localizing them geographically per se, but following different agendas respectively

nevertheless. Furthermore, due to Taiwan’s contested identity construction and its precarious international standing, the topic of “modernity” has the advantage of being less controversial than the ever-problematic “nation” concept. A topical arrangement, especially experimented with on the senior secondary level in both Taiwan and the PRC and often in non-compulsory courses, also gives more leeway to teachers in treating topics with pupils harboring a special interest in history. In that context, the concept of “the West” is also more flexible, covering different geographical areas (i.e. of different modern nation states), depending on the subject and particular historical problems discussed.

The second part of this volume deals with literary images, discussing how fictionalized representations defined, enlivened, or problematized Russia and the West for the Chinese reading public. Taking the question of radical evil and its personified form in Western/Russian literature as a starting point, chapter 6 (VETROV) discusses the Chinese grappling with this concept at first glance alien to Chinese readers, which connects Russia and “the West” via Christianity, and via literary intertextual relations. Namely, the famous German drama *Faust* by GOETHE (1749–1832) centrally concerned with the question of man and evil personified in the figure of Mephistopheles, reverberates also in Russian literature, while Russian authors also develop their own approach to evil and cross-refer between each other. Russian literature, on the one hand strongly linked to Western literature but on the other also very distinct, thus provides a multi-layered case which is of particular interest to China. The preoccupation with the topic of radical evil points to a common ground of “European” literature and thinking, but differences also appear in the way this is applied. A critical potential of the concept of radical evil is developed in Russian literature in various ways. On the one hand, it may serve for distancing Orthodox “holy” Russia from the “West”, when outstanding 19th century Russian writers of impact in 20th century China like GOGOL (GOGOL', 1809–1852) and (more controversially in Chinese 20th century eyes) DOSTOEVSKY (DOSTOEVSKI, 1821–1881) depict (elements of) “the West” as an incarnation of evil: be it modernity with its technical “progress” and secularization, be it the Enlightenment with its rationality, or be it Catholicism and the Pope. Even socialism, still nascent in the 19th century, is hinted at as one of these dangerous embodiments by DOSTOEVSKY. But the figure of personified evil can also be turned into a device to criticize the (realized) socialist Soviet system in Russia herself by positively positioning oneself vis-à-vis the “Western” tradition (and GOETHE’s *Faust*) as in the case of 20th century Russian “dissident” writer BULGAKOV (1891–1940), censured for many years in the Soviet Union and received in China only more recently. Interweaving “Western”, Russian, and Chinese literature, literary theory, and literary studies along the lines of this topic of radical evil

and through various phases of the 20th century, the chapter traces the changing agendas in China as reflected in the discussions of personified evil in general, and in the context of several literary works, from GOETHE's *Faust*, over pertinent works of GOGOL and DOSTOEVSKY to BULGAKOV, in particular. The shifts in Chinese interpretation modes, while closely related to changing Chinese politics, are furthermore set in relation to Russian/Soviet scholarship which for years was seen as authoritative in the PRC. The discussion of foreign concepts in China often did not wait for longer translations becoming available, as can be typically seen earlier in the century with the ideologically charged times of the late 1910s and the 1920s. At the time, a presumably "Faustian spirit" was propagated to hail creativity and originality of man without need of any God above, while the "Satanic" developed a negative attractiveness as a destructive, but welcome, force to smash the old and obsolete as a necessary correlate. Evil, thus, appears foremost as a social issue, and the Devil as a justified rebel. But a closer look into the history of longer or full translations of the literary works of the named foreign authors into Chinese which centrally deal with personified evil, the main genre being novels, over the 20th century, also makes evident that translations (and choices of what to translate and when) are a subtle continuation of politics in many ways, too. While Chinese interpretative approaches significantly increased their psychological complexity over time, given the greater leeway to discuss "evil" beyond the social after the Cultural Revolution, the ethical-theological specific concern of *personified* evil remains largely marginalized or even neutralized, given the sensitive Christian dimension and the non-transcendental thrust of interpretation in China. However, some recent Chinese readings of the Russian "classics" venture into the religious background of the concept of evil more outspokenly, connecting it, notably though, with a self-assertive cultural identity position via-à-vis "the West", presumably mirrored in the Russian case.

The following chapter (CHEN) takes inspiration from FOUCAULT to zoom closer into the role of the consciousness of the dark and mad as a mode to deal with modern "Westernized" civilization by intertwining the Russian critical "response" to the latter of 19th century writer GOGOL with the famous Republican-era Chinese writer LU Xun 魯迅 (1881–1936), a dedicated reader (and translator) of GOGOL. In this context, the chapter attempts to go beyond the conventional paradigm of "influence" of GOGOL on LU Xun by asking what might have induced LU Xun to pick up on this particular Russian writer in many ways so different in ideological outlook. Beyond the obvious literary referencing of GOGOL by LU Xun, most famously with the figure of the "madman" who writes a diary to expose the society he lives in (if with a decidedly different thrust of argument in the case of LU Xun who ends his story with a return of the "madman" to "normality"), the

Ukrainian-Russian GOGOL and the Chinese LU Xun have more things in common. Notably, they both reflect in parallel parts of the respective “self’s” “little tradition” (Robert REDFIELD), GOGOL, himself from “Little Russia”, more precisely the Ukraine, by referring repeatedly in his early works to Ukrainian folk tales told in the evening, brimming with demons, goblins, and other weird creatures, and LU Xun by referring to China’s “little tradition” of tales of the strange and miraculous in popular literature. They therewith open up the respective indigenous marginalized realms of a consciousness of the dark and mad in a centralized, supposedly rational, and illuminated “Westernized”, but alienating modern world; positioned between fear and laughter, tragedy and comedy. However, LU Xun, a man of the 20th century and certainly no defender of the ancient régime, mirrors the rationality and modernity associated with “the West” doubly, precisely by integrating the Slavophile satirist GOGOL. In his prose, while attacking Chinese traditionalism, his own *bête noire*, with “carnivalesque” (BAKHTIN) means à la GOGOL, LU Xun thus puts the “Russian” lens in between China and “the West”, resulting in the blurring of a neat “self and other” division.

The next chapter (RODIONOV) considers more specifically the fictional representations of Russia by focusing on a genre with its own peculiarities: literary periodicals in China, which presented a view on foreign countries, mostly “Western” ones, but also addressing Russia, for a broader reading public in Republican times. The presentation modes included creative works, translations, and accompanying illustrations. By analyzing the range of representations in such a serial format with relatively shorter texts, the chapter focuses on the yet understudied side of the Nationalists to counter the usual preoccupation with the views of Chinese leftist writers on Soviet Russia. In these nationalist periodicals of 1930–1931, at the very high time of GMD-CCP animosity after the bloody end of the First United Front in 1927, and subsequent to the 1929 military clashes with the Soviet Union over the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, it becomes obvious that the sensitive topic of Russia was of considerable concern to the GMD no less. While the periodicals were designed to advertise nationalism in a literary format by the GMD-affiliated writers to counter the proletarian literature movement driven by the leftists, the strong link between literature and nation-building as perceived by them, for example, in Western Europe, extended also to Russia. In fact, a split image of “Russians” evolved in these periodicals between the “dangerous Reds” and the (often poor and émigré) “Whites”, seen on the streets of Shanghai, where the periodicals were published. Furthermore, the service of some “White” Russians in the GMD military also allowed for a personal contact of some of the GMD writers reflected in literary pieces, which moved the image of “Russians” beyond the exclusive “Soviet” definition. While the Soviets were predictably depicted very negatively in

the periodicals, partly based on personal experience by some GMD writers who had been held captive by the Soviets in the wake of the 1929 crisis, the “other Russians” were at times presented in a way to solicit sympathy from the Chinese readers for their difficult émigré status, longing to go back to “their” homeland. Furthermore, by reference to the Russian “peasant poets” who were supposed to stand for Russia’s true “national spirit”, an image of “another Russia” than the one embodied in the Communist Soviet Union was evoked, thus challenging the leftist monopoly on representations of “Russia” and suggesting that the Soviet Union was a deplorable aberration in the history of the Russian nation.

The final contribution in this part, chapter 9 (MONSCHEIN), presents a very different Chinese view on Soviet Russia in a later period. Here the focus is on recent mainland Chinese literature, mainly through the lens of the author WANG Meng 王蒙 (*1934) who embodies an intersection of the national and the private as a CCP member and former Minister of Culture of the PRC, but writing as an author about private memories as well. These bespeak his own strong emotional attachment to things Soviet and represent, to some degree, a generation growing up in the 1950s, developing a “romantic” relationship with the Soviet Union, and then having to live through the Sino-Soviet split and all that came thereafter as a kind of harsh, but sobering coming-of-age. By this, he stands for a generation mourning its lost ideals, but also reminding present-day PRC society of this part of its own history by now largely relegated to the “subconscious”. Therefore, the chapter argues, his literary “memorial” to the Soviet Union, published fifteen years after the latter’s end, is a very conscious choice and goes well beyond a simple nostalgia. WANG’s writings furthermore demonstrate the decisive role of intangible Soviet-Russian heritage, not the least manifested in literature and film but also songs and music, which created and sustained this lasting emotional attachment of a whole generation of mainland Chinese, even if not necessarily knowledgeable in the Russian language. While film and literature were received in translation, music did not need any “translation” for speaking “to the heart”. However, the music and songs WANG refers to in his semiautobiographical writings are of themselves interlaced with Western cultural modes as well (for example TCHAIKOVSKY’s (ЧАЙКОВСКИЙ) *Capriccio Italien*, integrating Italian street music motifs), and at the same time with traditional Russian (including “Little Russian”) popular culture. This interwoven texture links “Russia”, “the West”, and China, literature and music, memory and desire, the political and the personal, the “self” and the “other(s)” in a free and playful way comparable to the literary-musical form of a *Capriccio* to commemorate the Soviet Union, and China’s (and WANG’s) own past at the same time. This “realm of memory”, though, is by the author supposed to inform but not block any new turn life in China is going to take. But it claims, against

present-day Russian as well as Chinese official memory politics, the legacy of this particular past as something due to be addressed, not repressed. In this, WANG is supported by other Chinese writers who might differ in their evaluation of the Soviet Union and even might rather prefer a broader take on “Russia” such as writer and painter FENG Jicai 冯骥才 (*1942) with his pronounced interest in daily life and popular culture, be it in China or in Russia. FENG, however, had also learnt the language, in contrast to WANG, and accessed “Russia” in more varied ways. But in spite of their differences, there is a shared belief that the memory of the past needs to be preserved in all its complexity and with all the conflicting emotions this may raise, for better or for worse, in a present-day mainland Chinese society tending to (or being induced to) forget and ignore this particular history as part of the “self”.

The third part in this volume, dealing with visual and material representations, starts with a look into a popular genre, the traditional Chinese *nianhua* 年畫 (New Year prints) of late imperial times which had a broad dissemination and formed images of foreigners and things foreign (mostly Western ones) for a broader public (STAROVOITOVA). Russian China scholars collected these popular woodblock prints systematically over years, resulting in a remarkable holding of this form of folk art in St. Petersburg today. The *nianhua* testify to a visual *imaginaire* for “the masses”. They were at times ordered and distributed as a way to criticize or satirize foreigners, namely Christians, by local elites perceiving themselves endangered by foreign encroachment and competition. The visual representations on these anti-Christian *nianhua* could serve to encourage societal xenophobic outbursts resulting in physical attacks on foreign and Chinese Christians with at times fatal outcomes. The negative stereotyping of foreign missionaries, Christian beliefs, and claimed societal “scandalous” behavior diverging from Chinese traditional norms mixed mockery with puns and visual negative signs like the use of green color for depravity familiar to the broader public from theatre performances. The *nianhua* were, however, not all satirizing and criticizing foreigners, but also put to use in the opposite sense, i.e. to advertise “modern” trends and fashions by those positively interested in the “Western” lifestyle. Here, the topic of women and (modern) schooling played a significant part, popularizing new ideas on gender roles and education with this widespread and affordable genre. This shows that the popular *nianhua* genre was attractive to people with widely diverging views. At times, the *nianhua* just reflected the simple fact of foreign things having become part of Chinese life already (or at least attest to the perceived desirability of such things), be it Western-style clothing or bicycles, while other *nianhua* were used to project wishful thinking in theatre-like fashion vis-à-vis the foreign/foreigners in this visual medium for a broader public.

This “mass-oriented” approach is continued in chapter 11 (GULEVA) with the (Western) format of cartoons representing foreigners, here namely those of the “West” which sometimes included Russians, notably both Soviet and “White”, in the mid-1930s. As this chapter demonstrates, the categories of “Russia” and “the West” very much depended on the viewpoint and were contingent on time circumstances. Thus, in the Chinese cartoon magazines of 1934–1937 considered in more detail, even Soviet Russia often appeared along with “Western” countries, since the main concern at the time was national power vs. weakness. In this context, the Soviet Union was as much a global player in power politics as Western countries. In cultural contexts, in turn, the concept of “European” was prevalent, again including the Russians. Here, the intersection with “race” is apparent, too, as the “Russians” were seen as part of the “white race”, and “race” was a central concern in GMD China. On the other hand, political systems suggested different groupings at the time, given the totalitarian regimes in Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union, typically also identified with their single power-holders MUSSOLINI, HITLER, and STALIN personally, or with the emblems of their respective regimes, as opposed to other “Western” nations subscribing to democracy, and therefore also less prone to stable personalization in representation. This often was substituted by a tagging with flags, for example. In the perspective of imperialism and/or capitalism, dividing lines were potentially different again. Thus, in the cartoon magazines, China was rather constructed as a “victim” alongside other global fellow victims of power politics and economic exploitation. These “fellow victims” included Ethiopia / Abyssinia which was attacked by fascist Italy at the time, with the League of Nations, perceived by the Chinese as de facto representing “the West”, only standing by, just passing some resolutions. This reminded Chinese readers of the situation in Manchuria where the League’s critical investigation into the Japanese invasion of 1931 (the “Manchurian incident”) had equally not proved very helpful. The Spanish Republic, in turn, had entered into Civil War in 1936, presented in the Chinese cartoon magazines as torn between Fascists and Communists more foreign than domestic, foreboding intensifying foreign threat and interference also in China. While Ethiopia was praised for its at least initial try to fight back the Italians, different from the Indian GANDHI-model, i.e. opposing the British colonizers with nonviolent means only, which was mocked as naive by the Chinese cartoonists, the implicit suggestion was for China to take a tougher stand against foreign encroachment. The plight of the helpless Spanish people in between the belligerents, in turn, solicited sympathy, and simultaneously expressed Chinese fears of a similar fate. This way, the “others” were depicted with an implicit reference to the Chinese “self”. On the other hand, real-life destitute foreigners, namely the émigré Russians on Shanghai’s streets where the cartoon

magazines were published, were looked down upon as White “failed cases”, contrasting badly with the “successful” Westerners far away, above all now intending the Americans, which in spite of all continued to serve as global trendsetters also for Chinese daily life. Still, the feeling that behind the attractive appearance of “the West”, for China herself, nothing but doom was in store, was palpable in the cartoon magazines during this period immediately preceding the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Chapter 12 (SAMOYLOV) continues the thread of visual representations of Russia (i.e. now the Soviet Union) and “the West” in “mass-oriented” media (including the “new” *nianhua*-genre as well as cartoons or public posters) into the 1950s to early 1970s, and thus into the times of the Cold War. At this point, the PRC constructed the public imagery of “the West” clearly in confrontational terms, while the image of the “Soviets” shifted completely over this period. The primary dividing line of systemic alliances, i.e. the “capitalist” and the “socialist camp”, clearly situated the Soviet Union and “the West”, primarily represented now by the U.S., as opposed to each other. During the 1950s, the Soviet Union was *the* reference for China, captured in the image of the “elder brother” and “teacher”, and this Sino-Soviet “honeymoon” period was reflected accordingly in the visual *imaginaire* via different publicly accessible formats to reach out to all kinds of target groups. However, the downturn of Sino-Soviet relations after STALIN reconfigured the imagery, with the Soviet Union growing from a friend into a competitor and finally a foe, though still different from the enemy “West”. This is tangible in the visual representations. For example, the Chinese derogatory “paper tiger” image propagated by MAO Zedong 毛泽东 (1893–1976) to encourage the Chinese “self” against a seemingly potent “other”, remained exclusive to the U.S. / “the West”. The Soviet Union, though, was never addressed as a “paper tiger”, but was characterized after the Sino-Soviet split and in the context of the Chinese Cultural Revolution as a hotbed of “revisionists” which still are in the “socialist camp”, but have gone ideologically astray. What paralleled both “enemies” of the PRC at that point, however, was the Chinese fear of military confrontation. Before, it had been “only” the U.S. / “the West” engaged on the “other side” in the Korean War in the 1950s as well as in the Indochina War of the 1950s–1970s. But after the Sino-Soviet split, tensions were mounting also with the Soviet Union, in the end a direct neighbor of the PRC with a long common border. The Chinese uneasiness created by witnessing Soviet interference in other parts of the (socialist) world received a boost by the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clash as a first military confrontation with the former “elder brother” which was accordingly reflected in Chinese posters and cartoons. The latter were designed for a Chinese public to reassure them of the

PRC's military strength, while diplomacy discretely tried to save the situation by preparing for a new rapprochement with the U.S.

The following chapter (CHIANG) leads us to Taiwan and adds to the discussion of imagery and perception the important aspect of intangible vs. tangible heritage by looking into the “revival” of the Russian Orthodox Church in Taiwan. Starting from the physical fact of a small Russian Orthodox chapel found in Taipei today, the chapter sets out to trace the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in Taiwan, discovering the crucial importance of intangible heritage, since the history of that Church could hardly refer to something enduring and tangible. Most of the latter had disappeared over time between Japanese colonialism (1895–1945) and the subsequent shift to the National People's Party (GMD/KMT) rule, given the Cold War and the suspicion raised by anything Russian in anti-Communist Taiwan. Furthermore, the personal composition of the community was subject to continuous change as well between temporary joining Japanese before 1945, émigré Russians, and the few local Taiwanese Orthodox believers. The post-WWII situation connected the few émigré Russians in Taiwan, sometimes wives of U.S.-aviators of the “Flying Tigers” volunteer unit helping the Chinese against the Japanese in WWII, with “the West” in political terms, while their Orthodox faith made them distinct. Still, with Japan, the former point of reference for the Orthodox faithful in Taiwan due to the colonial condition, as well as Taiwan now being under the wings of the U.S. during Cold War times, ecclesiastic relations with the Moscow Patriarchate which tried to claim control, were at first a problem. Taiwan thus linked up with the rivalling Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR). After the end of martial law in Taiwan in 1987 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, things Russian became easier to “revive”. “Naming” was one of the ways this could be done to create a “realm of memory”, while inner-ecclesiastic tensions between the rivalling Patriarchate of Moscow and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople interfered “from above” with the tradition-building practices of the faithful “from below”. To anchor their legacy also in a tangible way, the faithful thus (re)created their Russian Orthodox Church with a chapel in Taipei.

Chapter 14 (L1) takes us back to the PRC and to the focus on the tangible, looking at Harbin, the most Russian city in China, and how the normal people dealt, and deal, with “European”, mostly de facto Russian, architecture so strongly represented and inherited in their city, and the conflicting emotions these buildings at times raised. While the Soviet-Russian architecture de facto often took inspiration from Western Europe, the distinct Soviet style was seen as a model for socialist buildings in the PRC, also beyond Harbin. But in Harbin which as a city was created by the Russians, Russian architecture is a defining feature and thus closely connected to local identity issues. During PRC times, the admiration for the Soviet

style stood in contrast to the ideological antagonism to “imperialism” and “colonialism” represented by older European-style buildings. The main thrust of Cultural Revolution destruction thus was directed against a “Russianness” represented by, above all, churches, while the Soviet-style buildings were rather perceived as standing for “socialism” and thus spared. In commercialized post-Cultural Revolution China, though, the exotic flair of the Russian/European architecture is a selling point in city branding, appearing also on posters and other visual formats. In the bid to attract tourists, even reconstructions of “lost” (i.e. previously consciously destroyed) heritage in theme parks are seen as viable means, while in literature, art, and daily life, the Russian architectural heritage functions as a tangible site for (nostalgic) remembrance. Not the least the Russian churches with onion domes or in a Byzantine style are iconized as an unquestionable symbol of Russianness which mark the latter as distinct from a general “Westernness”. Similar moves to preserve or reconstruct outstanding foreign buildings as in Shandong, for example, with German colonial architecture, underline the fact that the Chinese “self” has been tied to the tangible heritage of “others” in the context of a local identity definition also with regard to the “West” at other places in China, too.

Chapter 15 (MÜLLER) tackles the ambivalence of tangible heritage of foreigners in China from the peculiar angle of Western and Russian tombs and cemeteries still extant in Greater China, posing the question as to whose “heritage” this actually is. While foreign architecture may be reused, altered or erased, tombs are more problematic since they involve human remains beyond the tombstones and cannot be used in any other way, nor can they be altered. They can be erased, though. Any decision of keeping them or not is sensitive on personal, religious, and political-diplomatic levels, and if they are kept, they need to be looked after. Thus, the question arises as to whose heritage this is, as tombs are first of all private, but may also be nationalized, for example in the case of “Soviet martyrs” or the military in general. They also challenge the view of the Chinese “self” by reminding the present society of the lingering impact of the foreign “others”, regardless whether these recall a happy or an unhappy “common” history, and pose the question as to how the present societies in Greater China want to deal with this legacy: accept it, relativize it, or repress it. With a look to the different “Chinese” settings in Macau, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China, and the focus on Western and Russian tombs and their tangible and visual presence, which mark their “otherness” and peculiarity to the surrounding societies, this chapter concludes this volume on Chinese perceptions of Russia and the West during the 20th century.

The final remarks (SAMOYLOV) elaborate on some more general implications of the whole book, arguing for the need to expand the still nascent field of imagological studies to connect with wider trends in scholarship. Beyond

scholarship, though, the social relevance of perceptions and images of “the other/s” needs to be accounted for, not the least for addressing possible conflicts engendered by them. In short, there is also a societal necessity to recognize not only the importance of facts, but also the impact of perceptions and images on human behavior, to further attempts at peace-keeping in a complex world.

Part I

TEXTBOOKS

Aleksandrs DMITRENKO

I The Image of Russia and the West in Chinese History Textbooks, 1900–1949

Abstract. The present chapter analyzes the image of Russia and the West in Chinese history textbooks published in the period between 1900 and 1949. It is aimed at revealing possible changes, continuities, and contingencies. Both Russia and the West are described through the same categories, which define their image as either liberalists and leaders of progress or aggressors and imperialists. Chinese textbooks associate Russia with the West, but often present it as the most despotic and aggressive representative of the West. At the same time it can be said that Russia stands in a certain opposition to the rest of the Western countries. There is a duality to the image of the West. The image of the Western countries in national history due to aggression and wars is mostly negative. In world history, the Western countries are portrayed as not only the imperialists, but also act as the authors of such concepts as human rights and constitution, liberalism; they are the creators of the Industrial Revolution and proponents of the development of science and progress.

Keywords. Chinese history textbooks, late Qing, Republican China, the Image of the West, the Image of Russia.

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Introduction

During the period under review, China had experienced crucial changes in terms of regime, self-identification, and many other aspects including the education policy. Bearing in mind those changes in curricula that took place in turbulent years between the Xinhai Revolution (Xinhai geming 辛亥革命, 1911) and the establishment of the Nanjing regime of the Nationalist Party (Guomindang 國民黨, GMD) in 1928, and the changes that took place during WWII (1939–1945),¹ the present chapter divides this time span into three periods.² The above-mentioned historical events are considered the most crucial for identifying possible changes. The three periods include 1900–1911 (late Qing era); 1912–1928 (the establishment of the Republic of China and the Warlord Era); 1928–1949 (the Nanjing decade, Sino-Japanese War, and the time before the establishment of the PRC).

The late Qing textbooks were produced before a national school system was established and hence the authors were free to design them, but used the Japanese and Western textbooks as the model, while also integrating the Chinese tradition.³ In the early Republican Era, regulations became more detailed but were firstly related to the change of terminology. The early 1920s historiography reflects a China decentered approach to history, which “was experimental and free to a degree hardly achieved again in the coming years”⁴

I would like to express my gratitude to all my colleagues in this project for advice and support, especially to Prof. G. MÜLLER-SAINI and Mariana MÜNNING. My sincere thanks also go to Daniel GERICHHAUSEN from the Institute of Oriental and Asian Studies (University of Bonn) for translating parts of the Japanese article on HONDA Asajirō. Finally, I would like to thank my wife Anastasia DMITRENKO for her support and concern.

1 Since 1923, regulations became much more detailed than those produced earlier, and name the exact topics that needs to be discussed in textbooks. For the overview of curricula change in the 20th century see: Gotelind MÜLLER: “Teaching ‘the others’ history” in Chinese schools: the state, cultural asymmetries and shifting images of Europe (from 1900 to today). In: *Designing History in East Asian Textbooks: Identity Politics and Transnational Aspirations*, London and New York: Routledge 2011, pp. 32–59.

2 I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. LI Fan from Beijing for advising to avoid distinguishing the 1920s as a separate period, and view the period from 1912 to 1928 as a whole.

3 Gotelind MÜLLER: “Teaching ‘the others’ history” (2011), p. 34; WONG, K.C. “Chinese history textbook writing in Late Ch’ing China”, 1986, unpublished thesis, University of Hong Kong; Peter ZARROW: *Educating China: knowledge, society and textbooks in a modernizing world, 1902 – 1937*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2015, pp. 13–15; Q. Edward WANG: *Inventing China Through History: The May Fourth Approach to Historiography*, Albany: State University of New York Press 2001, p. 15.

4 Gotelind MÜLLER: “Teaching ‘the others’ history” (2011), p. 36.

The GMD's ascension to power 1927–1928 led to a more nationalistic educational policy. Nationalism and patriotism were not a new ideology for Chinese intellectuals of the 1930s; nevertheless, an educational reform took place in those years, and during that period the state was able to assert greater control over publishing houses and considerably restricted the independence of private schools.⁵ The year 1931 stands as a certain benchmark when the Nationalist Government requested the League of Nations to prepare a plan for comprehensive education reform.⁶ During the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and in the subsequent period prior to the establishment of the PRC, the GMD, undoubtedly, did not exercise total control over a large part of the country, but not as much attention was paid to education during the wartime in general. Textbooks and curricula were “barely altered during these turbulent years”;⁷ hence, the textbooks produced at that time will be considered as part and product of preceding reforms.

In the choice of textbooks for analysis we first of all focus on the most influential publishing houses of the time, such as, Wenming shuju 文明書局, which contributed a lot to publishing industry and raised several famous publishers and editors before it was incorporated into Zhonghua shuju 中華書局 in 1915;⁸ Zhonghua shuju and the Commercial Press (Shangwu yinshuguan 商務印書館) as one of the oldest and most influential publishing houses; and Beixin shuju 北新書局 as an important textbook publishing house in the 1920s–1930s.⁹ In the choice of textbooks this chapter firstly focuses on textbooks that had several editions, but also consults less popular textbooks to reveal the scope of interpretations. The textbooks are from primary school to senior secondary school, prepared for the students from the ages of 6 to 18.

The comparison of the images of Russia and the West in national history (*ben-guoshi* 本國史) and Western (or World/Foreign) history textbooks will let us

5 Peter ZARROW: *Educating China* (2015), pp. 25–28; Helen R. CHAUNCEY: *Schoolhouse Politicians: Locality and State During the Chinese Republic*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1992, pp. 144–172.

6 Suzanne PEPPER: Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-century China: The search for ideal development model, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996, pp. 37–45.

7 Alisa JONES: “Changing the Past to Serve the Present: History Education in Mainland China”. In: Edward VICKERS, Alisa JONES (eds.): *History Education and National Identity in East Asia*, New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group 2005, p. 71.

8 ZHOU Lirong, 周利榮: “Wenming shuju kao” 文明書局考 (Investigating Wenming Publishing House). In: *Chuban shiliao* 出版史料 (Publication Archives) no. 2, 2007, p. 97.

9 CHEN Shuping 陈树萍: “Beixin shuju yu Zhongguo xiandai wenxue” 北新书局与中国现代文学 (Beixin Publishing House and Contemporary Chinese Literature). PhD Thesis. East China Normal University, 2006. Most Chinese publishing houses were originally established in Shanghai. For a historical overview of the development of the printing and publishing industry in Shanghai see: Christopher A. REED: *Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876–1937*, Vancouver: UBC Press 2004.

identify the common image and conclude on what and to what extent has changed. The very terminology “negative” or “positive” does not provide much space for discussion, and, therefore, we will also explore what exactly has changed and to what extent, how much space is devoted to particular events, countries, or figures, and finally what the main shifts in the representation of the topic are.

The methodology used in this chapter relies on the methods specified in *the UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research*. This includes a comprehensive analysis of the content and vertical analysis that helps to investigate how the presentation of a topic has changed over time, as well as qualitative and linguistic methods that provide answers to the questions: What is the general message of the text? In what context are terms placed? Is the text emotionally loaded? Are the protagonists considered to be “victims” or “perpetrators”?¹⁰

The Image of the West in Chinese History Textbooks, 1900–1911

There is a duality of the image of the West in textbooks during the whole period that I focus on in the present chapter. Western countries in general since the Portuguese coming to China in the 16th century are presented in the national history textbooks as aggressors; nonetheless, such figures as Marco POLO (1254–1324) and the Jesuit missionary Matteo RICCI (1552–1610) are not directly associated with aggression. The former is acknowledged as the traveler who praised China and was able to establish connections between China and the West, and the latter as the missionary who admired Chinese culture, spoke Chinese and brought Western Learning (*xixue* 西學) to the mainland. The two are barely mentioned in Qing times, but they became more important in early republican times. In the world history textbooks, the Western countries, on the one hand, represent imperialism, absolutism, and colonialism; on the other hand, they brought to the world ideas of freedom, equality, human rights, constitutionalism, and made a great impact on the development of arts, philosophy, and literature, scientific and technological progress. In most cases, the textbooks transmit the same interpretations, “clichés”¹¹, or provide facts, without stating any concrete interpretative angle. This

10 Falk PINGEL: *UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision*. 2nd revised and updated ed., Paris/Braunschweig: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2010, pp. 30–32; 68–71.

11 Such as the influence of the Arab countries on the Renaissance, etc.

changes during the GMD times, when the textbooks focus on imperialism, foreign aggression, nationalism, and the San-min Doctrine¹².

In the analysis of the “Western history” textbooks for the late Qing period, this chapter applies *Zhongdeng Xiyangshi jiaokeshu* (1904) edited by the Japanese author OGAWA Ginjirō 小川銀次郎. It also applies *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi jiaokeshu* (1905) ed. by Chinese official QIN Ruijie 秦瑞玠 (1874–?), who used to study law in Japan and was familiar with the Japanese education system. They provide a similar description despite being produced by two different authors. Remarkably, in certain cases they provide identical parts of a text. This reveals that QIN used the textbook by OGAWA while adding his own interpretations. The focus will be placed more on the textbook produced by QIN since he represents the Chinese historiographical school. Apart from that, other textbooks will also be referred to in order to provide more examples of characteristics found in the textbooks of the late Qing Era.

The textbooks were produced during the period later called by the PRC scholars “century of humiliation” (1839–1949). In the context of foreign aggression in China at that time, the duality of the image of the West in Chinese “national history” textbooks is understandable. On the one hand, the aggressor cannot be portrayed positively; on the other, China had to admit its weakness in comparison to the Great Powers (including Japan) and move away from the idea of China being the center of the civilized world. This was a new position, which China had to adapt to.¹³ As indicated by many scholars the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) became the turning point in the realization of one’s own weakness,¹⁴ but even before the

12 *Sanmin zhuyi* 三民主義 or the San-min Doctrine (also translated as The Three Principles of the People) is a political philosophy or ideology developed by the first president of the Republic of China SUN Yat-sen 孫中山 (1866–1925), which champions the principles of nationalism, democracy, and the People’s welfare, in order to “save the nation/country”.

13 Axel SCHNEIDER on the challenges faced by Chinese intellectuals and historians in the late 19th century: “They had a). To develop a new understanding of Chinese history as part of a coherent vision of world history, thus making it possible b). To envision China as an at least equal member in the international community. At the same time they had c). To safeguard, if necessary, to create some sort of continuity with the past in order to provide a basis for a Chinese identity. They also had to d). Conceptualize history in a way that would make it possible for China to catch up if not surpass the West, and, last but not least, this e). Had to be achieved in the context of a tradition placing the historian in an elevated political position, thus putting him under considerable pressure to come up with a viable solution.” See: Axel SCHNEIDER: “Nation, History and Ethics: The choices of Post Imperial Historiography in China”. In: V. MURTHY and A. SCHNEIDER (eds.): *The Challenge of Linear Time: Nationhood and the Politics of History in East Asia*, Leiden, Boston: Brill 2014, p. 88.

14 Marianne BASTID: *Educational Reform in Early Twentieth-Century China* (P. BAILEY, Trans.), Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 1988, p. 7; Suzanne PEPPER: *Radicalism*

First Opium War (1839–1842) there was awareness of the possible aggression of Western powers. Q. Edward WANG remarks that GONG Zizhen 龔自珍 (1792–1841), social thinker from a traditional official scholar family, from the 1820s onward studied China's frontiers:

He hoped that the Qing rulers could fortify its northern border in order to ward off the Russian ambition. He also kept a vigilant eye on the English presence across the South China Sea. “The English,” GONG noted, “are indeed very cunning. (! A.D.) [If we] refused their demand, they would knock on our door, if we agree with them, the consequence would bring harm to the entire country”.¹⁵

Qing China (1644–1911) was an imperial state, but ideas of freedom, constitutionalism, as well as Social Darwinism can be found already in the late Qing textbooks. These ideas were promoted by such intellectuals and reformers as KANG Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927), LIANG Qichao 梁啓超 (1873–1929), and YAN Fu 嚴復 (1854–1921).¹⁶ The Japanese example of political reforms has inspired Chinese intellectuals, and, of course, the very structure and content of Japanese history textbooks¹⁷ was even more influential to Chinese textbooks. In the study materials analyzed in the present chapter, one can observe changes in the following areas: ideas, interpretation of events, figures, and countries.

Setting the goal of revealing the image of Russia and the West in Chinese history textbooks, this chapter will not provide an overlook of all the topics covered in textbooks, but rather mark tendencies and general topics that elucidate how the image has changed.

and Education Reform (1996), p. 57; Q. Edward WANG: *Inventing China Through History* (2001), p. 15.

15 Q. Edward WANG: *Inventing China Through History* (2001), p. 30.

16 James Reeve PUSEY: *China and Charles Darwin*, Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University 1983; Jonathan D. SPENCE: *The Search for Modern China*, New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company 1991, pp. 300–302.

17 For the history of education and development of history textbooks in Japan in the Meiji Era (1868–1912) see: Benjamin DUKE: *The History of Modern Japanese Education: Constructing the National School System, 1872–1890*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, London: Rutgers University Press 2009; James C. BAXTER: “Shaping National Historical Consciousness: Japanese History Textbooks in Meiji-Era Elementary Schools.” In: James C. BAXTER and Joshua A. FOGEL (eds.): *Writing Histories in Japan: Texts and Their Transformations from Ancient Times through the Meiji Era*, Kyoto: International Research Center for Japanese Studies 2007, pp. 317–350.

One of such tendencies in the late Qing textbooks was the discussion of the origin and development of races (*zhongzu yuanliu* 種族源流).¹⁸ As indicated by ZARROW in discussing the late Qing geographies, “racial distinctions were fundamental to textbooks.”¹⁹ This will change to a certain degree in the Republican era.

As already mentioned, the textbooks of that time represented a kind of mixture of Chinese and Western traditions. This is particularly seen with the causal interpretation as the fall of a state, which is a significant “concept” explained in a traditional way in Chinese historiography: decrease of state power; outer aggression; and corruption/decay of inner political power. This pattern is followed in explaining such events as the fall of the Roman Empire, the Partition of Poland, and the French Revolution etc. The monarch is usually referred to as a tyrant/despot who, by a despotic rule and by levying high taxes, lost “people’s hearts” (*shi minxin* 失民心). For instance, in the section on the constitution in England entitled “The germs/seeds of the constitution” King John is claimed to be very tyrannical (*duo nüezheng* 多虐政) and having lost people’s hearts, and in the 13th century all dukes rallied together (*qunqi* 羣起) and forced the king to establish a constitution.²⁰

QIN, while using the same pictures as from OGAWA’s textbook, not only provides the name of a historical figure but also comments on what this figure was famous for. In most cases, the comments bear positive associations. For instance, “Jesus Christ who advocated universal love”,²¹ Constantine the Great is mentioned as the “Constantine who recovered Rome”²² etc.

A large amount of pages are devoted to the Roman Pope and papal power. Notably, in the textbook by QIN, none of the Popes are named; hence, the figure of the Pope represents power or function. The Pope is described as a despotic ruler, whose power was limitless,²³ and the Catholic Church is presented as the power that obstructed people from progressive development in science. The concept of the “dark ages” is explained by the statement that people’s knowledge decreased because Greek/Latin culture was completely brushed away (*saodi wuyu* 掃地無餘). Hence, people had superstitious beliefs and people deep down in their hearts trusted the Pope (*jiaohuang zui wei renxin suoxin* 教皇最為人心所信).²⁴

18 QIN Ruijie 秦瑞玠 (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi jiaokeshu, juanshang*, 高等小學西洋歷史教科書, 卷上 (Senior Primary School Textbook on the History of the West, vol. 1), Shanghai: Shanghai wenming shuju 1905, pp. 22, 29, 30.

19 Peter ZARROW: *Educating China* (2015), p. 227.

20 QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 1 (1905), p. 35.

21 Ibid., p. 20; OGAWA Ginjirō 小川銀次郎 (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi jiaokeshu, juanyi*, 中等西洋史教科書, 卷一 (Secondary School Textbook on the History of the West, vol. 1), Shanghai: Wenming shuju 1904, p. 18.

22 QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 1 (1905), pp. 20, 21.

23 QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 1–2 (1905).

24 Ibid., vol. 1 (1905), p. 32.

The Japanese author in particular talks about the collaboration of Charles the Great and the Roman Pope, and states that Charles the Great very much supported people's education. At the same time, he talks about collisions between them.²⁵ One of the more confusing and unequivocal topics is the role of the Mongols in China and their relations with the outside world. The Mongols are named as an independent race (distinct from the Chinese) and the Song (960–1279) as the dynasty conquered by them.²⁶ The textbooks talk specifically about the Mongol empire, not associating the Mongols only with the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368, fig. 1-1). Nonetheless, both textbooks discuss the relations of the Pope and the Yuan dynasty, and provide different interpretations. OGAWA states that the Pope sent representatives to Yuan China because he had heard of the military glory of the Yuan (*wen Yuan zhi weiming* 聞元之威名)²⁷ while QIN states he was shaken by or afraid of Yuan military glory (*zhen qi weiming* 震其威名).²⁸



Figure 1-1: Map of “The Mongol Empire”²⁹

25 OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 1 (1904), pp. 4, 5, 7, 8.

26 QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 1 (1905), pp. 38, 39; OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 1 (1904), p. 10.

27 OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 1 (1904), p. 10.

28 QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 1 (1905), p. 39.

29 Source: QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 1 (1905), p. 39.

In many aspects Chinese textbooks reflect the knowledge conveyed in Western textbooks. For instance, the result of the Crusades is associated with the end of feudalism, getting rid of the trammels of dukes and the Church, development of the city-states, trade, and gaining knowledge from the Muslim/Arab countries, which contributed to the scientific and academic development.³⁰ This is quite general knowledge, which is in a sense typical of western textbooks.

The East-West contacts are not as emphasized, but there is an attempt to reveal these connections. QIN indicates that the Xiongnu (ca. 3 BC – 3 AD) nomadic peoples who, according to Chinese sources, used to inhabit territories to the North of China; were suppressed by the Chinese, and went to the West and invaded Europe.³¹ It suggests that by mentioning this the author is attempting to integrate China into world history and reveal the influence of the events taking place in China upon the world.

The Reformation is explained via two main claims: firstly that the Church was corrupt (*fubai* 腐敗) and thus revealing the despotism of the Pope (“the Pope kept doing evil things without a sense of repentance” (*hu'e bu quan* 恕惡不悛)); secondly the increase in knowledge (“recovery of the ancient knowledge” (*xueshu fugu* 學術復古)).³² At the same time, the Reformation is viewed as closely connected to political affairs, and consequently, several wars and independence of states are discussed in this context. For instance, the French Wars of Religion (1562–1598), the independence of the Netherlands, the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), etc.

The French Revolution (1789), on the one hand, seems to be associated by some textbooks (but not all) with a riot and chaos because the character *luan* 亂 can be found in the titles of the chapter or sections on the French Revolution (Falanxi geming zhi luan 法蘭西革命之亂).³³ On the other hand, naming it the Great French Revolution (Faguo dageming 法國大革命) bears positive connotations. What can be said undoubtedly, the authors definitely stand in solidarity with those who opposed “the cruel and despotic reign” of the French kings. They stress that the French scholars (*ru* 儒) studied the English constitution. One can find a picture of ROUSSEAU (1712–1778) with a subtitle “Rousseau who glorified civil rights” (*changqi minquan zhi Lusao* 唱起民權之盧騷).³⁴ Only one textbook talks of the French

30 OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1904), pp. 10–12; QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 1 (1905), pp. 34, 35.

31 QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 1 (1905), pp. 22, 23.

32 Ibid., p. 37.

33 Shangwu yinshuguan bianyisuo (ed.): *Zuixin zhongxue jiaokeshu*, vol. 2 (1906), p. 321.

34 QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 2 (1905), p. 19. ROUSSEAU with his ideas of equality and social contract was a particularly popular figure among Chinese intellectuals of the time, such as LIU Shipei 劉師培 (1884–1919) and LIANG Qichao. See: Peter

Revolution as a warning, but, again, it says that the great countries changed their policy (obviously, despotic policy) taking the French Revolution as a warning (*gujian* 龜鑒).³⁵ It also states that the French led Europe to republicanism.³⁶

The USA as the country that opposed absolutism and proclaimed a constitution, as well as abolished slavery, has quite a positive image. The USA is also presented as the country, which helped Mexico to attain independence, with the help of the Monroe Doctrine which opposed the European colonialism in the Americas.³⁷

Poland and “Turkey” (i.e. the Ottoman Empire, 1299–1922) are viewed as the warning for future generations, of what can happen to the Qing Empire. For instance, one of the textbooks views “Turkey” as the victim of Russian aggression and states that “only the Sultan’s mistreatment of Christians is a cultural disgrace, suggesting that the diplomatic problems were born out of that. Our country’s people can do nothing but take it as an example/warning for future generations (*gujian* 龜鑒).”³⁸

The textbooks also pay attention to the topic of European aggression in Africa and Asia but do not discuss it in detail. Nonetheless, by providing separate sections on Russo-British interactions in Central Asia, Sino-Russian relations and Sino-French relations, the authors highlight these relations as the most important for them. Having provided a general overview of the situation in the World, in the next chapter the authors finally talk about the development of civilization, science and technology, as well as improvements in education, the military sphere and even politics.³⁹ Such a positive view seems to be aimed at revealing to students how well the government is dealing with the ongoing situation and how the world is becoming a better place to live in.

The Renaissance as an important cultural phenomenon is discussed in all textbooks, but the interpretations and the very terminologies vary from textbook to textbook. Different textbooks refer to it as *guxue fuxing* 古學復興 (“the revival of the ancient learning”) or *wenyun fuxing* 文運復興 (“the revival of the fate of

ZARROW: *Educating China* (2015), p. 96; Peter ZARROW: *After Empire: The Conceptual Transformation of the Chinese State, 1884–1924*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2012, pp. 104–110.

35 Shangwu yinshuguan bianyisuo (ed.): *Zuixin zhongxue jiaokeshu*, vol. 2 (1906), p. 321.

36 Ibid.

37 OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 4 (1904), pp. 15, 16; QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 2 (1905), pp. 38, 39.

38 Shangwu yinshuguan bianyisuo (ed.): *Zuixin zhongxue jiaokeshu*, vol. 2 (1906), p. 405.

39 OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 4 (1904), pp. 22–24; QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 2 (1905), pp. 42–44.

culture”) or even *guxue changming* 古學昌明 (“thriving of the ancient learning”).⁴⁰ While QIN explains the emergence of the Renaissance by connections with the Arab countries and getting rid of the Church’s authority, other textbooks talk about the Renaissance as a kind of natural phenomenon of the time.⁴¹ The trade and influence of the Arab culture are acknowledged, but not as the most crucial factors for the Renaissance. A more complicated explanation of the Renaissance phenomenon seems to be neglected later, and a more simplified explanation as in the textbook by QIN became widespread in the Republican Era. Remarkably, none of the textbooks mentions the printing press as the Chinese invention, but rather name Johannes GUTENBERG (c. 1400–1468) as the inventor.⁴² This reveals the overwhelming influence of western textbooks.

The main countries mentioned in the textbooks are the Holy Roman Empire (800–1806, Germany), France, Britain⁴³, Spain, Portugal, Italy, “Turkey”, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, Russia, Poland, the USA, Italy, Greece, Belgium, and the Netherlands.⁴⁴ The Great Powers associated with imperialism or colonialism are Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands. France is also associated with ideas of liberty (freedom), the fight for a constitution, and the republic. Britain is also associated with the constitution, parliament, and scientific progress. “Turkey” and Poland in contrast to these states are presented as victims of aggression. Greece, Belgium, and the USA are associated with the fight for independence and freedom.

In terms of the “national history” (*benguoshi* 本國史), Western countries are associated with aggression. Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands are seen as the main European powers that created colonies in Asia before the 19th century and were fighting for trade rights in China. The Portuguese as the first and main representatives of European power in China are described as invaders who rent the territory.⁴⁵ Britain, France, and Russia are mentioned in the context of the Opium

40 QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 1 (1905), p. 41; OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1904), p. 15; Shangwu yinshuguan bianyisuo (ed.): *Zuixin zhongxue jiaokeshu*, vol. 1 (1906), p. 181.

41 OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1904), p. 15; Shangwu yinshuguan bianyisuo (ed.): *Zuixin zhongxue jiaokeshu*, vol. 1 (1906), pp. 181–192.

42 OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1904), p. 15; QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 1 (1905), p. 42; Shangwu yinshuguan bianyisuo (ed.): *Zuixin zhongxue jiaokeshu*, vol. 1 (1906), p. 188.

43 All textbooks use the term Yingguo 英國 or Ying 英, which, depending on the time discussed in the textbook, is translated in this chapter as either Britain or England.

44 Textbooks normally do not indicate historical names of the countries they discuss, but refer to them as nation-states.

45 *Putong xin lishi duben* (1901), p. 111; YAO Zuyi (ed.): *Zuixin gaodeng xiaoxue Zhongguo lishi*, vol. 4 (1906), pp. 33, 34.

Wars (1839–42; 1856–60), the Sino-French War (1884–1885), and border as well as trade treaties.

The textbooks name China's and India's richness (*furao* 富饒), which was admired or longed for (*mu* 慕) by Europeans, as the reason for the Europeans coming to Asia.⁴⁶ The British are described as the one who swallowed the whole of India (*bingtun qi quantu* 并吞其全土), and then reached China at a gallop (*qinqin* 騁駿).⁴⁷ This definitely indicates that the Chinese viewed India as a warning for what might be/or is already happening to China.

The Catholic Church coming to China in turn is claimed to be the result of its loss of power in Western Europe.⁴⁸ Normally, no specific figures are mentioned in the context of the East-West contacts. Only one textbook mentions Matteo RICCI as an Italian missionary,⁴⁹ but later discusses the prohibition of the Catholic Church in China. The text also states that every country (meaning European countries) demanded, by force, reimbursement, claiming that it was in the name of “religious protection” (*hujiao* 護教). This led to clashes and the revolt called *quanfei zhi luan* 拳匪之亂, commonly known nowadays as the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901).⁵⁰ In this context, the name of Matteo RICCI can hardly be associated with anything positive. Another textbook indicates his impact on science (astronomy and calendar system/science, *lifa* 曆法), but it is hard to state if he is viewed as a positive or negative figure.⁵¹ Among the study materials analyzed in this chapter, only one mentions the Ming time (1368–1644) seafarer ZHENG He 鄭和 (1371–1433) and contends that 30 countries became China's vassal states in the result of his travel.⁵² The unpopularity of ZHENG He in textbooks can be explained by the fact

46 YAO Zuyi 姚祖義 (ed.): *Zuixin gaodeng xiaoxue Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu, di si ce* 最新高等小學中國歷史教科書, 第四冊 (The Most Recent Senior Primary School Textbook on Chinese History, vol. 4), Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan 1906, pp. 33, 34. The same in *Putong xin lishi duben* 普通新歷史讀本 (Ordinary New History Reader), n.p., 1901, p. 111 with the only difference that the author uses the term Zhina 支那 for “China”, which was used by the Japanese at the time.

47 YAO Zuyi (ed.): *Zuixin gaodeng xiaoxue Zhongguo lishi*, vol. 4 (1906), p. 34.

48 *Putong xin lishi duben* (1901), p. 112.

49 ZHANG Zhaotong 張肇桐 (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue guoshi jiaokeshu* 高等小學國史教科書 (Senior Primary School National History Textbook), Shanghai: Wenming shuju 1904, p. 67.

50 This is again quite a negative description of the Boxers. Here they are named as kind of “bandits” (the Boxer rebels), and the whole event is associated with unrest/rebellion. This will change in the republican era, when Yihetuan will be associated with a “movement” (yihetuan yundong 義和團運動) against foreigners.

51 *Putong xin lishi duben* (1901), pp. 112, 113.

52 QIAN Zonghan 錢宗翰 (ed.): *Chudeng xiaoxue Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu, di san ce* 初等小學中國歷史教科書, 第三冊 (Junior Primary School Chinese history textbook, vol. 3), Shanghai: Biaomeng shushi 1907, p. 5.

that his name was quite unknown before LIANG Qichao's publication "Biography of Our Homeland's Great Navigator, Zheng He" in 1904.⁵³

The Image of Russia, 1900–1911

The multiplicity of voices is one of the issues in the study of the image of both Russia and the West. This lies in the fact that different authors and publishing houses provide slightly different interpretations or ways of approaching a topic. For instance, the textbook by the Institute of Translation and Compilation of Commercial Press (1906)⁵⁴ stays highly critical in assessing Russia's role in both national and world history, which can be observed in the negative wording used to describe Russia and in representation of Russia as the biggest aggressor and "troublemaker" that causes *fear* even among other European states. In the section on "the Eastern Question", which was related to the policy of the European Great Powers toward the Ottoman Empire, it is said that Russia and Austria wanted to expand their territory by annexing the European part of "Turkey", and, therefore, "all European countries *were afraid* these two countries would unexpectedly expand" (*Ouzhou geguo kong er guo quanli zhoushang* 歐洲各國恐二國權力驟張).⁵⁵ In the section on the Crimean War (1853–1856), the text states: "Britain and France *were afraid* Russia would succeed in moving South" (*Ying-Fa zhuguo kong Eluosi dezhi yu nan* 英法諸國恐俄羅斯得志於南).⁵⁶ In the Russo-Turkish relations, Russia is labeled as the forerunner of aggression toward the Ottoman Empire (*Ouzhou zhi xiandao* 歐洲之先導).⁵⁷

Countries coming into conflict with Russia are depicted as victims of Russia's aggression: "Sweden *resists* to Russia" (*Ruidian yu E* 瑞典禦俄)⁵⁸, "Russia *again invades* Turkey" (*Eluosi zai qin Tujue* 俄羅斯再侵突厥), while "Turkey" resisted *utterly bravely* (*Tujue yu zhi yonghanmopi* 突厥禦之勇悍無匹)⁵⁹. In discussing

53 HUI Chun Hing 許振興: "Huangming zuxun yu Zheng He xia Xiyang" 《皇明祖訓》與鄭和下西洋 (Huangming zuxun and Zheng He's voyages to the Western Oceans). In: *Zhongguo wenhua yanjiusuo xuebao* 中國文化研究所學報 *Journal of Chinese Studies*, no. 51, 2010, pp. 67–85.

54 Shangwu yinshuguan bianyisuo (ed.): *Zuixin zhongxue jiaokeshu*, vol. 2 (1906).

55 Ibid., p. 301.

56 Ibid., p. 384.

57 Ibid., p. 301.

58 Ibid., p. 287.

59 Ibid., pp. 387–390.

Russia's domestic policy the textbook talks of a successive generation of Emperors as despotic rulers: even Alexander II, who promoted liberalism (*zizyouzhuyi* 自由主義), later came to accept an extreme form of tyrannical rule (*dayu zhuanzhi zhi ji* 達於專制之極); Alexander III abolished the already set constitution (*fei yi ding zhi xianfa* 廢已定之憲法) and specialized in suppression (*zhuanzhi yazhi* 專事壓制) and abusing Jews (*ntüedai youtairen* 虐待猶太人) etc.⁶⁰

Here are some more examples from other teaching materials, which, seemingly being slightly less critical of Russia, stay largely the same as the above-mentioned textbook in their major interpretive angle. In certain cases, the textbooks provide slightly different interpretations of certain events. Sometimes there are discrepancies in assessing some historical figures or Russia's role in concrete historical events. For instance, some textbooks refer to the king of Sweden Charles XII as a cruel, despotic ruler, who was later called "the Northern Napoleon", and this is claimed to be the reason why Peter the Great started the Great Northern War (1700–1721) against Sweden.⁶¹ Another textbook also mentions Charles XII as the "Northern Napoleon" but suggests that it was the original plan of Peter the Great to expand the territory of Russia to the Baltic Sea, which was part of Sweden, hence he made an alliance with Poland and Denmark to attack Sweden and divided it (*fenge* 分割). Nonetheless, the text does not apply any negative wording to describing the actions of Peter the Great. His actions are interpreted not as aggression toward Sweden but rather as necessity in order to establish a navy, renovate the army and bring Western civilization to Russia.⁶²

Not much attention is devoted to Russia in general. The emergence of Russia is often viewed together with the establishment of Prussia. These two represent Eastern Europe. Russia is mentioned for the first time in the discussion of modern European history, after such historic events as the Crusades and the Reformation.

While the textbook compiled by the Institute of Translation and Compilation of Commercial Press (1906) provides a general description of the history of Russia before Peter the Great,⁶³ QIN and OGAWA devote only a few sentences to the history of that period. The historic figures mentioned at that period are Ivan III (sometimes omitted) and Ivan IV, during whose reign the country started

60 Ibid., p. 399.

61 QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 2 (1905), p. 14; OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 3 (1904), p. 17.

62 HUANG Chaojian 黃朝鑒 (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi jiaokeshu, juan xia* 高等小學西洋歷史教科書, 卷下 (Senior Primary School Textbook on the History of the West, vol. 2), Shanghai: Zhendong xueshe 1906, pp. 29, 30.

63 Shangwu yinshuguan bianyisuo (ed.): *Zuixin zhongxue jiaokeshu*, vol. 2 (1906), pp. 285, 286.

expanding to Siberia.⁶⁴ In general, Russia is described as a quite weak, small and undeveloped (barbarous) country. Peter the Great is viewed as the leading figure in the entire transformation of the state. Russia is mentioned in the context of the Partitions of Poland (1772; 1793; 1795), and in chapters on the Eastern Question, the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), the Holy Alliance, the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish Wars (textbooks mostly discuss 18th–19th century conflicts), the Congress of Berlin (1878) after the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), the general situation in the world.

It should be noted that in Qing times, just as in the 1910s, textbooks devote much attention to the Great Northern War and Russia's role in this war, while starting with the late 1920s they only briefly mention it. The textbooks claim suppression to be the core ideology of the Russian Emperor Alexander I and his suggested Holy Alliance. They also assure that this was the reason why many European states entered this alliance (only the Roman Pope, Britain and "Turkey" did not support it). One of the textbooks indicates that in Germany (Deyizhi 德意志, obviously the German Confederation) "students suggested returning to freedom and unification".⁶⁵ The very mention of this fact again stresses that the educated persons opposed this ideology and any kind of suppression. According to the text, after the meeting of Prussia, Russia, and all the German states (Deyizhi zhu zhous 德意志諸州), it was decided that universities had to be strictly supervised, textbooks had to undergo strict censorship, and the will and spirit of the people were not to expand (*minqi yu bu de shen* 民氣愈不得伸).⁶⁶

Another textbook, while defining the ideology of the Holy Alliance as suppression (*yiya zhuyi* 抑壓主義), indicates that during the Greek War of Independence (1821–1829) from "Turkey", the Russian Emperor (Alexander I) not only did not support them despite claiming to support Christians but also being frightened by the Austrian side blamed them for this revolt (*yan ze zhi* 嚴責之).⁶⁷ Nonetheless, the new emperor later supported the Greeks, and the textbook mentions the Russo-Turkish War (1828–1829) in the context of the Greek War of Independence.⁶⁸

In the discussion of the Russo-Turkish wars, the textbooks always depict Russia as the aggressor even though they mention other reasons for the wars, i.e., the reasons for starting the Crimean War: the old plan to annex "Turkey", making

⁶⁴ OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 3 (1904), pp. 16, 17; QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 2 (1905), p. 13.

⁶⁵ OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 4 (1904), p. 7.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 2 (1905), p. 28.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 28, 29.

Bulgaria independent, defense of the Holy Land and the Orthodox Greeks living in “Turkey”.⁶⁹

The textbooks also provide a short description of the “national”, i.e., “Chinese history”. Russia is often viewed as the main opponent of Britain in the fight for influence. The textbooks indicate their collisions in Central Asia, Persia, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus in general. In the same context, they talk about Sino-Russian relations and Sino-British relations in the 19th century. Hence the actions of Russia in China are regarded as equal/or compared to the actions of Britain in China. The textbooks mention the invasion of Yili (1871), the Treaty of Aigun (1858), the loss of territories after the Convention of Peking (1860).⁷⁰ QIN also claims that the Russians occupied Sakhalin Island in order to spy (*kui* 窺) on Japan and Korea.⁷¹

Such a description of Russia creates an image of this country as not only aggressive toward “Turkey” but also toward China. Its actions are compared to the actions of the British in China, and hence it is depicted as one of the main enemies of China. It states that Russia claimed to fight for the rights of Christians but it looks as if the main reason behind this claim was the will to expand the territory and annex the European part of “Turkey”. Russia’s main ideology and strategy are often presented as oppression and aggression.

Remarkably, such an image of Russia is totally in line with the image of Russia spread in the Chinese press of the time. KANG Youwei and YAN Fu suggested Peter the Great as a model for China, but his figure was viewed only as a good example of exercising the autocratic power to modernize the state, and none of them seems to have regarded Russia as a stable country.⁷² Some reformers were very critical toward Russia, like WANG Tao 王韬 (1828–1897), who called for alignment with Britain and Japan against the Russian threat, or ZHANG Zhidong 張之洞 (1837–1909) and LIU Kunyi 劉坤一 (1830–1902) who “came to be strong proponents of a Sino-British-Japanese alliance against Russia by the end of 1897”.⁷³ In the late 19th, early 20th century, Russia was viewed by the Chinese intellectuals and reformers as an autocratic state that was never fully Europeanized. But what was the actual reason for such perceptions of Russia? It was partly because of anti-Russian propaganda by the Anglo-American missionaries’

69 OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 4 (1904), pp. 14, 15; QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 2 (1905), pp. 32, 33.

70 OGAWA Ginjirō (ed.): *Zhongdeng xiyangshi*, vol. 4 (1904), pp. 21, 22; QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 2 (1905), pp. 41, 42.

71 QIN Ruijie (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue xiyang lishi*, vol. 2 (1905), p. 42.

72 Don C. PRICE: *Russia and the Roots of the Chinese Revolution*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 32, 45.

73 Ibid., p. 67.

journal, *Wanguo gongbao* 萬國公報 (The Review of the Times) and by the reform press, which was heavily dependent on British and Japanese articles.⁷⁴ It was also in equal parts due to Russia's own policies in the Far East during the late 19th century (Yili Crisis, 1871–1881); the fact that the Liaodong Peninsula was leased to Russia (1898); Russia's intervention into China during the Boxer rebellion (1899–1901).

The image of Russia in Chinese “national history” textbooks is even less disputable, but the description also ranges from being very concise and cautious to very harsh and more detailed. Nevertheless, none of the textbooks presents Russia as a partner and friendly neighbor. For instance, *Putong xin lishi duben* provides a quite aggressive image of Russia. This can be seen from the language (the Russians “frequently spy on Heilongjiang” (*pin kui Heilongjiang* 頻窺黑龍江) and “glare like a tiger eyeing its prey” (*you hushi dandan zhi shi* 有虎視眈眈之勢) and the very interpretation of historical events. All mentions of Russia are put in one separate chapter, which provides a quite detailed narrative. In the discussion of the Treaty of Aigun (1858), the author seems to be searching for an excuse for ceding the territory to Russia. The text claims that the Chinese Emperor asked Russians to help with the border defense while the Russians seized the opportunity and made (*po* 迫) China discuss the border. The cession of the land to Russia in accordance with the Convention of Peking is explained with gratitude for mediation (*tiaoting* 調停) between the two parties (Britain/France - China) after the Second Opium War.⁷⁵

The textbook by the Chinese educator CHEN Maozhi is even harsher in the description of relations with Russia. The Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) is explained as the treaty between Russia and China in which China regained the territory once occupied by Russia.⁷⁶ According to Chinese historiography, the Russians invaded the Qing territory, and thus, after the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed and the Russians have left these territories, China has regained what was once occupied by the Russians. In the chapter on Sino-Russian relations, it says that when the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed, Russians could be suppressed by power (*li yi* E 力抑俄), but later they continued moving East.⁷⁷

Russia is described as an aggressor toward any territory. The text indicates that in 1690 Russia seized Kamchatka and was seeking to occupy Alaska (*canshi* 蠶食, just as how silkworms nibble away at leaves). Russia also forced/urged (*lü*

74 Ibid., pp. 67–69.

75 *Putong xin lishi duben* (1901), pp. 128–130.

76 CHEN Maozhi 陳懋治 (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxue Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu* 高等小學中國歷史教科書, 第五編 (Senior Primary School Textbook on Chinese history, Part 5), Shanghai: Wenming shuju 1906, p. 79.

77 Ibid., p. 84.

po 屢迫) China several times to sign the Treaty of Kyakhta (Kiakhta, 1728), but no explanation is given as to how this was done.⁷⁸ The author claims that since that time, Russia gradually had been invading the East, but again no additional information is provided on how and what exactly was invaded. CHEN Maozhi, just like the author of *Putong xin lishi duben*, claims that Emperor Nicholas I seized the opportunity of the Chinese soldiers neglecting their duty and established the city of Nikolayevsk (Nikolaevsk) on the outlet of the River Heilongjiang. He was also seeking to “nibble away at” (*canshi* 蠶食) Sakhalin island and used the unrests/revolt in China and foreign aggression to make China change the border and sign the Treaty of Aigun.⁷⁹

Another author, namely QIAN Zonghan, in the textbook for Lower Primary School provides a very concise description of the contacts with Russia. He remains very cautious about describing the 17th century border conflict and does not call the Russians “invaders” directly, but states that the Qing Emperor was “seeking to regain the territory taken away by force earlier”.⁸⁰ In the description of Russia’s role in the Second Opium War, the text indicates that the territory to the East from the Ussuri River was handed to Russia in gratitude for mediating. At the same time, the text indicates that Russians established a trading port at Haishenwei 海參威, i.e. Vladivostok.⁸¹

1912–1928: The Image of the West

The present chapter does not break down this period into smaller ones, but primarily focuses on two textbooks from two decades, one from 1914, and the other from 1923 to reveal, more specifically, the tendencies of the time. Additionally, the textbook by JIN Zhaozi 金兆梓 (1889–1975)⁸² will be consulted to supplement these examples.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid., p. 85.

80 QIAN Zonghan 錢宗翰(ed.): *Chudeng xiaoxue Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu* 初等小學中國歷史教科書, 第三冊 (Junior Primary School Chinese history textbook, vol. 3), Shanghai: Biaomeng shushi 1907, p. 14.

81 Ibid., p. 20.

82 JIN Zhaozi was a Chinese historian, who first of all focused on writing and editing history textbooks. He was a student of ZHANG Xiang, who worked at the Zhonghua Shuju. According to JIN, he compiled his first textbooks under guidance and motivation of ZHANG. He first entered Zhonghua Shuju in 1922 and has worked for around a year. His textbook on

The main aspects that change in textbooks are related to the interpretation of East–West relations; the understanding of “Our country” (China); the style of dating the events; maps; the 1054 East–West schism (or the Great Schism); the “new heroes” of the East-West contact; and the image of the USA.

One of the new features emerging in this period is that textbooks focus specifically on maps. The textbook of 1914 by the Chinese linguist and philologist ZHANG Xiang 張相 (1877–1945), who was in charge of the division of teaching materials and for 30 years was the associate director for the Institute of Compilation at the Zhonghua Shuju⁸³, does not have a single picture of any historical figure while it contains a huge amount of maps of different territories. All the maps are in black and white, embedded into the text and take up the size of half a page or one third of a page. Of 50 pages in the first volume, 13 have a map; of 78 pages in the second volume, 18 have a map. Hence, approximately every fourth page has a map. FU Yunlin’s textbook of 1923 has only 10 maps in two volumes, but they are in color and placed on separate pages (not numbered), while the pictures of some historical figures are in black and white and quite small in size. This could indicate that for China the territorial issues were much more important at that time than concrete historical figures. In the preface, FU Yunlin indicates that the main idea (*yaozhi* 要旨) is to impart to the students the change of situation in the world, the rise and fall of famous countries, the development of humanity, and, furthermore, relations with China.⁸⁴ Both authors, however, do not explain what the main function of the maps in the textbooks should be.

The textbook by the Chinese scholar ZHONG Yulong 鍾毓龍 (1880–1970) on “National history” also has many maps. There one can find, in particular, a quite exaggerated map of Qing China at its prime, where western frontiers of the Qing empire almost reach Europe (fig. 1-2).⁸⁵ This looks like an attempt to show China’s greatness as of an enormously huge country. At the same time, this again reveals the importance of the territorial issues for China of the time. The Qing dynasty was definitely considered to be a foreign, oppressive dynasty, but the perfected

Chinese history (*benguoshi* 本國史) produced at that period was very popular and the number of sales in half a year has reached a number of 25 000 copies. See: LÍ Zhiming 李志明: “Jin Zhaozi ji qí shixue” 金兆梓及其史学 (Jin Zhaozi and His Historiography). In: *Shi Lin* 史林 (Historical Review) no. 6, 2012, pp. 130–138.

83 ZHANG Xiang 張相. Available online: <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%BC%A0%E7%9B%88/2507523> (last access 2020, April 2).

84 FU Yunlin 傅運林 (ed.): *Zhongxuexiao yong Gongheguo jiaokeshu xiyang shi, juan shang* 中學校用共和國教科書西洋史, 卷上 (Secondary School Republican Textbook on the Western History, vol. 1), Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan 1923, p. 1.

85 ZHONG Yulong 鍾毓龍 (ed.): *Zhongxuexiao shiyong Xinzhi Benguoshi jiaoben, san* 中學校適用新制本國史教本, 三 (Secondary School New-Style Textbook on the History of Our Country, vol. 3), Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju 1914, p. 75.

territory of Qing China, as indicated in ZHAO Yusen's teacher's manual in Commercial Press from 1913–1914, had to be preserved by "the citizens of the Republic".⁸⁶ As indicated by ZARROW in discussing the textbooks produced after 1928, while Qing was treated as a conquest and foreign dynasty, the Qing "got high marks for territorial expansion".⁸⁷ Regarding the territorial issues, this was also true for textbooks produced just after the establishment of the Republic. Borders were often not delineated clearly. ZARROW suggests that this was due to the question of whether or not the Qing had become Chinese enough so that Han Chinese "should take pride in its imperial reach and lay claims to its territories",⁸⁸ and concludes that for most Republican elites "aside from any questions of national pride, strategic necessity meant that they needed to claim as much of the Qing territory as possible".⁸⁹ Illustrations became less important in comparison to the late Qing textbooks. For instance, the textbooks talk about Jesus Christ and the spread of Christianity, but they show no pictures of Jesus Christ.⁹⁰



Figure 1-2: Map of the Qing dominion at its prime⁹¹

86 Quoted from: Peter ZARROW: *Educating China* (2015), p. 186.

⁸⁷ Peter ZARROW: *Educating China* (2015), p. 194.

88 *Ibid.*, p. 193.

89 Ibid., p. 195.

¹¹ ZHANG Xiang 張相 (ed.): *Zhongxuexiao shiyong Xinzhixi yangshi jiaoben, shang* 中學校適用新制西洋史教本, 上 (Secondary School New-Style Textbook on the Western History, vol. 1, Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju 1914, p. 22; FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xi-yangshi* vol. 1 (1923), p. 27.

91 Source: ZHONG Yulong (ed.): *Xinzhi Benguoshi jiaberen*, vol. 3 (1914), p. 75.

In indicating the specific year, the textbook of ZHANG Xiang (1914) uses the Gregorian calendar, but FU Yunlin's textbook (1923) indicates time in a more GMD way: the Gregorian calendar, in *minguo (qian)* 民國(前) ((before) the Republic)⁹² and in classical Chinese style with the reign title.

The Xiongnu are mentioned but no connection to China is attributed to them. ZHANG Xiang's textbook (1914) merely indicates that they attacked the Goths and later attacked many other nations and established their own state.⁹³ FU Yunlin's textbook (1923) talks about Huns (*Fenren* 芬人) describing them as the descendants of the Xiongnu (*Xiongnu yizu* 匈奴遺族), who came from Asia.⁹⁴

Both textbooks mention the East-West Schism in Christianity of 1054, when the Eastern and Western Christian Churches broke communion; something that was not discussed in the late Qing textbooks for example.⁹⁵ Both textbooks discuss the relations between the state and the Church: first, the collaborations of the Pope and Charles the Great; then the collision between the state and the Church. Generally speaking, the image of the Pope is still quite negative, because that is the figure that, according to textbooks, wanted to control world Empires.⁹⁶

The Crusades continue to be described through the same categories as in the late Qing textbooks. The “Turkish” invasion in Jerusalem and the mistreatment of Christians are revealed to be the main reason for the Crusades. FU Yunlin's textbook (1923) provides quite emotional descriptions of the Christians who were “wildly excited” (*kuangfen* 狂奮) and could hardly wait to conquer the Turks and overtake Jerusalem.⁹⁷ The result of the Crusades named by the authors is the same as the ones mentioned in the Qing textbooks.⁹⁸

The concept of races (*zhongzu* 種族) is less discussed even though it does not disappear altogether. Most likely because the idea of the nation was much more important for the San-min Doctrine. The concept seems to become more general. For instance, the textbook of FU Yunlin (1923) uses the concept of the “Asian race”, and thus claims that “the ‘Turkish Empire’ was established by an Asian race, and that all European states originally hated it (*su xian e zhi* 素嫌惡之).”⁹⁹ The

92 The Republic of China calendar or Minguo calendar indicates the date since the establishment of the Republic (1912) or, consequently, before the Republic.

93 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xinzhi xi yangshi*, vol. 1 (1914), pp. 25–27.

94 FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xi yangshi*, vol. 1 (1923), p. 28.

95 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xinzhi xi yangshi*, vol. 1 (1914), p. 30; FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xi yangshi*, vol. 1 (1923), p. 33, 34.

96 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xinzhi xi yangshi*, vol. 1 (1914), pp. 30–35; FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xi yangshi*, vol. 1 (1923), pp. 47, 48.

97 FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xi yangshi*, vol. 1 (1923), p. 40.

98 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xinzhi xi yangshi*, vol. 1 (1914), p. 36; FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xi yangshi*, vol. 1 (1923), p. 41.

99 FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xi yangshi*, vol. 1 (1923), p. 51.

textbooks mostly talk about nationality or ethnic groups (*zu* 族).¹⁰⁰ The Mongols again are viewed as a separate ethnicity/nationality, different from the Chinese.

Disagreement appears between different authors about the interpretation of events and the role of the Mongols. The textbook by ZHANG Xiang (1914) devotes only one page to the Mongols and states that the Germanic people fled to the Roman Pope and asked to send the Crusades to defend them from “the Mongols”. He did not respond.¹⁰¹ FU Yunlin’s textbook (1923) states that the Pope saw the power of the Mongols and wanted to preach Christianity to them, and also with the help of them wanted to attack the Muslims from both sides (*jiaji* 焦擊).¹⁰²

The authors stress the impact of the Mongols on the East-West contact, which is revealed in the collaboration between the former and the Europeans to suppress the Muslims. At the same time, the new concept of the “Chinese Mongols” (*Zhongguo mengguzu* 中國蒙古族) appears. The Chinese historian JIN Zhaozi speaks of the Mongol Western military campaign as the land operation to the West completed by “the people of our country”.¹⁰³

In the discussion of the Renaissance (*wenyi fuxing* 文藝復興, “the revival of literature and art”), the Church continues to be represented as the power that impeded the development of sciences and progress. At the same time, the textbooks indicate that philosophy was used for scholasticism, and thus was not completely

100 In discussing the Origin myths in republican-period textbooks Peter ZARROW indicates that early Republican textbooks continued to speak of Huaren in racial terms, but I could not find such extensive use of the term race (*renzhong* 人種/ *zhongzu* 種族) in the textbooks discussing Western history, as it was in the late Qing textbooks. See: Peter ZARROW: *Educating China* (2015), pp. 164, 165. Here the term “nationality” will be applied, because the textbooks do not talk specifically about White, Black or Yellow races, but about specific nations/nationalities of China. For discussion of the use of the concept of race in China see: Gotelind MÜLLER: “Are We ‘Yellow’ and Who is ‘Us’? China’s Problems with Glocalising the Concept of ‘Race’” (around 1900), in: BJOAF 2008, pp. 153–180. LEIBOLD prefers not to translate the term “minzu”, and sometimes applies the term “zhongzu” only with a translation in brackets as “race”. He indicates that several Chinese intellectuals employed both terms interchangeably. See: James LEIBOLD: “Competing Narratives of Racial Unity in Republican China: From the Yellow Emperor to Peking Man”, in: *Modern China* no. 2, April 2006, pp. 208, 212, 213 fn. 1. Hyung Il PAI indicates that the same way the Japanese colonial period (1910–1945) publications “frequently do not distinguish between concepts such as race, tribe, clan, ethnic group, and ethnic state.” Hyung Il PAI: “Japanese Anthropology and The Discovery of Prehistoric ‘Korea’”, in: *Journal of East Asian Archaeology*, vol. 1, 1–4, 1999, p. 354, fn. 3.

101 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xinzhi xiyangshi*, vol. 1 (1914), p. 37.

102 FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xiyangshi*, vol. 1 (1923), p. 47.

103 JIN Zhaozi 金兆梓 (ed.): *Xin xuezhi shiyong Xin xiaoxue jiaokeshu Lishi keben jiaoshoushu, Gaoji di san ce* 新小學教科書: 歷史課本教授書, 高級 第三冊 (Teacher’s manual for New Educational System. Historical Readers for Higher Primary Schools, vol. 3), Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju 1923, p. 97.

neglected. The influence of the Arab civilization is still mentioned, but the focus has shifted to Italian schools, artists, and writers. Besides that, the authors mention Oxford and Bologna Universities, where people studied different disciplines. Textbooks continue the discussion regarding the printing press as GUTENBERG's invention and, surprisingly for some, paper as an Italian invention. The section on the Renaissance is followed by a rather short section on geographic discoveries.¹⁰⁴

While naming the reign of Elisabeth (1558–1603) as “prosperous times” in England, ZHANG Xiang also talks about the Western powers invading the East. According to the text, the Mongols lost their power in India,¹⁰⁵ while Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, Britain, and France focused on America and Asia.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, these countries are represented as the main colonizers. The textbooks have sections on the European colonies and vassal states, including those in Africa. For the description of the colonies in Africa, the authors use the sensitive term for the Chinese – *guafen* 瓜分 “to cut apart like a melon” (i.e. to dismember); which is often used for China. ZHANG Xiang's textbook also has a map of the colonies in Africa managed by such Great Powers as Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal (fig. 1-3).¹⁰⁷




Figure 1-3: Map of the European colonies in Africa¹⁰⁸

104 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xin-zhi xiyangshi*, vol. 1 (1914), pp. 47–50; FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xiyangshi*, vol. 1 (1923), pp. 56–59.

105 In the context of “five races under one union” this sounds like “our country’s people” lost the power in India.

106 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xin-zhi xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1914), pp. 6–11.

107 FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1923), pp. 126–130; ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xin-zhi xiyangshi* vol. 2 (1914), pp. 70–73.

108 Source: ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xin-zhi xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1914), p. 71.

The image of the USA changes at this period. The Puritans, who opposed the kind of tyrannical rule exhibited by the King of England and migrated to North America, have a more positive image, as the victims of the despotic reign. The image of the USA is consequently also quite positive in this context.¹⁰⁹ Nonetheless, in discussing a modern USA the textbooks pinpoint its aggression and fight for influence in the Pacific Ocean. The textbooks mention the war with Spain (1898) and state that the USA used the mistreatment of the Filipinos as an excuse (*koushi* 口實) to start the war. Hence, the USA also seized Cuba, and, in 1900, furthermore used the revolt in Hawaii to annex the latter. In 1900, together with Germany, it also separated Samoa. In this regard, the USA is also represented as the superpower that colonizes/annexes territories and, together with other Great Powers, participated in cutting apart states and islands.¹¹⁰

The image of the French Revolution stays more or less the same as in the late Qing textbooks. The authors name the following causes: the despotism of the ruler and mistreatment of the people; high taxes; the clergy and aristocracy's exemption from paying taxes; new ideas of freedom and equality; independence of the USA and constitution. The textbooks devote more than 10 pages to this topic, which again reveals the importance of it to the Chinese authors.¹¹¹

Surprisingly enough, despite the fact of WWI (1914–1918, as the “Great European War”, *Ouzhou dazhan* 歐洲大戰) standing in the 1923s curricula outline,¹¹² there is no separate chapter on WWI in the textbook by FU Yunlin. The war is even barely mentioned in the chapter on the recent situation in some Western countries, including the USA.¹¹³

The Industrial Revolution is not separately discussed either, even though it is named in the curricula outline (1923) as *gongye gexin* 工業革新.¹¹⁴ There are separate sections on culture and science: the authors discuss different achievements in culture and science, but the very Industrial Revolution is not yet represented as the main turning point. However, this changes in the 1930s.

The textbook thus seems to barely correspond to many points indicated in the course outline. Besides the aforementioned discrepancies with the curricula outline, there are many others. For instance, the Chinese printing press is not

109 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xin-zhi xi yangshi*, vol. 2 (1914), pp. 14–16, 33, 34; FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xi yangshi*, vol. 2 (1923), pp. 1–15, 26–27.

110 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xin zhi xi yangshi*, vol. 2 (1914), pp. 72, 73; FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xi yangshi*, vol. 2 (1923), pp. 120, 121.

111 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xin zhi xi yangshi*, vol. 2 (1914), pp. 37–48; FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xi yangshi*, vol. 2 (1923), pp. 28–41.

112 Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo (comp.): *20 shiji. Lishijuan* (2001), p. 20.

113 FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xi yangshi*, vol. 2 (1923), pp. 108–129.

114 Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo (comp.): *20 shiji. Lishijuan* (2001), p. 19.

mentioned (instead, the printing press is mentioned as GUTENBERG's invention); the textbook uses the term *wenyi fuxing* 文藝復興 for the Renaissance, and not *fugu yundong* 復古運動 (“the movement for the return to the ancients”) as in the outline; and the textbook does not discuss any aspects of socialism in the context of the Industrial Revolution; neither does it touch upon concepts such as Romanticism, or Rationalism, and has many other discrepancies with the outline.¹¹⁵ In discussing the 1923 curricula ZARROW, with reference to Robert CULP, states “it is not clear if any history textbooks were actually written along these lines”.¹¹⁶

The “National” or “Chinese history” textbooks rather chose to elaborate on the topic of the Mongols. ZHONG Yulong states that the Yuan's military power came to the West, and opened a new way to exchange and trade. The Europeans were fighting with the Muslims and were astonished by the Yuan military power; they wanted to form an alliance to suppress Muslims and for that reason sent representatives to the Mongols to negotiate.¹¹⁷ At the same time, in the introduction the author defines the Mongols as a separate nationality that conquered the Chinese, but later five nationalities, including the Mongols, became “one family”.¹¹⁸ Here one can see the principle commonly known as “Five Races Under One Union” (*wuzugonghe* 五族共和) proclaimed by the Beiyang government (1912–1928).

Some “new” historical figures appear in the textbooks on both “the national history” and “the history of the West”. ZHANG Xiang does not mention Marco POLO, but he appears in the textbook on “national history” by ZHONG Yulong as well as in the textbook on “the history of the West” by FU Yunlin. ZHONG Yulong states that POLO served in China and in his book described the richness (*fuli* 富麗) of China; it was thus that the name of the Khitan became widespread (*zao* 噪) in Europe.¹¹⁹ FU only mentions the fact that Marco POLO came from Venice, and was treated as a favorite (*chongyu* 寵遇) for 12 years by the Yuan.¹²⁰ JIN Zhaozi provides a whole section on Marco POLO with the map of his journey, a story of him coming with his father to China, and writing a book about China after his return, which has raised the interest of Europeans for China and influenced the discovery of the new sea route as well as the “New World” (*Xin dalu* 新大陸).¹²¹ To a certain degree, such interpretation made China a kind of contributor to the discovery of the “New World” and partly to the development of the world. This, in particular,

115 See: *Ibid.*, pp. 17–20.

116 Peter ZARROW: *Educating China* (2015), p. 153.

117 ZHONG Yulong (ed.): *Xinzhi Benguoshi jiaoben*, vol. 3 (1914), p. 6.

118 *Ibid.*, p. 1.

119 ZHONG Yulong (ed.): *Xin-zhi Benguoshi jiaoben*, vol. 3 (1914), p. 6.

120 FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xiayangshi*, vol. 1 (1923), p. 47.

121 JIN Zhaozi (ed.): *Lishi keben jiaoshoushu*, vol. 2 (1923), pp. 1, 2.

corresponds with the 1923 curricula, which discusses the development of the world cultures, as well as the relations between China and Europe.¹²²

Another historical figure, namely Matteo RICCI, is very briefly mentioned by ZHONG Yulong as a missionary.¹²³ PAN Wu mentions him, together with the Chinese scholar and Catholic convert XU Guangqi 徐光啓 (1562–1633), as the missionary who not only preached but also brought Western learning to China and who contributed, among others, to the development of guns. Nonetheless, the technique was not perfect, and the Ming have consequently lost out to the Qing Manchus.¹²⁴ JIN Zhaozi is much more positive about Matteo RICCI and Christianity in general, but this is rather an exception to the huge amount of other textbooks. He indicates that nowadays the Church builds schools, hospitals, and improves preaching techniques. RICCI learned Chinese, wore Confucian clothes, preached Christianity and brought with him the attributes of Western learning, with the help of which he preached Christianity to intellectuals. At the same time, the text points out that XU Guangqi has edited RICCI's books and made improvements where he has made mistakes. Thus, the text might indicate some kind of superiority of the Chinese over Europeans.¹²⁵ Talking about the image of the Western countries in the “national history” textbooks in general, it barely changes, and the aggressive nature of their arrival in China continue to be discussed.

The figure of ZHENG He became much more popular than in the Qing period. His journey is described in detail. It is indicated that 30 states paid tribute to the Ming and that consequently mutual trade continued. The map of his journey is also embedded in the text.¹²⁶

1912–1928: The Image of Russia

The textbooks produced in the 1910s are less negative in the assessment of Russia and its actions in the international arena. These textbooks definitely inherited certain features of the textbooks from the Qing era, for instance, a more detailed

122 Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo (comp.): *20 shiji. Lishijuan* (2001), pp. 16–19.

123 ZHONG Yulong (ed.): *Xin-zhi Benguoshi jiaoben*, vol. 3 (1914), p. 64.

124 PAN Wu 潘武 (ed.): *Gaodeng xiaoxuejiao yong Xinbian Zhonghua lishi jiaokeshu*, si 高等小學校用新編中華歷史教科書, 四 (New Chinese Historical Readers for Senior Primary School, vol. 4), Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju 1915, p. 2.

125 JIN Zhaozi (ed.): *Lishi keben jiaoshoushu*, vol. 2 (1923), pp. 25–30.

126 ZHONG Yulong (ed.): *Xin-zhi Benguoshi jiaoben*, vol. 3 (1914), p. 38; JIN Zhaozi (ed.): *Lishi keben jiaoshoushu*, vol. 2 (1923), pp. 97–103.

description of the Great Northern War. Russia before Peter the Great is not depicted as barbarous, and Tsar Ivan III is portrayed as a brave and powerful ruler. The textbooks also remark that Russia's expansion to Siberia started during the reign of Ivan IV.¹²⁷

In the case of FU Yunlin, the description of Russia before Peter the Great does not differ much from that of the Japanese historian and educator HONDA Asajirō (1867–1939)¹²⁸ and ZHANG Xiang. Nevertheless, FU specifically points out that Peter turned Russia from a barbarous into a civilized country.¹²⁹

The most important difference between the textbooks from the 1910s and 1920s concerning Russia before Peter is that in the 1910s the textbooks indicate the bonds of Russia with the Eastern Roman Empire (E.R.E., 395–1453), stressing that the Tsar viewed Russia as the successor of the E.R.E. and has married the niece of the last Emperor of the E.R.E.¹³⁰ In the 1910s this was a topic, but later this was not discussed at all.

What changes dramatically in comparison to the late Qing textbooks is the interpretation of Russia's role in the Holy Alliance. In this period the textbooks define the ideology of this alliance as suppression but also state that the Russian Emperor Alexander I suggested this alliance as the Christian Alliance, where all the state rulers are viewed as brothers and citizens of states as one family. Mutual support and love in the name of peace were proclaimed as the core of this alliance. The Austrian Chancellor METTERNICH (1773–1859) is claimed to be the one who used the opportunity and made “suppression” (*yazhi* 壓制) the core of the ideology behind the Holy Alliance.¹³¹ FU Yunlin states that “the meaning of this alliance

127 HONDA Asajirō 本多淺治郎 (ed.): *Xiyang lishi jiaokeshu* 西洋歴史教科書 (Textbook on Western history), Shanghai: Qunyi shushe 1912, p. 262; ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xinzhi xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1914), p. 21.

128 HONDA Asajirō graduated from the Department of History of the Imperial University [now: Tokyo University] in July 1893. He was a well-known and productive history educator, who specialized in writing history textbooks and focused on methods of education. The most important characteristic of HONDA's method of historical education was *sanbun hōron* 三分法論 [i. e. splitting chapters, explanations etc. into three parts, to make them easier to understand and remember, for example introducing a thought, developing it, and then drawing a conclusion]. See: SUZUKI Masahiro 鈴木 正弘: “Honda Asajirō no ‘seiyōshi’ kyōju kōsō to kyōkasho, sankō shorui” 本多浅治郎の「西洋史」教授構想と教科書・参考書類 (HONDA Asajirō's “Western history” teaching concept and textbooks, reference books). In: *Sōgō rekishi kyōiku* 総合歴史教育 (Comprehensive history education) no. 41, July 2005, pp. 10–32.

129 FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1923), p. 18.

130 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xinzhi xiyangshi*, vol. 1 (1914), p. 47; HONDA Asajirō (ed.): *Xiyang lishi jiaokeshu* (1912), p. 262.

131 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xinzhi xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1914), p. 49; HONDA Asajirō (ed.): *Xiyang lishi jiaokeshu* (1912), p. 357.

was quite unclear (*po wei kongmo* 頗為空漠) and METTERNICH got the real power of this alliance to carry out his conservative policy of suppressing liberal movements”.¹³²

In terms of the Greek War of Independence, the textbooks of that period merely interpret it as the opposition to the Holy Alliance (despite the fact that the Ottoman Empire did not support this alliance), and the very independence is associated with the end of the Holy Alliance. METTERNICH is viewed as the only supporter of the ideology of suppression, while Nicholas I is described as the one who stood in opposition to METTERNICH.¹³³ Nevertheless, the whole Greek War of Independence is discussed within the context of the opposition of the conservative policy pursued by the world empires and liberal movements that appeared in the 19th century.

Regarding Russo-Turkish relations, the textbooks continue to talk about Russia’s ambitions to invade “Turkey”. At the same time, the textbooks indicate that Christians in Jerusalem were abused by the Turkish and complained (*su 訴*) to the Russian Emperor. Nicholas I seized the opportunity, and thus the Crimean War started.¹³⁴ Another textbook states that Napoleon III ordered “Turkey” to admit protectorate rights of the Catholic Church over Jerusalem, and the Russian Emperor Nicholas I used this as an excuse to invade “Turkey”. Nonetheless, in the preceding subchapter, the textbook indicates that the French Napoleon III had close ties with the Pope and “wanted to enhance national prestige to strengthen his position and therefore the Crimean War started”.¹³⁵

With such a statement, the textbook claims that at least one of the reasons, or probably the main reason, for the outbreak of the Crimean War was the ambitions of Napoleon III. At the same time, in the description of the war, the text states that the Russian army “defended itself to the utmost” (*jieli fangyu* 竭力防禦),¹³⁶ which in a certain sense describes Russia as “a victim” who gave all its power to defend the state.

FU indicates that Russia had its own ambitions. “Turkey’s” decay is explained by the growth of Russia. Russia is portrayed as an aggressor toward “Turkey” that was willing to conquer it and even engaged in the defense of Christians in order to inflict hardship on “Turkey” (*yu yi ku Tuerqi* 欲以苦土耳其). Subsequently, “Turkey” is described as the victim of the Crimean War. The text states that the

132 FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1923), pp. 44, 45.

133 HONDA Asajirō (ed.): *Xiyang lishi jiaokeshu* (1912), pp. 360, 361; ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xinzhi xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1914), p. 51; FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1923), pp. 51–53.

134 HONDA Asajirō (ed.): *Xiyang lishi jiaokeshu* (1912), pp. 373, 374.

135 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xinzhi xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1914), p. 57.

136 Ibid.

Ottoman statesman and diplomat Reshid PASHA (1800–1858) assisted the ruler with all his heart and allowed religious freedom.¹³⁷

In the discussion of the Russian policy in the East and China, in particular, Russia is described as the aggressor, and its actions are compared to the action of other imperialist powers. The textbooks pay due attention to the Anglo-Russian competition and collisions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They are presented as competitors for the influence in Central Asia and in the Far East.¹³⁸ In this context, they also briefly mention Sino-Russian relations in the 19th century and indicate that Russia used the British-French invasion of China (Zhina 支那) to seize (*duo* 奪) the left bank of the River Heilongjiang. During China's peace discussion with Britain and France, Russia seized the opportunity and acted as an intermediary, later demanding the territory to the East from the Ussuri River as a reward for mediation.¹³⁹ In the domestic policy Russia is also depicted as an authoritarian state. Alexander II, in particular, is described as an original adherent of liberalism who allowed freedom of speech and in 1861 proclaimed emancipation (peasant reform) but later restored despotism.¹⁴⁰ Alexander III is mentioned as a despotic ruler who abused the Jews and forced Finland to submit. Nicholas II is suggested to be an adherent of liberalism, who reduced the land tax and granted amnesty to political criminals. After the loss in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), he proclaimed the constitution. However, Russia, as an initially despotic state, could not design a good constitution besides that WWI ("European War") influenced the situation in the country, and therefore, the revolt ensued in 1917.¹⁴¹ Such a depiction of the last three emperors is very close to what we could see in *Zuixin zhongxue jiaokeshu*, vol. 2 (1906) from the late Qing period. The October Revolution, however, is not discussed in detail. The text says that the House of Representatives formed the government and made the Emperor resign. He was brought to Siberia as a prisoner and was killed along with his entire family the next year. The whole state was seemingly in disorder (*yunrao* 雲擾) and fell apart (*sifan wulie* 四分五裂).¹⁴²

In the textbooks concerning "national history" or "the history of China", Russia continues to be presented as the aggressor. In the discussion of the border conflict of the 17th century and the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), the textbooks state that

137 FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1923), p. 75.

138 ZHANG Xiang (ed.): *Xin-zhi xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1914), p. 69; HONDA Asajirō (ed.): *Xiyang lishi jiaokeshu* (1912), pp. 402–404.

139 HONDA Asajirō (ed.): *Xiyang lishi jiaokeshu* (1912), p. 405.

140 FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xiyangshi*, vol. 2 (1923), pp. 102–116.

141 Ibid., pp. 116–118.

142 Ibid., p. 118.

Russian Cossacks invaded the Qing Empire.¹⁴³ The same image stays in the discussion of the Treaty of Aigun and Convention of Peking. Some authors portray Russia as an even greater aggressor than Britain and France. The textbooks state that Britain, France, and the USA received satisfactory treaties and some reward while Russia's wish was the most exceptional (*E ze xuwang youshe* 俄則蓄望尤奢).¹⁴⁴

To sum up, the reign of Peter the Great is depicted as a prosperous period of time wherein Western civilization entered the country, and all the great and useful reforms took place. At the same time, the idea of expansion, the invasion of Poland and especially the policy toward “Turkey” are associated with the name and will of Peter the Great. Russia's role in the Partition of Poland and interpretation of it stays more or less the same. FU also adds ideas of patriotism and states that people blamed their government and were not patriotic (*yuan qi zhengfu, haowu aiguo zhi xin* 怨其政府, 毫無愛國之心).¹⁴⁵ Alexander I is not viewed as a tyrant, but the ideology of his suggested alliance was changed to suppression. In the description of the relationship between “Turkey” and Russia, Russia continues to be regarded as the aggressor, which uses the mistreatment of the Orthodox Christians in “Turkey” as an excuse to achieve its ambitions i.e., to invade and annex parts of “Turkey”. The three lost Russian emperors: Alexander II, Alexander III and, to some extent, Nicholas II are claimed to be despots, and Russia is claimed to be a despotic state.

143 ZHU Wenshu 朱文叔 (ed.): *Xin jiaoyu jiaokeshu lishi gaodeng xiaoxue xiaoyong* 新教
育教科書歷史六高等小學校用 (New Educational Historical Readers For Higher Primary
Schools, vol. 6), Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju 1922, p. 1; LI Yuerui 李岳瑞 (ed.): *Xin xuezhi
zhongdeng xuexiao shiyong Pingzhu guoshi duben, shiyi ce* 新學制中等學校適用評注國
史讀本, 十一冊 (New Educational System Secondary School Annotated State History
Reader, vol. 11), Shanghai: Shijie shuju 1926, pp. 76–80.

144 See: ZHAO Yulin 趙玉林 (ed.): *Zhongxuexiao yong Gongheguo jiaokeshu Benguoshi,
juan xia* 中學校用共和國教科書本國史, 卷下 (Secondary School Republican Textbook
on the History of China, vol. 2), Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan 1915, pp. 56, 57; LI Yuerui
(ed.): *Pingzhu guoshi duben*, vol. 11 (1926), pp. 102, 103.

145 FU Yunlin (ed.): *Gongheguo xi yangshi*, vol. 2 (1923), p. 24.

1928–1949: The Image of the West

Already in the early 1920s textbooks where “national history” was integrated into “world history” started to appear. Such textbooks continued to appear in the 1930s–1940s. This shift to integrate all kinds of history was revolutionary, but it did not hold for a long time. In discussing this period, the present chapter first of all focuses on such textbooks. Nonetheless, other textbooks will also be used to provide more examples and reveal interpretive tendencies.

The curricular goals for 1932 and 1936 are identical; therefore, we cannot speak of any fundamental changes in textbooks throughout the 1930s. The objectives for 1940 and 1941 are also similar and do not differ much from those indicated in the curricula for the 1930s.¹⁴⁶

During this period, the curricula first of all focus on the development of imperialism. The 1932 curriculum for senior high school sets the goal: “to describe the development of modern imperialism, the general status of national movements and the origin of important contemporary international problems”¹⁴⁷

In the curriculum, the commissions have set the goal to arouse students’ patriotism, to cultivate self-confidence, to teach them to take pride in their nation, to provide a general knowledge of the states and nations which in their view are “important”, to highlight the history of national movements and to show the importance of the fight for independence.¹⁴⁸ It should be noted that throughout the history textbooks (*Lishi keben* 歷史課本) one can sense a negative attitude toward monarchy and imperialism on the one hand, and praise for revolutions and liberal movements on the other. The image of Western countries in terms of national history does not change much in this period. Still, there are some changes related first of all to the new ideas or patterns. The presence of such ideas as “capitalist imperialism” or “class struggle” in the textbooks reveals the influence of Marxism-Leninism. Another significant change is in the interpretation of the place of China in the world. The authors often point out that China has contributed a lot to

146 Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo (comp.): *20 shiji. Lishijuan* (2001), pp. 43–88.

147 Ibid., p. 50.

148 Ibid., pp. 43, 50.

Western scientific development.¹⁴⁹ The “3 great inventions of China” i.e., gunpowder, the printing press¹⁵⁰ and the compass¹⁵¹ are specifically mentioned.

The Great Western Powers and nations in the “national history” are generally shown as ambitious, cunning and cruel; nations who came to China for their own profit, mainly for the extraction of resources, for trade, and also Christian preaching. The textbook for higher primary school education of 1948 states that the main purpose for the arrival of the Europeans was trade, while Christian preaching and “Western learning” came next in importance.¹⁵² The textbook also indicates that the contacts with the West gradually developed since the Han (206 BC–220 AD) and Tang (618–907) times and during the Yuan dynasty while communication especially developed due to the extension of the state territory.¹⁵³ Hence, the authors not only stress the early development of the Sino-West contacts but also might imply that it was Yuan China that conquered some Western States including Russia.¹⁵⁴ ZARROW also remarks that the Yuan dynasty was, according to the

149 This objective is also indicated in the curriculum for junior secondary school students in 1932: “to explain what the contribution of Chinese culture to world culture was so that students are aware of the great deeds of our ancestors in order to develop noble aspirations and self-improvement spirit in them”. See: *Ibid.*, p. 43. The goals for the senior secondary school curriculum indicate that “the above-mentioned goals complement the goals specified in the junior secondary school curriculum”. The goals for the senior secondary school contain a similar item: “to show the contribution of every nation to the world culture”. See: *Ibid.*, p. 50.

150 With regard to the printing press (printing technique), it is said that this invention came to Europe from China and made a great contribution to the dissemination of culture. See: CHU Hui 儲禕 (ed.): *Beixin lishi jiaoben - Gaoji xiaoxue yong, di si ce* 北新歷史教本一高級小學用, 第四冊 (Senior Primary school history textbook, vol. 4), Shanghai: Beixin shuju 1932, p. 22.

151 According to CHU Hui, the Europeans admired Chinese culture, and after discovering these “3 Chinese treasures”, they desired to bring the Chinese their greatest learning/science (*xueshu* 學術), namely, Christianity. See: CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 2 (1932), p. 36. The compass is repeatedly referred to as a Chinese invention, which gave a huge impetus to the development of the shipping industry and, accordingly, the discovery of new lands. See: CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), pp. 22, 23. The textbook published in 1948 says that the Europeans used the “compass that came from China and the knowledge of geography that came to them from the Arab Empire, and thus maritime navigation developed”. See: Guoli bianyiguan 國立編譯館 (ed.): *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi keben, di san ce* 高級小學歷史課本, 第三冊 (Senior Primary school history textbook, vol. 3), Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan 1948, p. 1.

152 Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 3 (1948), p. 5.

153 *Ibid.*

154 Cf. Similar idea by CHU Hui: “[Russia] got divided into small many states, the *Chinese Mongols* have risen, expanded to the West, and many small states surrender to the Golden Horde.” CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), p. 28. On p. 23 the textbook states

textbooks, an oppressive dynasty, but Khubilai is acknowledged as the ruler who “unified China.”¹⁵⁵ Although Chinese authors of textbooks distinguished between the Chinese and outer territory (rest of Asia and eastern Europe), the Yuan were considered by them to be the dynasty “under which the extent of Chinese territory was at its greatest”.¹⁵⁶

Marco POLO and Matteo RICCI are briefly mentioned in the context of Sino-Western contacts. The textbooks provide the same set of information as in the previous period; POLO’s book raised European interest for the East and after the discovery of the new sea route the European presence in the East increased. RICCI preached Christianity and used the following method: following Chinese customs and introducing Western learning.¹⁵⁷

In discussing the migration period in Europe (375–568 AD), characterized by the widespread invasions of peoples, CHU Hui states that there was a tyranny of warlords (*junfa hengxing* 軍閥橫行) in Rome, and Germanic tribes started expanding. This could serve as a reference to warlordism in China and the connotations about the comparable situation in the unstable China at that time in order to raise students’ concern. By stating that there was a northern expedition (*bei zheng* 北征) of the military general WEI Qing 衛青 (?–106BC) against the Xiongnu, the result of which saw the Xiongnu invading Europe, he showed the connection between China and the West.¹⁵⁸

The textbooks always pay due attention to England or Britain. The “Magna Carta” of the 13th century England is referred to as the starting point (foundation) of constitutions of all countries in the whole world.¹⁵⁹ The authors praise the Industrial Revolution that came from Britain and has changed the entire world, especially, in terms of the development of material culture and improvement in the quality of life.¹⁶⁰ According to their interpretation, the Industrial Revolution not

more clearly that the Chinese Yuan dynasty made a military campaign to the West (Zhongguo Yuanchao juxing xiqin 中國元朝舉行西侵).

155 Peter ZARROW: *Educating China* (2015), p. 191.

156 Ibid., pp. 191, 192.

157 Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 3 (1948), p. 5.

158 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), p. 9.

159 Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 3 (1948), p. 10; Jiaoyubu bianshen weiyuanhui 教育部編審委員會 (ed.): *Gaoxiao lishi, di san ce* 高小歷史, 第三冊 (Senior Primary school history textbook, vol. 3), Beijing: Zhongguo lianhe chuban gongsi 1944, pp. 14–16.

160 Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 3 (1948), pp. 17, 18.

only led to improving the standard of living and the development of science but also contributed to the development of imperialism and colonial expansion.¹⁶¹

Highlighting the negative aspect of the Industrial Revolution, CHU expresses to a moderate extent a utopian idea of assistance to “small nations”. Assistance had to be provided by the Great Powers while extracting minerals in other countries. The textbook reads as follows: “However, they did not act upon the principle of mutual assistance to help small nations develop but used the method of occupation to suppress them”, and this struggle for resources led to wars.¹⁶² Remarkably, the chapters dedicated to larger wars as the First Opium War¹⁶³ or even the WWI¹⁶⁴ usually come directly after the description of the Industrial Revolution and its influence on imperialism.

The textbooks remain negative about the Pope and Christianity. CHU Hui states that before the Crusades, the Pope promised people that those who took part in the battle would atone for their sins (*shu zui* 賖罪) and those who were in debt would be forgiven. This made Christians very excited, and all joined the Crusades because they were looking for their own benefit.¹⁶⁵ Such negative depiction of the Catholic Church might reveal the influence of Protestantism as well as British or American teaching materials. At the same time, Christian leaders often shared many diagnoses of China’s ills such as corrupt politics. Many Chinese intellectuals considered Christianity to be superstition while there was belief in “science”. There was also a widespread conviction that capitalism and imperialism influenced China’s weakness, and Christian missionaries, since they actively collaborated with the Western imperialist, were associated with it.¹⁶⁶

In describing scientific progress, observation and experiment as the main research methods are set against conservatism and implicit faith in what is said in the books. The authors focus on DARWIN’s theory of evolution and state that “after the evolutionary theory was developed, the statement that everything had been created by God was rejected, and human thought could develop freely”.¹⁶⁷ CHU Hui also claims that before the Renaissance all people were intellectually tied by Christianity, and no matter what the Pope said to be true was simply true. The

161 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), pp. 38–40; JIN Zhaozi 金兆梓 (ed.): *Xinbian gaozhong waiguoshi, xia ce* 新編高中外國史, 下冊 (New Edition Senior Secondary school Foreign History, vol. 3), Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju 1941, p. 20.

162 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), p. 19.

163 Jiaoyubu bianshen weiyuanhui: *Gaoxiao lishi*, vol. 3 (1944), p. 31.

164 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), p. 45.

165 Ibid., pp. 14, 15.

166 Daniel BAYS: *A New History of Christianity in China*, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 2012, pp. 107–109.

167 Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 3 (1948), p. 21.

Crusades, which introduced Arabian culture and knowledge to Europe, are mentioned in the text, but the text also discusses the development of national languages, and the influence of the Renaissance on liberation and rationalism.¹⁶⁸ This scope of discussion was included already in the 1923 curricula but not yet directly mentioned and dealt with in the textbooks.

According to the textbooks, all Western imperialist powers, (just like the people during the Crusades) were fighting for their own benefit. The outbreak of WWI is claimed to be the result of a conflict of interests/profits (*liyi* 利益/*lihai* 利害) of the Great Imperialist Powers.¹⁶⁹ The main Western imperialist countries mentioned in the textbooks are Britain, Germany, Russia, the USA, and France.¹⁷⁰ CHU Hui devotes a section to French imperialism mentioning its colonies in Africa, fight for the influence in India and “swallowing China’s vassal state Annam”.¹⁷¹ Japan, while not being a “Western state” geographically, bears all the most important “attributes” of Western imperialistic states i.e., aggression (participating in splitting up China) and technological progress, which proves it to be an imperialistic state.¹⁷² Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands stay as representatives of colonialism, but not as the representatives of modern imperialism. CHU Hui says, “their policy of colonization was considered by the government only a means of gaining wealth, and not the modern imperialism having a far-reaching plan, that’s why they have lost (everything).”¹⁷³

In the late Qing textbooks, the USA is mentioned as the country that helped Mexico to gain independence; in the 1930s it is mentioned as the state that “took advantage of the United Mexican States’ civil strife to gain many economic rights (privileges).”¹⁷⁴ Nonetheless, it is difficult to define the image of the USA and its role between WWI and WWII (1939–1945). The image changes most likely due to the improvements in the relations between China and the USA: in 1941, the USA took part in WWII and fought against Japan; and in 1943, the USA and China then sign the Sino-American New Equal Treaty. In the textbook from 1948, while discussing the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920), after which Shandong was not returned to China, the role of the USA is more negative. The USA is mentioned as

168 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), pp. 20–22.

169 Ibid., p. 45; Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 4 (1948), p. 10. Similar interpretation in JIN Zhaozi: *Waiguoshi*, vol. 3 (1941), pp. 95, 96.

170 JIN Zhaozi: *Waiguoshi*, vol. 3 (1941), pp. 95, 96.

171 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), p. 42.

172 Ibid., p. 43; JIN Zhaozi: *Waiguoshi*, vol. 3 (1941), pp. 237–246.

173 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), p. 25.

174 Ibid., p. 43.

one of the five countries that conducted (*chi* 持) this conference,¹⁷⁵ while Britain, France, and the USA “had the power superiority” (*zuizhan shili* 最占勢力). Yet, in describing the Washington Naval Conference (1921–1922), after which Shandong was reverted to China, the USA is portrayed as an advocate of peace and democracy that supported China’s sovereign rights and state’s integrity.¹⁷⁶ In comparison, CHU Hui in 1932 talks of this conference as no different from the Paris Conference, after which the five Great Powers (including the USA) continued to fight.¹⁷⁷ JIN Zhaozi in 1941 talked of president WILSON, who suggested the Fourteen Points (for peace negotiations to end WWI) before the Paris Conference, as of an idealist.¹⁷⁸ At the same time, the USA is portrayed as the imperialist country, which, after WWI, wanted to control all countries of the world by means of their dollar.¹⁷⁹

While the interpretation of the French Revolution (1789) remains unchanged, the interpretation of Napoleon is different. CHU Hui in 1932 says that Napoleon “grasped (*zhangwo* 掌握) military and political power”, “had big ambitions and unexpectedly proclaimed himself emperor”, and “attacked all countries”.¹⁸⁰ The authors of the textbook from 1944 state that all European Empires with absolutism wanted to suppress the French Revolution and hence attacked France. Napoleon is called “the big hero of France” (*Faguo dayingxiong* 法國大英雄), and it is claimed that he was chosen (*bei xuan* 被選) to be the Emperor.¹⁸¹ JIN Zhaozi talks of him as of the possible savior of France, whom people trusted and supported (*yonghu* 擁護).¹⁸² The authors of the textbook from 1948 state that he “took up his post ‘to keep the reign’ (*churen zhizheng* 出任執政), and monopolized power; and he exploited the opportunity to restore the imperial system”.¹⁸³ Surprisingly, the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) are not discussed in the last textbook.

To sum up, the causes of the French Revolution do not differ, but the figure of Napoleon, him coming to power and his role in the history of France and Europe seem to be contested and controversial.

In this period such terms as “capitalism” and “working class” start to appear. While explaining how the Industrial Revolution influenced imperialism, CHU Hui

175 Including Britain, the USA, France, Italy, Japan. See: Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 4 (1948), p. 15.

176 Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 4 (1948), p. 16.

177 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), pp. 47, 48.

178 JIN Zhaozi: *Waiguoshi*, vol. 3 (1941), p. 119.

179 *Ibid.*, p. 232.

180 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), p. 32.

181 Jiaoyubu bianshen weiyuanhui: *Gaoxiao lishi*, vol. 3 (1944), pp. 22, 23.

182 JIN Zhaozi: *Waiguoshi*, vol. 2 (1946), pp. 244–250.

183 Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 3 (1948), pp. 15, 16.

uses the term “capitalist imperialism” (*ziben diguozhuyi* 資本帝國主義). According to the text, it came from Britain and influenced European countries and Japan. Capitalism creates inequality between the capitalists and the working class. Socialists, such as Robert OWEN (1771–1858), come up with peaceful measures on how to improve the circumstances of the workers (utopian socialism and cooperative movement); Marxists demand that means of production not be the private property of capitalists but belong to society. The teaching of SUN Yat-sen is presented as the perfect method to save the economy because it harmonizes the collaboration of both classes.¹⁸⁴ As ZARROW puts it, SUN’s San-min Doctrine became “the heart of the Nationalist ideology”¹⁸⁵ and hence it was implemented in the education system. The very first goal of the curricula standards for the 1932 senior secondary school calls for “elucidation of the historical foundation of the San-min Doctrine.”¹⁸⁶ With the split between the GMD and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1927 in mind, the presentation of socialist (and in particular Marxist) ideas in a textbook seems astounding. Nonetheless, here the author does not present them as right, but describes the problem, shows how other ideologies suggest dealing with it, and presents the San-min Doctrine as the best of all.

In the “national history”, i.e., “Chinese history”, the narrative of the Portuguese bribing Chinese official appears for the first time. This narrative mockingly shows Chinese officials and bureaucracy as corrupted and unpatriotic. The Chinese side is represented in this narrative as partly responsible for the boldness of the Portuguese. The Portuguese are portrayed as cunning in their demands for territory and privileges, and the Chinese as powerless to reject these demands, all of which let the Europeans fulfill their ambitions of occupying China.¹⁸⁷

Some textbooks also indicate that the general diplomatic policy of China was not always correct; the existing domestic problems caused conflicts and defeats in both diplomacy and wars.¹⁸⁸ In general, China is depicted as a “victim” of the imperialist powers. Furthermore, the textbooks provide several interrelated aspects: the defeat in both Opium Wars, the introduction of the term “unequal treaties” in traditional Chinese historiography,¹⁸⁹ the agendas of the Western Great Powers to

184 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), pp. 38–40.

185 Peter ZARROW: *Educating China* (2015), p. 35.

186 Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo (comp.): *20 shiji. Lishijuan* (2001), p. 50.

187 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben* vol. 2 (1932), pp. 34–35; Jiaoyu zongshu bianzhenghui 教育總署編審會 (ed.): *Chuzhong benguoshi* 初中本國史, 第三冊 (Junior Secondary school China’s history textbook, vol. 3), Beijing: Xinminyin shuguan 1939, p. 2.

188 Jiaoyu zongshu bianzhenghui (ed.): *Chuzhong benguoshi*, vol. 3 (1939), pp. 30–33.

189 According to the definition given in the textbook published in 1948 regarding the Treaty of Nanking, this treaty is unequal, because Britain gained rights in China, while China gained no rights in Britain. See: Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 3 (1948), pp. 23, 24.

dismember China and finally the outbreak of the Boxer Rebellion. The Boxers are described as courageous and faithful sons of the homeland rebelling against the arbitrary actions of the imperialist states.¹⁹⁰

1928 – 1949: The image of Russia

Textbooks of this period of time focus even more than those of previous years on the development of the imperialistic states, and Russia is mentioned as one of the main representatives of the imperialistic powers. Some textbooks only focus on the history of the West; others talk about world history with the focus on China. Hence most of the countries are only mentioned in the context of relations with China and the development of imperialism; in this case, the history of Russia is not described in detail, but we can still analyze its image and the interpretation of its role in certain historical events.

Russia is named as the country that was established by Rurik, a representative of the Slavic tribes in the 9th century. The country was invaded by Mongols or even by the *Chinese Mongols* in the 13th century.¹⁹¹ The backward nature of Russia before Peter the Great continues to be stressed by the authors. While one textbook says that “the king of the Muscovite Russia stood out, but Russia was not a model”,¹⁹² another claims that Russia’s underdevelopment at that time stemmed from the underdeveloped policy and culture of the Mongol state, which Russia seemed to have adopted.¹⁹³ Here one can see that the Mongols were considered to be foreign (in race and culture) even though the Yuan dynasty was treated as a Chinese dynasty.¹⁹⁴

Peter the Great, just like in previous textbooks, is given a very positive image. He is described as talented and bold, a reformer of the state policy, navy, and

190 The Boxers (Yihetuan 義和團) are shown as bold (*haowu weiju* 毫無畏懼 “absolutely fearless”) and faithful (*qian pu hou ji* 前仆後繼 “one falls, the next follows”) fighters, while the actions of joint forces are not viewed as heroic. When they invaded Beijing, they killed and plundered, “making thousand-year-old jewels their souvenirs”. See: CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 3 (1932), pp. 18, 19.

191 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), p. 28.

192 *Ibid.*

193 HE Bingsong 何炳松 (ed.): *Fuxing gaoji zhongxue jiaokeshu waiguo shi, xia ce* 復興高級中學教科書外國史, 下冊 (Fuxing Senior Secondary school textbook on Foreign History, vol. 2), Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan 1935, p. 23.

194 See: Peter ZARROW: *Educating China* (2015), pp. 191, 192.

customs. His victory over Sweden is mentioned as something positive that helped Russia to develop.¹⁹⁵

The Partition of Poland is briefly mentioned or if not, mentioned as something natural as a result of domestic problems (differences in religions, the ruler without real power, hard life of the common people) and ambitions of the neighboring rulers, among which Catherine II is even entitled the cleverest woman (*zui jingming de nüren* 最精明的女人) by the Chinese historian HE Bingsong 何炳松 (1890–1946).¹⁹⁶ In the Napoleonic Wars, Russia is described as the country that did not submit to Napoleon, and that was the reason for his military campaign against it.¹⁹⁷ HE Bingsong claims that after the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) Alexander I, together with METTERNICH, became very vigilant (*jiexin* 戒心) toward the revolution and changed his mind to despotism (*zhuanzhi* 專制).¹⁹⁸ His successor – Nicholas I is entitled “the most despotic ruler in the world” (*shijie shang zui zhuanheng baonüe de junzhu* 世界上最專橫暴虐的君主); his reign is described as the despotic time of strict censorship.¹⁹⁹ It also states that during the reign of Alexander II, peasants were abused and as the result of the Emancipation Reform (1861), they achieved nothing because they simply had no rights. People’s anxiety and discontent led to revolts of peasants and terrorism, and finally Alexander II was killed during a terrorist attack.²⁰⁰ Alexander III is also described as the ruler who practiced despotism, and even the rule of Nicholas II is associated with despotism and tyranny, during whose reign an anti-Jewish riot arose in Kishinev (1903). HE Bingsong also mentions “Bloody Sunday” (1905), when unarmed demonstrators were fired upon by soldiers, and this led to the 1905 Revolution and made the Emperor Nicholas II declare a constitution.²⁰¹ Thus Russia is represented as a state despotic in its essence, and it is even called “the most despotic country of Europe” (*Ouzhou zui zhuanzhi de guojia* 歐洲最專制的國家),²⁰² where “successive generations of emperors act despotically”,²⁰³ where even positive reforms result in nothing positive. Even the Trans-Siberian railway, the biggest railway in the world spreading from Saint Petersburg to Vladivostok, is claimed to be built

195 Ibid., pp. 25, 26.

196 HE Bingsong (ed.): *Waiguoshi*, vol. 2 (1935), p. 32. Also: CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben* vol. 4 (1932), p. 35; FU Binran, TAN Bitao 傅彬然, 覃必陶 (ed.): *Waiguoshi, shang ce* 外國史, 上冊 (Foreign History, vol. 1), Shanghai: Kaiming shudian 1948, p. 122.

197 HE Bingsong (ed.): *Waiguoshi*, vol. 2 (1935), pp. 114, 115.

198 Ibid., p. 229.

199 Ibid., pp. 229, 230.

200 Ibid., pp. 233–236.

201 Ibid., pp. 238–243.

202 FU Binran, TAN Bitao (ed.): *Waiguoshi*, vol. 2 (1948), p. 66.

203 Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 4 (1948), p. 13. CHU Hui also talks of the Russian Emperors as of despots: CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), p. 46.

from 1891 to 1916 for military reasons in order to reach the Pacific Ocean and to annex Manchuria and Mongolia.²⁰⁴

The interpretations of the Russo-Turkish relations remain unchanged. HE Bingsong even claims that Britain, France and Austria did not let Russia occupy “Turkey”, and this fight for the territory became the main reason for “the Great European War” (WWI).²⁰⁵

The Russian Revolution of 1917 (with the start in February followed by the seizure of political power by LENIN’s Communist Party in October) is generally viewed as positive because LENIN promoted self-determination, and the revolution led to the independence of small nations.²⁰⁶ The same way the establishment of the USSR is generally viewed as positive. After the overthrow of the regime of the Russian Emperors, the Soviet government immediately proclaimed armistice and made peace with Germany. One of the textbooks indicates that since the revolution was the result of socialism, it caused many difficulties, but after the New Economic Policy (NEP) was carried out, the economic situation improved.²⁰⁷ LENIN proclaimed that the land be returned to the peasants, and that sovereignty belong to the craftsmen, peasants, and soldiers. In 1928 STALIN started implementing a five-year plan, which was actually achieved in four years.²⁰⁸ As far as the difficult relations between the GMD’s Republic of China and the USSR in late 1920s until early 1930s as well as the situation after WWII are concerned, it seems unusual (to say the least) that textbooks provide generally positive image of the USSR as opposed to other “imperialist powers”. Nevertheless, the Republic of China was waiting for help from the USSR after Japan’s attack in 1931; from 1937 until 1941, the USSR provided military support; in August 1945, it carried out the Manchurian Operation. Without question, it is not easy to determine which factors could or could not influence the attitudes of the authors toward the USSR. The textbook from 1932 strictly follows the curricular guidelines, where topics such as the “fight against imperialism” and “movements for independence” are emphasized. In this sense, LENIN was fighting directly against imperialism, and the revolution led to the independence of small nations. The 1948 curricula do not specify how the development of international relations should be interpreted. The textbooks tend to explain how the USSR became a powerful state, improved its own economic situation and gained the victory over Nazi Germany. Still, another textbook produced

204 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), pp. 42, 43; HE Bingsong (ed.): *Waiguoshi*, vol. 2 (1935), p. 238.

205 HE Bingsong (ed.): *Waiguoshi*, vol. 2 (1935), p. 231.

206 CHU Hui: *Beixin lishi jiaoben*, vol. 4 (1932), p. 46.

207 Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 4 (1948), p. 14

208 Guoli bianyiguan: *Gaoji xiaoxue lishi*, vol. 4 (1948), pp. 13, 14; FU Binran, TAN Bitao (ed.): *Waiguoshi*, vol. 2 (1948), p. 68.

at the early stage of the Nanjing decade is extremely negative in assessing Russia and even the Russian Revolution. It calls Russia, together with Britain, the most outstanding among the European imperialistic powers which oppress small and weak nations of the world.²⁰⁹ Regarding the Russian Revolution of 1917, the text says that it is totally different from all the other revolutions because they were pro-democratic while the Russian Revolution is a socialist revolution.²¹⁰

In the “National history” textbooks, Russia continues to be presented as the aggressor both in the 17th century, when according to the textbooks, the Russians invaded the Qing, and in the 19th century, when, as noted, the Russians “seized the opportunity” and “made” China discuss the border as well as grant the territory in gratitude for the mediation.²¹¹

Conclusion

Both Russia and the West are described through the use of the same categories. Certain ideas continue to be interpreted as either positive or negative. At the same time, there is a multiplicity of voices. Before the GMD came to power in 1928, textbooks were shaped by different forces, including publishing houses, individual authors, teachers, etc. Although it must be pointed out that textbooks certainly tried to meet the official curricular objectives.²¹² In contrast to some articles from the Chinese reformist press of the late 19th and early 20th century, history textbooks do not state clearly that Russia “had never been fully Europeanized” or even that the Russians are “half-Asian themselves”.²¹³ However, certain topics or ideas that were expressed in the reformist press are found in the textbooks such as: “Russia’s southward expansionism due to her need for ice-free ports”,²¹⁴ the “autocratic nature of Russia’s emperors and Russia’s expansion”, “Russia’s expansionism as

209 FU Linyi 傅林一 (ed.): *Xin shidai lishi jiaokeshu, si ce* 新時代歷史教科書, 四冊 (New Era History Textbooks, vol. 4), Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan 1928–1932, p. 35.

210 Ibid., p. 41.

211 CHEN Dengyuan 陳登原: *Chenshi gaozhong benguoshi, xia ce* 陳氏高中本國史, 下冊 (Chenshi Senior Secondary School National History), Shanghai: Shijie shuju 1935, pp. 149, 254, 256; YING Gongjiu 應功九(ed.): *Chuzhong Benguoshi, di san ce* 初中本國史, 第三冊 (Junior Secondary School National history textbook, vol. 3), Shanghai: Zhengzhong shuju 1936, pp. 48–50, 92–96.

212 Peter ZARROW: *Educating China* (2015), pp. 6, 7.

213 Don C. PRICE: *Russia and the Roots* (1974), p. 173.

214 Cf. Don C. PRICE: *Russia and the Roots* (1974), pp. 68, 168; Shangwu yinshuguan bianyisuo (ed.): *Zuixin zhongxue jiaokeshu*, vol. 2 (1906), p. 287.

the legacy of Peter the Great”, and “Russia’s exploitation of an opportunity to protect her own interests”.²¹⁵ While some textbooks contrast Russia with the West to a certain degree, it can be said on the basis of the structure of textbooks and the content of chapters that Chinese textbooks certainly *associate* Russia with the West. At the same time, it also plays a quite specific role as the most despotic and most aggressive representative of the West. The textbooks do not discuss precisely when Russia became part of the West, but they describe the country as barbarous prior to the times of Peter the Great. With this historical figure, “western civilization” entered Russia and make the country thus become “civilized.” It is often portrayed as the main opponent of Britain in the fight for influence and the biggest “troublemaker” in Europe. In this context, Russia stands in a certain opposition to the West. At the same time, Russia is regarded as an East European state, and thus different from the West European states. Defining whether Russia is the West or not is a difficult task because it is a matter of interpretation. None of the textbooks states a clear answer. There is this opposition of Russia to Europe or the West. As in modern days, especially in mass media, Russia is opposed to Europe or the West, so was it in history textbooks. If Russia is not part of the West or part of Europe, then is it called with as part of Asia? Not really. In the textbooks of that time, Russia is part of the history of the West and is *associated* with the West, but it is not *equal* to the West. Otherwise, why would “western civilization” have entered Russia? In this sense, Russia stands apart.

Through all the periods analyzed in this chapter, one can see a very negative attitude toward Christianity in the textbooks.²¹⁶ It is viewed as an obstacle to the development of science and education. Textbooks stress that educated people always opposed despotism. Both in the case of Russia and the West, religion is associated with backwardness and blindness while the decrease of religious influence, as it is portrayed in the textbooks, enables people to develop science, education and a sense of constitutionalism.

Positive “attributes” of the West are the constitution, civil rights, liberalism, education and scientific progress. Since the 1930s the Industrial Revolution has played a central role in explaining the Western scientific and technological progress as well as the development of western “capitalist imperialism”. From the Republican era onward, the textbooks stress the importance of the republic and independence; Russia in this context bears only negative attributes of the West. It is seen to have no constitution apart from absolute monarchy and to have no civil rights and

215 For details on the image of Russia in the Chinese press: see chapter 6 of Don C. PRICE: *Russia and the Roots* (1974), pp. 164–192.

216 There are few exceptions. For example, JIN Zhaozi (ed.): *Lishi keben jiaoshoushu*, vol. 2 (1923), pp. 25–30.

no liberalism, but only despotic rule; it is an aggressor as well as an imperialist state. The “Western civilization”, which, thanks to Peter the Great, helped Russia to become one of the Great Powers, which is good in general but on the other hand, allow Russia to carry out aggressive policy toward neighboring countries.

The Western countries, as opposed to Russia, created a constitution; got rid of the influence of religion; contributed to the Renaissance (and all cultural and scientific developments associated with it) and scientific progress; dismissed absolutism and got rid of despotic rule; and established republics and constitutional monarchies. Almost none of these is attributed to Russia, and hence, until the beginning of the Russian Revolution, all the most negative aspects of the West are presented in this state.

Absolute monarchy is always criticized, in the discussion of both Russia and the West. Even the image of Peter the Great has two opposing sides: he introduced Western civilization and helped the state to develop, but the aggressive policy toward “Turkey” and Asia in general as well as toward Poland, is associated with his name. Similarly in vein, Charles the Great cared for education and established schools, but also fought with the Pope for power.

In the later textbooks when they discuss the Russian Revolution and the establishment of the USSR, the image of these historical events is generally positive. Russia finally got rid of the “despotic monarch”; people could attain land as well as human rights. The USSR exited WWI, made peace with Germany, and thus made significant progress.

Certain ideas that appear in the early Republic textbooks are present in the discussions of both Russia and the West. For instance, the East-West Schism of 1054 in Christianity is mentioned, and the story of Ivan III marrying the niece of the last emperor of the E. R. E. is described in textbooks of the same period. The statement that the Chinese Mongols conquered certain Western states appears in that period, and hence, it was the Chinese Mongols who conquered Russia.

While being diverse before 1928, textbooks followed curricular guidelines and a very concrete interpretive angle since the time of the GMD. The late Qing textbooks sometimes (but not always) talk of the revolutions as a source of unrest (*luan* 亂),²¹⁷ but in general support the opposition to “despotic rule”. The late Qing textbooks focus on constitutionalism and the opposition to absolutism. The West is associated with aggression and colonialism, but also with progress and development. The early Republican textbooks do not change much in the interpretation of

217 As indicated by ZARROW in discussing the Taiping rebellion, the textbooks of the Zhonghua Shuju regarded the Taipings as a source of “chaos” (*luan* 亂), and that “by using this term, they delegitimized the rebels”. See: Peter ZARROW: *Educating China* (2015), p. 185.

the West, but some new ideas and heroes come in. The whole interpretation of history is first of all related to self-identification, the understanding of oneself and one's role in society; those are the things that more obviously change. The textbooks provide many visualizations of territories; nonetheless, in many cases, the borders of China on the maps are quite vague or indistinct. The Mongols are now presented as "our country's people", and hence it is the Chinese Mongols who made a military campaign to the West in the times of the Mongol Empire. What changes in the image of the West, however, is the image of the USA since the 1910s, which is also presented as an aggressor and colonizer in the description of the modern state.

Since the 1930s textbooks have become extremely nationalistic. They stress China's contribution to world culture, stating that many inventions came from China and helped Europe develop. They detail more about the Sino-West contacts. ZHENG He is now mentioned as the Chinese traveler who made geographical discoveries before the Western travelers did so, which stresses the superiority of China over the West. The focus is on ideas such as the Western capitalist imperialism, movements for independence and republicanism. The Industrial Revolution is now presented as the central event in the history of the West. On the one hand, it is said to have facilitated scientific and technological progress. On the other hand, it led to a form of capitalist imperialism. Given such an interpretation, many wars are explained as the result of the fight of imperialistic powers for their own profit. In discussing the world order and political philosophies, the San-min Doctrine is presented as the most advantageous of all ideologies. The Yihetuan Movement is presented as the movement of Chinese patriots who stood against the Western imperialists, and hence they are praised as national heroes. In the end, the textbooks stress the necessity for China to stay unified, fight against foreign aggression and lead China to a better future.

2 Portrayals of Soviet Russian History in Chinese History Textbooks since 1949

Abstract. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Russian political history has always dominated the content of history textbooks in China. This situation was particularly evident in the edition of textbooks before 1996. When it comes to economic history, it does not truly concern the economics but mainly serves political needs. Even though the content of Soviet economic history was lengthened after 1996, political history remained as the mainstream. It was not until 2003 that the new edition of history textbooks elaborated on history in terms of politics, economy, and culture. The economic history of Russia was then truly equal to the political history. As for the description of Russian cultural history, it was often also seen as marginal in textbooks until China brought in new history textbooks in the late 1990s. The new textbooks inherit the "truth seeking" consciousness from the 1996 edition, adopting neutrality for the major events in Russian history and allowing readers to look at Russia's gains and losses from both positive and negative perspectives. With such consciousness in mind, it is likely to become a new mainstream principle in China of how Russian history should be portrayed in history textbooks in the future.

Keywords: Soviet Russian history, Chinese history textbooks, People's Republic of China, Teaching, History education.

Introduction

Russian political history has been playing a dominant role in Chinese history textbooks for more than 70 years. Textbooks have become one of the main channels for young students to understand the world since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Investigating the content and viewpoints of the history of the development of Soviet Russia¹ in Chinese history textbooks², on the one hand, can help to understand the recognition and changes of the image of Russia in China's mainstream value system under the current context. On the other hand, through the history of Russia presented in textbooks, we can analyze the influence of the era on writing historical textbooks.

The Description of Soviet Russia in Textbooks in Different Periods

The Description of the October Revolution

The October Revolution, as a major event affecting Russia and the history of the world, has always been a key component of world history in Chinese textbooks. As an important leader, LENIN (1870–1924) was highly praised. What role did STALIN, an important historical figure after LENIN, play in the October Revolution? How do the textbook of different editions evaluate this event and the figures concerned?

In the 1955 edition of history textbooks, STALIN's (1878–1953) role in the revolution is considered praiseworthy. It repeatedly mentions his name as many as 27 times and says that “当列宁避难的期间，斯大林领导了布尔什维克党，领导了关于武装起义的准备工作 (during the refuge of LENIN, STALIN led the

1 The history of the development of Soviet Russia includes the Soviet Russia period (1917–1922) and the Soviet Union period (1922–1991).

2 Before 2001, the history textbooks published by People's Education Press mentioned in this paper are senior secondary school history textbooks. After 2001, in order to show the latest research situation, history textbooks for junior secondary school and senior secondary school published by the same press were selected. Among them, history textbooks for junior secondary school include the newly one published by the ministry, and textbooks for senior secondary school include both a Chinese and foreign history outline (I) (ii).

Bolshevik Party and led the preparations for the armed uprising jobs)".³ It can be seen that the 1955 edition deliberately glorifies STALIN on the issue of the October Revolution while the name of STALIN was not mentioned in the "great victory of the October Socialist Revolution" in the 1957 edition and, therefore, can be seen as downplaying STALIN on purpose.

The new textbooks issued under the guidance of the new curriculum standard basically link LENIN with the October Revolution. For example, the elective textbook *Chinese and Foreign Historical Figures* from 2011 takes one lesson to introduce LENIN and suggests that LENIN was the leader of the October Revolution making great contributions and having created the first socialist country.⁴ The new textbook from 2019 objectively describes LENIN's leadership in the October Revolution: "1917年11月6日晚,列宁秘密来到彼得格勒起义的总指挥宫-斯莫尔尼宫,亲自领导起义(On the evening of November 6, 1917, LENIN secretly went to the Smolny (Smol'ny) Palace, the headquarters of the Petrograd Uprising, and personally led the uprising)".⁵

The significance of the October Revolution has always been the focus of Chinese textbooks. The 1955 edition of *The Modern History of the Soviet Union* highly praised the October Revolution: "动摇了帝国主义统治,还开启了民族解放运动的新高潮,是马克思主义的巨大胜利(That the imperialist rule has been shaken and the new upsurge of the national liberation movement has been started is a great victory for Marxism)".⁶ The 1976 edition quotes Chairman MAO (1893–1976) and advocates violent revolution: "只有通过暴力革命,才能夺取政权,摧毁资本主义的国家机器,建立无产阶级专政(Only through violent revolutions can we seize power, destroy capitalist state machines, and establish a dicta-

3 LI Chunwu 李纯武 (ed.): *Sulian xiandai shi* 苏联现代史 (The Modern History of the Soviet Union), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 1955, pp. 5–7.

4 Lishi Kecheng Jiaocai Yanjiu Kaifa Zhongxin 历史课程教材研究开发中心 (ed.): *Putong Gaozhong Kecheng Biaozhun Shixian Jiaokeshu: Lishi Xuanxiu 4: Zhongwai Lishi Renwu Pingshuo* 普通高中课程标准实验教科书:历史选修 4:中外历史人物评说 (Experimental Textbook of Curriculum Standards for Senior Secondary Schools: History Elective 4: Comments on Chinese and Foreign Historic Persons), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 2011, pp. 89–94.

5 Jiaoyubu 教育部 (ed.): *Yiwu Jiaoyu Jiaokeshu Qi Nianji Xia Ce* 义务教育教科书七年级下册 (Compulsory Education Textbook, the second volume of seventh grade), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 2019, p. 40.

6 LI Chunwu: *Sulian* (1955), pp. 15–17.

torship of the proletariat)".⁷ Although the 1982 edition of the textbook does not include the quotations of MAO, it still advocates the violent revolution.⁸

In addition to its international significance, the 1996 edition also sees the impact of the revolution on Russia itself: “建立了世界上第一个无产阶级领导的、工农联盟为基础的社会主义国家，为把俄国改造成社会主义工业强国创造了重要前提 (The establishment of the world's first socialist country, led by the proletariat and the alliance of workers and peasants, created important premise for the transformation of Russia into a socialist industrial power)”.⁹ The 2001 edition of the senior secondary school textbook is more objective, pointing out that “使人类进入探索社会主义发展道路的新时期 [...] 是世界现代史的开端 (Putting mankind into a new era of exploring the path of socialist development [...] is the beginning of modern world history)”.¹⁰ It also mentions the controversy of history and mentions in the notes that “在史学界还有一种观点，认为世界现代史开始于 19 世纪末 20 世纪初 (There is also a point of view in the academic world of history that modern world history began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries)”.¹¹ The textbook from early 2005 focuses on the impact of the October Revolution on China: “十月革命的一声炮响，给我们送来了马克思列宁主义 (The explosion of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism)”.¹² The history textbook for senior secondary school level from 2011, starting with the positive influence on the socialist revolution, sees its success “使得社会主义从理论变为现实，同时也鼓舞了国际无产阶级和殖民地半殖民地人民的解放斗争 (making socialism turn from theory into reality, but also inspiring the liberation

7 Beijingshi Jiaoyuju Jiaocai Bianxiezu 北京市教育局教材编写组编 (ed.): “*Shijie Jindai Xiandaishi*” xia ce 《世界近代现代史》下册 (World Modern History, Part 2), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 1976, p.15. (Because it is in the period of the "Cultural Revolution", there is no unified textbook compiled by the state, so the author chooses the senior secondary school history textbook of Beijing, which was widely used in the period of the Cultural Revolution.)

8 YAN Zhiliang 严志梁 (ed.): *Shijie Lishi Xia Ce* 世界历史下册 (World History, Part 2), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 1982, p. 172.

9 Renmin Jiaoyu Chuban She Lishi Shi 人民教育出版社历史室 (ed.): *Shijie Jindai Xian-dai Shi* 世界近代现代史 (World Modern History, Part 2), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 1996, p. 5.

10 Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe Lishishi 人民教育出版社历史室 (ed.): *Shijie Jindai Xian-dai Shi* 世界近代现代史 (World Modern History, Part 2), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 2001, p. 4.

11 Ibid.

12 Kecheng Jiaocai Yanjiu Suo Lishi Kecheng Yanjiu Kaifa Zhongxin 课程教材研究所历史课程研究开发中心 (ed.): *Yiwu Jiaoyu Kecheng Biaozhun Shixian Jiaokeshu Zhongguo Lishi Jiu Nianji Xia Ce* 义务教育课程标准实验教科书中国历史九年级下册 (Compulsory education curriculum standard experimental Chinese history textbook, The second volume of grade 9), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 2005, p. 5.

struggle of the international proletariat and the colonized and semi-colonized people)”.¹³ The narrative in the 2019 edition is basically the same and elaborates on the positive role of the October Revolution in the proletarian movement: “是人类历史上第一次胜利的社会主义革命，建立了第一个无产阶级专政国家，推动了国际无产阶级革命运动，鼓舞了殖民地半殖民地人民的解放斗争 (It was the first triumphant socialist revolution in human history. It established the first dictatorship of the proletariat, promoted the international proletarian revolutionary movement and inspired the liberation struggle of the colonized and semi-colonized people.)”.¹⁴

The latest history textbook for senior secondary school level introduces the October Revolution in Lesson 15 of the seventh unit “The Victory of the October Revolution and the Socialist Practice of the Soviet Union.” It highly values the October Revolution for world history: “是俄国与世界历史进程中的划时代事件 [...] 改变了 20 世纪的世界格局。从此，资本主义和社会主义两种社会制度的并存与竞争，成为世界历史的重要内容 (It is an epoch-making event in the historical process of Russia and the world [...] It changed the world pattern of the 20th century. Since then, the coexistence and competition of capitalism and socialism has become an important part of world history)”.¹⁵

In summary, the textbooks from the 1950s to the mid-1960s mainly describe the world significance of the revolution and the great importance of Marxism-Leninism. From the Cultural Revolution period until the early 1990s, the emphasis of these textbooks was put on seizing power by violence. The textbooks in the 21st century have become more objective and turned to praise the October Revolution for creating a situation in which both capitalism and socialism could coexist in world history.

13 Lishi Kecheng Yanjiu Kaifa Zhongxin 历史课程研究开发中心 (ed.): *Putong Gaozhong Kecheng Biaozhun Shixian Jiaokeshu: Lishi 1 (Bixiu)* 普通高中课程标准实验教科书:历史 1 (必修) (Experimental Textbook of Curriculum Standards for Senior Secondary Schools: History Compulsory 1), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 2011, p. 91.

14 Jiaoyubu: *Yiwu Jiaoyu Jiaokeshu Qi Nianji Xia Ce* (2019), p. 42.

15 Jiaoyubu Zuzhi Bianxie 教育部组织编写 (ed.): *Putong Gaozhong Lishi jiaokeshu Lishi Bixiu Zhongwai Lishi Gangyao Xia* 普通高中教科书历史必修中外历史纲要下 (Experimental Textbook of Curriculum Standards for Senior Secondary Schools: History Compulsory: Outline of Chinese and foreign history, Part 2), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 2019, pp. 90–91.

Description of the Soviet Union During the Stalin Period

The construction of socialism during the Stalin period was mainly embodied in the aspects of the Soviet Union; giving priority to the development of heavy industry is a major feature of the Soviet Union. The 1955 edition of the textbook points out that “苏联社会主义工业化的资金来源于公有制财产与生产率的提高 (the Soviet Union’s funds for socialist industrialization came from the improvement of public ownership of property and productivity)”.¹⁶ Although the 1982 edition does not mention it positively, it is mentioned in the Soviet Union’s objection to “The TROTSKY-ZINOVIEV alliance”. The 1982 edition states that “苏联积累资金的办法已经使农民作出了最大的贡献, 如果再按‘托——季联盟’的办法去做, 必将使农民破产, 农业崩溃, 工业化最后也必将失败 (The Soviet Union’s method of accumulating funds has already made the peasants make the greatest contribution. If it still goes on by following the way of the TROTSKY-ZINOVIEV alliance, it will definitely cause the peasants to go bankrupt as well as the agriculture to collapse, and the industrialization will eventually fail)”.¹⁷ The peasants have made tremendous contributions to the accumulation of funds in the Soviet Union, and agriculture has made sacrifices for the development of industry. The 1996 edition directly discusses the damage to agriculture caused by the development of industrialization: “国家从农民身上取走的东西太多, 使农业长期处于停滞状态 (There are too many things taken away from the peasants by the state, which makes the agriculture stagnate for a long time)”.¹⁸ The 2001 textbook is relatively objective, mentioning: “农业集体化虽然暂时有利于工业的发展, 为苏联工业化的实现提供了条件, 但存在着严重的问题和错误 (The agricultural collectivization is temporarily conducive to the industrial development, providing conditions for the realization of industrialization in the Soviet Union, but there are serious problems and mistakes)”.¹⁹ The 2005 edition for junior secondary school level pinpoints that in the process of agricultural collectivization, there are problems of forcing farmers to fight against rich peasants.²⁰ The 2011 edition for senior secondary school level not only directly highlights that funds are accumulated from agriculture for the industrial development but also presents specific figures to prove it. At the same time, it also argues that this measure is intended to enhance economic strength and national defense.²¹

16 LI Chunwu: *Sulian* (1955), p. 55.

17 YAN Zhiliang: *Shijie Lishi* (1982), p. 222.

18 Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe Lishi Shi: *World Modern History* (1996), p. 17.

19 Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe Lishi Shi: *World Modern History* (2001), p. 15.

20 Kecheng Jiaocai Yanjiu Suo Lishi Kecheng Yanjiu Kaifa Zhongxin: *Yiwu Jiaoyu Kecheng Biaozhun Shiyuan Jiaokeshu* (2005), pp. 8–9.

21 Lishi Kecheng Yanjiu Kaifa Zhongxin: *Putong Gaozhong Lishi Jiaokeshu* (2011), p. 96.

In comparison, the edition from 2019 is more comprehensive and better founded as it introduces the background of the agricultural collectivization: “苏联发生了严重的粮食收购危机，斯大林决心 [...] 解决粮食问题 [...] 多方面支持集体农庄的建设，加快组建拖拉机站，为农庄提供机械服务 (The Soviet Union has experienced a serious food acquisition crisis. STALIN is determined to [...] solve the food problem [...] support the construction of collective farms in many ways and the acceleration of setting up tractor stations, and provide farms with mechanical farming)”。²² The textbook introduces the era and rationale behind the agricultural collectivization policy as well as sees the damage to the interests of farmers under the administrative means of planning and the problems caused: “The interests of farmers were affected by serious problems which caused the stagnation of agricultural production in the Soviet Union”。²³ In Lesson 15, “十月革命胜利与社会主义实践 (Victory of the October Revolution and Socialist Practice)” under the fifth unit of the latest history textbook, the development model of the Soviet Union in special national conditions can be seen, that is, industrialization becomes the basis of Soviet industrial power that sacrifices agriculture for both the light industry and heavy industry: “在农业集体化中采用强制手段导致国民经济比例失调 (The use of coercive means in the collectivization of agriculture has led to national economic disproportion)”。²⁴

Discussion of the Stalin model principally differs between the textbooks before and after the 1996 edition. The textbooks before the 1996 edition²⁵ value its advantages of the Stalin model such as economic development and the “New Soviet Constitution”, marking the Soviet Union’s entry into socialism. After 1996, each version is more objective that evaluation not only includes merits but also drawbacks of the model. For example, the 2019 edition argues in a more neutral manner that the Stalin model, have brought economic and political benefits to the Soviet Union. At the same time, it also manages to dig out the setbacks which signify the disadvantages the Soviet Union would face in the future: “苏联在较短时间实现工业化，为日后赢得反法西斯战争的胜利奠定物质基础，显示了社会主义制度的优越性 [...] 但苏联模式的弊端也使苏联付出沉重的代价。 (The Soviet Union achieved industrialization within a relatively short period of time, laying the material foundation for the victory of the anti-fascist war in the future, showing the superiority of the socialist system [...] but the drawbacks of the Soviet model

22 Jiaoyubu: *Yiwu Jiaoyu Jiaokeshu Qi Nianji Xia Ce* (2019), p. 49.

23 Ibid.

24 Jiaoyubu Zuzhi Bianxie: *Putong Gaozhong Lishi Jiaokeshu Lishi Bixiu Zhongwai Lishi Gangyao Xia* (2019), p. 93.

25 Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe Lishishi 人民教育出版社历史室 (ed.): *Shijie Jindaixian-daishi* 世界近代现代史 (World Modern History, Part 2), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 1992, pp. 71–72.

were also there to cause the Soviet Union to pay a heavy price”.²⁶ The latest textbook for senior secondary school level also holds the same attitude toward the Stalin model: “奠定了强大国家的基础，为后来取得卫国战争胜利创造了物质条件。 [...] 但苏联模式排斥市场经济，片面发展重工业 [...] 导致国民经济比例失调， [...] 影响了苏联的发展。(it laid the foundation of a strong country and created material conditions later for the victory of the Great Patriotic War. [...] However, the development model of the Soviet Union rejected the market economy and developed one-sided development of heavy industry [...] leading to a disproportion of the national economy, [...] which affected the development of the Soviet Union)”.²⁷

The Chinese history textbook also describes that in the early period of STALIN’s rule, some important Communist Party leaders were defeated by STALIN, such as TROTSKY (TROTŠKIJ, 1879–1940), who played an important role in the October Revolution; BUKHARIN (1888–1938), who firmly supported LENIN’s new economic policy; and ZINOVIEV (ZINOV’EV, 1883–1936), the early leader of the Communist International. The 1955 textbook presents TROTSKY as “人民的叛徒 [...] 是帝国主义与俄国地主、资本家的助手和代理人 (the traitor of the people [...] the imperialist and Russian landlord as well as the assistant and agent of the capitalist)”.²⁸ In addition, as it is mentioned that LENIN was injured by gunshot in 1918, the book reads: “人民最恶毒的敌人托洛茨基、布哈林、加米涅夫及其帮凶们完全知道，并且参与其事 (The people’s most vicious enemies TROTSKY, BUKHARIN, KAMENEV, and their accomplices are fully aware and involved in the incident)”.²⁹ Referring to socialist construction, it states: “The TROTSKY, ZINOVIEV, BUKHARIN and other counter-revolutionaries denied that the Soviet Union had the chance of building socialism”.³⁰ Moreover, the 1960 textbook targets at TROTSKY and opportunists: “托洛茨基和机会主义分子出来反对社会主义建设 (TROTSKY and opportunists come out to oppose socialist construction)”.³¹ Moving on to the edition from 1976, for the first time TROTSKY and ZINOVIEV have been characterized as “the T-Z anti-party alliance”³² and they are said to appear as the “extreme left”. The 1979 edition is similar to the 1976 edition in the expression of this

26 Jiaoyubu: *Yiwu Jiaoyu Jiaokeshu Qinianji xiace* (2019), p. 50.

27 Jiaoyubu Zuzhi Bianxie: *Putong Gaozhong Lishi jiaokeshu Lishi Bixiu Zhongwai Lishi Gangyao Xia* (2019), p. 93.

28 Li Chunwu: *Sulian* (1955), p. 5.

29 Li Chunwu: *Sulian* (1955), p. 23.

30 Li Chunwu: *Sulian* (1955), p. 86.

31 Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe 人民教育出版社 (ed.): *Shijie Xiandai Shi* 世界现代史 (World Modern History), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 1960, p. 30.

32 Beijing Shi Jiaoyuju Jiaocai Bianxie Zu 北京市教育局教材编写组 (ed.): *Shijie Jindai Xiandai Shi Xia Ce* 世界近代现代史下册 (World Modern History, part 2), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 1976, p. 61.

issue that they all are given the labels of “左倾 (left-leaning)”, “右倾 (right-leaning)”, “(反党联盟) anti-party alliance” and “投降主义分子 (capitulationists)”. However, the difference is that the 1979 textbook does not label TROTSKY and others as “bourgeois agents”. The edition three years later mentions the historical facts but does not judge them. While it mentions that ZINOVIEV and others revealed the plans for the October revolutionary uprising, no specific judgment is given in the text. In addition, the textbook mentions BUKHARIN’s views on agricultural collectivization, and it says that “BUKHARIN’s opinion has received sympathy and support from many people... but because of STALIN’s dissatisfaction with BUKHARIN, he was criticized and labeled as an “右倾机会主义, 富农代理人 (Agent of right-opportunism and rich peasants)”.³³ Yet, these are no longer mentioned in textbooks from 1996 and the subsequent editions.

In summary, the textbooks of the 1950s and early 1960s are mainly negative toward TROTSKY and others; the textbooks of the 1970s remain basically unchanged; the textbooks of the 1980s and early 1990s are more factual but of less judgments. TROTSKY and the likes are no longer mentioned in history textbooks for senior secondary school level since the mid1990s.

Description of the Soviet Union History in World War II

Chinese textbooks basically provide positive points of view about the role of the Soviet Union in World War II. The 1955 edition acknowledges that the Soviet Union was destroying the fascists by its power: “The Soviet armed forces defeated the German fascists on the Western Front and defeated the Japanese fascists on the Eastern Front”.³⁴ The 1957 edition also emphasizes the Soviet Union’s crucial role in the war: “In the war that determined the fate of mankind, the Soviet Union played a decisive role”.³⁵ Focusing on the outcome of the China’s war of resistance, the 1960 edition gives accounts of Japan’s surrender and thoughts that the Soviet Union’s participation in the war accelerated Japan’s defeat. Additional content has been given in the 1982 edition that the Americans fought against Japan, which signifies the beginning of mentioning and describing the roles of other countries.

The 1996 textbook details the Soviet Union’s defeat in the early days of the war and analyzes the reasons: “A large number of outstanding commanders lost their lives in internal persecution, and the Soviet military’s combat effectiveness

33 YAN Zhiliang: *Shijie Lishi* (1982), p. 224.

34 LI Chunwu: *Sulian* (1955), p. 116.

35 YANG Shengmao 杨生茂 and LI Chunwu 李纯武 (ed.): *Shijie Jindai Xiandai Shi Xia Ce* 世界近代现代史下册 (World Modern History, part 2), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 1957, p. 111.

was severely weakened [...] The Soviets made serious mistakes in their defense strategy”.³⁶ The first edition of the 21st century not only points out the Soviet Union’s initial defeat and its causes, but also uses concrete figures to prove the huge losses suffered by the Soviet Union: “到 1941 年 11 月, 德军已经占领了苏联一百五十多万平方千米的土地, 控制了苏联大约 40% 的人口以及大部分工业区 (In November 1941, the Germans occupied more than 1.5 million square kilometers of lands of the Soviet Union as well as controlled about 40% of the Soviet Union’s population and most industrial areas)”.³⁷ The 2005 version of the junior secondary school textbook provides in-depth descriptions of the Soviet Union’s great contribution to the Battle of Stalingrad. In addition, after the end of the war against Germany, it sent troops to northeast China to fight alongside China against Japan.³⁸ The latest textbook reports that the Soviet Union “成为抵抗纳粹德国的主战场 (became the main battlefield against Nazi Germany)”,³⁹ and made great contributions to the war.

With respect to the Soviet Union’s expansion of territory during the war, Chinese textbooks of different eras provide very different angles on this issue. The 1955 version mentions that the Soviet Union expanded its territory to the west when the German army invaded Poland, but it was glorified.⁴⁰ For instance, it says that the eastern part of Poland and the Bessarabia of Romania were the territory of the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Union just made them return to the “homeland”. Finland had to accept the peace agreement because of its failure to attack the Soviet Union on its own initiative; Latvia and other countries joined the Soviet Union because of the people’s referendum. The 1957 edition skips the territorial issue of Romania but the rest of the content is consistent with the one from 1955. The first time that the Soviet Union’s occupation of the territories of these countries has been discussed is found in the 1996 edition: “When the German army invaded Poland, the Soviet Union began to expand its territory to the west and established the ‘Eastern Front’”.⁴¹ Meanwhile, the notes in the book explain the components of the Soviet occupied territory in detail. The 2001 version further shows the illegal occupation of the territories of these countries by the Soviet Union. It is not difficult to see that the textbooks of the 1950s completely modified the facts; afterwards, the issue was not touched upon in the textbooks until the

36 Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe Lishishi: *Shijie Jindai Xiandai Shi* (1996), p. 54.

37 Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe Lishishi: *Shijie Jindai Xiandai Shi* (2001), p. 51.

38 Kecheng Jiaocai Yanjiusuo Lishi Kecheng Yanjiu Kaifa Zhongxin: *Yiwu Jiaoyu Kecheng Biaozhun Shiyuan Jiaokeshu* (2005), pp. 36–40.

39 Jiaoyubu Zuzhi Bianxie: *Putong Gaozhong Lishi Jiaokeshu Lishi Bixiu Zhongwai Lishi Gangyao Xia* (2019), p. 102.

40 Li Chunwu: *Sulian* (1955), pp. 82–84.

41 Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe Lishi Shi: *Shijie Jindai Xiandai Shi* (1996), p. 52.

edition of the mid1990s represents the facts. Nonetheless, the new textbooks and the new curriculum rid of mentioning the issue as the Soviet Union's division on other countries' territory in the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact is indeed mentioned but not the demands of the Soviet Union on the territory of other countries in the Yalta (雅尔塔) Conference.

Description of the post-war Soviet Union

In regard to the death of STALIN, three and a half pages are used in the 1955 textbook with thorough appraisal of STALIN's life. In contrast, the 1957 edition takes only one third of a page with little evaluation and very simple narration: “斯大林于 1953 年 3 月 5 日与世长辞了。斯大林逝世以后，苏联人民更加紧密的团结在苏联共产党的周围，满怀信心地向建设共产主义的目标前进 (STALIN passed away on March 5, 1953. After STALIN's death, the Soviet people became more united around the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, confidently marching toward the goal of building communism)”.⁴² The textbooks of the 1960s and the subsequent versions barely mention the death of STALIN. It can be seen that the capacity of STALIN's death in textbooks have become more and more diminished, from the initial multipage content and high evaluation to the subsequent limited length, neutralization, and finally omission.

During the Khrushchevian era, China and the Soviet Union had a honeymoon period and subsequently a hostile period. Therefore, the description of Khrushchevian times also reflects the reality to a certain extent. The 1957 textbook focuses on achievements and vigor of the socialist construction movement under the leadership of Nikita KHRUSHCHEV (1894–1971) in the Soviet Union: “成功的进行了洲际弹道导弹的实验。成功地发射了世界上第一颗人造地球卫星 [...] 标志着苏联的科技成就达到了世界的顶峰 (Successfully conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile experiment; successfully launched the world's first artificial earth satellite. [...] That marks that the Soviet Union's scientific and technological achievements reached a world peak)”.⁴³ “1958 年，苏联的工业总产值比 1913 年增加了三十五倍 (In 1958, the industrial output value of the Soviet Union increased by 35 times compared with 1913)”.⁴⁴ Both the 1996 and 2001 textbooks talk about the reforms led by KHRUSHCHEV after the war. Although they point out

42 YANG Shengmao and LI Chunwu: *Shijie Jindai Xiandai Shi Xia Ce* (1957), p. 112.

43 YANG Shengmao and LI Chunwu: *Shijie Jindai Xiandai Shi Xia Ce* (1957), p. 66.

44 Ibid., pp. 88–89.

that the reforms had a certain effect but ended in failure. The 2011 edition for the senior secondary school level introduces the Khrushchevian reform in detail, including background, content, and evaluation. Note that the Khrushchevian reform improved the Stalin model, but because of the lack in scientific understanding of its drawbacks, it was impossible to make a fundamental breakthrough and eventually ended in failure.⁴⁵ The 2019 textbook is more or less the same: “在批判斯大林个人崇拜的同时，在经济上进行了一些改革。但是没有从根本上突破斯大林时期形成的政治经济体制 (At the same time as criticizing STALIN’s personal worship, some economic reforms were carried out. Yet there is no fundamental breakthrough of the political and economic system formed during the Stalin period)”.⁴⁶

Conclusion

Textbooks of different periods bear different descriptions of the same content of Soviet Russia history. Broadly speaking, Soviet Russia’s political history always takes a dominant position in terms of the main content of textbooks. Chronologically speaking, specific content of this history changes from time to time in textbooks especially after the founding of the People’s Republic of China as the selection of materials for the history of Soviet Russia has appeared to be different. Since 1949, the content of Soviet Russian history has undeniably been dominant in history textbooks in China; particularly evident in all the editions until the 1996 version. The description of economic history serves nothing more than as political propaganda. This is largely reflected in the description of the issue of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. Those editions before the 1996 publication mainly focus on the competition between socialism and capitalism, as well as the domestic political struggles. Although the range of discussing Soviet economic history increased after 1996, political history has still been the mainstream of content until 2003 that the new edition of history textbooks finally starts to elaborate on history by covering not only politics but also economy and culture. The

45 Lishi Kecheng Yanjiu Kaifa Zhongxin 历史课程研究开发中心 (ed.): *Putong Gaozhong Kecheng Biaozhun Shixian Jiaokeshu: Lishi 2 (Bixiu)* 普通高中课程标准实验教科书: 历史 2 (必修) (Experimental Textbook of Curriculum Standards for Senior Secondary Schools: History Compulsory 2), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe 2011, p. 99.

46 Jiaoyubu: *Yiwu Jiaoyu Jiaokeshu Qi Nianji Xia Ce* (2019), p. 84.

economic history of Russia has become an equal part to the political history. However, the cultural part of Russian history still takes up the least capacity.

The textbooks of different versions of China since 1949 have been different in the selection of angles and perspectives of the history of the Soviet Union. Some details have been given in some editions, but not in others, such as those about Leon TROTSKY. The description of Leon TROTSKY and those similar has gradually been ignored since the 1992 edition, and there is no description of these persons in the 1996 edition and thereafter as a result. Two typical issues are presented in each version of textbooks, that is, the October Revolution and the socialist construction of the Soviet Union. Although the textbooks of different times place different emphasis on these two issues, these two aspects are often the key content of the narration in the description of historical content.

There are two versions of textbooks that can be regarded as the turning point in the development of Chinese history textbooks with reference to Soviet Russian history: one is the 1982 textbook and the other is the 1996 textbook. Both have great impacts on the presentation of content in their subsequent editions. For example, the content about Russian history in textbooks in the 15 years after 1982 is based on the content in the 1982 version; those from 1996 to the present are mainly written with reference to the 1996 edition. Both the 1982 and 1996 version share one thing in common: showing more respect to history. For example, the 1982 version depicts a different Soviet Union by removing negative comments on BUKHARIN and others as well as adding more information about the history of the Second World War; the 1996 edition allows readers to learn from new historical knowledge and provides various aspects to understand the Soviet Union.

China has adopted brand new editorial history textbooks since 2019. The new textbook continues with the “truth seeking” consciousness takes a neutral stance in the descriptions of the major events in Soviet Russian history, allowing readers to look at Russia’s gains and losses from both positive and negative perspectives. This principle of seeking truth from facts is reflected on the mention of the “October Revolution” and “World War II”, and thus showing a more objective methodology in describing the historical image of Russia. The study of the content in this edition appears to be more rigorous and concise. Compared with the textbooks of previous editions, the new edition lays out the content in a more compact manner. For some controversial issues such as “STALIN’s death” and “the struggle for rights among Soviet Leaders”, the new edition takes no consideration and partly omits them. The embodiment of the rigorous and realistic orientation has been a general trend since the 1996 version of textbooks. To conclude, it is likely for such trends to become the mainstream principle of presenting Soviet Russian history in Chinese history textbooks in the foreseeable future.

Lung-chih CHANG

3 Strangers from the North: Russia in History Textbooks of Postwar Taiwan

Abstract. This chapter is aimed at exploring the changing representation of Russia in secondary school history textbooks of postwar Taiwan. The discussion is comprised of four main sections. Characterized by a mixture of anti-communism and exoticism, the depictions of Russia in Taiwanese history textbooks can be taken as an interesting case study in understanding nationalism and post-colonialism in modern China and East Asia. The first section offers a historical overview of the relations between Taiwan and Russia since the late 19th century. The second section introduces institutional features of history education and changing images of Europe in postwar Taiwan. The third section provides analysis of various depictions of Imperial Russia, the USSR, and contemporary Russia in secondary school curriculum guidelines and textbooks. The fourth section presents interviews of history teachers and their reflections of classroom experiences. The central argument of this chapter is that the changing discourse of Russia not only reflects the transformation of the official ideology during and after the Martial Law era but is also intertwined with the memory of the politics of the Second World War, the Chinese Civil War, and the Cold War. Further reflections on the Taiwan case in a larger context of modern Chinese and East Asian History are provided at the end of this chapter.

Keywords. Taiwan, Russia, USSR, World history education, Pedagogy.

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Taiwan-Russia Relations in a Historical Perspective

In May 2019, the Royal Flight Airlines (RL) announced its direct charter flight service between Moscow and Taipei. The first group of Russian tourists were warmly received at the airport with souvenirs of Taiwan's mascot bear. Meanwhile, the Siberia Airlines (S7) also started its new Vladivostok-Taipei route service.¹ It was nearly one and half centuries after Russian Naval officer Paul IBIS (1852–1877) first set foot on the island and visited the indigenous tribes during the Japanese expedition to southern Taiwan in 1875.² From the late-Qing encounter to the twenty-first century tourism, Russia has been a remote yet important presence in the Taiwanese historical imagination of Europe and the world.

Early Encounters in the Late 19th Century

Separated by the Eurasian landmass, Taiwan did not draw much attention of Imperial Russia until the late 19th century. Sketchy and fragmented information about the island can be found in early missionary reports of the Russian Orthodox Church, before which the founding of the Russian Spiritual Mission in Beijing was approved by Qing Emperor Kangxi 康熙 in 1712.³ After the treaty ports of the island opened in 1860, a small number of Russians visited Taiwan for coal supply and worked for the Chinese Maritime Customs Service.⁴

In May 1874, Taiwan became the focus of diplomatic crisis when the fleet of Meiji, Japan occupied southern Taiwan and invaded the aboriginal territory. A Russian gunboat Gornostai was dispatched the following month to Fujian for

I would like to thank Prof. Gotelind MÜLLER-SAINI and the participants of Heidelberg Workshop on Chinese Perceptions of Russia and the West for their comments on the draft. The opinion and possible errors are the author's sole responsibility.

1 “Tai e fuhang! Eluosi huangjia hangkong zhi hang banji mei zhou yi ban” 台俄復航！俄羅斯皇家航空直航班機每週一班 (Taiwan-Russia Flight resumes! One flight per week by Royal Flight), 2019, May 25. Available online: <https://newtalk.tw/news/view/2019-05-25/251474> (last access 2019, September 20).

2 Samuel STEPHENSON: “Paul (Pavel Ivanovich) IBIS 16 June 1852 – 1877 with a Supplemental Biography by M.F. Chigrinskii”. Available online: <https://www.reed.edu/formosa/texts/IbisBio.html> (last access 2019, September 20).

3 “Russian Orthodox Church marks 300 years in China”, 2012, December 7. Available online: <https://www.ucanews.com/news/russian-orthodox-church-marks-300-years-in-china/66785> (last access 2019, September 20).

4 Harold M. OTNESS (ed.): *One Thousand Westerners in Taiwan, to 1945; A Biographical and Bibliographical Dictionary*, Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica 1999.

monitoring the potential military confrontation between China and Japan. From January to February 1875, Paul IBIS was the first Russian who had travelled throughout the island and later wrote an ethnographic account of the indigenous peoples. Published first in Russian in 1876 and then in German in 1877, IBIS's work became the first well-constructed source on Taiwan's history, culture, and society.⁵

Limited Contacts in the Japanese Colonial Era, 1895–1945

Although Taiwan was featured in the famous “Frontier Defense vs. Maritime Defense” debate of the Qing court, the modernization efforts by progressive officials such as SHEN Baozhen 沈葆禎 (1820–1879) and LIU Mingchuan 劉銘傳 (1836–1896) could not prevent the cession of the island as a result of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894.⁶ The short-lived Taiwan Republic of 1895 proved to be a failed diplomatic attempt by local officials and gentry elites to solicit support from Western powers including Russia.⁷ The island and its 2.5 million inhabitants have since then undergone significant changes of colonial modernization as the first overseas colony of the Japanese empire.

Taiwan witnessed the celebration of Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the founding of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1912, and the Russian Revolution in 1917. The Taiwanese Communist Party was established in 1928 in Shanghai under the direction of the Comintern and the Japanese Communist Party. In 1937, all political and social movements in Taiwan were crushed by the colonizing authorities when Japan declared a total war on China and the Allied Powers. Some Taiwanese soldiers were detained in Siberian labor camps after Japan surrendered in 1945.

In the early 20th century, several Russian military personnel, journalists, and scholars visited Japanese colonial Taiwan. Among them was historian S.G. ELISEEV who graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University and came to Taiwan in 1912.⁸ However, most contemporary Russian newspaper and official reports

5 LIU Yuwei 劉宇衛 (Valentin GOLOVACHEV) and Moluojiakefu 莫洛賈科夫 (Vassily MOLODYAKOV, eds.): *Riben tongzhi shidai de Taiwan: Ewen shiliao yu yanjiu* 日本統治時代的臺灣：俄文史料與研究 (Taiwan Under Japanese Rule: Russian Language Sources and Studies), Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Taiwan shi yanjiusuo 2018, pp. 24–28.

6 Lung-chih CHANG: “From Island Frontier to Imperial Colony: Qing and Japanese Sovereignty Debates and Territorial Projects in Taiwan, 1874–1906”, Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University 2003.

7 LIU Yuwei 劉宇衛 (Valentin GOLOVACHEV) and Moluojiakefu 莫洛賈科夫 (Vassily MOLODYAKOV, eds.): *Riben tongzhi shidai de Taiwan* (2018), pp. 24–25.

8 ELISEEV's manuscripts on Taiwan are now kept in the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Science.

remained narrowly focused on Taiwanese peasant and communist movements between 1920s and 1930s. In 1934, an abridged, if not distorted, Russian translation of *Taiwan Under Imperialism* by YANAIHARA Tadao 矢内原忠雄 (1893–1961) was published in Moscow in accordance with the orthodox Marxist doctrine of Soviet Russia.⁹

Mutual Hostility in the Postwar Era, 1945–1986

In December 1949, CHIANG Kai-shek (JIANG Jieshi 蔣介石, 1887–1975) and the ROC government retreated to Taiwan after their debacle in the Chinese Civil War. More than 1.2 million Kuomintang (*Guomindang* 國民黨, henceforth KMT) troops, civilians, and refugees migrated to the island where Taipei became the new capital city. CHIANG promulgated the Temporary Provisions for the Period of National Mobilization which constrained the function of the ROC Constitution. The imposition of martial law further consolidated the authoritarian rule of the KMT regime in Taiwan.¹⁰ The fate of CHIANG Kai-shek and the KMT regime in Taiwan was saved by the Korean War in 1950–1953. The signing of the “Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty” in 1954 and the U.S. military and economic aids helped push Taiwan to the forefront of the anti-communist movement during the Cold War period. The two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s testify to the military threat from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the mainland. Despite claiming her sovereignty over mainland China, the ROC holds the de facto territory comprising only Taiwan, the Pescadores and the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

9 Susan C TOWNSEND: *Yanaihara Tadao and Japanese Colonial Policy: Redeeming Empire*, Richmond: Curzon Press 2000.

10 Dafydd FELL: *Government and Politics in Taiwan* (2nd ed.), London and New York: Routledge 2018.

In 1956, CHIANG published his work entitled *Soviet Russia in China* (fig. 3-1) to uphold the doctrine of anti-Communism and the ambition of retaking the mainland.¹¹




Figure 3-1: Soviet Russia in China by CHIANG Kai-shek
Photo taken by Lung-chih CHANG

With anti-communist and anti-Russian aggression (*fan gong kang E* 反共抗俄) being the official ideology of the KMT regime in the 1950s, there was virtually no Russian visiting Taiwan in the postwar era. People suspected of communist ties were imprisoned or executed during “White Terror” political purges. It was not until the Sino-Soviet split and border conflict in the late 1960s that the doctrine was altered as anti-communism and restoration of the nation (*fan gong fu guo* 反共復國).

In the 1970s, the KMT regime suffered a series of diplomatic setbacks and the resulting legitimacy crises; first the withdrawal from the United Nations in 1971, followed by the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1972 and with the U.S. in 1979. It is against this background that the KMT regime adopted the new policy of Taiwanization while Taiwanese politicians called for political reform and greater participation in local and national elections. In 1978, CHIANG Ching-kuo (JIANG Jingguo 蔣經國, 1910–1988), who was sent by his father CHIANG Kai-shek to study in Moscow and married a Russian woman in the 1920s, was elected as the ROC president. In 1980, he proposed a new doctrine of Reunification of China

11 CHIANG Kai-shek: *Soviet Russia in China: A Summing-up at Seventy*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy 1957.

under the Three Principles of the People (*sanmin zhuyi tongyi zhongguo* 三民主義統一中國).

Interactions in the Post-Martial Law Era, 1987–2019

Taiwan underwent a transition from authoritarianism to democratization in the 1980s. The first Taiwanese opposition party (the Democratic Progressive Party, DPP) was founded in 1986. In July 1987, CHIANG Ching-kuo declared the lifting of Taiwan's decades-old martial law. After CHIANG passed away in January 1988, LEE Teng-hui (LI Denghui 李登輝, *1923) became the first Taiwanese president of the ROC. He initiated a series of constitutional reforms and formally abolished the Temporary Provisions for the Period of National Mobilization in 1991. Direct elections for Taiwan provincial governors and mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung were held in 1994. In 1996, a majority of Taiwanese voters elected LEE in the first direct presidential election amidst a Chinese military test in the Straits. The ROC constitution went through seven revisions in post-martial law Taiwan that transformed presidential and parliamentary elections, restructured local government, and discarded the anti-communist ideology. In 2000, the island witnessed the first regime change when the DPP candidate CHEN Shui-bian (CHEN Shuibian 陳水扁, 1950–) won in the tight presidential election. The second and third regime change happened peacefully when the KMT candidate MA Ying-jeou (MA Yingjiu 馬英九, 1950–) and the DPP candidate TSAI Ing-wen (CAI Yingwen 蔡英文, 1956–) won the presidential elections in 2008 and 2016 respectively.¹²

Taiwan resumed interaction with Russia when president Mikhail GORBACHEV (*1931) initiated his Perestroika (Perestroika) political movement in the late 1980s. In October 1990, the mayor of Moscow paid his first visit to Taiwan after four decades of separation of Taiwan and Russia. In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Taiwan endeavored to develop relations with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other former Soviet Republics. In 1993 and 1996, representative offices were set up in Taipei and Moscow respectively for economic and cultural cooperation.¹³ In 1997, Russia joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In 2002, the Taiwan-Russia Association was established to promote commercial, technological, and cultural exchanges with the

12 Gunter SCHUBERT (ed.): *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan*, London: Routledge 2016.

13 “Representative Office of the MTC in Taipei”. Available online: <http://www.mtc.org.tw/new/ch/main.php> (last access 2019, September 20).

Commonwealth of Independent States.¹⁴ The total volume of trade between Taiwan and Russia reached a record high in 2014.¹⁵ In terms of education, Russian used to be a division of the Department of Oriental Languages in the 1950s. As of today, Russian is taught in the Departments of Slavic Languages and Literature at three major Taiwan universities: The National Chengchi University, Chinese Culture University, and Tamkang University. Research on Russia related issues is no longer a matter of political warfare and secrecy as it was in the Martial Law era (fig. 3-2), while academic exchanges between Taiwan and Russia have been facilitated in recent years.¹⁶




Figure 3-2: Recent publication on Taiwan-Russia relations

Photo taken by Lung-chih CHANG

14 “Taiwan-Russia Association”, 2017, June 14. Available online: <http://www.tra.org.tw/> (last access 2019, September 20).

15 “‘Zengjin Tai E guanxi’ keneng ma, zenme zuo? – Cong Tai E guanxi yanjin yu guoji zhanlüe jiaodu tan qi” “增進台俄關係” 可能嗎，怎麼做？—從台俄關係演進與國際戰略角度談起 (Is “promoting Taiwan-Russia relations” possible, and how? – from the perspective of the development of their relations and international strategy), 2018, January 25. Available online: <https://crossing.cw.com.tw/blogTopic.action?id=845&nid=9345> (last access 2019, September 20).

16 Lin Chia-nan: “Interview: Taiwan-Russia ties promising, envoy says”, 2019, June 03. Available online: <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2019/06/03/2003716251> (last access 2019, September 20).

History Education and Changing Perspectives of Europe in Postwar Taiwan

During the four-decade Martial Law period, history textbooks were standardized and issued by the National Institute of Compilation and Translation (NICT) under the ROC Ministry of Education.¹⁷ Teachers offered courses on Chinese history and Western history which followed the national curriculum standards. History education in Taiwan emphasizes the KMT orthodoxy of Chinese nationalism and the official doctrine of Three Principles of the People as exemplified in the following goals of junior secondary school curriculum standards in 1968:¹⁸

1. To understand the development of the Chinese nation and its territorial changes.
2. To understand the development of political institution and social life of our nation.
3. To cultivate patriotic spirits by teaching the glorious history and culture of our nation.
4. To understand the development of major nations in the world, and international status and duty of our nation.

The goals of senior secondary school curriculum standards from 1948 to 1984 also display similar features:

1. To understand the evolution of the Chinese Nation and the harmonious and interdependent relations among the constituent groups.
2. To understand the glorious history and cultural achievements of our nation as the inspiration to national revival.
3. To understand the history of major nations in the world and their interactions.
4. To understand the development of world culture and modern trends to strengthen the international role of our nation.

It was not until the removal of Martial Law in 1987 and the education reform movement in 1994 that textbook policy and curriculum guidelines were liberalized

17 The National Institute of Compilation and Translation was founded by the KMT government in Nanjing in 1931 and moved to Taipei in 1949. In 2011, the NICT was merged with the National Academy of Education Research and renamed Research Center for Translation, Compilation and Language Education.

18 CHEN Yun-Shiuan 陳昀萱 and CHEN Hsiao-Lan 甄曉蘭: “Guo zhong lishi kegang zhong de Ouzhou yixiang (國中歷史課綱中的歐洲意象 European Images in Taiwan’s Junior Secondary School History Curriculum Guidelines)”. In: *Jiaokeshu Yanjiu* 教科書研究 (Journal of Textbook Research) vol. 11, no. 2, 2018, p. 39.

and democratized. New curriculum guidelines no longer advocate anti-communism or patriotism but emphasize civic values and a new worldview as shown in the following goals of the 1994 Junior Secondary School Curriculum Standards.

1. To help students understand the nature of historical knowledge.
2. To help students cultivate their own interest in learning history.
3. To help students understand the hardship in nation building and personal responsibility.
4. To nurture students to become a modern citizen with open-mindedness and worldview.

The history of Europe appears in both Chinese history and Western history textbooks. Although their main contents are mostly the same, there have been important changes in the narrative structure and perspectives. The changing perspectives of Europe in secondary school history textbooks of postwar Taiwan can be summarized as follows:¹⁹

1. **Europe as modern Western civilization:** This has been the most influential and lasting image since the nine-year compulsory education was implemented in 1968. It emphasizes the rise of the West as the model for Chinese modernization while criticizing the aggression of Western imperialism.
2. **Europe as a set of modern international powers:** This image emerged in 1994–95 when the new knowing Taiwan curriculum guidelines were issued, emphasizing a Taiwan-centered perspective. New contents such as Dutch and Spanish regimes in seventeenth-century Taiwan were added.
3. **Europe in the multicultural world:** This image appeared between 2000 and 2008 when the new Grade 1-9 curriculum guidelines were issued, emphasizing world history and global connections in contrast to conventional nationalist narration and Eurocentric viewpoints.

19 Ibid., pp. 38–47.

Representation of Russia in Secondary School History Textbooks of Taiwan

As mentioned earlier, history education in postwar Taiwan is closely linked to the island's political history and corresponds to the transition from authoritarianism to democratization.²⁰ Throughout the Martial Law era, Russian history was never an independent subject and often appeared as part of Sino-Soviet relations. The representation of Russia in textbook has been dominated by the official Chinese nationalism and anti-communism advocated by CHIANG Kai-shek until the early 1980s when Taiwan began the process of political liberalization under CHIANG Ching-kuo. A Taiwan-centered narrative structure was implemented in the mid1990s amid LEE Teng-hui's indigenization efforts and new vision of global history; and a multicultural perspective was introduced following Taiwan's first democratic regime change in 2000.

Tables 3-1 to 3-3 summarize Russia-related topics in history curriculum standards and guidelines of postwar Taiwan. Worthy of note are the following textbook depictions of Russian history. (Sources: Textbook Library and Center for Textbook Research, National Academy of Education Research. Compiled by the author.)

1. The anti-Russian aggression propaganda in early versions of curriculum standards was toned down after the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1960s and completely disappeared in the early 1980s.
2. The Cold War rhetoric of a bipolar world has been replaced by new writings such as pluralization of international order that takes changing relations among the U.S., Russia, and China in the 1970s into account.
3. On account of Taiwan's democratization and the liberalization of textbook policy, Russian history was reconstructed according to the new Taiwan-centered narrative structure in the mid1990s.
4. New curriculum guidelines issued in the twenty-first century not only adopt a global historical perspective but also include new contents of media, culture and society in the post-Cold War world.

20 Lung-chih CHANG, "Telling Histories of an Island Nation: the Academics and Politics of History Textbooks in Contemporary Taiwan". In: Gotelind MUELLER (ed.): *Designing History in East Asian Textbooks: Identity Politics and Transnational Aspirations*, New York: Routledge 2011, pp. 117–134.

Table 3-1: Russia-related topics in senior secondary school history curriculum standards in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s

Subject	Version	Topic *	Description **
Chinese History	1948	20. Russia's Eastward Invasion	Russian's invasion
		22. Loss of Tributary States	Russian, Japanese and British aggressions
		24. Boxer Rebellion and Crisis in the Northeast	Russia's occupation of the northeast region
		27. China in First World War	Russia's occupation of the outer Mongolia
		30. New Constitution and Anti-Communism and Anti-Russian Aggression	Aggression of Soviet Russia, peril of Chinese Communist Party, and anti-Russian aggression
History of Foreign Countries	1952	15. Soviet Russia's Aggression Policy and New International Situation	
History of Foreign Countries	1962	11. Era of New Imperialism	New imperialism and the redivision of the world
		14. Second World War	Confrontation between dictatorship and democracy
		15. Contemporary World	New threats to world peace

* Showing topics that mentioned Russia directly.

** Showing descriptions that mentioned Russia.

Table 3-2: Russia-related topics in senior secondary school history curriculum standards in the 1970s and 1980s

Subject	Version	Topic *	Description **
Chinese History	1971	30. New Constitution and Anti-Communism	Aggression of Soviet Russia and peril of Chinese Communist Party
History of Modern World	1971	3. Era of Absolute Monarchs in Europe	England, France, Russia, and Prussia
		9. The World between Two World Wars	Soviet Russia under communist rule
		II. Contemporary World	Cold war and hot war
History of Western Culture	1971	4. Modern European and American Culture	Socialism and communism
Chinese History		18. Aggression of Western Powers	Russia's eastward aggression
		30. Calamity of Chinese Communists	Aggression of Soviet Russia
History of Modern World	1983	3. Rise and Fall of Absolute Monarchy	Enlightened absolutism in Austria, Prussia, and Russia
		II. Second World War	Dictatorship of Russian Communist Party
		12. Pluralization of Postwar International Order	Red peril of communism, U.S.-Russia contest for hegemony, U.S.-Russia-China tripartite relations

* Showing topics that mentioned Russia directly.

** Showing descriptions that mentioned Russia.

Table 3-3: Russia-related topics in senior secondary school history curriculum standards in the 1990s and 2000s

Subject	Version	Topic *	Description **
History I	1996	13. Impacts of Foreign Powers and Changes in Late Qing Period	Unequal treaties and loss of territories
		15. Internal Disturbances and Foreign Invasions in Early Republican Era	

Subject	Version	Topic *	Description **
History I	2005	5. The World in Second Half of the Twentieth Century	End of Cold War and the dissolution of Soviet Union, the Comintern, and the founding of the CCP
History (elective)	2009	3. Spread of Information and Communication Media	Invention and development of modern cinema

* Showing topics that mentioned Russia directly.

** Showing descriptions that mentioned Russia.

History Pedagogy on Russian History: Interviews of Secondary School History Teachers

To gain insight into the perspective of history teachers in Taiwan on the representation of Russia in textbooks, two teachers were interviewed to share their firsthand observations, which offer a glimpse of ideological and generational changes in history textbook and pedagogy of postwar Taiwan.²¹

Interview of Teacher S

On History Curriculum Standards:

“In the past, history was considered as part of national spirit education. Chinese history was dominated by linear and highly homogenous interpretations under the theme of the Chinese nation. To strengthen this national myth, the subject of world history was distorted as the history of foreign countries in contrast to Chinese history. This kind of conventional China-Foreign History is the product of Han cultural chauvinism that emphasizes the Us-Other distinction.”

21 Interviews of Teacher S (born in 1959, female, retired history teacher from Taipei First Girls' Secondary School) and Teacher C (born in 1981, female, history teacher in Taipei Song-shan Senior Secondary School) were conducted in written form in summer 2019. The English translations by this author have been reviewed and approved by the interviewees.

On World History:

“As a result of the Sino-Foreign dichotomy and the homogeneous perspective of Chinese history, world history has been reduced if not distorted as mirror images of Chinese history. Generally speaking, the core narration of Europe before the sixteenth century emphasizes the cultural inferiority compared with China, while the key words for modern world history are ‘Western powers’ and ‘imperialism’.”

On History Textbooks:

“The earlier history textbooks on foreign countries emphasize the parallel development between China and the West. In 1971, the subject was renamed World History that focuses on Western Europe. It was not until the 1995 Curriculum Guidelines that major textbook revision was conducted.”

On Russia:

“The narrative structure of world history for early secondary school level was fragmented and inconsistent. Take Russia for example: Imperial Russia always appeared in sections regarding China’s territorial issues while Soviet Russia appeared in sections between the two World Wars. There is almost no mention of Russia in the post-Cold War era.”

“The World History textbook did cover the westernization policy of Peter the Great and the enlightened despotism and expansion of Catherine II. The Chinese History textbook focused on Imperial Russia’s territorial ambition from the Treaty of Nerchinsk during the reign of Kangxi, the atrocity during the Boxer Rebellion, Russo-Japanese rivalry in Manchuria as well as Soviet Russia’s export of communism to China, the Yalta (Îalta) Conference, and the Sino-Soviet unequal treaty in WWII. There was no mention of Marxism. This narration pattern remained as the standard version for decades.”

On Textbook Reform

“It was not until the liberalization of textbooks in 1999 that new efforts began to emerge. The sections on Imperial Russia and territorial aggression was shortened in Chinese History textbook. New information on Latin America and Africa was added to the World History textbook. More emphasis has been put on modern and contemporary history. The impacts of Marxism and the Cold War were discussed in the history of world culture. The new 2019 curriculum guidelines are innovative

in terms of topical teaching and hands on projects that focus more on multi-cultural Taiwan and East Asian transnational migration and modern world civilizations.”²²



圖 4-17 清代晚期俄國所侵占中國東北及西北領土

Figure 3-3: Russia in secondary-school history textbooks

Photo taken by Lung-chih CHANG



Figure 3-4: Russia in secondary-school history textbooks

Photo taken by Lung-chih CHANG

22 The curriculum guidelines of 12-year basic education took effect on August 1, 2019. For more information, see Ministry of Education: *Curriculum Guidelines of 12-year Basic Education*, 2014, November. Available online: <https://cirm.moe.edu.tw/Upload/file/946/70456.pdf> (last access 2019, September 20).

Interview of Teacher C

On History Curriculum Guidelines

“The key feature of the 1995 curriculum guidelines is the emphasis on strengthening students’ core capacity in historical thinking. It is an important breakthrough compared with conventional emphasis on historical knowledge and political indoctrination. The following revisions do not alter this direction, and teachers now have better awareness of historical methodology.”

On Students’ Learning Experiences of Russia

“Students nowadays will first learn the physical and human geography of Eurasia in the second year of senior secondary school before taking the world history courses. They will learn how to interpret historical sources. In terms of European history, new sections on nomadic peoples and Asian empires were added to ancient Mediterranean civilizations to promote comparative perspectives on interaction and connectivity among world cultures. In this new global history framework, Russian history becomes more contextualized and integrated with discussions on Nordic and Mongolian cultures.”

On Prospects of History Pedagogy in Taiwan

“The new 2019 history curriculum guidelines are a continuation of the 1995 version that emphasizes the importance of historical literacy. A more dynamic narrative structure for Taiwan’s connectivity with East Asia and the globe has replaced the somewhat invariable concentric model²³ of Taiwan subjectivity. New pedagogy is required in order to build up the core capacity of inquiry and practice. The history of Russia will be explored through elective courses and teaching projects on political economic development, human migration, cultural communication, and social movements.”

23 The “concentric view of history” (*tongxin yuan shi guan* 同心圓史觀) is a historical concept proposed by former Minister of Education Tu Cheng-sheng. See “Taiwan zhuti xing – Du Zhengsheng: Yao zuo dao xiang huxi yiyang ziran 台灣主體性 – 杜正勝：要做到像呼吸一樣自然 (Taiwan Subjectivity – Tu Cheng-sheng: To be as natural as breathing), 2016, March 10. Available online: <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/breaking-news/1628255> (last access 2020, April 16).

Conclusion

This article has offered a preliminary overview of textbook depictions of Russia in secondary-school history education of postwar Taiwan. Though not mentioned as much as the U.S. and Japan, Russia has been an important component in the narration of Chinese History and World History textbooks. The case of ROC in Taiwan can be compared with parallel developments in the People's Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, and Macau in the following ways.²⁴

First, postwar Taiwan has been taken as an interesting case study in understanding Chinese perceptions of Russia and the West as a complex process characterized by historical contingency and path dependency. For example, revisions of the anti-Russia aggression propaganda between presidents CHIANG Kai-shek in the late 1950s and CHIANG Ching-kuo in the late 1970s testify the transformation of the KMT official ideology and the international relations among the U.S., Soviet Russia, and communist China.

Second, the shifts and continuations of the representations of Russia in postwar Taiwanese history textbooks also illustrate the construction and transformation of "otherness" in different political and cultural contexts. The three major images of Europe (as modern Western civilization, international powers, and multicultural world) not only reflect the political process of Taiwan's democratic transition but also the politics of memory, as well as war legacies of WWII, the Chinese Civil War, and the Cold War.

Finally, with Taiwan's successful transition from authoritarian rule to a democratic state, the growing and collective efforts with political and institutional reform also bore fruit in the field of history education. From Sinocentric nationalist history, through Taiwan-centered island history and to transnational global history, the paradigm of history pedagogy has shown shifts. Although it is yet to be seen whether the new ideal of historical literacy and core competency can be realized, promising young history teachers have bid farewell to the old slogans of patriotism and national spirit, and endeavor to replace national history with the vision of a connected history in post-colonial Taiwan. For future Russian visitors to the island, it is certain that they will never be greeted with an anti-Communist and anti-Russian aggression song!

24 Claudia SCHNEIDER: "National Fortresses Besieged: History Textbooks in Contemporary Mainland China, Taiwan, and Japan". In: Steffi RICHTER (ed.): *Contested Views of a Common Past: Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia*, New York: Campus Verlag 2008, pp. 245–270.

Mariana MÜNNING

4 World History at the Service of the Ruling Party: The Image of Russia and the West in ROC and PRC History Curricula and Textbooks 1949–90

Abstract. This chapter compares the history curriculum standards and textbooks in the Republic of China (ROC) and the People's Republic of China (PRC) from the 1950s to the 1980s, focusing on world history at the junior secondary school level. The image of the West and that of Russia/the USSR as the “other” are described as a means to conceptualize the “self”. These images are embedded in an overall concept of history varied in both countries. It will be analyzed how these images are employed to legitimize the respective political system and ruling party. The findings show how world history is employed to take sides in a bipolar world order. The ROC books appropriate Western achievements and demonize Soviet Russia. The PRC books begin with an idolization of the USSR in the 1950s. With the split of the PRC-Soviet ties, disenchantment with the post-Stalinist USSR ensues, and the PRC styles itself as the only true proponent of communism. Western “progress” and “achievements”, in contrast, are deconstructed by exposing their inhumane nature, especially in the 1950s. With the “Reform and Opening” politics and the “Four Modernizations” beginning in the late 1970s, the West is cautiously credited for technological innovation. To a certain extent, world history is used as a prop to legitimate domestic policies and should therefore be read as allegory. This may be seen especially clearly from the changes in the PRC teaching material.

Keywords. Republic of China, People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Russia, West.

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Introduction

With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the retreat of the Kuomintang (*Guomindang* 國民黨, henceforth KMT) to the island of Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait became the fragile and contested border not only between two different political regimes that had previously clashed with each other in a turbulent civil war over China, but also between the two major spheres of influence of the Cold War – the USSR and the USA. Both of them supported their favorite part of China with military and financial aid as well as through advice and teaching. All aspects of life under the two rival political regimes, especially historical education, had to cater to the legitimization and promotion of the respective party and ideology: communism in the PRC, nationalism in the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan).

The ROC and the PRC, both authoritarian states during the period discussed, exerted a high, if not the highest possible, level of state control over education, the curriculum and the production of textbooks.¹ The threat of the invasion of the respective other party or the aim of reconquering the other part of China was constantly in view. Students had to be educated in terms of a worldview that could secure their loyalty to the ruling party. This was especially the case in history education as it has always provided the possibility to legitimize the polity. In order to do so, history education conveys to the students a particular concept of history (“Geschichtsbild”): a fixed idea and interpretation of the past which is (intended to be) shared in a community. It serves to answer relevant questions such as “what is history?”, “what or who ‘makes’ history?” and “where does history lead?”. It fosters the formation of a collective identity and can be projected into the future. For this reason, history education is used for nation building and also for committing the populace to the pursuit of a desirable future.² It provides legitimacy to the

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the Georg-Eckert-Institut (GEI, Leibniz-Institut für internationale Schulbuchforschung) in Braunschweig, Germany and The Textbook Library of the Center for Textbook Research of the National Academy for Educational Research (國家教育研究院教科書研究中心教科書圖書館) in Taipei, Taiwan. Both libraries have granted me access to their collections and supported my research with their expertise and advice.

1 Alisa JONES: “Toward Pluralism? The Politics of History Textbooks in South Korea, Taiwan, and China”. In: Gi-Wook SHIN and Daniel C. SNEIDER (eds.): *History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories*, New York: Routledge 2011, pp. 215–231, p. 215.

2 Karl-Ernst JEISMANN: “Geschichtsbilder: Zeitdeutung und Zukunftsperspektive”. In: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Federal Agency for Civic Education, ed.): *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, December 2002, pp. 13–22.

government, the party, and its policies as it is employed to show the validity of state ideology.

This ideology, which may be made up of political (historical) myths, is employed to legitimate the rulership and to reach political goals.³ The “belief in legitimacy” (“Legitimitätsglaube”) is crucial for the exercise of dominion (“Herrschaft”), and schools are places where this belief in the legitimacy of the ruling is cultivated,⁴ and where the myths and collective memory of the past are transmitted.⁵ Such “politics of remembrance”, especially when they are used to legitimize and solidify extant power structures, to construct a shared identity, to increase the cohesion in society, and commit members of it to the pursuit of a common goal, usually utilize and instrumentalize ones’ “own” past. These politics narrate myths of the greatness and diachronic unity of the self. This chapter, in contrast, focuses on the image of the *other*. The concepts of otherness⁶ are crucial to the constitution of the self.⁷

In the textbooks, this other can play several roles. It can be a hostile enemy, against which the self is demarcated, and thanks to which the ruling party can treat itself as successful and hence the legitimate defender. If this “other” is an overly powerful, omnipresent normative system, we may go as far as to call it LACAN’s capitalized “Other” (“grand Autre”). If it is not hostile, we can conceptualize it as authoritative but benevolent “Other”. In both cases, the “Self” gains its identity

3 Yves BIZEUL: *Glaube und Politik* (Belief and Politics), Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2009, pp. 139, 238. On page 26, BIZEUL gives the example of primitive communism in prehistory as a political myth employed to legitimize Marxist governments. This precisely explains what the PRC textbooks do.

4 Max WEBER: *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, Guenther ROTH and Claus WITTICH (ed.), Berkeley: University of California Press 1978, pp. 212, 215

5 Jan ASSMANN and Aleida ASSMANN, after BIZEUL: *Glaube und Politik* (2002), p. 251.

6 CHEN and CHEN choose the post-colonial reading of otherness: CHEN Yun-Shiuan 陳昀萱 and CHEN Hsiao-Lan 甄小懶: “Guozhong lishi kegang zhong de Ouzhou yixiang” 國中歷史課綱中的歐洲意象 (European Images in Taiwan’s Junior Secondary School History Curricular Guidelines). In: *Jiaokeshu yanjiu* 教科書研究 (*Journal of Textbook Research*) vol. 11 no. 2, 2018, pp. 27–55. They show the development of the ROC history curriculum and how it emancipates itself from presenting the West as the norm. The present chapter discusses sources during their first phase; therefore, this emancipation has not yet taken place.

7 HEGEL (1770–1831) is seen as the primary thinker who defined self-consciousness as exclusion of the other using the example of how servitude is most easily grasped in its relation to lordship. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich HEGEL: *System der Wissenschaft I: Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* (System of Sciences I: The Phenomenology of Spirit), Bamberg / Würzburg: Joseph Anton Goebhardt 1807, pp. 117, 124. Available online through “Deutsches Textarchiv”: http://www.deutschestextarchiv.de/book/show/hegel_phänenomenologie_1807 (last access 2020, February 13).

via the gaze of this capitalized “Other”.⁸ It can also be LACAN’s lowercased “other”, i.e. an “other” that may represent a reflection, a possible development, a (future) ideal version of the self.⁹ In that case, this “other” functions as a model, as an idol. The ruling party gains legitimacy by identifying the self with it, by providing evidence that this ideal state of the self will be reached under its rulership. In that regard, the world history textbooks are only superficially concerned with the “other”. They should, however, rather be read as allegory of the self. The books are pervaded by ideology and legitimization narratives of current policy. This makes them a parable of the here and now. The “Geschichtsbild” put forward in them has the sole purpose of legitimizing and cementing the status quo.

In the curriculum standards and textbooks of the ROC and PRC during 1949–1990, the image of two important “others”, the West and Russia, is discussed. Changes and consistencies in their depiction are analyzed against the backdrop of coeval events and affairs. It will be demonstrated that the image of either the West or Russia (or the Soviet Union) is employed to legitimize the ruling party and their ideology. These images fit into the worldview that is taught to the students and varies with its shifts.

It will also be demonstrated that the nationalist outlook of the KMT in the ROC remains steady, as do the curricula and textbooks from 1952–1990. The initially pronounced denigration and demonization of the Soviet Union was slightly watered down over time. Nationalism, however, remains the all-pervasive trope of the world history textbooks, making the birth of nations the most important turning point of history and neatly assigning distinct characteristics to all nations. The nation is the main reference point for the identity of the individual. In the interaction of the different nations of the world, Wilsonianism¹⁰ is the ideal. Projected into the future, this concept of history will lead to peace among all nations, (scientific) progress, and prosperity.

8 This argument is based on the adaptation of LACAN’s “grand Autre” for the analysis of PRC historiography and its othering of the West by: Q. Edward WANG: “Encountering the World: China and Its Other(s) in Historical Narratives, 1949–89”. In: *Journal of World History* vol. 14 no. 3, 2003, pp. 327–358. LACAN himself utilizes the grand Autre to denote the parents, teachers etc. of the self, a whole set of norms that preexists. In my analysis, the West or the USSR may play the role of this grand Autre as they provide the framework of norms.

9 Sean HOMER: *Jacques Lacan*, London and New York: Routledge 2005, p. 70.

10 Wilsonianism, named after the U.S. president behind the founding of the League of Nations, Woodrow WILSON (1856–1924), encompasses the values of democracy, freedom, human rights, capitalism, and the need of these values to be disseminated in the world. See Lloyd E. AMBROSIUS: *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2002.

The PRC, in contrast, narrates world history exclusively within the scope of historical materialism to convey Marxist values. The peer group of the individual is not the nation, but the class. International solidarity of the proletariat is invoked, superficially internationalist, but actually instrumentalized to speak to the domestic. World history in the PRC furthermore exhibits profound changes in its history teaching material, reflecting the radical changes in policy. The 1950s begins with an idolization of the Soviet Union, followed by the emancipation or rather coming-of-age, in the course of which the PRC promotes itself as the legitimate leader of the communist camp and increasingly delegitimizes Post Stalin USSR leadership.¹¹ In terms of the image of the West, a rather opposite development takes place. At the beginning of the PRC, the West is treated as an archenemy not only of China but basically of the proletariat of the entire word. It is presented as the inventor of capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, and described by a plenitude of negative attributes. With the beginning of the “Reform and Opening” politics of the late 1970s, the image is bettered, and the textbooks provide a showcase for Western technological achievements.

This chapter describes the main historical narrative of first the ROC, and then the PRC textbooks (sections 2. and 3.). Noteworthy is how the overall narrative of both regimes conveys a teleological concept of history.¹² Section 4. offers the analysis of the images of Russia and the West with reference to the description of major historical events as they are described in the textbooks. In all sections, it is attempted to include the main directions of development.

11 WANG describes this emancipation from the Soviet model as the reemergence of nationalism. Cf. Q. Edward WANG: “Between Marxism and Nationalism: Chinese Historiography and the Soviet influence, 1949–1963”. In: *Journal of Contemporary China* vol. 9 no. 23, 2000, pp. 95–111, <https://doi.org/10.1080/106705600112074>.

12 Conceptualizing history as progress, as “anticipation of the present” goes back to English liberal history or “Whig history”. “Marxist history is characteristically whig.” John BURROW: *A History of Histories: Epics, Chronicles, Romances & Inquiries from Herodotus & Thucydides to the Twentieth Century*, London: Penguin 2009, pp. 473–474.

World History in the ROC: Nationalism, Progress, Wilsonian Idealism and the Fight against Communism

To begin with, the investigation is undertaken into the Taiwanese history teaching material in 1952 when the first standardization took place. Before that, the KMT had imported the heterogenous teaching material from the mainland.¹³ The ROC history curriculum standards begin with neatly stating their teaching “aims” (*mu-biao* 目標).¹⁴ They clearly exhibit a nationalist ideology. This nationalist outlook refers on the one hand to the domestic realm and Chinese history, and on the other hand to the international arena and world history.

Regarding the domestic situation, the major challenge faced by the KMT was the Communist rule on the mainland and the KMT’s declared aim to reconquer it. It was only abandoned in 1991 when the “Temporary provisions effective during the period of communist rebellion” (動員戡亂時期臨時條款) were repealed. Another important challenge was the resistance of the Taiwanese populace to what they perceived simply as new colonial rule¹⁵ and the fact that the island’s population was just as multiethnic as the mainland. Therefore, the students were to study the evolution (*yanjin* 演進) of the Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu* 中華民族) and how the “different clans were on friendly terms with each other” (*ge zongzu jian rongqia* 各宗族間融洽).¹⁶ Furthermore, the students were not only to understand how ancient and venerable Chinese culture is, but also that an important responsibility arises:

認識民族的傳統精神，以啓發復興國家責任之自覺 [...]]¹⁷

To know the consciousness of tradition of the nation in order to develop the awareness of the responsibility to regain the mainland [...]

13 Cf. DMITRENKO’s contribution to this volume.

14 For an overview of the development of the teaching aims in the ROC, see Lung-chih CHANG’s contribution to this volume and CHEN/CHEN: “Guozhong lishi kegang zhong de Ouzhou yixiang” (2018).

15 And less competent than Japanese colonization. Cf. Steven PHILIPS: “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945–1948”. In: Murray A. RUBINSTEIN (ed.): *Taiwan: A New History*, Armonk, NY: Sharpe 2007, p. 276.

16 Jiaoyubu 教育部 (Ministry of Education, ed.): *Xiuding zhongxue gongmin, guowen, lishi, dili ke kecheng biaozhun* 修訂中學公民、國文、歷史、地理科課程標準 (Revised Secondary School Citizen, Chinese, History, Geography Curriculum Standard), n. p. 1952, p. 40.

17 Ibid., p. 20.

In terms of an international perspective, the development of nations and nationalism is the nexus between world history and the core value of KMT rule. Students are expected to be able to understand the main points of the evolution of each important nation of the world and China's position and responsibility in the international arena.¹⁸ By this rather abstract imperative the curriculum means the following two points: The first is that Taiwan perceives itself as part of the worldwide Cold War bulwark against communism; the second is that the KMT still felt entitled to rule over all of China.

The emergence of national consciousness and the birth of nations in Europe are depicted as a key turning point in world history.¹⁹ History as a whole is presented as a succession of achievements, progressing toward an ever-improving state with better living conditions for the people. Listed as achievements are the Western values that are to be adhered to in the ROC such as freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. The fact that from 1949 (following the February 28 incident of 1947) until 1987 martial law and “White Terror”, during which many Taiwanese were persecuted for alleged cooperation with the communists, reigned the island, makes the praise of these values appear to be mere lip service.

National unity in the various European countries was achieved during the age of absolutism (*junzhu zhuanzhi shidai* 君主專制時代, from the 15th to the 18th century), implying that only a strong government can finally unite the people. England, France, Spain, Prussia and Russia were all:

民族國家，由一羣語言文字相同、風俗習慣類似、屬於同一種族的人民、組織而成。²⁰

Nation-states [that] were formed by the people belonging to one race that had the same language and script and similar customs.

Only after that were democracy and freedom established by the “revolutionary movements for democracy and freedom” (民主與自由的革命運動), which

18 Ibid.

19 See, as an early source: Zhongxue biaozhun jiaokeshu lishike bianji weiyuanhui 中學標準教科書歷史科編輯委員會 (Secondary school standard textbook history compilation committee) and XIA Deyi 夏德儀: *Chuji zhongxue biaozhun jiaokeshu: Chuzhong lishi* 初級中學標準教科書: 初中歷史 (Junior secondary school standard textbook: Junior secondary school history) vol. 5, Taipei: Taiwan sheng zhengfu jiaoyuting 1958, p. 85. Volumes 1–4 deal with Chinese history; volumes 5–6 with world history.

20 XIA Deyi 夏德儀, Qi Letong 祁樂同, Li Maixian 李邁先: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi* 國民中學歷史 (History for Junior Secondary School) vol. 4, Taipei: Guoli Bianyiguan 1971, p. 69. Volumes 1–3: Chinese history. Volumes 4–5: world history. The fact that XIA remains chief editor may serve as a further argument for the continuity of the ROC textbook landscape.

consist of the Enlightenment, American Independence, and the French Revolution. They established an ideology of freedom and equality. The establishment of citizen's rights and the nationalist movements led to technological innovation, progress, improvement of the living conditions via the Industrial Revolution,²¹ and the advancement of modern European and American science (近代歐美科學之發達).²² The future is implied to be as rosy as it can be if we believe in technological progress and Wilsonian idealism which will unite the world under the wings of the United Nations (or a similar institution). The KMT was highly dependent on U.S. financial help (1954–1979). Republican scholars were actually already far beyond this teleological and didactic presentation of history. Many had studied progressive historiography in the USA and would have approached their sources critically.²³ However, history education in Taiwan under KMT conservatives was not to form a critical, but an obedient student.²⁴

How do these laudations of Western civilization relate to China having become a victim of imperialism and colonialism?²⁵ Social Darwinism is the answer to this question: a worldview that has shaped the thought of the early 20th century Chinese intellectuals as well as KMT politics.²⁶

Imperialism is explained as geographical discoveries and the opening up of sea routes, combined with the needs for resources rising from the Industrial

21 Zhongxue biaozhun jiaokeshu lishike bianji weiyuanhui and XIA Deyi: *Chuji zhongxue biaozhun jiaokeshu: Lishi* 初級中學標準教科書：歷史 (Junior secondary school standard textbook: History), vol. 6, Taiwan shengzhengfu jiaoyuting 1958, p. 15.

22 Jiaoyubu (ed.): *Xiuding zhongxue gongmin, guowen, lishi, dilike kecheng biaozhun* (1952), p. 53.

23 For example, the historian and textbook author HE Bingsong 何炳松 (1890–1946): He studied in Princeton University and became an advocate of American progressive historiography, influenced by James Harvey ROBINSON's *New History* (which he used for the historical methodology course at Peking University; it was published in Chinese in 1924) and his New History School with James SHOTWELL, J. H. HAYES and William DUNNING. See Q. Edward WANG: *Inventing China Through History – The May Fourth Approach to Historiography*. Albany: State University of New York Press 2001, pp. 67–68. See also FANG Xinliang 房鑫亮: *Zhongxin dujing – He Bingsong zhuan* 忠信笃敬——何炳松传 (Loyal and respectful – Biography of HE Bingsong), Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe 2006, p. 15.

24 WANG: *Inventing China Through History* (2001), p. 200.

25 CHEN and CHEN present 1968–1985 as a time period in which Europe was synonymous with modernity and civilization. The fact that Europe was also the cradle of imperialism led to an ambiguous feeling toward Europe. Cf. CHEN/CHEN: “Guozhong lishi kegang zhong de Ouzhou yixiang” (2018), p. 40.

26 See James Reeve PUSEY: *China and Charles Darwin*, Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press 1983 and YANG Haiyan: “Encountering Darwin and Creating Darwinism in China”. In: Michael RUSE (ed.): *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Darwin and Evolutionary Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013, pp. 250–257.

Revolution in Europe leading to a “competition” (*zhengduo* 爭奪) for colonies (*zhimindi* 殖民地) and trade monopolies (*shangye longduan* 商業壟斷).²⁷ The resulting imperialism (*diguo zhuyi* 帝國主義), a policy of countries with an advanced industry (*chanye* 產業), aimed at seizing land, resources, the market, etc. of other “backwards nations” (*luohou minzu* 落後民族), denying others the access to them and sometimes ultimately swallowing (*bingtun* 併吞) them.²⁸

The attack of imperialism toward China (*Diguo zhuyi dui woguo de qinlie* 帝國主義對我國的侵略) is explained by the fact that the country, despite being prosperous and rich in population, was “ignorant of the general world trends” (*meiyu shijie dashi* 昧於世界大勢, i.e. not acting adequately in global politics), and its politics and economy were not (yet) improved (*gaijin* 改進). After China’s defeat in the First Opium War (1839–1842), it became the object of a competition for hegemony of the Great Powers (*lieqiang* 列強), lost a number of territories and rights, and was therefore attacked by many imperialist countries in the realms of politics, economy and warfare, and found itself in great peril (*weiwang* 危亡). Only after the end of the Second World War (1939–1945) could China shake off (*baituo* 摆脫) the oppression of imperialism.²⁹ The Taiwanese textbooks do not question imperialist practices per se; they just convey the image that China in the past was too weak or backwards to play the game of power struggle. Now (i.e. 1950s–1980s), however, national unity, progress, and a strong KMT rule enable the ROC to compete.

The depiction of Russia is divided into two parts. Peter the Great in Tsarist Russia is lauded as a reformer, an image going back to KANG Youwei’s 康有爲 (1858–1927) biography of the Russian Tsar³⁰ handed to the Guangxu 光緒 emperor (r. 1875–1908). Peter’s strategy to modernize Russia was to travel and send informants to Western Europe to learn and bring their knowledge back to their own country. Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union, in contrast, are described as an aggressive, dangerous force whose domestic economic policies failed, and thus bringing havoc to the Chinese mainland by leading it astray toward communism.

The rule of the Communist Party on the mainland is one of the main concerns of the KMT on Taiwan and shapes historical education decisively under the

27 Note how the description of the interdependence of trade monopolies and imperialism is at its core not so different from the Marxist take on it.

28 Zhongxue biaozhun jiaokeshu lishike bianji weiyuanhui 中學標準教科書歷史科編輯委員會 (Secondary school standard textbook history editing committee) and XIA Deyi 夏德儀: *Chuji zhongxue biaozhun jiaokeshu: Lishi* 初級中學標準教科書: 歷史 (Junior secondary school standard textbook: History) vol. 6, Taipei: Taiwan sheng zhengfu jiaoyuting 1958, pp. 22–23.

29 Ibid., p. 23.

30 See DON C. PRICE: *Russia and the Roots of the Chinese Revolution 1896–1911*, Cambridge (Massachusetts): Harvard University Press 1974, pp. 33 ff.

catchphrase “oppose communism, resist Russia” (*fan gong kang E* 反共抗俄).³¹ The aforementioned “Temporary provisions” were already added to the constitution in 1948 on the mainland during the Civil War.³² The KMT had also taken the 1948 republican era curriculum standard (*Xiuding zhongxue kecheng biaozhun* 修訂中學課程標準) with them to the island, and it already bore the nucleus of history education for the following decades. In so far, history education in Taiwan is to be seen as a continuation of history education of the Republic before its retreat to the island.

The 1952 curriculum, as well as the standardized history teaching material based upon it, incorporated the *fan gong kang E* policy. Apart from the abovementioned responsibility to reconquer the mainland, requirements are given that teachers should:

說明共匪一面倒的投靠蘇俄。

Explain that the communist criminals have all sold themselves to Soviet Russia.

說明自由世界對共匪封鎖禁運之必要。³³

Explain the need that the free world should cut off the communist criminals.

The blame for the communist rule over the mainland is assigned to Russia as the “troublemaker”.³⁴ The negative image of the Russians in China goes back to the 17th century.³⁵ The two countries look back on a long history of “cross-border distrust”,³⁶ during which Russia was perceived as expansionist and potentially threatening. Putting the blame on Russia, however, the textbooks make a future reunification with the mainland feasible and desirable. Russia is stylized as an archenemy,

31 This is not the first policy to protect the ROC in Taiwan from forces deemed threatening. When the KMT took over Taiwan from the Japanese colonial rulers in 1945, they had begun a policy of “removing Japanization” (*qu ribenhua* 去日本化, i.e. decolonization after Japanese rule 1895–1945).

32 On the “mutual hostility” between Taiwan and Soviet Russia, see Lung-chih CHANG’s contribution to this volume.

33 Taiwan sheng zhengfu jiaoyuting 臺灣省政府教育廳 (Taiwan provincial government department of education): *Taiwan sheng Guomin Xuexiao ge ke jiaocai tiaozheng shuoming kecheng biaozhun* 臺灣省國民學校各科教材調整說明課程標準 (Taiwan province primary school curriculum standard readjusted and explained for all subjects), Taipei: Taiwan shudian 1952, p. 16.

34 Cf. Aleksandrs DMITRENKO’s contribution to this volume.

35 T. A. HSIA: “Demons in Paradise: The Chinese Images of Russia”. In: *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* vol. 349, *Communist China and the Soviet Bloc*, Sep. 1963, pp. 27–37.

36 Sayana NAMSARAEVA: “Déjà vu of Distrust in the Sino-Russian Borderlands”. In: Caroline HUMPHREY (ed.): *Trust and Mistrust in the Economies of the China-Russia Borderlands*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2018, p. 40.

and the aggression of Western countries is played down. For example, in the discussion of the Opium Wars, teachers are motivated to lay special emphasis on the attack of the Russian Tsar (俄帝侵略我國的史實).³⁷ This is rather far-fetched as Russia was not directly involved in the wars. Russia did, however, act as a mediator between Britain, France, and the USA on the one side and the Qing dynasty on the other, in the Second Opium War.³⁸ The tradition of mistrust of Tsarist Russia becomes reinforced by the animosity toward communism, and the country was thus scapegoated.

With respect to domestic history, it, too, becomes increasingly full of anti-communist propaganda. The teachers are supposed to explain to the students on many occasions how the “communist criminals” (*gongfei* 共匪) have gone astray. Early instances of these misdemeanors allegedly happened as early as the genesis of the Chinese people (中華民族的構成). The mainlanders “abandoned the concept of [a] national population” (廢棄國家民族觀念), and made the mistake to become the marionette of Soviet Russia (甘作蘇俄傀儡之錯誤). They also abandoned traditional morals and culture, replaced them by Marxism-Leninism and affronted them by practices such as viewing STALIN as their father figure³⁹ (「不爱爸爸爱斯大林」).⁴⁰ The “communist criminals [...] enslaved the people” (*nuyi renmin* 奴役人民), but their attack will ultimately fail.⁴¹ Domestic history and world history are all equipped with the many mistakes the communists on the mainland committed. The creation of the script, for example, is juxtaposed with the mistakes to use abbreviated characters (*jianhuazi* 簡華字) and to write horizontally from left to right (*hengxie zuoqi* 橫寫左起).⁴²

After the Sino-Soviet split (discussed in greater detail below), the *Fan gong kang E* policy was replaced by the policy of “resist communism, recover the [lost]

37 Jiaoyubu (ed.): *Xiuding zhongxue gongmin, guowen, lishi, dilike kecheng biaozhun* (1952), p. 21.

38 S. C. M. PAINE: *Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier*, Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe 1996, p. 60 ff.

39 On the personality cult of STALIN, which stylized him as the “father” of the citizens of the Soviet Union, see: Graeme GILL: “The Soviet Leader Cult: Reflections on the Structure of Leadership in the Soviet Union.” In: *British Journal of Political Science* vol. 10 no. 2 April 1980, pp. 167–86, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400002088>.

40 Literally speaking, not loving daddy but loving STALIN. Not loving the father is a severe offense in Confucianism.

41 Taiwan sheng zhengfu jiaoyuting 臺灣省政府教育廳: *Taiwan sheng Guomin Xuexiaoge ke jiaocai tiaozheng shuoming kecheng biaozhun* 臺灣省國民學校各科教材調證說明 (Explanation of the Taiwan province primary school all subjects teaching material regulations), Taipei: Taiwan shudian 台灣書店 1952, p. 16. This is a handbook for textbook authors and teachers aimed at fostering the students’ “national spirit” (*minzu jingshen* 民族精神, cf. p. 1).

42 Ibid.

country” (*fan gong fu guo* 反共復國). The hostility toward Russia in the ROC textbooks decreased as the USSR fell out of the equation, but the policy remained active until 1980, when CHIANG Ching-kuo (JIANG Jingguo 蔣經國, 1910–1988), replaced it with the policy of the “three principles of the people” (*Sanmin zhuyi* 三民主義).⁴³

The general tone in Taiwanese education material remained anti-communist and the description of the USSR remained focused on its failures, especially economically. The 1971 textbook (after the introduction of compulsory 9-year education 1968) concludes that “Communism is not at all a good doctrine” (共產主義絕對不是一種良好的學說).⁴⁴ Let us now examine the main historical narratives of these “communist criminals”.

World History in the PRC: All-encompassing Class Struggle Narrative and the Development from a Soviet Protégée to a Progress Oriented Technocracy

Since the early 20th century, Marxism had a wide appeal among Chinese intellectuals. It offered the possibility to reject the West⁴⁵ and instead of, as would have been the case with nationalism, “being the laggard, following in western footsteps, a communist China, with Russia, could seem to be at the head of the queue.”⁴⁶

The establishment of the PRC came hand in hand with massive aid from the Soviet Union, including the involvement of Russian teachers and professors in historiography and the construction of the education system. The signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance (中蘇友好同盟互助條約), which included that both sides agree to common ideological values, that they shared a history of revolutionary cooperation, and that China would receive Russian aid, was followed by a “honeymoon period”.⁴⁷ Soviet advisors were sent to China. Educational specialists contributed significantly to building up the educational system as a whole and especially tertiary education, including teacher training. Chinese engineers, workers, and students traveled to the USSR to receive

43 Cf. Lung-chih CHANG’s contribution to this volume.

44 XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi* vol. 4 (1971), p. 36.

45 As MARX and ENGELS were westerners, too, the West without communism is meant.

46 Joseph R. LEVENSON: *Confucian China and its Modern Fate: The Problem of Intellectual Continuity*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1958, p. 134.

47 Q. Edward WANG: “Between Marxism and Nationalism: Chinese Historiography and the Soviet influence, 1949–1963”. In: *Journal of Contemporary China* 9 (23) 2000, pp. 95–111, p. 97.

training there⁴⁸ and Marxist historiographical writings were translated into Chinese. While the application of Marxist historiography to domestic history posed a challenge in China,⁴⁹ it was wholeheartedly adopted for world history.

The PRC history teaching aims (*mubiao* 目標, just like that in the ROC) in the first PRC history curriculum standard clearly set the scene for a Marxist history teaching. It states the students should:

[...] 懂得历史是劳动人民创造的，与阶级斗争是推动历史前进的动力；逐步培养其历史唯物主义的观点与革命的战斗意志。

[...] understand that history is made by the working people, and that class struggle is the force that pushes history to advance. [History teaching aims at] step-by-step training [the students'] standpoint of historical materialism and [their] determination [to partake in] revolutionary struggle.⁵⁰

World history textbooks in the 1950s were compiled with Soviet help following this maxim. The protagonists, of course, are the common people, the lower strata of society, the peasants, the workers, and the proletariat. They are anonymous (with rare exceptions of a few revolutionaries, such as Sten'ka RAZIN,⁵¹ LENIN)

48 Jan-Ingvä LÖFSTEDT: *Chinese Educational Policy: Changes and Contradictions 1949–79*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 1980, p. 62.

49 WANG: “Between Marxism and Nationalism” (2000), pp. 101–102, *passim*.

50 1950 “Xiaoxue lishi kecheng zanxing biaozhun (caowan)” 小学历史课程暂行标准（草案）(Preliminary curriculum standard for primary school history teaching (draft)). In: *Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo* 课程教材研究所 (ed.): *20 Shiji Zhongguo zhongxiao xue kecheng biaozhun jiaoxue dagang huibian, lishi juan* 20 世纪中国中小学课程标准教学大纲汇编, 历史卷 (Collection of 20th century Chinese secondary and primary school curriculum standards and syllabi, History volume), Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 2001, p. 104.

51 Stepan (“Sten'ka”) RAZIN (~1630–1671) and the uprising led by him are hailed by PRC textbooks; just like in their Soviet models. The book concerns how the multiethnic and multilingual oppressed (*yazha* 壓榨) common people of Russia united under RAZIN and were able to kill rich merchants, nobles, and chase away the Tsar's governors. They democratically elected leaders from among their ranks. Ultimately, the uprising was suppressed, and RAZIN was killed by an enormous army of the Tsar. The 1957 textbook concludes that the Russians will remember the heroic deeds of the rebels forever. Cf. WANG Zhijiu 王芝九: *Chuji Zhongxue Keben: Shijie Lishi* 初級中学課本: 世界历史 (Junior secondary school textbook: World history) vol. 2, Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 1957, pp. 21ff. On RAZIN's image in the USSR, see Dietmar NEUTATZ: “Die Umdeutung von Razin und Pugačev in der Sowjetunion unter Lenin und Stalin” (The reinterpretation of RAZIN and PUGAČEV in the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin). In: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge* (Yearbooks for East European history) vol. 65.1 *Kosakische Aufstände und ihre Anführer: Heroisierung, Dämonisierung und Tabuisierung der Erinnerung* (Cossack uprisings and their leaders: heroization, demonization and tabooing of memory) 2017, pp. 113–131.

and create an all-encompassing positive impetus on history. The peasants are a mighty force, illustrated by peasant uprisings. While rebellions and revolutions are emphasized in general, the peasants' role in them is especially underlined. The focus on peasants represents MAO Zedong's ideology. He was aware of the importance of the peasants for the Chinese revolution and gave them a key position in his teachings as China did not have the large numbers of workers like industrialized Europe. Marxism was not only adapted to the situation in China in general, but the textbook spoke to domestic current affairs in particular. MARTIN points out that in the 1950s, the reorganization of the Chinese peasants was underway, and the textbooks were intended to encourage this process.⁵²

The kings, feudal lords, landowners, the bourgeoisie as well as capitalists are the antagonists, sometimes bundling several of these characteristics into one specific group of people. They are nameless and exploit and oppress the people for their own benefit. If they make concessions to the people, they betray them later. All this is especially true for Western, and also for Russian history.

The PRC textbooks and curricula make it clear that the greed of the Western bourgeoisie and the capitalists does not stop at their borders. This is how international conflicts are explained. The bourgeois and capitalists wrought havoc (economic crisis), started the wars and established oppressive regimes (esp. fascism). In the case of colonialism, the victims are outside of the country of origin, but in the case of peasant serfdom etc., the victims are the compatriots, showing: you cannot trust the bourgeois, capitalists, or the feudal lords; you should only trust the members of your own (proletarian) class, whichever nation they belong to.

The PRC did not simply adopt the teaching of MARX and ENGELS as state doctrine, but subscribed to Leninism, which viewed imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. The liberation struggle of colonized countries is equated with the liberation struggle of the proletariat. In this way, an international solidarity against Western capitalist exploitation is created. Furthermore, Marxist internationalism had already interested Chinese migrants and intellectuals decades before the proclamation of the PRC.⁵³ The class is presented to the students as reference group that transcends all national borders. They should feel solidarity with the proletariat all over the world. Admittedly, patriotism ("patriotic thinking" 爱国主义的思想) is encouraged in the curriculum standards, but class belonging supersedes national

52 Dorothea A. L. MARTIN: *The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View: Perceptions and Interpretations of World History in the People's Republic of China*, Armonk / London: M. E. Sharpe 1990, p. 49.

53 Ironically, MARX himself saw Chinese migration as a threat. Cf. Gregor BENTON: *Chinese Migrants and Internationalism: Forgotten histories, 1917–1945*, London and New York: Routledge 2007, pp. 5, *passim*.

belonging. Although some enemies might be found outside of China, the most important ones are actually inside of China, the landowners, the bourgeoisie, etc.

Just as it is the case with the ROC, so do the PRC textbooks and curricula differentiate between Russia before and after the October Revolution of 1917. The common people of Tsarist Russia were tortured by an oppressive nobility like in any other Western country. The Revolution, then, is a turning point. It established socialism and transformed Russia into the only foreign country that the teaching materials refer to as generally positive: The Soviet Union. While in the other countries, the respective classes act as separate agents in world history, the USSR can now be referred to as being peaceful on the whole as it has overcome class differences.

The two main patriotic elements that exist in the 1950s textbooks are the security of the borders and the unity of a multiethnic and multilingual people. The country is to be defended against foreign enemies (as mentioned above, this enemy is never the foreign country's common people, but the bourgeoisie or the ruling elites); secure borders make the economy thrive. The people inside a country have the ability to unite, transcending different ethnicities and languages. It is the greed of the bourgeoisie, which keeps different countries in opposition.

Innovation only comes from the common people. No members of the elites can act as reformers, and therefore, Peter the Great is not mentioned. In the life of revolutionaries, their peasant or proletarian background is emphasized. This brings us to the last important difference: What is listed as achievement for all people in the Taiwanese textbooks is described as belonging to the bourgeoisie or benefiting them in the PRC books, such as the Renaissance or all revolutions before 1848.

While the Marxist stages of development (primitive society, slave society, feudalism, capitalism, communism) are universal for all countries and are validated in the textbooks, and the different classes are well differentiated in Western history, the terms capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism appear in connection with the term “West” (*xifang* 西方) in the curriculum standards, thereby implying that they are Western inventions.⁵⁴ The curriculum standards, however, are much more schematic and clear-cut black and white than the actual textbooks.

After all, this “honeymoon period” of the PRC and the USSR did not last long. While in the realms of politics, De-Stalinization and the refusal to grant China access to nuclear technologies led to the Sino-Soviet split (progressing gradually

⁵⁴ Such as in the 1956 “Xiaoxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (caoan)” 小学历史教学大纲 (草案) (primary school history syllabus (draft)), pp. 118–119, or the 1963 “Quanrizhi zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (caoan) 全日制中学历史教学大纲 (草案) (Fulltime system secondary school history syllabus (draft)), p. 317. Both in: Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo (ed.): *20 Shiji Zhongguo zhongxiao xue kecheng biaozhun jiaoxue dagang huibian, lishi juan* (2001).

from 1956–1966), in the realms of historiography, it was the inapplicability of Marxist historiography to Chinese history that led to disenchantment with the wholehearted adoption of all of Soviet-Russian historiography. While in the curriculum standards of the 1950s, the role of the USSR is idolized with keywords such as “heroic” (or “hero” *yingxiong* 英雄) and their leadership is overly emphasized (“under the leadership of the Soviet Union” *Sulian wei shou* 蘇聯為首, the USSR “leads” *lingdao* 領導, etc.), especially in the defeat of Fascism (*Faxisi* 法西斯), these keywords disappear altogether in the 1963 curriculum standard.⁵⁵

WANG describes this “ideological rift” with the USSR and the liberation of the Chinese Marxists “from the domination of Soviet culture” as the manifestation of Chinese nationalism,⁵⁶ especially because he discusses the discourse on the periodization of Chinese history. With regard to world history, however, the general Marxist interpretation inherited from the Soviet Union prevailed; only the role of the USSR itself came to be estimated differently.

After the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976 (during which no curricula were published) and the death of MAO Zedong, the next curriculum was published in 1978 and shows the completion of a PRC self that is independent from the Soviet Union and outspokenly criticizes the former idol. The USSR was no longer the leader of the peaceful camp, but it became part of the problem by degenerating into socialist imperialism. It is now being likened to the USA. While in the 1950s, an ideal image of the USSR as “grand Autre” was juxtaposed to a demonized image of the USA, they are now depicted in an equally negative manner:

[...] 如苏联蜕变为社会帝国主义，美帝国主义日益衰落，苏美争霸是世界不得安宁的根源，第三世界的觉醒和壮大等。⁵⁷

[...] the transformation of the USSR into socialist imperialism, the increasing decline of American imperialism, and the scramble of the USSR and the USA for supremacy are the reason why the world cannot be at peace and why the third world wakes up and becomes strong.

MAO Zedong is progressively characterized as the guardian of Marxism-Leninism. Following the death of STALIN, a 1979 book explains, the USSR under

55 1963 “Quanrizhi zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang (caojan). In: Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo (ed.): *20 Shiji Zhongguo zhongxiao xue kecheng biaozhun jiaoxue dagang huibian, lishi juan* (2001), pp. 239 ff.

56 WANG: “Between Marxism and Nationalism” (2000), pp. 110–111.

57 1978 Quanrizhi shinianzhi xuexiao zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang 全日制十年制学校中学历史教学大纲 (Secondary school history syllabus for the full-time ten-year school system). In: Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo (ed.): *20 Shiji Zhongguo zhongxiao xue kecheng biaozhun jiaoxue dagang huibian, lishi juan* (2001), pp. 327–385, p. 329.

KHRUSHCHEV restored capitalism. Since 1956, the book continues, imperialists and reactionaries in many countries turned against the people and the concept of socialism. In order to protect the principles of Marxism-Leninism, chairman MAO led the whole party and the whole population to stop revisionism (*xiuzhengzhuyi* 修正主义)⁵⁸ and to stop the Soviet traitors. In this way, he leads the way for the proletariat and revolutionaries of the whole world. This passage of the history revision book is actually from the section on domestic history (*Zhongguo lishi* 中国历史). I include it here because the world history section of the same book ends in 1945, and to show how the negative image of the USSR is employed to legitimate Chinese domestic policy. The book specifically evokes this global conflict scenario to come to speak of MAO Zedong's speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People" (关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题) in which he criticized the USSR for being too repressive, which was the starting signal for the Hundred Flowers Campaign.⁵⁹

Multilayered metaphors in the PRC history textbooks do not stop there. Dorothea A. L. MARTIN demonstrates how the description of the English "Bourgeois" Revolution (more details follow below) changed to accommodate criticism of the USSR since the Sino-Soviet split from 1962 onwards. The restauration of the house of Stuart, described as the "old ruling class seeking to regain power" became a metaphor for Soviet "revisionism".⁶⁰ After the end of the Cultural Revolution, MAO's death, the rehabilitation of DENG Xiaoping, and the beginning of the Reform and Opening (*gaige kaifang* 改革开放) policy, the narrative changed. Textbooks of the late 1970s and early 1980s cease to devote extra space to the restauration of the house of Stuart, and in general, the "emphasis on the threat of class restoration [...] is drastically toned down".⁶¹ This change in the depiction of English revolutionary history also reflected the amelioration of the relations with the USSR.

While still keeping its maximum distance to the USSR, the PRC began rapprochement with the West. In 1971, MAO and U.S. president NIXON met. In the same year, the PRC replaced the ROC in representing China at the United Nations.

58 HSIA argues that "Mao's polemics against the 'revisionists' met with greater welcome in Communist China than did his former policy of 'leaning to one side'", especially because of the long record of hostilities between Russia and China. HSIA: "Demons in Paradise" (1963), p. 27. The negative image of Russia (inherited from the Qing dynasty and the ROC) was the rule while the short-lived friendship with the USSR is the exception.

59 Beijing jiaoyu xueyuan jiaocai jiaoyanbu 北京教育学院教材教研部 (Beijing Institute of Education teaching material teaching and research office, ed.): *Beijingshi zhongxue keben: Lishi fuxi cankao ziliao* 北京市中学课本: 历史复习参考资料 (Beijing city secondary school textbook: History revision reference material), Beijing: Beijing chubanshe 1979, pp. 181–182.

60 MARTIN: *The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View* (1990), pp. 53, 55.

61 Ibid., p. 62.

In 1978, after MAO's death, DENG Xiaoping's Reform and Opening policy was initiated, and the related "Four Modernizations" (*si ge xiandaihua* 四个现代化) were inscribed in the curriculum standard in 1980.⁶² Not only was the education system reformed (beginning with the reinstallation of the college entrance examinations *gaokao* 高考 in 1977), the general climate for intellectuals improved,⁶³ and the image of the West in the textbooks also changed. The West was no longer only seen as an imperialist and capitalist aggressor, but also as an important contributor of technological and scientific innovations. The image of the Industrial Revolution, for example, changed completely. The suffering of the workers took the backseat while the invention of new machinery and the improvement of infrastructure were praised.⁶⁴ It was then that world history in the PRC was no longer used to legitimize Soviet support, but Westernization. This Westernization, however, as Alisa JONES demonstrates, was limited to the modernization of technology and science and excluded the introduction of Western values.⁶⁵

62 Abbreviated "*si hua*" 四化. 1980 "Quanri zhi shi nian zhi xuexiao zhongxue lishi jiaoxue dagang" 全日制十年制学校中学历史教学大纲 (Secondary school history syllabus for the full-time ten-year school system). In: Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo (ed.): *20 Shiji Zhongguo zhongxiao xue kecheng biaozhun jiaoxue dagang huibian, lishi juan* (2001), pp. 386–439, p. 386.

63 The reforms in the PRC education system after MAO's death have been discussed by Edward VICKERS and ZENG Xiaodong: *Education and Society in Post-Mao China*, New York: Routledge 2017. They point out that PRC education system was not always homogeneous. Especially in the first years, achieving universal education was a great challenge and had to periodically be shelved to pursue the aim of elite schooling for the few. Differences between the provinces or rural and urban environments persevere until today. See also: Suzanne PEPPER: *Radicalism and Education Reform in 20th-Century China: The Search for an Ideal Development Model*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996; Stewart FRAZER (comp., ed.): *Chinese Communist Education. Records of the First Decade*, New York: Wiley 1965. The two juxtaposing forces or approaches in the Chinese government that also compete in the management of the education system have been labeled "red" and "expert" as they represent diehard communist ideologists versus utilitarian technocrats. Their competition has been described as a main driving force behind policy changes in the PRC. See Ann KENT: "Red and Expert: The Revolution in Education at Shanghai's Teachers' University, 1975–76". In: *The China Quarterly* no. 86, 1981, pp. 304–321.

64 SHOU Jiyu 寿纪瑜, YAN Zhiliang 严志梁, CHEN Qi 陈其: *Chiji zhongxue keben: Shijie lishi* 初级中学课本: 世界历史 (Junior secondary school textbook: World history), Hubei: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 1988, pp. 50–52.

65 Alisa JONES: "Changing the Past to serve the Present". In Gi-Wook SHIN and Daniel C. SNEIDER (ed.): *History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories*, London and New York: Routledge 2011, p. 84.

Comparison of Historical Events

To illustrate the different images of Russia and the West presented in ROC and PRC textbooks, the following pages attempt a comparison of individual historical events in textbooks of the two regimes. The chosen events are described in both the ROC and PRC textbooks and illustrate the different roles ascribed to the various “others” in the respective “Geschichtsbild”. Another important difference between ROC and PRC textbooks lie in the *choice* of events. For example, the PRC books place an important emphasis on the Paris Commune of 1871,⁶⁶ an event that is not mentioned in the ROC books at all. However, only examples of historical events that can be found in both are presented here.

Antiquity

Both the ROC and the PRC world history textbooks provide the students with canonical knowledge about antiquity. The striking difference, however, is the focus on different agents in history, symbolized also by the use of different illustrations, and different assessments. The ROC books do not question traditional authorities and rely on a history of “great men”. The Marxist books of the PRC, in contrast, provide the viewpoint of the lower classes and describe social and economic dynamics.

The discussion of antiquity in the ROC books is dominated by the description of the national character of the historic groups and ethnicities and by a focus on providing a nomenclature of Western achievements. The first great achievement is democracy, introduced in the discussion of Greece. It does not mention, however, that the Greeks had slaves or that other certain prices that had to be paid in order to keep up such a societal structure:

雅典人熱愛自由，實行民主政治，國家的大事由人民決定或由人民選出的代表來管理。⁶⁷

The Athenians loved freedom and practiced democratic politics. Important affairs of the state were managed by the people or by representatives elected by the people.

⁶⁶ MARTIN analyses it: MARTIN: *The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View* (1990), pp. 67 ff.

⁶⁷ XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi* vol. 4 (1971), p. 15.

As philosophy is discussed, it is made clear that “Greek culture is the major source of Western culture” (希臘文化是西方文化的主要泉源).⁶⁸ The students are then introduced to the names of famous ancient Greek philosophers (the “three philosophers” Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle) without learning anything about their teachings. A parallel is drawn between the West and China:

蘇格拉底和我國的孔子約為同時，有人稱蘇氏為「西方的孔子」，稱孔子為「東方的蘇格拉底」。他們兩人的學說，也有很多相似相通之處。⁶⁹

Socrates and Confucius from China roughly lived at the same time, some people call Socrates the “Western Confucius” and Confucius the “Eastern Socrates”. The teachings of the two also have many common points.

This comparison of Socrates and Confucius goes back to FENG Youlan’s (1895–1990) “History of Chinese Philosophy” (*Zhongguo Zhixue Shi* 中國哲學史, first published in 1931) in which he likens Confucius’ teachings with the teachings of the Greek Sophists (*zhizhe* 智者) and the influence of Confucius in the Chinese historical perspective to the influence of Socrates for Western thought.⁷⁰

As we proceed toward the culture of Rome, the category “Indo Europeans [!]” (印歐民族) is introduced to describe not only Greeks and Romans, but also the ancestors of contemporary European nations. While the Greek are described as lively, passionate, and imaginative (活潑熱情和富於幻想), the Romans are depicted as earnest, down-to-earth, and said to determinedly put things into practice (腳踏實地, 著重於力行實踐). Therefore, volume 4 from 1971 argues that the Romans’ contributions lie mainly in the realms of law and politics as well as other practical issues (所以羅馬人對於文化的貢獻，也偏重於法律和政治等實際問題).⁷¹

The aspect of law leads to a characterization of the Western world in general:

法律：西方人重視法治，各國皆有其成文法或不成文法，為全國人民所一致遵守，這種習慣和觀念，全是導源於羅馬。⁷²

Law: Westerners attach great importance to the rule of law. Each country has written or unwritten law, by which all citizens completely abide. This habit and concept originated entirely from Rome.

68 Ibid. p. 16.

69 Ibid. pp. 17–18.

70 FENG Youlan 潘友蘭: *Zhongguo Zhixue Shi* 中國哲學史 (History of Chinese Philosophy) vol. 1, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 1992, p 71. Compare also BODDE’s English translation: FUNG Yu-Lan: *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, tr. by Derk BODDE, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1952, p. 49.

71 XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi* vol. 4 (1971), p. 24.

72 Ibid.

The introduction of codified law is listed explicitly as an achievement. Implicitly, it is added to the list of characteristics of a successful nation. The abidance by law becomes an imperative for the Taiwanese students.

One of the illustrations is the Roman emperor Augustus (fig. 4-1),⁷³ namely a black-and-white picture of the Augustus of Prima Porta statue preserved at the Vatican Museums. It illustrates how the Taiwanese books concentrate on a historical narrative of “great men” that does not put into question the power structures in a state. They convey a classicist image of Western history (inherited from the Renaissance and enlightenment historians) that sees these early achievements of civilization as a basis of future progress.




Figure 4-1: Augustus of Prima Porta

This photograph of August of Prima Porta was taken by James ANDERSON (1813–1877) about 1845–1855. This or a similar photo must have been the template for the ROC textbook illustration, as Augustus has the staff in his hand, which is not part of the statue itself.⁷⁴




Figure 4-2: Spartacus

Spartacus the slave as cover image of the PRC world history textbook by LI Gengxu. The image goes back to a fresco in Pompeii⁷⁵ and can also be found in German Democratic Republic history textbooks for the 5th grade.⁷⁶

73 Ibid., p. 23.

74 Digital image courtesy of the Getty’s Open Content Program. Available online: <http://www.getty.edu/art/collection/objects/41131/james-anderson-augustus-of-prima-porta-british-about-1845-1855/> (last access 2020, March 3).

75 Brent D. SHAW (transl., ed.): *Spartacus and the Slave Wars: A Brief History with Documents*, Boston and New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2001, p. 15.

76 Cf. Dieter BEHRENDT, Hans FRIEDRICH and Hannelore IFFERT: *Geschichte* (History) 5, Berlin: Volk und Wissen 1973, p. 115.

The PRC books set a tone that is strikingly different. Already the title image of “World history for junior secondary school”⁷⁷ shows that in PRC history textbooks, the lowest people in society are the heroes of history: The cover shows the image of the slave Spartacus on a horse with shield, short sword, and helmet, the spear that wounded him sticking in his thigh (fig. 4-2). Karl MARX himself had already expressed his appreciation of Spartacus. LENIN expanded on this and constructed a class struggle narrative for antiquity according to which ancient Rome was characterized by a struggle between slaves and masters. Spartacus then began to play a key role in Soviet historiography under STALIN.⁷⁸

Following this Soviet take on antiquity in the framework of stages according to historical materialism, slavery is the important characteristic of not only ancient Rome, but also Egypt and Greece. This second stage of human development (after primitive communism) is illustrated in the PRC books with a slave in shackles and a Roman slave collar (fig. 4-3).⁷⁹ The inhumane treatment of the slaves is discussed, and it is explained that the ancient Roman society was very unequal with clear differences between nobles, citizens and slaves. The achievements of the West that are hailed in the ROC textbooks are deconstructed in the PRC books to show that they happened because of the exploitation of the working (or later in history, colonized) people. The slave uprising led by Spartacus is described, setting the scene for the narrative focus of PRC history on the heroes among the commoners or low strata of society, and their ability to rise as well as to start revolts and revolutions.




图 34 奴隶带的项圈，上面写着：“捉住我，不要让我逃走。”
上面还有奴隶所有者的名字

Figure 4-3: Slave collar

77 LI Gengxu 李赓序: *Chuji zhongxue keben: Shijie lishi* 初级中学课本: 世界历史 (Junior secondary school textbook: World history) vol. 1, Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 1957 (first published 1955).

78 SHAW, *Spartacus and the Slave Wars* (2001), pp. 14–17.

79 LI: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 1 (1957), p. 72. The image of the slave collar bears striking resemblance to an illustration from Hutton WEBSTER: *Ancient History*, Boston, MA: D.C. Heath & Co., 1913, see https://etc.usf.edu/clipart/80200/80292/80292_collar.htm (last access 2020, June 5).

The (Italian) Renaissance

Also in the description of the Renaissance (*wenyifuxing* 文藝復興), striking differences can be seen between the ROC and the PRC books. However, there is one important similarity that shows how China in general wants to reclaim its importance vis-à-vis the mighty West, whose hegemony rests on developments that already began during the Renaissance. Both regimes highlight the stimulus by China or Asia.

The 1971 ROC textbook writes that while Europe was dwelling in the Dark Ages, Asian culture prospered:

如果把此時的東方和西方作一比較，顯然是亞洲超過了歐洲。⁸⁰

If one were to compare East and West at that time, Asia would obviously have surpassed Europe.

The Middle Ages ended thanks to the Crusaders and the campaigns of the Mongols, who are clearly presented as a part of the Chinese nation. The travels of Marco POLO and the influence of his travel report are also mentioned in this light. Although both the Crusades and the Mongol invasions were acts of war claiming many casualties, they are seen as positive, because they led to the contact between European and Asian cultures. Indirectly, China takes credit for Europe's progress toward modernity:

十字軍東征和蒙古西征，[...] 使東西文化發生了密切的接觸。由於比較進步的東方文化輸入西方，形成了一股動力，促成了啟迪近代歐洲文化昌明的文藝復興運動。⁸¹

The eastward march of the Crusaders and the westward march of the Mongols, [...] made Eastern and Western culture come into close contact. The relatively advanced culture of the East entered the West, which led to an impetus that facilitated the Renaissance movement of the flourishing enlightened Modern European culture.

The Renaissance is, for the ROC, the beginning of “Modern Europe” and of a development toward the Reformation, maritime navigation, colonialism and the industrial revolution. These four “movements” lead Europe “from backwardness to progress, from darkness to light, from reservation to openness, from poverty to prosperity” (由落後轉為進步，由黑暗轉為光明，由閉塞轉為開放，由貧乏轉為繁榮).⁸² Until the 19th century, Europe had reached a status of hegemony

80 XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi* vol. 4 (1971), p. 39.

81 Ibid., p. 38.

82 Ibid., p. 50.

over the entire world (世界的霸權地位). In short, the textbook argues that Europe attained hegemony thanks to Asia as a whole and China in particular.

As in other sections of the ROC book, the reasons why a certain event or period came into being, are neatly enumerated.⁸³ The three reasons given for the Renaissance are the stimulus (*ciji* 刺激) by the Eastern Culture, the rise and prosperity of the cities and commerce, and the introduction of paper making and printing technology from China (via the Arabs). A great number of achievements of the Renaissance are enumerated such as the new thought of Humanism (*renwenzhuyi* 人文主義) that focused on man and not god. Other achievements such as art and science are also noted while many Renaissance figures are enumerated with their achievements (PETRARCH, Leonardo DA VINCI, etc.). Vernacular literature (“topolect literature” *fangyan wenxue* 方言文學) developed and developed into nowadays’ national languages (DANTE, CERVANTES, SHAKESPEARE, LUTHER). Translating “Renaissance” as “再生 [zai sheng] Re birth [sic]” or “新生 [xin sheng] New-birth [sic]”, the book explains that it was not only a movement to revive ancient times (*fugu yundong* 復古運動) but also wanted to be a movement of rebirth (*xinsheng yundong* 新生運動), in the course of which the thought of the people was liberated; literature, art, science, technology, and other more generalized views of life (*rensheng guan* 人生觀) were renewed and opened up new prospects.⁸⁴

The PRC textbooks, in contrast, view the Renaissance as “bourgeois culture” (*zichan jieji wenhua* 資產階級文化). On the one hand, the book acknowledges that science, technology and the arts were freed from the constraints of the church; the “superstition” (*mixin* 迷信)⁸⁵ of the church was overcome by “enlightenment” (*qifa* 启发). As the bourgeoisie tried to revive the culture of antiquity, the term “Renaissance” (*wenyi fixing* 文艺复兴, different to the ROC books, no English terms are used) was coined. Leonardo DA VINCI and his Mona Lisa are mentioned, with pictures; a common ground of the PRC and ROC books.

On the other hand, as the PRC books lay out, the beginning of the division of labor in the wool handicraft industry during the Renaissance constituted the earliest capitalist production mode and gave rise to the bourgeoisie (*zichan jieji fenzi* 資產階級分子) who were in control of society. They wanted to use the developing

83 A characteristic of liberal “Whig” historiography.

84 XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi* vol. 4 (1971), pp. 50ff.

85 This praise of overcoming “superstition” *mixin* 迷信 resonates with campaigns against a wide range of popular (religious) practices that were either seen as potentially subversive or simply a “misallocation of resources badly needed for industrial development”. The impulse to limit or eradicate “superstition” precedes the PRC. John WILLIAMS: “Superstition”. In: Christian SORACE, Ivan FRENCESCHINI, Nicholas LOUBERE: *Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi*, Acton: ANU Press 2019, pp. 270, 272.

science and technology to increase their riches. The new culture⁸⁶ and the liberated science remained in the hands of the few members of the bourgeoisie, not in the hands of the laboring people. As the workers (*gongren* 工人) were exploited, the first uprising (*qiyi* 起义) of workers in history took place in Italy in 1378.⁸⁷

Another development which fell into the hands of the bourgeoisie and was thus only used for the benefit of their own social class was the invention of printing by the Chinese, of which the Europeans learned through the Mongols (a clear parallel to the ROC books). In the 15th century then, the German GUTENBERG improved printing by developing a “hand printing machine” (*shou yao yinshuaji* 手摇印刷机) for movable type.⁸⁸

In contrast to the ROC textbooks, single achievements or artists (except Leonardo DA VINCI) are not hailed in the PRC textbooks of the 1950s as they concentrated on a rather dogmatic Marxist presentation of history. This view, however, shifts notably during the Reform and Opening policy, when in the 1984 World history textbook, the scientific and cultural achievements of DANTE, SHAKESPEARE, GALILEI, and COPERNICUS are lauded.⁸⁹ The political rapprochement with the West comes hand in hand with a convergence of PRC and ROC images of the West and paves the way for a friendlier relationship between the two beginning in the late 1980s.

Reformation

In the ROC books the Reformation (*zongjiao gaige* 宗教改革, lit: “religion reform”) is described as leading toward the development of new culture and the rise of nation states (*minzu guojia de xingqi* 民族國家的興起). The emergence of nation states is one of the main narratives in the world history textbooks and is well in line with the nationalist state ideology. That corrupt practices of an overly powerful Catholic Church were exposed and ended by the Reformation is just one of three outcomes. The other ones are the birth of national consciousness (*minzu yishi* 民族意識) as the sovereigns became independent of the Pope and the abolition of certificates of absolution and other economic activities that had hitherto benefitted

86 I suspect this to also be a critique of the Republican May Fourth Movement / New Culture Movement and HU Shi and other liberals who equated it with the Renaissance.

87 WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), pp. 6–8.

88 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

89 SHOU Jiyu 寿纪瑜 (ed.): *Gaoji zhongxue keben: Shijie Lishi* 高级中学课本: 世界历史 (Higher level secondary school textbook: world history) vol. 1, Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 1984, pp. 136–39.

the Church. Now, the lords were able to acquire great wealth, which is seen as a development toward self-determination.⁹⁰

In stark contrast, in the PRC books, the Reformation is seen in the context of social inequalities and exploitation and as a consequence of economic pressure. In a scattered Germany, feudal lords raise many taxes and seize land of the peasants, who then have to borrow money from loan sharks (*gaolidaizhe* 高利貸者) in order to pay their taxes. Additionally, the Catholic Church forces the peasants to pay a share of their harvest as taxes and uses several ways to cheat the people out of their money (*pianqian* 骗钱, such as letters of indulgence) or to suppress them (such as tribunes against heretics).

This leads to the people and Martin LUTHER opposing the church. As in other passages, the role of workers and especially peasants and their revolutionary force is emphasized. As the handicraft workers in the cities suffer from heavy taxation by the nobles, they begin a revolt. They realize that they need to join forces with the peasants.

The PRC book points out that it was especially the bourgeoisie who opposed the economic practices of the Catholic Church and wanted *their* church to replace it. As an outcome of the Reformation, the beneficiary of taxation and exploitation changes while the injustice prevails. The Catholic “feudal church” is replaced by a “new” “bourgeois” church: Protestantism (*xinjiao* 信教, lit. “new teaching”).⁹¹ By labelling Protestantism as “bourgeois”, the PRC book delegitimizes it. This rhetoric of delegitimization is employed to virtually all events that are listed as (Western) “achievements” in the ROC books. All social and political movements before the establishment of Communism by MARX and ENGELS are labeled “bourgeois”.

Seafaring and Colonialism

The description of seafaring and colonization (*hanghai he zhimin* 航海和殖民) is discussed in a positive way in the ROC textbooks. The discovery of new routes, establishment of trade relations and colonization elevated Europe from poverty, made it prosperous and thus connected the continents. For Western history as a whole, this meant that the Mediterranean period (*Dizhonghai shidai* 地中海時代) ended and the Atlantic period (*Daxiyang shidai* 大西洋時代) began, in which the countries bordering the Atlantic Ocean attained the superior status. With the rise of the cities and the development of mercantilism, which replaced the manorialism

90 XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi*, vol. 4, (1971), pp. 55ff.

91 WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), pp. 13–16.

of the feudal Middle Ages, the demand for products increased, which had to be imported to Europe from elsewhere. Unlike in the PRC textbooks, the hardship suffered by the colonized people is downplayed in the ROC books, that is, unless it specifically concerns China.⁹²

The PRC textbooks criticize colonialism as a whole. They make it clear that the discovery of new sea routes to India and the Americas was, like most “achievements” in Western history, motivated by greed, as the Europeans were hoping to find gold in India and China.⁹³ A map shows “the 15th and 16th centuries’ discovery of new sea routes and the plundering of colonies” (*shiwu shiji dao shiliu shiji xin hanglu de faxian he zhimindi de liueduo* 十五世紀到十六世紀新航路的发现和殖民地的掠夺).⁹⁴ Not only the routes of the Western explorers Bartolomeu DIAS, Vasco DA GAMA, COLUMBUS, and MAGELLAN are drawn on the map. They are also put into perspective with reference to the routes that the Chinese explorer ZHENG He 郑和 took 1405–1433. Relevant places of origin and of destination are marked, but not only the ones of the Western explorers (such as the European countries of departure, Africa with the Cape of Good Hope or the Caribbean Island of San Salvador), but also the Ming Empire with Liujiagang 刘家港, ZHENG He’s point of departure.⁹⁵ By inserting Chinese into Western history, the Chinese historiographer validates the Marxist theory of history for China by showing that the same historical stages were completed there (or even earlier) in order to legitimize the rule of the Communist Party today. This was an important objective of the Chinese historians and the reason for dispute with Soviet historians.⁹⁶

The rhetoric describing the colonial activities of Spain and Portugal creates a cruel and unjust image in the PRC books. The agents of wrongdoing who occupy and plunder gold and silver are the kings, not the common people. Colonialism is seen as a global phenomenon: The submission of the people in Central and South America, the enslavement of Africans who are brought there to lead an inhumane life (*feiren de shenghuo* 非人的生活)⁹⁷, leads to the installation of the Portuguese and Spanish in Asia (India, Macau, Philippines). In all these colonies in the “East” (“Dongfang” 东方, the book uses quotation marks), exploitation (*boxue* 剥削),

92 XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi* vol. 4 (1971), p. 60 ff.

93 WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), p. 8.

94 Note the partially abbreviated orthography in the books that were published after the “Chinese Character Simplification Scheme” (*Hanzi jianhua fang’an* 汉字简化方案) of 1956 and before the promulgation of the “List of simplified characters” (*Hanzi jianhua zongbiao* 汉字简化总表) 1964.

95 Ibid. p. 10.

96 Cf. WANG: “Between Marxism and Nationalism” (2000). The emancipation of the Soviet view on Chinese history is labelled as “nationalism” by WANG.

97 WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), pp. 11–12.

persecution (*pohai* 迫害), and massacres (*tusha* 屠殺) take place. The resources extracted from the colonies enabled the Europeans' capitalist development.⁹⁸

A striking difference of the ROC textbooks in comparison to the PRC textbooks is that the effects of colonialism on China are discussed in the books on domestic history (usually titled *Zhongguo Lishi* or *Benguo Lishi* 本国历史). The ROC books seem to aim at avoiding a connection with other oppressed people. However, even in the ROC textbooks, the hardship suffered by the colonized, with regard to China, is acknowledged. In the textbooks, becoming the victim of colonialism is seen as an impetus for modernization and self-strengthening. In the PRC textbooks, however, in accordance with Leninism, colonization is seen as the epitome of the struggle against capitalist oppression and the aforementioned solidarity among all colonized people is evoked. In so far, it is possible to say that the ROC and the PRC history textbooks find different explanations for the Chinese trauma of a hitherto "all under heaven" falling victim to the colonialism of "Barbarians".⁹⁹

England

English history provides a good example for the comparison of the view on political and economic developments in the West. Already the placement within greater historical dynamics stands for the different conceptions of the role of England for world history.

In the ROC books, England features as an important element in the chapter on absolutism (*junzhu zhuanzhi* 君主專制), which in turn is seen as an important stepping stone toward the formation of nation states, as it fostered the development of "national consciousness" (*minzu yishi* 民族意識). England is presented as a "nation state" (*minzu guojia* 民族國家) that was mainly established by the Anglo-Saxons.¹⁰⁰ The section on the English monarchy is, like many other chapters in the book, full of personal names. The Taiwanese students are introduced to the Tudors, Henry VIII, and Elizabeth I, all with corresponding pictures. The Puritan Revolution (*qingjiaotu geming* 清教徒革命) and the English Revolution ("Glorious Revolution", adopting the British term: *guangrong geming* 光榮革命 1688/1689) are discussed, climaxing in the English Constitution (*Yingguo de yihui zhengzhi* 英國的議會政治), with the parliament and constitutional monarchy as important

98 Ibid., p. 11.

99 Note CHEN and CHEN's discussion of orientalism and the discursive Other (after SAID and BHABA) in the ROC curriculum standards. CHEN/CHEN: "Guozhong Lishi Kegang zhong de Ouzhou yixiang" (2018), pp. 27–55.

100 Ethnic categorizations play a prominent role in the ROC books, much unlike the PRC books.

(Western) political achievements.¹⁰¹ This is an important difference to the description in the PRC books.

In the PRC books, the rise of centralized nation states (*zhongyang minzu guojia* 中央民族国家) is acknowledged, too. However, social inequalities and economy as well as class dynamics are part of the main focus. Even the concentration of power in the hands of the English king is seen as an evil scheme of the “new nobility” (*xin guizu* 新貴族),¹⁰² industrials and landowners. As they acquired great wealth, they stood against the nobles and feudalism in general. History is not necessarily narrated as the ever-progressing enumeration of achievements as in the ROC books, but as a struggle between the classes for economic resources.

In contrast to the ROC book, the Hundred Years’ War between England and France plays an important role in the PRC book in order to show that peace is impossible under feudalism or a monarchy. The classes and social inequalities drive the main narrative. Something like national character or other ethnic specific tendencies do not appear. Instead, the kings and the nobility, of both France and England, appear as greedy and oppressive – which is the reason why France and England found themselves in this long succession of wars. The general term of the “ruling class” (*tongzhi jieji* 統治階級) is employed. Especially the peasants, but also the masses of the people in general, are portrayed as heroic. They are the driving force behind upheavals, revolutions and innovation, and fight for their equality and against constant oppression and precarious living conditions. The unity of peasants¹⁰³ and poor people is able to “terribly frighten” (*xiahuai* 吓坏) the nobility (*guizu* 貴族), especially in France, but also in England. In English history, the fact that the English king first accepted, but then did not grant the peasants their demands, i.e. the “ruling class” “shamelessly” (*wuchi* 無恥) betrayed (*pian* 騞) the peasants, is a further example of the depravity of the elites who continue to exploit the poor who in turn were forced to dwell in a state of serfdom (*nongnu* 農奴).¹⁰⁴

For the PRC books, the progression of history according to the Marxist stages is key, and so is the establishment of capitalism in England. Three main conditions (*tiaojian* 条件) enabled it, implying that capitalism was invented in England and that capitalism is English per se. Those three conditions are: the manufacturers

101 XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi* vol. 4 (1971), pp. 69–72.

102 I. e., merchants who were given titles and fiefs for their help in the civil war.

103 As mentioned above, MAO put special emphasis on the role of the peasants. MARTIN: *The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View* (1990), p. 49.

104 LI: *Shijie lishi* vol. 1 (1957), pp. 136–137.

(*gongchang shougongye* 工場手工业),¹⁰⁵ the enclosure movement (*quandi yundong* 圈地运动), and overseas plundering (*haiwai liueduo* 海外掠夺).¹⁰⁶ The birth of capitalism heralds the beginning of Modern History:

近代历史是资本主义从确立到衰落，无产阶级从兴起 to 壮大的历史。资本主义是在英国最先确立的，无产阶级是在英国最先出现的。¹⁰⁷

Modern History is the history from the establishment to the decline of capitalism, and from the rise to strength of the proletariat. Capitalism was first established in England, and the proletariat also first appeared in England.

The question whether or not the birth of capitalism was to be considered the starting signal for Modern History, had been matter of considerable debate among Soviet historians of the early 1950s, some argued for the French, some (like Aleksei Vladimirovich EFIMOV, 1896–1971) for the English Revolution. The PRC more or less fortuitously decided to follow EFIMOV's view, even before the matter was officially decided in favor of the English ("Bourgeois") Revolution in 1956.¹⁰⁸

The PRC books describe the economic development in detail. The manufacturers, in the case of England especially in the wool industry, constitute the beginning of capitalist production (英國的資本主义生产开始盛行) in the 16th century. The enclosure movement is presented as an evil scheme of the government: (new) nobles just take the land of the peasants, enclose it with fences and convert it into pasture areas.¹⁰⁹ The peasants, formerly able to earn a comfortable living by selling wool to the textile workshops,¹¹⁰ are forced to lead a vagrant life, are criminalized (also branded and executed), and driven to the manufacturers in the cities to work. In this way, the nobles not only acquire pastures for the sheep for the

105 Cf. "manufacture" (Manufaktur) in: Karl MARX, *Das Kapital* I.I. Hamburg: Otto Meissner, 1867, pp. 318 ff. Accessed online: Deutsches Textarchiv, http://www.deutschestextarchiv.de/book/view/marx_kapital01_1867/ (last access 2020, June 4).

106 WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), pp. 16–17.

107 Zhejiangsheng zhongxiaoxue jiaocai bianji weiyuanhui 浙江省中小学教材編輯委员会 (Zhejiang province secondary and primary school teaching material compilation committee, ed.): *Chuzhong Lishi* 初中历史 (Junior secondary school history) vol. 4: *Shijie Jindai Xiandaishi* 世界近代现代史 (Modern and contemporary world history), Hangzhou: Zhejiang jiaoyu chubanshe 1958, p. 1.

108 MARTIN: *The Making of a Sino-Marxist World View* (1990), pp. 45, 50. Compare with EFIMOV's textbook *Novaia istoriia, pervaia chast'* (Recent History, part one), described in: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (ed.): *Teaching the Social Sciences and the Humanities in the U.S.S.R.*, 1959, pp. 10 ff.

109 WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), p. 18.

110 Zhejiangsheng zhongxiaoxue jiaocai bianji weiyuanhui: *Shijie Jindai Xiandaishi* (1958), p. 1.

production of wool, but also cheap labor for their wool handicraft industry.¹¹¹ Capitalist production and the accumulation of capital began in England on the ground of bitter exploitation (从殘酷剝削中积累資金).¹¹²

The aforementioned described plundering of the overseas colonies by the English bourgeoisie is the last link in the chain to enable the development of capitalism, as the PRC books point out. The trading companies (*maoyi gongsi* 贸易公司), such as the East India Company, are just “overseas plundering organizations” (*hai-wai lüeduo jigou* 海外掠夺机构).¹¹³ In India, the English levied heavy taxes, bought all the grain and sold it at an appallingly expensive price. Great famines took place and millions of people starved to death in the 18th century.¹¹⁴ The English furthermore “poisoned” (*duhai* 毒害) China with Opium. Silver from China and other valuables were used by England to accumulate capital. Even as a victim, China is credited for a contribution to the progression of world history.¹¹⁵

The economic dynamics now called for political change. Against the backdrop of the birth of capitalism, the PRC books come to describe the English Revolution as “English Bourgeois Revolution” (英國資產階級革命). According to the PRC books, this revolution was not as positive as Western and Taiwanese historiography would perhaps want us to believe. England was still in a political state of backwards feudalism, reigned by a king who not only oppressed the workers, but also extracted taxes from the bourgeoisie. Absolutism posed a serious impediment to capitalism reaching the next level. Therefore, the bourgeoisie began to fight with the king. Initially on their own, the bourgeoisie was easily defeated. But then, they joined forces with the poor: peasants, workers of the manufactures. These poor fought a heroic war, defeated the king’s army and arrested and executed the king. The bourgeoisie depended on the masses of the people for their victory, feudalism was smashed (*cuihui* 摧毀). Strong and pictorial language describes the nameless heroes of the lower strata of society. The bourgeois government that was established, however, was built on the enslavement of the people (却騎在人民头上奴役人民). Although such a slave society is long gone, the vocabulary suggests that the same inequality prevailed. The peasants who had helped the bourgeoisie win still did not receive any land. Even worse, the enclosure movement sped up, peasants who owned the land they tilled completely disappeared. English colonies

111 WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), p. 18.

112 Zhejiangsheng zhongxiao xue jiaocai bianji weiyuanhui: *Shijie Jindai Xiandaishi* (1958), p. 1.

113 WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), p. 18.

114 Zhejiangsheng zhongxiao xue jiaocai bianji weiyuanhui: *Shijie Jindai Xiandaishi* (1958), p. 2.

115 WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), p. 18.

were expanded, the bourgeoisie added to their riches by increasing their exploitation and oppression of people in England and also, more generally, the world.¹¹⁶

The English Bourgeois Revolution is one of many examples of how the PRC textbooks deconstruct and delegitimize Western “achievements” by arguing how they were made possible by the lower classes of society but only benefitted the ruling elites. These elites twisted the accomplishments of the common people to make them serve their own needs. Be it in terms of the English Revolution or the French Revolution, the resulting political changes are rejected by the PRC books as “bourgeois”.

The World Wars, Soviet Russia, and U.S. Intervention

The ROC and the PRC name different reasons for breakout of the two world wars (apart from the tangible event of Franz Ferdinand being murdered etc.). In the ROC books, the preconditions for WWI were exaggerated nationalism, economic competition, and the forming of alliances against other countries. This exaggerated nationalism was, for example, Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism that aimed at uniting these ethnic groups and expanding their territories. Economic competition denoted the competition between the industrially advanced European nations for the market, resources, and, as both were to be found there, colonies. The alliances that many countries made for their own security finally drew everybody into the war, as the allies were obliged to help each other.

The Wilsonian approach is rather obvious in this presentation by the ROC books: All countries must be in one union, all kind of fragmentation, exclusion or building of individual groups might lead to war. WILSON himself is credited as a great idealist politician and the League of Nations initiated by him as a very positive idea that was simply not carried out well enough. The later success of the United Nations is already foreshadowed. The blame for the negative outcome of the Paris Peace Conference after WWI is seen on all politicians, excluding WILSON. CLEMENCEAU and LLOYD GEORGE only saw the benefit of their own people and selfishly sought revenge in the form of reparations.¹¹⁷

In the PRC history textbooks, the growing “contradiction” (*maodun* 矛盾)¹¹⁸ between the imperialist countries eventually led to WWI.¹¹⁹ The textbooks state

116 Zhejiangsheng zhongxiao xue jiaocai bianji weiyuanhui: *Shijie Jindai Xiandaishi* (1958), p. 1.

117 XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi* vol. 5 (1971), pp. 23–33.

118 Contradiction is a key concept in MAO Zedong’s teachings, cf. his essay “On Contradiction” (*Maodun lun* 矛盾論, 1937).

119 WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), p. 75.

that actors like the USA did not join the war to bring peace, but to contend for supremacy. The common people, especially the workers and peasants who were forced to fight or work in arms factories, did not win anything. Therefore, LENIN called for turning the international war into a national one, i.e. into a revolution against the capitalists.

The Russian Revolution is a crucial interlude before, and leading to the end of, WWI¹²⁰ and the main achievement in world history. This is illustrated by the 1947 painting “V. I. LENIN proclaims Soviet power” (列宁宣布苏维埃政权成立) by Vladimir SEROV (1910–1968)¹²¹ which is also the cover image of the PRC world history book remaining the standard for the next decades (fig. 4-4). This painting is also symbolic for Chinese-Soviet relations and their increasingly diverging interpretations of Marxism. It was the first version of SEROV’s representations of LENIN’s proclamation, and behind LENIN, we see STALIN, Felix DZERZHINSKY and Yakov SVERDLOV. It was gifted to MAO Zedong by the USSR and the scene found its way onto the face of numerous stamps, posters, and other media formats in both China and the USSR. When the USSR de-Stalinized, and DZERZHINSKY and SVERDLOV fell into disgrace, SEROV repainted the scene and replaced the three with nameless figures.¹²² The first version of this painting, remaining on the cover of the world history books and in the most important Chinese museum, symbolizes how the PRC held fast onto Stalinism, developed its own Marxism “with Chinese characteristics” and split ties with the USSR.

120 The PRC book states more precisely that the success of the October Revolution and the establishment of socialism lead to the end of WWI because the Germans and the Austrians hear about peace in Russia and “everybody opposed to continue fighting and demanded peace” (大家都反对继续作战, 要求和平), see WANG: *Shijie Lishi*, (1957) p. 88.

121 Inside WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), it is on page 85.

122 Chang-Tai HUNG: “Oil Paintings and Politics: Weaving a Heroic Tale of the Chinese Communist Revolution”. In: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* vol. 49 no. 4, Oct. 2007, pp. 783–814, p. 807. The painting is now kept at the Chinese National Museum (中国国家博物馆). A digital reproduction can be accessed at: http://www.chnmuseum.cn/zp/zpml/201812/t20181218_25510.shtml. (last access 2020, June 5).




Figure 4-4: LENIN proclaims Soviet power

Title image of WANG Zhijiu's *Shijie Lishi* (World history) after SEROV's 1947 painting "V. I. Lenin proclaims Soviet power".

According to the PRC books, the establishment of Soviet Russia is crucial for the end of WWI. The October Revolution marks the beginning of the section on contemporary (*xiandai* 现代) history. However, as a prelude to that, the emergence of "scientific communism" with the works of MARX and ENGELS, as well as its tryout in the Paris commune, which gives a first taste of the dictatorship of the proletariat, is seen as one of the reasons why moribund capitalism enters the last stage and with it, the War breaks out as some sort of final convulsion.

The inter-war period as described in the 1971 ROC-textbook is characterized by the Great Depression and the establishment of dictatorships. The Depression leads to the decline in democratic nations, such as England, France, and especially the USA. The USA, terribly hit by the crisis, kept to itself, which only changed after ROOSEVELT was elected president. This is a clear call for U.S. intervention. The ROC books define dictatorships as states in which one person has all the power, the people are restricted in their freedom and they aim at invading other countries. The books talk about the Communist Party in Russia, the Fascist Party in Italy, and the National Socialist party (*Guoshedang* 國社黨, also "Nazi" *nacui* 納粹) in Germany.¹²³ It goes without saying that this alignment of Soviet Russia with the Fascists and National Socialists is diametrically opposed to the presentation in PRC textbooks.

123 XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi* vol. 5 (1971), p. 41.

The anti-Soviet ROC-books present a negative view on the Soviet Union. They imply that the Russian people were tricked into supporting the Soviets by promising them a dictatorship of the proletariat, while it really turned out to be a dictatorship with all the power in the hands of LENIN, and later STALIN, not even in the hands of the Communist Party. Furthermore, the ROC books argue, communism as an economic system did also fail. They describe how LENIN began to govern according to communist theory, and how it failed to work; peasants and workers became lazy and their work slowed down, the economy went bankrupt and many people starved to death. Two aspects, however, are acknowledged, namely that Soviet Russia sought to make peace with Germany toward the end of WWI, and that the era of the Russian Empire, a longtime enemy of the ROC, came to an end.¹²⁴ This could be seen as an analogy to the end of the Qing empire, which is undoubtedly seen in a positive light by the KMT.

According to the ROC books, the National Socialists in Germany were able to rise to power because the Weimar Republican government did not rest on a secure basis, and rightist conservatives and leftist communists fought for power. The Versailles Treaty humiliated and finally angered the Germans as the reparations they were forced to pay led to the degradation of the economy, as well as the rise of poverty and unemployment. Similar to China after the Versailles Treaty, Germany suffered from “inner trouble and foreign aggression” (*nei you wai huan* 內憂外患: This catchphrase is often used to describe China’s situation;¹²⁵ using it for Germany creates a certain solidarity), i.e. the treaty from the outside and the Communists from the inside. Thanks to these preconditions, the Nazis were able to win a mandate and form a government with HITLER.¹²⁶

As presented in the ROC books, WWII had to take place to restore the Western Democratic order and liberal economy – i.e. the ideal state of the world. The image of ROOSEVELT being sworn as president¹²⁷ resonates with the paintings of the proclamation of kings and emperors of nation states earlier in the book, providing him with legitimacy. With ROOSEVELT and his New Deal, the economic crisis was ended, and the “Western traditional democratic system was not destroyed” (西方的傳統民主制度未受破壞). The U.S. ended their separatism and found their way back to Wilsonian idealism. The success of the USA proved that democracy stood up to the challenge. Thanks to the U.S.’ participation in WWII, the atomic bombs were launched, and Japan capitulated. The considerable anti-Japanism and pro-Americanism are visible by the choice of images. They show one of the atomic

124 Ibid., pp. 34–37.

125 Cf. DMITRENKO’s contribution to this volume.

126 XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi* vol. 5 (1971), p. 41.

127 Ibid., p. 46.

bomb's detonation, the signing of the capitulation by Japan, Eisenhower, American flags, and Allied airplanes. The KMT legitimizes its rule by siding with the winners.¹²⁸ The book ends with laudations of postwar achievements, such as the founding of the United Nations and the progress of science and technology, illustrated by the landing on the moon.¹²⁹ It leaps to the eye that these are all Western achievements.

According to the PRC textbooks, in contrast, capitalism pulled the world into WWII. The “contradiction” between the capitalist countries led to the economic crisis and the Fascist “attack”. The Great Depression is depicted to have happened because the capitalist countries' markets were weakened due to the establishment of socialism in Russia, and because of the liberation struggle of the colonized and semi colonized countries. Economic reasons facilitate the rise of the Nazis in Germany. They are called “fascist” (*faxisi* 法西斯) to avoid all association with socialism. The decrease in industrial production, trade, and increase in unemployment hit Germany especially hard; the struggle of the German proletariat grew in intensity day by day while the contradictions with other countries, such as England, France and the U.S. also increased. The establishment of HITLER's regime was a scheme of the bourgeoisie to oppress the people:

为了加强压榨人民，为了准备新的战争，德国资产阶级捧出代表垄断资本家集团利益的希特勒，让他建立法西斯的恐怖性专政。¹³⁰

In order to exploit the people and to prepare a new war, the German bourgeoisie supported the representative of the interests of the monopolistic capitalist group, HITLER, and let him establish a terror dictatorship.

The 1950s PRC books clearly take sides with the USSR against the West; while all Western countries either support or at least tolerate the fascists and their attacks (Japan in China, for example), only the Soviets urge the League of Nations to

128 Japanese colonization was estimated differently by Taiwanese and KMT mainlanders that came to the island after 1945. The former saw it in a much more positive light but were not able to articulate that during martial law and White Terror. Today, after martial law was lifted in 1987, and as Taiwan's history education started to undergo “Taiwanization”, these views can be expressed. Compare Polina RYSKOVA's contribution to this volume.

129 XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi* vol. 5 (1971), pp. 62, 83, *passim*.

130 WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), p. 98.

restrain them. They also support the “Spanish people’s struggle against fascism”¹³¹ and the Chinese war of resistance against Japan.¹³²

In the description of the outbreak of WWII, the PRC books unmask Western (capitalist) hostility toward the USSR and reluctance to step in for world peace. They argue that the West is only mindful of its own advantage. It is described how the capitalist world was divided into two camps: Germany, Italy and Japan on one side versus the USA, England and France on the other. The latter did not intervene as Germany attacked Poland, in the hope that the Germans would eventually also conquer the USSR. However, the contradictions between the capitalist countries (i.e. all except the USSR) were so strong that war broke out between them. Poland was overrun by Germany, but the Polish people continued their struggle against fascism, the PRC book claims. The Soviet Union did not want to join the war as it was peace loving but had no choice but to defend itself against Germany, which the Red Army, in turn, did “heroically” (*yingyong de* 英勇地).¹³³

In countries which were attacked by fascists, like in France, members of the bourgeoisie act as traitors (*maiguozei* 卖国贼) and surrender to accept fascist military rule and to establish a puppet regime. Only the people patriotically resist the foreign invasion, mostly under the leadership of the communist parties and communism in general.¹³⁴ In this way, the PRC books also delegitimize the former KMT rule on the mainland, alluding to the puppet regimes installed there by the Japanese.

The Second World War is said to have ended when the Soviets take Berlin and join the Chinese people to defeat Japan in China. The atomic bombs are not mentioned. After the war, the Soviet Union and China develop their socialist governments and societies further and make great progress. The oppressed nations in Asia and Africa strive for and already partly achieve their freedom at that time.¹³⁵ An important characteristic of history textbooks in the PRC: Most of them end with the Second World War and the establishment of the PRC. It is to be repeated that the exaltation of Soviet activities decreases and comes to an end with the Sino-Soviet split.

131 “西班牙人民的反法西斯斗争”. The book does not provide any detail, but from the dates it is clear that the Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) is meant. See: WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), p. 99. On the Soviet activities in Spain, see: John MCCANNON: “Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–39: A Reexamination”. In: *Russian History*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (summer 1995), pp. 154–180.

132 WANG: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 2 (1957), p. 99.

133 Ibid., pp. 99–102.

134 Ibid., p. 100.

135 Ibid., pp. 104, 107.

Conclusion

Some important differences can be described in the description of world history and the respective perceptions of Russia and the West in ROC and PRC textbooks. If they had to be summarized in one keyword each, the fitting ones would be “appropriation” vs “deconstruction” of the West (fig. 4-5, 4-6) and “demonization” vs “idolization” of Russia.



Figure 4-5: Qianlong-era vase



图 33 带着脚镣工作的奴隶

Figure 4-6: Slave in shackles

The cover of XIA et al.’s *Lishi* (History) for junior secondary schools vol. 5 in the editions of 1971 and 1973 from the ROC bears a photograph of a copper-padded porcelain vase painted with Western figures from the Qianlong era, Qing Dynasty (清 - 乾隆 - 銅胎畫琺瑯西洋人物觀音瓶) preserved in the National Palace Museum in Taiwan. The Western figures on it illustrate the aspect of “appropriation”.¹³⁶

The picture of a slave in shackles from LI’s *Shijie Lishi* (World History) illustrates that in the PRC books, Western achievements are demasked as benefitting the ruling classes and having been accomplished by exploiting the lower classes.¹³⁷

136 XIA et al.: *Guomin Zhongxue Lishi*, vol. 5, title page. Image source: National Palace Museum 國立故宮博物院 OPEN DATA, Taiwan, <https://theme.npm.edu.tw/open-data/DigitImageSets.aspx?sNo=04014126> (last access 2020, March 3).

137 LI: *Shijie Lishi* vol. 1 (1957), p. 72.

The ROC appropriates Western achievements by learning about them, internalizing them, and integrating them into their own worldview, such as democracy, law, scientific, artistic, and technological progress and, most importantly, nationhood. The ROC books not only accept the normative framework of the West as “grand Autre” but also see it as a model for the future self, as LACAN’s lowercased “other”. The PRC deconstructs Western wealth, power, and hegemony by showing that they actually only belong to a tiny upper stratum of Western society; that they have been achieved by brutal exploitation; and that they caused great pain to the world. It aims at also deconstructing the power imbalance between “East” and “West”, likening the exploitation of colonized peoples of the “East” to the oppression of proletariat all over the world (Leninism). With the Reform and Opening policy, however, Western technological innovation was increasingly seen in a positive light.

For Soviet Russia, the situation is juxtaposed – in the 1950s. The ROC demonizes the Soviet Union, while the PRC idolizes it. The demonization serves the aim of legitimizing the recapturing of the mainland by the KMT whereas the idolization caters to the legitimization of Marxism in China by a communist party that identified the self with the USSR.

Considering Tsarist Russia, the ROC presents Peter the Great as a reformer, an image that goes way back to the times in the 19th century when Qing intellectuals demanded modernization. The PRC, in contrast, treats Tsarist Russia like all other European countries and focuses on the exploitation of poor and working people by the nobility. The books of both the ROC and the PRC, however, also show that the Sino-Russian relationship had always been a difficult, if not dangerous one.

The image of the USSR in the PRC textbooks is subject to dramatic changes. The curricula were significantly altered as policies and the Sino-Soviet relations bettered or, for the most part, worsened. Marxism with Chinese characteristics evolved into a doctrine of its own and led to severe clashes with the Soviet Union. The PRC had a veritable “coming of age”, dropping the former laudations of the USSR, and gradually bringing in overt criticism in the history books before stylizing itself as the only legitimate communist country. The 1980s, however, were to see an appeasement between the two powers.

In the long run, the different approaches to world history can be seen as different reactions to the trauma of China’s forced opening to the West in the 19th century, humiliated by the Opium Wars and the unequal treaties. The traditional concept of a Chinese empire which literally represented “all under heaven” had to be discarded. The ROC in Taiwan ultimately sided with the West as the winner and accepted Western norms. The PRC, in contrast, rejected these values and presented itself as the leader of the opposing camp.

Polina RYSAKOVA

5 The Images of Western Countries and Russia in History Textbooks for Secondary Schools in the PRC and Republic of China on Taiwan in 1990–2000s

Abstract. This chapter deals with the analysis of the presentations of Western countries and Russia in mainland Chinese and Taiwanese history textbooks for secondary school level in 1990s–2010s. The analysis of Western states and Russia's images in contemporary history books of the People's Republic of China (PRC/ mainland China) and the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan/the Republic/the Island) serves to demonstrate that in the academic and political environment of both societies, the content of these textbooks reflects complex and multidirectional trends. In recent decades, the image of the Western countries and Russia has been defined by mainland Chinese and Taiwanese political and economic policies aimed at their integration into the world's global institutions. For this purpose, previous history concepts gave way to a new theoretical framework. From that perspective, mainland China and Taiwan became considered an integrative part of the global historical process led by the West to form a united world political and economic system. Western countries received a much more positive appraisal as the main leading states contributing to the formation of the world economy system. At the same time, this global history concept is used in the history textbooks of mainland China and Taiwan as a tool for constructing national identity and supporting their domestic political agenda.

Keywords. History textbooks, Modernization, Colonization, Globalization, Global history.

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Introduction

In recent decades, the educational systems of both the PRC and the ROC have been a major newsmaker, arousing interest not only among educators, but also experts in political science and international relations.¹ This can be explained by the Chinese and Taiwanese currently striving to redefine their political and ideological identities, which, in turn, impacts their education. In view of today's globalization of higher education, schools have taken the lead in communicating the fundamental provisions of a state's ideology as well as sociocultural and political values of a nation upon teaching such subjects as history, civic education, and social studies. For mainland China and Taiwan, where education has traditionally been a priority for the government, the school reform is of particular importance. School reform is aimed not only at its structure, but also at its philosophy, especially as far as history is concerned. Both political entities struggle to provide a comprehensive ideological framework for interpreting historical events and current affairs as well as explaining their position in the region and the world.

They are revising not only key events in the national history, but also the milestones in world history and international politics. Today's political and economic contradictions among Asian countries are therefore revealed in the way the events of the recent past – their joint history of the 20th century – are being interpreted.² Thus, the so-called "history wars" illustrate how history education in the schools of China, Japan, and Korea is in fact ideologically changed.³ It is worth mentioning that from schools, interpretations of the national, regional, and world history

1 Marie LALL and Edward VICKERS (eds.): *Education as a Political Tool in Asia*. Routledge 2009; ZAJDA J. (ed.): *Nation-Building and History Education in a Global Culture*, Springer 2015.

2 MORRIS-SUZUKI T., LOW M., PETROV L. and TSU T. Y.: *East Asia Beyond the History Wars: Confronting the Ghosts of Violence*, Routledge 2013; Gi-Wook SHIN and Daniel C. SNEIDER (ed.): *History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories*, Routledge 2011.

3 However, it should be noted that the problem of interpretation and, to some extent, ideologization of history education was manifested in course of the national educational policy implementation not only in Asia but also in Europe. For example, in 1937, 26 states under the auspices of the League of Nations signed the Declaration Regarding the Teaching of History (Revision of School Text Books). Meanwhile, representatives of the most powerful states of the time refused to sign the document in view of external interference in the national educational policy. As a result, the principles set out in the Declaration have been adopted by only a small number of countries, and the international debate on history school education has been most productive between closely related states with long-standing relations, such as the Nordic and Latin American countries. See: Falk PINGEL (ed.) *UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision*, Paris/Braunschweig: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 2010, pp. 9–11.

later, affect both interstate and interindividual relations in the globalized environment. For example, they define destinations for educational, labor, and tourist migrations, as well as strategies for cultural and niche consumption.

The way Asian countries generate mutual images and deliver them in school subjects has long interested experts, resulting in a number of topical studies.⁴ In contrast, Western images are still under researched. This article targets the images of the West and Russia in Chinese and Russian school textbooks featuring the period 1990 to 2010. The study analyses the history curricula for the junior and senior grades of secondary school, as well as the most popular textbooks developed alongside their guidelines and issued by the largest publishing houses in mainland China and Taiwan. This article discusses three issues: milestones in the school history reform over the 1990s–2010s; current trends in modern historical studies in mainland China and Taiwan applied to textbooks in view; the image of the West and Russia in history textbooks for high school level within this period.

Secondary School History Curricular Reform in PRC and ROC in 1990s–2010s

Before the analysis of Western countries and Russia's images in Chinese and Taiwanese school textbooks of the 1990s–2000s, it is necessary to outline the socio-political environment to which the educational policy of PRC and ROC has been introduced, later instigating the revision of new textbooks. Both in mainland China and Taiwan, the issue of teaching history at school is an essential part of domestic political agenda, which, in turn, is largely defined by ongoing self-determination and development of the world outlook. Since the 1990s to this day, school education has undergone a number of significant changes affecting both its structure and content. First of all, it should be noted that over the given period, the state policy for curriculum and textbook development changed significantly.

China of the 1990s continued the 1980s' shift from a centralized system of developing education and publication standards to higher autonomy for regions and therefore greater diversity in teaching methods. The policy of “*yi gang yi ben*, 一纲一本” (one educational plan, one textbook) was abandoned in favor of varying textbooks. Moreover, 1994 saw new regional educational plans, such as those in

⁴ Edward VICKERS, Paul MORRIS and Naoko SHIMAZU: *Imagining Japan in Post-war East Asia: identity politics, schooling and popular culture*, London: Routledge 2013.

Shanghai and Prov. Zhejiang.⁵ Further, in the 2000s, with the introduction of new syllabi for junior and senior secondary schools, the main emphasis was placed on diversifying textbooks for different regions of the country, while maintaining a single curriculum⁶. This policy of “*yi gang duo ben* 一纲多本” (one curriculum, many textbooks) allowed for several large regional publishers: *Renmin Chubanshe* 人民出版社 (People’s Publishing House); *Yuelu Shushe* 岳麓书社 (Yuelu Publishing House) in Prov. Hunan; and *Daxiang Chubanshe* 大象出版社 (Elephant Press) in Prov. Henan. However, the publishing lead was maintained by the Beijing-based publishing house *Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe*, 人民教育出版社 (People's Education Press), which issued textbooks closest to the state standard.

The trend for the 2000s for more vigilant state control over development and publication of textbooks for all grades of secondary school continued to grow over the 2010s. 2012 witnessed the next stage in school textbooks reform, aimed at centralized development, compilation and publication of textbooks on such fundamental subjects in junior high school curriculum as the native language, history and politics/morality. They started to develop new textbooks on these three subjects in 2012 only to introduce them in 2017. A radical innovation at the time was the final approval of textbooks by *Guojia Jiaocai Weiyuanhui* 国家教材委员会 (the Special State Committee on Teaching Manuals) established in 2017. This establishment was meant to emphasize the centralized approach to development, revision, and introduction of textbooks. After 2017, textbook unification policy was extended to senior secondary school. In 2019, some regions of the country ventured to introduce a single history textbook for senior high school. Thus, over the past decades since 1990, China's educational policy for textbooks aimed to limit regionalism and promote centralization for the native language, history, politics/morality, which are key subjects in terms of ideology.

The ROC showed similar trends for centralization and liberalization of state policy in school textbooks regulation over the 1990s–2010s. Starting from the 1950s and up to the 1970s, the state had enjoyed the right to develop and publish uniform versions of school textbooks for all levels of school education. In the 1970s, there was then a spell of minor liberalization – diversity of textbooks – which involved only the natural sciences. When it came to humanities subjects, they continued to use a single set of textbooks until the 1990s. This practice stopped with the 1995 reform introducing a single curriculum instead of a single textbook, which allowed

5 Alisa JONES: “Politics and history curriculum reform in post-Mao China”. In: *International Journal of Educational Research*, vol. 37, 2002, pp. 545–566.

6 Yunhuo CUI and Yan ZHU: “Curriculum reforms in China: history and the present day”, *Revue internationale d'éducation de Sèvres*, Colloque: L'éducation en Asie en 2014: Quels enjeux mondiaux?, 2014, June 05. Available online: <http://journals.openedition.org/ries/3846> (last access 2019, December 2).

for different textbooks.⁷ Later, it was the content of the curriculum which rival political parties in Taiwan fought over in their ideological and political struggles. Currently, Taiwanese schools employ several different textbooks published by major publishing houses, such as *Sanmin Shuju* 三民書局 (San Min Book/ Sanmin Publishing), *Hanlin Chubanshe* 翰林出版社 (Hanlin Publishing), *Nanyi Shuju* 南一書局 (Nanyi Publishing). To sum up, it should be noted that over the period of 1990–2010 the main trend in school textbooks regulation was the introduction of different school textbooks published by commercial publishers. However, the political and ideological struggle was mainly over the curriculum that could change ideological attitudes of the dominant political party. Qualitative changes in the educational policy of PRC and ROC between 1990 and 2010 were of similar importance. These innovations had a direct impact on emphases made upon teaching history in high school and, in particular, broadcasting images of Russia and Western countries. The next discussion will consider how the concept of teaching history on both sides of the Taiwan Strait has changed over the 1990s–2010s.

Reinterpretation of world history in China's and Taiwan's history research

As far as ideological policy of modern mainland China is concerned, a growing number of researchers note a trend for nationalism; citizens, especially the youth, manifest power and importance of the Chinese nation.⁸ Scholars attribute this trend to changes in Chinese educational policy with new civil and history education programs introduced to the schools of secondary and higher education level. This long-term trend began in the 1990s with the introduction of “patriotic education”. The campaign for patriotic education was meant to deal with the challenges associated with the geopolitical changes of the time: the collapse of the Soviet

⁷ Vladimir STOJAN: “Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History in High Schools during the Ma Ying-jeou Presidency”. In: *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 2017, vol. 46, no. 1, p. 101–130; PENG Minghui 彭明輝: “Taiwan de lishi jiaoyu yu lishi jiaokeshu (1945–2000)” 臺灣的歷史教育與歷史教科書 (1945–2000) (Historical education and historical textbooks in Taiwan (1945–2000)). In: *Historiography East & West*, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 231–232.

⁸ Suisheng ZHAO: “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China”. In: *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 31, no. 3, 1998, pp. 287–302.

Union and criticism of the socialist model. On top of that, it aspired to offer a new unifying concept after the tragic youth protests in 1989.

The key element to the patriotic campaign was the history reform in schools of secondary and higher education level, which aimed at revising the very concept of history education.⁹ In order to reinforce patriotism in 1992, it was decided to teach national history in senior high school alongside the world history. Moreover, the additional emphasis was made on modern and contemporary history of China, from which the concept of history education originated. The centenary from 1849 to 1949 was labeled as the “*bainian guoru* 百年国辱” (one hundred years of humiliation), followed by a period of slow recovery for the Chinese nation.¹⁰ Therefore, in respect of processing history materials, the focus shifted from the history of interparty confrontation between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (*Guomindang* 国民党, the Nationalist Party) to the conflicts between mainland China and foreign countries in the 19th and 20th centuries. In other words, the principal innovation of 1990s was a new “patriotic narrative” which replaced the class struggle discourse. The modern and contemporary history of China was no longer marked by the CCP’s triumph in interparty struggle. On the contrary, it was marked by the time China suffered from the aggression of foreign powers.

The erosion of the “class struggle” concept underpinning history education of the past continued in the 2000s with new historiographical concepts stated in new curriculum. The new educational standard for junior high school was officially launched in 2001 with a pilot session in selected provincial schools. By 2005, the new standard had been introduced everywhere.¹¹ Meanwhile, the new standard for the senior secondary school was underway. The latter was test launched in 2004 in four provinces and adopted as mandatory for all national schools in 2010.¹² The new standard for history in senior secondary school involved a number of conceptual innovations: history was no longer defined by class struggle; the history of China emerged with the world history. These novel aspects to historical presentation are of great importance for this research paper. Changes in history

9 Zheng WANG: “The Power of History and Memory: National ‘Patriotic Education’ and China’s Conflict Behavior in Crises with the U.S., 1991–2001”. A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University 2005.

10 Ibid., p. 97.

11 An updated version of the Junior high school standard was published in 2011. In: “Yiwu jiaoyu lishi kecheng biaozhun (2011 nianban)” 义务教育 历史课程标准 (2011 年版) (Compulsory education. History curriculum standard, 2011 edition). Available online: <http://mati.gting.com/edu/pdf/edu/xkb2011/20120130155914152.pdf> (last access 2019, December, 2).

12 Hong-Biao YIN and John Chi-Kin LEE (ed.) *Curriculum reform in China: Changes and challenges*, New York: Nova Science Publishers 2012, p. 18.

interpretation have set a different perspective on the image of Western countries, their role in world history and the history of China.¹³

As mentioned earlier, innovations in the standard of history education in school were closely related to the main trends in Chinese history. China's involvement in the world economy and politics meant new approaches to interpreting history. When revising the historical materialism, it was decided to rely on American and European studies, which later laid the ideological and theoretical foundations for such a modern historiographical concept as "global history".¹⁴ Interest in these studies as well as in the emerging "global history" concept was fueled by the fact that their authors did not contradict Chinese scholars. The world history processed in the global framework did not override historical materialism, which facilitated the "global history" movement in China. In fact, "global historians" criticized Eurocentrism, suggesting a new vision of regional actors in the world history. Apparently, this idea became popular with Chinese historians. Eventually, the new historiographical paradigm helped Chinese historians develop methodological tools for studying globalization.¹⁵

One of the Chinese historians who popularized "global history" in the 1990s was Prof. WU Yuqin 吴于廑 (1913–1993). As a Harvard graduate later employed at Wuhan University, he authored and helped to develop a number of major scientific works and textbooks on world history.¹⁶ Modern Chinese historiographical community praises Prof. WU Yuqin for his concept of "zhengti shijie shi guan 整体世界史观" (complex world history) which is frequently cited in today's

13 "Gaozhong lishikecheng baiozhun" 高中历史新课程标准 (History curriculum standard for senior secondary school). Available online: <http://www.zyyz.cn/%E6%95%99%E5%8A%A1%E5%A4%84/%E6%96%B0%E8%AF%BE%E7%A8%8B%E8%AF%BE%E7%A8%8B%E6%A0%87%E5%87%86%E5%8F%8A%E8%A7%A3%E8%AF%BB/%E8%A F%BE%E7%A8%8B%E6%A0%87%E5%87%86/%E9%AB%98%E4%B8%AD%E5%8E%86%E5%8F%B2%E6%96%B0%E8%AF%BE%E7%A8%8B%E6%A0%87%E5%87%86.htm> (last access 2019, December, 2).

14 LIU Xincheng: "The Global View of History in China". In: *Journal of World History*, vol. 23, no. 3, 2012, pp. 491–511; Nicola SPAKOWSKI: "National aspirations on a global stage: concepts of world/global history in contemporary China". In: *Journal of Global History*, vol. 4, no. 3, 2009, pp. 475–495.

15 Ibid., pp. 499–500.

16 WU Yuqin 吴于廑, ZHOU Yiliang 周一良, QI Sihe 齐思和, ZHU Huan 朱寰, YANG Shengmao 楊生茂, ZHANG Zhilian 張芝联 and CHENG Qiuyun 程秋原: *Shijie tongshi* 世界通史 (World's comprehensive history), Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1962; WU Yuqin 吴于廑 and QI Shirong 齐世荣 (ed.): *Shijieshi* 世界史 (World's history), Beijing, Gaodeng jiaoyu chubanshe, 1992–1994; XU Lan 徐蓝: "WU Yuqin xiansheng de shijie lishi guan yu wo de shijie lishi jiaoxue" 吴于廑先生的世界历史观与我的世界历史教学 (Mr. WU Yuqin's World History View and My Teaching of World History). In: *Wuhan daxue xuebao* 武汉大学学报 (Journal of Wuhan University), vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 29–32.

historical research.¹⁷ According to the Chinese historian, the fundamental factor for historical development was the mode of production, the quality of productive forces. This allowed for a three stage model of world history: *gudai* 古代 (antiquity), *jindai* 近代 (modern times), and *xiandai* 现代 (contemporary times). Antiquity was mainly associated with the origin and development of the agricultural society. This meant gradual involvement of formerly nomadic communities with an agricultural lifestyle.

The world's historical development took a turn in the 15th–17th centuries. 1500, the time of great geographical discoveries, opened a new era which eliminated the former isolation of nations. This time period was also defined by capitalistic production mode, which secured the future industrial revolution and the rise of industrial society. The 15th–17th century marked the beginning of “world history” with a “*zhengti shijieti* 整体世界体” (complex world system) gradually emerging as well as the industrial society being established worldwide.¹⁸ The historical development went horizontally, bringing capitalism to different parts of the world and promoting industrial societies in various forms.

One of the challenges which both WU Yuqin and contemporary scholars have been facing is to interpret a socialist model alongside the concept of global capitalization. WU Yuqin characterized the 20th century as a period of capitalist and socialist confrontation as well as their mutual influence and mutual deterrence. The collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe meant new prospects for the capitalist society. Nevertheless, the socialist model employed by the developing states was not to be abandoned. The historian concluded that new socialism would survive any transformation of capitalism.¹⁹

Interestingly, the concept of 1990s by WU Yuqin is still relevant. Being an important milestone in “global history” studies, it attracts a growing number of Chinese historians. In fact, the “global history” concept often receives political and ideological support. At a special meeting on philosophical and social sciences in China, May 2016, president XI Jinping insisted on developing a philosophical and social paradigm with Chinese characteristics (*zhongguo tese zhixue shehui kexue*,

17 LIU Jinghua 刘景华: “WU Yuqin xiansheng dui zhengti shijie shi guan xueshu yuanyuan de tantao” 吴于廑先生对整体世界史观学术渊源的探讨 (Deep Discussion on the Academic Origins of the Overall World History View by Mr. WU Yuqin). In: *Wuhan daxue xuebao* 武汉大学学报 (Journal of Wuhan University), vol. 6, no. 6, pp. 32–40; CHEN Zhiqiang 陈志强: “Lun WU Yuqin ‘zhengti shijie lishiguan’” 论吴于廑 “整体世界史观” (On WU Yuqin's “Overall World History View”). In: *Shijie tongshi* 世界历史 (World's comprehensive history), no. 2, 2013.

18 CHEN: “Lun WU Yuqin ‘zhengti shijie lishiguan’” (2013), p. 55.

19 Ibid., p. 56.

中国特色哲学社会科学)²⁰. The subsequent academic discussion proved the popularity of Xi's idea with scholars working within the framework of "global history". In fact, the concept of "world history" became an academic achievement of Chinese scholars.²¹ Not only were new theoretical and methodological approaches applied in the actual historiographical research, but also they were employed for teaching history both in colleges and schools. This resulted in new standards of history education and textbooks.

What was new about teaching history in high school in the 2000s? Earlier it was mentioned that the very concept of the historical development underwent revision overshadowing the idea of class struggle as its main characteristic feature. History was now thought to involve all regions of the world. This brought forward the idea of the interconnectedness of different societies – the co-influence of Chinese and foreign history (*Zhong wai he bian* 中外合编), as well as the concept of continuous historical trends – and the link between past and present experiences (*guantong gujin* 贯通古今)²². As a consequence, in terms of delivering historical material, the emphasis was put on common features and similar processes. The history of China was no longer separated from the world history, but rather the former was viewed as an integral part of the latter. The amount of material concerning the world and Chinese history finally equaled, which was not the case by the previous standard.

The idea of Chinese history being in tune with the world history found its way into academic material on the main topics covering different periods in the history. Moreover, an attempt was made to abandon a restricted interpretation of history as a series of political events. Sections on economic and cultural history were finally balanced out in terms of their volume.

20 Xi Jinping. "Speech at the working meeting on Philosophy and Social Science (full text)", 2016, May 18. Available online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-05/18/c_1118891128_3.htm (last access 2019, December 2).

21 ZHANG Xiang 张象. "Building a World History System with Chinese Characteristics", 2016, September 5. Available online http://www.cssn.cn/zx/201609/t20160905_3188307_2.shtml (last access 2019, December 2).

22 YU Xiuping 俞秀萍: "Cong quanqiu shi guan kuitan gaozhong lishi xin jiaocai de xueshu xing shiye – yi 2007 nian ren jiao ban jiaocai wei li" 从全球史观窥探高中历史新教材的学术性视野—以 2007 年人教版教材为例 (Penetrating the academic vision of new high school history textbooks from the perspective of global history – with the 2007 People's education publishing textbook as an example). In: *Xin jiaoyu* 新教育 (*New Education*), 2015, no. 4, p. 78; LI Yun 李昀: "Zhongguo shijie shi xueke tixi de goujian yu jiaoxue moshi de gaige" 中国世界史学科体系的构建与教学模式的改革 (Construction of Chinese World History as a Discipline System and Reform of Teaching Mode) In: *Cangsang* 沧桑, 2011, no. 1, pp. 141–142.

Surprisingly, the 2000s' curriculum, which emphasized global integration, was used in the 2010s to develop a set of textbooks. The latter were characterized with the utmost attention to the issues of national identity. As this set of textbooks was carried out under centralized state control, they are featured with the sociopolitical discourse of the 2010s under Xi Jinping. Textbooks were introduced to junior high schools in 2017; they were taken up by senior high schools in 2019 as well.

The concept to be taken into account for analyzing the innovations in textbooks of the 2010s is “The Belt and Road Initiative”. Another characteristic trend in today's political and academic environment of China, which should be taken into consideration, is the heated debates over the so-called “discourse power” (*huayu quan* 话语权). This means China's subjective position in formulating and communicating ideological provisions within the country and abroad. The recent development of the “discourse power” concept testifies to ambitions of China to impose its own sociopolitical outlook on the world and China's disposition in it. Clearly, this vision is meant to reinforce the real economic and political power of the country in the world system. The ambition is to depart from “global” discourse and to promote China's interpretation of the context.

In this study, the most important component of the debate over the “discourse power” should be mass media and education systems with their role in communicating new terms and meanings. Educational institutions aim to develop new textbooks. As a result, the “system of textbooks” is a step toward new social and humanitarian disciplines with Chinese characteristics, as well as a new system of academic subjects, methods of scientific research and terminology.²³ This context for junior and senior high school textbook reform is part of the focus of this chapter since it influenced three ideologically charged subjects: history, the native language, and politics/morality.

History textbooks of the 2010s were developed over five years from 2012 and put into use in 2017–2019. According to the Editing Commission, the textbook was to cover five aspects in terms of its content, structure, and pathos. Among these were China's historical and cultural accomplishments; Chinese revolution as a difficult way to statehood; China's multinational character, shared destiny, national sovereignty and the integrity of China's territory as well as “oceanic consciousness”, implying recognition of the island territories of China and the country's role as an ocean power; and finally the concept of the multipolar world and the community with a shared future for mankind (*renlei mingyun gongtongti* 人类命运共

23 “Academy of Social Sciences: Promote the Construction of Discipline System with Excellent Teaching Materials”, 2016, July 18. Available online http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-07/18/content_5092364.htm (last access 2019, December 2).

同体).²⁴ Accordingly, the standardized textbooks published in 2017–2019 emphasize China’s involvement in the world’s land and sea trade routes from the early stages of its development, its exposure to cultural and trade contacts. At the same time, they stress inviolability of China’s state borders; both land and especially sea, which are claimed to date back to the early historical periods under Chinese government.

The history syllabus integrated into the textbook of the new edition consists of several distinctive features. The analysis of the textbook units covering the history of China’s intercultural contacts and modern borders suggests two ideas to define the national discourse of modern China, namely: China’s involvement in regional and world trade as well as cultural exchange, along with the emphasis on national sovereignty. Audience within the country receives these messages through the education system and mass media while external audience perceives this discourse as a number of statements and foreign policy initiatives, such as “Belt and Road”.

According to LAMS, many analysts argue that the combination of political involvement and national sovereignty is a very characteristic paradox for modern Chinese political ideology, a combination of contradictory attitudes.²⁵ Meanwhile, this paradox is easily removed if the attempts of Chinese ideologists to offer their own view of the world, as discussed earlier, are taken into account. China is eager to see itself open to the world and involved in the world’s political, economic, and cultural management. However, this openness and involvement should be achieved on the conditions set by China. Among these are national sovereignty and a zealous attitude to its land and sea borders.

Moving on to the ideological and political context for Taiwanese history textbooks of the 1990s–2010s, Taiwan focuses on self-determination and its opposition to China rather than conflicts with other countries, unlike the leading trend in China’s reform in history education of the same period, which covered national aspirations alongside China’s involvement in globalization. At the present stage, political history of Taiwan is characterized with self-determination discourse. The extreme points of this discourse are “Sinicization”, which refers to close economic, cultural, and political contacts with mainland China; and “Taiwanization” of Taiwan as an independent cultural, historical, and political actor with loosened contacts with mainland China. In some way, each of these ideological and political attitudes is articulated by a certain political force, which, in turn, sets the direction

24 “Interpretation of three compulsory education textbooks”, 2017, August 29. Available online http://www.jyb.cn/zgjyb/201708/t20170829_752732.html. (last access 2019, December 2).

25 Lutgard LAMS: “Examining Strategic Narratives in Chinese Official Discourse under Xi Jinping”. In: *Journal of Chinese political science*, 2003, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 387–411.

for political development of Taiwan. The Kuomintang (KMT), which ruled from 1947 to 2000, has been in favor of maintaining ties with mainland China whereas its rival the People's Democratic Party supports “Taiwanization”.

The political leadership of either party was associated with an educational reform, curricula and textbooks revision. First of all, the reform involved historical education in junior high school, and later it was extended to senior high school. This followed a fierce political and public debate aimed at defining the historical, cultural, and current political status of Taiwan and accordingly choosing the best way of teaching the history of Taiwan. The origins of this debate were rooted in the program of Taiwan's history under the KMT. Starting in 1952, when the first reform of history textbooks published outside mainland China was carried out, Taiwan was positioned as a province of the Republic established in the aftermath of the Xinhai Revolution of 1911. The major part of the historical material was dedicated to the history of mainland China, which was conceptualized as the historical territory of the Republic temporarily under the CCP. After the loss of official international status and UN membership, the leaders of the Republic acknowledged that regaining control over the mainland rendered an almost unattainable prospect. This meant addressing the history of Taiwan and the Republic of China within that history

The most significant innovations in teaching history were introduced in the 1990s with the start of liberalization and democratization after martial law was abolished in 1987, and president LEE Teng-hui (李登輝) known for his Pro-Taiwan views came into power. The curriculum for the history course in junior high school underwent a major update. The new syllabus was approved in 1994 and implemented in 1997, which had a pronounced unit entitled “Knowing Taiwan” (*renshi Taiwan* 認識台灣). This was a section dedicated to the history of the Island that had to be studied alongside the history of mainland China and other foreign countries. Thus, the history of Taiwan's region went beyond random references to the Island as a remote province of mainland China which was involved in two historical events: the establishment of the Qing dynasty and Japanese colonization of the first half of the 20th century.

In the 2000s, the focus of political and ideological struggle shifted to history education in senior high school when a “joint nine year plan” (*jiu nian yiguan kecheng* 九年一貫課程) of junior high school and primary school curricula came into force in 2004. The updated plan did not have a course titled “Knowing Taiwan”, since it was extended and emerged with a number of related subjects. The history of Taiwan was integrated with the general history course. Despite all the public criticism, the policy of “Taiwanization” in history education initiated further changes in the senior secondary curriculum. As a result, political leaders of

the 2000s–2010s were involved in the somewhat chief task in the field of education, which was to develop and approve a new curriculum. However, the political struggles of the time, such as changes of the ruling parties and policies as well as academic and public criticism resulting in street protests, led to numerous reforms and revisions of the history curriculum in senior high school.²⁶

Today's textbooks for senior high school sprang from the 2012 curriculum called “Plan 101” based on the number of the years, i.e. 101 years, in the political tradition of Taiwan that the first year of the establishment of the Republic of China was 1912. The plan was approved under president MA Ying-jeou, leader of the KMT. Since the curriculum was criticized by both “Sinicization” and “Taiwanization” advocates, 2014 saw another updated version of the plan (“Plan 104”), which resulted in major student and public protests in 2015. After the 2016 presidential elections, TSAI Ing-wen, the new head of state from the Democratic People's Party (DPP), announced to keep the “101 curriculum” and only to drop it in view of another revision under a twelve-year compulsory education reform scheduled for 2020.²⁷

The continuous reform of history curricula under the KMT and DPP in the 2000s and 2010s resulted from ongoing political and ideological debate at the academic and public level, that was launched as early as the 1990s. The focus of the debate was the relations between mainland China and Taiwan as a historical, cultural, and political actor. The actual historiography of Taiwan has also played an important role in developing key arguments in this debate. A brief description of the two viewpoints will allow for improved analysis of the images of Western countries and Russia in current history textbooks for high school level.

In the 2000s, under the DPP administration of president Chen Shui-bian, there were two curricula for senior high school: one of 2004 (“plan 95”) and another of 2009 (“plan 98”). Basically, these two education plans communicated the same concept of teaching history as that implemented in junior high school. Both syllabi had a separate section on the history of Taiwan as an independent region rather than a province of China. The curricula relied on actual Taiwanese historiography for methodology. Since the 1980s when the Republic of China was stripped of its official international status, Taiwanese historians have been studying the island's history in various periods. Their ideological and political aspirations were to deliver the unique culture and history of Taiwan and to diminish its ties with mainland China.

26 Vladimir STOLOJAN: “Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History” (2017).

27 “History curriculum review starts today”, 2018, August 11. Available online <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/08/11/2003698324> (last access 2019, December 2).

One of the leading historians developing this trend in Taiwanese historiography was TSAO Yung-ho (曹永和 1920–2014). In his theoretical settings, he relied on the “annals” school and Fernand BRAUDEL. The long term research into the history of Taiwan’s early colonization by European powers in the 17th century brought about the concept of “*Taiwan dao shi* 台灣島史” (Taiwan’s island history). According to TSAO Yung-ho, it was Taiwan’s location which exposed itself to various cultural influences and numerous trade contacts but also turned the island into an independent and strategically important center of regional trade. In addition, the continuous intercultural interaction of the native population, migrants from the continent along with immigrants from various Asian and European countries, formed a special “island” identity open to communication on a global scale.²⁸ Later, TSAO Yung-ho’s work on Taiwan’s “island history” was incorporated into the broader discourse of “*Haiyang Zhongguo* 海洋中國” (oceanic China). Taiwanese history research was thus in keeping with a major Japanese and American trend for studying maritime trade interregional contacts between countries of the Asia-Pacific region. This was authored by both historians TAKESHI Hamashita and Paul COWAN.²⁹

In general, the island concept for Taiwan implies its historic independence from mainland China. The Island’s extensive economic and intercultural ties, interethnic relations, succession of rulers have been opposed to the mainland’s dominant ethno-cultural tradition. The concepts of “oceanic China” and “island Taiwan” characterize mainland China as one of the external political forces that temporarily established their dominance over Taiwan, just as Europeans in the 17th century, and the Japanese in the early 20th century. The historiographical approaches in view impacted both curricula on history and history textbooks in the 1990s–2000s when Pro-Taiwanese advocates were in office. First of all, it is necessary to mention the concept of “the concentric view of history” by TU Cheng-sheng (杜正勝) and a new history periodization.

The concept of “the concentric view of history” was put forward in the late 1990s by TU Cheng-sheng, a Taiwanese historian who also worked as head of the state committee revising textbooks for senior high school. Later, under the then president CHEN Shui-bian he was appointed Minister of Education. The concept implied that historical material should be delivered as a gradual development of the historical timeframe: from the history of Taiwan to Chinese history and then to world history (“take root in Taiwan’s history; with attention to mainland China;

28 Ann HEYLEN: “The Transnational in Taiwan History: A Preliminary Exploration”. In: *Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies*, 2010, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 18–19.

29 TAKESHI Hamashita, Linda GROVE and Mark SELDEN (ed.): *China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional and Historical Perspectives*, New York: Routledge 2008.

enter the external world”). The first textbook with this approach was on the history of Taiwan for junior high school – “Knowing Taiwan”. This textbook opened the history course for junior high school with the “native land” history, followed the history of China and the rest of the world. The concentric circle involving Taiwanese, Chinese, and global history was then made into a framework for the “unified nine year plan” for junior high school as well as the 2004 and 2009 curricula for senior high school. As a clear result, these textbooks not only set out the history of Taiwan as a separate unit but also put extra emphasis on it as a core aspect to any other section. The history of China, on the other hand, was presented as the history of a more remote and alienated region.

The cultural and historical alienation from mainland China was further stressed by a new interpretation of chronology. The public resented the way material was presented with the history of China after 1500 included in the world history section. Proponents of such periodization believed that this would finish the isolation of individual countries and foster global contacts. In contrast, the opponents believed that attributing the history of late Imperial China to a section of world history would deteriorate cultural ties with China, which had become alienated from Taiwan.³⁰ The curricula and associated textbooks developed in the 1990s–2000s under the DPP thus relied on the latest developments of Taiwanese historiography. They were characterized not only by the Taiwanese specifics but also by the revision of Taiwan’s relations with the neighboring countries and the outside world. Mainland China was seen as an adjacent country which made some historical, economic and cultural impact on Taiwan. However, the plan to use this methodology in teaching was short-lived.

The change of political leadership in the 2010s led to another revision of historical curricula and textbooks. The Kuomintang in office meant partial restoration to historiographical assessments typical of the KMT government of the 1950s–80s. This influence can be traced in the history curriculum for the senior secondary school, approved in 2012 (“plan 101”). The history of Taiwan was presented as a separate section. Meanwhile, the proportion of the content to that on the history of China is far from even. The focus shifted to the Republic of China as the historical successor of Imperial China. Taiwan was characterized as a region involved in the sociocultural model typical of China’s government. Therefore, the 2012 curriculum sought to emphasize the cultural and historical unity of the Island and Mainland. According to Taiwanese researchers, the 2012 curriculum and concomitant textbooks for high school marginalized the idea of “ocean Taiwan”. The way that

30 Bi-yu CHANG: “From Taiwanisation to De-sinification”. In: *China Perspectives*, 2004, vol. 56, Available online DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.438. (last access 2019, December 2).

both the Dutch and Japanese governance were assessed, and some crucial events in the history of Taiwan were covered is not in keeping with contemporary Taiwanese historiography.³¹

On the whole, it should be noted that the continuous political struggle, academic and public opposition, lack of a compromise between the irreconcilable supporters of the pro-Chinese or pro-Taiwanese concept of history teaching have had a detrimental effect on the quality of educational standards and textbooks. As a result, the history textbooks in modern Taiwan high school have three sections: the history of Taiwan, China, and foreign history. Meanwhile, there is no conceptual framework or evaluation, rather we find detailed descriptions of historical events.

The Image of the Western Countries and Russia in Chinese textbooks

The discussion moves on to images of Western countries and Russia in Chinese textbooks of the 1990s–2010s. One should not forget that the history teaching over the given period has been featured with a gradual departure from the concept of social conflict and struggle in favor of continuity, mutual influence, and globalization trends. Chinese historians still adhered to materialism, making emphasis on global economic development. The list of key subjects in the history of Western countries and Russia has remained almost unchanged. The narration covers mostly modern history, the period associated with the new most ambiguous phenomena, among which are great geographical discoveries, the development of capitalistic systems across the world, the rise of nation states, socialist revolution, confrontations of socioeconomic systems in the second half of the 20th century.

The textbooks of 1990s are based on a formation approach and highlight class struggle and populace as key factors in the history of China and Western countries. In modern and contemporary times, the main role is given to economically developed countries, such as Britain, France, and the United States. Their economic

31 LIN Yinshun 林琮舜: *Taiwan shi yanjiu zai gaozhong jiaokeshu zhong de luoshi yu luocha* 臺灣史研究在高中教科書中的落實與落差 (The Practice and Disparity between Academic Research of Taiwan History and High School History Textbooks), *Shuoshi lunwen* 碩士論文 (A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the Master degree), Guoli taiwan daxue lishi yanjiu suo 國立臺灣大學歷史學研究所 (Taiwan National university, History Department) 2014.

leadership manifests itself as early as the industrial revolution, later they introduce a large number of countries to capitalist framework. Germany and the United States are trying to quickly overcome the economic lag and embark on the path of modernization. They are followed by Russia and Japan, with their state reforms aimed to bridge the economic gap. Economic ambitions push European countries to foreign expansion, which marks the beginning of the world colonial system, victimizing China. These tendencies exacerbate internal contradictions in Western societies, and act as a breeding grounds of Marxism and proletarian movement.

The October revolution in Russia becomes a turning point in the history of mankind, which shows an alternative way to a capitalist development. The postwar era with the USSR and the United States confrontation implies a higher probability of a new world war. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic decline of the United States means prospects for a multipolar world with new centers of economic development, such as Germany and Japan. Over the 1990s, most Chinese history textbooks for high school described Western countries as colonizers and aggressors who sought the economic exploitation of the rest of the world and imposed a colonial system. It's of no doubt that Japan belonged to the list of economically developed countries alongside the rest of the Western world. In other words, Japan was positioned as a "Western", economically developed, and aggressive country. Nonetheless, due to the innovations in historiography and history education, the image of European countries and Russia in contemporary Chinese textbooks for high school was changing in 2000s. These changes in the image of Western states in Chinese textbooks have already drawn the attention of Chinese researchers, who have established that textbooks of the 1980s and 1990s present a negative vision of Western countries as colonizers and exploiters. In comparison, textbooks of the 2000s provide a neutral and rather positive assessment. Western countries are described as advanced capitalist powers, whose economic development not only led to colonization of other parts of the world but also contributed to building world economic and political ties, making room for the capitalist world system.³²

A more tolerant Western rhetoric with an emphasis on interaction with Western countries was employed in the 2000s as economic ties strengthened and mainland China was gradually integrating in the global economic system. The 2000s corpus

32 HE Yingfei 何英菲: *Gaozhong lishi jiaokeshu zhong de yiguo xingxiang. Yi renjiao ban lishi jiaokeshu wei li* 高中历史教科书中的异国形象.以人教版历史教科书为例 (Images of the other states in high school history textbooks. Taking People's education's textbooks as an example), 2009 *jie yanjiusheng shuoshi xuewei lun* 2009 届研究生硕士学位论 (A dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the Master degree in 2009 school year), Huadong shifan daxue 华东师范大学 (East China Normal University) 2009, p. 19.

of textbooks for senior high school developed against the 2004 educational standard did not plot interclass struggle but rather put forward new global economic relations within “integrated global system”. The historical material in the textbook featured similar developmental patterns for different parts of the world, primarily Europe and China. The whole history course was divided into one compulsory syllabus and several electives. The mandatory part included twenty-five topics arranged in three clusters: politics, economics, and culture. The “politics” cluster included nine topics covering the political history of China and Western countries from ancient times to the present day, the rise and development of socialism, China’s foreign policy contacts, and the system of international relations. The “economics” cluster consisted of eight topics related to China’s economic development at different stages up to the period of the PRC and the present, as well as issues of capitalism and socialism in Western countries and Russia, the features of economic globalization. The “culture” cluster included eight topics observing trends in culture and science of China and the Western world.

By and large, the compulsory syllabus maintained the chronological principle of narrating the history as well as treating Chinese and world history as separate entities. In comparison, electives featured separate cross-cutting topics related to different countries and regions. The optional part included six major overlapping topics designed to compare “Chinese and foreign perspectives” as well as “antiquity and modernity”. Among those six topics were the world experience of reforms, democracy, and its implementation; war and peace in the twentieth century; personalities in world and Chinese history; the mysteries of history (vanished civilizations); and the world cultural heritage. Attention should be paid to the main topics of both compulsory and optional parts. The authors of the standard textbook focus on the following issues: the development of democracy, the rise of capitalism and promotion of industrial society; with the 15th–17th centuries, the socialist experience, the multipolar system of international relations, and worldwide implementation of reforms represented as key milestones. In fact, the world and Chinese history are defined by the topics that were the most popular in the Chinese political and public discourse of the time, which results in corresponding slogans and programs: integration of China into the world economic system; globalization and China’s involvement in it; position of China in the multipolar world system; the rule of law and democratic concepts; and finally the role of scientific and technical progress.

While historical development is interpreted as the world capitalist development, the images of Russia and the Soviet Union become of particular interest. There are several reasons for this. First, Russia is the largest Northern neighbor of mainland China, with a large and long border. Disputes over border territories have been one

of the popular topics in Chinese historiography for a long time. These have had a direct impact on Russia's perception by both professional historians and ordinary citizens of mainland China. It is crucial to analyze how this topic is observed in school textbooks since school education often becomes the main source of knowledge about the country and communicates a number of concepts relevant to the public. Additionally, the accounts of Russian history in Chinese textbooks can be beneficial to historiography by bringing in innovations discussed earlier. Those, in turn, can explain how the image of the country fits into the concept of history as the world capitalist movement.

Next, here comes the analysis of the main components of Russia's image (the Soviet Union), which are delivered in the history textbook for high school issued by the publishing house "People's Education". This textbook in view is fully compliant with the requirements of the standard that was introduced nationwide. Russian and Soviet history is covered in four main topics: the reform of the second half of the 19th century and the abolition of serfdom; the October revolution; socialist experience in politics and economics; and Russia's confrontation with the United States in the Cold War. Moreover, there is an elective on global reforms including reforms under Alexander II, with a brief insight into the history of earlier periods and a more detailed account of the country's history from the 18th century.

Special attention should be given to Russia and China's territorial disputes over the so-called territorial gains of Russia in the second half of the 19th century. This topic is touched upon in the section of modern China's history dedicated to the Opium wars and Qing's clash with Western countries. Accordingly, when describing the events of the Second Opium War, the textbook says: "the United States and Russia took advantage of China and forced the Qing government to sign unequal treaties with them. The main benefiting party was Russia which occupied most of China's northern lands."³³ It should be noted that this subtle topic is covered in a rather concise and restrained manner, especially when compared with earlier editions of textbooks. Therefore, in the textbooks of 1980 and 1991, Russia is characterized as a state with aggressive foreign policy aimed at territorial expansion. They highlight territorial acquisitions at the expense of China in the Far East and the military occupation of the Ili district in the west of the country.³⁴ Evidently, this problem, rooted in the Chinese modern historiography of Russian-

33 *Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun shiyan jiaokeshu: lishi (bixiu)* 普通高中课程标准实验教科书: 历史(必修) (General High School Curriculum Standard Experiment Textbook: History (Required)), vol. 1, Beijing: People's Education Press 2007, p. 53.

34 HE Yingfei: *Gaozhong lishi jiaokeshu zhong de yiguo xingxiang* (2009), pp. 30–31.

Chinese relations, is no longer urgent or acute due to improved relations between the two countries and a multifaceted partnership.³⁵

The account of Russia and the Soviet history in the compulsory course starts with a chapter on the October Revolution of 1917, following the section on Marxism in Europe. The events of 1917 can thus be interpreted as another stage in Marxism development, which brought about its main theses. Interestingly, the events are set out very succinctly. The language itself is devoid of emotional evaluative utterances, unlike that used in earlier versions of the 1980s and 1990s, which describe the revolution as “a set example for the international proletariat which leads it in a new era.”³⁶ The 2007 textbook focuses on the historical background for the revolution and its historical significance. It suggests that the revolution resulted from Russia economically falling behind more developed capitalist countries in the aftermath of the First World War. Social contradictions turned the country into the weakest link in the chain of imperialism, which made the revolution inevitable.³⁷ According to the editors of the textbook, the 1917 revolution is a significant historical event since it was aimed to create the first socialist state and set a new path for Russia. At the same time, the revolution revealed a loophole in the world capitalist system, allowing for the socialist movement and the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle.³⁸

The next topic in the history of the Soviet Union deals with the features of the socialist economic model, which is why the unit is part of the economic section of the history course. It is noteworthy that the material is presented in a way that the economic development of the USSR could serve as a historical lesson for other socialist states. Covering economic reforms and starting with the New Economic Policy (NEP) by the USSR in 1920s up to the transient 1980s, it is stressed that the Soviet model was innovative and unprecedented, and in this sense, the Soviet leaders had to develop reforms by trial and error. However, despite all the achievements, the Soviet model was not devoid of significant drawbacks: excessive centralization, prioritizing heavy industry, and the military industrial complex. As a consequence, the most hard-hit were agriculture, light industry, and the public welfare. The main problem of the Soviet model was its rigidity. This thesis is supported by a quote of DENG Xiaoping that the Soviet model in the late stages was

35 At the same time, it should be noted that the textbook for junior secondary school describe in detail China’s territorial loss in favor of Russia. The dates of major acquisitions and the territory itself are marked on the map.

36 *Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun shiyan jiaokeshu: lishi (bixiu)*, vol. 1, 2007, p. 33.

37 *Ibid.*, p. 88.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 91.

obsolete.³⁹ Unsuccessful economic and political reforms in the late 1980s led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the editors of the textbook state that the Soviet experience of socialist development teaches valuable historical lessons, and the collapse of the USSR only stimulates the search for new ways to implement the socialist model of development.⁴⁰

The history of today's Russia is by far less interesting. In the section on the current international situation, Russia is only mentioned as the successor to the Soviet Union and one of the centers in the multipolar world. The authors of the textbook note that the international position of the country strengthens as economic reforms unfold.⁴¹ At the same time, the economic section and units on economic integration and globalization clearly indicate that the direction of history is aimed at further world integration and globalization. In this respect, the events of the 20th century – the Cold War and the confrontation between the capitalist and socialist models – are deemed to slow down the integration processes significantly. On the other hand, the collapse of the bipolar world and promotion of market reforms worldwide are believed to contribute significantly to economic globalization, as well as to introduce new economic and trade relations.

Economic globalization and integration first mentioned in textbooks of the 2000s is further developed in textbooks for junior and senior high school introduced in 2017 and 2019. They set out the period of great geographical discoveries as not only overriding isolation of certain world regions but also paving the way for building global ties.⁴² The textbooks also emphasize the importance of economic relations, the impact of the industrial revolution and technological advancement in capitalist relations. The most remarkable feature about the colonial expansion of Western countries in the textbooks is the emphasis placed on the issue of monetary relations and trade exchanges rather than colonial exploitation. At the same time, in view of fostering economic ties, the unit on Marxist doctrine is given in great detail, which could have resulted from the latest trends in Chinese domestic policy with its focus on the historical role of the CCP and Marxism.

To draw some intermediate results of this analysis, it can be said that the images of Western countries and Russia in modern Chinese textbooks for high school are largely affected by internal ideological, political, and economic trends in China

39 *Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun shiyan jiaokeshu: lishi (bixiu)*, vol. 2, 2007, pp. 98–101.

40 *Ibid.*, vol. 2, 2007, p. 94.

41 *Putong gaozhong kecheng biaozhun shiyan jiaokeshu: lishi (bixiu)*, vol. 1, 2007, pp. 128–129.

42 *Putong gaozhong jiaokeshu. Bixiu. Zhong wai lishi ganyao*. 普通高中教科书. 必修. 中外历史纲要 (General High School Textbook. Compulsory. Chinese and Foreign History Outline), vol. 2, Beijing: People's Education Press 2019, p. 40.

itself. The desire to bridge social gaps and produce a unifying idea for the divided Chinese society has forced China's leaders to abandon the rhetoric of struggle and conflict. Being largely integrated into the world economic processes, it is suggested that China should search for historiographical concepts that can justify the inclusion of their socialist economy in the world capitalist system. The materialist approach to history is needed when speaking about world economic development and the history of such leading Western countries as the UK, France, and the USA. However, the history of these Western countries is discussed and becomes relevant only through the lenses of China's domestic agenda and social issues that are important for the PRC government, such as national sovereignty, economic cooperation, the legal system and reforms. Therefore, Western countries are thought to unite the disparate parts of the world into a single capitalist system while Russia is praised for living up to Marx's teaching with the mistakes that should be avoided in socialist development.

The Image of Western Countries and Russia in Taiwanese Textbooks

As previously noted, the key issue in the 1990s–2010s, which defined domestic political life and public discourse of the island state, has been the self-determination of Taiwanese society and its place as opposed to mainland China. As a result, the history of mainland China and Taiwan in current textbooks has undergone a significant revision and has been prioritized over the history of the Western world. It is the history of China that defines the role of some Western countries, which have been in relation to Taiwan over different historical periods. Keeping in mind that Taiwan's historical relationship with China and the intention to distance its history from China was the background for taking Western history consideration; to prove that China was not the only source of cultural influence.

Today in Taiwanese school, the history is broken down into three major sections: world history, Chinese history, and Taiwanese history. All the sections assess political actions of Western countries and Russia. However, as it will be demonstrated further, they are not fully consistent with each other, resulting in contradictory images of the West and Russia to some extent. Similar to that in Chinese continental textbooks, the world history is represented by the leading powers: Britain, France, and the United States. Moreover, the textbooks cover modern times with their radical structural changes in the political, economic and

socio-cultural areas affecting the modern global structure. Also chosen as the watershed in the history of Western countries was the 15th–16th centuries; the era of great geographical discoveries, which gave rise to these radical shifts.⁴³ The leading trend in the 18th century, early modern times, is thought to be the rise of the nation state, i.e., a political unity of the nation with ethnic, linguistic and cultural affinity. The first nation states emerged in the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, and Spain. Then, they spring up in other parts of Europe. Later, according to the editors of the textbook, the nation state as a political structure develops worldwide, thereby inducing a system of international relations.⁴⁴ Starting with the nation state concept the authors go on to discuss its evolution and gradual democratization, namely: restrictions to the absolute power of the monarch, the so-called “enlightened despotism” under Russian emperors Peter I and Catherine II and Prussian king Frederick II the Great; the French Revolution; and the war for independence in the United States.⁴⁵

Special attention is also given to the 18th century as the age of the industrial revolution with new technologies and socioeconomic relations. It was the industrial revolution that then instigated further social changes: urbanization, mass media and public education.⁴⁶ Whereas the main political changes took place in France, the economic innovations were most pronounced in the UK.

In regards of the descriptions of the political and economic changes in Europe in the 17th–18th century, the issue of nation state is highlighted, and subsequent events are presented in the textbooks of 1990s to illustrate the nation state development in Europe and beyond. The same concept of nation state development underpins the world colonial system, which is regarded as a result of European economic and political dominance, the demonstration of their national superiority.⁴⁷

On the other hand, the concept of “nation state” in the textbook of the late 2000s in accordance with the syllabus approved by the KMT is used less often by far. In fact, there is no definition of the term. Political and industrial revolutions are associated with the new concept of “modernity”. Likewise, the concept of “modernity” implied changes in the values and normative system of European societies.

43 XIONG Bingzhen 熊秉真 (ed.): *Guomin zhongxue. Lishi* 國民中學. 歷史 (National secondary School. History), vol. 4, Guoli bianyiguan, 1991, pp. 68–69; GU Weiying 古偉瀛 and WANG Shizong 王世宗 (eds.): *Putong gaoji zhongxue. Lishi* 普通高級中學. 歷史 (General senior secondary school. History), vol. 3, Sanmin Book 2007, pp. 220–221.

44 Ibid., p. 57.

45 XIONG Bingzhen: *Guomin zhongxue. Lishi* (1991), pp. 76–78; GU/ WANG: *Putong gaoji zhongxue. Lishi* (2007), pp. 20–21.

46 XIONG Bingzhen: *Guomin zhongxue. Lishi* (1991), pp. 93–97; GU/ WANG: *Putong gaoji zhongxue. Lishi* (2007), pp. 51–52.

47 WANG Zhizhi 王芝芝 (ed.) *Guomin zhongxue. Lishi* 國民中學. 歷史 (National secondary School. History). vol. 5, Guoli bianyiguan 1991, p. 28.

Technological advancement and the age of enlightenment are seen to have established new ideals: faith in the progress and power of science and rationalization of activity. Humanism, rationalism, and liberalism are considered the most important modern values, which emerged in Europe thanks to the revolutionary processes, primarily those in France. At the same time, imperialism is interpreted as a result of rapid industrial growth, which mainly took place in Britain, a great economic power.⁴⁸

Through the analysis and the interpretation of European and American history, the Taiwanese textbooks of 1990s–2010s have embodied the framework commonly used by Taiwanese historians. Their focus on the development of the nation state, democratic and industrial revolutions, the rationalization of culture, and special characteristics of “modernity” indicates that the history of Western countries is processed through the concept of modernization, which was once popular with the Taiwanese academic community under the influence of post-war American sociology.⁴⁹ The history of Europe is presented as a transition from a traditional society to a modern one with democratic institutions, capitalist economy, public education and concepts of rationality and progress. The progress from tradition to modernity sets the direction of world development, and allows Taiwan to position itself as a modern democratic state in Asia. The desire to gain independent statehood is the driving force for Taiwanese historians editing textbooks of the 1990s to focus on the rise of the nation state. In contrast, with the lingering ambiguity of Taiwan’s international status in the 2000s and 2010s, the desire to deal with Taiwan’s independence is reflected by a shift of discourse from the issues of nation building to the analysis of a less specific concept of “modern society”.

For the further consideration of the image of Western countries in Taiwanese history textbooks it is crucial to observe Taiwan’s own cultural interaction with foreign countries, which is featured in the section of the history of China. Based on Taiwanese topical studies, most events in Chinese history, especially those of the 19th century – the period of direct confrontation between China and the Western world – are associated with imperialist aggression of the leading world powers toward neighboring regions. With this in mind, the history of Europe is opposed to the history of China and that of the Republic of China. The latter have to interact only to survive Western imperialist aggression causing great economic and

48 GU Weiyi/WANG Shizhong: *Putong gaoji zhongxue. Lishi* (2007), p. 96.

49 Mau-kuei CHANG, Ying-hwa CHANG and Chih-chieh TANG: “Indigenization, Institution-alization, and Internationalization: Tracing the Paths of the Development of Sociology in Taiwan”. In: Michael Burarwoy, Mau-kuei Chang and Michelle Fei-yu Hsieh (eds.): *Facing an Unequal World: Challenges for a Global Sociology*, vol. 2, Taipei: ISA-CNA, Academia Sinica, Institute of Sociology 2010, pp. 158–191.

political damage to China's part.⁵⁰ The similar view on Western countries in the modern history of China seems to be preserved in the 2000s–2010s textbooks.⁵¹ Without question, mainland Chinese historians sympathize with this approach to describing the historical contacts with Western countries.

However, when it comes to the Taiwanese history itself, the image of Western countries is significantly altered. In the 1990s and 2000s, Taiwanese historiography under the DPP government was revised in regard to the assessments of the impact of Western countries on the national history. Over the given period, historians of Taiwan added a considerable number of European countries to the list of those to be featured in the modern history of the Island. Colonial conquests by Portugal, Spain, Holland, and Japan; but also their trade, economic, social, and cultural interaction with the islanders were now rendered crucial for the development of Taiwan. Moreover, the once negative assessments of colonial presence of both Europeans and Japanese in Taiwan were also revised. This resulted in terminological replacements for Japanese governance that a more neutral term “*zhi* 治” (control) was introduced instead of “*ju* 據” (capture), which also caused heated discussions.⁵²

As the 2010s textbooks show, the arrival of the Dutch and Spanish in Taiwan, the competition of European Maritime states to gain control over the Island was considered helpful in Taiwan's integration into the world system and its transformation into an important transport hub in East Asia, which allowed further involvement of the Island in the world processes starting in modern times.⁵³ The Dutch rule, for example, is associated with the introduction of Taiwan-specific models of public administration and interaction with local elites. Furthermore, the textbooks of the 2000s as “pro-Taiwanese” ones provide positive assessments of Japanese governance and emphasize Japan's socio-economic and cultural contribution to the earlier modernization of Taiwanese society. Taiwan's openness to foreign relations and its inclusion in the world system manifest themselves in the appreciation of post-war political, financial and economic aid from the United

50 CHEN Yunxuan 陳昀萱 and Zhen Xiaolan 甄曉蘭: “Guozhong lishi kegang zhong de ouzhou yixiang” 國中歷史課綱中的歐洲意象 (Europe's Image in the History Standard for Junior Secondary School), In: *Jiaokeshu yanjiu* 教科書研究 (Textbooks Research), vol. 11, no. 2, 2008, pp. 39–41.

51 XUE Huayuan 薛化元 (ed.) *Putong gaoji zhongxue. Lishi* 普通高級中學. 歷史 (General senior secondary school. History), vol. 2, Sanmin book 2007, pp. 220–230.

52 Yoshihisa AMAE: “Pro-colonial or Postcolonial? Appropriation of Japanese Colonial Heritage in Present-day Taiwan” In: *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, vol. 40, no. 1, 2011, pp. 19–62; LEE Ming-tsung: “Discouraging ‘Japan’ in Taiwanese Identity Politics: The Structures of Feeling of the Young Harizu and Old Japanophiles”. In: *Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2015, pp. 49–103.

53 XUE Huayuan: *Putong gaoji zhongxue. Lishi* (2007), p. 34.

States and later from Japan.⁵⁴ Alongside such positive “pro-Taiwan” assessments of economic and cultural interaction with other countries, the textbooks broaden the notion of “world history” by no longer limiting it to a selected group of European countries. They tend to introduce to students the traditions and important events in the historical development of various regions of the world, including the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

It should be noted that positive assessments of foreign influence on the historical development of Taiwan, as well as the extended list of countries in long relation to Taiwan are primarily aimed at weakening the (mainland) China centric historiography of the past. It is necessary to prove that mainland China has not been the one and only influence on the Island, but rather one of many sources of cultural influence. Apart from that, Taiwanese historians seek to identify socio-economic and political institutions which emerged in Taiwan through Europeans and differed from those of mainland China. Of particular interest for this research is the way these new historiographical approaches have impacted the image of Russia and the Soviet Union in modern Taiwanese textbooks. The restoration of relations between the Russian Federation and Taiwan took place several decades ago in the 1990s. In the 1950s–80s due to conflicts with the CCP with its support from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the consequent defeat in the civil war and forced displacement to the island of Taiwan, the ruling Kuomintang party pursued a specific ideological and educational policy. The essence of the policy was ideological rejection and harsh criticism concerning the communist doctrine and those advocating the countries which followed such a doctrine: China, North Korea, and the USSR.

This ideological struggle reached its climax in the 1950s and 60s when the CCP still seemed rather vulnerable, and the return of the KMT to the mainland was feasible. The KMT aimed at promoting hostility toward such communist countries as China and North Korea. However, the key slogan of this struggle mentioned Soviet Russia as well: “*fan gong kang E*, 反共抗俄” (oppose communism, resist Russia). The corresponding ideological education was introduced to the main subjects of primary and secondary schools. Among those were the national language, history, geography and social studies. Still, it was most characteristic that Russia was never heavily criticized for its adherence to Communist ideology, but rather for the territorial acquisitions of Tsarist Russia at the end of the Qing rein, which were regarded as unfair. The curricula of the 1950s and 60s urged to “stress seizures of national territories by Russia, to promote anti-communist and anti-

⁵⁴ Frances CHAN: “How Liberal Korean and Taiwanese Textbooks Portray their Countries’ ‘Economic Miracles’” In: *Student Work*, vol. 3, 2016. Available online http://elis scholar.library.yale.edu/ceas_student_work/3 (last access 2019, December 2).

Russian sentiments".⁵⁵ In fact, even though the anti-communist and anti-Russian rhetoric was dropped by the 1970s–80s, its influence on historiographical assessments of Russia was still evident in the forthcoming years and thus cannot be ignored.

The next step in the given analysis is to trace topics and events in the textbook for secondary school associated with the Soviet Union and Russia. The first to mention would be the textbooks of the 1990s–2010s, which mention Russia in the units on mainland China and world history, but not in those on the history of Taiwan. The section dedicated to traditional China and the Republic of China before 1947 features Russia and the Soviet Union in relation to three key topics, namely: Russia's territorial acquisitions in the late Tsarist period, the Soviet Union's relationship with the CCP and the KMT respectively; military and technical assistance at an early stage as well as political ties between the USSR and the PRC.

It should be noted that the issue of territorial conquests of Chinese territories by Russia in the late Tsarist period is described in great detail in the textbooks of both the 1990s and 2010s. Thus, the unit on imperialist conquests in the 1990s textbook lists Russia as one of the major aggressors, alongside the UK. Since the beginning of the 16th century, Russia is said to have been advancing from the Central part of Eurasia toward the Pacific coast. First, it subjugates Siberia. By the 19th century, its aspirations are reported to be aimed at the North-East of China, Korea and the North-Western regions of the Qing Empire. They had to fight over the latter with Britain.⁵⁶ Russia is believed to act treacherously, violating previous agreements. It is the weakness of China during the Opium wars that allowed Russia to "bite like a mulberry worm and swallow a significant part of China's territory like a whale" (*canshi jingtun*, 蚕食鲸吞), causing it to be the greatest damage compared to other territorial losses.⁵⁷

Similarly, these events are narrated in the textbook of the 2010s. The text is illustrated with many map insets of allegedly seized territories in the size that visually looks equal to a significant part of China itself. The textbook emphasizes that Russia annexed not only the territories in the Northeast of mainland China, but also those in the Northwest. Overall, as the textbook reveals, 1.2 million km² of

55 WANG Enmei 王恩美: "Lengzhan shiqi xuexiao jiaoyu zhong de fan gong xingxiang: yi Taiwan yu Hanguo liang di xiaoxue jiaokeshu wei zhongxin de fenxi" 冷戰時期學校教育中的反共形象：以臺灣與韓國兩地小學教科書為中心的分析 (Anti-Communist Images in School Education during the Cold War: An Analysis Centered on Primary School Textbooks in Taiwan and Korea). In: *Si yu yan* 思與言 (Thoughts and words), vol. 48, no. 2, 2010, pp. 49–117.

56 WANG Zhizhi: *Guomin zhongxue. Lishi* (1991), p. 34.

57 HU Pingsheng 胡平生 (ed.): *Guomin zhongxue. Lishi* 國民中學. 歷史 (National secondary School. History). vol. 3, Guoli bianyiguan, 1991, pp. 7–8.

Qing territory were ceded to Russia, of which about 0.4 million km² was to the west of Lake Balkhash.⁵⁸ Later, apart from the appropriation of land, Russia took advantage of the weakness of the then Republican China on the mainland and interfered with the political processes on the outskirts of the country, in Mongolia and Tibet, not to mention its interference in Xinjiang during the Sino-Japanese War. As a result, Outer Mongolia declared independence and China lost sovereignty over its historical region.⁵⁹ The image of Russia as an invader is supported by a visual series. In the historical cartoon from the Hong Kong newspaper of 1898, featuring the division of China into zones of influence between Western countries and Japan; Russia is depicted as a massive growling bear.⁶⁰

It is noteworthy that the textbooks of the 1990s and the 2010s provide different assessments of Russia's role in Chinese history of the twentieth century. The anti-communist rhetoric of the previous period is employed in the earlier textbooks; and the connection between Soviet Russia and the CCP, but not the KMT, is emphasized. Meanwhile, Russia's assistance to the CCP is said to be limited to military aid in World War II.⁶¹ The textbooks of the 2010s offer a fuller picture of Russia supporting the KMT by means of the Soviet Union and the Comintern (Communist International) movement. Here Russia is acting as a source of international support and specific military and technical assistance. In the textbooks it also mentions Adolf JOFFE, a representative of the Soviet government in Beijing, who together with Sun Yat-sen published the "Declaration of SUN Yat-sen and JOFFE". It was this document that laid the foundation for a temporary cooperation between the CCP and the KMT. A military school in Huangpu built under the supervision of M. BORODIN from Russia, a political adviser to the KMT, became an important step in this cooperation.⁶² Unlike textbooks of the 1990s, later editions stress the role of the Soviet Union to explain the essence of the PRC's domestic and foreign policies. On the one hand, the political experience of the Soviet Union is believed to have had a direct impact on the CCP as a party type, which in the textbooks is called the Leninist party with all critical characteristics. On the other hand, it is viewed not only as inter-party relations, but also as an interstate cooperation with the USSR. The Soviet Union was the first to recognize the PRC after its proclamation in 1949 and to establish diplomatic links with it. It also provided substantial financial, military, and technical aid, granted a big loan, and sent some skilled workers to rebuild the industry. Additional historical material is

58 XUE Huayuan: *Putong gaoji zhongxue. Lishi* (2007), pp. 230, 239.

59 GU Weiying/WANG Shizhong (eds.): *Putong gaoji zhongxue. Lishi* (2007), pp. 15–16.

60 XUE Huayuan: *Putong gaoji zhongxue. Lishi* (2007), p. 238.

61 HU Pingsheng (ed.): *Guomin zhongxue. Lishi*, vol. 3 (1991), pp. 66, 88–89.

62 GU Weiying/WANG Shizhong: *Putong gaoji zhongxue. Lishi* (2007), p. 28.

illustrated with photographs: a shot of the signing ceremony of the Treaty of Friendship between STALIN and MAO Zedong, as well as a photo of a Soviet specialist surrounded by Chinese workers at a factory.⁶³

At the same time, the editors of the textbook explain in detail the development of Soviet-Chinese relations: from close and friendly cooperation in the 1950s; to the deterioration after STALIN's death, which resulted in a military conflict on Damansky Island in 1969; and later to improvement from the late 1980s. It should be noted that today the countries once involved in the conflict are trying not to address these events directly. In fact, the 50th anniversary of the collision was hardly remembered in 2019 in both countries, as well as the fact this memorable date has never been mentioned in the textbooks.⁶⁴ In stark contrast, the incident is portrayed in the Taiwanese textbooks, which seems to be set as a pathway to the subsequent events. The clashes on Damansky Island are set to be the turning point of PRC's relation with the USSR, but also with the United States. An improvement in Sino-American relations results in Taiwan losing its legitimate status in the UN and revising its domestic and foreign policy. Finally, with another improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations in the 1980s and 90s, Russia becomes a significant political partner of the PRC, only so willing to provide military and technical assistance. As cited in the Taiwanese textbook of 1990s, Russia provided the PRC with arms supplies for the PLA's modernization.⁶⁵ Therefore, in the section on the history of China and the Republic of China, Tsarist Russia is portrayed as a very aggressive state taking advantage of its neighbors' weakness for the sake of territorial expansion. However, in the Soviet period, Russia acts as an ally providing the necessary support such as economic and military assistance.

There is a small paragraph about Russia in the world history section which shows a concise and neutral layout of the main events in Russian history in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Among those are the abolition of serfdom and the reforms of Alexander II, the First World War involvement, the February and October Revolutions of 1917 and STALIN's industrialization. While Russia acts as an economically and technically obsolete state, it is one of the main actors in significant pan-European events, especially those related to military clashes. Therefore, the Crimean War and the defeat of Russia

63 Ibid., p. 101.

64 Mikhail KOROSTIKOV: "Ostrov izmeneniâ mirovoi istorii. Kak konflikt na Damanskom povernul istoriâ Kitâa, SSSR i SSHA" (World history's Island of changes. How the conflict on Damansky Island turned the history of China, the USSR and the USA), 2019, March 15. Available online <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3909917> (last access 2019, December 2).

65 GU Weiying/WANG Shizhong: *Putong gaoji zhongxue. Lishi* (2007), pp. 103–107.

are presented before the unit on the causes of the First World War. The focus is put on Russia encroaching on neighboring territories.

Attention is drawn to the account of the October Revolution, a key event in the history of Russia with global implications. In the 1990s, the revolutionary events were interpreted as social upheavals caused by hostilities, which did not afford the people any relief. Although the industrialization brought the USSR to a leading economic position, it was carried out at the expense of depriving people of their freedom and normal working conditions. Textbooks of the 2010s provide similar assessments of the 1917 Revolution. Moreover, the very name of the new state, the Soviet Union, which involved other countries apart from Russia, is seen as a crafty plan to further world revolution.⁶⁶ In general, Russia, and then the Soviet Union are shown as active participants in both World Wars, taking both diplomatic and military tasks. The Cold War is described as a time of confrontation between the capitalist and socialist camps. The Soviet Union acted as a strong opponent to the United States. The competition between the two in terms of politics, economics, military technologies, and space exploration involved both European and Asian countries. The suggested reasons for the Soviet Union's collapse are poor quality of life for the population, conflicts within the socialist camp, and upward democratic trends. A brief account of the collapse is given in the textbook with the coup of 19 August 1991 followed by the ban on the Communist Party and dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. Typically, there is no mention of Russia and the Soviet Union throughout 1991, and descriptions of modern Russia are not found in the textbook either.

According to the modern Taiwanese textbook, all relations with Russia are restricted to those in the history of mainland China during in the Qing period, the Republic of China, or the PRC. The Taiwanese textbook characterizes Tsarist Russia as a state driven by the desire to seize foreign lands. The world history unit suggests that Russia's territorial claims are addressed to both Eastern and Western countries. At the same time, the Soviet Union is believed to be a major ally providing military and political aid, leaving aside any trade, financial or cultural assistance. Therefore, Russia is presented as a strong military partner rather than a trade counterpart.

66 WANG Zhizhi: *Guomin zhongxue. Lishi* (1991), pp. 63–65; GU Weiying/WANG Shizhong: *Putong gaoji zhongxue. Lishi* (2007), pp. 126–127.

Conclusion

There are several characteristic features to be seen with respect to the images of Western countries and Russia in modern Chinese and Taiwanese history textbooks for high school. First of all, it should be noted that Chinese and Taiwanese societies are still struggling to solve problems associated with teaching history in schools. Now and then, this struggle shifts into public debate. The reform of school history education has become a core aspect to largescale ideological and political transformations resulting in major state projects. Although the 1990s saw more liberal regulations for history education, the last decades have witnessed a growing trend for stricter control over the subject by the state. This trend is most evident in today's mainland China, where the reform of school history education is part of the ideological agenda targeting at control and consolidation of the society by the Communist Party and the state.

It should also be noted that innovations introduced to the school history course in both mainland China and Taiwan are in keeping with the key theses of the current domestic political and public agenda. On both sides of the Taiwan Strait, the main challenge of 1990s–2010s is globalization that urges the countries in view to define their own status in the world community and prove their unique role in world political and economic development. Meanwhile, integration into the global community should be consistent with the local-national specialty. Mainland China focuses on building the image of a strong nation state with indisputable national sovereignty, inviolable state borders, cultural continuity, and socialist ideology while acting as an active participant on the global scale. On the other side, Taiwanese political and academic communities stress the island's position in relation to its mainland neighbor and differences between their cultural and political traditions. These non-trivial items on home ideological agenda have predetermined the direction for the school history reform: changes in curricula and standards, new editions of textbooks in the 1990s–2010s. As a result, both national and world history courses in school have been aimed at highlighting the key theses of the domestic agenda.

Both in mainland China and in Taiwan, changes in the school history course have to do with the latest sound achievements of the national scholars in historical research. China's desire to abandon the rhetoric of social protest and struggle, and to integrate into the world community has brought about historiographical approaches which accentuate trends for world economic integration. As early as the 1990s, school textbooks started to drop class theory in favor of the “complex world system” concept authored by the Chinese historian WU Yuqin. The textbooks from

2000–2010 present world history as a steady development of a single economic world system, which is based on the capitalist mode of production. Unsurprisingly, mainland Chinese textbooks focus on the materialistic view of history and pay primary attention to economic processes.

In comparison, Taiwanese textbooks of the 1990s–2010s employ an earlier concept of modernization to explain the world history development and focus on Taiwan's political progress as the nation state, the democratic political system and the rational culture. The most characteristic feature of these textbooks is the “Taiwanization” of historical research and history education with emphasis on the local history of the island and its cultural and political difference from mainland China. One of the leading historiographical concepts of the time is TSAO Yungho's idea of the “island history of Taiwan”, which presents Taiwan as an oceanic island located at the intersection of trade routes and exposed to various sociocultural influences. The “pro-Taiwan” trend results in major alterations which mainly follow the way Taiwanese history is presented. These trends in domestic politics and historical studies of mainland China and Taiwan have made a direct impact on how the image of Western countries and Russia evolves in the textbooks of 1990s–2010s.

References to Western countries and Russia are made in units on both world history and national history of China. However, since the mid1990s, Taiwanese textbooks have been mentioning Western countries in the section on Taiwanese history of the 16th century and onward. Schools of both the PRC and ROC share a similar approach to modern periods of world history, which is associated with the key trends in the modern world, such as the nation state, capitalism, colonialism, integration of world regions into a single economic system, and consolidation of inequality between the West and the rest of the world. The world development has been defined by the leading countries of the West, among which are the UK, France, the USA, Italy, Germany, and Russia. At the same time, France and the United States take leading positions in political development since they have consolidated democratic forms of government. The United Kingdom plays a major role in economic development with the Industrial Revolution which led to the establishment of capitalism, imperialism, and the world colonial system.

Textbooks of mainland China seem to fail to provide consistent interpretation of the Chinese-Western military-economic clash in the 19th century. Traditionally, Chinese historiography blames Western countries for inflicting the economic and political losses on China in the Opium Wars. However, the single fiercely critical rhetoric against the Western powers has notably improved in view of China's integration into the global economy. While the textbooks stress the inflicted damage, the authors argue that clashes with Western countries refer to the end of China's isolation and new prospects for integration into the world economic system.

Taiwanese textbooks kept the section of Chinese history almost intact while major changes can be found in the Taiwanese historical narration. The list of important countries was extended with the introduction of Holland and Spain as well as extra emphasis on the United States in the recent history of the Island. However, a more significant innovation is the way earlier Dutch and Spanish colonial governance and American economic aid in the 1950s–60s are regarded as a positive factor contributing to Taiwan’s modernization, special social and economic environment, and global integration.

Surprisingly, the account of Taiwan’s relations with foreign colonizers in the unit on the history of Taiwan differs from that of the relations with European powers and Japan in late Qing period and Republican China units. Modern Taiwanese historiography values the colonial experience as the one fostering modernization and global integration. By contrast, the section on late Qing history of China heavily relies on the popular rhetoric of China being taken advantage of and economically oppressed by foreign powers. Therefore, the section on the history of Taiwan in the given textbook must have been written with the new historiographical assessments and the changing political context of Taiwanese society of the 2000s in view. Meanwhile, the narrative in the units on mainland China was largely borrowed from the textbooks of previous periods with dated assessments of foreign activities. The image of Russia in modern Chinese and Taiwanese textbooks seems slightly different from that of rather positively assessed Western countries. Textbooks on both sides of the Taiwan Strait tend to characterize Tsarist Russia as a state with the development strategy of outward expansion. They provide a detailed coverage of land appropriation by Russia in the Far East.

Interestingly, Taiwanese textbooks include even more negative assessments in the section on the history of China even though there has been a steady improvement in bilateral relations between Russia and Taiwan since the 1990s. This might be attributed to the anti-Soviet and anti-communist rhetoric of the 1950s–70s, which is left unattended since the main focus is placed on the revision of Taiwan’s proper history. Similarly, Chinese and Taiwanese textbooks show different assessments of the 1917 Revolution, the key event in the history of Russia with world implications. Chinese textbooks describe the October Revolution as a turning point in world history, which produced a non-capitalist model of social development. The later Soviet experience of socialism is seen as an example of bad implementation, a warning against mistakes that could be made on the way. In Taiwanese textbooks, the 1917 Revolution is persistently shown as the result of military upheavals, which did not bring relief to the people, but rather deprived the country of democracy and freedom.

Part II

LITERATURE

6 Coming to Terms with Evil

Abstract. The paper is conceived as a study of the concept of evil in the process of mutual perceptions of the West and China since the early 20th century until today. It begins with a discussion of the theory according to which the “otherness” of Chinese civilization, the specific course of its development, and the difficulties China faced in coming to grips with Western powers in the 19th century are largely due to the fact that the idea of radical personified evil was known to the Christian world but not to China.

The debate among Western sinologists on this theory is investigated along with the study of the parallel reception process of the Western idea of evil among Chinese intellectuals. First of all, it was the Faustian tradition, one of the promising achievements of the European Renaissance, making this idea become so attractive to China in the previous century. While this article reflects upon China’s reception of the significant elements of this tradition as ideas such as creation, originality, negation, Chinese discussions of GOETHE’s *Faust* etc., focus is put on Chinese readings of three Russian classical writers who centrally employ the motif of personified evil in their works: Nikolai GOGOL, Fyodor DOSTOEVSKY, and Mikhail BULGAKOV. The decided selection of Russian classics was motivated by the highly ambivalent position of Russia in the process of intercultural dialogue between the East and the West - not only as part of the West but also as a culture which at many crucial stages of its history distanced itself from the West in search for some original unique path into future.

Keywords. Motif of evil, Christianity, Gogol, Dostoevsky, Bulgakov.

Introduction

Academic studies on cultural differences between China and the West in regard to the idea of evil have always rested on the assumption of a fundamental mutual otherness of both cultures: Their focus lies on the peculiarities of the other and on an intensive investigation of them which is seen as helpful in the construction of one's own cultural identity. The most important one among all the initial works in this area was Max WEBER's (1864–1920) *Economy Ethics of World Religions* (*Confucianism and Taoism*, 1911–1915); and among later influential studies there were Alfred FORKE's (1867–1944) *The World Conception of the Chinese* (1925), Frederick MOTE's (1922–2005) *The Cosmological Gulf between China and The West* (1972) as well as François JULLIEN's (b. 1951) *L'Ombre au tableau. Du mal ou du négatif* (2004).¹ Among the most recent works, Adrian CHAN's monograph *Orientalism in Sinology* (2012) deserves special attention as it combines the Weberian tradition of discussing the idea of evil with the post-colonial discourse and with all the political critiques in Sinology that have been inspired by Edward SAID's (1935–2003) *Orientalism* (1978). CHAN's monograph is also conceived as a political critique and pursues the liberation of China related studies from elements of Western ideology projected upon it. One of the most important ideological projections discussed by CHAN is the concept of *sin*. According to him, it is one of the most crucial mistakes in Sinology to interpret the Chinese concepts of *guo* 过 and *zui* 罪 as *sin*,² because it makes the idea of Christian transcendence which is foreign to Chinese cosmology and cosmogony appear as something indigenously Chinese. While discussing this topic of “sin in a cross-cultural comparison”, CHAN resumes one of the key arguments of Max WEBER³ and demonstrates that studies of evil do not only remain important for academic discourse, but also are highly relevant from a political standpoint, reflecting the post-modern

1 See also Livia KÖHN: “Zur Symbolik des Bösen im alten China”. In: Ingrid KRÜSSMANN (ed.): *Der Abbruch des Turmbaus: Studien zum Geist in China und im Abendland. Festschrift für Rolf Trauzettel*, Nettetal: Steyler Verlag 1995, pp. 113–133; Fabian VÖLKER: “Der Ursprung und Sinn des Bösen und des Seins der Welt: Zu einer theodiceeanalogen Frage im Vedānta und Buddhismus”. In: *Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft*, 2014, pp. 330–374; Franklin PERKINS: *Heaven and Earth are not Humane: The Problem of Evil in Classical Chinese Philosophy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2014.

2 Adrian CHAN: *Orientalism in Sinology*, Bethesda: Academica Press 2012, pp. 2–4.

3 For Max WEBER's study of the idea of *sin* in Western-Chinese comparative frame, see his *Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen: Konfuzianismus und Taoismus*, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr 1991, pp. 145, 194–195, 205, 213.

issue of a global over-communication as well as the problematics of ties between knowledge and power.

For the present paper, all these theoretical cultural studies of the evil East and West represent an important discursive frame. However, my core issue would be not the idea of evil as it is reflected in Western academic discourse, but rather the interpretations of the Western ideas of evil by broader strata of Chinese intellectuals and the connections between these interpretations and Chinese politics.

The first decisive phase in China's coming to terms with Western idea of radical evil resulted in a confrontation of Chinese intellectuals with Christian missionaries, not in the early stage of the mission, but rather in the 18th and 19th centuries, when Chinese saints and sages were increasingly perceived by Christian missionaries as sinful and for this reason were systematically banned to Christian hells.⁴ In this dramatic dialogue, too, cultural differences pertaining to the idea of sin were a crucial factor. The spiritual background of coming to terms with Western evil at this early stage has been thoroughly discussed in Sinology.⁵

The second phase, roughly between the late 19th century and 1949, took its course under a general conviction of the necessity of modernizing China after the model of the militarily and technologically superior West. It was the time of an active reception of the history of Western thought and Western concepts, such as the Renaissance, the Faustian tradition which originated from the Renaissance⁶ and GOETHE's (1749–1832) *Faust* with its philosophical elaboration of the theme of radical evil. It seems important that the reception of GOETHE⁷, as well as that of many other figures associated with the genealogy of Western modernity (DANTE (1265–1321) LUTHER (1483–1546), etc.), was only marginally connected to Chinese translations of these works and real acts of reading them either in the original or in translation. Both the Renaissance and the Faustian spirit had become part and parcel of Chinese political discourse long before the first translation of *Faust* (part one) by GUO Moruo 郭沫若 (1892–1978) appeared in 1928. The idea of evil came to the fore in its constant deep interrelation with such other concepts as *creation*,

4 For more details, see the chapter “Damnation des Saints et dieux de la Chine” in Jacques GERNET, *Chine et christianisme, action et réaction*, Paris: Gallimard 1982, pp. 238–247.

5 See, for example, the monographs by Paul A. COHEN, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860–1870*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1963, and by Jacques GERNET, *Chine et christianisme, action et réaction* (1982).

6 For the ideological background of the boom of the Renaissance idea during the May Fourth, see Jerome GRIEDER: *Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance, Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution 1917–1937*, Cambridge: Harvard University 1970.

7 For the reception of GOETHE's *Faust* in East Asia, see Adrian HSIA (ed.): *Zur Rezeption von Goethes „Faust“ in Ostasien*, Bern: Peter Lang 1993.

negation, negation of negation, individuality and geniality, all of them becoming a subject of new intercultural interpretations within the current political discourse.

Reflections on creation as one of the most ambivalent concept in Chinese cultural tradition were central for such seminal sinological studies as Kirina GOLYGINA's "Kontseptsiia tvorcheskoi lichnosti v konfutsianskoi esteticheskoi teorii" (On the creative personality in the Confucian aesthetic tradition, 1973⁸) and Michael PUETT's *The Ambivalence of Creation* (2001.) In Western tradition, creation is also a highly ambivalent concept which is documented as early as in the *Book of Genesis*: by committing the original sin, man puts himself in a competing position with God. The ability to judge on good and evil, which man attains through the original sin, is closely associated with the act of divine creation. Creation, creativity, individuality, geniality, all these concepts, since the Renaissance and most essentially in the age of Enlightenment, developed to underscore the ambivalent position of man before God. Man is seen as a creation of God, but he is himself also a creator who increasingly aspires to affirm himself as a competitor to God, i.e. as the subject of an individual, independent, and progressive creation.

The topoi of creation⁹, creativity, and the Renaissance, dominated the Chinese intellectual discourse since the beginning of the 20th century. The metaphysical ambivalence of these concepts in the Western cultural tradition¹⁰ was not in the focus of debates among Chinese intellectuals. Neither were the changes in the spiritual atmosphere of the West which marked the transition from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in the focus of debates among Chinese intellectuals. The focus was, instead, on the perception of the Renaissance as a symbol of rapid scientific, economic, and technical growth, of rising national strength and of consolidation of political power. Renaissance came to be one of the most popular political slogans which united ideologically different thinkers such as HU Shi 胡适 (1891–1962), ZHOU Zuoren 周作人 (1885–1967), XU Zhimo 徐志摩 (1897–1931), and LIANG Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) etc. For this reason, it was no coincidence

8 In: *Izuchenie kита́skoї literatury v SSSR* (Soviet Studies on Chinese Literature), Moskva: Nauka 1973, pp. 194–205.

9 Ironically, it is this very concept of creation which is among the primary aims of Adrian CHAN's critical study. In his scathing polemics against Western sinologists – first of all against James LEGGE (1815–1897) – these are constantly addressed as "created people", as for example in the following passage: "The lack of sin [in China – V. V.] has led to conflicts and misunderstanding, not only in sinology but ... also in the contemporary international political relations between China and the Created people." (Adrian CHAN: *Orientalism in Sinology* (2012), p. 9.)

10 For more details see Viatcheslav VETROV: "Zur Dekonstruktion des Un/Gesunden in philologischen Taxonomien: Westlich-chinesischer Renaissance-Diskurs". In: *Oriens Extremus* vol. 51, 2012, pp. 331–368.

that the combination of the concepts of evil and creation became a focal point in the general self-strengthening discourse.

It was in 1927 that CHENG Fangwu 成仿吾 (1897–1984) presented in his essay “Cong wenxue geming dao geming wenxue” 从文学革命到革命文学 (From Literary Revolution to Revolutionary Literature), published in 1928 in the *Chuangzao yuekan* 创造月刊 (*Creation Monthly*), a political manifesto in which leading Chinese intellectuals of the May Fourth were scathingly criticized for being alien to the masses and unable to carry out the overdue revolutionary mission. In a laconic form, CHENG formulates his own mission as a *negation of negation (fouding de fouding* 否定的否定).¹¹ This remarkable fruit of negation spirit was brought forward in the middle between two great events in the modern Chinese history: the New Culture movement, within which the Creation Society (*Chuangzaoshe* 创造社, 1921–1930) was formed; and the political triumph of the Chinese Communist Party (1949.) The Creation Society¹² which produced this prominent communist ideologist and translator of the *Communist Manifesto* into Chinese, was on its part very much concerned with the topic of coming to terms with Western evil, which can be illustrated by the examples of GUO Moruo’s translation of GOETHE’s *Faust* (Part One) and QUAN Ping’s 全平 *Satanic Project* (*Sadan de gongcheng* 撒旦的工程.)

GUO Moruo’s translation of GOETHE’s *Faust* on which he worked from 1919 until 1928 was not the beginning of Chinese intellectuals’ reception of GOETHE. GOETHE had been a major figure of Chinese political debates since the *Yangwu* movement (*Yangwu yundong* 洋务运动, Western affairs movement), and the early decades of the 20th century are often called the age of the Faustian spirit in China. Among the early Chinese works which discussed GOETHE was GU Hongming’s 辜鸿铭 (1857–1928) chapter *Zi qiang bu xi* 自强不息 (On unswerving self-strengthening) from his *ZHANG Wenxiang mufu jiwen* 张文襄幕府记闻 (Recollections from the Quarters of ZHANG Wenxiang, 1910.) In this chapter, GOETHE’s work is discussed not as a tragedy, but as a triumph of an unswerving aspiring mind which is interpreted in terms of, and assimilated to, the indigenous Chinese tradition by a quotation from the *Book of Changes* – *Zi qiang bu xi*; being

11 CHENG Fangwu 成仿吾: “Cong wenxue geming dao geming wenxue” 从文学革命到革命文学 (From Literary Revolution to Revolutionary). In: *Cheng Fangwu wenji* 成仿吾文集 (Collected works of CHENG Fangwu), Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe 1985, pp. 241–247, here p. 246.

12 For the significant role of the Creation Society in the politics of Republican China, see TANG Xiaobing and Michel HOCKX, “The Creation Society (1921–1930)”. In: Kirk A. DENTON, Michel HOCKX (eds.): *Literary Societies of Republican China*, Lanham: Lexington Books 2008, pp. 103–136; YIN Zhiguang: *Politics of Art: The Creation Society and the Practice of Theoretical Struggle in Revolutionary China*, Leiden: Brill 2014.

an allusion to the sentence: *Tian xing jian, junzi yi zi qiang bu xi* 天行健，君子以自强不息 (Just as the heaven is constant in its motion, the sage never ceases from strengthening himself).¹³ It is significant that in this interpretation GOETHE comes to personify the unity of man and the cosmos; he is placed within the immanent natural order; and there is no reference to the Christian transcendence, to the symbolic accompaniment of Faust both by Mephistopheles and by God. GOETHE who thus is seen as representing an immanent world vision, is interpreted as a key figure who demonstrates the unity of Chinese and Western cultures. As another prominent intellectual FENG Zhi 冯至 (1905–1993) summarized the attractive force of the Faustian evil to Chinese intellectuals of the 1920s and 1940s, the evil was seen as an effective stimulus to action, as something which in the end is positive and good, which he supports by the following quotation from GOETHE's *Faust*: *Wo shi na liliang de yi busen, ta yongyuan yuanwang e er yongyuan chuangzao le shan* 我是那力量的一部分，它永远愿望恶而永远创造了善 (I'm part of that power which wills forever evil, yet does forever good).¹⁴ Thus, the Faustian good and evil come to be seen as complementary, just like the categories of *yin* and *yang* in Chinese cosmology and completely in accordance with the traditional Chinese interpretations of evil, for example by ZHU Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) or by WANG Yangming 王阳明 (1472–1529).¹⁵

Both for GOETHE's *Faust* and for the whole European Faustian genealogy (from Christopher MARLOWE up to Thomas MANN and Mikhail BULGAKOV), Christianity was a very important spiritual source. In this tradition, evil always shows itself in its intentionality (as an explicit ethical choice, “that always *wishes* evil”¹⁶), which is reflected upon in terms of the transcendence idea. It is also this metaphysical Christian context which is missing both in the first translation of GOETHE's *Faust* by GUO Moruo and in most of other acts of Chinese reception of the Renaissance and the Faustian problematics at that stage of the cultural dialogue with the West.¹⁷

13 GU Hongming 壤鸿铭: *Zhang Wenxiang mufu jiwen* 张文襄幕府记闻 (Recollections from the Quarters of Zhang Wenxiang, 1910), Taiyuan: Shanxi guji chubanshe 1996, p. 76.

14 FENG Zhi: “Fushide li de mo” 浮士德里的魔 (The Evil in GOETHE's *Faust*, 1943). In: *FENG Zhi xueshu lunzhu zixuan ji* 冯至学术论著自选集 (Self-selected academic works of Feng Zhi), Beijing: Beijing shifan xueyuan chubanshe 1992, pp. 292–313, here p. 312.

15 For the Neo-Confucian perspective on the problem of evil, see the essay by CHEN Lisheng and HUANG Deyuan: “Research on the issue of ‘evil’ in WANG Yangming’s thought”. In: *Frontiers of Philosophy in China* vol. 2 no. 2, April 2007, pp. 172–187.

16 Note that BULGAKOV used this self-introduction of Mephistopheles as an epigraph to *The Master and Margarita*.

17 From the very outset, the Western Renaissance discourse was marked by extreme ambivalence: alongside the optimistic view of its emphasis on the beautiful and healthy body, freedom of personality, creativity, etc., there was a very strong pessimistic attitude to it,

Among the statements of Mephistopheles concerning his identity, one of the most important is the sentence which I have just quoted from the essay by FENG Zhi's concerning evil in *Faust*. In GUO Moruo's translation, this phrase reads as follows: *wo shi zuo e zao shan de li zhi yi ti* 我是作恶造善的力之一体 (I am a part of that force which commits evil and creates goodness).¹⁸ The intentionality of evil which is so important in the German original is completely neutralized by GUO; working good deeds is complementary to committing evil, which is also an assimilation of GOETHE to the Chinese conceptual system and an alienation from the original Western one. A further characteristic of GUO's strategy and role as the translator is an almost complete renunciation of commentary and notes on especially important parts in the text, for example in the *Prologue in Heaven*, in which GOETHE alludes to the *Bible*, the bet between God and Mephistopheles in the *Prologue* is thought as parallel to the story of Job, which is made unrecognizable by GUO Moruo.¹⁹ It is neither the tragedy of Faust, nor the highly complex positioning of Faust within the ethical coordinate system that is important to GUO Moruo, but the triumph of an aspiring mind. His interpretation is therefore similar to that of GU Hongming. It is not the original context or the original conceptual frame, which they try to grasp in coming to terms with evil; the Western classic is rather assimilated to the indigenous conceptual frame, and no commentary is deemed necessary for its understanding.

The Satanic Project by QUAN Ping illustrates how far Chinese intellectuals of the early 20th century were driven in their discussions of the practical application of the idea of evil. This essay, with which the periodical *Hongshui* 洪水 (Deluge) – a direct offspring of the *Chuangzao*-Journal – was started in 1924, represents a manifesto of the Creation Society. Satan is conceived as a symbol of progress and of an effective struggle against stagnation and ugliness; the Satanic Project is a call for destruction of all that had been responsible for this stagnation in Chinese traditions. The negation (destruction) idea is as complementary to the idea of creation – the central idea of the Creation Society – as in GUO's interpretation of good and evil in the auto-reflections of Mephistopheles. In QUAN Ping's words on the division of labor: “所以我们不妨说：美善的创造是上帝的本能。真正的破坏

which was first expressed by Jacob BURCKHARDT in his *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* (1860). This classical study of Renaissance was hardly known in China in the early 20th century. For more details, see my above-mentioned essay.

18 GUO Moruo 郭沫若 (tr.): *Fushide* 浮士德 (Faust) vol. I, Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1987, p. 65.

19 GUO Moruo: “Tian shang xumu” 天上序幕 (Prologue in Heaven). In: *Fushide* (1987), pp. 13–20.

是撒旦的天职。”²⁰ (That's why we should say that the creation of what is good is the ability of God and the destruction is the righteous task of Satan.) It is not only the self-identification with Satan which is placed in the focus of this manifesto, but also a twofold critical attitude of its author both to his own tradition and to Christian ethics:

所以我们固然不愿抹去良心，做假守祖宗律法，立在街头祈祷的法利赛人；
但也没有那种伟大的愿力去学牺牲一己，钉死十字架，为恶人赎罪的救主。
我们只凭着我们的良心，顺着我们的感情，来做被人咒诅被人憎厌的撒但…。

²¹

Therefore, we are not willing to eradicate our conscience sticking to the laws of the ancestors and reciting Pharisee prayers. But we do not possess the willingness to sacrifice ourselves on the cross or to be redeemers for the sins of others. We lean only on our conscience, we follow only our feelings, in order to fulfil the satanic task which is condemned and hated by ordinary men etc.

In this second phase, we can see Chinese intellectuals coming to terms with Western evil was a process of an assimilation of Western concepts to the Chinese cultural context and the current political agenda, rather than a confrontation with the West which was characteristic of the 18th and 19th centuries. Cultural “othering” was now replaced by an effective Sinicization. CHENG Fangwu's above mentioned essay *Cong wenxue geming*, in which the negation of negation – an augmentation of the negation spirit of GOETHE's Mephistopheles – and the Hegelian dialectics of *Aufheben* were projected upon the current political agenda in China, was a variety of instances of Sinicization within the influential ideology of the Creation Society. CHENG's text, which anticipates all the basic points of the state ideology of the communist regime, is a logical continuation of the interpretations of GOETHE and HEGEL within the Creation Society; but on the other hand, it overcomes the predominance of aesthetic problems characteristic of the creationists and focuses on the purely political issue of class struggle.

Between 1949 and 1977, Marxism became the predominant religion in China and the notions of good and evil were no more under free debates among intellectuals. What was to be perceived as good or evil, was clearly sanctioned from above. It was only in the 1980s – after the beginning of the “Reform and Opening” era 改革开放 – when Chinese intellectuals resumed discussions of many inter-cultural issues which had been of central concern to the intellectuals prior to 1949. One of

20 QUAN Ping 全平: *Sadan de gongcheng* 撒但的工程 (The Satanic Project, 1924). In: *Chuangzaoshe ziliao* 创造社资料 (Material of the “Creation Society”) vol. I, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe 1985, pp. 493–495, here p. 493.

21 Ibid., p. 495.

these issues was the Western concept of evil, which was now approached in a strikingly different manner from that characteristic of the earlier stages: among the most significant intellectual productions of this period were new translations of GOETHE's *Faust* (among them QIAN Chunqi's 钱春绮 *Fushide* 浮士德 (1982),²² which in stark contrast to the above-mentioned translation by GUO Moruo was a minutely commentated rendering of the original text, as well as the first translations of Mikhail BULGAKOV's *Master i Margarita* (The Master and Margarita).

The present study focuses on Chinese readings of three Russian writers, all of whom take a firm position in the tradition of Christian faith as well as in the tradition of literary elaboration of the motif of Faust and the personified evil: Nikolai GOGOL (Nikolai GOGOL', 1809–1852), Fyodor DOSTOEVSKY (Fedor DOSTOEVSKI, 1821–1881), and Mikhail BULGAKOV (1891–1940). The choice of Russian writers was motivated by the fact that in the history of the cultural dialogue between China and the West, Russia played the role of a very special partner: On the one hand, Russia is itself part of the West, on the other hand, it has experienced quite a long history of confrontations with the West. Of the three authors chosen for the present analysis, this ambivalent position to the West is especially characteristic of GOGOL and DOSTOEVSKY. Both of them participated in the debates between Westernizers and Slavophiles – two major political camps with different programs for answering the question which way Russia should follow in the future: that of the West or its own peculiar way. The participation in these debates strongly influenced the manner in which both authors conceptualized the problem of evil: from the psychologically rather simple figure of the Devil in GOGOL's *Noch' pered Rozhdestvom* (Christmas Eve, part of the *Vechera na khutore bliz Dikan'ki* (Evenings on a Farm Near Dikanka, 1831–1832)) to the far more sophisticated incorporation of evil in CHICHIKOV (*Mertyye Dushi* (Dead Souls), 1841) and to the highly complex idea of evil elaborated in DOSTOEVSKY's Grand Inquisitor (the Antichrist) in *Brat'ia Karamazov* (The Brothers KARAMAZOV, 1875–1880). The following words of DOSTOEVSKY testify to the prominence of this theme in GOGOL's work:

Byli u nas i demony, nastoiašchie demony...Odin iz nikh vse smeialsia; on smeialsia vsiu zhizn' i nad soboi i nad nami, i my vse smeialis' za nim, do togo smeialis', chto nakonets stali plakat' ot nashego smekha.²³

22 QIAN Chunqi 钱春绮 (tr.): *Fushide* 浮士德 (Faust), Shanghai: Shanghai yiwen chubanshe 1982.

23 Fedor DOSTOEVSKI: *Riad statei o russkoj literature* (A Series of Essays on Russian Literature, 1861). In: *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii v tridtsati tomakh* (Complete works in thirty volumes) vol. 18, Leningrad: Nauka 1978, pp. 41–107, here p. 59.

Among other things, we had demons, real demons...One of them laughed all the time; throughout all his life, he was laughing at himself as well as at us, and we followed him in this laughing and laughed, too, till the laugh turned into a cry.

In these words, GOGOL himself is said to be one of the demons of Russian literature. This demonic quality refers both to the demonic figures in his works as well as to GOGOL's capacity to hit the audience's nerves and make his readers laugh and cry over his demonic literary productions. The idea that GOGOL by himself regarded his major aim as deriding the Devil was also central to one of the most profound studies on GOGOL: Dmitry MEREZHKOVSKY's (Dmitrii MEREZHKOVSKIĬ, 1865–1941) *Gogol' i chort* (GOGOL and the Devil, 1906.)

In MEREZHKOVSKY's eyes, the artistic elaboration of evil in GOGOL's work went through some powerful transformations, from the first initial stage when it was conceptualized as a fantastic force – a Devil from *Dikanka Tales* who steals the moon from the sky in his desire to harm people – to a stage in which all fantastic elements were eliminated, and evil appeared as something quite ordinary. This ordinary manifestation of radical evil possesses, in MEREZHKOVSKY's description, the following traits: as flatness it is the negation of all human depths and heights; as the face of the crowd it is all too familiar to us, especially in the moments when we lose the courage to be ourselves and thus willingly become part of the crowd; there is nothing tragic about radical evil however, on the contrary, it manifests itself in the absolute absence of any tragedy, as the infinite vulgarity of the human race.²⁴ CHICHIKOV is among the most successful incarnations of evil and as such he receives a most detailed analysis by MEREZHKOVSKY.

At the end of his study, he turns to discussing one of GOGOL's books which only at first sight has little to do with its main topic (evil): (*Vybrannye mesta iz perepiski s druz'ami* (A Selection of Letters to My Friends, 1847.) This publication was a milestone in GOGOL's life and belonged to the most controversial intellectual productions of the 19th century.

In these letters, GOGOL tried to fulfil what he perceived to be his direct civil duty to make public his ideas concerning the future of Russia; its unique destiny as a Christian country, the necessity to preserve its spiritual heritage, and the divine significance of monarchy. It goes without saying that such ideas were met with sharp criticism by the Westernizers. The possibly most famous reaction to this publication was the letter by Vissarion BELINSKY (Vissarion BELINSKIĬ, 1811–1848) – one of the leading ideological figures under the future Soviet regime – to GOGOL in which the following was said:

²⁴ Dmitrii MEREZHKOVSKIĬ: *Gogol' i chort* (GOGOL and the Devil), Moskva: Skorpion 1906, pp. 2–4.

Rossiia vidit svoe spasenie ne v mistitsizme, ne v asketizme, ne v pietizme, a v uspekhakh tsivilizatsii, prosveshchenii i gumannosti. Ei nuzhny ne propovedi (dovol'no ona slyshala ikh!), ne molity (dovol'no ona tverdila ikh!), a probuzhdenie v narode chuvstva chelovecheskogo dostoinstva, stol'ko vekov poteriannogo v griazi i navoze, prava i zakony, soobraznye ne s ucheniem tserkvi, a s zdravym smyslom i spravedlivost'iu...²⁵

Russia sees its salvation not in mysticism, not in asceticism, not in pietism, but in the progress of civilization, enlightenment and humanism. It needs no sermons (it has heard enough of them!), no prayers (it has repeated them long enough!), what it needs is the awakening of the sense of human dignity in its people that for centuries were lost in the mud and dung. It needs rights and laws which would satisfy not the Church teachings but common sense and righteousness.

From this point onwards, an unbreachable gulf in the perception of good and evil divided the traditionalist GOGOL and the reformer BELINSKY. This gulf was caused by the book which was barely discussed during the Soviet era. It was only in the last twenty years that Russian readers began to show interest in the patriarchal – still practically unknown today – aspects of the psychology of one of Russia's greatest writers, aspects which heavily influenced GOGOL's conceptualization of good and evil. The fact that GOGOL saw the future of Russia in further practice of Christian (Orthodox) belief rather than in pursuing comforts produced by the technical achievements of the West had great impact on Chinese reception of this work (very much like the reception in the Soviet Union and later in post-Soviet Russia). Chinese discussions of the *Letters to My Friends* are in themselves a symbolic milestone and mark a turning point in the intellectual atmosphere after the beginning of the “Reform and Opening” reforms.

DOSTOEVSKY was GOGOL's direct spiritual follower in the expression of his own concerns about the global future of Christianity as well as in the literary elaboration of evil in the discussion of these concerns. For him just as for GOGOL, Western civilization was primarily associated with a beginning alienation from Christianity. The main causes for this alienation were seen in intellectual currents which acted in the name of universal happiness and turned man into an object of almost religious worship, eventually replacing God by man. Vasilij ROZANOV's (Vasilii ROZANOV, 1856–1919) *Legenda o velikom inkvizitore F. M. Dostoevskogo* (The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor by F. M. DOSTOEVSKY) is a well-known study which focused on DOSTOEVSKY's criticism of these spiritual developments in the West. ROZANOV recognizes a deep relationship between

25 Vissarion BELINSKY'S (Vissarion BELINSKII) letter to GOGOL (on 15 June 1847, Salzbrunn). In: Nikolai GOGOL': *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Complete Works) vol. 8, Len-grad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk 1952, pp. 500–510, here p. 501.

Catholicism and the boom of the socialist idea as one of the intuitions which were central to the poetics of DOSTOEVSKY: *the formicary (muraveiňik)*, *the crystal palace (khrustal'nyi dvorec)*, *the henhouse (kuriatnik)* are among the most frequent figurative expressions for this intuition which ROZANOV discusses at large.²⁶ *The Grand Inquisitor* is DOSTOEVSKY's most significant philosophical elaboration of radical evil. As in the case with GOGOL, the exposition of this theme is inseparable from DOSTOEVSKY's concerns about the future of Christian faith. For this reason, it is self-explanatory that the developments in Chinese discussions of evil in DOSTOEVSKY's work followed similar patterns as in GOGOL's case.

Compared with GOGOL and DOSTOEVSKY, BULGAKOV displays a significantly different approach to the problem of evil. His exposition is an open political parody of the Soviet reality and of communism. The incorporation of evil is conceptualized in a quite different manner from the Devil and CHICHIKOV by GOGOL and *the Grand Inquisitor* by DOSTOEVSKY: BULGAKOV's Voland comes to Moscow to carry out a task which in effect – “normally” – he is considered to manage in the afterworld. He punishes all possible manifestations of evil in humans: envy, greed, cruelty, etc. He emerges as a gentleman who is able to recognize great personalities and helps them struggle through all the horrors of the socialist reality. BULGAKOV's *The Master and Margarita* is therefore first and foremost a socio-critical psychological parody. However, he operates with similar visions of evil – against the background of Christianity – as GOGOL and DOSTOEVSKY did before him. The epigraph which he has chosen for the novel – the self-introduction of Mephistopheles from GOETHE's *Faust*²⁷ – already clearly indicates the adherence to the same spiritual tradition as both of his predecessors. Yet ironically, precisely in spite of this epigraph and in marked contrast with Mephistopheles, Voland does not display even the slightest intent of acting out evil. Evil is alien to him, and hence this is maybe the greatest metamorphosis of evil if one compares BULGAKOV's novel with all other literary elaborations of evil in Western and Russian literature.

Another essential difference between BULGAKOV and his two predecessors can be observed from the perspective of their attitude to the West. BULGAKOV is much more positive in this respect, which is reflected in many episodes of his novel: Margarita is not only said to be a queen at Satan's ball, but is made far more specific in her royal qualities – as a direct descendant of the French court²⁸; KANT is

26 Vasilii ROZANOV: *Legenda o Velikom Inkvizitore F. M. Dostoevskogo* (The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor by F. M. DOSTOEVSKY, 1894), Moskva: Respublika 1996, p. 87.

27 “Ein Teil von jener Kraft, die stets das Böse will und stets das Gute schafft.” (Johann Wolfgang von GOETHE: *Faust*, Weimar: Volksverlag 1958, p. 52.) Mikhail BULGAKOV: *Master i Margarita* (The Master and Margarita), Moskva: Golos 1999, p. 156: “Іа - чист' тóї сily, chtо vechno khochet zla i vechno sovershaet blago.”

28 Mikhail BULGAKOV: *Master i Margarita* (1999), p. 387.

said to have attained access to the Paradise for developing his own way of proving the existence of God²⁹; alone the fact that BULGAKOV takes a passage from GOETHE as the epigraph for the novel is sufficient to prove his inner self-identification with the culture of the West.

The present study aims at an analysis of the Chinese reception of all the above mentioned affinities and differences in the work of three Russian classics, and is intended as a contribution to better understanding the complex process of intercultural communication and the exchange of ideas between China, Russia, and the West.

GOGOL

In the history of the Chinese reception of GOGOL, LU Xun 鲁迅 (1881–1936) played a remarkable role both as an active propagator of GOGOL and as the first translator of *Dead Souls* into Chinese, on which he worked in 1935/1936. Raoul FINDEISEN who made this translation – one of the last works of LU Xun – the subject of a separate study, lists considerable complexities LU Xun was confronted with while preparing it. Among other things, FINDEISEN mentions a letter written by LU Xun to his younger colleague HU Feng 胡风 (1902–1985) in the year 1935, in which the following statement may be found: “My head and brain are confused because I have read too little of GOGOL in the past. I thought it would be easy to translate and did not imagine it so difficult.”³⁰ This is a remarkable complaint if one considers that prior to this letter LU Xun often referred to GOGOL as one of his own literary authorities, a person who exerted great influence on his own career as a writer: in this sense GOGOL was mentioned in his essay *Wo zenme zuo qi xiaoshuo lai* 我怎么做起小说来 (How I Began to Write Fiction, 1933)³¹ as well

29 Ibid., p. 163.

30 Raoul David FINDEISEN: “A Translator’s Testament: Lu Xun’s *Si hunling* (*Dead Souls*, 1935–1936)”. In: Raoul D. FINDEISEN, Gad C. ISAY (et al., eds.): *At Home in Many Worlds: Reading, Writing and Translating from Chinese and Jewish Cultures, Essays in Honour of Irene Eber*, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2009, pp. 189–202, here p. 194. LU Xun *quan ji* 鲁迅全集 (Complete works by LU Xun), Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe 2005, p. 458. “这几天因为赶译《死魂灵》 vol. 8, 弄得昏头昏脑, 我以前太小看了ゴーゴリ, 以为容易译的, 不料很难...” Literally, “tai xiaokan le” should be more accurately translated as “underestimated” (rather than “read too little”), but the reason for *underestimating* GOGOL should actually have been LU Xun’s insufficient experience of reading GOGOL.

31 *LU Xun quan ji* (2005) vol. 4, pp. 525–530, here p. 525.

as in the work of his youth, a literary manifesto of modern China *Moluo shi li shuo* 摩罗诗力说 (On the Power of Mara Poetry,³² 1907). For the present study, the manifesto on Mara Poetry is especially relevant because it signaled the beginning of the Chinese reception of GOGOL and listed GOGOL's name alongside various other poets all of whom were called by LU XUN *Mara* or *Satanic* poets. The following passage from this work in the translation by Shu-ying TSAU and Donald HOLOCH may illustrate what exactly he meant by this designation:

I cannot detail each varied voice, but none has such power to inspire and the language as gripping as Mara poetry. Borrowed from India, the term "Mara" – celestial demon, or "Satan" in Europe – first denoted Byron. Now I apply it to those, among all the poets, who were committed to resistance, whose purpose was action but who were little loved by their age...They'd bellow an audience to its feet, these iconoclasts whose spirit struck deep chords in later generations, extending to infinity.³³

One mutual trait is shared by all Satanic poets who are brought together in this piece of writing by LU XUN is that all of them are *loud* poets. The pictures LU XUN resorts to in describing them constantly underline this loud disposition: *voices*, *bellowing*, *striking deep chords*, etc. Loud voices – especially those from the West – are reported to be necessary in order to shake China from its perilous dream and develop a strong national spirit. According to LU XUN, China has to recognize that any state of peace is yet an illusion, and Satan (*sadan* 撒但) is regarded as someone who can help China arrive at this realization: Satan is opposed to any harmony between man, God, and nature; he is the very personification of the impossibility of a peaceful existence:

Consider Nature: woods caressed by soft breezes, everything moist with sweet rain, as though all things were meant to bless humanity; yet flames raging underneath make vents in the earth and erupt one day to destroy all things. The frequent breeze and rain are passing phenomena, not an eternal idyll as in Adam's native place...The killer instinct is born with life; "peace" is a name for what is not.³⁴

The destruction is the reality of Satan which is opposed by the force of LU XUN's imagination to the illusory harmony of Adam. All the poets who are associated with this reality are said to have the same ability: to erupt and rebel. GOGOL figures among the first of these powerful eruptions and is introduced in the following

32 LU XUN *quan ji* (2005) vol. 1, pp. 65–120.

33 LU XUN: "On the Power of Mara Poetry", tr. by Shu-ying TSAU and Donald HOLOCH. In: Kirk A. DENTON (ed.), *Modern Chinese Literary Thought: Writings on Literature 1893–1945*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 1996, pp. 96–109, here p. 99.

34 Ibid., p. 100.

characteristic manner: “十九世纪前叶，果有鄂戈理者起，以不可见之泪痕悲色，振其邦人。”³⁵ (In the early 19th century, GOGOL appeared and struck his countrymen by the force of unimaginable tears and suffering.)

All the figures from the huge melting pot of LU Xun's *Mara school* (*Moluozong* 摩罗宗, or Satanic school/Satanic poets, as it is sometimes called by his interpreters³⁶) including PUSHKIN, BYRON, SHELLEY, LERMONTOV, and GOGOL are quite simple symbols, all of them meaning nothing more than “a storm”, “an upheaval”, “a revolt”, “an eruption”,³⁷ all mutually interchangeable, in spite of any actual differences existing in their worldviews. The very idea of a “complicated worldview”, of inner conflicts and philosophical quests which could have accompanied these authors in the course of their lives is negated by LU Xun from the outset, as – according to him – “no principles are pursued (in literature)” (*jiuli fucun* 究理弗存).³⁸

LU Xun's idealization of liberation powers associated here with Satan is completed by explicitly neutralizing any rationality. The poetry theorist is literally enchanted by feeling, intuition, and Satanic inspiration which in the first place allows him to equalize such aesthetically different writers such as PUSHKIN and GOGOL. This methodology also explains why some thirty years later he would complain to a colleague about not having had enough reading experience of GOGOL: the emotional emphasis and the negation of rationality allowed him that in his youth he could bring forward judgments on literature without sufficiently relying on primary sources. However, in spite of all the irrationality of this approach to literature and arts, or maybe exactly due to this irrationality and intuition, LU Xun had understood the prominence of evil and the Satanic as a major constituent of GOGOL's poetics. Ironically, it would take almost a whole century to revise the sometimes

35 *LU Xun quanji* (2005) vol. 1, p. 66.

36 Cf. OU Li: “Romantic, Rebel, and Reactionary: The Metamorphosis of Byron in Twentieth-Century China”. In: Alex WATSON, Laurence WILLIAMS (eds.), *British Romanticism in Asia: The Reception, Translation, and Transformation of Romantic Literature in India and East Asia*, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan 2019, pp. 191–220, here p. 198; SONG Qing-bao: “The Different Views of Women of Lord Byron and Su Manshu”. In: Peter COCHRAN (ed.): *Byron and Women [and men]*, Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars 2010, pp. 81–88, here pp. 87–88.

37 A much more thorough analysis of the psychology of BYRON's revolting “Satanic heroes” is provided by Fred PARKER: “Their consciousness is withdrawn, inflamed and brooding; the pain they carry within is never fully communicated, but expressed in part by the attitude of disdain, severe and superb...” (Fred PARKER: “Between Satan and Mephistopheles: Byron and the Devil”. In: *The Cambridge Quarterly* vol. 35 no. 1, 2006, pp. 1–29, here p. 2.)

38 Shu-ying TSAU and Donald HOLOCH (“On the Power of Mara Poetry” (1996), p. 105) provide a more expressive translation for this passage: “no philosophy is to be dug out of it.”

too simplistic sentimental judgments made by the classic of modern Chinese literary theory.

The present paper cannot provide an exhaustive picture of Chinese translations of GOGOL³⁹ and studies on his work. Instead some turning points in the history of GOGOL's reception have to be highlighted here, i.e. the most important stages in China's coming to terms with GOGOL's evil. During the first of these stages – roughly between the May Fourth era and the 1960s – GOGOL was seen primarily as a great satirist and social reformer. Therefore, Chinese readings of GOGOL of the time can be interpreted as quite in tune with LU Xun's exposition of his Satanic qualities. A good overview for this particular stage is provided by WANG Zhigeng 王志耕 in his essay *Guogeli zai Zhongguo de bashi nian licheng* 果戈理在中国的八十年历程 (Eighty Years of GOGOL in China).⁴⁰ WANG begins his discussion with LU Xun and the May Fourth and approaches GOGOL as a romantic author whose main intent was to call people to freedom (*dui ziyou de nahan* 对自由的呐喊).⁴¹ He, too, interprets GOGOL as a critical reformer, and it is striking that for the whole period of eighty years of Chinese readings of GOGOL, which he discusses, the religion is practically not mentioned at all. The problem of evil is mentioned, but only as *the evil(s) of the epoch* (*dangdai de zuie* 当代的罪恶),⁴² which is (are) in need of corrections. Another striking feature of this analysis is the predominantly negative approach to spiritual components in GOGOL's thought: as early as in the 1920s Chinese intellectuals were said to have avoided any discussions on the supernatural (*shengui de shijie* 神鬼的世界) as something alien to them for the following reason: “而中国人需要的是写实主义的旗帜，是对黑暗的揭露与控诉，而不是带有中国传统味的轮回报应故事” (What people in China need[ed], was the banner of realistic writing by which darkness is revealed and denounced rather than stories about retribution which are reminiscent (lit.: which *smack*) of Chinese tradition).⁴³ In other words, he makes it clear that the early reception of GOGOL in China was accompanied by a serious contradiction: on the one hand, GOGOL the reformer was welcome, but on the other hand, a critical distance was taken to some of his major themes, among other things, to the demonic

39 The above-mentioned article by Raoul D. FINDEISEN lists a large number of further translations of *Dead Souls* which appeared after that of LU Xun (FINDEISEN: “A Translator's Testament” (2009), p. 202). A good review of other works of GOGOL translated into Chinese up to 1990 is provided in the essay by WANG Zhigeng 王志耕, “Guogeli zai Zhongguo de bashi nian licheng” 果戈理在中国的八十年历程 (Eighty Years of GOGOL in China). In: *Waiguo wenxue yanjiu* 外国文学研究 (Foreign Literature Studies), no. 2, 1990, pp. 194–199.

40 WANG Zhigeng: “Guogeli zai Zhongguo de bashi nian licheng” (1990).

41 Ibid., p. 194.

42 Ibid., p. 195.

43 Ibid.

and supernatural and to the religious component which in the eyes of Chinese literati smacked of their own obsolete cultural past.

That this contradictory attitude lasted for quite a long time can be corroborated by an essay of another GOGOL specialist PENG Ke 彭克 from 1959: *Jinian weida de Eluosi zuojia Guogeli dansheng yi bai wu shi zhou nian* 纪念律大的俄罗斯作家果戈理诞生一百五十周年 (Commemorating the 150th Anniversary of GOGOL's Birth).⁴⁴ He, too, begins his commemoration with GOGOL's impact on many pioneers of the May Fourth, among others on LU Xun und QU Qiubai瞿秋白 (1899–1935) and approaches the motif of evil as *social evils* (*shehui de choue* 社会的丑恶, p. 121). Nonetheless, until the time of PENG writing this essay, nothing seemed to have significantly changed about this approach:

在解放了的中国,果戈理的作品受到广大人民的热爱。他的主要作品,从《狄康卡近乡夜话》直到《死魂灵》,都已经有了较好的译本。《钦差大臣》经常在舞台上演出,加深观众对于旧社会的仇恨和对于果戈理所追求的光明的新社会的热爱。⁴⁵

In the liberated China, the works of GOGOL were met with universal love. Fairly good translations were produced for all of his major works, from *Dikanka Tales* up to *Dead Souls*. *The Government Inspector* was staged several times: it has deepened the audience's hatred of the old society as well as its love for an enlightened new society which GOGOL had sought.

Dikanka Tales – a product of distinctly religious thinking – are not only mentioned by PENG, but receive a rather detailed description. Among other things, he reports on the doings of the Devil in *Christmas Eve*, how he tries to steal the moon from the sky in order to hinder the protagonists' meeting and how Wakula (Vakula) – the main character of the tale – circumvents the Devil's schemes. The work is said to be imbued with *folk intonation* (*minjian koutou* 民间口头) and *romanticism* (*langman zhuyi* 浪漫主义), etc.⁴⁶ However, nothing is said about the real motives of the Devil's action (it is Wakula's religiosity that highly disturbs the Devil) or about the friendly reception of Wakula by Empress Katharina at her court in St Petersburg. Popular and romantic features play the dominant role in this reception of evil in GOGOL's early work: evil is equal to darkness, which is understood purely in socio-critical terms, not as part of a religious program. The religious motives are also cut out in PENG's analysis of *Peterburgskie povesti* (The

44 In: *Beijing daxue xuebao* 北京大学学报 (Journal of Beijing University), 1959, no. 2, pp. 121–128.

45 PENG Ke, "Jinian weida de Eluosi zuojia Guogeli dansheng yi bai wu shi zhou nian" (1959), p. 121.

46 Ibid., p. 122.

Petersburg Tales, pp. 124-125), and of all the tales it is *Portret* (The Portrait) which is omitted completely, a tale which hardly allows any socio-critical approach and is filled with reflections on evil against a predominantly religious background. The role of GOGOL as a progressive reformer is fortified by the authority of BELINSKY: “别林斯基并且指出果戈尔创作的巨大的革命意义，经常利用他的作品进行反对专制农奴制度的斗争。”⁴⁷ (BELINSKY also mentions the great revolutionary idea in the works of GOGOL who often used them to struggle against the traditional system of serfdom.)

As mentioned in the introduction of this article, in the course of time BELINSKY had developed a much more critical view of GOGOL than is shown in PENG’s study. The reason for such a critical reevaluation of his views on GOGOL was primarily the publication of *Selected Letters to my Friends* (1847) in which GOGOL was emphatically portraying to his contemporaries the great mission of the Orthodox faith; the needs to preserve the national spiritual heritage; and the sacred nature of the monarchy, which eventually caused a wave of scathing criticism against GOGOL primarily among Westernizers like BELINSKY. The book marked a turning point in GOGOL’s career, but in the history of Chinese reception of GOGOL and his ideas of evil, discussions of this book were also a significant milestone. They began relatively late, and a prominent role in them was played by REN Guangxuan 任光宣 who in effect opened the eyes of Chinese readers on the very existence of this book. In the year 1999 REN published his complete Chinese translation of it,⁴⁸ but already in his earlier publications he explored the extreme importance of the religion for GOGOL’s thought. In his essay “On the Religious Vision in GOGOL’s Work” (1993), he introduced this theme as follows: Unlike religious mystics, GOGOL did not plunge into any kind of religious romanticism to describe a supernatural world. From the very beginning to the end, his work was dedicated rather to the realities of life in Russia. Still, it was exactly his religious vision that helped him come to grips with that real life. The best picture of his religious thought may be gained from his *Excerpts from Letters to My Friends* (*Yu youren shuxin xuan* 与友人书信选, 1847).⁴⁹ In REN’s exposition, the main idea behind *The Letters* is similar to that of *Dead Souls*: the evils of reality can be overcome only by means of faith, because it is only in the realm of religion that man can gain an exact picture of evil’s nature and provenance. If in *The Letters* the prominence of this

47 Ibid., p. 127.

48 REN Guangxuan 任光宣 (tr.): *Yu youren shuxin xuan* 与友人书信选 (Excerpts from Letters to My Friends), Anhui wenyi chubanshe 1999.

49 REN Guangxuan: “Lun Guogeli chuangzuo zhong de zongjiao guannian” 论果戈理创作中的宗教观念 (On the Religious Vision in GOGOL’s Work). In: *Waiguo wenxue pinglun* 外国文学评论 (Foreign Literature Review), no. 4, 1993, pp. 105–111, here p. 105.

theme is discussed directly, *Dead Souls* provides the aesthetic elaboration of the relationship between evil and reality:

果戈理认为，恶不是一个抽象的概念，而是具有本体论实质。就是说，每个人本质里含有恶的因素，纯洁的无恶的人是没有的…《死魂灵》展示俄国生活的邪恶和弊端，是从揭示人身上的恶开始的。在第一部里，各种人物表现出俄罗斯这座“地狱”里人的种种邪恶欲望，表现出人物内心的黑暗。⁵⁰

In GOGOL's thought evil is not an abstract category. It has its own ontological status, i.e. everybody carries inside themselves an element of evil, and no one is absolutely free from it... *Dead Souls* demonstrates some of the evils pertaining to life in Russia and begins with the evil within man himself. Every figure in the first part of the novel displays various evil aspirations of this “hell (on Earth)” and makes visible the darkness of the human mind.

Within the *Earthly hell of life*, CHICHIKOV is said to be an evil spirit or the Devil (*e mo* 恶魔),⁵¹ an observation which is quite in tune with MEREZHKOVSKY's judgment on the nature of the Devil in GOGOL's work. REN informs his readers that according to GOGOL's design of the complete novel, this Devil stands in the center of both parts. Sin is his essential nature, and as a personification of it, it appears not only in the center of *Dead Souls*, but also in a number of other works by GOGOL, such as *The Grand Inspector* and *The Portrait*.⁵² REN abstains from a detailed discussion of transformations which the motif of evil went through in GOGOL's thought but he captured the essence of what was characteristic of it from the beginning to the end: it is not a purely ethical or socio-critical motif but one which is firmly rooted in religion, i.e. in the Christian frame of reflections on good and evil. This is a completely different way to approach GOGOL compared with what had been the case in the early stage of his reception. REN's analysis neither rests on omissions, adaptations, and concealments nor does it pursue any officially prescribed ideological correctness. On the other hand, this new approach does not appear to be something accidental, but is rather in accord with a general search for new ways of communication with the world which began with the “Reform and Opening” reforms, i.e. it is in accord with a radical re-evaluation of one's own cultural past and with an active consciousness of peculiarities of one's cultural self. In the context of this new spiritual atmosphere, a significant event was the re-evaluation of the exact relationship between BELINSKY and GOGOL, and the discovery of deep complexities pertaining to this relationship. It was again REN Guangxuan who informed Chinese readers about these complexities in one of his

50 Ibid., p. 108.

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., p. 110.

later essays, which refers directly to GOGOL's *The Letters* already in its title: "GOGOL's Spiritual Testament: Reading *Excerpts from Letters to My Friends*" (2001).⁵³ In this work, REN focuses on one of GOGOL's fundamental concerns: What way shall Russia follow in the future? REN explains the main tendencies of GOGOL's time to approach this question, reports about the tension between Russia's two major intellectual camps – the Westernizers (*xioupai* 西欧派) and Slavophiles (*silafupai* 斯拉夫派) – and describes the reasons for GOGOL's sympathies with the latter:

为了净化心灵和完善道德,果戈里认为必须了解自己的心灵,需要自我的构建。...果戈理认为为国家服务就是为天上的君主 – 上帝服务的愿望。这的确是一个基督徒在谈自己的服务思想。⁵⁴

In order to purify the soul and to bring one's morality to perfection, GOGOL thinks it is necessary to know one's own soul; an identity structure is needed... GOGOL thinks that the desire to serve one's country is equal to the desire to serve the Lord in Heaven – God. This thinking is really characteristic of a Christian who is reflecting on his personal duties.

REN elaborates on GOGOL's consciousness of deep connections between the love of God and the love of Russia, also a country that enjoys God's special love because of the unprecedented piety of her people.⁵⁵ This patriotic love is said to be no impediment for a fruitful exchange with other cultures. On the contrary, GOGOL was convinced that Russia also had to learn from others, but not at the cost of abandoning one's own cultural self: "这里果戈理首先论述了接受外来文化与继承自己民族文化传统的辩证关系; 其次, 他暗示出俄罗斯人性格中的宗教性。"⁵⁶ (GOGOL develops here the principle of a dialectical relationship between accepting elements of foreign cultures and going on to foster the traditions of one's own national culture; furthermore, he alludes to the religiosity peculiar to the Russian character.)

In this particular instance of interpreting GOGOL, the word "dialectics" (*bian-zheng* 辩证) is by no means accidental. In my opinion, it acts as a powerful signal and points at some present-day problems with which China's intellectuals themselves are directly confronted. All the numerous studies in which GOGOL's *The*

53 REN Guangxuan 任光宣: "Guogeli de jingshen yizhu – du 'Yu youren shujian xuan'" 果戈理的精神遗嘱——读《与友人书简选》(GOGOL's Spiritual Testament: Reading *Excerpts from Letters to My Friends*). In: *Waiguo wenxue jikan* 外国文学季刊 (Foreign Literature Quarterly), 2001. no. 4, pp. 101–110.

54 Ibid., p. 103.

55 Ibid., p. 104.

56 Ibid., p. 108.

Letters have been discussed here since the early 1990s make a point highlighting the great dilemma of GOGOL's time and his answer to it which is met with criticisms of many of his contemporaries for its apparent backwardness: for the defense of Russia's old patriarchal way of living, traditions, and religiosity.

Looking once more back on the early stage of the Chinese reception of GOGOL, for example, on the analysis provided by WANG Zhigeng for the 1920s in which any discussions of supernatural and spiritual are said to have been avoided by Chinese intellectuals because of the possible "smack of Chinese tradition" (*chuantong wei* 传统味), it is possible to see what a radical reversal has taken place in the conceptualization of values in the last thirty years. REN Guangxuan's discussion of GOGOL's concept of *universal love* may serve as a further illustration of this process: by displaying universal love ("liubov' ko vsemu chelovechestvu"⁵⁷ *yi pian aixin* 一片爱心) of his subjects a monarch follows one of the most essential principles of God.⁵⁸ GOGOL is said to have regarded the religious destination – and not simply a justification – of monarchy in terms of exactly this principle, which also presupposes a divine quality; in this essential ability, God's own presence is incorporated, and nobody but a monarch is ever able to come into its possession.

In the clear difference from other monarchy discourses that highlight the idea of modernization, as for example those of constitutional monarchy and enlightened absolutism, GOGOL's approach to monarchy and his conceptual elaboration of universal love are patriarchal to the core; and within current discussions of GOGOL it is striking how much interest they find in China, and how close these readings occasionally come to indigenous Chinese conceptuality, when for example "universal love" is translated by terms like "boai" 博爱 (universal love). ZHENG Weihong's 郑伟红 essay "On the Religious Thought of GOGOL"⁵⁹ follows this way in discussing the religious thought of GOGOL. By choosing the indigenous Chinese concept "boai", he constructs an ideal bridge between Russia and China, but simultaneously it functions as a call-sign to evoke the idea of a confrontation with the West and searching for an alternative for something the West is not able to offer. It is not surprising that ZHENG's analysis of GOGOL's religious thought is introduced by a discussion concerning the fourteen years GOGOL spent in Europe and, for his pessimistic impressions, gained from this travelling experience. For

57 Nikolai GOGOL': *Vybrannye mesta iz perepiski s druz'iами* (Selected Letters to My Friends). In: *Polnoe sobranie sochineniĭ* (Complete Works) vol. 8, p. 256.

58 REN Guangxuan, „Lun Guogeli chuangzuo zhong de zongjiao guannian“ (1993), p. 106.

59 ZHENG Weihong 郑伟红: "Lun Guogeli de zongjiao sixiang" 论果戈理的宗教思想 (On the Religious Thought of GOGOL). In: *Baoding xueyuan xuebao* 保定学院学报 (Journal of Baoding University) vol. 23 no. 1, Jan. 2010, pp. 15–17, here p. 15.

example his thoughts on Europe not having a future; the only possible way for Russia's future prosperity is in its Orthodox belief.⁶⁰

“The primary deception of modernity” (“xiandaixing de zhuyao huangyan” 现代性的主要谎言) is nothing else than turning its back on religion. In spite of all its technical and artistic achievements, Europe lacks a spirit of love (“queshao guan’ai jingshen” 缺少关爱精神)⁶¹ which is said to be among the central ideas of GOGOL’s *The Letters*. One of the obvious results of Europe’s not duly cherishing Christian religion is the neglect of the divine mission of monarchy and the neglect of universal love. ZHENG approaches this concept as follows:

道德高尚纯洁的人固然值得尊敬，但那些下等人，心灵被恶习浸染的人更需要去爱，更值得去爱。用爱去帮助他们，用爱使他们高尚起来，这就是基督的博爱精神。⁶²

It goes without saying that people of high morality deserve respect, but those who are inferior to them and those whose souls are stained by evil need and deserve even more love. Caring for them with love in order to help them elevate themselves is exactly the spirit of Christian universal love (*boai*).

GOGOL returns to the discussion of the theme of universal love (istinnoe chelovekoljubie) at the end of *The Letters* in the section which he calls “The Glory of Resurrection” (Svetloe Voskresenie),⁶³ to which ZHENG pays special attention.⁶⁴ In GOGOL’s view, the lack of sincere Christian universal love which is peculiar to the average modern Westerner manifests itself most clearly – and again in stark contrast to Russia – during Easter festivities; no enthusiasm comparable with Orthodox Easter can be perceived at this time in the West.⁶⁵ In this context again ZHENG’s translation of universal love by “*boai*” is likely to exert, at least to some degree, a suggestive power on Chinese intellectuals and make them think of contexts in which it was employed by thinkers of Chinese antiquity.⁶⁶ Yet simultaneously it refers to reflections about the West, being explicitly critical about

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid., p. 16.

62 Ibid.

63 Nikolai GOGOL: “Vybrannye mesta iz perepiski s druz’iami” (Selected Letters to My Friends). In: *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Complete Works) vol. 8, pp. 409–418.

64 ZHENG Weihong: “Lun Guogeli de zongjiao sixiang” (2010), p. 16.

65 Ibid., p. 409.

66 For the indigenous Chinese concept “*boai*”, see for example the article by XIANG Shiling 向世陵 and XIN Xiaoxia 辛晓霞: “Rujia *boai* guannian de qiyuan ji qi yunhan” 儒家博爱观念的起源及其蕴含 (On the Confucian notion of *boai*, its origin and meaning). In: *Beijing daxue xuebao* 北京大学学报 (Journal of Beijing University) vol. 51 no. 5, Sep. 2014, pp. 35–43.

abandoning traditional spiritual values and reflecting on the lessons one can learn from GOGOL's personal experience of the West.

To sum up, it can be said that current Chinese readings of GOGOL and the theme of evil in his work testify a far deeper and more complex level of understanding of his ideas than it was in the case in the May Fourth era and before the beginning of the opening reforms. Certainly not all of the numerous studies dedicated to GOGOL in China display the same quality. Apart from perceptive psychological analyses⁶⁷ of GOGOL's thought, there are also studies which do no justice to the subject (e.g. the interpretation of the Devil in *Christmas Eve* as a *lovely* (*keai de* 可爱的⁶⁸) *being*). Despite all the qualitative differences, however, most of the current studies of GOGOL display one significant common feature: they all recognize that GOGOL's evil cannot be reduced to the pragmatics of social reforms; that it is primarily a religious concept; and any search for ways to overcome this kind of evil refers the reader not only to ways of securing a splendid future, but also of necessity to the realm of one's cultural past.

DOSTOEVSKY

Esli est' na svete strana, kotoraiā byla by dlia drugikh, otdalennykh ili sopredel'nykh s neū stran bolee neizvestnoiū, neissledovannoiū, bolee vsekh drugikh stran neponiātoiū i neponiātnoiū, to éta strana est', bezuslovno, Rossiā dlia zapadnykh sosedei svoikh. Nikakoi Kitaī, nikakaī ĪAponiā ne mogut byt' pokryty takoi tañoi dlia evropeiskoi pytlivosti, kak Rossiā, prezhde, v nastoiashchuiū minetu i dazhe, mozhet byt', eshche ochen' dolgo v budushchem.⁶⁹

67 For example, the analysis of evil in GOGOL's *The Portrait* in: FENG Xiaoqing 冯小庆: “Guogeli zhongpian xiaoshuo Xiaoxiang de zongjiao shenmizhui qianxi” 果戈理中篇小说《肖像》的宗教神秘主义浅析 (Some Remarks on the Religious Mysticism in GOGOL's Novel *The Portrait*). In: *Xiboliya yanjiu* 西伯利亚研究 (Siberian Studies) vol. 39 no. 5, Oct. 2012, pp. 51–54.

68 YU Xianqin 余献勤: “Cong ‘Dikangka jin xiang yehua’ guan Guogeli” 从《狄康卡近乡夜话》观果戈理 (A View on GOGOL from the Perspective of his *Evenings on a Farm Near Dikanka*). In: *Jiefangjun Waiguoyu xueyuan xuebao* 解放军外国语学院学报 (Journal of PLA University of Foreign Languages) vol. 26 no. 1, 2003, pp. 99–102, here p. 101.

69 Fedor DOSTOEVSKIĬ: *Riad statei o russkoī literature* (A Series of Lectures on Russian Literature, 1861). In: Fedor DOSTOEVSKIĬ, *Polnoe sobranie sochineniĭ v tridtsati tomakh* (Complete Works in Thirty Volumes) vol. 18, Leningrad: Nauka 1978, pp. 41–107, here p. 41.

If there exists a country in the world which is the most unknown and unexplored by other countries, either its neighbors or not, the least understood and the least comprehensible one, that country would certainly be Russia in the eyes of her Western neighbors. No other place in the world like China or Japan could ever be covered by a comparable mystery for European inquisitiveness as Russia has been before, remains to be now, and will continue to be probably for quite a long time in the future.

Meanwhile the great mystery of Russia is being explored not only by Europe, but also by other cultures which DOSTOEVSKY mentions only on the margins of his *Lectures on Russian Literature*, as well as by China and Japan. DOSTOEVSKY himself may be called one of the greatest mysteries worldwide to which not everybody has access. In her study on the parallels between *The Brothers KARAMAZOV* and *The Book of Job*, WU Shan 吴珊 complains about the pertaining complexities and states that “it has never been easy [to read DOSTOEVSKY]” (*conglai bu shi yi jian rongyi de shi* 从来不是一件容易的事).⁷⁰ HE Huaihong 何怀宏, specialist in cross-cultural ethics, suggests that reading DOSTOEVSKY should be reserved for a special kind of people: “接受陀思妥耶夫斯基确实需要某种气质和机缘。” (A special disposition as well as special circumstances are really required in order to accept DOSTOEVSKY.)⁷¹ That the circumstances have not always been favorable for China’s approaches to DOSTOEVSKY is testified by numerous instances in which he was condemned as a reactionary (*fandong* 反动) and obscure (*heian* 黑暗) author.⁷² As in the case with GOGOL, an active reception of his work began in the May Fourth era,⁷³ and it was, again like in GOGOL’s case, the religious

70 WU Shan 吴珊: “*Yuebo ji* dui Tuosituoyefusiji wenxue guan de yingxiang” 《约伯记》对对陀思妥耶夫斯基文学观的影响 (On the Influence of *The Book of Job* on DOSTOEVSKY’s Literary Thought). In: *Henan keji xueyuan xuebao* 河南科技学院学报 (Journal of Henan Institute of Science and Technology) no. 7, 2012, pp. 70–73, here p. 73.

71 HE Huaihong 何怀宏: *Daode, Shangdi yu Ren: Tuosituoyefusiji de wenti* 道德·上帝与人: 陀思妥耶夫斯基的问题 (Ethics, God and Man: On the Problems of DOSTOEVSKY), Beijing: Xinhua chubanshe 1999, p. 189.

72 See for example a review article by DING Shixing 丁世鑫: “20 shiji 80 niandai Zhongguo de Tuosituoyefusiji yanjiu” 20世纪 80年代中国的陀思妥耶夫斯基研究 (“On Studies on DOSTOEVSKY in China in the 1980s”). In: *Zhejiang ligong daxue xuebao* 浙江理工大学学报 (Zhejiang Sci-Tech University) vol. 38 no. 4, Aug. 2017, pp. 312–317, here p. 314.

73 A detailed review of this reception is provided in: LI Wanchun 李万春: “Tuosituoyefusiji yu Zhongguo wenxue” 陀思妥耶夫斯基与中国文学 (DOSTOEVSKY and Chinese Literature). In: *Shehui kexue zhanxian* 社会科学战线 (The Front of Social Sciences) no. 1, 1989, pp. 342–346.

Christian idea that stood in the way of a sympathetic understanding of the motif of evil before the “Reform and Opening” reforms.⁷⁴

The first complete Chinese rendition of *The Brothers KARAMAZOV* was issued in 1981.⁷⁵ For the present study, it is especially the reception of this particular novel which can prove illuminating in terms of understanding DOSTOEVSKY’s ideas on evil because it represents a synthesis of these ideas as a sum of all that he had said on this subject. The personified evil is part of the novel’s key chapters; it is always an open adversary of figures who have faith, as well as of the Christian God himself.

In itself evil is a theme that finds a place in all of DOSTOEVSKY’s writings, but it is not as optically sharply positioned within an interplay of questions generally concerning individuality, nation, and humanity in any other work as in this novel. DOSTOEVSKY gives us some illuminating hints that are helpful for approaching this complex subject in the *Lectures* which I have just cited. He does not simply formulate the great puzzle, i.e. the mysterious nature of Russian psychology in the eyes of the West but regards it as his own direct duty being a Russian writer to offer a solution to the puzzle. He defines the essence of Russian psychology as follows:

V russkom kharaktere zamechaetsia rezkoe otlichie ot evropeitsev, rezkaia osobennost', chto v nem po preimushchestvu vystupaet sposobnost' vysokosinteticheskaiia, sposobnost' vseprimirnosti, vsechelovechnosti. V russkom cheloveke net evropeiskoii ugrovatosti, nepronitaemosti, nepodatlivosti. On so vsemi uzhivaetsia i vo vse vzhivaetsia. On sochuvstvuet vsemu chelovecheskomu vne razlichiiia natsional'nosti, krovi i pochvy. On nakhodit i nemedlenno dopuskaet razumnost' vo vsem, v chem khot' skol'ko-nibud' est' obshchecelovecheskogo interesa. U nego instinkt obshchecelovechnosti.⁷⁶

A striking difference can be observed between the Russian character and its European counterparts. A striking peculiarity of the Russian character is its being primarily marked by a highly synthetic ability of an all embracing tolerance and

74 For China’s criticisms of some “unhealthy elements” (*bujiankang de sixiang* 不健康的思想) peculiar to DOSTOEVSKY’s work, of his Orthodox belief among other things, which were expressed by Chinese intellectuals prior to the opening reforms, see pp. 48–49 of TIAN Quanjin 田全金 and WANG Shengsi 王圣思: “Tuosituoyefusiji de san fu miankong: Dui Zhongguo Tuoshi yanjiu de pipanxing kaocha” 陀思妥耶夫斯基的三副面孔——对中国陀氏研究的批判性考察 (Three Faces of DOSTOEVSKY: A Critical Examination of Chinese Studies on DOSTOEVSKY). In: *Wuhan keji daxue xuebao* 武汉科技大学学报 (Journal of Wuhan University of Science and Technology) vol. 8 no. 2, 2006, pp. 46–51.

75 GENG Jizhi 耿济之 (tr.): *Kalamazuofu xiongdi* 卡拉马佐夫兄弟, Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe 1981.

76 Fedor DOSTOEVSKI: *Riad statei o russkoii literature* (1978), p. 55.

universal humanism. There is nothing of European clumsiness, impenetrability or rigidness in a Russian. He agrees with everyone and comes to terms with everything. He sympathizes with everything that is humane regardless of nationality, blood, and origin. He admits the rationality of all that bears at least some traces of a universal human concern. He possesses an instinct of universal humanism.

DOSTOEVSKY's discussion of national issues displays, as it shall be illustrated later, the same methodology as the discussion of evil: in both cases he heavily relies on antinomies, i.e. such logical operations in which contradictions are not only conceded but regarded as a necessary precondition of knowledge; a thesis and an antithesis are not eventually resolved in a synthesis but constitute a logical continuum without any neutralization (*Aufheben*). As for the above problem of Russian national character, it is evident that the “universal humanism” which he regards as the general aspiration of Russians is being opposed to something which is quite recognizable for any reader: qualities associated with the West, Western rationalism, as well as Western Christianity. What is claimed to be universally humane is thus simultaneously counterbalanced against those aspects of humanity treated as the aim of an open critique and thought of as an antithesis. The thesis (the Russian instinct for what is universally humane) cannot be formulated without the existence of its opposite counterpart. Neither is the case with DOSTOEVSKY's theory of freedom and evil. In his famous work on the worldview of DOSTOEVSKY, BERDYAEV (Nikolaï BERDIÄEV, 1874–1948) begins his discussion of *The Poem on the Grand Inquisitor* by observing that it was more than unusual of the author to make no one but Iwan KARAMAZOV (Ivan KARAMAZOV), an outspoken atheist, pronounce this poem which is *an unprecedented praise of Christ* (nebyvalui po sile khvalu Khristu⁷⁷) and the peak of DOSTOEVSKY's entire literary career (vershina tvorchestva Dostoevskogo⁷⁸). BERDYAEV himself interprets this contradiction dialectically: “Light is being brought forth in darkness” (svet vozgoraetsia vo t'me).⁷⁹ Exactly just as the highest possible goodness is brought forward by the force of a dialectical principle (out of darkness) the nature of radical evil which is personified in the figure of the Grand Inquisitor follows similar intricate dialectics: “Light is being brought forth in darkness” (svet vozgoraetsia vo t'me).⁸⁰ Exactly just as the highest possible goodness is brought forward by the force of a dialectical principle (out of darkness) the nature of radical evil which is personified in the figure of the Grand Inquisitor follows similar intricate dialectics:

77 Nikolaï BERDIÄEV: *Mirosozertsanie Dostoevskogo* (The Worldview of DOSTOEVSKY), Moskva: Iskusstvo 1994, p. 124.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid.

On soblaznen zlom, priniāvshim oblich'e dobra. Takova priroda antikhristova soblazna. Antikhristovo nachalo ne est' staroe, gruboe, srazu vidimoe zlo. Éto — novoe, utonchennoe i soblazniāiushchee zlo, ono vsegda īavliāetsiā v oblich'e dobra. V antikhristovom zle vsegda est' podobie khristianskomu dobru, vsegda ostaetsiā opasnost' smesheniā i podmeny. Obraz dobra nachinaet dvoit'sia. Obraz Khrista perestaet īasno vosprinimat'sia, on smeshivaetsiā s obrazom antikhrista.⁸¹

He is being tempted by evil that has taken the appearance of goodness. It is such a nature of the temptations by the Antichrist. This is not the old, crude, immediately visible evil. This is rather a new, sophisticated, and tempting evil that always appears as goodness. The Antichrist's evil always displays a similarity to Christian goodness. The danger of mixing up good and evil is ever present. The picture of what is good becomes blurred. The figure of Christ can no longer be perceived clearly and merges with the figure of the Antichrist.

The sophisticated nature of radical evil manifests itself in the concern about man's happiness which is made possible by depriving man of God and freedom. The worldly power over the *happy formicary*⁸² is founded on nothing but these two deprivations. One of the most prominent features of the Grand Inquisitor which he shares with all the happy inhabitants of the formicary is the absence of faith. Just like Iwan who pronounces the Poem, the Inquisitor is an atheist: he believes neither in God nor man. In his philosophical analysis of the Poem, BERDYAEV admits how important it is for the Inquisitor that man should be deprived of the freedom of will while freedom would imply a possibility of a way to God but simultaneously would be a way across sin and suffering. It is only by virtue of an immense effort that man can display his greatness in overcoming evil. This is the antinomic quality of freedom, that it offers a way to God through the experience of evil. The eventual success in finding one's own way to God is possible only for great personalities; it cannot be promised to everyone, but everyone who is free has access to it.⁸³

Most relevant Chinese bibliographies make references to BERDYAEV even if they sometimes are not explicit about which passages from his work have been taken to be revealing in approaching DOSTOEVSKY. The following essay by JING Jianfeng 景剑峰 may serve as an illustration: “Yi ‘Zongjiao Dafaguan’ san zhang wei ju tanxi Tuosituoyefusiji de ziyou sixiang” 以“宗教大法官”三章为据探

81 Ibid., p. 133.

82 “The common happy formicary” (*obshchiī soglasnyī muraveiñik*) — one of the central metaphors used by the Grand Inquisitor for the man's world under his power, a world without God and freedom. Fedor DOSTOEVSKI: *Brat'ia KARAMAZOVY*. In: *Polnoe sobranie sochineniī* vol. 14, Leningrad: Nauka 1976, p. 235.

83 BERDYAEV's most detailed analysis of the concepts of freedom and evil in DOSTOEVSKY's work is provided in Chapters III “Svoboda” (Freedom) and IV “Zlo” (Evil) of his “The Worldview of DOSTOEVSKY” (*Mirosozertsanie Dostoevskogo*).

析陀思妥耶夫斯基的自由思想 (An Analysis of the Freedom-Idea in DOSTOEVSKY's Work on the Material of Three Great-Inquisitor Chapters.)⁸⁴ In this study, the author relies on two works by BERDYAEV: *Novoe religioznoe soznanie i obshchestvennost'* (The New Religious Consciousness and the Public, 1907) and *Mirosozertsanie Dostoevskogo* (The Worldview of DOSTOEVSKY, 1923).

The analysis is introduced by pointing out significant contradictions pertaining to DOSTOEVSKY's idea of freedom as they are observed in the latter work by BERDYAEV: she reproduces BERDYAEV's interpretation according to which freedom of will that makes man able to choose between good and evil is given to him by God, but being confronted with evil makes man raise the question about God's existence, because, as far as Iwan KARAMAZOV's idea of ethics is concerned, it cannot be accepted that God concedes evil and lets innocent children suffer.⁸⁵ In *The Poem of the Grand Inquisitor*, the Inquisitor is given the role played by the Devil in the Bible and exposes Christ to three temptations⁸⁶ by asking him to turn stones into bread, to perform miracles, and to gain power over the world. The great value of freedom of will which makes it possible to overcome suffering is seen by the fact that Christ could withstand all temptations:

陀思妥耶夫斯基的自由(Свобода)依然在基督教神学家的理解范围之内，需要放置到自我和上帝的关系中来理解，是自我趋向于全知全能全善的上帝，既是一种内在的驱动力又是这种趋向上帝的精神轨迹图示。⁸⁷

DOSTOEVSKY's concept of *freedom* (svoboda) remains within the framework of Christian theology and has to be understood within a personal relationship between an individual self and God, as a self in its striving for an omniscient, almighty, absolutely good God, both as an inner moving force and as a spirit looking for God.

Yet on the other hand, the idea of freedom suggests that – as Iwan puts it – “everything is allowed” (*yi qie dou keyi* 一切都可以), which in turn is an effect of the original sin, of the ability to tell fair from evil and of an alienation from God. The Grand Inquisitor divests man of freedom and constructs a godless kingdom of alleged happiness:

84 JING Jianfeng 景剑峰: “Yi ‘Zongjiao Dafaguan’ san zhang wei ju tanxi Tuosituoyefusiji de ziyou sixiang” 以“宗教大法官”三章为据探析陀思妥耶夫斯基的自由思想 (An Analysis of the Freedom-Idea in DOSTOEVSKY's Work on the Material of Three Great-Inquisitor Chapters. In: *Shijie wenxue pinglun* 世界文学评论 (*The World Literature Criticism*) no. 2, 2010, pp. 162–166. The number “three” refers here to Chapter V (“The Grand Inquisitor”) of Book V (Pro and Contra) as well as to the two preceding Chapters III (“The Brothers Meet”) and IV (“Rebellion”).

85 JING Jianfeng: “Yi ‘Zongjiao Dafaguan’ san zhang” (2010), p. 163.

86 MATTHEW 4; LUKE 4 (“Jesus is Tested in the Wilderness”).

87 JING Jianfeng: “Yi ‘Zongjiao Dafaguan’ san zhang” (2010), p. 164.

在《宗教大法官》一章中，人们听从于专制主义代表的大法官，就是因为大法官那里有面包、奇迹、神秘、权威等所谓的幸福，这样他们宁肯不要自由，甚至会把能为他们带来真正自由的基督放置到‘艳丽夺目的火堆上’，并争先恐后地去添柴。…那么一切都交给教皇，交给大法官是人类的理想状态吗？⁸⁸

In the chapter ‘The Grand Inquisitor’, people take orders from the absolutist inquisitor because he provides the joys of bread, miracles, mysticism, and power; doing so, they prefer to have no freedom, are even ready to throw Jesus who can make them really free into a blazing fire and rush on to be the first to put more firewood on to it...Is it the ideal state of humanity that everything is given over to the Pope and to the Grand Inquisitor?

In the novel which JING Jianfeng traces in the light of the contradictory nature of freedom, the major opposition is that which exists between “a Man-God” (*renshen* 人神 *chelovekobog*), i.e. a titanic man who is dependent entirely on himself because of his denial of God, and a really free “Man-in-God” (*shenren* 神人 *bo-gochelovek*).⁸⁹ The first is the Inquisitor himself; the second is Christ who is listening to him in *The Poem*. This observation, too, is in line with BERDYAEV.⁹⁰ One substantial difference from BERDYAEV, however, is her extension of the above opposition to that between Catholicism (*tianzhujiao* 天主教, Inquisitor) and Orthodoxy (*dongzhengjiao* 东正教, Jesus).⁹¹

While JING Jianfeng is certainly correct in stating DOSTOEVSKY’s critical attitude to Catholicism and in perceiving a projection of this critique on the figure of the Grand Inquisitor, she seems to pose a great simplification by equating the figure of Christ in *The Poem* with the Orthodox Church. In my opinion, this last figure was not conceived by DOSTOEVSKY to reproduce any positive religious dogma but rather represents that *instinct of universal humanism* which he discusses in the abovementioned *Lectures*: as an ideal construction and God’s sacred gift of freedom to all humanity. In other words, the novel does not reproduce a confrontation between two confessions, but rather attests to a personal inner confrontation of the writer with Catholicism, a Western belief which in his opinion usurped the freedom of man in order to exert power over the world. The following passage from *Idiot* (The Idiot, 1867–1869) may illustrate the prominence of this theme in DOSTOEVSKY’s work:

88 Ibid., p. 165.

89 Ibid.

90 Nikolai BERDIAEV: *Mirosozertsanie Dostoevskogo* (1994), pp. 133–134.

91 JING Jianfeng: “Yi ‘Zongjiao Dafaguan’ san zhang” (2010), p. 165.

Katolichestvo – vse ravno chto vera nekhristianskaia!...katolichestvo rimskoe dazhe khuzhe samogo ateizma. Ateizm tol'ko propoveduet nul', a katolitsizm idet dal'she: on iskazhennogo Khrista propoveduet, im zhe obolgannogo i porugannogo...On antikhrista propoveduet.⁹²

Catholicism is as good as an unchristian religion! ...Roman Catholicism is even worse than atheism itself, in my opinion! Yes, that's my opinion! Atheism only preaches zero, but Catholicism goes further: it preaches a distorted Christ, a Christ calumniated and defamed by itself, the opposite of Christ! It preaches the Antichrist, I swear. I assure you!⁹³

For DOSTOEVSKY, Catholicism is a Christian faith which was unable to withstand the third temptation of Christ by Satan, i.e. power. This was the reason for the establishment of the Vatican state as well as for the institution of the Inquisition as a special group within the Church to control its power and condemn dissidents. Even if Orthodoxy has never resorted to such radical forms of control and punishment as the Catholic Inquisition, it does not mean that it denies direct relations with state power. The problem may be illustrated by consulting the official site of the Russian Orthodox Church where the following is said:

Търков' не tol'ko predpisyvaet svoim chadam povinovat'sia gosudarstvennoi vlasti, nezavisimo ot ubezhdenni i veroispovedaniia ee nositelei, no i molit'sia za nee, «daby provodit' nam zhizn' tikhuiu i bezmiatezhnuiu vo vsiakom blagochestii i chistote» (1 Tim. 2. 2).⁹⁴

The Church does not only prescribe the obedience to state power for its children, regardless of the convictions and confessions of its (i.e. state power's) possessors, but also prays for it “so that we may have a calm and quiet life in all fear of God and serious behavior.” (I Timothy 2/2)

BERDYAEV must have had similar official statements in mind when he wrote:

Dlia chisto pravoslavnogo soznania on, konechno, bolee priemlem, chem dla soznania katolicheskogo, no i konservativnoe pravoslavie dolzhna pugat' dykhovnaia revoliutsionnost' Dostoevskogo, ego bezmernaia svoboda dukha.⁹⁵

92 Fedor DOSTOEVSKI: *Idiot*. In: *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* vol. 8, Leningrad: Nauka 1973, p. 450.

93 Fyodor DOSTOEVSKY: *The Idiot*, tr. by Constance GARNETT, New York: The Heritage Press 1956, p. 485.

94 Emphasis by bold characters as in original, see <https://mospat.ru/ru/documents/social-concepts/iii/> (last access 2020, May 25).

95 Nikolai BERDIAEV: *Mirosozertsanie Dostoevskogo* (1994), p. 131.

To a purely Orthodox mind, he (DOSTOEVSKY) is certainly much more acceptable than to a Catholic one, but the conservative Orthodoxy should also be alert to the spiritual revolutionary character of DOSTOEVSKY as well as to the infinite freedom of his spirit.

Despite some seeming simplifications in the analysis by JING Jianfeng, in general her essay provides a careful study of DOSTOEVSKY's religious thought and of the close and contradictory relationship between freedom and evil within his ethical theory. Her study may be considered exemplary of a large number of works produced by Chinese intellectuals in the last twenty years.⁹⁶ They often draw on BERDYAEV as an expert who approaches DOSTOEVSKY from the standpoint of Russian religious philosophy. Another important authority in what specifically regards DOSTOEVSKY's aesthetics is Mikhail BAKHTIN (1895–1975), the author of *Problemy poëtiki Dostoevskogo* (The Poetics of DOSTOEVSKY, 1929) and of the theory of *dialogism* (dialogizm) or *polyphony of voices* (polifoniia golosov) in DOSTOEVSKY's work. In China, too, BAKHTIN's theories belong to the standard instrumental set in approaching DOSTOEVSKY. The *polyphony of voices* is occasionally also part of the discussions of the problem of evil, as is the case with the above-mentioned essay by WU Shan 吴珊 “*Yuebo ji* dui Tuosituoyefusiji wenxue guan de yingxiang” 《约伯记》对陀思妥耶夫斯基文学观的影响 (On the Influence of *The Book of Job* on DOSTOEVSKY's Literary Thought)⁹⁷ which interprets Iwan's “soliloquy”, i.e. the dialogue with the Devil in his own possession who is a part of Iwan's own self, from Book XI/xi “The Devil. Iwan's Nightmare” as an example of “polyphonic words” (“*fudiao*” xing de yuyan “复调”性的语言). The polyphony is said to be a perfect means of auto-reflections of a character whose inner self is split

96 Among other in-depth studies of DOSTOEVSKY's religious thought and the problem of evil which have been recently produced in China are WANG Manli's 王曼利 “*Zhiyi yu zhuixun: lun Tuosituoyefusiji chuangzuo zhong de yuanzui yu jiushu*” 质疑与追寻：论陀思妥耶夫斯基创作中的原罪与救赎 (Questioning and Pursuing: The Original Sin and Salvation in DOSTOEVSKY's Work). In: *Zhejiang gongshang daxue xuebao* 浙江工商大学学报 (*Journal of Zhejiang Gongshang University*) no. 144, May 2017, pp. 49–56; WANG Zhigeng's 王志耕 “*Zongjiao renbenzhuyi shiye zhong de Tuosituoyefusiji*” 宗教人本主义视野中的陀思妥耶夫斯基 (DOSTOEVSKY from the Perspective of Religious Humanism). In: *Jilin shifan daxue xuebao* 吉林师范大学学报 (*Jilin Normal University Journal*) no. 6, Dec. 2005, pp. 21–26; HE Lihua's 贺立华, JIANG Guixu's 姜桂翠 “*Ren de youxianxing, shangdi de kenengxing: Lun Tuosituoyefusiji fudiao xiaoshuo de zhengjiu zhuti*” 人的有限性与上帝的可能性——论陀思妥耶夫斯基复调小说的拯救主题 (On the Limits of Man and the Possibility of God: On the Salvation Motif in Polyphonic Novels by DOSTOEVSKY). In: *Qilu xuekan* 齐鲁学刊 (*Qilu Journal*) no. 5, 2007, pp. 106–110.

97 *Henan keji xueyuan xuebao* 河南科技大学学报 (*Journal of Henan Institute of Science and Technology*) no. 7, 2012, pp. 70–73.

(*xin zhong ling yi ge ziji* 心中另一个自己) and represents a reproduction of one voice by means of another (*jilu shengyin de shengyin* 记录声音中的声).⁹⁸

In a broader frame, BAKHTIN's theory of dialogism is discussed by SHA Mei 沙湄 in her essay “*Zongjiao Dafaguan yu Bachejin de shixue wenti*” 《宗教大法官》与巴赫金的诗学问题 (*The Grand Inquisitor and the Problems of Poetics Discussed by BAKHTIN*)⁹⁹ in which the motif of evil in the novel is interpreted as participating in a multi-layered dialogue and takes on quite different identities: Catholicism, Socialism, and Western Rationalism.¹⁰⁰ As a product of the Anti-christ, who divests humanity of freedom, Socialism is also investigated in one of SHA Mei's further studies, where it receives the following explanation: “他（宗教大法官）‘修正’了基督的事业，接管了人的自由并将世界建造为一个幸福的、无争议的蚁窝。” (He (the Grand Inquisitor) ‘corrected’ the work of Jesus, brought the freedom of men under his own influence and constructed a happy harmonious formicary.)¹⁰¹ In this study, SHA Mei's main concern is the dialogical quality of evil in the novel, i.e. its appearance as an opposition, primarily directed against faith, which allows her to come up with a complex psychological portrait of atheism and of motivation behind its metaphysical revolt:

形而上学反叛者也不是无神论者，而是渎神者，以人类生存秩序的名义辱骂神明者，正如宗教大法官和伊凡所作。¹⁰²

98 WU Shan: “*Yuebo ji dui Tuosituoyefusiji wenxue guan de yingxiang*” (2012), p. 72. The author relies in her study on the following translation of BAKHTIN: Bahejin 巴赫金: *Tuosituoyefusiji shixue wenti* 陀思妥耶夫斯基诗学问题 (*The Poetics of DOSTOEVSKY*), Shanghai: Sanlian shudian 1988.

99 SHA Mei 沙湄: “*Zongjiao Dafaguan yu Bachejin de shixue wenti*” 《宗教大法官》与巴赫金的诗学问题 (*The Grand Inquisitor and the Problems of Poetics Discussed by BAKHTIN*). In: *Wenxue pinglun* 文学评论 (Literature Review) no. 3, 2004, pp. 47–55.

100 The deconstruction of these great ideological enemies of DOSTOEVSKY is indebted to Romano GUARDINI's essay “The Legend of the Great Inquisitor”. In: *CrossCurrents* vol. 3 no. 1, Fall 1952, pp. 58–86. A study which focusses of DOSTOEVSKY's critical attitude to Western rationality and in particular to the philosophy of the Enlightenment is provided by HUANG Ruijie 黄锐杰: “*Qimeng ji qi xiandu: 'Kalamazuofu xiongdi' zhong Yiwan de san-chong mianxiang*” 启蒙及其限度: 《卡拉马佐夫兄弟》中伊万的三重面相 (On the Limits of Enlightenment: Three Portraits of Iwan in *The Brothers KARAMAZOV*). In: *Changjiang xueshu* 长江学术 (Yangtze River Academic) vol. 43 no. 3, 2014, pp. 83–90.

101 SHA Mei 沙湄: “*Xinyang qishilu: Qian xi Tuosituoyefusiji Kalamazuofu xiongdi 'Zongjiao Dafaguan'*” 信仰启示录: 浅析陀思妥耶夫斯基《卡拉马佐夫兄弟·宗教大法官》 (An Apocalypse of Faith: A Preliminary Study of ‘The Grand Inquisitor’ Chapter from *The Brothers KARAMAZOV*). In: *Xinan minzu xueyuan xuebao, Zhhexue shehui kexue ban* 西南民族学院学报。哲学社会科学版 (Journal of Southwest Institute for Ethnic Groups. Philosophy and Social Sciences) vol. 19 no. 1, 1998, pp. 77–101, 140, here p. 99.

102 SHA Mei: “*Xinyang qishilu*” (1998), p. 100.

Metaphysical rebels are not atheists, they are rather blasphemers who offend God in the name of the human life order (literally: the life order of the human race, *renlei*). That is exactly what the Grand Inquisitor and Iwan are doing.

A similar psychological study on the atheism in *The Brothers KARAMAZOV* was produced in LI Junjun's 李君君 "Lun Tuosituoyefusiji zuopin zhong de gete xiaoshuo yinsu" 论陀思妥耶夫斯基作品中的哥特小说因素 (On Some Gothic Features in DOSTOEVSKY's Work):¹⁰³ in the study, Iwan's doubts about God's existence are said to result in a negation of God, which makes him represent a very special kind of atheism because he has recognized that religious worship (*chong-bai* 崇拜) counts among the eternal perplexities of the human race (*renlei yongheng de kunhuo* 人类永恒的困惑).¹⁰⁴

Such explicit psychological studies on DOSTOEVSKY's aesthetics display one common feature in terms of the analysis of evil as an ethical problem in which they all are engaged in closely examining his religious concepts and they all link these concepts with that of *humanity* (*renlei* 人类). Even if it is not made explicit, the authors of the above essays are in general quite sensible of the antinomic quality peculiar to DOSTOEVSKY's international problematics: the search for what is *universally human* (freedom, the nature of evil, and ways in which to overcome it) is embedded in a critical dialogue with a civilization which has generated the Grand Inquisitor, the West, its Church, and its rationality.

BULGAKOV

As mentioned in the introduction, from the standpoint of literary tradition, BULGAKOV plays a very specific role both in regard to the modifications of the motif of evil, its symbolic positive reversal in a force which punishes men for evil doing, and in regard to his overall overtly more positive attitude to the West than that found in the work of GOGOL and DOSTOEVSKY. From the perspective of political and cultural history, however, he must have posed a very specific case for Chinese readers as well: the direct butt of mockery in his satire is not simply a pettish man who commits himself to evil but one who is representative of ideas of a political

103 LI Junjun 李君君: "Lun Tuosituoyefusiji zuopin zhong de gete xiaoshuo yinsu" 论陀思妥耶夫斯基作品中的哥特小说因素 (On Some Gothic Features in DOSTOEVSKY's Work). In: *Yuxi shifan xueyuan xuebao* 玉溪师范学院学报 (Journal of Yuxi Normal University) vol. 32 no. 2, 2016, pp. 29–34.

104 Ibid., p. 33.

regime (socialism) with which China herself was more than familiar. Other than DOSTOEVSKY, who interpreted socialism as one of the most terrible possible manifestations of evil (the happy formicary), for BULGAKOV socialism was not a vision but evil reality with which he was directly and tragically confronted. Therefore, *Master i Margarita* (The Master and Margarita, 1928–1940) may be seen for Chinese readers as suggestive of two oppositional schemes: a classical one, in which a gentleman appears alongside petty men (this would correspond to classical Chinese opposition between a *junzi* 君子 and a *xiao ren* 小人), and a modern one: between universal humanism and ethical abuses prevailing within a society which identifies itself with socialism.

Chinese translations as well as Chinese readings and interpretations of *The Master and Margarita* show continuity and changes in the intellectual atmosphere between 1980s and the present time. One of the earliest Chinese publications on BULGAKOV's novel was the essay by TONG Daoming 童道明 from 1977: “Sulian zuojia Buerjiakfu ji qi Dashi he Majialita” 苏联作家布尔加科夫及其《大师和玛加丽塔》 (The Soviet writer BULGAKOV and his *The Master and Margarita*).¹⁰⁵ Tong approaches BULGAKOV's work as follows:

它不能在无产阶级专制的苏联出版，而只能在资本主义全面复辟的苏联出笼。
容许《大师和玛加丽塔》出笼，就等于承认对列宁斯大林时代进行恶毒攻击是正当的，就等于承认丑化、诬蔑十月革命的反动宣传是合理的。¹⁰⁶

(The novel) could not be published in the Soviet Union of proletarian dictatorship; it could only come out after a comprehensive restoration of capitalism by Soviet revisionists. The permission to publish this novel is tantamount to the recognition that vicious attacks against the epoch of LENIN and STALIN are justified; that the reactionary propaganda of vilifying the October Revolution is reasonable.

In TONG's essay, sharp criticism of BULGAKOV's work is accompanied by that against the first officially permitted public performance of the novel on the Taganka stage in 1977. TONG relies on the review of it issued on the pages of the official periodical of the communist party in the Soviet Union: the newspaper *Pravda* on 25 May 1977 under the title “Seans chjornoī magii na Taganke” (Performing Black Magic on the Taganka Stage). One of the critical points within this relatively positive review by Nikolai POTAPOV (Nikolaï POTAPOV) referred to the historical atmosphere of the 1920s which he had missed in the theatrical

105 TONG Daoming 童道明: “Sulian zuojia Buerjiakfu ji qi Dashi he Majialita” 苏联作家布尔加科夫及其《大师和玛加丽塔》 (The Soviet writer BULGAKOV and his *The Master and Margarita*). In: *Waiguo wenxue dongtai* 外国文学动态 (World Literature Recent Developments) no. 8, 1977, pp. 1–11.

106 TONG Daoming: “Sulian zuojia Buerjiakfu ji qi Dashi he Majialita” (1977), p. 10.

presentation; its stage director Yuri LUBIMOV (Юрий ЛУБИМОВ) created instead an atmosphere which reminded the audience of the contemporary times (1977, the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution). On his side, TONG Daoming accuses the author of the review of not having demonstrated clearly enough that BULGAKOV's novel was imbued with shameless aggression (*wuchi gongji* 无耻攻击) and defamation (*feibang* 谤谤); the novel was nothing but an assault on the very essence of the October Revolution (*geming de benzhi* 革命的本质).¹⁰⁷

This critique, largely inspired by the righteous indignation of a communist ideologist, appeared ten years before the first Chinese translations of the novel. The political changes during these ten years that ushered in the “Chinese thaw period” appear visually sharp if the critique by TONG is compared with the corresponding judgment by the first translators of the novel. In the year 1987, two translations were published in China: QIAN Cheng's 钱诚 *Dashi he Magelite* 大师和玛格丽特 and XU Changhan's 徐昌翰 *Mosike guiyi: Dashi he Magelite* 莫斯科鬼影: 大师和马格丽特. QIAN's preface¹⁰⁸ and XU's afterword¹⁰⁹ contain pieces of information ranging from the complexities in BULGAKOV's career and his dramatic conflict with the existing totalitarian regime, through STALIN's political play with the uneasy dissident BULGAKOV to the official prohibition to publish and perform BULGAKOV's dramatic works. All of these serve for Chinese readers' better understanding of the novel as well as the political and cultural background in which it was created. On the other hand, they certainly called to mind events from the history of the Chinese totalitarian regime, not only in terms of parallels (the sad lot of intellectuals under the dictatorship of the party), but also in terms of contrasts with the Soviet past: for instance, references to the fact that the first Russian edition of the novel appeared in 1966,¹¹⁰ after a long-term period of the “Soviet thaw”, were very likely to remind Chinese readers of the outbreak of the Great Cultural Revolution in the same year.

The commentaries on BULGAKOV's text are not only free from ideological criticism peculiar to TONG Daoming's essay but also display a deep sympathy with the Russian writer. XU Changhan explains the great difficulties confronted with the first Russian edition and accompanies it by a complete Chinese translation of

107 Ibid., p. 11.

108 QIAN Cheng 钱诚: “Yizhe xu” 译者序 (Translator's Preface). In: QIAN Cheng (tr.), *Dashi he Magelite* 大师和玛格丽特 (The Master and Margarita), Beijing: Waiguo wenxue chubanshe 1987, pp. 1–15.

109 XU Changhan 徐昌翰: “Yi hou” 译后 (Translator's Postface). In: XU Changhan (tr.), *Mosike guiyi: Dashi he Magelite* 莫斯科鬼影: 大师和马格丽特 (Moscow ghost: The Master and Margarita), Shenyang: Chunfeng wenyi chubanshe 1987, pp. 467–469.

110 QIAN Cheng: “Yizhe xu” (1987), p. 8.

Konstantin SIMONOV's Russian preface¹¹¹ to it. SIMONOV's name deserves to be mentioned for at least two reasons: his preface to the first Russian edition of the novel in the journal *Moskva* had made it possible in the first place that it could be published under the regime of that time. SIMONOV exercised the necessary authority among Soviet literati to persuade the censorship that a publication would mean no threat to the Soviet ideology. However, his eventual victory over the apparatus was not without its price: the first edition of the novel is also the one that is marked by enormous omissions. All the passages which might have appeared ideologically unsafe had been cancelled.¹¹² SIMONOV's preface was marked by considerable caution in regard to the fantastic and the satirical in the novel:

Trudno skazat', kak by vygliadel étot roman, esli by i tak rastianuvshaiasia na dvenadtsat' let rabota dlilas' eshche i eshche. Mozhet byt', v romane byli by ispravleny nekotorye nesovershenstva, mozhet byt', bylo by dodumano chto-to eshche ne do kontsa dodumanno ili vycherknuto chto-to iz togo, chto neset na sebe seichas pechat' neumerennoi, izbytochnoi shchedrosti fantazii.¹¹³

It is hard to say what this novel would have looked like if the work on it, which lasted for twelve years, had continued. Maybe some of the shortcomings of the novel would have been omitted, maybe the author could have thought to the end something he had not managed to do, maybe something would have been cancelled, which in its present form bears the mark of an unrestrained and superfluous generosity of imagination.

These words anticipate quite probable reactions of many Soviet readers whose commitment to the communist ideals would make them feel very much like TONG Daoming while reading the work of a dissident, even in this shortened form. The preface was therefore an expression of SIMONOV's good command of Soviet psychology. XU's decision to translate this preface may have originated in the same editorial tactics. His version as one of the first two Chinese translations¹¹⁴ of the

111 XU Changhan (tr.): "Ximengnuofu xu" 西蒙諾夫序 (Preface by SIMONOV). In: XU Changhan (tr.): *Mosike guiying*, pp. 1–4.

112 This first publication appeared in the journal *Moskva* (1966 no. 11 and 1967 no. 1). The commentary by Irina BELOBROVTSEVA (Irina BELOBROVTSEVA) and Svetlana KULJUS (Svetlana KUL'JUS) reports about 159 text passages left out of the original which is equal to 12% of the whole text. (See their *Roman Bulgakova Master i Margarita: Kommentarii* (BULGAKOV's Novel *The Master and Margarita*: A Commentary), Tallinn: Argo 2006, p. 27.) The first complete edition of the novel was issued in Paris, at the YMCA-Press in 1967.

113 Konstantin SIMONOV: "Predislovie k romanu Master i Margarita" (Preface to the novel *The Master and Margarita*). In: *Moskva* no. 11, 1966, pp. 6–7, here p. 7.

Preface to the novel. In: *Moskva* no. 11, 1966, p. 7.

114 Among later complete translations of the novel into Chinese, there are: HAN Qing's 寒青 *Sadan qiwu* 撒旦起舞 (Satanic Dance), Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe 1997 and GAO

novel is automatically the more cautious one in regard to its fantastic satire and political critique. QIAN's version, on the contrary, was not only complete, but also a translation that documented a desire to reveal the maximum of its symbolic meaning, among other things the nature of Voland and the relationship of good and evil. The following lines from QIAN's preface may serve as an illustration:

他认为，可恶而又可怕的并不在于相信耶稣和撒旦的存在与否，而在于不应由此得出结论：既然没有上帝和魔鬼，人便可以为所欲为，并从而否定一切文化传统、精神价值和人们心中的‘上帝’ – 最根本的善恶观念。¹¹⁵

According to the author, the worst and the most horrible thing is not the question of whether one believes in the existence of Jesus and Devil or not but in the inferences one draws from (discussing) these questions: as neither God nor Devil exists, man can act just as he likes and therefore he denies altogether the cultural tradition, spiritual values and God within his own heart; the most fundamental notions of good and evil.

In QIAN's view, the significant difference between GOETHE's Mephistopheles and BULGAKOV's Voland is that Voland does not defend the evil, nor does he tempt people to commit evil deeds. Instead, he observes actions of evil people and administers their destiny which he has to do because of the division of labor between God and himself.¹¹⁶ Thus, Voland is not opposing the good but supports the coordinate system of ethics in which everyone gains a chance to approach God, to develop necessary spiritual and creative forces within themselves for approaching God and to withstand all the petty vulgar materialistic impulses that would impede this approach.

Few studies on BULGAKOV refrain from providing interpretations of parallels between him and his predecessors in the elaboration of the Mephistopheles motif. A study which focuses on connections between BULGAKOV and GOETHE is, for example, XU Zhiqiang's 许志强 “Buerjiakefu ‘Hei Misa’ dui Gede Fushide de jicheng yu gaizao” 布尔加科夫“黑弥撒”对歌德《浮士德》的继承与改造 (BULGAKOV's ‘Black Mass’ and GOETHE's *Faust*: Continuities and Transformations).¹¹⁷ The author concentrates on the first five chapters of the second part

Huiqun's 高惠群 *Dashi he Majialita* 大师和玛加丽塔 (The Master and Margarita), Shanghai: Shanghai yiwen chubanshe 2007.

115 QIAN Cheng: “Yizhe xu” (1987), p. 10.

116 Ibid., p. 11.

117 XU Zhiqiang 许志强: “Buerjiakefu ‘Hei Misa’ dui Gede Fushide de jicheng yu gaizao” 布尔加科夫“黑弥撒”对歌德《浮士德》的继承与改造 (BULGAKOV's ‘Black Mass’ and GOETHE's *Faust*: Continuities and Transformations).¹¹⁷ In: *Waiguo wenxue* 外国文学 (Foreign Literature) no. 4, 2013, pp. 69–75.

of *The Master and Margarita*, specifically the Margarita plot line in which she transforms into a witch and attends the ball of Satan. These developments are compared with the Walpurgis Night from the first part of *Faust*. Among differences between these works, XU observes BULGAKOV's refusal to provide any rational explanation of Margarita's transformations. Another difference refers to the relationship between fiction and reality which merge in BULGAKOV's novel (*xianshi he shenhua huxiang ronghe* 现实和神话互相融合). According to XU, this merge results in the fact that the whole of the Margarita plot should be interpreted as an allegory (*fengyu* 讽喻.) Nevertheless, still the more striking difference from GOETHE's elaboration of the pact with the Devil is said to be the absence of a clear positioning of Margarita within the realm of religion:

玛格丽特没有照浮士德传统公开否认基督教信仰，鉴于苏联社会的无神论背景也是解释得通的，以此确认她的基督教象征性似乎显得较为牵强。魔鬼以‘玛戈王后’的名义为玛格丽特加冕，这就清楚地表明其象征世俗权能的身份。
118

Margarita does not follow the Faustian tradition in openly rejecting Christian faith, which is quite understandable in view of the atheist background of the Soviet society. For this reason, it seems too farfetched to affirm her symbolic adherence to Christianity. The Satan crowns her in the name of 'Queen Margo', which quite clearly displays the secular character of the symbolism.

XU's comparative study seems to ignore the fact that the whole of the Moscow plot, including the ball of Satan, represents a direct counterpart to the Jeshua-plot and that it is nobody else but Voland who – similarly to the Master – is able (and willing) to reproduce events which culminated in the execution of Christ. In BULGAKOV's novel, the religious meanings are greatly different from those in GOETHE's *Faust*: BULGAKOV's hero is not an aspiring mind ready to scarify everything including his faith in order to attain the ability of an all-encompassing experience of being but one who regards the faith as a chance of which he has been once robbed by the state and which he ironically regains through the Devil's help. The ideal atheist background of the Soviet society to which XU is referring here can hardly explain anything about Voland's and Margarita's attitude toward religion exactly because both of them directly oppose the realities of the atheist state.

A more convincing examination of parallels between BULGAKOV and GOETHE was provided by ZOU Hongjin 邹洪锦 in his “Fushide ticai de bianyi: *Fushide yu Dashi he Magelita duochong shijiao yanjiu*” 浮士德题材的变异 —— 《浮士德》与《大师和玛格丽塔》多重视角研究 (Transformations of the Faust-

118 Ibid., p. 73.

Theme: A Multi-Perspective Analysis of *Faust* and *The Master and Margarita*).¹¹⁹ According to ZOU, the Faustian theme continues throughout the whole of BULGAKOV's novel: beginning with the epigraph which is taken from the self-presentation of Mephistopheles in *Faust* up to the last conversation between the Master and Voland in which Voland describes the charms of the life in the afterworld that awaits the heroes after leaving the horrors of the Soviet reality: "Can it be that you do not want to hear SCHUBERT's music at night? Wouldn't you enjoy writing with a goose-feather in the light of candles? Wouldn't you wish to be like Faust, sit over a test tube and hope to produce a new homunculus?"¹²⁰ In spite of all the obvious parallels, ZOU states that both works display different ideals: whereas *Faust* represents man's untiring spiritual search for a complete self-realization, for BULGAKOV it is the idea of *salvation* (*zhengjiu* 拯救) which is central to the novel:

玛格丽塔愿意接受魔鬼的考验既是出于他对大师的拯救，也是出于对自己无爱婚姻的拯救；大师写小说是出于对社会的道德沦丧而实施的内心的自我拯救，而小说《本丢·彼拉多》中总督杀死出卖耶稣的犹太...也可看作是对自己杀死耶稣的愧疚的赎罪和拯救。¹²¹

Margarita is willing to accept the test of the Devil because he can save the Master, but also because of her own escape from a marriage without love; the Master writes his novel because he wants to save the fulfilment of his inner self in spite of the moral crisis of the society. The procurator from the novel *Pontius Pilatus* gets Juda killed for having betrayed Jesus, which can also be interpreted as a desire of salvation and atonement for his own execution of Jesus.

It is true that salvation is also one of the themes of *Faust* (*Faust* is eventually taken by angels into the paradise and thus escapes Mephistopheles' powers), but BULGAKOV's elaboration of this theme is more complex and serves as a constant perspective for reflections on good and evil. According to ZOU, GOETHE's distribution of roles in the coordinate system of good and evil is made completely unequivocal, but such a clear distinction is not characteristic of BULGAKOV. Making these observations, ZOU continues a relatively young tradition of deep psychological analysis of the motif of evil in BULGAKOV's work which began with the

119 ZOU Hongjin 邹洪锦: "Fushide ticai de bianyi: *Fushide* yu *Dashi* he *Magelita* duochong shijiao yanjiu" 浮士德题材的变异——《浮士德》与《大师和玛格丽塔》多重视角研究 (Transformations of the Faust-Theme: A Multi-Perspective Analysis of *Faust* and *The Master and Margarita*). In: *Suihua xueyuan xuebao* 绥化学院学报 (Journal of Suihua University) vol. 33 no. 2, 2013, pp. 72–76.

120 BULGAKOV: *Master i Margarita*, p. 510; quoted by ZOU Hongjin: "Fushide ticai de bianyi" (2013), p. 72.

121 Ibid., p. 73.

abovementioned preface by QIAN Cheng in the first complete Chinese translation of *The Master and Margarita*. The psychological perceptiveness is accompanied by a historical analysis which opposes a spiritual crisis of the socialist society of the early 20th century to the optimistic humanism of the early 19th century as it is documented in GOETHE's work.¹²²

One of direct manifestations of the described crisis may be seen in the life of intellectuals who would not sacrifice their individual will to the reigning regime. BULGAKOV himself was beyond any doubt among these intellectuals, and one of his direct experiences of evil was the impossibility to publish most of his works. QIAN Cheng was among the first to point out a personal communication which had taken place between BULGAKOV and STALIN. He mentions the famous letter of BULGAKOV from 28 March 1930 in which he asked STALIN for permission either to work and realize himself freely in Soviet Russia or to emigrate, as well as the telephone call from STALIN that ensued upon this letter.¹²³

Being more than uneasy, the relations between BULGAKOV and power holders in the Soviet Union were also subject of examination in various studies by TANG Yihong 唐逸红, among others in her essays “Buerjiakefu he Sidalin” 布尔加科夫和斯大林 (BULGAKOV and STALIN)¹²⁴ and “Qian xi Dashi he Magelite zhong de zhishi fenzi xingxiang” 浅析《大师和玛格丽特》中的知识分子形象 (A Preliminary Analysis of the Image of Intellectuals in *The Master and Margarita*).¹²⁵ Here I will limit myself to a short discussion of the latter essay as it vividly reproduces the links between the motif of evil and the lot of intellectuals. She begins with clearing the meaning of the term *intelligenzija* (*intelligentsiia*, *zhishi fenzi* 知识分子), its Russian origin and its reference to a country's spiritual elite: having specialized knowledge or working as an intellectual did not qualify a person to be part of it. Belonging to *intelligenzija* suggested rather a leading critical role in society and the ability to perceive the origins of its problems and openly proposing means for overcoming them. TANG traces the history of this phenomenon in Russia back to the *dekabristy* (Decembrists) of the 19th century. BULGAKOV is said not only to be situated in the same tradition (like other dissidents such as Boris PASTERNAK, 1890–1960), the deep cultural and political role of the *intelligenzija* is also a central motif of his work. In *The Master and Margarita*, the literal society

122 Ibid., p. 75.

123 QIAN Cheng: “Yizhe xu” (1987), p. 5–6.

124 TANG Yihong 唐逸红: “Buerjiakefu he Sidalin” 布尔加科夫和斯大林 (BULGAKOV and STALIN). In: *Eluosi wenyi* 俄罗斯文艺 (Russian Literature) no. 3, 1999, pp. 69–71.

125 TANG Yihong and LI Zhe 李哲: “Qian xi Dashi he Magelite zhong de zhishi fenzi xingxiang” 浅析《大师和玛格丽特》中的知识分子形象 (A Preliminary Analysis of the Image of Intellectuals in *The Master and Margarita*). In: *Wenhua xuekan* 文化学刊 (Culture Journal) no. 6, Nov. 2011, pp. 139–142.

Mossolit may be regarded as the caricature of *intelligenzija* displaying all the possible vices of greed, vanity, gluttony, etc.; these intellectuals represent an exact opposite of what real *intelligenzija* should be like. Among figures discussed by TANG as its real representatives are on the other hand the Master, Margarita, Pontius Pilatus, but an especially prominent position among this group is given in her study to the *most peculiar intellectual* (*zui guaidan de zhishi fengzi xingxiang* 最怪诞的知识分子形象¹²⁶) Voland. She examines him in detail as the first in the group: he is the professor of black magic who is invested with the role of a just punisher (*zhenli chengfazhe de juese* 真理惩罚者的角色) and of doing good works by open denial (*tongguo gongkai de fouding lai chengjiu shan* 通过公开的否定来成就善)¹²⁷. Besides these ethical functions, one of the primary duties of Voland is seen in his religious mission of restoring the faith of which people have been divested:

沃兰德这一形象就是要告诉无知的人们，如果抛弃了信仰，丧失了精神支柱，那么价值观将被颠覆。所以作为一名知识分子，沃兰德不仅坚持自己的精神追求，充分利用其话语权来证明上帝的存在，甚至以极端的手段维护其道德的纯洁性…¹²⁸

Voland's message to those ignorant men is that if the faith is rejected, and the spiritual foundations lost, then all values will be ruined. This is the reason why Voland as an intellectual does not only stick to the pursuit of his own moral principles and fully uses the power of his words to prove God's existence but also takes extreme measures to defend the moral purity.

TANG Yihong refrains from any direct observations on the possible relevance of Voland's religious ethical mission for Chinese readers, as all other above examinations of BULGAKOV do, but all of them provide their studies with suggestive callsigns that are likely to evoke in readers' consciousness associations with their own cultural past and present. For example, in the quoted essay by TANG Yihong, as the analysis of evil accompanies the theme of Voland's punishment of atheism and materialism¹²⁹ which is one of the central themes in BULGAKOV's work, this is more than suggestive of the experiences which China and Chinese *intelligenzija* went through in the recent past: the dangers of losing one's cultural values and the

126 TANG Yihong, Li Zhe: “Qian xi Dashi he Magelite zhong de zhishi fenzi xingxiang” (2011), p. 140.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 TANG Yihong: “Buerjiakefu bi xia de mogui xingxiang” 布尔加科夫笔下的魔鬼形象 (The Devil in BULGAKOV's Work). In: *Eluosi wenyi* no. 3, 1997, pp. 54–56, here p. 56.

eventual realization of one's full dependence on oneself within a complete spiritual vacuum.

Conclusion

The major purpose of the present study was to trace prevailing tendencies in Chinese interpretations of the motif of evil within the work of three Russian classical writers as well as to illustrate them by some representative examples. In the original discourse, which is outlined in the introduction, Western ideas on absolute evil were usually met with suspicion by Chinese literati and up to now continue to fuel studies focusing on cultural differences between China and the West (for example in Adrian CHAN's ironical treatment of the West as the place of origin of Created people), whereas the transformations that have developed within this discourse in the last hundred years attest to a considerable mutual rapprochement of these cultures.

The selection of Russian classics for discussing these rapprochement processes was motivated by the fact that in the history of contacts with the West, Russia played for China an ambivalent specific position: on the one hand it was one of the powers of the West which identified directly with Western philosophy, science, and Christian faith, but on the other hand also one that critically distanced itself from the West in many crucial instances at the same time. All the complexities pertaining to Russia's construction of her own cultural identity was an experience which proved to be of unique importance for Chinese intellectuals. However, from the standpoint of political history, the Russian experience of evil was also of great significance for China: the success of socialism, the construction of a totalitarian state, the abolishment of the traditional scale of values, the eventual crisis of socialist ideas, and the beginning of a positive reevaluation of traditional values; with all these epochal transformations China was more than familiar, and her interest for this shared historical experience is easily explained. GOGOL, DOSTOEVSKY, and BULGAKOV were among the authors who either had a strong intuition of the aforementioned ideological shifts – an intuition which caused GOGOL's need to defend the sacred nature of Russian monarchy and was responsible for DOSTOEVSKY's critique of *the happy formicary* (socialism) – or experienced them directly (BULGAKOV). They all closely associated these historical shifts with the ideas of absolute evil which they elaborated in their literary works.

In relevant studies produced by Chinese intellectuals, three general ways of approaching the idea of evil could be observed. First, it was a welcoming gesture for ideological import from the West which rested mainly on an acutely perceived necessity of social, political, and cultural reforms as well as intuitions of great utility of the authors discussed for these reforms but not on an active direct analysis of the texts discussed. This way of a rather superficial literary reception was characteristic of the May Fourth era. The present study illustrated this with reference to LU Xun's discussions of GOGOL within a large group of the so-called Satanic writers, but it was by no means LU Xun alone who occasionally displayed insufficient knowledge of primary sources: the same occurred in the case with generally praising discussions of DANTE, GOETHE, and LUTHER as the symbolical figures. Used as slogans, their names were often automatically associated with successes of social reforms and the necessities of abandoning one's cultural past. Close reading of their works was not meant to be the prerequisite for achieving these aims. A different way in coming to terms with the ideas of evil was demonstrated in the studies which illustrate a much better grasp of primary sources and an overall positive attitude to the classics discussed but are extremely cautious at the same time in regard to some central ideas of these works. This approach was characteristic of reading GOGOL and DOSTOEVSKY between the May Fourth and roughly the 1990s. Both classics were regarded as grand literary figures, but the strong religious component of their thought was not in the spirit of the time and therefore remained either tacitly ignored, explicitly avoided, or openly criticized. Finally, the third way of literary approach to discussions of evil manifests itself in free and thorough readings of texts in all their complexity. This method is characteristic of the last thirty years of ideas exchanged between China and the West. Even in view of the fact that not all of them display the same high quality of literary examination, they all testify to one great achievement of our time: the freedom of raising questions and searching for answers which is equally free of any ideological constraint.

Hsiang-Yin Sasha CHEN

7 Russia as Master and Monster: Absorbing GOGOL’s Madness and the Chinese “Little Tradition” in the Prose of LU Xun

Abstract. In the light of FOUCAULT’s theory, this chapter examines the association between the theme of madness and the consciousness of darkness in the works of Nikolai GOGOL (Nikolaĭ Vasil’evich GOGOL’, 1809–1852) and LU Xun 魯迅 (1881–1936), showing how the two writers inherit Russian literary legacy and Chinese “little tradition” of the dark world, respectively. A comparative analysis of GOGOL’s *Večera na khutore bliz Dikan’ki* (Evenings on a Farm near Dikanka) and PU Songling’s 蒲松齡 (1640–1715) story collection *Liaozhai Zhi Yi* 聊齋志異 (Strange Tales from a Chinese Studio) demonstrates not only a Chinese modernity acquired from Russia, as many scholars have done, but also the Russian Eurasian mentality resembling Chinese transcultural characteristics. Similarities in the two works account for LU’s admiration and appreciation for GOGOL and motivate both writers to create the image of madness through absorbing the imagination of the strange and of others, which originated correspondingly from Ukrainian folklore and Chinese “little tradition”. With juxtaposed texts and a comparative analysis, it can thus be better understood that the crazed is the product of the “self and others” that echoes the phenomena or the spirit in the Classical era and Age of Reason. FOUCAULT’s theory reveals, particularly when both GOGOL and LU, and meanwhile Russia and China respectively, face the challenges of westernized civilization.

Keywords. Lu Xun, Gogol, Foucault, Madness, Chinese “little tradition”.

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Literary Relationship between GOGOL and LU Xun

The prominent Chinese writer LU Xun (1881–1936) narrates in his prose work “How I came to write fiction” that he has never read any theoretical book about such literary theme before his first published story “Diary of a Mad Man” (*Kuangren riji* 狂人日記).¹ The most beneficial factor of finishing his first collection *Nahan* 呐喊 (The Scream) is, as LU Xun suggests, the experience of reading a wide range of foreign short stories, literary history, and criticism during his stay in Japan.² He continues to expound that the writers he adores the most are GOGOL (1809–1852) and Henryk SIENKIEWICZ (1846–1916). Such narration also explains why LU Xun acknowledges his literary debts to GOGOL when he describes the inspiration of creating his own short stories:

Since May in 1918, my works “Diary of a Mad Man”, “Kong Yiji”, “Medicine” and so on have been published one after another, showing the achievements of the literary revolution. They were reviewed as works with “profound presentation and distinguishable form” so that they could touch young readers. However, such stimulation was one of the results of neglecting the introduction of European literatures. Russian writer GOGOL created “Diary of a Mad Man” in 1834. NIETZSCHE speaks by means of Zarathustra that “you have evolved from worm to man, but much within you is still worm. Once you were apes, yet even now man is more of an ape than any of the apes.” Furthermore, the treatments and ending of “Medicine” are clearly inherited from ANDREEV’s gloomy and grim style.³

The literary relationship between him and GOGOL, on top on being acknowledged by LU Xun himself, is further reinforced by the memoirs of his younger brothers ZHOU Zuoren and ZHOU Jianren.⁴ Like his elder brother, the prominent writer

This chapter mostly includes the essence of my Chinese article: “Fengkuang de qianzouqu – chutan guogeli yu lu xun zuopin de ‘he’ an sijie” 瘋狂的前奏曲——初探果戈理與魯迅作品的「黑暗世界」(The Prelude to Madness: The Dark World of GOGOL and LU Xun). In: *Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiu tongxun* 中國文哲研究通訊 (Newsletter of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy) no. 85, 2012, pp. 151–176.

1 LU Xun 魯迅: “Wo zenne zuoqi xiaoshuo lai” 我怎麼做起小說來 (How I came to write fiction). In: *Lu Xun Quanji* 魯迅全集 (Complete Works of LU Xun) vol. 4, Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe 2005, p. 525; Patrick HANAN: *Chinese Fiction of the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*, New York: Columbia University Press 2004, p. 218.

2 Ibid.

3 LU Xun: “Zhongguo xinwenxue daxi xiaoshuo er ji xu” 《中國新文學大系》小說二集序 (Preface to the second collection of short stories in “The great compendium of new Chinese literature”). In: *Lu Xun Quanji* (2005), vol. 6, pp. 246–247.

4 ZHOU Zuoren 周作人 and ZHOU Jianren 周建人: *Nianshao cangsang: xiongdi yi LU Xun* 年少滄桑:兄弟憶魯迅 (Time brings great changes since childhood: memoirs of LU Xun’s

ZHOU Zuoren, who lived under the same roof with LU Xun during their stay in Tokyo, specifies that GOGOL is the first foreign writer motivating LU Xun to create works,⁵ resulting in the production of the Chinese version of “Diary of a Mad Man”. For that reason, eminent scholars, such as Leo Ou-fan LEE,⁶ Patrick HANAN,⁷ V. I. SEMANOV⁸ and FUJII Shōzō⁹ in their studies in different languages, all demonstrate how LU Xun reads, identifies, imitates and absorbs the literary theme and writing techniques of GOGOL to represent and embody the Chinese mad man. Their research also indicates the multilingual influence (Chinese, Japanese, and German) and the characteristics of intertextuality of foreign works in LU Xun’s writings. Some of these studies further trace the literary heritage of Chinese classics, showing how LU Xun combines and contrasts the two different genres, *wenyan* 文言 (literary Sinitic) and *baihua* 白話 (vernacular), in order to transform the former and transcend its longstanding tradition.¹⁰

These aforementioned scholars, however, rarely deliberate the literary ties linking LU Xun with his favorite writers GOGOL, SIENKIEWICZ, NIETZSCHE and ANDREEV (Leonid Nikolaevich ANDREEV). What bonds LU Xun with these foreign writers is neither a simple relationship of imitation, identification and inspiration, nor an oversimplified question about supply and demand; or to illustrate the economic conditions in the writers’ different life stages and thus to determine the motivations and motifs of their evolutions. In fact, it is problematical to categorize the two writers’ motivations, philosophical thoughts and inner worlds into a pure, simple and lucid characteristic.

The literary creation of both GOGOL and LU Xun is analogous to holding a masquerade, sharing similarities under varied masks in their works, particularly when the text queries the nature of human beings and the characters interact or conflict with one another. The most common technique employed in their works

brothers), Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, vol. 1, 2001, p. 193. (LU Xun was the pen name of ZHOU Shuren 周樹人).

5 ZHOU Zuoren: “Guanyu LU Xun” 關於魯迅 (About LU Xun) and “Guanyu Lu Xun zhi er” 關於魯迅之二 (More about LU Xun II). In: ZHI An 止庵 (ed.): *Zhou Zuoren ji* 周作人集 (Collection of Zhou Zuoren), Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe, vol. 2, 2004, pp. 604–623.

6 LEE Leo Ou-fan: *Voices from the Iron House: A Study of LU Xun*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1987.

7 HANAN Patrick: *Chinese Fiction* (2004), pp. 217–244.

8 SEMANOV V. I.: *LU Sin’i ego predchestvenniki* (LU Hsun and His Predecessors), Moskva: Nauka 1967; *Lu Hsun and His Predecessors*, trans. and ed. by Charles J. ALBERT, London: Routledge 2016.

9 FUJII Shōzō 藤井省三: *Roshia no kage: Natsume Sōseki to Ro Jin* ロシアの影:夏目漱石と魯迅 (The Shadow of Russia: NATSUME Sōseki and LU Xun), Tokyo: Heibonsha 1985.

10 LEE: *Voices* (1987); HANAN: *Chinese Fiction* (2004), pp. 217–244.

is to display the multilayers of chaotic conflicts and intellectual arguments between the inner worlds (i.e. self-imagination, illusion, delusion, and dream) and the external environments (i.e. reality, patriarchal society, system, and authority). In addition, the conflicts buckle themselves with one of the most vital themes during the Chinese May Fourth Movement: humanity and humanism, both of which are to explore the deep bottom of unknown souls and probe the unreasoned power, in order to question and even criticize the constructed code of etiquette and the norm of reason. Adopting the words, phrases and ideas by FOUCAULT from his book *Madness and Civilization*, this chapter defines the “irrational” in the works of GOGOL, SIENKIEWICZ, NIETZSCHE, ANDREEV and LU Xun as elements that cannot be understood or managed via reason (brightness and day are usually the incarnations of normality). Furthermore, ingredients of the “dangerous” mind, such as passion, loneliness, solitude and strangeness, as FOUCAULT suggests, are all “excluded” and demarcated into categories of mysticism, heresy, atheism, or “madness”.¹¹ In their respective scrutiny of GOGOL and LU Xun’s writings, K. MOCHUL’SKIİ and Tsi-an HSIA designate the “irrational” mental and psychological phenomena as “night consciousness” (*nochnoe soznanie*)¹² and the spirit opening “heian zhamen” 黑暗閨門 (the gate of darkness),¹³ correspondingly. The so-called “irrational” and the “dangerous” mind is exactly the leitmotif that forms a solid chain connecting the oeuvre of GOGOL, SIENKIEWICZ, NIETZSCHE, ANDREEV and LU Xun, beyond the peripheral and mere relationship of reading, identifying, and learning. Among these writers, GOGOL and LU Xun predominantly share similarities of inherent perception of the cosmos easily summoned by the inspiration and stimulation of the so-called “night consciousness” and “darkness”, both of which are merged and termed as “the consciousness of darkness” in this article.

Based on the above studies of the consciousness of darkness, several questions are thus raised. How are the inherent perception and the consciousness of darkness shaped in their works? How are formations, symbols, masks, and incarnations of such perception and consciousness represented in the writings of GOGOL and LU Xun? What are the similarities and differences between the works of the two writers? Furthermore, what do these similarities and differences indicate? Would new denotations and perspectives be found through a comparative analysis apart from the study of the individual original text? All these questions are taken into consideration in this article.

11 Michel FOUCAULT: *Madness and Civilization*, London and New York: Routledge 2002, p. 4.

12 Konstantin MOCHUL’SKIİ: *GOGOL’*. *SOLOV’EV. DOSTOEVSKIİ*. (GOGOL. SOLOVYOV. DOSTOEVSKY), Moskva: Respublika 1995, p. 49.

13 HSIA Tsi-An: *The Gate of Darkness: Studies on the Leftist Literary Movement in China*, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press 1968, pp. 101–145.

Association between Madness and Consciousness of Darkness in the Classical Era and Age of Reason

Almost all researchers on GOGOL and LU Xun have noted that the theme of madness in their works is significant and meaningful because insanity perpetuates throughout the plot and atmosphere or simply in words, phrases and incarnations of the entire creation. Meanwhile, literary factors of madness are often linked with the imagery of heresy, the consciousness of darkness, and emotions of the irrational. The following textual analysis reveals that treatments of madness, darkness and the irrational in the writings of GOGOL and LU Xun are not only inherited from Russian and Chinese literary legacy respectively; they also fit in with the innovative components of *natural'nost'* (naturalness), *sluchainost'* (fortuity) and *netipichnost'* (the atypical), as nineteen century Russian critics regularly accentuate in their critiques. Although there are plentiful works of GOGOL and LU Xun which are related to the theme of madness and the consciousness of darkness, this chapter focuses on a comparative analysis of their earlier works written before both the Russian and Chinese “Diary of a Mad Man”.

David Der-wei WANG regards “positive” and “negative” values generally acknowledged in LU Xun’s “Diary of a Mad Man” as the vague demarcation between madness and reason, cannibalism and civilization, as well as revolution and feudalism, albeit with seemingly distinct boundaries on the surface. However, these dichotomies are often so interlaced and interactive that their borderlines are hard to delimit at the end of the story.¹⁴ As suggested by WANG, it is necessary to comprehend how the reality hybridizes the unreality in every layer when the narrative refers to madness, darkness and irrationality in both the Russian and Chinese “Diary of a Mad Man”. Such literary means is a remarkable writing strategy that GOGOL and LU Xun both share in common and which stimulates readers to think about problems and thus question authorities, the structure of power, family and society.

The general criticism of LU Xun’s “Diary of a Mad Man” is that this story exposes how the code of etiquette and the Chinese family system corrode individuals. I would, however, argue that the highly complex ingredients of this story are oversimplified with such clichés because it is neither sufficient to justify both the profound meaning and the avant-garde role of “Diary of a Mad Man” in the intellectual history and the development of Chinese literature, nor is it eligible to indicate the epoch-making significance the story radiates.

14 WANG Dewei 王德威: *Zhongsheng xuanhua: 30 yu 80 niandai de Zhongguo xiaoshuo* 眾聲喧嘩: 30 年代與 80 年代的中國小說 (Heteroglossia: Chinese Fiction in the 1930s and 80s), Taipei: Yuanliu chuban gongsi 1988, p. 12.

In terms of the hybridity of reality and unreality, and the multiple layers of the consciousness of darkness in the theme of madness, FOUCAULT provides a noteworthy analysis of the works of European writers in his book *Madness and Civilization*. His theory coincides with the artistic quality, writing characteristics, and purpose GOGOL and LU Xun are both concerned about in their “Diary of a Mad Man”:

Tamed, madness preserves all the appearances of its reign. It now takes part in the measures of reason and in the labor of truth. It plays on the surface of things and in the glitter of daylight, over all the workings of appearances, over the ambiguity of reality and illusion, over all that indeterminate web, ever rewoven and broken, which both unites and separates truth and appearance. It hides and manifests, it utters truth and falsehood, it is light and shadow.¹⁵

Notwithstanding FOUCAULT’s providing examples of the Baroque period to show how madness is experienced, identified with and represented in European works, several characteristics he induces, such as the hybridity and duality of reality and illusion, truth and falsehood, brightness and darkness, are repeatedly used in the writings of GOGOL and LU Xun. It is thus not surprising that the manifestation of madness is often associated with the characteristics of duality, hybridity and changeability, all of which are highly relevant to the historical development of reason in different ages. Such reason is frequently labelled as civilization earlier in FOUCAULT’s theory and later in the monograph by SCULL.¹⁶

Madness and Civilization aims at the “mad men” imprisoned in European mental hospitals in the Classical era. To FOUCAULT, the meaning of immurement is to control, manage, punish and correct patients and the main purpose is to tame and rationalize the madness. The so-called “tameness”, if rephrased in psychological or sociological terms, corresponds to “rationalization”, “normalization” and “socialization”. In this book, FOUCAULT articulates the chronological meanings of madness in European cultures in different periods, concluding that the definition of the so-called “normal” or “average” condition, standard and mode has never been solid. In other words, what changes the historical meanings of madness is knowledge, identification, and acceptance of humankind.

FOUCAULT continues querying and arguing that the history of madness has been constructed as a kind of mental illness excluded by morality, society or normality, and further categorized into the structure of control and management via reason for a long term. Such structure will not allow madness to be treated as a

15 FOUCAULT: *Madness* (2002), p. 32.

16 FOUCAULT: *Madness* (2002); Andrew SCULL: *Madness in Civilization*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2015.

subject to speak out via reason. Like the “others” under the structure constructed by civilization, madness is speechless and finally “disappears/ed”. As a result of “La folie, l’absence d’œuvre” (madness, the absence of the oeuvre),¹⁷ as FOUCAULT suggests, the history of madness is in fact “an archaeological excavation of such silence”¹⁸ of others.

Similar to the aforementioned European works, the theme of madness in both Russian and Chinese literature before the writings of GOGOL and LU Xun had rarely been represented systematically. As FOUCAULT signifies the works of “silence”, the Russian and Chinese “Diary of a Mad Man” produced in an uproar of heteroglossia in the age of westernized civilization in Russia and China, respectively revealed their extraordinary significance and impressive power in the face of Russian and Chinese literary traditions. If we follow FOUCAULT’s arguments to review the Russian and Chinese “Diary of a Mad Man” published in 1833 and 1918 respectively, it is notable that these two specific years were exactly the points in time when Russia and China correspondingly encountered violent and severe challenges of European superpowers and empires established and dominated by “reason” and “science”. GOGOL and LU Xun both choose the diary as a form and a mad man as the first-person narrator to manifest how the male protagonist subsists on the “civilized” surroundings full of huge differences between strength and weakness, brightness and darkness, as well as greatness and insignificance. “The other” (mad man) who is usually silent reverses to the subject who is empowered to speak in both the Russian and the Chinese “Diary of a Mad Man”. More skillfully, the reversed “others” in the two stories not only signify the “normal” characters, but also connote the two societies which cannot accommodate a mad man in the age of westernized civilization.

By narrating insanity and showing the circumstances the protagonist encounters, GOGOL and LU Xun respectively insinuate that Russia and China, similar to their European counterparts which chase “reasoned” westernization and “civilized” modernization in the face of international competition, cannot tolerate the mad, weak, dark, and little characters. Therefore, the unreasonable, feeble and unacceptable others should be odd and crazed,¹⁹ and even dogs, for example, in both

17 Cited from LIN Zhiming 林志明: “Yizhe daoyan: Fuke double 譯者導言：傅柯 Double” (Avant-propos of the translator: Foucault Double). In: *Gudian shidai fengkuangshi: daodu biece* 古典時代瘋狂史：導讀別冊 (Introduction to History of Madness in the Classical Age), Taipei: Shibao wenhua chubanshe 2016, pp. V–LXIV.

18 Ibid., p. XLV.

19 It is well known that GOGOL suffered from illusion and delusion of the Devil before his death, and his health was broken due to the great pain resulting from anorexia. I would suggest that all these symptoms originated from the irrational elements as we can see in this article. This chapter uses the word “madness” to signify how GOGOL embodies the illusion

stories belittle them. For that reason, the Russian and Chinese mad men finally fail to live or love in daylight; otherwise they would confront the others' scorn and taunt. Only in the shadow, moonlight, and darkness can Russian and Chinese mad men survive to write their feelings in diaries. Both GOGOL and LU Xun associate the theme of madness with the multiple layers of meanings, connotations, insinuations and images.

Despite their similarities, what GOGOL emphasizes more is to question the peculiar phenomena caused by the eminent development of the westernized and civilized Russian capital St. Petersburg in his time, while LU Xun stresses the criticism of the "eerie" code of etiquette in a Chinese old town, which defends tenaciously the thousand-year Chinese civilization. The former shows the grotesqueness of madness because of the westernized Russia while the latter ridicules China that has become the symbol of madness under the invasion of westernization and modernization. GOGOL's male protagonist is sent to the mental hospital at the end of the story, showing the author's unending mockery against the reason of Western European civilization via Russian madness. Nonetheless, the Chinese mad man eventually returns to normality and becomes tamed under the civilization of a thousand-year tradition, revealing LU Xun's resentment and criticism of the rationality and authority reinforced and justified by the old civilization. Regardless of GOGOL's or LU Xun's position vis-à-vis westernized reason or science, it is now clear that the Russian and Chinese "Diary of a Mad Man" both represent the authors' shared sympathy for the weak and mad intellectuals imprisoned in darkness under the historical currents of powerful and bright civilizations.

In addition to the Russian and Chinese "Diary of a Mad Man", several stories in either GOGOL's *Peterburgskie povesti* (Petersburg Novellas, 1830–1840) or LU Xun's collections such as *Nahan* and *Panghuang* 徘徊 (Hesitation, 1926) repeat a series of questions on the theme of madness, tameness, and civilization. It is evident that the two writers are deeply concerned about this topic, so it is noteworthy to probe its meanings, contexts, ideas, and ideologies. From the association between madness and the consciousness of darkness as FOUCAULT suggests, the following questions are thus raised. Firstly, how are the elements of the dark, the irrational, and the abnormal bound together to form and signify the theme of madness in the works of GOGOL and LU Xun? More importantly, it has been shown

and delusion in the crazed and possessed characters in his writing. It is also noteworthy that another foreign writer, NIETZSCHE, whom LU Xun adores and cites the most in his prose works, encountered similar predicaments in life and creation. Most of the crazed or the possessed characters in the works of GOGOL, NIETZSCHE, and LU Xun are in fact not mentally insane. Nonetheless, they are sensitive, intelligent, and regarded as products of social circumstances in the extravagant pursuit of civilization. Please see my arguments in this chapter.

that FOUCAULT links the multiple layers of brightness and darkness with truth and falsehood to illuminate a possibility of explicating the dark cosmos in the prose of GOGOL and LU Xun. With this in mind, was there a concrete tradition of associating darkness with madness in both Russian and Chinese literature that GOGOL and LU Xun had inherited before the creation of “Diary of a Mad Man”? If yes, how did the two writers absorb, identify, and convert such literary heritage into their writings?

The following section investigates how GOGOL and LU Xun respectively inherit the theme of madness and the consciousness of darkness in Ukrainian folk culture and the “little tradition” of Chinese classics,²⁰ in order to show the structure of the dark world in their inherent perceptions. I will also demonstrate that the two writers share relative similarities of coping with their interests in the consciousness of darkness originating from the eastern elements, i.e. Ukrainian folk literature and Chinese little tradition, in relation to the strange or others; evil spirits, demons, devils, and ghosts.

Absorbing “Madness”: Imagination of the Strange and Others and the Formation of the Dark World

The earlier works of GOGOL, *Vechera na khutore bliz Dikan'ki* (Evenings on a Farm near Dikanka, 1831–1832, hereafter *Dikanka*)²¹ and *Mirgorod* (1835), are tales both highlighting the relationship between human beings and rustic nature, which had not experienced the westernized industrial revolution before the eighteenth century. In comparison with GOGOL’s inner perception of the dark cosmos in traditional Ukraine in these collections, LU Xun shares the similarities of that in traditional China in his prose works, for instance, “She xi” 社戲 (She Drama, 1922) and “Nü diao” 女弔 (A Hanged Woman, 1936), and the poems collection *Ye cao* 野草 (Weeds, 1927). The parallels of their inner perceptions of the old world are related to, or motivated by, the characteristics of what MOCHUL'SKII and Tsi-An

20 LEE Leo Ou-fan terms popular fiction, mythology, fable, fantasy and the so-called *zaxue* 雜學 (miscellaneous learning), the knowledge of subjects somewhat beyond the pale of the orthodox Confucian canons, as “little tradition”. Please refer to *Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1987, pp. 4–5.

21 This paper refers mainly to the English translation by Leonard J. KENT (ed.): *The Complete Tales of Nicolai Gogol*, vol. 1, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press 1985.

HSIA respectively and coincidentally term in their research on GOGOL and LU Xun the allurement of darkness.²²

It is worthy of note that GOGOL evolves the theme of madness acknowledged by westernized civilization in his *Petersburg Novellas*. His two earlier collections *Dikanka* and *Mirgorod*, however, focus mainly on how countrymen in rustic villages in Ukraine from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries created stories for peasants after a busy day. These rural inhabitants play the role of both storytellers and literary characters, perceiving darkness as an occasion to indulge themselves in their productive imagination. It is common knowledge that most of this region was called Little Russia, where GOGOL's characters have not yet identified themselves as citizens in the westernized, nationalized, and modernized Great Russian Empire as those in the *Petersburg Novellas*. Both *Dikanka* and *Mirgorod* show how people treat, deal and struggle with the obscure in nature or with others from different worlds in darkness and at dawn. It is thus not surprising that these two collections are tinged with the color of Ukrainian folklore and a mysterious mood fashioned by ghosts and goblins.

According to most researchers of Slavonic studies, the Ukrainian folk tales in *Dikanka* and *Mirgorod* play a significant role in GOGOL's creation of the *Petersburg Novellas*.²³ Coincidentally, a few scholars note that the “little tradition”²⁴ of Chinese fantasy literature in particular deeply influenced LU Xun's writings and his evolution, such as the ancient *Shan Hai Jing* 山海經 (Classic of Mountains and Seas), *Youyang Zazu* 西陽雜俎 (Youyang Miscellany) of Tang times, *Xi You Ji* 西遊記 (Journey to the West) of Ming times, and *Liaozhai Zhi Yi* 聊齋誌異 (Strange Tales from a Chinese Studio) and *Yuwei Caotang Biji* 閱微草堂筆記 (Random Notes at the Cottage of Close Scrutiny) of the Qing times.²⁵

The creation of *Dikanka*, as its title implies, targets this rustic village in Little Russia, which was once the station of Cossack armies famous for their extreme

22 K. MOCHUL'SKI: *GOGOL'* (1995), pp. 48–51; HSIA: *The Gate* (1968), pp. 151–153.

23 M. B. KHRAPCHENKO: *Izbrannye trudy: Nikolai Gogol': Literaturnyi put'*. *Velichie pisatelia* (Selected Works: Nikolai GOGOL: The Literary Way – The Writer's Greatness), Moskva: Nauka, 1993, pp. 104–208; Y. V. MANN: *Poéтика Gogolia: Variatsii k teme* (Poetics of GOGOL: Variations of a Theme), Moskva: Voda 1996, pp. 39–53.

24 LEE: *Voices* (1987), p. 5.

25 HSIA has pointed out LU Xun's obsession of the power of darkness in his childhood. His study is very inspiring for this article. Please refer to HSIA: *The Gate* (1968), pp. 146–162. Following HSIA's research, Leo Ou-fan LEE attributes LU Xun's obsession of the power of darkness to his favorite reading of the “little tradition”. Please refer to LEE: *Voices*, pp. 4–6. It is noteworthy that ZHOU Zuoren specifies the significant relationship between LU Xun and the *Shan Hai Jing* because this classical work is the root of both LU Xun's creation and his understanding of traditional Chinese mythology. See ZHOU Zuoren and ZHOU Jianren, *Nianshao cangsang: Xiongdi yi Lu Xun*, vol. 1, p. 47.

love for freedom and defiance against oppression. Before the dismissal order from Catherine the Great in 1775, the relation between this frontier region and the central authorities, the so-called Great Russia, had been neither friendly nor aloof.²⁶ For such historical, geographical, social, and cultural backgrounds, it would be understandable, if we borrow Leo Ou-fan LEE's term and follow its logic of the development of Chinese literature, to define GOGOL's Ukrainian folk tales in *Dikanka* as the representation of Little Russia; it is as well the "little tradition" in the history of the nineteenth-century Russian literature. The term "little tradition" would aptly and meaningfully describe GOGOL's literary debut *Dikanka* because this collection plays a vital role in showing the strange, the marginal, and others. Juxtaposing the works of the little traditions of the aforementioned Chinese and Russian literature, the following section details several remarkable similarities.

First, in terms of content and context, the leitmotifs in both GOGOL's two collections of Ukrainian tales and Chinese works of little tradition, such as *Xi You Ji*²⁷ and *Liaozhai Zhi Yi*,²⁸ are madness and tameness. All these works relate to the imagination of the strange and others in the dark world, mirroring the feelings, emotion and passion of the metamorphosing characters. They are often night creatures or animals, for instance, devils, goblins, monsters, and evil spirits from different worlds to disturb the order, harmony, and authoritative power consolidated by the domestic institution "on the surface of things in the glitter of daylight" in FOUCAULT'S words. The arrangement of plots in these aforementioned fantastic literary works is gives a sense of the grotesque and ludicrous.

Regardless of the mutual confrontation or coordination among human beings, ghosts, devils, and monsters, the characteristics of greed, temper, obsession, stupidity, and lust are all portrayed and accentuated in these Russian and Chinese works. In *Dikanka*, these characteristics are usually depicted and constructed via

26 In 1834, GOGOL wrote an article "Otryvok iz istorii Malorossii" (Excerpt from the History of Little Russia) to show his knowledge of his hometown in Little Russia. This article refers to its Chinese translation: Guogeli 果戈理 (GOGOL): "Lüelun xiao Eluosi de xing-cheng" 略論小俄羅斯的形成 (Briefly on the formation of Little Russia). In: ZHOU Qichao 周啟超 (ed. and tr.): *Guogeli Quanji Wenlunjuan* 果戈理全集文論卷 (GOGOL's oeuvre: literary theory), Hefei: Anhui wenyi chubanshe 1999, vol. 7, pp. 61–72.

27 This Chinese novel written in the sixteenth century is attributed to WU Cheng'en. Based on historical events, i.e. on Chinese monk Xuanzang 玄奘 (602–664, well-known as TANG Sanzang) in Tang Dynasty who travelled to India and studied Buddhism, *Xi You Ji* fantasizes how he and his three followers, SUN Wukong 孫悟空 (or Monkey King), ZHU Bajie 豬八戒 (or Pigsy) and SHA Wujing 沙悟淨 (or Sandy) overcame all difficulties of threat, allurements and harassments from monsters, demons and goblins on the pilgrimage.

28 It is a collection of Chinese fantasy stories and marvel tales written by PU Songling (1640–1715), who spent most of his life attempting to pass the Imperial examinations on the authoritative Four Books and Five Classics of Confucianism and failed until he was 71.

dialogism, with specific reference to the description of the literary type of devils and goblins. GOGOL uses the form of a conversation between two or among more persons to show the general fear that people have of devils and demons and how they look for powers representing goodness, kindness, and decency to overcome such fears. This literary technique resembles that in *Xi You Ji* and *Liaozhai Zhi Yi*. Take “Solochinskaiā iarmarka” (The Fair at Sorochintsy) in *Dikanka* as an example. The pig monster in a red jacket is almost the mirror personification of Zhu Bajie 豆八戒 (Pigsy)²⁹ in *Xi You Ji*, both of which are portrayed with a pig’s face and oink to scare people. Although both characters embody the animal metamorphosis of the pig, the former is from hell while the latter is from heaven. Their respective representation of the nature of evil and the inclination toward goodness reflect the different writing purposes of GOGOL and WU Cheng’en, to whom *Xi You Ji* is attributed.

It is not difficult to note that GOGOL tends to use animal traits, with specific reference to the pig’s snout, to illustrate the physical and psychological characteristics of a monster or the strange/others identified by the general public. Employing such literary means, GOGOL satirizes those of the upper class and their resemblance with the pig symbolizing the dispositions of laziness, greed, and importunity. For example, the German-like assessor of Sorochintsy in “Noch’ pered Rozhdestvom” (Christmas Eve) and the role of the mayors appointed by the Tsar in this collection are frequently represented with such physical features and have similar psychological and mental characteristics. While the symbol of pig is marked in the character, the atmosphere is infused with grotesqueness, ludicrousness, irony, and mockery. In GOGOL’s writings, most of the powerful upper-class characters in the Ukrainian society are transformed into the appearance of pigs so that the image can create double and subversive meanings: fear and laughter. While civilians are awed by these powerful characters from the upper class, their pig image dissolves the former’s fear via ridicule. Russian scholars Mikhail BAKHTIN and Yuri MANN, both term GOGOL’s evolution of early writings as a “carnival debut”, of which the literary motivation is not only to turn the social status of bigwigs and the authorities upside down, but also to enrich the rhetoric of folktales.³⁰ It is interesting that the pig like characters created by GOGOL share certain similarities with the wild and mad Pigsy during his stay in Gao Village

29 Bajie literally means eight precepts. In some English versions of *Xi You Ji*, this character is translated as Pigsy.

30 BAKHTIN M.M.: “Rable i Gogol’ (Iskusstvo slova i narodnaiā smekhovaia kul’tura)” (RABELAIS and GOGOL: The Art of Discourse and the Popular Culture of Laughter). In: *Voprosy literatury i estetiki* (Questions of Literature and Aesthetics), Moskva: KHudozhestvennaiā literatura 1975, pp. 484–495; MANN: *Poetics* (1996).

rather than the tamed disciple of the monk TANG Sanzang 唐三藏 (Tripitaka) in *Xi You Ji*.

In the Cossack folk tale “Maïskaïa noch’, ili Utoplennitsa” (A May Night or the Drowned Maiden), the young witch stepmother transforms into a monstrous black cat at the first night when she comes to her new home and tries to drive her stepdaughter away. The stepdaughter is finally turned out of the house by her own father and drowns herself in the water. Her ghost assembles all the drowned girls every night and searches for the witch, trying to take revenge. The character of a young fair lady who can metamorphose into different kinds of animals, chiefly cat or fox, is, however, not a unique technique in Ukrainian Cossack tales. Such literary tropes of a beautiful young lady and the plot of wreaking vengeance via supernatural powers after death are both repeatedly seen in PU Songling’s *Liaozhai Zhi Yi*³¹ which LU Xun loved the most in his childhood.

Take “Propavshaïa gramota” (The Lost Letter) as another example. The horse-faced devil with human elements portrayed in it has a comparable character (Ma-mian 馬面, horse-face) in Chinese mythology. Though alike, these creatures or personalities embody different cultural meanings in Russian folklore and Chinese strange tales. In *Dikanka*, plenty of images of Cossack armies, peasants and devils are depicted as mad, mischievous, greedy and arrogant. Furthermore, the tales often begin with narrating the characteristics of these protagonists i.e. how they are fond of drinking, playing, dancing, and singing. It is not difficult to find Chinese counterparts of either such Russian literary types, or arrangements of plots and genres in *Liaozhai Zhi Yi*. For instance, “Luocha haishi” 羅刹海市 (The Rakshas Sea City), “Hu xie” 狐諧 (The Jocularity of Fox), “Huang Ying” 黃英 and “Ma Jiefu” 馬介甫 have similar plots and narrative openings for the fantastic adventures of human protagonists with ghosts, demons or characters metamorphosed from animals after binge drinking as in *Dikanka*. Moreover, *Dikanka* and *Liaozhai Zhi Yi* share the semblance of literary technique and device – *mise en abyme*, i.e., a story within a story; a tale within a tale, which is often seen in terms of magic realism.

As implied by their titles, *Dikanka* and *Liaozhai Zhi Yi* are the collections suitable for and targeted at the audience with preference of listening to stories in the evenings. On one hand, their mental status is more relaxed at night under the moon and stars; on the other hand, their perception in the dark is heightened, enabling their reception of literary characters that embody all elements of the irrational to unshackle their love, hatred, attachment, enmity, and other emotions.

31 This article refers chiefly to the English translation by LU Yunzhong, CHEN Tifang, YANG Liyi and YANG Zhihong: *Strange Tales of Liaozhai*, Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 1988. Their translations will be modified. Otherwise, the citation will be specified.

Provided the aforementioned analysis of Russian and Chinese works, it is noteworthy that GOGOL and PU Songling both articulate the special manners and cultural imagination of the aliens and outsiders in imperial Russia and China, when they respectively narrate the irrationality of their characters in the two collections of tales. To show Russian and Chinese subjectivity, GOGOL and PU both use numerous different tones and language varieties to mock, ridicule, tease and occasionally even curse, particularly when the discourse refers to the German and the Dutch. For instance, the narrator in GOGOL's "Christmas Eve" analogizes the German and the pig. In Sorochintsy, no matter where the foreigners come from, they are all categorized as "the German", which suggests the consistence of degrading aliens and others. Nevertheless, in GOGOL's writings, the Germans are treated entirely different from the Poles, the Russian's Slavonic kindred. According to BOJANOWSKA, the Poles represent traitors in most of GOGOL's works.³² Take the sorcerer in "A Terrible Vengeance" as an example. Any Ukrainian character conspiring with the Poles is branded as a traitor. The elements of the irrational are more vividly displayed in GOGOL's *Petersburg Novellas*, as BOJANOWSKA shows in her book.³³ Images of the Germans and the Poles in GOGOL's writings are certainly related to the historical backgrounds and the tense international relations in his age.

Similarly, several stories in *Liaozhai Zhi Yi* not only alienate foreigners from the Chinese, but also smear their image. For example, when the good-looking Chinese protagonist MA Ji, who loves singing, drinking, and dancing, drifts to Rakshas Sea City due to a hurricane on the sea, he finds the inhabitants there appallingly ugly. These fierce-looking Rakshas people, however, treat the handsome MA as a horrible monster. More interestingly, the discourse shows that Rakshas people value appearance more than literary accomplishment, which is highly appreciated in Chinese culture. They tell MA that the most handsome men in this country are appointed high officials; yet the prime minister whom MA sees in the street is described by the Chinese omniscient narrator as bearing Rakshas features.

雙耳接背生，鼻三孔，睫毛覆目如簾。³⁴

His ears join his back and he has three nostrils. His eyelashes cover his eyes like a screen.

32 E. M. BOJANOWSKA: *Nikolai GOGOL: Between Ukrainian and Russian Nationalism*, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press 2007, p. 175.

33 Ibid., pp. 114–115.

34 PU Songling: *Liaozhai Zhi Yi* 聊齋誌異 (Strange tales from a Chinese studio), Changsha: Yuelu shushe 1989, p. 142.

In line with such a principle, all senior courtiers are “all dishevelled and queer-looking; the lower their rank, the less ugly they are”,³⁵ as the narrator depicts.

Compared with *Dikanka*, *Liaozhai Zhi Yi* provides two-way thinking in its narration of aliens, foreigners, strangers, or outsiders, particularly in the plot of the Chinese stranger regarded as a monster in a foreign country. Furthermore, PU’s usage of words and treatment of closures in his tales both show his leisure and carefree mood nurtured by the Chinese mentality of traditional intellectuals for personal enjoyment, which is relatively different from the peppery and acidic tone of GOGOL.

Looking at “The Jocularity of Fox” for instance, the king of Hongmaoguo 紅毛國 (Kingdom of Red Hair), which usually implies the Dutch from the Netherlands in Qing Dynasty, has never seen a fox, and as a result he has no idea of how to write the pictographic character. Although this plot shows mainly how the Hulijing 狐狸精 (fox spirit) teases himself and amuses his guests for jocularity, it suggests the intense exclusiveness and solid subjectivity in Chinese imagination of strangers and others in the classics. As we have seen, such characteristics are repeatedly manifested in *Dikanka* as well. It is indeed contradictory that both Russian and Chinese tales on one hand show their strong opposition to any institutionalization or centralization, but on the other hand connote the two authors’ standpoint of nationalism in the face of other foreign countries.

Dikanka is GOGOL’s literary base for developing his Ukrainian folk style in Russian language; while *Liaozhai Zhi Yi* deeply influences LU Xun’s literary evolution and motivates him to construct the Chinese subjectivity of both anti-institutionalization and nationalism. The connection between *Dikanka* and *Liaozhai Zhi Yi* explains why it was much easier for LU Xun to accept, adore, and absorb GOGOL than other foreign writers in his wide-ranging reading experience in Tokyo. Additionally, it is thus understandable how LU Xun learns from GOGOL and PU Songling and synthesizes the tone of *Dikanka* and *Liaozhai Zhi Yi* to tease, mock, ridicule or criticize those he calls “Jia yang gui zi” 假洋鬼子 (fake foreign devils) in his works. The fake foreign devils to LU Xun appear in parallel to the Polish traitors to GOGOL.

In terms of content, theme, images, symbols, styles, atmosphere, multiple layers of designs, and various emotions, the Ukrainian stories in *Dikanka*, as well as *Xi You Ji* and *Liaozhai Zhi Yi*, all enrich LU Xun’s literary techniques and inspire him to create the Chinese version of “Diary of a Mad Man”. Therefore, both Russian and Chinese “Diary of a Mad Man” are epoch-making works and products of classical inheritance, deserving more in-depth examination in a worldwide literary area related to the theme of madness rather than studies of one-way influence.

35 LU, CHEN, YANG and YANG (trans.): *Strange Tales* (1988), p. 222.

More importantly, FOUCAULT's arguments illuminate a new perspective of analyzing the writing strategies and purposes of both GOGOL and LU XUN in the face of international competition and sociohistorical currents of westernization and modernization. GOGOL's imagination of the strange and others carries the passion and paranoia of madness to question the norm and power granted by the authority, which coincides with the "tamed madness" in the writings of the Classical age, as FOUCAULT reveals:

We owe the invention of the arts to deranged imaginations: the Caprice of Painters, Poets, and Musicians is only a name moderated in civility to express their Madness.³⁶ Madness, in which the values of another age, another art, another morality are called into question, but which also reflects — blurred and disturbed, strangely compromised by one another in a common chimera — all the forms, even the most remote of the human imagination.³⁷

According to the famous Russian critic V.G. BELINSKI³⁸ (1811–1848), GOGOL's *Dikanka* indulge people in the irrational fascination and lyricism, full of life and enchantment (ocherki, polnye zhizni i ocharovaniia).³⁹ Meanwhile, the writer spontaneously integrates sense and sensibility in a spacious cosmos to approach what BELINSKI³⁸ believes to be the perfection of poetic writing: "aimlessness with aim, unconsciousness with consciousness (bestsel'nost' s tsel'iu, bessoznatel'nost' s soznaniem)".⁴⁰ To BELINSKI³⁸, GOGOL was not merely a "writer" with writings of normal or general standard, but an excellent and unique "poet" who succeeds to PUSHKIN's laurel wreath and literary estate.⁴⁰

The above comparative analysis of *Dikanka* and the Chinese traditional classics, *Xi You Ji* and *Liaozhai Zhi Yi*, has made clear that the "little tradition" of Russian folk and Chinese mythology shared essential parallels of both perceiving darkness and narrating the strange and others before the two "Diary of a Mad Man" were respectively created. *Dikanka* elucidates that Little Russia had preserved the Eurasian nomad mythology of polytheism when Ukraine was under incomparable influence of the Orthodox Church. Such a multicultural and contradictory situation between the so-called uncivilized and civilized in the frontier region is embedded

36 Charles de SAINT-ÉVREMONT: *Sir Politick would be* (ca. 1664), act V, scene ii. Cited from Michel FOUCAULT: *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, London: Routledge 2001, trans. by Richard HOWARD, p. 26.

37 Ibid., Michel FOUCAULT: *Madness* (2001).

38 V. G. BELINSKI³⁸: "O russkoj povesti i povestiakh Gogolia" (On Russian Story and Novellas of GOGOL). In: *N.V. Gogol' v russkoj kritike* (GOGOL in Russian Criticism). Moskva: Gos. izd-vo khudozhestvennoj literatury 1953, p. 56.

39 Ibid., p. 40.

40 Ibid.

in early GOGOL writings to contrast the central and westernized authorities. On the other hand, *Xi You Ji* and *Liaozhai Zhi Yi* are transcultural products representing the rebellion against the orthodox tradition of the “Four Books and Five Classics” deeply rooted in Confucianism. These similar characteristics of Russian and Chinese tales LU Xun loved to read the most, clarify why he adopts GOGOL’s literary heritage in choosing the leitmotifs of madness and tameness in his literary debut.

The Problematic Nature of Laughter and Illusion

According to the celebrated Russian symbolist writer and scholar D. S. MEREZHKOVSKIĬ (1865–1941), the recurring theme in GOGOL’s evolution from *Dikanka* to *Petersburg Novellas* is the fight with the devil, a metaphor signifying the evil in society and the spirit of SMERDYAKOV (Smerdiákovskaí dusha) in human nature. The oeuvre of GOGOL is devoted to examining “the mechanism of mysterious essence” and the laughter he designs shows that human beings are battling with the devil within their mind.⁴¹ According to MEREZHKOVSKIĬ’s criticism, Soviet scholars, such as M. M. BAKHTIN (1895–1975), V. I. PROPP (1895–1970), D. S. LIKHACHEV (1906–1999), and Y. MANN (1929–) all examine the theme of laughter in GOGOL’s works.⁴² These Russian studies on GOGOL inspire similar questions on LU Xun’s writings.

BAKHTIN argues that BELINSKIĬ’s criticism regarding GOGOL’s laughter and humor as a kind of pure and parochial irony falls short of explaining GOGOL’s profound and complex thoughts. It is necessary to investigate the origin of not only western influence on GOGOL, such as the laughter of romanticism (its carnival sources) and Don Quixote, but also Russian culture, for instance, the laughter of festivals, feasts, plazas, and students of religious schools. These sources reveal the extraordinary association of laughter with the illusion in the lower/other world; “the longstanding historical connection of laughter and death leads to the construction of a special form: the image of laughter and banter.”⁴³

41 D. MEREZHKOVSKIĬ: *Gogol' i chort'*: *Issledovanie* (GOGOL and the Devil: Research), Moscow: Skorpion 1906, p. 95.

42 Both the movement and the sounds of laughter are important factors in GOGOL’s writing. The treatment of plots and the ending in the comedy *Revizor* (The Government Inspector) are one of the excellent instances to elucidate the performance of laughter on stage.

43 I quote and translate this information from the Chinese translation of BAKHTIN’s notes. The original text has not been found yet. Please refer to BAHEJIN 巴赫金: “Guogeli zhi xiao de lishi chuantong han minjian yuanyuan wenti” 果戈理之笑的歷史傳統和民間淵源問

In line with BAKHTIN's research of GOGOL, LU Xun should not be interpreted merely as a writer satirizing banality, laughing at society and criticizing the traditional system and authorities because he had read abundant traditional Chinese and modern Western classics and ruminated different literary themes of creation before he wrote "Diary of a Mad Man".⁴⁴ As Chinese scholar HSIA indicates,

It is general criticism of categorizing LU Xun and his writings into a movement, a role or even a direction of development. These categories sacrifice individual talent and overestimate the great history. The era LU Xun was situated in cannot be understood via the metaphor of contrast between brightness and darkness because there is something interesting in gray that lies in between. Sometimes at dawn, there is illusion like swinging shadows or flickering ghosts with whispers, and they are easily ignored if you are impatiently waiting for daybreak. LU Xun is similar to a historian catching and narrating this moment, using his profound perspective and sensitive insight and that is exactly the characteristic he lacks when he means to pose as a rebel to create works.⁴⁵

HSIA specifies that death, illusion in the lower/other world and the gloomy side of LU Xun's writing are frequently disregarded. However, HSIA's research, similar to BELINSKIĬ's criticism of GOGOL, treats the laughter of LU Xun as either a sort of joke or witticism, and is thus unable to unearth the seriousness of LU Xun's laughter in a broad sense. Hence, a comparative analysis of tracing the Chinese tradition and probing the origin of Russian influence of GOGOL's early writings would shed more light on LU Xun's power of laughter.

Different from BAKHTIN, PROPP develops his research of GOGOL's laughter and comedy according to BELINSKIĬ's criticism. It is noteworthy that BAKHTIN focuses on the irrational characteristics of the carnivalesque essence in GOGOL's early writings, absorbing the concept of madness in the folklores of Little Russia, but PROPP stresses that GOGOL's works after the *Petersburg Novellas* show the theme of madness in the age of westernized civilization. These two scholars, nonetheless, agree that laughter plays a significant role in these two periods of GOGOL's evolution. PROPP follows BELINSKIĬ to cite GOGOL as an example to demonstrate that elements of comedy can be meaningful in contradicting the general criticism of praising tragedy and devaluating the significance of comedy in nineteenth

題 (The Historical Tradition of GOGOL's Laughter and Problems of National Sources). In: QIAN Zhongwen (ed.): *Bahejin Quanji* 巴赫金全集 (Complete Works of BAKHTIN), Shijiazhuhan: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe 1998, vol. 4, pp. 54–55.

44 This point of view can be seen in HSIA: *The Gate* (1968), pp. 146–162 and LEE: *Voices* (1987).

45 HSIA Tsi-An 夏濟安: *Xia Ji'an xuanji* 夏濟安選集 (The Selected Works of HSIA Tsi-An), Taipei: Zhiwen chubanshe 1974, p. 30.

century Great Russia.⁴⁶ PROPP provides two further examples, “Diary of a Mad Man” and “The Overcoat”, articulating that the content of GOGOL’s works is in fact a tragedy although both styles and techniques are represented in the form of comedy.⁴⁷ Moreover, PROPP highlights the significance of GOGOL’s humor and argues that this is the key to pondering over GOGOL’s artistic and moral value in the field of aesthetics. Otherwise, critics may think that most of GOGOL’s works involve vulgar and contemptible problems of comedy.⁴⁸

The laughter of satire, humor, seriousness, and comedy constitute styles, forms and literary means for manifesting GOGOL’s multiple layers of emotion and his integration of tragedy with comedy. LU XUN’s reading of GOGOL is similar to the criticisms of BAKHTIN and PROPP that he comments on his own prose works, with specific reference to “Cong fengci dao youmo” 從諷刺到幽默 (From Satire to Humor) and “Cong youmo dao zhengjing” 從幽默到正經 (From Humor to Seriousness). In these two pieces, LU XUN ridicules different types of satirists in his age, arguing that his contemporary critics do not understand his cosmos of satire. That is why they judge his works as full of “freezing irony, invectives, witticism, venom, resentment”, and himself as *xuefei* 學匪 (academic bandit) and *Shaoxing shiye* 紹興師爺 (Master Shaoxing)”.⁴⁹ In the face of such criticism, LU XUN resists by saying:

If I am not totally dead and even there is only half breath left, I would rely on the signboard of laughter, exhaling haha...⁵⁰

Unfortunately, GOGOL’s style of satire and humor which LU XUN identifies with, has unavoidably transformed into a kind of hypocritical and paradoxical seriousness in Chinese society when China encounters national calamities, as LU XUN explains in another essay, for the reason that satire and humor are either misunderstood or incriminated.⁵¹

Following the transformation of satire and humor, LU XUN uses a facetious tone and comic talk:

46 V. I. PROPP: *Problemy komizma i smekha* (Problems of Comedy and Laughter), Moskva: Iskusstvo 1976, pp. 4–5.

47 Ibid., pp. 8–10.

48 Ibid.

49 LU XUN: “Cong fengci dao youmo” 從諷刺到幽默 (From Satire to Humor). In: *Lu Xun Quanji* (2005), vol. 5, p. 46. Shaoxing is LU XUN’s hometown.

50 Ibid., p. 47.

51 LU XUN: “Cong youmo dao zhengjing” 從幽默到正經 (From Humour to Seriousness). In: *Lu Xun Quanji* (2005), vol. 5, pp. 48–49.

The saying “A wise man does not fight when the odds are against him” is the exhortation of Chinese sages. Meanwhile, humor passes away and seriousness uniforms the rest of China.⁵²

Such narration connotes that these Chinese critics prefer the pretense of a serious face to the seriousness of humor; and they force writers not to laugh at society, nation, and authorities. This literary phenomenon is unacceptable to LU Xun, and therefore he employs GOGOL’s writing technique to portray a tamed “zhengjingren” 正經人 (Chinese serious character) who fits in with the normal standard in order to show the ridiculous problems in China. LU Xun’s resistance of being tamed motivates him to choose the gesture of a rebel and mad man in the later evolution, and he thus uses different forms of comedy and laughter to flicker in the spectra of lightness and darkness, normality and abnormality, flippancy and seriousness, truth and falsehood. Therefore, the art of the mad world in the writings of GOGOL and LU Xun is comparatively close to what FOUCAULT suggests:

It plays on the surface of things and in the glitter of daylight, over all the workings of appearances, over the ambiguity of reality and illusion, over all that indeterminate web, ever rewoven and broken, which both unites and separates truth and appearance.⁵³

LU Xun is not only a thoughtful and sophisticated writer, but also an avant-garde and professional critic superior to his contemporaries. While commenting on GOGOL’s notable novel *Mertvye dushi* (Dead Souls), LU Xun lists specific and representative examples to expound the frequent literary means in GOGOL’s writings:

These most ordinary tragedies even close to nothing are the same as the works full of silent words. It is not easy to become aware of them unless they are depicted as the images by a poet. However, people who die in heroic tragedies are much fewer than those in the most ordinary ones.⁵⁴

Despite being unable to read GOGOL’s works in Russian,⁵⁵ LU Xun undoubtedly has an insight into the core and essence of GOGOL’s artistic world. Also, it is

52 Ibid.

53 FOUCAULT: *Madness* (2002), p. 32.

54 LU Xun: “Jihu wushi de beiju” 幾乎無事的悲劇 (Tragedies of almost nothing). In: *LU Xun Quanji* (2005), vol. 6, p. 383.

55 ZHOU Zuoren recalls that LU Xun and he studied Russian language for several months when they were in Tokyo in 1907, but they soon gave up. ZHOU Zuoren thinks that Russian language is too difficult for Chinese people, and they felt tense while they were learning it.

considered unusual among Chinese translators and critics during the May Fourth Movement that LU Xun regards GOGOL as a poet rather than a novelist, although the nineteenth century Russian critics have generally accepted such a title of honor for GOGOL. LU Xun also suggests that laughter with tears is the characteristic of comedy and tragedy combined in GOGOL's writings. These proofs sufficiently validate LU Xun's sense and sensibility and most importantly his absorption of GOGOL's works.

Conclusion

It is clear that GOGOL and LU Xun share relatively significant similarities in their early works. These parallel characteristics are not merely embedded in the process of how LU Xun adores, identifies, imitates and absorbs GOGOL, but are more notably represented in the inner perception and external attitude of LU Xun when he faces his "self and the others" under the historical currents of westernization and civilization.

More importantly, GOGOL and LU Xun respectively inherit the literary legacy of Russian and Chinese "little tradition" of the dark world. They both show an inclination for the consciousness of darkness, and their works are about problems of the marginal, strange, crazed, and others in society. The comparative analysis of *Dikanka* and *Liaozhai Zhi Yi* in this chapter demonstrates not only the Chinese modernity acquired from Russia, as many scholars have shown, but also the Eurasian-Russian mentality resembling Chinese transcultural characteristics. These similarities serve as the main reason why GOGOL is enthroned in LU Xun's wide-ranging reading list of Chinese and foreign literature.

Finally, the early works of both GOGOL and LU Xun are associated with the theme of madness and the consciousness of darkness; and both writers choose the literary treatment of comedy and laughter to represent the derivative problematics as demonstrated in this article. Hence, it can be concluded that the power of darkness is more subversive than the discourse or sermon of morality in the usual realistic works for the purpose of deconstructing westernized civilization. When the curtain of these two writers' carnival debut rises on the literary stage, their early works transform the vulgar and contemptible problems into an aesthetic combination of both tragedy and comedy and become classics in Russia and China.

Please refer to ZHOU Zuoren and ZHOU Jianren: *Nianshao canggang* (2001) vol. 1, pp. 119–120.

Alexey RODIONOV

8 Images of Russia in Chinese Literary Periodicals at the Beginning of the 1930s: Nationalist Perspective

Abstract. The contribution of left wing literati to the translation and promotion of Russian and Soviet literature in China at the beginning of the 1930s is widely acknowledged. However, their ideological rivals – Chinese nationalists – did not ignore Russian literature either. Communist and nationalist literati each had their own reasons to address Russia and constructed distinct images of Russia and Russian literature in their publications. This chapter examines the portrayal of the Russians and Russia as well as the translation of Russian and Soviet literature in the nationalist periodicals *Qiansheng Zhoubao* and *Qiansheng Yuekan* in the literary and historical context.

Keywords. Russian literature, Soviet literature, Image of Russia, Chinese nationalism, Vanguard Society.

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Introduction

The introduction of Russian literature to China dates back to 1872 when “A Russian Fable” (*E ren yuyan* 俄人寓言) was first translated into Chinese by Presbyterian missionary William A. P. MARTIN (1827–1916) and published in the first issue of *The Peking Magazine* (*Zhong Xi wen jian lu* 中西聞見錄, 1872–1875). It is supposed to be an adapted version of the story by Leo TOLSTOY (Lev TOLSTOJ, 1828–1910) “Two Friends”, which itself is based on a popular fable.¹ However, it took almost thirty years for another publication of Russian literature in China when three fables by Ivan KRYLOV (1769–1844) were consecutively published by the Shanghai Chinese monthly *The Review of the Times* (*Wanguo gongbao* 萬國公報, 1868–1907) in 1899–1900. N. SAMOYLOV draws our attention to the fact that “the content of those fables, being an object of mockery and derision for the Russian people, likewise catered to similar convictions of the Chinese society (in particular, relating to the absolute power of bureaucracy and corruption).² However, it may also be that the very selection of these fables by the Western missionaries reflected their negative stereotypes and stereotypes of a Chinese audience toward Russia. I agree with N. SAMOYLOV that: “The most negative image of Russia was formed in Chinese periodicals that were dependent on foreign states”.³ Additionally, since the beginning of the 20th century we can see a growing interest in Russian literature and numerous translations of Aleksandr PUSHKIN (1799–1837), Leo TOLSTOY, Anton CHEKHOV (1860–1904), Leonid ANDREEV (1871–1919) etc. into the Chinese language, which were driven not by the intention to expose the evils of the aggressive northern barbarians, but by the desire of Chinese literati to learn the revolutionary experience of Russia in the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, or, by the similar understanding of the moral power of literature in both cultures.⁴

Although initially the translation of Russian literature was lagging behind the Western literature, after the May Fourth Movement in China in 1919 and the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, it started attracting more and more attention.

1 CHEN Jianhua 陈建华: *Ershi Shiji Zhong E Wenxue Guanxi* 二十世纪中俄文学关系 (Comparison between Chinese Literature and Russian Literature of the 20th Century), Beijing: Gaodeng Jiaoyu Chubanshe 2002, pp. 40–46.

2 Nikolay SAMOYLOV: *The Evolution of Russia’s Image in China in the early 20th century: Key Factors and Research Methodology*, Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University, Asian and African Studies, 2019, Vol. 11, Issue 1, p. 32.

3 SAMOYLOV: *The Evolution* (2019), p. 36.

4 Mark GAMSA: *The Reading of Russian Literature in China. A Moral Example and Manual of Practice*, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan 2010, p. 12.

While Chinese literati were looking for recipes and methods concerning how to make the country strong and how to cope with militarist warfare and foreign aggression, they found, as LU Xun 魯迅 (1881–1936) says, that “Russian literature is our teacher and friend. There we have seen the beautiful soul of the oppressed person, his suffering and struggle; the novels of the 1840s gave us a hope, and the literature of the 1860s made us mourn”.⁵ One of the first Chinese Marxists LI Dazhao (李大釗, 1888–1927) stressed the link between the revolution and literature in Russia and saw in Russian literature the following specific features: “first, it carries a distinct social flavor, second, it is permeated by high humanism”.⁶ In the 1930s, the Russian and Soviet literature became the second most frequently translated foreign literature in China, and from the 1940s up to the end of the 1980s, it was dominant in the circle of foreign literature.

In 1920s–1930s, lots of eminent Chinese leftist literati took part in the translation and promotion of Russian and Soviet literature and literary theory in China. Among them we can name LU Xun, MAO Dun 茅盾 (1896–1981), GUO Moruo 郭沫若 (1892–1978), QU Qiubai瞿秋白 (1899–1935), JIANG Guangci 蔣光慈 (1901–1931) and many others. It must be noted, however, that the introduction of Russian, and especially Soviet, literature encountered many political obstacles as it became tied to the confrontation between Soviet Russia and capitalist countries, Russian-Chinese diplomatic relations and conflicts, including the Chinese Eastern Railway conflict, the cooperation and struggle of the Guomindang (GMD) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), etc. After the split of the GMD and the CCP in 1927 and the rupture of diplomatic relations between China and the USSR in 1929, the promotion of Soviet literature became not only problematic, but also a rather dangerous affair. Nevertheless, the beginning of the 1930s saw a rapid acceleration in the translations of Russian and Soviet literature. On the one hand, there was an objective interest of the society in the understanding of the Soviet experience; on the other hand, there were enormous efforts to achieve this goal by the League of Leftist Writers. At that time, literary journals played a crucial role in authors reaching their audience.

The contribution of the numerous but short-lived left-wing journals, like, *Beidou* 北鬥 (Big Dipper, 1931–1932), *Mengya* 萌芽 (Sprouts, 1930), *Baerdishan* 巴爾底山 (Partisan, 1930), and *Tuohuangzhe* 拓荒者 (Pathfinder, 1930) to the translation and promotion of Russian and Soviet literature in China at the beginning of

5 LU Xun 魯迅: “Zhi Zhong E Wenzi Zhi Jiao” 致中俄文字之交 (Greeting the Literary Communication of China and Russia). In: *Lu Xun Wen Cui* 魯迅文萃 (Collection of Lu Xun), Shanghai: Baijia Chubanshe 2001, Vol. 3, p. 303.

6 LI Dachzhao: *Russkaia literatura i revoliutsiia* (Russian Literature and Revolution). In: LI Dachzhao. *Izbrannye proizvedeniia* (Selected Works), Moskva: Nauka Publishers 1989, p. 148.

the 1930s is widely acknowledged.⁷ However, Russian literature was also far from being ignored by the nationalist literary journals, like the *Qianfeng Zhoubao* 前鋒周報 (Vanguard Weekly, 1930–1931) and the *Qianfeng Yuekan* 前鋒月刊 (Vanguard Monthly, 1930–1931). Just like the leftists, the nationalist literati had their own reasons to address Russia and constructed rather specific images of Russia and Russian literature in their publications. Further to this we can examine the portrayal of the Russians and Russia as well as the translation of Russian and Soviet literature in the above-mentioned journals in the literary and historical context.

Worldview of the Nationalist Literary Periodicals

Nationalism became a very popular ideology in China since the end of the 19th century. A number of important thinkers and politicians of the late-Qing and early Republican periods, for example, LIANG Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929), ZHANG Binglin 章炳麟 (1868–1936), and SUN Yatsen 孫中山 (1866–1925) developed their own concepts of nationalism, though the initial theoretical basis had been borrowed from abroad, especially from the works of the Swiss scholar and politician Johann Kaspar BLUNTSCHLI (1808–1881).⁸ Since the analysis of the evolution of their nationalist concepts as well as the obvious social impact of nationalism is not the focus of this chapter, we will concentrate on the literary nationalism of the early 1930s, represented in the right-wing periodicals *Qianfeng Zhoubao* and *Qianfeng Yuekan*. These Shanghai journals along with Nanjing monthlies *Wenyi Yuekan* 文藝月刊 (Literature and Art Monthly, 1930–1941) and *Maodun Yuekan* 矛盾月刊 (Paradox Monthly, 1932–1934), as well as the Hangzhou journal *Huang Zhong* 黃鐘 (Yellow Bell, 1932–1937) were part of the movement for nationalist literature, launched by Guomindang in an effort to cope with the proletariat literature.

Unlike the kaleidoscopic governments of Chinese militarists in the 1910s–20s, the Nanjing government of Guomindang had a clear ideology i.e., the nationalism of SUN Yatsen, formulated in his works of the 1920s. During the period of military struggle for power, the literature was not a top priority for Guomindang. However,

7 Mark SHNEIDER: *Russkaia klassika v Kitae* (Russian Classics in China), Moskva: Nauka 1977, p. 272; CHEN: *Ershi* (2002), p. 357.

8 Aleksej MOSKALEV: *Natsiia i natsionalizm v Kitae* (Nation and Nationalism in China), Moskva: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli 2005, pp. 20–23; YANG Sixin 杨思新: *Wenhua minzu zhuyi yu jindai Zhongguo* 文化民族主义与近代中国 (Cultural Nationalism and China in the New Time), Beijing: CASS Press 2003, pp. 68–76.

after the split with the communists and following the swift spread of leftist ideas in the minds of Chinese intellectuals and on the literary arena, Guomindang in 1928–1929 took a series of repressive measures to subdue the opposition. Unsurprisingly, however, it was far from enough; Guomindang had to offer some positive ideology to dominate the literary sphere. The necessity became obvious after the unification of the Marxist literary forces in the League of Leftist Writers in March, 1930. The idea of building the party literature on “three principles” was voiced at the National Propaganda Meeting in June, 1929, but the “Manifesto of Movement for Nationalist Literature and Art” was proclaimed only a year later in June 1930. The “Manifesto” played a very important role in the development of the nationalist literature. It is widely cited in almost all other theoretical articles of the Chinese nationalist literati.

The anonymous authors of the “Manifesto” were the founders of the literary society “Vanguard” (*Qianfeng she* 前鋒社), which existed in Shanghai from June 1930 to June 1931. According to Fudan scholar NI Wei, the basic ideas of the document are based upon the earlier works of FU Yanchang (傅彥長, 1891–1961), a key member of the “Vanguard” society.⁹ However, a direct and indirect influence of SUN Yatsen’s ideas can also be seen. On the one hand, the society was closely connected to Guomindang (its leaders FAN Zhengbo 範爭波 (1901–1983) and ZHU Yingpeng 朱應鵬 (1895–1966) were the members of the Shanghai executive committee of Guomindang). On the other hand, it was close with Shanghai literary circles, ZHU Yingpeng was the editor of influential Shanghai newspaper *Shen Bao* 申報 (Shanghai News, 1872–1949). There were also direct links to academic circles due to FU Yanchang’s position of professor at Tongji University. Many of the members were young officers of the Guomindang army, such as WAN Guoan 萬國安 (?–?) or HUANG Zhenxia 黃震遐 (1907–1974). The society became famous due to the publication of the *Qianfeng Zhoubao* (QFZB) and the *Qianfeng Yuekan* (QFYK), which not only became very popular with the public but also attracted fierce criticism from the liberal and leftist literati. Among the latter, we can see LU Xun, MAO Dun, QU Qiubai and others. The indignation over the activities of the “Vanguard” society provoked in May 1931 several dozens of leftist activists into attacking the office of the “Xiandai Publishers”, which circulated the nationalist journals. Though very successful in the aspects of ideology, popularity and even finance, the “Vanguard” society turned out to be short lived. Being a group

9 NI Wei 倪伟: “Minzu” xiāngxiāng yù “guojia” tǒngzhì: 1928–1948 Nanjing zhengfǔ de wényi zhèngcè jí wényi yùndòng “民族”想象与“国家”统治: 1928–1948 南京政府的文艺政策及文艺运动 (Nation’s Imagination and State’s Rule: Literary and Cultural Politics and Movements of the Nanjing Government in 1928–1949), Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaoyu Chubanshe 2003, p. 53.

of people, who shared common views and whose relationship was cemented by personal ties, the society disintegrated in June 1931 after the key figures had left Shanghai. It also led to the end of its journals.¹⁰

Nevertheless, the *Qiansheng Zhoubao* and the *Qiansheng Yuekan* made a major contribution to the theoretical development of the nationalist literature. The weekly was the first periodical of the “Vanguard” society. There were 46 issues published between 22 June, 1930 and 31 May, 1931.¹¹ However, only 36 issues survived until today, I have in my possession copies of the 25 issues of the weekly. It is a thin black and white bulletin of eight pages without illustrations. It was edited by LI Jinxuan 李錦軒 (the penname of YE Qiuyuan 葉秋原, 1907–1948), printed by Shanghai “Guangming Publishers” and circulated by the “Xiandai Publishers”. The success of the weekly inspired the “Vanguard” society to announce in August 1930 their plans of establishing a big literary monthly. Edited by the same group of people (reportedly by ZHU Yingpeng and FU Yanchang), its publication was arranged with the help of the “Xiandai publishers”. The first of the 7 issues appeared on 10 October, 1930, the last on 10 April, 1931¹². It was a literary journal of around 300 pages with colored illustrations. After the establishment of the *Qiansheng Yuekan* monthly, the weekly concentrated on short stories and prompt literary critique while the monthly published novels, plays, poems and all sorts of long materials on the nationalist literature and movements in China and abroad. Unlike other nationalist journals, e.g., Nanjing *Wenyi Yuekan*, the periodicals of the “Vanguard” society put special stress on publishing only those materials that supported the Nationalist cause.

On the basis of the “Manifesto” as well as the other articles in both periodicals, e.g., “Minzuzhuiyi wenyi zhi lilun de jichu” 民族主義文藝之理論的基礎 (The Theoretical Basis of the Nationalist Art and Literature) by YE Qiuyuan (*QFYK*, 1930: N 8-10), “Bianjishi tanhua” 編輯室談話 (Notes of the Editor, *QFYK*, 1930: N 10), we can see that just like the concept of nationalism itself, their understanding of the nationalist literature was in many aspects borrowed from abroad. The manifesto of the movement for nationalist literature evidently looked for the theoretical grounds in the experience of foreign literature, especially in the literature of nation states, emerging in the 19th century (Germany, etc) or of countries with strong nationalist movements (India, Ireland, etc). In other words, its nationalism was extremely international.

10 NI Wei: *Minzu* (2003), p. 51–58.

11 LIU Zengren 刘增人: *Zhongguo xiandai wenxue qikan shi lun* 中国现代文学期刊史论 (On the History of Modern Chinese Literary Periodicals), Beijing: Xinhua Chubanshe 2005, p. 293.

12 LIU Zengren: *Zhongguo* (2005), p. 297.

Theoretical articles on various aspects of nationalism and its representation in the works of literature and art can be found in all the issues of both periodicals, whereas the *Qianfeng Yuekan* pays more attention to the things from abroad. The prevailing authors of the materials are YE Qiuyuan (LI Jinxuan), ZHANG Jiping 張季平, (?-?), YI Kang 易康, (?-?), TANG Bingruo 湯冰若 (?-?), and WANG Tiran (汪倜然, 1906-1984). All of them now are obscure figures in the history of modern Chinese literature but were prolific critics and writers in the 1930s.

In regard to the concept of nationalism itself, YE Qiuyuan acknowledged that “nation” is a relatively new word in the Chinese language, which often causes embarrassment, because the people do not understand clearly the relationship between race, nation, and state.¹³ Thus, he delves into explanation of different criteria of a nation. Among these the most important for him is national consciousness, which is quite natural since his article is about literature. Although “nation” is a notion imported from abroad at the turn of the 20th century, nationalism is regarded as something that had already existed in China, but was lost under the influence of Taoism and Buddhism. In actuality, here he follows SUN Yat-sen’s understanding of nationalism. The major ideas of the latter are described as: self-liberation of the Chinese nation, equality of all peoples in China and the liberation of all the oppressed nations of the world. However, of the main concern is the first point, that is, aspiration for an independent and strong China. YE Qiuyuan says that China is a semi-colony. On one hand, it suffers political and economic aggression of foreign imperialism. On the other hand, China is exploited by remnants of feudalism. Nationalism is seen as the only force which can unite China and guarantee its existence forever in the future.¹⁴

However, in circumstances where nationalist feelings are not strong enough, active measures should be taken to awake the “spirit of the nation”. Nationalist literature and art can be extremely useful in this regard as they are “capable of giving a new life to the nation”. For those ends, nationalism should become the “central idea”, the “ultimate sense” of Chinese literature, which at the beginning of the 1930s was “in a pathological situation”. To achieve the ambitious goals, nationalist literature should reflect the history of both ancient and contemporary struggle of the nation for survival, the real life of the common people, and the local flavor and customs. It should struggle against everything detrimental to the development of the nation, including communism. Despite literature being regarded as a product of a nation by nature, still nationalist literature is the only one which

13 YE Qiuyuan 葉秋原: “Minzuzhuyi wenyi zhi lilun de jichu” 民族主義文藝之理論的基礎 (The Theoretical Basis of the Nationalist Art and Literature). In: *Qianfeng Yuekan*, 1930, No. 8, p. 57.

14 YE Qiuyuan: “Minzuzhuyi” (1930), pp. 57-58.

combines the “national consciousness” and the “spirit of the epoch”. It is proclaimed that nationalist literature is literature “of the people, by the people, for the people”¹⁵ – a clear trace of the Gettysburg Address of Abraham LINCOLN, which was also once cited by SUN Yat-sen. In fact, this proclamation draws comparisons between the revolution in China and the Civil War in the U.S. which was very popular in the circles of Guomindang literati.

What made the nationalist literati so confident in their cause was the history of European literature and its role in the creation of new nation states in the 19th–20th century. They were greatly impressed by the direct influence of literature and art on the development of political nationalism. The examples of Germany, France, Italy and the former Russian Empire were referred to especially often. All this made them conclude that “the movement for nationalist literature and art, first of all, corresponds to the tendencies of world literature and art, but more importantly is that it exactly fits the urgent needs of our nation”¹⁶.

However, their nationalist zeal caused a much distorted presentation of foreign literature. For example, the true spirit of modern French literature and art was said to be fauvism and purism while for Germany it was expressionism, and for Italy futurism¹⁷. These trends were seen as deeply rooted in the national consciousness of the nations. In the article of YI Kang devoted to Russia, the author characterizes the genuine essence of Russian literature and art as primitivism or archaism, discussing, therefore, only the writers famous for their obsession with the glory of Russia – Aleksandr BLOK (1880–1921), Sergey YESENIN (Sergei ESENIN, 1895–1925), Nikolay KLYUEV (Nikolaï KLYUEV, 1884–1937), and Petr ORESHIN (1887–1938)¹⁸. The same goes for German literature, which is mainly represented by writers with strong nationalist sentiment, like Hermann SUDERMANN (1857–1928) and Gustav FRENSEN (1863–1945).

Another international dimension of the *Qianfeng Zhoubao* and the *Qianfeng Yuekan* is a constant critique of Chinese communists and proletariat literature, which were regarded as a major internal threat to Guomindang and Chinese nationalist literature.

Quite telling is, the fact, that we have found neither articles which state superiority of Chinese culture over foreign cultures, nor, in fact, the reverse. What can be found is political motivation of the choice, which is expressed in the interest in

15 “Minzuzhuyi wenyi yundong xuanyan” 民族主義文藝運動宣言 (Manifesto of Movement for Nationalist Literature and Art). In: *Qianfeng Zhoubao*, 1930, No. 2, p. 17.

16 LI Jinxuan 李錦軒: “Bianjishi tanhua” 編輯室談話 (Notes of the Editor). In: *Qianfeng Zhoubao*, 1930, No. 10, p. 79.

17 “Minzuzhuyi”, p. 18.

18 YI Kang 易康: “Eguo de nongmin wenxue” 俄國的農民文學 (Peasant Literature of Russia). In: *Qianfeng Zhoubao*, 1930, No. 14, pp. 106–107.

the literature of the oppressed nations, or certain restraints, at least proclaimed, in regard to the literature of greater powers, or the anti-communist drive which has been mentioned above. In the “Notes of the Editor” LI Jinxuan indicates that: “when introducing the foreign literary works, we will choose only those which could be useful for the progress of our nation. We do not ignore the foreign culture, but are not going to blindly accept the culture of the countries which harm our nation”.¹⁹

As regards the consistency of literary practice with the theoretical declarations, we prepared statistics on the content of both periodicals with reference to their interest in foreign literature.

Table 8-1: Publications devoted exclusively to foreign nations in the *Qianfeng Zhoubao*

Country	Total number of publications	Number of translations
France	1	1
Japan	1	0
England	1	0
Russia	1	0
Total	4	1
Number of represented countries	4	
Number of all publications, regardless of the content	123 (in issues no. 2-26)	

The statistics for *Qianfeng Zhoubao* (issues no. 2-26) reveals only four publications out of 123 were devoted to foreign literature. This lack of interest in foreign literature is explained by the fact that the weekly, being the first periodical of the movement for nationalist literature, was keen on introducing the basic ideas of Chinese nationalist literature, or on attacks on the proletariat literature. Moreover, due to its size it could not publish literary works in a large number, concentrating instead on literary critique. Nevertheless, foreign literature is still discussed in all articles, devoted to nationalism, regardless of not being the main focus there. In contrast, the more telling statistics is shown in the monthly.

19 LI Jinxuan: “Bianjishi” (1930), p. 80.

Table 8-2: Publications devoted exclusively to foreign nations in the *Qianfeng Yuekan*

Rating	Country / region / nation /peoples	Total number of publications	Translations	Illustrations
1.	Germany	II	I	4
1.	France	II	3	2
2.	England	9	I	0
2.	USA	9	4	0
3.	India	7	0	4
3.	Russia	7	0	6
4.	Ireland	6	0	0
4.	Japan	6	5	0
5.	Norway	3	0	0
5.	Netherlands	3	0	0
5.	Jews	3	I	0
5.	Italy	3	0	0
6.	Scotland	2	0	0
6.	Belgium	2	0	0
7.	Turkey	I	0	0
7.	Isle of Man	I	0	0
7.	Bulgaria	I	I	0
7.	Poland	I	0	0
7.	Vietnam	I	0	0
7.	South America	I	0	0
7.	Denmark	I	0	0
7.	New Zealand	I	0	0
7.	Austria	I	0	0
7.	Canada	I	0	0
7.	Greece	I	0	I
7.	Romania	I	0	0
7.	Australia	I	0	0
7.	Spain	I	0	0
7.	Iceland	I	0	0
7.	Hungary	I	0	0
7.	Finland	I	0	0

Rating	Country / region / nation /peoples	Total number of publications	Translations	Illustrations
7.	Armenia	I	I	0
	Total	100	17	17
Number of represented countries, regions and nations		31		
Number of all publications, regardless of the content		185		

The monthly set up a special section devoted to foreign developments and regularly published translations. We see that out of 185 publications, 100, which take up more than a half, were about literary events from abroad. Geography of the publications covers all the world with 31 countries, regions, or peoples and ranging from the Isle of Man and Iceland to New Zealand and Vietnam. They should have the clear intention to introduce such diverse literature in just seven issues of the monthly. It was important for the *Qianfeng Yuekan* to show that nationalism dominated the world literary arena. Needless to say, most of the reports were quite superficial and biased. I would like to draw special attention to the countries, of which literature and culture attracted the strongest interest of Chinese nationalists – Germany, France, England, the USA, India, Russia, Ireland and Japan. These countries take up between 6 and 11 publications within just 7 issues of the journal. Chinese nationalists were extremely fascinated with the German consolidation under Prussia in the 19th century. For them it was a successful story of “national consciousness” that united the country and made it strong in a very short time. France was also a common reference for Chinese nationalists, mainly as a prime example of strong “national spirit”. India and Ireland were reasonably chosen. The popularity of the UK, the U.S., and Japan was most likely due to the language. English and Japanese were the most popular foreign languages in the circles of intellectuals, which facilitated translations and access to necessary information. Russia actually was not of priority, but by coincidence, there were many Russian illustrations to a poetic play *Blood of the Yellow Race* by HUANG Zhenxia.

To summarize, it is worth reiterating that Chinese nationalism and nationalist literature, represented on the pages of the *Qianfeng Zhoubao* and the *Qianfeng Yuekan*, were considerably internationalized almost in all senses. However, it did not last long. Just one year later JIANG Jieshi 蔣介石 (1887–1975) and Guomindang started to shift to a much more original concept of nationalism.²⁰

20 MOSKALEV: *Natsiia i natsionalizm v Kitae* (2005), pp. 118–123; YANG: *Wenhua minzu zhuyi yu jindai Zhongguo* (2003), p. 390.

Russia, Russians, and Russian Literature in the Nationalist Periodicals

As noted above, Russia and Russian literature were not ignored by the nationalist literati in their periodicals. As can be expected, the leading tone of their portrayal of Russia is abusive criticism. Their indignation over the USSR comes from the Soviet support for Chinese communists and attempts to sovietize China. In this context, the military clashes on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) in 1929 are usually mentioned. For example, in the article of DI Gengsheng 狄更生 (?–?) “*Zhanzheng*” 戰爭 (War, *QFZB*, 1930, No. 7), which deals with pacifism in the European and Chinese literature, the peacefulness of the USSR and of the communists, is declared false, as eloquently demonstrated by the events of 1929.²¹

The USSR is often mentioned in articles criticizing Chinese proletarian literature. Quite typical is the article of LI Jinxuan “Boerxiweike de enshang” 波爾系維克的恩賞 (Mercy of the Bolsheviks, *QFZB*, 1930, No. 15), where the author attacks the story of the leftist writer MA Ning 馬寧 (1909–2001), *Xiboliya* 西伯利亞 (Siberia) published in the magazine *Tuohuangzhe* (1930, No. 4–5). MA Ning’s story is dedicated to the stay in the USSR of a Chinese soldier, captured during a military conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Russians treated the soldier like a blood brother, sharing food and clothes with him.²² MA Ning recalls that the story was written at the request of the editor of *Tuohuangzhe*, a famous communist writer JIANG Guangci, and complained that JIANG Guangci, who had visited the USSR and knew it well, did not correct the apparent flaws contained in the story due to his respect for the author.²³ A certain idealization of the story and the emphasis on the unity of the Russian and Chinese proletarians reflected the heat of political struggle between the communists and the nationalists at that time.

It is known that during the conflict on the CER in 1929 the Communist Party supported actions of the USSR. However, from LI Jinxuan’s point of view, Soviet Russia was an aggressor, and MA Ning and other proletarian writers who defended Soviet interests were traitors, who sold their souls to the “Red Russia imperialism”: “The recent war on the Chinese Eastern Railway revealed the ferocious face of Soviet Russia and its aggressive policy”²⁴; “the proletarian writers, having

21 DI Gengsheng 狄更生: “*Zhanzheng*” 戰爭 (War). In: *Qianfeng Zhoubao*, 1930, No. 7, pp. 48–49.

22 MA Ning 馬寧: “*Xiboliya*” 西伯利亞 (Siberia). In: *Tuohuangzhe*, 1930, No. 4–5.

23 MA Ning 馬寧: “*Huiyi ‘Zuolian’ wu ji*” 回憶 “左聯” 五記 (Five Memories of the “Left Association”). In: *Zhongguo Xiandai Wenxue Yajiu Congkan*, 1980, No. 1, pp. 9–10.

24 LI Jinxuan 李錦軒: “*Boerxiweike de enshang*” 波爾希維克的恩賞 (Mercy of the Bolsheviks). In: *Qianfeng Zhoubao*, 1930, No. 15, p. 117.

received the Soviet rubles and drunk Soviet beer, dream of Soviet butter, beef, leather boots and do not consider it shameful to write such slave stories out of their fantasies...”.²⁵ Invective, addressed to the leftist writers, can be also seen in the articles of ZHANG Jiping “Puluo de shi” 普羅的詩 (Proletariat Poetry) and (“Puluo de xiju” 普羅的戲劇 (Proletariat Drama), as well as DI Gengsheng’s article “War”, all published in the *Qiansheng Zhoubao*. Moreover, ZHANG Jiping and DI Gengsheng suppose that the proletariat literature is not capable of reflecting the spirit of the epoch and is very crude artistically.

On the pages of the nationalist magazines we can also see fictional works that deal with Russia or Russians. Those are the novel “Guo men zhi zhan” 國門之戰 (Battle at the Motherland’s Gate, *QFYK*, no. 6, 1931) by WAN Guoan, poetic drama “Huang ren zhi xue” 黃人之血 (Blood of the Yellow Race, *QFYK*, no. 7, 1931) by HUANG Zhenxia, and the novel “Longhai xian shang” 隴海線上 (On Longhai Railway, *QFYK*, no. 5, 1931) by HUANG Zhenxia. Both writers were the key members of the “Vanguard” society.

The novel of WAN Guoan is devoted to the heroic exploits of the 15th brigade of the North-Eastern army in the defense of Manchuria station, as well as to the ordeal that fell to the lot of Chinese soldiers in Soviet captivity. The story is more documentary in style rather than fictional. From the preface written by HUANG Zhenxia, we know that it is based on the personal experience of WAN Guoan²⁶. Autobiographical characteristics are also confirmed by the fact that the name of the main character is WAN Guoan. The novel is not distinguished by any deep images, or by expressive language, or by the thoughtful composition, but the relevance of the topic, the portrayal of the real horrors of war and the flavor of life in the border areas attracted attention of the readers. The anti-Sovietism of this work is manifested in the repeatedly declared one-sided assessment of what was happening at the CER. It is the USSR, due to its support for the Chinese communists, that is declared to be an aggressor. For example, the beginning of the conflict is described as follows:

I heard yesterday that there were a lot of Communists found in the Russian Consulate in Harbin. Chairman of the board of the CER LÜ wanted to end this once and for all, for a start he decided to return control over the telegraph at all railway stations, and the actions have already been taken at the main Harbin station.²⁷

25 LI Jinxuan: “Boerxiweike” (1930), p. 118.

26 HUANG Zhenxia 黃震遐: “Huang Zhenxia de xu” 黃震遐的序 (Preface by HUANG Zhenxia). In: *Qiansheng Yuekan*, 1931, No. 6, pp. 5–6.

27 WAN Guoan 萬國安: “Guo men zhi zhan” 國門之戰 (Battle at the Motherland’s Gate). In: *Qiansheng Yuekan*, 1931, No. 6, p. 18.

According to WAN Guoan, the communists are “the avowed enemy of humanity”²⁸, and “... Soviet Russia is our biggest enemy”²⁹, “Red Russia, in spite of international commitments, strives to sovietize our land”³⁰. Accordingly, the Soviet Union is usually endowed with very unflattering epithets such as cruel, deceitful, inhumane, ferocious, aggressive, etc. However, the author does not attribute his hostility to the USSR on the Russian people as such. On a personal level his Russian characters differ little from Chinese heroes. Though he mentions the cruelty of the Cossacks, at the same time he describes the reverse scenes of brutal massacres of Chinese soldiers over Red Spies. The story takes place in the Soviet-Chinese border areas, which, in addition to Chinese people, is inhabited by Mongols, White and Red Russians, Koreans, and Japanese. White Russian emigrants are stricken with poverty and live miserable lives while the Reds behave in an unbridled way and “consider Manchuria their colony, use control over the Chinese Eastern Railway for an open propaganda of communism”³¹. Moreover, the Reds treat the Chinese army with contempt, believing that “Chinese soldiers are like flies; it is enough to hush and they will flee.”³²

Young Chinese officers often marry uninhibited golden-haired Russian girls, who, the author stresses, though, marry only for love.³³ The main character, the company commander WAN, also married a Russian girl Lyuba (Люба) shortly before the war. Since Lyuba turned out to be a Soviet spy and tried to recruit her husband, there occurred a conflict between love and duty, similar to the one described by Boris LAVRENEV (1891–1959) in the novel “The Forty-first” (1924). WAN, like LAVRENEV’s heroine Maryutka (Мариутка), fulfilled his duty and shot his beloved Lyuba. He cries with grief but has no regrets because “she stands for her country, and I stand for mine, this is our duty. If I hadn’t killed her, she would have killed me”.³⁴ When describing the family life of the Chinese officer and the Russian girl, the author brings to the narrative some Russian flavor. On the one hand, it is manifested in everyday details (for example, in frequent kisses of spouses), and on the other, there are many Russian words in the Chinese language of WAN and Lyuba.

The portrayal of the stay of Chinese prisoners of war in “cold snow covered Siberia”, contained in the letter of a fellow soldier to commander WAN, is completely opposite to the above mentioned story of MA Ning. Robbery, brutality of

28 Ibid., p. 29.

29 Ibid., p. 118.

30 Ibid., p. 127.

31 Ibid., p. 11.

32 Ibid., p. 41.

33 Ibid., p. 12.

34 Ibid., p. 94.

the guards, hard work in the coal mines, beating with whips, hunger, and cold turned the lives of Chinese soldiers into an absolute hell, from which they did not hope to escape. Such an image of Soviet Russia could not but arouse hatred of Chinese readers for the interventionists, who severely abused their compatriots. The odium of “Battle at the Motherland’s Gate” provoked a fierce reaction of the leftist writers. In his article “Qingnian de shiyue” 青年的十月 (Youth September, 1931) QU Qiubai repeatedly mentions this story as an example of the ideological attack of nationalists and imperialists on the Soviet Union.³⁵

HUANG Zhenxia’s novel “On the Longhai Railway” is about a war between the army of the GMD government and the troops of FENG Yuxiang and YAN Xishan in the summer of 1930. The author compares the punitive operation against rebel generals with the war between the American North and South for the liberation of slaves.³⁶ A motorcycle battalion is dispatched from Nanjing to Henan Province, where it undergoes a baptism of fire, and its soldiers experience numerous hardships and trials. It is an autobiographical novel, where HUANG Zhenxia himself is the narrator and the protagonist. It is interesting to note that among the fellow officers of the main character, we can see a young Nationalist writer, WAN Guoan. However, our attention to this novel is due to the presence in the ranks of the battalion of a significant number of Russian emigrants. For example, out of 11 soldiers sent on patrol, 4 are Russians;³⁷ the same ratio of Russian and Chinese make up the reserve company, commanded by HUANG.³⁸ Some of the Russians are regular officers, some are ordinary Cossacks, and the rest are young “Shanghai dandies”, who joined the Chinese army in the hope to earn money and become famous. One might not rule out national animosity between Russians and the Chinese; on the contrary, “despite the difference in language and culture, they could still understand and support each other, becoming close like hands and feet, and all that because they were people, all having the same heart”.³⁹ It is important to note that in this novel there are no criticisms aimed at Soviet Russia. HUANG Zhenxia describes Russians as fearless soldiers, caring officers, and generous friends. At the same time, they all tend to long for the abandoned homeland, often recall Moscow and the broad Volga. Their loss of the motherland makes the narrator sincerely sympathetic with them. Among the Russian characters, the author paid special attention to Ivan BAGROV. This is a short, powerfully built man “with a fox’s nose,

35 《青年》1931年第9期：“Molodezhnyi sentiabr” (Youth September). In: 《QU Qiubai: Selected Works》, Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura 1975, pp. 67–75.

36 HUANG Zhenxia 黃震遐: “Longhai xian shang” 隴海線上 (On the Longhai Railway). In: *Qianfeng Yuekan*, 1931, No. 5, p. 77.

37 Ibid., p. 23.

38 Ibid., p. 64.

39 Ibid., p. 45.

an eagle's eye and an alcoholic smell spouting from his mouth”⁴⁰. He was born in the Amur region in a Cossack family and became a professional soldier. BAGROV is brave in battle and “has all the qualities that a soldier should have”.⁴¹ The writer does not report the circumstances that forced the hero to move to China. BAGROV is able to express himself in broken Chinese, placing words in an unusual order. However, the most vivid feature of BAGROV’s portrayal is his love for vodka. HUANG Zhenxia mentions this addiction of BAGROV five times, for whom the ability to drink is a matter of special pride. After getting drunk, he usually sings a famous folk song “From Behind the Island to the Midstream”, dances the folk dance hopak, harrows a harmonica, or indulges into debauchery.⁴² Being an experienced and smart man, BAGROV in any circumstances manages to get something to eat for himself and his fellows whether it be a pig, flatbreads, a watermelon, etc. At the same time, he constantly takes care of the commander of his squad, HUANG, who had just graduated from the officer’s training courses, and went to war for the first time. BAGROV shares food, vodka, blankets, etc. with him. If BAGROV can be considered to be the personification of the Russian soul, then the company commander SELEZEN’ is a symbol of the emigrant melancholy. HUANG Zhenxia calls him “a typical Chekhovian Russian”⁴³. He is a lean brunette with lively eyes, who is however extremely meditative and silent – “often he did not say a word all day, and if he did, it was only to attract attention to something”.⁴⁴ SELEZEN’ is educated, brave, loves his Motherland, but his abilities are not in demand, life has prepared the fate of a wanderer for him. “Failures in life, loss of friends, five to six injuries and tragedy of losing the Motherland have turned this once brave and lively gentleman into the saddest and quiet middle-aged man”.⁴⁵ SELEZEN’ calmly and accurately executes orders; he does not fear any difficulties. However, he is not indifferent: when, after a long march, the soldiers do not get dinner, he gives them his own money to buy food. SELEZEN’ helps his subordinates to pull motorcycles out of the mud and to drag their machine guns. In addition, the writer briefly, just in one or two lines, describes three young Russian men, ANISIMOV, SHEGAN’KO and KOCHUROV, who had left their wives in Shanghai and joined the army in search of heroic deeds and wealth.⁴⁶ Most likely, all the characters of this documentary style novel had real prototypes. The fate of the White Russian emigrants is by no means

40 Ibid., p. 9.

41 Ibid., p. 9.

42 Ibid., p. 9; p. 20; p. 42.

43 Ibid., p. 12.

44 Ibid., p. 12.

45 Ibid., p. 12.

46 Ibid., p. 37.

the theme of "On the Longhai Railway", however, the introduction of Russian heroes undoubtedly gave the novel an additional flavor.

In another famous work of HUANG Zhenxia, a play in verse "The Blood of the Yellow Race", describes the conquest of Russia by the troops of Batu Khan, consisting of Mongols, Hans, Jurchens, and Khitans. The main idea of the play, is eloquently outlined by the poet himself: "In one thousand two hundred forty second / all over the world the yellow wind blew. / In one thousand two hundred forty second / the yellow race was the ruler of the world".⁴⁷ In the context of the political situation of the early 1930s, such a story was perceived as a clear call to war against the USSR.⁴⁸ It must be noted, though, that HUANG Zhenxia was not the first in using the motif of the Mongol conquest. This historical fact was actively used by the Chinese press in the late 1920s during the "anti-Russian campaign", caused by the conflict on the CER. As LU Xun aptly noted, following a similar logic of appropriating other people's victories, "Russians can also ... assert that during the Yuan dynasty they owned China".⁴⁹ Yet, for HUANG, the selection of Russia as an enemy was not a goal itself, but rather a routine moment (that is why the image of Russia is hardly portrayed). The main idea of the play lies in the assertion of Pan-Asian unity. Being united, Asians can easily win over Europeans; however, internal dissensions, including those incurred by a captured Russian Princess, lead to the defeat of the Asian army. Appeals to the kinship of blood, the contraposition of Europeans and Asians were very common among Chinese nationalists, who saw this as a possible basis for the unity of multinational China, and a basis for the struggle against Western colonialism. Of course, after Japan captured Manchuria in September 1931, supporters of Pan-Asianism in China lost their popularity.

As a curiosity, it is impossible not to mention that as an illustration to HUANG Zhenxia's play, the action of which takes place in the 13th century, the magazine chose a painting by Konstantin FLAVITSKY (Konstantin FLAVITSKIĬ, 1830–1866) "Princess Tarakanova" (Княжна Тарakanova, 1864), which actually has nothing to do with the Mongolian conquest. However, the canvas was called "Princess in the Besieged Kiev", and the artist remained anonymous.

47 HUANG Zhenxia 黃震遐: "Huangren zhi xue" 黃人之血 (The Blood of the Yellow Race). In: *Qianfeng Yuekan*, 1931, No. 7, p. 134.

48 LU Xun 魯迅: "‘Minzuzhuiyi wenxue’ de renwu he yunming" "民族主义文学"的任务和运命 (Tasks and Destiny of the "Nationalist Literature"). In: *LU Xun Wen Cui* 魯迅文萃 (Collection of LU Xun), Vol 3, Shanghai: Baijia Chubanshe 2001, p. 129.

49 LU Xun 魯迅: "Wu guo zheng Eluosi zhi yi ye" 吾国征俄罗斯之一页 (How Our Country has Conquered Russia). In: *LU Xun Wen Cui* 魯迅文萃 (Collection of LU Xun), Vol. 2, Shanghai: Baijia Chubanshe 2001, p. 1156.

One of the major activities of the “Vanguard” society was the development of the theory of Chinese nationalist literature. They believed that “the ultimate mission of literature and art is manifestation of its national spirit and consciousness. In other words, the ultimate sense of literature and art is nationalism”.⁵⁰ As described above, Chinese nationalists learnt a lot in this regard from the national literature of Europe, the rise of which in the 19th century was directly related to the development of the nation states. Russian literature was not left without attention either, though. In the very text of the “Manifesto of the Movement for Nationalist Literature and Art” (June 1930), we can see the statement that the October Revolution led not only to the collapse of the Romanov’s empire, but also stimulated the development of nationalism in Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Belarus, etc. There we see two mentions that the genuine Russian literature is related to primitivism. Apart from the “Manifesto”, we can find information about Russian literature in a special section of the *Qianfeng Yuekan* called “News of the World Literary Arena”. For example, in issue no. 7, there was an article about the publication of Andre MAUROIS’s book “Turgenev” (1931).

The most detailed information on the attitude of Chinese nationalists’ perception of Russian literature can be found in YI Kang’s article (“Eguo de nongmin wenxue” 俄國的農民文學 (Peasant Literature of Russia, *QFZB*, no. 14). First of all, YI Kang notes that Russia is a multinational country, and thus its literature reflects the spirit of different nations. However, at the prevailing moment its national spirit is manifested stronger than ever before. YI Kang’s narrative can be divided into two parts: first, about the poetry of the so-called new peasant poets, and second, about the literatures of the national minorities of Soviet Russia (Ukrainian, Azeri, Bashkort, Tatar, and Buryat literature). According to YI Kang, it is exactly the poetry of peasant poets that is truly popular in Russia because ninety percent of the population are peasants there.⁵¹ These genuine national poets, in YI Kang’s opinion, are Nikolay KLYUEV, Sergey YESENIN, Petr ORESHIN and Aleksandr BLOK. Speaking about the creative writings of KLYUEV, YESENIN, and ORESHIN, the author stresses two moments. First, it is their attitude to the Motherland. They all glorify the greatness of Russia, express their attachment to its villages, fields, wheat, vastness, and patriarchal way of life. “The peasant poets, whose origins are the countryside, treat Russia as their mother and do not want to leave her embrace even for a second”.⁵² Second, it is their attitude toward the revolution. It was crucially important for YI Kang to show that these poets did not accept the revolution. For example, YESENIN, according to YI Kang, “was no more

50 “Minzuzhuyi” (1930), p. 10.

51 YI Kang: “Eguo” (1930), p. 106.

52 Ibid., p. 107.

than a random companion of the revolution”.⁵³ As for KLYUEV, “though he had praised LENIN...but finally took a critical stand”.⁵⁴ For ORESHIN the revolution is no more than “a sudden storm”.⁵⁵ The situation with BLOK is slightly different. Though YI Kang attributes him to symbolists, the reason to include BLOK into the ranks of genuine national poets is the fact that BLOK “in his poetry praises the greatness of Russia”.⁵⁶ In order to prove this basically true assessment, YI Kang cites BLOK’s poem “The Twelve”. The article of YI Kang can hardly give an adequate description of what was going on in Russian poetry of the first quarter of the 20th century. However, if we take into account that for YI Kang, the main criterion was the manifestation of “national spirit”, then this selection of authors seems to be quite logical.

Thus, it can be summarized that at the beginning of the 1930s, the rivalry between the GMD and the CCP, the confrontation between nationalist literature and proletariat literature resulted in a differentiation of attitude to Russia and Russian literature of the Chinese nationalist literati. Soviet Russia, Bolsheviks, and Soviet proletariat literature were perceived with serious hostility; as a direct menace to China and its interests. At the same time, non-revolutionary Russia, Russian emigrants and non-proletarian Russian literature were perceived in a calmer manner, without animosity. Moreover, Russian village literature was one of the important references to the development of the Chinese nationalist literature although much more attention was paid by the nationalists to the countries more distant from communism and to those where nationalism was better represented in the public discourse, such as Italy, Germany, Japan or India.

53 Ibid., p. 107.

54 Ibid., p. 106.

55 Ibid., p. 107.

56 Ibid., p. 107.

Ylva MONSCHEIN

9 Paradise Reloaded? Wang Meng’s Public Private Memories of Soviet Russia or the Art of Composing a Capriccio

Abstract. WANG Meng 王蒙 (*1934), one of the most prominent and prolific writers of Chinese contemporary literature since the founding of the People’s Republic, is known for having a “strong Russian complex”. This paper examines his lifelong fascination with Russia and the Soviet sphere. In *Sulian ji*, semi-autobiographical encounters between fact and fiction have the potential of being a transferable indicator of the confrontations and entanglements of private memories and public history, of personal fate and national destiny. Literature thus not only provides a key instrument in shaping one’s own identity, but turns out to become a catalyst in revoking the collective memory of a whole generation and its lost ideals, as additional case studies of fellow writers may also show. By setting up a memorial to the Soviet Union and a greatly underestimated literary masterpiece, WANG Meng transforms Soviet Russia into a Chinese “realm of memory” in its own right.

Keywords. Wang Meng, Soviet Union, Russia, Literature, Music.

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Introduction

In the TV series *The Black Hole*¹ of 2002, the criminal hero, time and again vanishes behind his luxury bureau into a secret room with a Spartan military interior to play a Soviet evergreen on his accordion. The song “Ural Rowan Tree” about a young girl who has to decide between two equally attractive lovers appears to be a metaphor for the inability to choose between two systems, the ultra-left and the market economy. When analyzing modern Chinese literature, could this private hideout for your eyes only, a world between dream and trauma, turn out to be the image of a Soviet Russia in the Chinese mind?

Taking WANG Meng 王蒙 (*1934) as an example, there are more options to perceive today’s neighboring country, and nobody seems to be more suitable to serve as a case study in terms of quality and quantity. Being able to continuously reinvent himself and at the same time staying true to his origins, this liberal intellectual who would even defend commercial culture² is one of the most representative authors of the first writer generations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).³ He also shaped cultural politics during the 1980s as the minister of culture from 1986 to 1989, a post he stepped back from in reaction to the bloody Tiananmen events.

Moreover, the author is known for being deeply influenced by Soviet Russian literature,⁴ and having a “strong ‘Russian complex’”⁵. Would it therefore suffice to interpret his texts on the topic as a pure expression of “nostalgia”⁶ or a “quixotic

1 Heidong 黑洞 (The Black Hole), 31-part TV serial of 2001, directed by GUAN Hu 管虎 (*1968), based on the novel by ZHANG Chenggong 张成功, Starring: CHEN Daoming 陈道明.

2 Cf. WU Jin: *The Voices of Revolt. Zhang Chengzhi, Wang Shuo and Wang Xiaobo*, UMI dissertation, Ann Arbor: University of Oregon 2005, p. 28.

3 For an overview of the PRC’s first six literary generations see Helmut MARTIN: “Wang Mengs Roman *Schwer fällt das Wiedersehen* und die Begegnung mit dem Ausland”. In: Helmut MARTIN: *Chinesische Literatur am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts. Chinabilder II. Neu-anfänge in den 80er und 90er Jahren*, Dortmund: Projekt Verlag 1996, pp. 279–291.

4 ZHU Jingyu 朱靜宇: *Wang Meng xiaoshuo yu Su-E wenxue* 王蒙小說與蘇俄文學 (Wang Meng’s Fiction and Soviet-Russian Literature), Taibei: Wen she zhe chubanshe 2011, p. 3.

5 LIU Haihua 刘海花: *Wang Meng shiye zhong de Su-E xingxiang – yi “Sulian ji” wei lie* 王蒙视野中的苏俄形象 – 以“苏联祭”为列 (The vision of Wang Meng’s images in the Soviet Union – Soviet Offering as an example), Master Thesis, Central South University (People’s Republic of China), ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, May 2011, p. ii.

6 Elizabeth MCGUIRE: *Red at Heart. How Chinese Communists Fell in Love with the Russian Revolution*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press 2017, pp. 366–372, however, quite a few of her arguments in this chapter as well as in chapter 15 (pp. 269–282) and some translations (e.g. p. 269) are questionable.

quest”⁷? By adopting the mode of close reading, I would propose a diversified approach in order to examine the author’s image of the Soviet Union and Russia. After reviewing WANG Meng’s biography⁸ and his early texts, the main focus will pertain to his most relevant *oeuvre* in the present context, *Sulian ji* 苏联祭 (Memorial of the Soviet Union)⁹. It can be considered the most important (post)modern Chinese literary work on Sino-Soviet relations to date. As a third step, the preliminary findings will be reflected on in view of comparable Sino-Russian and other perceptions, before finally drawing a general conclusion.

Writing in times of turbulence while looking at Russia through a Soviet lens

WANG Meng’s life and literary fate have been closely interwoven with Chinese history, aptly reflecting the impact of macro history on personal micro histories: At the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) his family fled to “Beiping”. He would always recall this “childhood occupied by a foreign army”¹⁰ as a time of utter evil and darkness, relieved only by the news of a bright Soviet empire, which, as he learned from his otherwise much despised father, was the “most

7 Nicolai VOLLAND: *Socialist cosmopolitanism. The Chinese Literary Universe, (1945–1965)*, New York: Columbia University Press 2017, p. 3.

8 For biographical information see e.g.: DUZAN: “Wang Meng” (2019); WANG Meng: “Autobiographical Note”. In: WANG Meng: *Selected Works of Wang Meng*, Vol. I, *The Strain of Meeting*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press 1989, pp. 370–381; WANG Meng: “Verbannt nach Sinkiang. Oder vom tierischen Haß auf die Literatur”. In: Helmut MARTIN (ed.): *Bittere Träume. Selbstdarstellungen chinesischer Schriftsteller*, Taipei, Vanguard 1992, pp. 55–63; S. A. TOROPTSEV: “Van Mén kratkaā biografiā” (Wang Meng. Short Biography). In: S. A. TOROPTSEV (ed.): *Van Mén v kontekste sovremennoi kitaiskoř literatury* (Wang Meng in the context of contemporary Chinese literature), Moskva: Institut Dal’nego Vostka 2004, pp. 5–8.

9 WANG Meng 王蒙: *Sulian ji* 苏联祭 (Memorial of the Soviet Union), Beijing: Zuojia chubanshe 2006. The title’s translation follows: Mark GAMSA: *The Reading of Russian Literature in China. A moral example and manual of practice*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2010, p. 181.

10 S. A. TOROPTSEV: “Preodelet’ granitsy vremeni i prostranstva” (Overcoming the limits of time and space). In: VAN Mén: *Izbrannoe* (Selected Works), Moskva: RADUGA 1988. Available online: https://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1044452/1/Men_-_Izbrannoe.html (last access 2019, October 15).

powerful country in the world".¹¹ Although his father left his mother and four young children in abject poverty, WANG Meng still managed to become an excellent student. During the Chinese Civil War (1945–1949), he joined the Communist underground and became a party member in 1948. A fellow student introduced him to left-winged ideology and "Katyusha (Katiusha)" (1938), the most popular Russian song of World War II.¹²

Soon after the founding of the PRC (1949) WANG Meng made a decent career as a member of the Chinese Youth League. He was a contemporary of the mass media campaign promoting eternal Sino-Soviet friendship and friendly bilateral relations in a worldwide unprecedented mode when the song "Moscow – Beijing" (1950)¹³ was launched – the only song which mentioned a foreign leader (MAO Zedong 毛泽东, 1893–1976) on equal terms to STALIN (1878–1953).¹⁴ Under the influence of the novels of Soviet author Sergey ANTONOV (Sergei ANTONOV, 1915–1995) featuring people on a construction site, WANG Meng applied for studying architectural engineering but was rejected. Literature showed him a way out of his distress as writers were also supposed to fulfill the eminent role of engineers of the new Soviet people.¹⁵ According to WANG, "Soviet literature may have had an even greater impact than the country Soviet Union".¹⁶ Even more than the literary classics of Chinese modernity such as LU Xun 鲁迅 (1881–1936), BA Jin 巴金 (1904–2005), or DING Ling 丁玲 (1904–1986), WANG Meng enjoyed the classics of Russian and Soviet literature. There is also evidence that Ilya EHRENBURG's (Il'ia ÈRENBURG, 1891–1967) theories lured him into writing.¹⁷

WANG Meng began writing in 1953, a fateful year when he or his Alter Ego in the semiautobiographical *Sulian ji* went ice skating once a week on the frozen Shichahai Lake 什刹海 accompanied by the soundtrack of Soviet mass music through loudspeakers, listening to the Pyatnitsky (Piatnitskii) Russian Folk Choir

11 WANG Meng 王蒙: *Wang Meng zizhuan di yi bu* 王蒙自传第一部 (Autobiography of Wang Meng, Part 1), Beijing: Beijing lianhe chubanshe 2017a, p. 55.

12 Robert A. ROTHSTEIN: "Homeland, Home Town, and Battlefield: The Popular Song". In: Richard STITES (ed.): *Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia*, Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1995, p. 78; Richard STITES (ed.): *Russian popular culture. Entertainment and society since 1900*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992, pp. 77f.

13 Music by the Georgian Vano MURADELI (1908–1970), text by Mikhail VERSHININ (1923–1987).

14 Alexander LUKIN: *The Bear Watches the Dragon. Russia's Perception of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations since the Eighteenth Century*, Armonk, NY, London: M. E. Sharpe 2003, pp. 117f.

15 NG Mau-sang: *The Russian Hero in Modern Chinese Fiction*, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press 1988, p. x.

16 WANG Meng: *Sulianji* (2006), p. 178.

17 WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2017a), p. 101.

and songs like “And who does know?”¹⁸. The scene evokes the happiest times of a Beijing youth in the 1950s and even after that. The 1999 Chinese TV serial *The Place Where Dreams Began*¹⁹ has a similar skating scene on the same lake in the 1970s which the film aficionado may even refer to. From this early time onward writing became his way of literally reenacting the past, and music, especially Soviet and Russian music, was a major vehicle to invoke it.

The three famous novels of early Socialist realism belonged to WANG Meng's favorites:²⁰ *How the steel was tempered* by OSTROVSKY (OSTROVSKIĬ, 1832–1886), *The Iron Stream* by SERAFIMOVICH (1863–1949), and *Cement* by GLADKOV (1883–1958). His first novel *Long live Youth!* (*Qingchun wansui* 青春万岁) followed the model of *How the steel was tempered*. WANG's short story “The Young Newcomer in the Organization Department” (*Zuzhi bu xinlai de qingnian ren* 组织部新来的青年人)²¹, published in 1956 was an immediate success. This early short story already shows a typical pattern in the author's perspective of the Soviet Union. He designed it after the novel *The Tractor Station Manager and the Chief Agronomist* (1954) by Galina NIKOLAYEVA (Galina NIKOLAEVA, 1911–1963) which was recommended by the Youth League. The overzealous heroine Nastya KOVSHOVA (Nastia KOVSHOVA) serves as a role model for his main character.²² NIKOLAYEVA's novel provides a veritable *vademecum* to the protagonist while his superior, on the other hand, used to read SHOLOKHOV's (1905–1984) *Virgin Soil* as well as *And Quiet Flows the Don* or TURGENEV's (1818–1883) *A Nest of Gentlefolk*. A tender love story between the protagonist and his unhappily married colleague unfolds toward the story's open end, symbolized by a new painting of “Moscow in spring” with the Soviet capital as a place of longing. Both enthuse over Pyotr TCHAIKOVSKY's (Pëtr CHAIKOVSKIĬ, 1840–1893) *Capriccio Italien* aired by Radio Beijing.

After years of waiting, WANG Meng's first novel *Long Live Youth!* was partly published, albeit with disastrous consequences. The young author became a victim of the subsequent purge of rightists and was sent to the countryside for compulsory

18 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 21.

19 *Meng kaishi de disfang* 梦开始的地方 (The Place Where Dreams Began), 20-part TV serial (1999), directed by YE Jing 叶京.

20 WANG Meng: “Wonach ich suche”. In: *Akzente. Zeitschrift für Literatur*, 32. Jg., Heft 2 (April 1985), p. 116.

21 WANG Meng: “Der Neuling in der Organisationsabteilung”. In: Wolfgang KUBIN (ed.): *Hundert Blumen. Moderne chinesische Erzählungen 1949–1979*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1980, pp. 83–149; WANG Meng: “The Young Newcomer in the Organization Department”. In: WANG Meng: *The Butterfly and Other Stories*, Beijing: Panda Books 1983, pp. 186–239.

22 Douwe Wessel FOKKEMA: *Literary Doctrine in China and Soviet Influence 1956–1960*, The Hague: Mouton & Co. 1965, p. 100.

labor although MAO Zedong personally put in a good word for him in supporting the novel's criticism of bureaucratic and corrupt tendencies. As an irony of fate, the successful publication originally was thought to serve as the entrance ticket to the Moscow World Youth Festival in August 1953.²³ The author had never imagined that it would take more than two decades for the final publication. (Three more decades later, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the PRC in 2019, the novel was chosen one of seventy novel classics.)

After a short rehabilitation in the early 1960s he went into more or less voluntary exile in the province of Xinjiang which in retrospect proved to be a blessing in disguise, as he was saved from the most atrocious purges of the Cultural Revolution. He felt lucky to live in an area where the Soviet Russian influence was relatively strong.²⁴ He also got astonishingly well along with the Uighur population of the borderlands and learnt their language to the extent of being able to translate local literature.²⁵ Meanwhile, however, the Soviet Union "turned from paradise to hell, from friend to enemy",²⁶ and one of his I-narrators recounts: "In the 1960s my youth ended – and at the same time the popularity of Soviet songs"²⁷.

The death of MAO Zedong (1976) meant a "second liberation"²⁸. After his rehabilitation in 1979, WANG Meng had a spectacular comeback in DENG Xiaoping's 邓小平 (1904–1997) new era of reform during the 1980s, a decade which brought an enormous boom of Western, as well as Russian and Soviet publications to the Chinese book market.²⁹ As a pioneer of avant-garde literature he soon became a well-received guest in international literary circles. The long time he spent as a political outcast proved to be a valuable asset: "I gained twenty years of intense life experiences. My starting point would be now a country of 8,000 miles and thirty years of political turbulences"³⁰. The author caused controversies with new short novels like "Bolshevik Salute" ("Buli" 布礼).³¹ Being a representative of the

23 DUZAN: "Wang Meng" (2019).

24 ZHU Jingyu: *Wang Meng xiaoshuo* (2011), p. 4.

25 See the review of Lutz BIEG: "Anekdoten vom Abteilungsleiter Maimaiti". In: *Die Horen. Zeitschrift für Literatur, Kunst und Kritik*, Bd. 155 (3 / 1989), pp. 224–230.

26 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 251.

27 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 214.

28 WANG Meng: "Verbannt nach Sinkiang" (1992), p. 60.

29 B. L. RIFTIN: "Ideologīja, ēstetika, kul'tura. Tian'tssinskie vstrechi 1981". In: *Voprosy literatury* (Literary issues) 1, 1984, pp. 96–129.

30 WANG Meng: "Verbannt nach Sinkiang" (1992), p. 61.

31 Cf. the articles of William TAY: "Modernism and Socialist Reform: The Case of Wang Meng", *World Literature Today*, Vol. 65, No. 3, *Contemporary Literature* (summer, 1991), pp. 411–413; William TAY: "Wang Meng's modernistische Erzählweise", *Die Horen. Zeitschrift für Literatur, Kunst und Kritik*, Bd. 155 (3 / 1989), pp. 233–237.

so called “literature of introspection”³², he first had to face harsh criticism for a writing style considered westernized and modernist, too difficult to understand, and even lacking “Chineseness”³³.

Similar to “Buli”, many of WANG Meng’s novels start with the “golden era”³⁴ of the 1950s. He applies the same pattern in his “Seasons” (“*jijie* 季节”) tetralogy and its follow-up novel *Qinghu* 青狐 (*Blue Fox*), where he returns time and again to certain motives of Sino-Soviet relations in the required historical context. The famous start of *A Tale of Two Cities*³⁵ as well as the family chronicle *Seasons of the Year*, published in 1953 by Vera PANOVА may have inspired not only his novel cycle.³⁶ PANOVА is repeatedly referred to in different texts of WANG Meng.³⁷ Her *Sentimental Novel* (1958), an autobiographical recollection of her youth, uses literary techniques similar to WANG and her photo appears among those of his favorite writers in *Sulian ji*: Maksim GORKY (Maksim GOR’KII, 1868–1936), Aleksandr FADEEV (1901–1956), Vladimir MAYAKOVSKY (Vladimir MAIАKOVSKIИ, 1893–1930), and Yevgeny YEVTSUSHENKO (Evgeniј EVTUSHENKO, 1932–2017).

WANG Meng visited the Soviet Union and later Russia at least four times. His first visit in 1984 came by chance as the film version of his fatal novel *Long Live Youth!*, *Qingchun wansui* (English title *Forever Young*) by director HUANG Shuqin 黄蜀芹 (*1939) was chosen to be shown at the International Tashkent Film Festival. The second visit, twenty years later (in 2004),³⁸ was on the occasion of being granted an honorary doctorate by the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow.³⁹ His first visit must have already caused a

32 The term is explained in Helwig SCHMIDT-GLINTZER: *Geschichte der chinesischen Literatur. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, München: C. H. Beck 1999, p. 570.

33 Leo Ou-fan LEE: “Erzähltechnik und Dissens. Zu Wang Mengs neueren Erzählungen”. In: Wolfgang KUBIN (ed.): *Moderne chinesische Literatur*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1985, p. 415.

34 WANG Meng: “Andante Cantabile”. In: WANG Meng: *Ein Schmetterlingstraum. Erzählungen*, Berlin, Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag 1988, p. 182.

35 Charles DICKENS: *A Tale of Two Cities*, Beijing: Oxford University Press, Foreign Language and Teaching Press 1994, p. 1.

36 On PANOVА see Johannes HOLTHUSEN: *Russische Literatur im 20. Jahrhundert*, München: A. Francke 1978, pp. 188–190.

37 E.g. in *Huodong bian renxing* 活动变人形 (The Movable Parts) (1987), for a translation by Ulrich KAUTZ see WANG Meng: *Rare Gabe Torheit*, Frauenfeld: Verlag Im Waldgut 1994, p. 432.

38 He visited Russia once more in 2007 attending a book fair and with his second wife in 2016 to attend the St. Petersburg International Cultural Forum. (Thanks to A. A. RODIONOV who pointed the latest visit out to me.)

39 WANG Meng 王蒙: *Wang Meng zizhuan di-san bu* 王蒙自传第三部 (Autobiography of Wang Meng, Part 3), Beijing: Beijing lianhe chubanshe 2017b, p. 327.

certain disillusion: “In June I set out for a visit to the Soviet Union – a place that enchanted me, yet made me feel lost and hurt and disappointed.”⁴⁰

Russian music always was of particular relevance to WANG Meng. A telling example would be the medium-length novel “Andante Cantabile”⁴¹ (1981), where the Soviet impact is felt almost everywhere, beginning with the name of the I-narrator ZHOU Ke 周克, whose given name stems from the last syllable in “Bolshevik”. The protagonist admires the professional revolutionary DZERZHINSKY (DZERZHINSKIĬ, 1877–1926), the founder of Lenin’s Cheka. The funny poem on the commune by MAYAKOVSKY is cited only to state that in China even toothbrushes might be shared.⁴² Even classic Russian poetry like Aleksandr PUSHKIN’s (1799–1837) poem “If life deceives you...” (1825) seems to fit better for serving as a comfort to people than Tang poetry. On an old Japanese gramophone (WANG Meng himself possessed one), the youth are listening to Soviet songs like “LENIN Hills” sung by lyrical tenor Vladimir NECHAEV. But an absolute highlight to the protagonist is the second movement of TCHAIKOVSKY’s string quartet No. 1, *Andante Cantabile*. When listening to it, he meets the love of his life. She is wearing a white blouse and a dress in the style of the quasi sanctified heroine Zoya KOSMODEMYANSKAYA (Zoīa KOSMODEM’IĀNSKAIĀ) in the “Stalinist fairy tale”⁴³ *Zoya* (Zoīa, 1944). “Andante Cantabile” is the symbol of the young couple’s common dreams. Similar to the love story later embedded in *Sulian ji*, a boat trip on a lake in Beijing is part of the amorous setting. However, due to the childish arrogance of the protagonist, who stylizes himself as a second Pavel KORCHAGIN trying to teach his friend Tonya TUMANOVA (Tonīa TUMANOVA) like in the movie adaptation of OSTROVSKY’s novel⁴⁴, the lovers are separated for decades. After many twists and turns being reunited, they try in vain to recall their former enthusiasm for TCHAIKOVSKY’s string quartet and finally come to the conclusion that it is simply outdated. Yet, as they assure each other, this is not due to the new recording by the Columbia Orchestra and has nothing to do with the “‘superficial’ Americans and their history of merely two hundred years”, as “The problem is that we are no longer the same as before”.⁴⁵ Likewise WANG Meng was no more the same when he visited the Soviet Union: “Life is but one huge jet-lag. Most things of what one is yearning

40 WANG Meng: “Autobiographical Note” (1989), p. 380.

41 WANG Meng: “Ru ge de xing ban” 如歌的行板 (*Andante Cantabile*). In: WANG Meng: *Wang Meng wencun* 9 (2003), pp. 173–237; WANG Meng: “Andante Cantabile” (1988), pp. 109–204.

42 WANG Meng: “Ru ge de xing ban” (2003), p. 178.

43 Directed by Leo ARNSHTAM, cf. STITES: *Russian popular culture* (1992), pp. 114f.

44 *Kak zakalialas’ stal’* (1942), directed by Mark DONSKOĬ.

45 WANG Meng: “Andante Cantabile” (1988), p. 203; WANG Meng: “Ru ge de xing ban” (2003), pp. 236f.

for are unachievable. [...] When I most longed to go to the Soviet Union was in the 1950s, thirty years later my dream finally came true, but after three decades external circumstances and inner attitudes have completely changed. The Soviet Union was not the Soviet Union of my dreams, Sino-Russian relations were even less the relations of thirty years before.”⁴⁶

While his early works show a Russia through the Soviet lens, can one expect a considerable change in his later perception similar to the “Andante Cantabile” story? An answer can be found when turning to *Sulian ji*, featuring the pitfalls of love in a transcultural setting.

In the Mood for Love – *Sulian ji* as a Memorial of Transcultural Entanglements

Triggered by two journeys lying two decades apart, *Sulian ji* sets out on a reminiscent “spiritual adventure” and a part time sentimental journey through time and space to the dreamscape of his adolescence, the motherland of Socialism. In a note to the reader, WANG Meng presents his main leitmotifs: “If I had to paraphrase my youth in four keywords, it would be: revolution, love, literature and Soviet Union.”⁴⁷ In many of his texts, WANG Meng tries to evoke the enthusiastic feelings of his adolescence, albeit always from the position of someone who has overcome the fancies and teething problems of his youth.

At first glance *Sulian ji* with its “glossy” illustrations may merely look like a concealed culturally-toned attempt to propagate a rather stereotyped image of Soviet Russia. It presents a collage of essays, diary notes, travelogues, autobiographical memoirs, documentaries, fiction, excerpts of poems and song texts as well as more than 200 black and white illustrations. The author himself poses in several photos, subtitled as a rule with excerpts of the main text: “This is a journey about reanimating an old dream, but also a journey about bidding farewell to an old dream.”⁴⁸ This sentence may be considered the author’s hidden concept of the book. The few Western analyses to date tend to only pay attention to its dream dimension. A polyphonic diversity and multiplicity of voices still combine astonishingly well in one whole ensemble which even could be regarded as a “novel”

46 WANG Meng 王蒙: *Wang Meng zizhuan di-er bu* 王蒙自传第二部 (Autobiography of Wang Meng, Part 2), Guangzhou: Huacheng chubanshe 2007, p. 201.

47 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 8.

48 Ibid., p. 17.

(*xiaoshuo* 小说), as the author calls it on several occasions when trying to distance himself from the I-narrator.⁴⁹ The influence of Doris LESSING's (1919–2013) *The Golden Notebook* which combines different genres while leaving behind a linear narrative structure, should not be dismissed, as WANG Meng was personally acquainted with the British author since 1988.⁵⁰

Whereas the first part of *Sulian ji* mainly consists of older text segments dating back to WANG's first trip to the USSR in 1984, the second part is dominated by texts of the 1990s and later while step by step discreetly exposing weaknesses of the Soviet system or hinting at controversial topics of Sovietology. The author quotes the disputed memoirs of Dmitrij SHOSTAKOVICH (Dmitrii SHOSTAKOVICH, 1906–1975), which mentions the Zhdanovshchina (1946–1948), or the inhuman role of Pyotr PAVLENKO (Pëtr PAVLÉNKO, 1899–1951) toward Osip MANDELSHTAM (1891–1938) during the Stalinist terror, although he voices unbroken admiration for PAVLENKO's prose. He describes the Soviet cult of monuments and the increasing emergence of LENIN statues after De-Stalinization “in order to fill the vacuum”⁵¹. From Lenin he comes to MARX who must feel “lonely” in comparison to Lenin with his many statues. On the other hand, he observes the role of monuments as a part of Soviet lifestyle and seems truly impressed by the custom of newlyweds laying flowers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. As in more or less veiled cases before, he turns to his homeland and suggests: “Wouldn't it be a good idea, if young Chinese bridal couples laid down a wreath as well at the Monument of the People's Heroes?”⁵² Thus in all subtleness he alludes to the neglected memory of those killed during the Tiananmen incident in 1989.

As chapters of the second part of *Sulian ji* become increasingly shorter, they lead to the highly visible last and disproportionately longest chapter of the book. Picking up once more on the leitmotifs of the previous text, this chapter contains the key messages. WANG Meng's “sentimental journey” not only morphs into a time travel into his own past, but into fictionalized transcultural flashbacks of a whole generation where Soviet Russia becomes the personified beautiful girl with the graceful, seductive figure of a ballerina. The narrator describes a guest performance of *Swan Lake* and *Giselle* by the Moscow Ballet shortly before the founding of the People's Republic, on the occasion of the first Soviet friendship delegation to China in 1949: “When watching the ballet, I was determined to marry a Russian

49 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), pp. 220, 242; WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2017b), pp. 363f.

50 WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2007), p. 312.

51 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 65.

52 Ibid., p. 78.

girl, a Katyusha or a Natasha, a Lyubova (Любова) or a Svetlana. I absolutely wanted to marry the Soviet Union, no matter what.”⁵³

Like the postmodern movie *In the Mood for Love* (2000) by WONG Kar-wai 王家衛 (*1958), WANG Meng's novels are inspired by moving soundtracks, displaying an “ever-present fusion between East and West” and a permeating “tension between past and present” linked to memory and desire.⁵⁴ Oscillating between time and space, his narrative imperceptibly moves back to a past overshadowed by unspoken taboos and tunes into a gripping Sino-Soviet romance, the I-narrator's personal affair, which at times may be even read as the author's own intimate *éducation sentimentale*, thereby slowly unveiling traces of an ominous love story, more possibly even the end of an affair before it began, between a young Chinese official named Wang and the Russian expert Katya SMIRNOVA (Катя Смирнова), one of the ca. 18,000 Russian specialists working in China between 1954 and 1958,⁵⁵ according to *Sulian ji*. Allusions to unfulfilled passions may be found throughout the whole text: On their stopover in the Hotel Rossiya (Россия), WANG's delegation makes the acquaintance of KURIHARA Komaki 栗原小巻 (*1945),⁵⁶ once the most famous Japanese actress in Russia, who starred in the first joint Soviet-Japanese film drama *Moscow, My Love*⁵⁷ (1974) in the role of a girl born in Hiroshima, fulfilling her dream to become a prima-ballerina at the Bolshoi by performing TCHAIKOVSKY's *Giselle* and falling in love with a Russian sculptor before dying of leukemia. The author does not go into these details because they are directly linked to his hidden subtext as other scenes, for example, the mute eye contact between the author and an unknown Russian woman in a rainy park of Tashkent.⁵⁸ We are also introduced to Ivan KRAMSKOY's (Иван Крамской, 1837–1887) provocative “Portrait of an Unknown Woman” (1883), a personification of Russia's so-called “Soul”. The painting which by the way also embellished the poster of an exhibition entitled *Russia's Soul*⁵⁹ illustrates a single page in *Sulian ji*, featuring the recurring subject of a “sad beauty”⁶⁰ dressed in luxurious outfits with the subtitle: “Why do her eyes look so distressed?” and culminating in

53 Ibid., p. 224.

54 In WONG's movie see the filmography of Elizabeth WRIGHT: “Wong Kar-wai”, May 2002, Available online: <http://sensesofcinema.com/2002/great-directors/wong/> (last access 2019, October 15).

55 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 226.

56 Ibid., p. 97.

57 *Moskva, любов' мои*, directed by Aleksandr MITTA and YOSHIDA Kenji 吉田健二.

58 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 126.

59 Exhibition of the Bonner Bundeskunsthalle in 2007: *Russlands Seele. Ikonen, Gemälde und Zeichnungen aus der Tretjakov Galerie*.

60 On the topic of “sad beautiful girls” see LIU Haihua: *Wang Meng shiye* (2011), pp. 22–25.

the bilingual greeting: “Zdravstvuj (Zdravstvui) – Hello Sadness!”⁶¹ as if it were citing the bestseller *Bonjour Tristesse* (1954) by the 18-year-old Françoise SAGAN (1935–2004). The leitmotif of love drama pops up again in the chapter “Suliko”,⁶² a Georgian song and favorite of STALIN, mourning a late lover. The author himself hints at the love theme in connection with the name and the song “Katyusha”, which becomes evident in the chapter “Pirog pies and Katyusha”⁶³. Katyusha, the narrator tells us “was my first love”.⁶⁴ But more important, already in the very first chapter under the heading of “Love in the Time of Turbulences”⁶⁵ – maybe a reference to the 1985 bestseller of Gabriel García MÁRQUEZ (1927–2014), *Amor en los Tiempos de Colera (Love in the Time of Cholera)* – there is a Sino-Russian love story mentioned and documented by photos, the story of the late “old G”. A “Latvian”⁶⁶ poetess, the former lover of this scholar and translator of Soviet literature, addresses WANG Meng during a literature reading. WANG seems to be shocked to hear their story which both kept secret to the day. The alias “G”, we are told, is not his initial,⁶⁷ but the description would perfectly fit to GE Baoquan 戈宝权 (1913–2000), famous translator of Russian literature, journalist and diplomat. In fact, GE’s full name is randomly mentioned and a few lines of his translation of PUSHKIN’s elegiac poem “A Winter Evening” are cited, on the occasion of an evening in the Russian restaurant Baikal near the Russian embassy in Beijing 1998, where during the performance of a Russian vocal ensemble, the I-narrator all of a sudden imagines the female singer being his great love of the 1950s, beautiful Katerina SMIRNOVA with chestnut hair. Later, he imagines her being the daughter of SMIRNOVA.

The first name Ekaterina or Katerina and its diminutive variations like Katya (Катя) or Katyusha as well as the song “Katyusha” appear as an ever-pervasive leitmotif. Already in “Bolshevik Salute” the song “Katyusha” was sung by the young couple on their wedding night – evoking memories of the year 1946.⁶⁸ (Songs representing pertaining years would replace their diary.⁶⁹) The leitmotif

61 WANG Meng: *Sulianji* (2006), p. 153.

62 Ibid., pp. 144–153.

63 WANG Meng: *Sulianji* (2006), pp. 138–143.

64 Ibid., p. 212.

65 Ibid., pp. 30f.

66 As H. DEMIDO pointed out in S. A. TOROPTSEV (ed.): *Okno. Rossiia i Kitaï smotriat drug na druga: Rasskazy, ocherki, ese* (Window: Russia and China look at each other. Short stories, Features, Essays), Moskva: Akademkniga 2007, p. 13, the Russian speaking poetess has actually Armenian roots, but why should Wang not make use of his artistic freedom as in the case of old “G”?

67 WANG Meng: *Sulianji* (2006), p. 31.

68 WANG Meng: “Mit bolschewistischem Gruß” (1988), p. 68.

69 Ibid., pp. 79f.

becomes more obvious when the author ponders on the name of his host's and translator's daughter ("Was she really called Katyusha?"⁷⁰). Toward the end of *Sulian ji*, where the notation and song text of "Katyusha" illustrate one page,⁷¹ followed a few pages later by the dancing scenes from TCHAIKOVSKY's *Swan Lake*⁷², the secret love story lingering in permanent suspense is unveiled amidst a confusing fusion of fact and fiction. While the narrative constantly alternates between past and present, action and reflection, between today's Baikal restaurant in Beijing and the memoirs of a youth, the love story takes shape. In 1955, the 21-year-old I-narrator is transferred to the Party Secretary post of the Youth League in a textile factory where he meets Ekaterina SMIRNOVA, the vice head of technical production, responsible for quality management as a member of the Soviet expert group from a Leningrad partner enterprise. It is attraction at first sight as he merely concentrates on her words translated by the interpreter nicknamed "Leatherball". Despite his Russian being as bad as her Chinese, they soon get closer during a Sino-Soviet dancing event: "Never again did I dance as happily with a woman – not even with my more than ten years-younger wife after the Cultural Revolution."⁷³ The statements sound almost like a disclaimer to "pacify" WANG Meng's own wife CUI Ruifang 崔瑞芳 (1933–2012), being one year older, whom he married before the Cultural Revolution. However, an earlier edition of WANG Meng's autobiography includes an uncommented photo of a boat trip with his newly wed wife – in the background on the same boat sits a foreign lady with an unusually ample décolleté.⁷⁴

Already in her thirties, the seductively beautiful "comrade Katya" with melancholic eyes and a sad smile is the only single person among the Russian experts. The interpreter tells him about the tragic fate of SMIRNOVA in the wake of World War II, but also spreads rumors about an illegitimate daughter and an affair with her superior. The gradually invoked personification of a tragic Russian beauty blends at least here with the person of foreign expert Katya, an opaque lady with a past. Her best years are over as the Sino-Soviet friendship is doomed to end, and the narrator feels the foreboding: "Every official document would give me the premonition that the Chinese-Soviet honeymoon was but a short dream of spring."⁷⁵ A boat trip with Katya seems to be their first and only rather intimate meeting before parting, caught in the photo of a fellow expert.

70 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 142.

71 Ibid., p. 219.

72 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 225.

73 Ibid., p. 233.

74 WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2006), p. 152.

75 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 229.

After more than two decades, during the narrator's visit to Moscow, he receives Katya's phone call and at once recognizes her aged brittle voice singing "Fangzhi guniang" 纺织姑娘 ("Spin, oh my spinner") and stammering "Moscow – Beijing! STALIN – MAO Zedong!" in broken Chinese.⁷⁶ He meets her twice, but never alone "to avoid misunderstandings". She must be 64 by now ("Russians age more quickly than Asians"⁷⁷), having a plumper but still attractive figure. She tells him that was the most beautiful time in her life she spent in China. She is accompanied by the author of the song text "Moskva – Pekin", which had never been sung since the Sino-Soviet split. An indication of the unusual mixture of fiction and life is WANG Meng's account toward the end of his autobiography, where strikingly large passages of the alleged fictive Sino-Russian affair are *in extenso* and verbatim excerpted from *Sulian ji*.⁷⁸ When it comes to the farewell of the two former lovers, WANG Meng admits that he actually wrote "in complete disregard of policy and diplomacy":⁷⁹

I noticed her beautiful eyes – maybe not so beautiful anymore, noticed even more her aged appearance [...] "If we could stay friends forever, everything will be fine", she murmured. All of a sudden, she broke into tears. Afraid of not being able to restrain myself, I hurriedly turned away. Trying to cover my embarrassment I said: "Comrade Katya, you should know better than we do your Oscar-winning movie *Moscow does not believe in tears*⁸⁰". "Then you also do not believe in my tears?" She asked her eyes wide open. Suddenly tears were flowing down my face as well.⁸¹

What may partly sound like involuntary comedy, would be just another of many more allusions, as the movie mentioned starts in 1958 and ends in the 1970s, almost covering the same time lag the Sino-Soviet amorous couple experienced, and its heroine Katya (sic) has a child out of wedlock.

In the aftermath of the highly emotional rendezvous, the narrator also recalls the "somewhat hurtful" circumstances, the Soviet side and even Katya herself noting virtually everything down in a small booklet. Yet, he himself wasn't better, he admits, bringing along his whole delegation. The reunion of the former lovers is

76 Ibid., p. 254.

77 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 254.

78 The chapter is entitled "Bi zou yanyun" 笔走烟云 (Mists and Clouds Follow the Writing Brush). In: WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2017b), pp. 351ff.

79 WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2017b), pp. 363f.

80 *Moskva slezam ne verit* (*Moscow does not Believe in Tears*), Soviet movie of 1980, director Vladimir MEN'SHOV (*1939), written by Valentin CHERNYKH (1935–2012), 1981 Oscar for the best foreign film.

81 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 156; cf. WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2017b), pp. 363f.

being formally staged in public. After three decades of separation not only “Wang” and “Katya” come together, but China and Russia; and what makes things worse: the whole world is watching, in a sense alluding to the historical meeting between DENG Xiaoping and Mikhail GORBACHEV (*1931) in the midst of the Tiananmen protest movement (1989). The only person not taking notes was the author of “Moscow – Beijing”, the narrator recalls. Amazingly enough, the song’s famous first line “Russians and Chinese, brothers forever”, is not cited, quite on the contrary, the narrator remarks that the text wasn’t very impressive after all.⁸²

Toward the end of *Sulian ji*, the author admits losing control over his narrative by all of a sudden introducing a second song “equally important” as “Katyusha”, a signature tune which SMIRNOVA sang on the phone: The Ukrainian folksong “Spin, oh my spinner” – “Pryadi, moya pryakha (Priadi, moia priakha)” – does not belong to the early Soviet songs he learned, as it was only introduced to the PRC in the winter of 1956, after the death of STALIN and right after the events in Hungary and Poland when the Sino-Soviet friendship had passed its zenith.⁸³ “Spin, oh my Spinner” is also the central section of the second movement in TCHAIKOVSKY’s Symphony No. 2 in C Minor, Op. 17 (1872), subtitle “Little Russia”, the bridal march for the unpublished opera *Undine*. Here again there is a hint on the author’s intention: “What must she have gone through? … Sad Russia! Oh, Rossia!”⁸⁴ And after the “Hello Sadness” passage quoted twice, a highly ambivalent, though unconditional declaration of eternal love follows:

I think I will always love this country and this people, no matter how many people STALIN killed, no matter whether KHRUSHCHEV talked nonsense, no matter whether the author of *Young Guard* committed suicide with his pistol, no matter, whether the Western countries wished her to hell, no matter whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) doesn’t acknowledge her anymore, whether the CCP follows her or doesn’t give a damn about it, no matter whether her entire so called advanced technology was only scrap. But her songs are just so wonderful. … Even her deficiencies, her ugly products do hurt me, hurt as much as the heart of the spinner girl hurts.⁸⁵

Initially striking is the unusual disparate formal appearance of *Sulian ji*, reminding of a *bricolage*⁸⁶. Being an author with an unmistakable penchant for experiments, WANG Meng is obviously attracted to the rare literary form which is known as “caprice” or “capriccio”, in analogy to its musical counterpart. His book even

82 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), pp. 253f.

83 Ibid., p. 220. Photos of textile workers, text and notation of the song, see p. 139.

84 Ibid., p. 221.

85 Ibid., p. 221.

86 Within the meaning of Claude LÉVI-STRAUSS: *La pensée sauvage*, Paris: Plon 1962, p. 26.

seems to be based on a musical structure, as the author reveals: “While reading this novel, the reader will perhaps be able to hear the sound of TCHAIKOVSKY’s music”.⁸⁷ To TCHAIKOVSKY whose compositions were a source of inspiration since his youth,⁸⁸ a whole chapter under the heading “Andante Cantabile” (“Xing ban ru ge” 行板如歌) is dedicated.⁸⁹ No wonder that *Sulian ji*’s structure goes astonishingly well with one of TCHAIKOVSKY’s most famous musical pieces, the fantasy for orchestra *Capriccio Italien* (1880) which already played a role in WANG Meng’s early short story “The Young Newcomer in the Organization Department”.

The *Capriccio* runs as a subtext through *Sulian ji*’s entire narrative arrangement. Even the very first sentences seem to imitate the brief bugle call opening the musical fantasy: “Nothing – Still nothing – What, if I don’t find it in the end?”⁹⁰ Its leitmotif is the eternal love of two young people inevitably doomed to failure. When browsing through the inflight program on his way to Moscow, the enumeration gives a hint of what WANG Meng (or his I-narrator) is looking for as he begins his search with Italian operas. Another common feature of WANG Meng’s prose and TCHAIKOVSKY’s music is the incorporation of folksongs. *Capriccio* incorporates Italian street music, especially a popular love song about two lovers who should not find each other because of their parents. In *Sulian ji*, WANG Meng uses Soviet Russian mass songs and folksongs as eye-catching recurring motifs, some even occurring in chapter headings: “Pirog Pies and Katyusha”,⁹¹ “Suliko”,⁹² “Kalinka”,⁹³ and “Tomorrow we set out into the sea”⁹⁴ – a line of the song “Evening at Anchor” – “Vecher na reyde (Vecher na reide)” by Vasily SOLOVYOV-SEDOI (Vasiliĭ SOLOV’EV-SEDOI 1907–1979). They constitute the middle part of the book, followed by the chapter on TCHAIKOVSKY and four chapters dealing with the gloomy sides of the Soviet system. The ultrashort chapter acting as a kind of transition tunes in on a “romantic mood”⁹⁵ before the title of the last one repeats the musical theme, stemming from the Chinese text version of “Katyusha”: “Sound of singing like an enchanting spring scenery”⁹⁶.

87 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 173.

88 Cf. the chapter in ZHU Jingyu: *Wang Meng xiaoshuo* (2011), pp. 170ff.

89 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), pp. 168–173. For a translation by DEMIDO see TOROPTSEV: *Okno* (2007), pp. 14–18.

90 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 15.

91 Ibid., pp. 138–143.

92 Ibid., pp. 144–153.

93 Ibid., pp. 164–167. Music and lyrics of 1860 originate from Ivan LARIONOV (1830–1889).

94 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), pp. 156–163.

95 Ibid., pp. 208–211.

96 Ibid., pp. 212–277. The chapter which appeared as an independent medium length novel before was translated by A. N. ZHELOKHOVTSÉV in VAN MÉN: “Pesniā laskova, kak solnechnyī svet vesnoī” (Sound of singing like an enchanting spring scenery). In:

In correspondence to the first and longer part of WANG Meng's earlier novelette "Andante Cantabile", *Sulian ji* consists of 17 chapters and the last chapter consists of 17 subchapters – figuring as a fictional story in the story. As WANG Meng always had a special liking for figures,⁹⁷ the numerical duplication can hardly be a coincidence. Of course, the number 17 first of all refers to the birth date of the Soviet Union. Adding to this, WANG Meng's exposure to Soviet influence lasts about 17 years before joining the workforce in Xinjiang and a long compulsive literary break. The recurring number seven could also allude to the mythological love story of "Cowherd and weaver maiden" (*niulang zhinü* 牛郎织女), two stars which might only meet once a year on the 7th day of the 7th month, the official Chinese Valentine's day. This in turn could be a direct link to the folk tune "Spin, oh my spinner" and the textile factory, the stage of the Sino-Russian romance in *Sulian ji*. Not unlike his "spinner girl", the author himself as a tireless master of the loom is interweaving one tiny detail after the other in this highly illusive imaginative texture. Therefore, at least one more cross-cultural parallel regarding numbers could have played a role: *Seventeen Moments of Spring*⁹⁸ is the title of a popular 12-part Soviet war drama serial of 1973, aired in China at the end of the 1980s, when WANG was minister of culture. The story, in which music plays a crucial role as well in the rare moments of romance, is about a Soviet agent embedded in the Gestapo under the pseudonym of von STIERLITZ toward the end of WW II in order to prevent a separate peace agreement of Nazi Germany with the Western allies. One main protagonist is the pregnant Kathe or Katherin KINN, another suffering Russian beauty in disguise, her clear name is Katya.

Sulian ji thereby presents another leitmotif, the code of mutual distrust. In the last chapter, the first-person narrator is confronted with suspicion of espionage. Sino-Soviet relations and the status of mixed Chinese-Russian couples disintegrate into dangerous liaisons. First, we hear how he runs into trouble after the last Soviet experts have left the country due to the testimonies of "Leatherball". She reports to his superiors about a photo taken of his boat trip, showing Katya almost naked and accuses her of being a Soviet spy.⁹⁹ After decades of preparing for his very first trip to the Soviet Union, another rumor is spread warning his delegation to watch out for a KGB trap, a female spy alias "White Swan" (sic) who has already lured a number of comrades into defection.

Sovremennaiā kitaïskaia proza (Chinese contemporary prose literature. Life is like a vibrating chord), Moskva: AST; Sankt-Peterburg: Astrel'-SPb 2007, pp. 7–100.

97 WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2017a), p. 43.

98 *Semnadtsat' mgnovenii vesny*, 12-part TV series (1973) based on the novel by IULIAN SEMÈNOV (1931–1993), directed by Tat'iana LIOZNOVA (1924–2011), starring Viacheslav TIKHONOV (1928–2009).

99 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 247.

Although the author deplores the failure of the Socialist experiment, he does not take the stance of teaching lessons like political think tanks or a documentary series (for internal use only) tend to do¹⁰⁰ which appeared in the same year as *Sulian ji* – well in time to commemorate the 15th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s disintegration. According to its cover and foreword, *Sulian ji* takes a basically positive stance as it officially commemorates the first major historical triumph of socialism from the angle of a China determined to continue the Socialist tradition: “This book is dedicated to the Soviet Union, abbreviated CCCP in Russian and USSR in English, in commemoration of the ninetieth anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution in the year 2007.”¹⁰¹ Finally he concludes with a consolation or an appeal to his own country: “The Soviet Union is the Soviet Union, and China is China. Unnecessary to overly care about their affairs; the crucial point is that China takes good care of its own matters.”¹⁰²

Window on Russia and on China, and Other Windows of Perception

On his third visit to Russia on the occasion of the “Year of China in Russia” (2007)¹⁰³, being addressed for the first time as an “old friend of Russia”¹⁰⁴ WANG Meng attended a Russian book fair where his works appeared in three

100 *Ju an si wei – Su gong wang dang de lishi jiaoxun* 据安思危. 苏工亡党的历史教训 (Alert to danger while dwelling in safety – The historical lesson of the perishing of the Soviet Communist Party): Beijing: Zhongyang jiwei Zhongguo fangzheng chubanshe, Jilin chuban jituan 2006. For an ample discussion see Gotelind MÜLLER: *Documentary, World History, and National Power in the PRC. Global Rise in Chinese Eyes*, London and New York: Routledge 2013, pp. 133–176. For a short analysis of the topic see Neil MUNRO: “Aufgeschobene Demokratie. Chinesische Lektionen aus dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion”. In: *China aktuell* No. 4 / 2008, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 32–61.

101 This might be another allusion (albeit omitting “Great”) to a book by Viacheslav MOLOTOV (1890–1986) under the title *The 28th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution* (published in 1945) which was part of a reading list the Russians recommended to their Chinese counterparts: Austin JERSILD: *The Sino-Soviet Alliance. An International History*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press 2014, p. 64.

102 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), pp. 175f.

103 The gradual Sino-Russian rapprochement and the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship in 2001 involved a number of bilateral activities as e.g. the “Year of Russia” in China (2006) and in 2007 the “Year of China” in Russia, as well as “Beijing days” in Moscow (27.–30.6.) and “Shanghai days” in St. Petersburg (9.–18.6.).

104 WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2017b), p. 296.

publications.¹⁰⁵ Of special interest for our topic is the already mentioned volume entitled *Okno*¹⁰⁶ (*Window*) edited by Sergey TOROPTSEV (Sergej A. TOROPTSEV, *1940)¹⁰⁷. According to the editor, *Okno* pursues two different approaches: Part One ("Window on Russia") contains translations of Chinese texts, four¹⁰⁸ excerpts of *Sulian ji*¹⁰⁹ and one chapter of the travelogue *Listen to Russia*¹¹⁰ by FENG Jicai 冯冀才 (*1942). Part Two ("Window on China") consists of twenty texts on China from the pen of TOROPTSEV. This second part, a view "from within" seen through the lens of a "rossianin", is intended to create the illusion of a genuine Chinese creation. It is further split into two chapters, "View of an essayist" in seven essay-travelogues and "View of an author" in thirteen stories or tales about traditional China. "Twenty years before", TOROPTSEV stresses in his preface that the era of "great" and "small brother" is over and quotes from PUSHKIN: a window opened "in the Wall of far-off China"¹¹¹. The sinologist seeks to reanimate the spirit of a China "seen much more through his heart" than through his eyes, thereby following in the steps, as he suggests, of Sergey TRETYAKOV (Sergej TRET'JAKOV, 1892–1937)¹¹² or of Pearl S. BUCK (1892–1973). It would be, however, not justified to claim another version of "Orientalism". Perhaps it also served as a publishing survival strategy, as Russian sinology, a world leader until the 1960s / 1970s, faced notorious underfunding after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As FENG Jicai noted in his travelogue, citing firsthand information of renowned sinologists, Russian research on China might be eight years behind the current leading French

105 The two other volumes were the translated long novel *Huodong bian renxing* 活动人形 (*The Movable Parts*), and a prose volume including texts of Wang Meng translated by Dmitrii VOSKRESENSKI¹¹³.

106 TOROPTSEV (ed.): *Okno* (2007).

107 On his extensive research on WANG Meng see e.g.: TOROPTSEV: *Van Mēn v kontekste* (2004); *Van Mēn: "CHuvstvuiu, chto popal k starym druz'iam"*, *Zapis' besedy i vstuplenie S. Toroptseva* ("A feeling as if I've come to old friends": Record from a Conversation and Introduction by S. Toroptsev"). In: *ZHurnal'nyi zal. Inostrannaiā literatura* (Literary Saloon. Foreign Literature) No. 4, 2005, Available online: <http://magazines.russ.ru/inostran/2005/4/m12.html> (last access 2019, October 15).

108 Cf. the description in A. A. RODIONOV: "O perevodakh noveishej kitaiskoj prozy na russkij jazyk posle raspada SSSR" (Latest translations of Chinese prose after the collapse of the USSR). In: *Vestnik SPbGU* (Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University) No. 13, 2 (2010), p. 149.

109 Russian title: *K altariu Sovetskogo Soiuza* (To the Altar of the Soviet Union).

110 FENG Jicai 冯冀才: "Qingting Eluosi" 倾听俄罗斯 (*Listen to Russia*). In: *Feng Jicai fenlei wenji* 冯冀才分类文集 (Classified Collected Works of Feng Jicai), Vol. 12, Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe 2005.

111 See the translation in LUKIN: *The Bear Watches the Dragon* (2003), p. 15.

112 Sergej TRETYAKOV: *Den Shi-chua. Ein junger Chinese erzählt sein Leben*, Kiel: Neuer Malik Verlag 1988.

sinology.¹¹³ Anyway, while TOROPTSEV literally goes about the window in the Great Wall and adopts a Chinese identity to enhance understanding, this would be an unthinkable act for WANG Meng and most probably for FENG Jicai as well, as they incorporate Soviet culture from the onset without the need of conscious or subconscious transition into a foreign identity.

Despite being sufficiently representative, the chapters of *Sulian ji* in *Okno* have been selected without a traceable effort of contextualization. There is no explanation given as to why from all the texts in *Sulian ji*, the choice fell on TCHAIKOVSKY, on the cultural minister and music erudite Aleksandr SOKOLOV (*1949), and on the TOROPTSEV family. It should also be noted that the publisher is introduced as “essayist and writer” whereas the two famous Chinese authors are merely mentioned as “essayists”. The whole set-up could be interpreted as if the Russian perspective of China would be more authenticable than the other way round. Moreover, the translation of WANG Meng’s account of the visit to the TOROPTSEV family contains a seemingly minor but crucial error as the last sentence critical for his leitmotif and love story has been changed in a significant way: Whereas the author (or I narrator) wishes “all houses harboring a Katyusha” well (of course and primarily including his own Katya), the translation only refers to the translator’s own daughter and family.¹¹⁴

Judging by his epilogue to *Sulian ji*, WANG Meng’s translator compares the author’s gaze on Russia to a personal utopian dreamscape, almost irrelevant for Russian eyes. He reflects on the author’s person, but not on the subject of his gaze. At least one more seemingly minor error does occur as the popular song “Kalinka” is not a main key word of *Sulian ji*, but “Katyusha” in all its dimensions. Not unlike other Western colleagues,¹¹⁵ TOROPTSEV obviously failed to realize the complex texture of the whole narrative, a meticulous labyrinth of memories revealing a secret Sino-Soviet love story. Instead, he patronizingly comforts the author:

113 FENG Jicai: “Qingting Eluosi” (2005), p. 128. The judgment seems to be in accordance with the official Chinese in a volume collecting articles of ten Russian and ten Chinese authors: WEN Zhixian 温哲仙: “Tuozhan Zhong-E wenzxue jiaoliu hezuo duice yanjiu” 拓展中俄文学交流合作对策研究 (Study on Measures to Expand the Cooperation in Sino-Russian Literary Exchange). In: WANG Qi 王奇 (ed.): *Zhong-E zhanlue huoban duihua. Xianzhuang, wenti, jianyi* 中俄战略伙伴对话: 现状, 问题, 建议 (Strategic cooperative dialogue between China and Russia: Actual situation, problems, and proposals), Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe 2014, p. 521.

114 TOROPTSEV (ed.): *Okno* (2007), p. 22.

115 At least McGuire: *Red at Heart* (2017); Volland: *Socialist cosmopolitanism* (2017).

What a pity, the real “Peach blossom utopia”¹¹⁶ has nothing in common with the imagined idealistic paradise of his youth. But this is of course not his fault. As we understand our way of life in this country, the song “Kalinka” (sic) does not belong to our daily necessities [...] “Kalinka” has nothing to do with the Soviet Union nor with modern Russia. The memoirs written by Wang Meng reflect his own inner mindset [...]. He does not need to seek paradise for a second time, he has never left it, always kept it in his heart.¹¹⁷

WANG Meng, whose works have recently become rare in trendy bookstores, seems to have foreseen this disinterest in *Sulianji* by an international public and realized that his new book would:

most probably only find readers outside of China in Vietnam because Russians tend to repress their more than seventy-year-old history of the Union of Soviet Republics. Whereas in the West, there is rarely anyone willing to hold a memorial ceremony to commemorate the dead. When on a banquet in Vietnam I announced my publication there was at once keen interest. They especially appreciated my wording and were touched: The Soviet Union was my first love, I have to publish a book in her commemoration.¹¹⁸

What about the second Chinese author FENG Jicai whose reminiscences of his first visit to Russia in 2002¹¹⁹ were partly included in *Okno* along with WANG Meng's texts? Although having been widely received in Russian publications, in particular by the sinologist Boris RIFTIN (1932–2012), FENG Jicai was not as lucky as WANG Meng in visiting the late “Soviet Union” (he usually writes the name in quotation marks). One reason for having been included in *Okno* may be that his publications from the very beginning had been extensively translated into Russian. His short novel “The Street-Facing Window”,¹²⁰ could even have inspired the concept and

116 He applies the traditional Chinese notion for “utopia” or “paradise”, based on the novel by TAO Yuanming 陶渊明 (365?–427) “Story of the Peach Blossom Spring” (*Taohuayuan ji* 桃花源记).

117 Sergey TOROPTSEV: “Wang Meng xinli yongcun de Taoyuan” 王蒙心里永存的桃园 (The Eternal Peach Blossom Utopia in Wang Meng's Heart). In: WANG Meng: *Sulianji* (2006), pp. 278–279.

118 WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2017b), p. 295.

119 FENG Jicai: “Qingting Eluosī” (2005), pp. 11–151. On FENG Jicai's biography and work see e.g. Monika GÄNSSBAUER: *Trauma der Vergangenheit: die Rezeption der Kulturrevolution und der Schriftsteller Feng Jicai*, Dortmund: Projekt-Verlag 1996, pp. 31–115.

120 FENG Jicai 冯骥才: “Linjie de chuang” 临街的窗 (The Street-Facing Window). In: FENG Jicai 冯骥才, *Ganshang gushi* 感伤故事 (Sentimental Tales), Beijing: Wenhua yishu chubanshe 2015, pp. 138–162; FENG Jicai, “Das Fenster zur Straße”. In: *Nach den Wirren. Erzählungen und Gedichte aus der Volksrepublik China nach der Kulturrevolution*, Dortmund: RWAG Dienste und Verlag GmbH 1988, pp. 12–30.

title of TOROPTSEV's *Okno*. The absurd story reminding of a mixture of GOGOL' and CHEKHOV, takes place in a China of the late Cultural Revolution. It is about the member of a construction team who makes friend with the strange resident of a windowless apartment. Instead of waiting for the workmen to open the wall for a window, the guy paints his own fantastically realistic looking window on the wall and sends the team away. (Adding to this, a real window would have had the disadvantage of being in view of the opposite Red Guard Headquarters.) Overwhelmed by this artistic skill, the I-narrator drops in every now and then every time to find another window scenery reflecting the mood of its resident. Finally, the painter is dead, the neighborhood and the remaining fresco released for demolition. FENG Jicai's magic window on the outside world, always separated by a wall and only reflecting one's own interior, thus proves to be a true document of troubled times and a perfect allegory of human perception – just in line with the mysterious verse at the onset of the story:

You have your window.
I have my window.
He has his window.
There is still another window.¹²¹

Despite all personal and artistic differences, WANG and FENG both share a number of common predilections, for example, their writing against forgetting (FENG exposes the traumatic experiences of the Cultural Revolution), as well as music, in particular TCHAIKOVSKY (WANG Meng beat him in snatching the title of "Andante Cantabile") and Russian literature, in particular PUSHKIN. As a longtime companion and close friend, FENG Jicai was cited at the end of WANG Meng's voluminous autobiography with a great compliment: "You have attained the ultimate in every respect!"¹²² Unlike WANG he learnt Russian in senior high school and used to have a female Russian pen friend.¹²³ Whereas WANG Meng is interested in the Soviet Union, FENG Jicai, on the other hand, mainly writes about Russia. Another difference is his artistic focus, as FENG is not only a writer but also a successful painter. The above-mentioned *Listen to Russia* is amply illustrated, albeit in a more sophisticated way than *Sulianji*, featuring elaborate, expensive color images and art reproductions. The first picture shows a popular painting and poster motif advertising the Russian capital in English ("I love Moscow"); the second one the photo

121 FENG Jicai: "Das Fenster zur Straße". In: *Nach den Wirren. Erzählungen und Gedichte aus der Volksrepublik China nach der Kulturrevolution*, Dortmund: RWAG Dienste und Verlag GmbH 1988, p. 12.

122 WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2007), p. 393.

123 FENG Jicai: "Qingting Eluosi" (2005), p. 30.

of a woman in a park presenting an American flag, subtitled with the question: “A new generation worshipping America?”¹²⁴ The eighth and longest chapter of the fourteen chapters of FENG’s travelogue (“Another pen of the literary grandmasters”¹²⁵) was translated for *Okno*. It may be considered representative as it features FENG’s own setting of priorities – an emphasis on painting and his deep interest in Russian painters and authors who were as adept in painting as he is. The second longest chapter is about his favorite poet: “Why did Pushkin duel to his death?”¹²⁶ Suicide was always an important literary topic for FENG Jicai – another difference to WANG Meng. FENG seems mainly interested in TCHAIKOVSKY’s *Sixth Symphony* because of the suicide theory although this has long been refuted.¹²⁷ FENG observes daily life (one chapter is devoted to “Oleg and his rural dacha”¹²⁸) and takes an avid interest in painting and literature (including translations), in landscapes and nature, as well as in paintings of landscapes. He is especially keen on Russian folklore and popular culture, admiring the lifework of the Russian sinologist Vasily ALEKSEYEV (Vasiliĭ ALEKSEEV, 1881–1951), he himself being a famous promoter of Chinese popular culture. His skepticism about the Soviet system is easily transferable to skepticism about his own system, having experienced the most traumatic times during his adolescence. As a rule, FENG Jicai sympathizes with the victims as he and his family were victims of fanatic ultra-leftism. Citing PUSHKIN’s poem “If life deceives you...”¹²⁹, he succeeded in giving a desperate woman new hope to face her life during the Cultural Revolution. It may be no more than a detail, but it is certainly not a chance that the impressive menu card of the newly (in March 2019) opened Pushkin Literature Restaurant in Beijing has this poem on the front page and mentions its translator GE Baoquan. Like WANG Meng, FENG Jicai reflects on the Soviet cults of sacrifice and on the high value placed on war victims in the daily lives of young people, a custom he misses in China. Being granted a maximum of 15 minutes, FENG Jicai stayed much longer in Lenin’s Mausoleum than WANG, visually recording each tiny detail.

FENG confines himself to a documentary, nonfictional report without noteworthy leaps in time or space, framed by accounts of a friendly personal relationship with his Russian hosts: The very first chapter introduces translations of his works in Russian, and he describes his meeting with Russian China experts. FENG Jicai’s encounters with his Russian translators seem to be more relaxed than the first

124 Ibid.: “Qingting Eluosi” (2005), pp. 12, 18.

125 Ibid.: “Qingting Eluosi” (2005), pp. 84–106.

126 FENG Jicai: “Qingting Eluosi” (2005), pp. 107–122.

127 On the symphony see Dorothea REDEPENNING: *Peter Tschaikowsky*, München: C. H. Beck 2016, pp. 116ff.

128 FENG Jicai: “Qingting Eluosi” (2005), pp. 48–60.

129 Ibid., pp. 30f.

meeting between WANG Meng and TOROPTSEV. Although WANG seems less interested in the status of Russian sinology and details of academia than FENG, his meeting with the sinologists V. F. SOROKIN, Lev EYDLIN (Lev ЭЙДЛИН), and in Moscow 1984, after returning from Tashkent, sounds much more at ease. When SOROKIN introduced WANG to a chanson of Soviet poet Bulat OKUDZHAVA (1924–1997), he was impressed by his casual, natural singing and signaled his profound admiration of the refrain “As they breathe, so they write // Not trying to please”, comparing writing and a free expression of opinion to breathing.¹³⁰

Another longtime companion is mentioned in the foreword to *Sulian ji* when WANG Meng extends his thanks to an anonymous female “colleague” – most likely the author TIE Ning 铁凝 (*1957) – for encouraging him in his writing project. TIE Ning, president of the Chinese Writers Association (since 2006) wrote the welcome address to a collection of contemporary Chinese novels¹³¹ translated into Russian and co-financed by the Association whose authors were selected by the Association. The volume starts precisely with WANG Meng’s key chapter of *Sulian ji* “Sound of singing...”. TIE Ning herself wrote another quite remarkable short story shedding her own auctorial light on Sino-Soviet relations from a completely other angle under the title “An Delie’s (or Andrey’s) Night”¹³². The strange name of the protagonist, sounding like a Russian first name is due to the main protagonist being born in the era of Sino-Soviet friendship and working in one of the factories built by the “dear big brother Soviet Union” (*Sulian lao da ge* 苏联老大哥)¹³³ along with Soviet-style apartment blocks occupying half of the urban area. Two widely spaced Chinese characters for “Dancing Hall” on top of the former Worker’s Club look like a pair of lonely dancers eternally separated from each other. Nothing else than this unspectacular reminder of the era serves as a clue to interpretation.

Like in *Sulian ji*, unfulfilled desires and the concept of a missed moment linger in the center of the story. The latent, never expressed affection of two factory workers, both married, becomes a metaphor for the former bilateral relationship of China and the Soviet Union. Only when the factory is close to being shut down and a separation is inevitable do they realize their looming loss. However, the only chance for a first and last rendezvous is wasted. The sadly grotesque scene when

130 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 119. According to the line cited, it is the song “I’m writing a historical novel”.

131 *Sovremennaiā kitaiškaiā proza* (2007).

132 TIE Ning 铁凝: “An Delie de wanshang 安德烈的晚上” (An Delie’s Night). In: SUN Ke 孙颗 (ed.): *Gaige kaifang 30 nian. Duanpian xiaoshuo xuan* 改革开放 30 年. 短篇小说选 (30 Years of Reform and Opening. Selection of Short Stories), Shanghai: Shanghai wenyi chubanshe 2008. A German translation by the author of this article is in preparation.

133 TIE Ning: “An Delie de wanshang” (2008), p. 286.

“Andrey” loses his way on a terrain known to him since early childhood, his disorientation when searching for the well-known address of an old friend who gave him the key to his apartment for the intimate meeting, is paradigmatic of the disorientation of a generation which has not found its place, neither in the old Soviet world, nor in the new modern one. The hopeless search and getting lost in a spacious uniform residential area might have a kind of inverse parallel in Soviet comedy TV film *The Irony of Fate, Or Enjoy Your Bath!* (1975).¹³⁴ Similar to the completely drunk Russian protagonist played by Andrey (sic) MYAGKOV (Andrei MIÄGKOV, *1938), the utterly sober and serious Chinese “Andrey” opens the wrong apartment door with his borrowed key and has to face the coarse insults addressed to burglars and even worse – making public what should have been kept secret. The “1950s keys” belong to the past without having ever been used. “Andrey’s” only souvenir of the common time with his unspoken love remains her lunch box, her dumplings finally falling to the ground – prefiguring the coming end of Socialist “iron rice bowls”.

Apart from all the differences in their literary styles and focusing only on a purely factual level, the travelogues of FENG and WANG show some striking similarities. The same is true with the East German writer Christa WOLF (1929–2011), who visited the Soviet Union ten times from 1957, describing her impressions in her *Moscow Diary* in a similar chord as WANG Meng in “Fang Su riji” 访苏日记 (Visit to the Soviet Union), the fourth chapter of *Sulianji*. As a convinced Socialist like WANG Meng, WOLF’s early accounts sound very similar to his enthusiastic fantasies: “Once you were in Moscow, you’ll always long to be back, especially in spring”¹³⁵ (1959). Like WANG Meng, she becomes soon disillusioned. In 1966, she resents the unfriendly attitudes of service personnel and gradually gets the impression that the historical role the Soviet Union may have to play in the future has become increasingly less supported by the will of its inhabitants.¹³⁶ While her main impression in 1981 was that individuals were not of much value, finally in 1989 the country seems to be disintegrating in the East, having “glasnost but nothing to eat”.¹³⁷

The sensation of infinite width and dissolution which WANG Meng amusingly cites as an expression of excessive Russian self-esteem, is the subject of the Polish novel *The East*.¹³⁸ In a tremendous epical monologue on his way from Poland to

134 *Ironiia sud'by, ili S lëgkim parom!*, Mosfilm.

135 Own translation from: Christa WOLF: *Moskauer Tagebücher. Wer wir sind und wer wir waren, Reisetagebücher, Texte, Briefe, Dokumente 1957–1989*, Berlin: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch 2015, p. 38.

136 WOLF: *Moskauer Tagebücher* (2015), pp. 61, 86.

137 Ibid., pp. 198, 213.

138 Andrzej STASIUK: *Der Osten*, Berlin: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch 2017.

China, the author Andrzej STASIUK (*1960) takes up the trial of a seemingly infinite Post-Soviet space and a (Soviet) Russia he never cared about in his youth. His longing for a dreamscape and the dwelling in a melancholy of knowing that this will never be attained, could at times be a reminder of WANG Meng in a nostalgic mood. Yet the beginning and the end of his journey into the depths of Post-Soviet space and into his own mind and past are very different, with one main exception – Russian music: The songs, they are “singing deep into the night [...] for which they are loved all over the world.”¹³⁹ Arriving at the glitzy, hypermodern Manzhouli at the Chinese border, rising like a mirage out of the Russian grassland his outlook remains disenchanted and like that of WANG Meng, albeit sounding more blunt: “Russia, you don’t have a chance.”¹⁴⁰

In a similar way WANG Meng abandons the realm of courtesy prescribed by paying one’s respects to a memorial in his autobiography. An example of this would be his participation in a conference on civil society and public space in Bellagio (Italy) in 1993 when he met with Russian scholars:

While discussing the notions of Asia and the East, the two Russian participants emphasized that their country was European as well as Asian, covering an area of so and so many million square miles of which so and so many million square miles were situated in Asia. Their argumentation reminded me of the Sino-Soviet dispute during the era of KHRUSHCHEV about whether the Soviet Union should attend the Asian-Africa-Conference. [...] Circumstances have completely changed with the passage of time as well as the nature of the discourse, but their discursive strategies remained the same. The Russian way of argumentation resembles their blueprint of reform. It’s meant to prove that their model of reform is of transcontinental significance, to demonstrate that with their model of reform, even without generating positive results for the time being, they will still have the last laugh. [...] Why does one have to insist so stubbornly on the universal transferability of one’s own way? Without further ado, China calls its method “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”.¹⁴¹

Conclusion: Paradise Lost – Memories Regained

Coming back to the movie scene mentioned at the beginning: Did WANG Meng open a similar secret room in *Sulianji* only to proclaim that it belongs to somebody

139 STASIUK: *Der Osten* (2017), p. 138.

140 Ibid., p. 144.

141 WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2017b), p. 108.

else? In contrast to *Black Hole*, this is not a nostalgic re-enactment leading to nowhere. On the contrary – this does not at all remind us of another version of disorientation, where the protagonist hides in a secret retreat playing “Ural Rowan Tree”. The Soviet song is mentioned several times in *Sulian ji* as well, first of all in the Hotel Cosmos in Moscow, later in the Restaurant Baikal in Beijing.¹⁴² But WANG Meng, who certainly likes the song and who must know the blockbuster series widely discussed by intellectuals, obviously avoids a direct connection to his thematic spectrum. He does not need to choose between two systems. According to ZHA Jianying 查建英 (*1959), WANG Meng cited a line from BEI Dao's 北岛 (*1949)¹⁴³ famous poem in a TV interview: “I do not believe!” – Only to solemnly make the statement: “I can say this about my generation: We believe!”¹⁴⁴ Not without humor, the implicit author ponders on his credibility: “Would outsiders understand if I told them that I spent the best time of my life with the Soviet Union? They would take me for a Stalinist or even worse [...]. At least some Hong Kong readers would find it unbearable.”¹⁴⁵ However, his political convictions tend to be rather pragmatic when it comes to historical evaluations: “Blaming China's problems on MAO is simplistic [...] And I think he did two great things. The first was leaving Hong Kong alone in 1949 even though he could have taken it over with a brigade at the time. The second was breaking up with the Soviet Union, thus leaving a window open to the West and getting China out of the big Socialist family.”¹⁴⁶

Although there are more than enough accounts of WANG Meng's many visits to other countries and continents,¹⁴⁷ in *Sulian ji* the “window on the West” is a comparably small one. However, the author's cross-cultural gaze never disappears. Trying to avoid treating the “West” as one amorphous cultural entity, he differs as a rule between individual European countries and the U.S. Yet, none of these countries may compare to the country of his youth: “This of course is a result of the

142 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), pp. 19, 213.

143 For a German translation see Wolfgang KUBIN (ed.): *Nachrichten von der Hauptstadt der Sonne. Moderne chinesische Lyrik 1919–1984*, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1985, pp. 184f.

144 ZHA Jianying: “Servant of the State. Is China's most eminent writer a reformer or an apologist?”, 2010, November 1. Available online: <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/11/08/servant-of-the-state> (last access 2019, October 15).

145 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 156, cf. WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2017b), p. 363.

146 ZHA Jianying: “Servant of the State” (2010).

147 See a few examples in WANG Meng 王蒙: *Wang Meng wencun* 王蒙文存 (Wang Meng Archive), Vol. 15, *Fengge Lundun* 风格伦敦 (London Style), Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe 2003.

exclusive orientation toward the Soviet Russia (*Su-E* 苏俄) during the 50s.”¹⁴⁸ In the 1982 novelette “It’s Hard for Us to Meet”¹⁴⁹ the title of which could be a heading to WANG Meng’s Sino-Russian story as well, the author describes the complicated interpersonal relationships between a mainland Chinese man and an American overseas Chinese woman, bearing certain autobiographical features.¹⁵⁰ Its plot of two lovers being prevented from coming together in the wake of unfortunate circumstances seems to be a recurring theme in his work.

Sometimes foreign representatives play the role of testimonies of the author’s own impressions; or they share observations he had not thought about, as in one case, when an American visitor to the Soviet Union states that the Soviets have no sense of humor. In another passage of the text we hear that WANG himself would lose all his humor as soon as the Soviet Union was involved:

Humor is a wisdom of adults. [...] But not in the case of the Soviet Union. When I longed to go there, this was a long, long time before my wisdom developed. As for the Soviet Union, it seems to me my sense of humor will not be sufficient. During the 22 days when I visited the SU, I had problems with my humor.¹⁵¹

Two decades later, however, his humor had matured. After a visit to the Crimea, the backdrop of Anton CHEKHOV’s (1860–1904) short story “The Lady with the little Dog”, he observes that the seaside promenade and the waves of the Black Sea may not have changed, but “I only saw old ladies with big dogs”.¹⁵²

Memory turns out to be somewhat untamable, being even all but politically correct. In his childhood imagination, the Hong Kong author LEUNG Ping-kwan 梁秉鈞 (1949–2013) associated Great Britain with “a country on a distant continent, with a sparkling grey aluminum tooth mug and ominous, tasteless old meat”.¹⁵³ Time and again WANG Meng seems to disclose fragments of his autobiography. However, when disclosing the nonfictional background of one puzzling detail, another mystery pops up, as in the case of the mysterious black Russian noodles sent

148 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 169.

149 “Xiangjian shi nan” 相见是难, cf. the translations WANG Meng: “The Strain of Meeting”. In: WANG Meng, *Selected Works of Wang Meng*, Vol. I, *The Strain of Meeting*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press 1989, pp. 83–248; WANG Meng: “It’s Hard for Us to Meet”. In: WANG Meng: *Alienation. Yihua* 異化, Hong Kong: Joint Publishing (H.K.) Co. 1993, pp. 103–281.

150 For a critical comparison with two similar texts (one of FENG Jicai) see MARTIN: “Wang Mengs Roman *Schwer fällt das Wiedersehen*” (1996), pp. 279–291.

151 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 54.

152 WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2017b), p. 295.

153 LEUNG Ping-kwan: “Die Insel und das Festland”. In: Marc HERMANN (ed.): *Stumme Städte. Neue Großstadtliteratur aus China*. In: *Orientierungen. Zeitschrift zur Kultur Asiens*, Themenheft 2006, p. 143.

from Moscow (with love?). In doing so, he leaves us with a series of metaphors of how we humans will never truly understand each other, be it Russians and Chinese, be it Chinese and Chinese, or any other people.

Despite WANG Meng's openness to foreign countries and cultures all over the world, this does not touch upon his special relationship toward Russia, as the happiest time of his youth after an unbearable childhood was the direct outcome of Sino-Soviet friendship, whereas traumatic events like the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural Revolution" coincided with the Sino-Soviet split. According to him "from 1949 to 1957 China was a free kingdom of love"¹⁵⁴. One of his novels is even entitled *Season of love*¹⁵⁵. In *Sulian ji* we are told: "The Soviet Union, this is me at the age of 19, this is my first love, the beginning of my life as a writer."¹⁵⁶ Therefore, the author's first idealized or sexualized love might well have been a Russian "devushka", no matter whether real or imagined. Taking this into account, the approach to compare the "relationship between the Russian and Chinese revolutions" to a "romance"¹⁵⁷ would prove perfectly correct in the case of WANG Meng. However, this becomes obvious only when reading the whole *oeuvre* in question in order to recognize the semi-fictitious love story and the artistic finesse behind it. Therefore, it is also a lack of understanding or interest which perpetuates the tragedy of this publicly private love in a very special way. As the romance is destined to remain a secret from the very beginning and without a common future, this not only conforms to the encapsulated literary necessity connecting the narrative to the world of famous tragic love stories, but also ensures the overall consistency of a Sino-Soviet partnership which was doomed to failure.

When figuring out how to characterize WANG Meng's actual view of the Soviet Union, we have to distinguish between different levels of perception: When looking at the cover and leafing through the booklet, one might easily get the impression of a politically correct publication for the sake of Sino-Soviet friendship. However, when going into detail and looking behind the numerous hints and remarks, this will lead quite to the opposite result. *Sulian ji* does not merely show a Russia through a Soviet lens or the Soviet Union through a modern Chinese liberal socialist's lens, but by constantly changing perspectives it is zooming in and zooming out of space and time, switching between a great diversity of sometimes contradicting constellations. After all, these variations show the contours of a Soviet Union in the Chinese mind, an intangible Soviet Russian cultural heritage being

154 WANG Meng: *Wang Meng zizhuan* (2017a), p. 103.

155 WANG Meng 王蒙: *Lian'ai de jijie* 恋爱的季节 (Season of Love), Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe 2001.

156 WANG Meng, *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 21.

157 Elizabeth McGuire: "Sino-Soviet Romance: An Emotional History of Revolutionary Geopolitics". In: *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 52 (4), 2017, pp. 853–873.

remembered as part of the Chinese collective memory. *Sulian ji* closes with an open question about the value of memories: “Would it be better to constantly revive my fading memories and to refresh them, as soon as I remember, or wouldn’t it be better to put them aside, solemnly and with extreme caution, so as to bury them for good ...”¹⁵⁸ The question remains unanswered, but isn’t the book itself the answer, enfolding a kind of Proustian *In Search of Lost Time* with Chinese characteristics?

Sulian ji argues for an unforgettable love, be it for the dream girl of one’s youth, be it for the country of one’s youthful dreams, be it even for the dream of a whole generation or be it most likely for both as these different dreams are already inseparably intertwined. By setting up a memorial to Soviet Russia and a literary masterpiece in its own right, WANG Meng turns out to be a chronicler of the Chinese “political subconscious”¹⁵⁹. He makes a passionate plea for addressing the present and remembering the past in its entire depth and diversity, no matter how difficult or painful it may be. By applying all the literary refinements of his repertoire, WANG Meng transforms “his” Soviet Russia into a “realm of memory”, a *lieu de mémoire*¹⁶⁰ of today’s China. *Sulian ji* may therefore be considered a Chinese *musée imaginaire* of the Soviet era.¹⁶¹ At the same time it can serve as a perfect example to show that contemporary Chinese literature can be read as world literature.

158 WANG Meng: *Sulian ji* (2006), p. 277.

159 On this term see Peter VON MATT: “Die Inszenierung des politischen Unbewussten in der Schweiz”. In: Peter VON MATT, *Die tintenblauen Eidgenossen. Über die literarische und politische Schweiz*, München: Carl Hanser 2001, pp. 96–112.

160 Cf. Pierre NORA (ed.): *Les lieux de mémoire*, Paris: Gallimard 1984–1994.

161 Following a notion of Karl SCHLÖGEL: *Das sowjetische Jahrhundert. Archäologie einer untergegangenen Welt*, München: C. H. Beck 2017, pp. 833ff.

Part III

VISUAL AND MATERIAL CULTURE

Elena STAROVOITOVA

10 Foreigners and Foreign Realities on Traditional Chinese Woodblock Prints of the Late 19th–Early 20th Centuries

Abstract. This chapter highlights the theme of mutual images between China and, first of all, the Western powers at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries when there was an unprecedented expansion of contacts between the parties. The question of the appearance of new visual images of foreigners and foreign realities in China during this period is studied through the prism of traditional Chinese folk woodblock printing art – *nianhua* 年畫 (New Year pictures), which, in contrast to traditional academic painting, has very vividly responded to changing historical realities. This article also provides a classification of *nianhua*, in particular, the following categories of images with “foreigners and foreign phenomena” on them: woodblock prints associated with the activities of Christian missionaries in China, well-wishing pictures with images of Western realities, as well as images on historical and political topics that became particularly popular in the early 20th century.

The research is based, first of all, on the richest collection of Chinese folk paintings kept in the museums of St. Petersburg: the State Hermitage Museum; the State Museum of the History of Religion; the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Kunstkamera); and the Russian Geographical Society, which is based on the collection of the famous Russian academic V.M. ALEKSEEV.

Keywords. China, Foreigners, Mutual images, *Nianhua* prints, ALEKSEEV.

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In recent decades, both in the Western as well as in the Russian and Chinese studies of international relations, there has been a shift in the study of political history in favor of studying the history of cultural interaction and the formation of mutual images between different states. For example, Igor' Vasil'evich SLEDZEVSKIĬ, a famous Russian scholar and specialist in African studies, notes that the comparison of “national images, ideas, models and development projects produced both at the interstate level and at the level of mass consciousness and popular culture” became an “integral feature of world transformations in the 20th century”¹. In the 21st century, it can be seen how mutual images continue to have a significant impact on relations between individual states and nations. In the era of the “clip culture”, this statement becomes especially relevant to visual images.

As for China's relations with Russia and the West, the active stage of the formation of mutual visual images between the parties began in the second half of the 19th century, with the expansion of mutual contacts and the emergence of new touchpoints but also thanks to the development of communications and printing technology. Turning to popular culture in Russia and the West, one can suggest that the most vivid image of China was manifested in the pages of various satirical cartoons so popular among readers of those years. In China itself, according to many experts, the outlook for relations with foreigners began to change after the period of the Opium Wars. Even though it is known that by the end of the Qing dynasty, a large part of the Chinese population was still skeptical about the achievements of the “barbarians” and did not want to learn from them, some scientists believe that as early as the 17th century, certain representatives of the Chinese elite from imperial China “abandoned the ‘civilised-barbaric matrix’”².

As noted by famous Russian specialist in Chinese art Tat'jana Igorevna VINOGRADOVA, “v techenie mnogikh vekov zhivushchie za predelami Sredinnoi imperii risovalis' na stranitsakh kitaiskikh knig soglasno traditsii, voskhodiaschchei k drevnei «Knige gor i morei», t.e. fantasticheskimi antropomorfnymi sushchestvami s raznym naborom konechnosteii i golovami prichudlivykh ochertaniii” (“for many centuries those who lived outside the *Zhongguo* 中國 (Central State) were

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1 I.V. SLEDZEVSKIĬ: *Mental'nye obrazy v mezhdunarodnykh sopostavleniakh i modelirovaniu global'nogo budushchego* (Mental images in international comparisons and modeling a global future). In: *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost'* (Social science and contemporary world), vol. 4, Moscow: Science 2008, p. 71.

2 Ronald Chung-yam Po: “Maritime countries in the Far West: Western Europe in Xie Qinggao's Records of the Sea (c. 1783–93)”. In: *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire*, vol. 21 no. 6, London: Taylor and Francis 2014, pp. 857–870, there on p. 859.

painted on the pages of Chinese books according to a tradition dating back to *Shan Hai Jing* 山海經 (The Classic of Mountains and Seas), i.e. unrealistic anthropomorphic creatures with a different set of limbs and heads of bizarre outlines”).³ However, the growth of direct contacts between Asia and Europe, which was due, *inter alia*, to the development of navigation during the Ming dynasty, led to a significant increase in the number of publications related to foreigners. Since the 16th century, various illustrated ethnographic treatises that introduced local readers to the customs of foreigners were widely circulated in China. The primary audience belonged to the officials who had to serve in places of contact with foreign culture.

According to HE Yuming, a modern Taiwanese specialist in book history of imperial China, one of the most popular publications of this kind in those years was a treatise named *Luochong lu* 羸蟲錄 (Record of naked creatures) that was widespread among a large number of readers in different circles of society since the 16th century. The treatise is a printed text that collects images and descriptions of more than one hundred species of *luochong* 羸蟲 (literally, naked creatures), also known as *yi* 夷 (barbarians, foreigners). The articles of the treatise, organized under the headings for the various *guo* 國 (states), cover countries in Asia and the Indian Ocean region, the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. The researcher notes that the text focuses mainly on *waiyi* 外夷 (external barbarians) living outside the *Zhongguo*, but it also covers various ethnic groups in the area, including legendary countries mentioned in earlier Chinese texts, such as *The Classic of Mountains and Seas*. Moreover, like this treatise, with which it was often used together during the Ming times, *Luochong lu* stresses not only written reports on exotic peoples, but also on “weird” images, which was closely linked to the flourishing of the *banhua* 版畫 the print illustration industry at the time.⁴ HE Yuming also names another treatise of this kind – *Dongyi tushuo* 東夷圖說 (Pictures and Descriptions of Eastern Barbarians), commissioned in 1586 by the Provincial Administration vice commissioner of Guangdong province CAI Ruxian 蔡汝賢. Some of the illustrations in this treatise were copied from earlier sources, some were newly added, such as the Portuguese.⁵

The Norwegian Sinologist Erling AGØY in his work on the description of foreigners in traditional Chinese historical and literary works emphasizes the

3 T.I. VINOGRADOVA: “«Nekitaïskie» kитаïskie narodnye kartiny («Non-chinese» Chinese folk paintings)”. In: *Kiunakovskii sbornik* (Kiunakovskii anthology). no. 7, St. Petersburg: MAE RAS 2013, p. 32.

4 HE Yuming. “The Book and the Barbarian in Ming China and Beyond: The *Luo chong lu*, or ‘Record of Naked Creatures’”. In: *Asia Major. Third series*, vol. 24. no 1. Taipei: 2011, pp. 44–47. Available online: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/41650005.pdf?seq=1> (last access 2020, April 7).

5 *Ibid.*, p. 67.

geographical directory *Haiguo tuzhi* 海國圖志 (Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms), first published in 1843 in response to China's defeat in the First Opium War. It is believed that the collection was compiled by the famous official and scientist WEI Yuan 魏源 on the instructions of the famous statesman of the first half of the 19th century LIN Zexu 林則徐, who personally conducted most of the work for the preparation of the initial version of the handbook. Most of the handbook is made up of descriptions of various countries of the world, from South-East Asia to Russia and the USA. Each article focuses on history, geography, military aspects, and trade, although there are also descriptions of local traditions and customs. The treatise was reprinted twice in 1847 and 1852 respectively. Each subsequent edition was significantly expanded, primarily due to the rapidly growing amount of new information on foreigners. However, the book received little popularity until the 1860s and a narrow readership in coastal areas of China. As AGØY points out, although this edition is sometimes called the greatest geopolitical work in imperial China, it had no impact on the Qing Empire's policy toward Western countries but served only as a source of information about them.⁶

As mentioned above, such treatises did not widely circulate among a wide range of Chinese readers, being popular mainly among representatives of Chinese officials who served in the areas of contact with the foreigners. However, the expansion of China's contacts with the West since the second half of the 19th century, as well as the emergence of "overseas wonders" in Chinese everyday life could not but impact the formation of a special image of foreigners in folk culture. When China faced the danger from the Western powers, it could not but reflect on the traditional worldview, causing various reactions from the intellectual elite of the Qing state. Lots of thinkers of that time expressed their opinions about the "Western barbarians", suggesting various ways of interacting with them. The expansion of contacts with the West influenced almost all spheres of Chinese life, including its traditional art.

Traditionally, among the most common visual "carriers" of information in China among the broad masses of the population were Chinese folk woodblock prints – *nianhua* 年畫 (New Year pictures). The custom to decorate the house on New Year's Eve with bright printed images with well-wishing symbols on them appeared in China as early as the 12th century. In the second half of the 19th century the art of *nianhua* became widespread in China and developed into an independent form of fine art. At the beginning of the 20th century with the development

⁶ Erling T.H. AGØY: *Portrayal of Foreigners in Traditional Chinese History and Literature*, pp. 120–123. Available online: <https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/54557/EAST4591-Master-s-Thesis-in-East-Asian-Culture-and-History--Erling-Hagen-Ag-y.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> (last access 2019, December 11).

of printing technology, these images became extremely popular with all kinds of population of the Qing Empire.

Today's experts all over the world are currently arguing about what kind of folk paintings is worth classifying as *nianhua*. Originally, they were xylographic⁷ images used in cult practices connected with the celebration of the Chinese New Year. However, with the development of this type of art, folk woodblock paintings began increasingly to appear on subjects unrelated to the celebration of *Chunjie* 春節 (The Spring Festival). Modern Chinese scientists use a broader term to refer to such folk pictures – *mubanhua* 木版畫 (Woodblock Prints). However, in Russian Sinology and Art history, the name of *nianhua* has been firmly established. According to Saint Petersburg specialist in Chinese art Galina Sergeevna GUL'TIĀEVA, in spite of the fact that since the end of the 19th century “traditsionnaia zhanrovaia i khudozhestvennaia sistema nian'khua preterpevaet kardinal'nye izmeneniia” (the genre and artistic system of *nianhua* began to undergo radical changes), the folk painting “sokhraniāet v sebe traditsionnye osnovy: dekorativnyi kharakter, uslovnyi simvolikometaricheskii īazyk” (“preserved its traditional foundations: decorative character, as well as symbolic and metaphorical language”).⁸

The first collector of Chinese woodblock paintings in Russia was academic Vasilii Mikhailovich ALEKSEEV (1881–1951) – a prominent Russian Sinologist. Starting from 1906, when he first visited China, V.M. ALEKSEEV was lucky to visit over 50 main centers of production of Chinese woodblock prints and started to collect them as part of his study of local folklore. The scientist collected a huge number of New Year pictures, about 3000 pieces in total. At the behest of academic ALEKSEEV, his extensive collection, which was enriched in 1912 and 1926 during his trips to southern China, was divided between major museums of Leningrad. The collections of New Year paintings in Saint Petersburg museums was once again enlarged in the 1960–1980's. Most of these images (about 2000 pieces) are now stored in the State Hermitage. Nowadays, the museums of St. Petersburg, such as the Hermitage, the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography (the Kunstkamera), the State Museum of the History of Religion, and the Russian Geographical Society, are the owners of a unique collection of *nianhua* – more than 4500 pieces. Only collections in China can compare with this collection.

7 Xylography or woodcut - a printing technique that involves carving text in relief upon a wooden block, which is then inked and applied to paper. Merriam-Webster: “Xylography”. In: *Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary*, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/xylography> (last access 2020, April 14).

8 G.S. GUL'TIĀEVA: *Kitaiskaiā narodnaiā kartina nian'khua XX veka: tipologīa zhanrov i īevoliūtsiā* (Chinese Nianhua folk painting of the 20th century: genre typology and evolution), Sankt-Peterburg: SPbUHSS 2007, pp. 3–4.

A student of V.M. ALEKSEEV and longtime curator of the collection of Chinese folk paintings in the Hermitage, Mariia Leonidovna RUDOVA, identified five main groups of such woodblock prints based on their theme: 1) New Year paintings with religious subjects; 2) Pictures with well-wishing symbols; 3) Images of everyday life scenes; 4) Illustrations for literary works - myths, legends, novels, etc.; and 5) Theatrical pictures.⁹ G.S. GUL'TIÄEVA in her Ph.D. dissertation on the typology and evolution of *nianhua* genres in the 20th century expanded this list by adding two more types of Chinese folk New Year folk paintings: 6) Political paintings, which reflected the sociopolitical events of the 20th century and 7) Calendar pictures, as well as promotional calendars¹⁰. As the famous British Sinologist of the 20th century, John LUST mentioned in his monograph: “rigid criteria are not easily imposed on the prints. Illustration had always tended to move outside narrow definitions of celebrations.”¹¹ He also for the first time drew attention to the possibility of classifying *nianhua* not only by their subject matter, but also by “target audience”¹².

Despite the fact that the first images of foreigners and “overseas wonders” appeared on the Chinese folk woodblock prints in the 18th century, the largest number of images of “European realities” refers to the late 19th and early 20th century as a response to the expansion of the sphere of interaction between the Qing Empire and the world. Such woodblock prints, usually dated between the 1890s and the 1920s, can be divided into several main groups:

- 1) Images related to the activities of Christian missionaries in China. These are anti-Christian drawings depicting the missionaries in the most unattractive form and calling for struggle against them.
- 2) Traditional well-wishing woodblock prints with images of Western realities on them: houses, household items, costumes, etc. Such pictures became popular at the beginning of the 20th century with the increasing spread of “European innovations” in Chinese everyday life.
- 3) Images on historical and political issues, depicting, among other things, China’s relations with foreign states. According to experts, this genre first appeared at the turn of the 19–20th century.

9 M.L. RUDOVA: *Kitaïskaiâ narodnaiâ kartinka* (Chinese folk paintings), Sankt-Peterburg: Aurora 2003, pp. 12–16.

10 G.S. GUL'TIÄEVA: *Kitaïskaiâ narodnaiâ kartina* (2007), p. 26.

11 John LUST: *Chinese popular prints*, Leiden: Brill 1996, p. 8.

12 For more details see: E.A. TERIÜKOVA, E.A. ZAVIDOVSKAIÄ, O.S. KHIZHNIÄK, M.V. KORMANOVSKAIÄ, V.N. MAZURINA: “*Kitaïskaiâ narodnaiâ kartina iz sobraniâ GMIR: opyt sistematizatsii* (Chinese folk painting from the SMHR collection: the experience of systematization)”. In: *Trudy Gosudarstvennogo muzeïa istorii religii* (Proceedings of the State Museum of the History of Religion), no. 17, Sankt-Peterburg: SPbGUD 2017, p. 96.

Pictures of Christian missionaries in China

According to academic V.M. ALEKSEEV, Christianity, like Buddhism, was “hostile to Confucianism”, however: “buddisty prosto ne obrashchali vnimaniā na prenebrezhenie konfutsiantsev, khristianstvo, chuvstvuia v konfutsianstve vraga, vse vremiā srazhalos’ s nim” (“the Buddhists simply took no notice of the disdain of Confucianists, while Christianity, seeing Confucianism as an enemy, fought against it all the time”).¹³ He also noticed that:

Evropeiſty, prinesshie khristianstvo, ne mogli poniat’ kitaiskuū kul’tu-ru. Missionery izuchali Kitaī lish’ s tsel’iu uchit’ ego. ... Sami khristian-skie missii veli mezhdu soboī voīnu. Kitaitsy nedoumevali – vse raznye very: tian’chzhu tsziao – katolichestvo, esu tsziao – protestanstvo, tszidu tsziao – pravoslavnaiā tserkov’. ... [Missionery zachastuiū] shli na shpionazh, politi-ku poblagzhek, i, konechno, pastva sostoīala glavnym obrazom iz kar’eristov i voobshche skvernykh elementov. ... Skandal’nye istorii, v kotorykh uchastvo-vali khuligany i grabiteli, prikryvavshiesia missionerstvom, ne raz vyzy-vali otkrytye vosstanīa protiv khristian.

The Europeans who brought Christianity could not understand Chinese culture. Missionaries studied China only to teach it. ... The Christian missions themselves fought among themselves. The Chinese were puzzled – all different religions: *tian-zhu jiao* 天主教 – Catholicism, *yesu jiao* 耶稣教 – Protestantism, *jidu jiao* 基督教 – Orthodox Church. ... [Missionaries often] went on espionage, a policy of indulgence, and, of course, their parish consisted mainly of careerists and generally bad elements. ... Scandalous stories in which hooligans and robbers participated, hiding behind missionary work, have repeatedly caused open rebellions against the Christians.¹⁴

The contradictions between Christianity and traditional Chinese beliefs, along with the growing pressure from the Western Powers after China’s defeat in the Opium Wars, resulted in numerous protests against Christians (both missionaries and converted Chinese). In particular, in the series of anti-Christian riots of 1891, when crowds rose up in nearly one dozen cities along the Yangzi River, stretching from Nanjing to Yichang, and hundreds of Chinese Christians and two Englishmen were murdered. As foreign missionaries and local officials believed, one of the causes that stirred up public violence in this case, was a series of woodblock prints

13 V.M. ALEKSEEV: *Kitaiskaiā narodnaiā kartina. Dukhovnaiā zhizn’ starogo Kitaia v narodnykh izob-razheniiaakh* (Chinese folk picture. The spiritual life of old China in folk images), Moscow: Science 1966, p. 148.

14 Ibid., pp. 148–150.

that were included in an illustrated pamphlet by conservative Chinese scholar ZHOU Han 周汉 (1842–1911) titled *Jin zun shengyu bixie quan tu* 謹遵聖諭辟邪全圖 (In Accord with the Imperial Edict: Complete Illustrations of the Heretical Religion) and published around 1890. The pamphlet was reproduced by a member of the London Missionary Society, Welsh Christian missionary in China Griffith JOHN (1831–1912), who put the pictures in the reverse order (32–1), added translations and commentary, and published them under the name of *The Cause of the Riots in the Yangtse Valley: A “Complete Picture Gallery”* in Hankou in 1891. Some of the examples from JOHN’s pamphlet are now stored in the State Museum of the History of Religion in Saint Petersburg as part of ALEKSEEV original collection.

All these paintings depict admirers of Christianity in an extremely unpleasant form. For this purpose, in particular, a play on words is used. Thus, the character *tianzhu* 天主 (the Lord) is in tune with the character *tianzhu* 天豬 (the heavenly pig), so Jesus is usually depicted on such prints as a pig with the character *yesu* 耶蘇 on its side. The character *jiao* 教 (the doctrine) is replaced by *jiao* 叫 (a cry, a squeal). Therefore, preachers are called *jiaosi* 叫司 (the one who shouts), and the Christian sermon is called no other way than “the squeal of a pig”. Believers, *jiaotu* 叫徒 (a follower of the “squeal”), are often depicted wearing Chinese and Western clothing as well as sitting in *jiaotang* 叫堂 (the hall of shouting) in pairs of the opposite sex to embrace each other, which indicates the complete lack of morals in the followers of Christian teaching. These paintings contain a large amount of green color, which is traditionally considered a symbol of depraved behavior in China. All the paintings in the series are supplied with anti-Christian inscriptions calling on the Chinese people to rebel against the followers of other people’s teachings. Figures 10-1 to 10-3 show some of the most striking examples of the wood-blocks of this series with Chinese characters written and read from right to left.

Figure 10-1: In this picture, one can see two bearded foreigners on the left, both wearing western clothes and green hats, kneeling; representing *jiaosi* 叫司 and *jiaotu* 叫徒. *Yesu* 耶蘇 is written on the pig on the right. The inscription on the far right reads: *Zhe chusheng nai yanggui suo gui pimao wei tuo* 這畜牲乃洋鬼所皈皮毛未脫 (This beast, whose pelt and bristle has not yet been removed, is embraced by foreign devils). On the far left it reads: *Tang renlei yi tianzhu wei zhu yanmian he cun* 倘人類以天豬為主顏面何存 (If humanity treats a hog as heavenly god, then how do they not lose face?)



Figure 10-1: *Gui bai zhu jing tu* 鬼拜猪精圖
(The devils worshipping the hog)¹⁵



Figure 10-2: *Jiao tang chuan jiao tu* 叫堂傳叫圖
(Propagating religion in the chapels)¹⁶

15 State Museum of the History of Religion collection, (SMHR No X-2910/1-VII).

16 Ibid., (SMHR No X-2910/3-VII).

Figure 10-2: In the middle of the picture, a bloody pig with the characters *yesu* 耶蘇 on its chest is crucified on a wooden cross. In front of the cross there is a table with two candles and a censer. Half circling around the table is a group of Chinese on their knees in robes of various colors. In the foreground sit three hugging couples on three benches, which symbolizes the lack of morality among the followers of Christianity.



Figure 10-3: *Shi dao zhi gui tu* 釋道治鬼圖
(The priests of Buddha and Dao expelling the devils)¹⁷

Figure 10-3: The painting depicts a group of eight Chinese people in various poses and multi-colored robes. They are holding sticks in their hands and using them to beat three pigs on the ground. On the surface of each pig one can see the Chinese characters from left to right: *jiaotu* 叫徒, *yesu* 耶蘇, *jiaosi* 叫司. Near the top of the picture, a Taoist saint is depicted on a cloud on the right holding a sword in his right hand and a flag in his left. The floating figure also on a cloud next to him is the Buddha holding a staff in his right hand and a rosary in his left. The picture very well depicts the idea popular in China during the second half of the 19th century that only traditional culture can help fight against foreign invaders.

17 State Museum of the History of Religion collection, (SMHR No X-2910/12-VII).

Traditional Well-wishing Woodblock Prints with Images of Western Realities

As V.M. ALEKSEEV noted:

Kogda v kitaïskom bytu poïavilis' evropeïskie novshestva, narodnaïa kar-tina seïchás zhe uchla éto, i v 1906 g. na narodnykh kartinakh uzhe mozhno bylo vstretit' evropeïskie doma, nariady, tipy liudej i takie novinki, kak gramofon, stennye chasy, nastol'nye lampy, neveroiatnye golovnye ubo-ry, izobrazhaûshchie evropeïskie solomennye shliâpy, i t.p. ... Odnako, evro-peïskie novshestva, vryvaiâs' v tkan' kitaïskoï narodnoï kartiny, ne narushali ee, ne meniali narodnyi stil' i formulu, priniatuiu stoletiâmi.

When European innovations appeared in Chinese everyday life, the folk picture immediately took this into account, and in 1906 European houses, outfits, types of people, and such novelties as a gramophone, wall clocks, table lamps, incredible hats, depicting European straw hats, etc. were often seen on *nianhua*... However, European innovations, breaking into the fabric of the Chinese picture, did not violate it, did not change the folk style and formula adopted by the centuries.¹⁸

Participants of a recent research project that aims to systematize the collection of Chinese folk block-prints from the collection of academic ALEKSEEV, stored in the archives of the State Museum of the History of Religion in Saint Petersburg, also mention:

Gibkiï kharakter iskusstva nian'khuâ, kotoroe vpityvalo v sebia i postoianno obogashchalo novymi siuzhetami i obrazami, shlo v nogu s meniaûshchimsia obshchestvom i tekhnicheskim progressom i v silu svoeï neobyknovennoi populârnosti i rasprostranennosti neslo informatsii ob étikh sotsial'nykh i tekhnologicheskikh novshestvakh v samye shirokie sloi sel'skogo naseleniâ.

The flexible nature of *nianhua* art, which was constantly enriched by new subjects and images, kept pace with the changing society and technical progress and, because of its unusual popularity and prevalence, carried information about these social and technological innovations to the widest sections of the rural population.¹⁹

18 Ibid., pp. 33–35.

19 E.A. TERIUKOVA et al.: *Kitaiskaïa narodnaïa kartina* (2017), p. 108.

Among such images we can highlight a series of paintings made in the workshops of *Yangliuqing* (楊柳青) – a village in the suburbs of Tianjin, which is still one of the most famous centers of traditional woodblock prints in China. Tianjin was also one of the most westernized cities of late Qing China, which is why such images often depict the achievements of Western technology such as: railways, railway bridges, western-style buildings and other foreign engineering structures, as well as signs of Western lifestyle penetration into China (Figures 10-4 to 10-7).

Figure 10-4: As mentioned, among the most frequent subjects in the images of this group were modern engineering structures. In this picture, you can see one of said structures: a drawbridge over the Great Canal in Tianjin. This city was opened for foreign trade after 1860 and began to develop rapidly as one of the centers where foreign states representatives could stay. Therefore, in addition to the new “modern” bridge, we can see Chinese ladies and men in Western outfits, European style wagons, new European style lanterns and other innovations in the picture.

Figure 10-5: This picture portrays the way the western fashion of that time influenced everyday life in late Qing China. It shows modern Tianjin residents: two ladies riding bicycles (a symbol of western civilization) and three gentlemen with European style buildings behind them in the background. This painting was created after 1900, when the old city wall was demolished in Tianjin.

Figure 10-6: According to a famous Russian sinologist B.L. RIFTIN, this picture was first created in Yangzhou after 1894 and later reprinted in Shanghai.²⁰ The picture is intended to show how different the morals of foreigners are from those of the Chinese, which is written at the top of the image. However, neither the image nor the inscription should be considered to contain any negative connotations. The author is merely puzzled: “How unusual are the manners of foreigners!” (*Yang fengsu geng xiqi* 洋風俗更希奇).

20 B.L. RIFTIN and ІUіshan' LIU (ed.): *Redkie kitaіskie narodnye kartiny iz sovetskikh so-braniі* (Rare Chinese folk paintings from Soviet collections), Leningrad: Aurora 1991, p. 198.



Figure 10-4: *Tianjin Hebei xin Fuqiao* 天津河北新浮橋
(New drawbridge in Tianjin)²¹



Figure 10-5: *Tianjin malu* 天津馬路 (Tianjin Road)²²

21 Museum of Anthropology and Ethnology (Kunstkamera) collection, (MAE No 1080-111/49).

22 Museum of Anthropology and Ethnology (Kunstkamera) collection, (MAE No 1080-97/22).



Figure 10-6: *Furen zuo jiao nanren zou hou* 婦人坐轎男人走後
(Wife riding a sedan chair, husband walking behind)²³



Figure 10-7: *Wenwu nü xuetang* 文武女學堂
(Civil and military women's academy)²⁴

23 Museum of Anthropology and Ethnology (Kunstkamera) collection, (MAE No 3676-236).

24 State Museum of the History of Religion collection, (SMHR No D-3616-VII).

Figure 10-7: One can see a courtyard of a western style school. The female students are all wearing flat western hats while the teacher is dressed in a traditional Chinese dress. Some of the students are reading; others are practicing martial arts. A man wearing a western style suit is peeping from the street. As another specialist in *nianhua* from Saint Petersburg, Ekaterina ZAVIDOVSKAIÀ, and her colleagues on the project on ALEKSEEV's collection of State Museum of the History of Religion noted, women's themes were very popular for Shanghai *nianhua*. These pictures tell us about new forms of women's leisure that became typical of China in 1900–1920, reflecting a change in women's status in Chinese society.²⁵

Images on Historical and Political Issues

As a prominent Chinese expert on the history of Chinese folk paintings, WANG Shucun wrote: “v otlichie ot vysokož zhivopisi, tselikom zamknutsheisja v sfere odnih i tekh zhe traditsionnykh tem, kitaïskaia narodnaia kartina etogo vremeni shiroko otrazhala real’nuju deistvitel’nost” (“in contrast to high painting, seriously limited in its scope to the same traditional themes, the Chinese folk picture of this time widely reflected the reality”).²⁶ One of the most popular new themes for the Chinese folk painting at the turn of the 20th century was fighting with foreign invaders. First of all, there were paintings depicting the Japanese aggression against China, as well as the topics related to the participation of Western powers in suppressing the Boxer movement in China.

The peculiarity of such paintings, which was noticed by V.M. ALEKSEEV, was that:

Istoricheskie legendy i epopei izobrazhalis' vsegda v vide teatral'nogo predstavlenija: kitaitsy ne mogut sebe inache predstavit' istoricheskoe deistvie, kak tol'ko v vide deistviia teatral'nogo, i eto poniatno, tak kak imenno teatr znakomit negramotnykh s istoriei i literaturoi.

The historical legends and sagas were always depicted in the form of a theatrical performance: the Chinese can only imagine a historical action if it is shaped as a

25 For more details see: E.A. TERIUKOVA et al.: *Kitaïskaia narodnaia kartina* (2017), pp. 106–108.

26 SHutsun' VAN: “K istorii kitaïskoi narodnoi kartiny”. In: B.L. RIFTIN and İUishan' LIU (ed.): *Redkie kitaïskie narodnye kartiny* (1991), p. 28.

theatrical action, and this is understandable, since it is the theater that introduces illiterate people to history and literature.²⁷

The “historical” stories depicted in such paintings often contradicted reality. This could be due to authors’ low awareness of historical processes, as well as due to a deliberate desire to “embellish” certain events. Unfortunately, Saint Petersburg collections do not include such paintings in a wide range, but one of the brightest examples called *Paoda Riben guo* 炮打日本國 (MAE No 3676-249) exaggerates the achievements of the Chinese military in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894–95 (Figure 10-8).



Figure 10-8: *Paoda Riben guo* 炮打日本國 (Shelling Japan)²⁸

In conclusion, it is plausible to say that one can hardly argue with T.I. VINOGRADOVA’s opinion that talking about *nianhua* we should recognize that these paintings were created “*iskliuchitel’no dlia obsluzhivaniia nuzhd osnovnoi natsii, naseliaiushchei imperiiu*, t.e. *khan’tsev, kitaifsev*” (“solely to serve the needs of the main nation inhabiting the Empire, i.e. *Han* 漢 - the Chinese”). However, one should always keep in mind that among the vast mass of representatives of the Chinese nation, there could be groups of “consumers” of folk paintings with sometimes completely opposite demands – from fighters against Christianity to fans of any kind of new Western trends. One way or another, it is obvious that the

27 V.M. ALEKSEEV: *Kitaiskaia narodnaia karta* (1966), p. 35.

28 Museum of Anthropology and Ethnology (Kunstkamera) collection, (MAE No 3676-249).

unprecedented expansion of China's contacts with the outside world, which began in the second half of the 19th century, impacted almost all spheres of life of Chinese society and the state, which is very clearly reflected in the most "popular" (i.e. widespread among the general public) of all types of visual art in China – the art of *nianhua*.

Mariia GULEVA

II Visual Perceptions of the West and Russia in Chinese Cartoon Magazines of the 1930s

Abstract. This chapter focuses on the way the West and Russia were shown in Chinese political cartoons from a turbulent decade, the 1930s. It is based on caricatures, photo collages, and other pictorial materials published in cartoon magazines: Duli Manhua, Manhuajie, Qunzhong Manhua, Shanghai Manhua, Shidai Manhua, Wanxiang, and Zhongguo Manhua. The central questions raised by Chinese cartoonists about the Western world of that time included the problems of how powerful states struggled in what seemed to be their ambition to rule the world, causing military clashes in colonies and even in Europe itself (Ethiopia and Spain attracting a great deal of attention); how the disarmament movement and peace-keeping negotiations failed and the new global conflict loomed on the horizon; and, finally, what the daily life of foreigners both inside and outside of China looked like.

The abundance of new media, of the visual one in particular, expanded the Chinese public's perceptions of the West and Russia. It also created a sense of interconnectedness of things happening on the planet, thus shifting the focus of attention from China as the civilized centre to concerns for global, planetary civilization falling prey to warmongering barbarians. The absence of positive power in international relations created a pessimistic outlook on the Earth's prospects. Yet, on a "ground" level, routines and mundane affairs went on, with Western additions – from Hollywood movies to strip-tease, from Christian churches to roller-skating – becoming ever more inextricable from the fabric of urban China and, primarily, Shanghai.

Keywords. Cartoon, Communism, Fascism, Abyssinian Crisis, Spanish Civil War.

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Introduction

This chapter aims to reconstruct the image of the West and Russia through the medium of Chinese cartoons published in cartoon magazines in the 1930s. The phenomenon of illustrated or pictorial periodicals was not new for China by that decade: apart from the centuries-old tradition of popular prints and books with woodcut illustrations, several pictorials were produced in China from the late 19th century. The earliest one was *Dianshizhai Huabao* 點石齋畫報 (published 1884–1898), followed later by many others. By the 1930s the term *manhua* 漫畫 (cartoon, etching, or sketch) came to be used in the magazines' titles to indicate the priority of such items in the contents, with some 20 titles appearing then.¹ This chapter is based on cartoons from *Duli Manhua* 獨立漫畫 (publ. 1935–1936, DLMH), *Manhuajie* 漫畫界 (publ. 1936, MHJ), *Qunzhong Manhua* 群眾漫畫 (publ. 1935, QZMH), *Shanghai Manhua* 上海漫畫 (publ. 1936–1937, SHMH), *Shidai Manhua* 時代漫畫 (publ. 1934–1937, SDMH), *Wanxiang* 萬象 (publ. 1934–1935, WX), and *Zhongguo Manhua* 中國漫畫 (publ. 1935–1937, ZGMH).² Their important common trait is that they struggled to be in the avant-garde of fashion, news, and artistic trends while digesting these novelties and reinterpreting them through hand-

1 For a list of cartoon magazines published in that decade see: Nick STEMBER: *The Shanghai Manhua Society: A History of Early Chinese Cartoonists, 1918–1938*, Master's thesis, Vancouver: University of British Columbia 2015, pp. 119–120. A commentary on the term *manhua* and its evolution in China is given in the introduction of Paul BEVAN's detailed study of the 1920s–1930s cartoons in Shanghai: Paul BEVAN: *A Modern Miscellany: Shanghai Cartoon Artists, Shao Xunmei's Circle and the Travels of Jack Chen, 1926–1938*, Leiden: Brill 2016, pp. 7–14. For more about pictorial magazines and the history of cartooning in China see: BI Keguan 毕克官 and HUANG Yuanlin 黄远林: *Zhongguo manhua shi* 中国漫画史 (The history of Chinese *manhua*), Beijing: Wenhua Yishu Chubanshe 1986; John A. CRESPI: "China's Modern Sketch—1: The Golden Era of Cartoon Art, 1934–1937". In: *MIT Visualizing Cultures* (2011). Available online: http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/modern_sketch/ (last access 2019, 13 August); Hans HARDER and Barbara MITTLER (eds.): *Asian Punches: A Transcultural Affair*, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer 2013; HUANG Ke 黄可, GAN Zhenhu 甘振虎, CHEN Lei 陈蕾: *Lao Shanghai manhua tuzhi* 老上海漫画图志 (Old Shanghai *manhua* pictorials), Shanghai: Shanghai Kexue Jishu Wenxian Chubanshe 2010; Lynn PAN: *Shanghai Style: Art and Design between the Wars*, South San Francisco: Long River Press 2008; "Shenghuo Yuekan" 生活月刊 (eds.): *Shidai Manhua: bei shiguang chenfeng de 1930 niandai Zhongguo chuangaoli* 时代漫画: 被时光尘封的1930年代中国创造力 (*Shidai Manhua: 1930s China's creative force covered by the dust of time*), Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Daxue Chubanshe 2015.

2 All of these magazines except *Qunzhong Manhua* did not have pagination, so the phrase "Unnumbered page" is omitted from all relevant footnotes, unless the quoted image was placed on the front or back cover of a magazine.

drawn images. This makes the cartoons an important source for studying Chinese perceptions of large and small domestic and foreign affairs.

The 1930s were a time when such magazines were still politically neutral (or, at least, independent from direct governmental propaganda and party ideology, although affected by censorship), but the fundamental principles of cartoon art and magazines had already become established.³ The periodicals, following examples set by foreign pictorials (*Punch*, *Puck*, *Vanity Fair*, *Life*, etc.) and by local predecessors, included a wide assortment of materials; apart from cartoons, there were news items, photographs, jokes, essays, fictional stories, poetry, advertisements, and much more. The cartoons themselves varied in size, style, themes, and artistic value. Yet, it must be noted that many of the *manhua* magazines published works by the same artists, e.g. LU Shaofei 魯少飛 (1903–1995), YE Qianyu 葉淺予 (1907–1995), HUA Junwu 華君武 (1915–2010), WANG Dunqing 王敦慶 (1899–1990), ZHANG Guangyu 張光宇 (1900–1965), ZHANG Zhengyu 張正宇 (ZHANG Zhenyu 張振宇, 1904–1976), CAO Hanmei 曹涵美 (1902–1975), and WANG Zimei 汪子美 (1913–2002), etc. This means that the style of all these magazines was quite homogeneous. For that reason this chapter draws upon as many cartoons from the magazines as was possible to locate in the available databases. However, the quantitative data is given only for *Shidai Manhua* as the longest-running of them and for *Shanghai Manhua* as an example of a later 1930s publication since, by that time, the political involvement of cartoonists grew stronger.

The term “the West” is problematic in and of itself. Its variations in Chinese, such as *xiyang* 西洋, *xifang* 西方, *xitu* 西土, as well as derivatives like Western goods (*xihuo* 西貨), Westerner (*xiren* 西人), and Western hemisphere (*xibanqiu* 西半球), are used in the magazines; the notion is thus not altogether inappropriate. However, there are no clear boundaries of what is or is not the West from the cartoonists’ point of view. When speaking about international politics, the cartoonists often referred to the world at large or divided it not by geographical principle but along the lines of strong against weak or big against small. In such cases, Soviet Russia and Japan were among the strong, along with European powers and the USA. When depicting matters of culture, on the other hand, the cartoonists separated Japan from the West, which is visible in the prevalent presence of “Americanized” or “Europeanized” fashions, entertainment, and art (Japanese influence in the cultural sphere was not a noticeable narrative in cartoons, with the exception that when Chinese magazines quoted foreign caricature, some Japanese examples were given along with Soviet, American, and European).

Differentiation between the West and non-West is also complicated by the obvious fluidity of categories, such as democratic and totalitarian states, capitalism

³ BEVAN: *A Modern Miscellany* (2016), pp. 7–14.

and Communism; in the 1930s the nearing split into Axis and Allied powers was not clear, so in cartoons one often finds interchangeable clashes and alliances of random combinations: the USSR with or against Germany, Germany with or against the UK, the USA together with Germany, the USSR, Italy, and Japan, etc. This makes the idea of including or excluding either of these countries from this chapter a partly arbitrary choice. However, for the cartoonists whose work is studied in this chapter the world powers in the political sense included the USA, the USSR, the UK and more generally Europe, and Japan; simply the countries which had concessions in China (in the case of the USSR it is “had had”), so they are considered to be the West in this chapter. Yet the cartoons where Japan is the sole actor or is in a bilateral confrontation with China are excluded from the corpus of this chapter’s sources, because Japan by the 1930s was playing its cards quite differently from the other “colonial” powers in China; so, due to the simmering conflict after the Manchurian incident of 1931, cartoons satirizing Japan and Sino-Japanese relations built up into quite a separate account. The League of Nations is also a part of the “Western” narrative, because much of it is described in the light of Western powers’ domineering agenda-setting and decision-making, both of which, as cartoons reminded the readers, took place in Geneva.

In cartoons on various aspects of “culture”, the West is mostly depicted as Europe and America, with Soviet Russia often included as well, because it was part of the “white people” or “white race” narrative, and its cinematographers, artists, dancers, and architects were in line with the Western styles, even though the Communist nature of art would sometimes be noted. By the same logic of the “white race”, the presence of Russian emigrants is part of the “foreigners in China” group further in this chapter whereas the Japanese are excluded, again with the argument that their presence at the time was mostly part of the satire on the Sino-Japanese conflict, rather than China’s relations with the rest of the world. The West, thus understood, was one of the central themes for the cartoon magazines in the 1930s. In *Shidai Manhua*, various things and events related to the West appear in around 180 cartoons while in *Shanghai Manhua* they are around 60, suggesting that of the total number of cartoons in both magazines, such Western narratives and references amount to more than 10%.⁴

4 This figure is very rough, appearing from the calculation that in cases of both magazines each issue consisted of around 40 pages, almost every page containing one or several cartoons (textual references are not taken into account here) while some cartoons could be of double-page size. As a result, for 39 issues of *Shidai Manhua* and 13 issues of *Shanghai Manhua*, there would be approximately 1560 and 520 cartoons in total respectively. This arithmetic is rather hypothetical because in many cases cartoons consist of several parts and counting them as one or several items is subject to researcher’s interpretation. Yet, however loose the above mentioned percentage might be, it is still informative in the sense that out

The range of topics for cartoons about the West is very varied, oscillating between world powers and average individuals appearing in the news, as well as Westerners staying in China and living abroad. Out of this sweeping multitude the recurring large groups of narratives emerge. These are world politics on the one hand, and people's daily life and entertainment on the other. The "world politics" group covers a vast field of intertwining themes, among which are: major world powers and their attempts to control the globe; imperialism, capitalism, militarism, and totalitarian ideologies being the driving forces behind international affairs; smaller nations and the wars into which they are dragged by the powers; the international struggle for peace and disarmament and its failures; premonitions of a "second World War" and the extinction of humankind. The "daily life" group also varies greatly, including cartoons of foreigners living in, or visiting, Chinese cities; photographs or cartoons of places and people abroad; pictures of foreign theater and cinematic celebrities, outstanding writers, sportsmen, etc.; annotated reprints of foreign cartoons or paintings on various subjects. The ways each of these Western themes unfolded in the magazines deserve some elaboration.

World Powers in the Struggle for Global Dominance

The 1930s were certainly a provocative decade for an observer of world affairs, when the planet grew ever more engulfed in struggles for global dominance and total power. The key instigators of this trend, according to Chinese magazines, were, unsurprisingly, Japan, Germany, Italy, the USSR, the USA, the UK, and, albeit to a much lesser degree, France. Each of these frequented the cartoons. The statistics for *Shidai Manhua* and *Shanghai Manhua* are provided in Table 11-1 (Japan is only counted for cases where other powers appear, too).

of the entertaining features, domestic problems, and, crucially, Sino-Japanese affairs of the decade, the matters of wider international trends and foreign life took up quite a visible share. This percentage varies between different magazines: e.g. *Duli Manhua*, having published 9 issues, produced over 50 cartoons related to the West while for the 8 issues of *Manhuijie* the number is around 30, but such fluctuations hardly demonstrate any pronounced attitude to the world or China's place in it. The number of pages in each issue varied (from 30 to 50) in these cases, as well as in *Shidai Manhua* and *Shanghai Manhua*, but it is mostly comparable as the magazines were produced in similar technical principles.

Table 11-1: Quantity of references to nations, their leaders, and symbols in *Shidai Manhua* and *Shanghai Manhua* cartoons

	<i>Shidai Manhua</i>	<i>Shanghai Manhua</i>
Germany (directly mentioned)	25	5
HITLER (mentioned or portrayed)	35	23
Swastika (depicted)	33	30
Italy (directly mentioned)	23	7
MUSSOLINI (mentioned or portrayed)	27	23
Fasces (depicted) ⁵	9	4
The USSR (directly mentioned)	13	2
STALIN (mentioned or portrayed)	12	11
Hammer and sickle (depicted)	18	14
Five-ended star (depicted)	11	6
The USA (directly mentioned)	23	5
ROOSEVELT (mentioned or portrayed) ⁶	4	5
Stars-and-stripes flag or pattern (depicted)	11	5
The UK (directly mentioned)	26	8
— in explicit relation to Hong Kong	5	0
Union Jack or its pattern (depicted)	9	10
France (directly mentioned)	13	6
Marianne (portrayed, always in Phrygian cap)	2	1
Japan (mentioned or depicted as national flag)	36	25

It is visible from the table that Fascist states are featured in cartoons very prominently, attracting a great deal of attention, especially through the portrayal of their leaders – Benito MUSSOLINI (1883–1945) and Adolf HITLER (1889–1945), or their ideological symbols – primarily the swastika. A similar ratio is noticeable in the case of the USSR: Joseph STALIN (1878–1953) and the Soviet emblems (hammer

5 Noticeably fewer than the swastika in both magazines, with a similar tendency in other periodicals, probably for the plain reason that fasces take more time to draw and more space in the picture. In some cases, MUSSOLINI has a swastika rather than fasces somewhere on his uniform (e.g. ZHANG E 張譯: “Tongyang de shensu” 同樣的伸訴 (The same complaint). In: *SDMH* no. 15 (March), 1935).

6 Meaning, of course, Franklin Delano ROOSEVELT, although in one case *Shidai Manhua* explicitly mistook him for Theodore ROOSEVELT (GE Baoquan 戈寶權 and LU Shaofei: “Zhi ci yi jia” 只此一家 (Only this bunch...). In: *SDMH* no. 1 (April), 1934).

and sickle, five-ended star, or both) appear more frequently than the name of the state. The case of the USA is different, as ROOSEVELT, while portrayed in a very recognizable way (in several cases as an eagle with a characteristically drawn human head, see figs. 11-1 and 11-2), is not shown in the cartoons so proportionately as was the case with Italy, Germany, and the USSR, in which the leaders could be regarded as absolutely synonymous to the country they represented. The stars-and-stripes pattern was used more often to represent the USA than the president's figure, but visibly less so than the party symbols of Communists and Fascists. As for the UK and France, their heads of state did not become in any degree recognizable. In the 1920s–1930s the UK government was presided in turns by Stanley BALDWIN and Ramsay MACDONALD, and the absence of any stable personified depiction of the UK can be traced to this merry-go-round of the two faces, with the final switch between them occurring in June 1935, at the time of *Shidai Manhua* and other magazines' publishing. Additionally, the abdication of Edward VIII in December 1936 triggered a flow of cartoons, distracting attention from any single political actor and creating several images of a stereotypic “royal” figure.⁷ In the case of France, which figures in cartoons much less in any case, the then president, Albert LEBRUN, remained obscure and of little import for the Chinese cartoonists. France, while occasionally depicted among the nations influencing the fates of the world,⁸ seems to have lost its might by the 1930s in the eyes of Chinese cartoonists.

7 For example, see CAO Hanmei and WANG Dunqing: “Manhua manhua: yi jiu san liu nian shiyi yue” 漫畫漫話：一九三六年十一月 (Occasional talks on *manhua*: November 1936). In: *MJH* no. 8 (December), 1936; CHEN Zhenlong 陳振龍: “Yi jiu san liu nian de huigu: shier yue, Ying wang Aidehua wei qu Xin furen xunwei” 一九三六年的回顧：十二月，英王愛德華為娶辛夫人遜位 (Remembering 1936: December, English king Edward abdicated to marry Mrs. Simpson). In: *SHMH* no. 9 (January), 1937; Lao Ji 老紀: “Lian’ai yu yiwu! Sheng-danjie qian zhi shijie xinwen” 戀愛與義務！聖誕節前之世界新聞 (Love and duty! World news before Christmas). In: *SDMH* no. 33 (December), 1936; see also fig. 11-3.

8 For example, see ZHANG Guangyu: “Baise taimian, he lai huang li?” 白色檯面，何來黃狸？ (At the white table, whence the yellow dog?). In: *DLMH* no. 2 (October), 1935; TE Wei 特偉: “Rong miao ji yu yi chang, jin mo xiang zhi bai tai” 容妙技於一場，盡魔相之百態 (One stage contains amazing skills, the diversity of all magic appearances). In: *DLMH* no. 5 (November), 1935; LU Shaofei: “Yu wo suo yu ye” 魚我所欲也 (I like fish). In: *SDMH* no. 5 (May), 1934; CHENG Liushen 程柳森: “Zaomu gun-er da lang, lang ye pa ren, ren ye pa lang” 裝木棍兒打狼，狼也怕人，人也怕狼 (Jujube stick hits the wolf, both the wolf fears the man and the man fears the wolf). In: *SDMH* no. 8 (August), 1934; see also figs. 11-4 and 11-5.



Figure II-1: [WANG Zimei or ZHANG Guangyu?]: “Yuzhou feng” 宇宙瘋
(Universal madness)⁹




Figure II-2: WANG Zimei: “Shi’er shengxiao tu” 十二生肖圖
(Twelve zodiac animals)¹⁰

9 In: SHMH no. 8 (December), 1936. Digital platform for documents on War of Resistance and modern Sino-Japanese relations (*Kang Ri zhanzheng yu jindai Zhong-Ri guanxi wen-xian shuju pingtai* 抗日战争与近代中日关系文献数据平台). Available online: <http://www.modernhistory.org.cn/index.htm> (last access 2019, June 14).

10 In: SDMH no. 33 (December), 1936.



Figure 11-3: AI Zhongxin 艾中信: “Fu Weisiminsite dajiaotang tu zhong” 赴威斯敏司特大教堂途中 (En route to Westminster Cathedral)¹¹

The caption reads:

Emperor: Sitting in this 18th century chariot, my bottom hurts, really can't stand it anymore!

Empress: Be patient, being an emperor is just like that!




Figure 11-4: ZHANG Hongfei 張鴻飛: “Yi ban jiugui zi yuan shang gou” 一般酒鬼自願上鉤 (A bunch of drunkards eagerly gets hooked)¹²

The captions on drinking figures indicate their countries (from right to left, front row: Italy, France, England, second row: Japan, Germany, Russia, person sitting on the high stool: America), the bar tender is “arms merchant”, the bottle he is holding is “weaponry”.

11 In: ZGMH no. 14 (June), 1937.

12 In: SDMH no. 9 (September), 1934.



Figure II-5: JIANG Mi 江敉: “Zai lai yi ge!” 再來一個! (Once more!)¹³

The inscription on the “angelic” figure reads “peace”.



Figure II-6: Author unstated: “Xiandai Napolun” 現代拿破崙 (Contemporary Napoleons)¹⁴

The caption reads:

Black Napoleon MUSSOLINI, red Napoleon STALIN, brown Napoleon HITLER.

13 In: *SDMH* no. 21 (September), 1935. Back cover.

14 In: *SHMH* no. 2 (June), 1936. Digital platform for documents on War of Resistance and modern Sino-Japanese relations (*Kang Ri zhanzheng yu jindai Zhong-Ri guanxi wenxian shuju pingtai*). Available online: <http://www.modernhistory.org.cn/index.htm> (last access 2019, June 14).



，道公張主，平和護保，士騎四
死生之類人司，券惡善之界世操
。薄

Figure 11-7: WANG ZIMEI: “Jindai shenhua” 近代神話 (Legends of modern times)¹⁵

The caption reads:

Four knights, protecting peace, advocating justice, controlling good and evil in the world, managing the lives and deaths of people.



Figure 11-8: WANG ZIMEI: “Dizhonghai” 地中海 (Mediterranean Sea)¹⁶

15 In: *SDMH* no. 31 (October), 1936. Fragment.

16 In: *DLMH* no. 2 (October), 1935.



Figure 11-9: Author unstated: “Jinrong ziben zhuyi ju jing” 金融資本主義巨鯨 (Great whales of financial capitalism)¹⁷



Figure 11-10: ZHANG Guangyu:
“Yi shen lanlü” 一身褴褛
(Being all in rags...)

The caption of Figure 10 reads:

Being all rags, two lines of tears; left
ear hears right, right ear hears left.
What a fat head he has by nature, who
is his suitable hat? Oh! Oh! He is a
good commoner!

The inscription on the hat worn by the “commoner” is the “government”, the “patches” on the robe are references to Mongolia (*Meng* 蒙), Hebei 河北 and Chahar 察哈爾 (*Jicha* 冀察) provinces, North-East of China (*Dongbei* 東北) and most probably the Xi'an incident (*Shanbian* 陝變).¹⁸

17 In: *SDMH* no. 4 (April), 1934.

¹⁸ The Xi'an incident (*Xi'an shibian* 西安事變) took place on 12 December 1936, when an ex-militarist, high-ranking officer of the National Revolutionary Army, ZHANG Xueliang 張學良 and his fellow officer YANG Hucheng 楊虎城, arrested (or, depending on the point




Figure II-II: WEI Chenying 魏沉影: “Nao de jiepou ji bijiao” 腦的解剖及比較
(Dissection and comparison of the brain)¹⁹

The rightmost column states the age: 6–20, 20–30, 30–40, 40–50, 50–60, 60–70.

The columns from right to left are: Japan, Russia, China.

of view, took hostage) the head of the Republic of China, their direct commander CHIANG Kai-shek (JIANG Jieshi 蔣介石), requesting that the anti-Communist campaign in China be stopped and all national forces united in the struggle against the Japanese invasion. As a result, after over a week of nationwide uproar and confusion, CHIANG was forced to agree to the United Front and was released on 25 December. For more about the incident see Edmund O. CLUBB: *20th Century China*, N.Y., London: Columbia University Press 1964, pp. 202–210; Lloyd E. EASTMAN: “Nationalist China during the Nanking decade 1927–1937”. In: Denis TWITCHETT and John K. FAIRBANK (gen. eds.): *The Cambridge History of China*, John K. FAIRBANK, Albert FEUERWERKER (eds.): vol. 13, Republican China 1912–1949, Pt. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986 [2002], pp. 162–163; Jay TAYLOR: *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China*. Cambridge (Mass.), London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2009, pp. 124–137.

19 In: *SDMH* no. 21 (September), 1935.



Figure 11-12: ZHANG Zhengyu: “Shijie paolongtao”
世界跑龍套 (World walk-ons)²⁰

The poem in caption reads:

Walk-ons, / walk-ons, / you wear green clothes, / I wear red hat, / you carry gun, / I drag cannon, / after we've finished bleeding, / they put on dragon robes.

The individual pictures have indications of national attribution; in the bottom row from left to right are: Russia, America, England, France, Germany (the character for the latter is invisible here but visible on a black-and-white microfilm copy which was cropped differently).

Top row, left to right: unstated (intentionally, with the possible interpretation that dragon robes will not belong to a nation but to a ruler of the whole world), Abyssinia, Italy, China, unstated (Japan, possibly not mentioned to avoid censorship).

‘Walk-ons’ is used here to translate the word *paolongtao* 跑龍套 which refers to utility personnel or actors playing small parts in theatrical shows.

20 In: SHMH no. 1 (May), 1936. Digital platform for documents on War of Resistance and modern Sino-Japanese relations (*Kang Ri zhanzheng yu jindai Zhong-Ri guanxi wenxian shuju pingtai*). Available online: <http://www.modernhistory.org.cn/index.htm> (last access 2019, 14 June).

As already mentioned above, the future divide between the Axis and Allied powers was definitely not self-evident to the Chinese cartoonists in the mid-1930s. Although caricature portrayal of national leaders was applied less often in the case of countries which from today's point of view can be classified as liberal than in the case of totalitarian regimes, it can be explained by generally closer attention to the aggressive actions of the latter (the Second Italo-Ethiopian war, the Spanish Civil War and foreign interference therein), rather than by cartoonists' sympathies for either a liberal or a totalitarian model. The opposition of Communism and Fascism was also a dubious phenomenon, because while in some cases the two would fight each other (see fig. II-1, where HITLER and STALIN are instigating the scrap between Spanish "crabs" on a frying pan, and fig. II-2, where a "bull", again as reference to Spain, with swastika and fasces for horns attacks the Communist hammer and sickle emblem), in other examples they would work toward some common goal (see fig. II-6, with HITLER, MUSSOLINI, and STALIN equally called "contemporary Napoleons", and fig. II-7, where the same three and a Japanese Prime Minister, either HIROTA Kōki 廣田弘毅 or OKADA Keisuke 岡田啓介, are named "four knights protecting peace"). Moreover, not infrequent are the cartoons where various combinations of the world powers participate in unjust dealings in some way. In addition to fig. II-1, where all powerful actors of international affairs behave like madmen, see also fig. II-8, where an octopus with MUSSOLINI's head is fighting a dark-skinned merman (Haile Selassie I, 1892–1975, emperor of Ethiopia) while swastika-shaped starfish with Hitler's moustache and two fish bearing stars-and-stripes and Union Jack patterns (ROOSEVELT and, possibly, king George V) are watching the battle. In several cases foreign countries are united as "imperialist" (*diguo zhuyi* 帝國主義), "capitalist" (*ziben* 資本 and derivatives), and influential parts of their business circles as "arms merchants" (*junhuoshang* 軍火商, see fig. II-4). Sometimes the cartoonists also used clichéd figures of Uncle Sam, John Bull, or a vague generalized figure of a fat imperialist/capitalist, possibly wearing a top hat or a monocle (see fig. II-9). Imperialism and capitalism were a widespread topic for cartoons: there are 28 and 15 references to each phenomenon in *Shidai Manhua* and 17 and 7 in *Shanghai Manhua* (not counting cartoons where only the Japanese imperialist endeavors are shown), mostly in relation to imperialist ambitions of the states which had concessions in China, but also to enslavement of native peoples in Africa as well as Italy's perceived revival of "Roman Empire" rhetoric and the like.

The cartoonists paid much heed to the importance of ideology and indoctrination for totalitarian regimes. This is corroborated by ZHANG Guangyu's cartoon published in December, 1936, where a hammer and sickle emblem and a swastika are marked as "ideologies" (*zhuyi* 主義), whereas American and British flags as

well as Japan's rising sun emblem are “organizations” (*zuzhi* 組織), while yet other influences pestering the Chinese government are “elements” (*fenzi* 份子), “clique” (*xi* 系), and “front” (*zhenxian* 陣線), all of an unspecified nature (marked as X or XX, see fig. 11-10). The ideological pressure of Communism (along with Japanese militarism) onto the common citizens was satirized in a cartoon by WEI Chenying 魏沉影, where the “brains” of three men – a Chinese, a Japanese, and a Soviet Russian – are “dissected”. While mocking the Chinese people's primitive desire for bodily pleasures, prosperity, and quiet elderly age, the cartoonist demonstrated the megalomaniac aspirations of both Japanese and Soviet citizens who were educated from childhood into thick-headed confidence, believing that the whole planet should become their dominion (see fig. 11-11). This sort of ideological, even tyrannical pressure on the common people led to a large number of cartoons showing the disastrous effects of dictatorship on a nation. The pictorial descriptions of dictators oppressing people, manipulating them, starving them, standing on top of them, or throwing them into meaningless wars appear almost 20 times in *Shanghai Manhua* and over 20 times in *Shidai Manhua*. However, such pressure was not produced exclusively by totalitarian regimes; on the contrary, the juxtaposition of dictators versus people crossed national borders and political principles in the same way as “imperialism”, “capitalism”, and “militarism” appeared trans-national. A vivid example of an abstract “them” oppressing commoners (in this case, low-ranking soldiers) is shown in a 1936 cartoon by ZHANG Zhengyu (see fig. 11-12), while other examples can be found, where the dictators are either specified (in most cases those are MUSSOLINI, HITLER, and STALIN) or unspecified.²¹ As a proof that the overall panorama of world affairs could at times appear quite confusing and distorted, it should be noted that on more than one occasion HITLER was shown to be secondary to some other tyrannical force: in one case he is called

21 Some examples featuring MUSSOLINI are: ZHANG E: “Guangrong keyi dang fan chi de ma” “光榮可以當飯吃的嗎? ” (“Can glory substitute food?”). In: *SDMH* no. 22 (October), 1935; TE Wei: “Guangrong yu mianbao” 光榮與麵包 (Glory and bread). In: *DLMH* no. 4 (November), 1935. A case of people against Fascist dictatorship can be seen in: WANG Zimei: “Ba zhege dongxi dadao”. Ruoxiao minzu de lianhe husheng” “把這個東西打倒”。弱小民族的連合呼聲 (“Away with this thing”. United cry of the smaller peoples). In: *SHMH* no. 2-1 (July), 1937. A fairly straightforward reference to STALIN's Great Purge appears in CHEN Haoxiong's 陳浩雄 strip where, among other figures, one can find STALIN holding a big sword and a bunch of heads dripping with blood: CHEN Haoxiong: “Shijie jutou de dongtai” 世界巨頭的動態 (Developments of the world's giants). In: *SHMH* no. 2-1 (July), 1937. HITLER is present in the same set, as well, bringing bombs to his people instead of food. A kind of “imperialistic” crown is being forcibly put on the bodies of common people (wearing “Indian” turban and “Egyptian” fez distantly similar to those in fig. 11-1 and thus hinting at the “Britishness” of the crown) in: WANG Zi[mei] 汪子[美]: “Jiamian” 加冕 (Coronation). In: *SHMH* no. 2-1 (July), 1937.

“a straw dog” (*chugou* 豢狗), which is a reference to Taoist texts meaning things that are presently useful but will be thrown away later²²; in another case, HITLER, GOERING, and GOEBBELS appear to be obediently following instructions from the then minister of economics Hjalmar SCHACHT while the title of the cartoon makes the reader wonder who is the real dictator of Germany.²³

Generally, the struggle for ultimate power was an underlying theme for many cartoons, constructing a parallel between dictatorial ambitions of individual leaders inside the state and imperialistic claims of world powers well beyond national borders. While some cartoons prophesied the emergence of rulers wearing “dragon robes” (as in fig. 11-12), others translated a foreboding that in the end there would be one dictator, trampling the planet and committing suicide as a final act of a great tragedy.²⁴ This final act was preceded by a line of odious military events leading up to World War II, as observed, mocked, and mourned by the cartoonists.

Small Nations Ground Into Dust

If one were to look at the 1930s through the prism of any of the *manhua* magazines published in Shanghai at the time, two great international clashes would stand out, thundering along with China’s own misery: the Abyssinian Crisis (1934/35–1936, usually known now as the Second Italo-Ethiopian war, but never entitled thus in

22 The meaning is explained in the commentary to the cartoon itself, stating that “of old, dogs were made of straw, used for sacrifice, and thrown away after the ritual”. See CHEN Jingsheng 陳靜生: “Chugou yu miao gen du ye” 豢狗與妙根篤爺 (A straw dog and reverent grandpas). In: *SDMH* no. 9 (September), 1934. The second part of the title, “reverent grandpas”, is explained in the same commentary as a reference to “the old style humourist” WANG Wuneng’s 王无能 (sic!) masterpiece, in which mice are shedding false tears over a cat’s death. From the cartoon it is clear that HITLER is “worshipped” by England, Italy, and France, but will be discarded after his purpose is fulfilled (the cartoon does not specify what such purpose was perceived to be).

23 [Alois DERSO and Emery KELEN]: “Shui shi Deguo zhenzheng de diketuiduo?” 誰是德國真正的狄克推多? (Who is the real dictator of Germany?). In: *SDMH* no. 13 (January), 1935. This cartoon is a reprint from foreign papers, but it was still a part of the overall impressions that Chinese magazines’ readers were to get after considering such a point of view. Worth noting also are the questioning title of the cartoon and the use of transliteration “*diketuiduo*” 狄克推多 rather than the already existing word *ducai* 獨裁. There is hardly any complicated motive for such translation, but the “foreignness” of the cartoon and the word “dictator” emphasize each other well.

24 LIAO Bingxiong 廖冰兄: “Weida beiju de zhong mu” 偉大悲劇的終幕 (The end of the great tragedy). In: *SHMH* no. 1 (May), 1936.

the cartoons) and the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), the atrocities of which were emphasized by aggressive foreign interference. Both of these (primarily the Abyssinian case) brought about considerations of China's destiny and of the helplessness of those who cannot rely on brute force. Yet both conflicts, Ethiopian and Spanish, were looked at with a lot of sympathy to the people's sufferings as such. These events amount to over 20% of all "Western" narratives in both *Shidai Manhua* and *Shanghai Manhua*.²⁵

Table 11-2: Quantity of references to the Abyssinian Crisis and Spanish Civil War in *Shidai Manhua* and *Shanghai Manhua* cartoons

	<i>Shidai Manhua</i>	<i>Shanghai Manhua</i>
Abyssinia (black figure)	17	24
Haile Selassie, king of Ethiopia	9	7
Spain	14	11
Bull	4	4
General FRANCO	2	4
Madrid	1	1
Toreador	1	0
League of Nations (Geneva, disarmament)	13	4

As can be seen from table 11-2, Haile Selassie became a very frequent personified image for the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. His iconographic traits – curly hair, beard, "African" clothing – can be recognized especially easily in works by WANG Zimei (see the horse in fig. 11-2 and the merman, already mentioned above, in fig. 11-8).²⁶

25 More specifically, the Italo-Ethiopian war appeared in 20% of Western references in *Shidai Manhua* cartoons and in 40% of *Shanghai Manhua* ones; the Spanish Civil War took up 24% and 23% respectively. Only the issues published after the outbreak of each conflict, October 1935 and July 1936 accordingly, are taken into account although Haile Selassie appeared in *Shidai Manhua* already in September 1935. As this is but one appearance, it does not severely distort the statistics in table 11-2.

26 For some other examples see WANG Zimei: "Xin Shengjing" 新聖經 (New Bible). In: *SDMH* no. 27 (June), 1936; Idem: "Jindai shenhua" 近代神話 (Legends of modern times). In: *SDMH* no. 31 (October), 1936; Idem: "Shizijia" 十字架 (Crucifix). In: *SHMH* no. 6 (October), 1936; Idem: "Qun ying hui" 群英會 (Assembly of heroes). In: *SHMH* no. 10 (March), 1937; Idem: "Gou xin dou jiao" 鋤心鬥角 (Elaborate maneuvers). In: *MHJ* no. 8 (December), 1936. Similar iconography in the depiction of Haile Selassie as the embodiment of Abyssinian people's sufferings can be seen in fig. 11-1.

The fate of Abyssinia was compared to China's helpless stand against Japan's encroachment. Direct comparison can be found in a small black-and-white cartoon portraying two people: a tiny black person wearing a straw skirt and a larger figure clad in an old-fashioned Chinese robe. The inscription explains the meaning: "A black slave who lost his country thoughtfully speaks: 'He isn't resisting, why doesn't he ever lose his country?'"²⁷ Another example of likening the Abyssinian conflict to the Sino-Japanese confrontation can be found in *Duli Manhua*, where Mussolini and a Japanese man (unspecified) are called "two sculptors" aiming "to passionately express the spirit of the 20th century" (see fig. 11-13). Among the most telling of such cartoons is a very laconic work by HU Tongguang 胡同光: a "visitor" in a portrait gallery, again in an old-fashioned Chinese robe, looks at two portraits, most probably of Mohandas GANDHI (1869–1948) and Haile Selassie (see fig. 11-14), comparing them. While the attitude to GANDHI in China was dubious, because his belief in Satyagraha inspired both admiration and criticism from different groups,²⁸ Haile Selassie, at the time of the cartoon's publication, appears to have been praised for preparing for battle and resisting Italian troops, unlike China after the Manchurian incident of 1931. So in this cartoon, the Chinese nation faces a choice between non-violence and armed resistance, thus the Abyssinian policy toward military preparations is shown as a possible example.²⁹ Yet another case

27 亡了國的黑奴想著說：《他不抵抗，為什麼總也不會亡國呢？》. See: LAO [?] 老[?]: "Wang le guo de hei nu" 亡了國的黑奴 (A black slave who lost his country...). In: *SHMH* no. 6 (October), 1936.

28 For some remarks on how GANDHI and his non-violent resistance were perceived in China, see SHANG Quanyu: "Mahatma Gandhi in mainland China: Early 1920s to late 1970s". In: *Gandhi Marg*, vol. 35, no. 2 (July/September), 2013, pp. 245–261. Available online: <https://www.mkgandhi.org/articles/mg-and-china-1920-1970.html> (last access 2019, August 6). GANDHI and Indian ways of resistance were satirized several times in the cartoons. For example, there is a drawing where Buddha tells a pilgrim coming to India from China that the pilgrim ought to return and tell his compatriots, "those muddle-heads" (*hutuchong* 糊塗蟲), that praying to Buddha is useless since he cannot even get rid of an eagle gripping his head (Author unstated: "Fo dui dao Yindu lai chaosheng de Zhongguo shizhe shuo" 佛對到印度來朝聖的中國使者說 (Buddha tells a Chinese pilgrim coming to India...)). In: *SHMH* no. 11 (April), 1937). Another example is a cartoon ridiculing GANDHI's repetitive hunger strikes as a method of leading the national resistance (a clenched-fisted Indian approaches a bold bony figure of GANDHI sitting with a book and demands some action, to which GANDHI responds that he is prepared to go to prison and decline food for a week; WANG Zimei: "Assembly of heroes". In: *SHMH* no. 10 (March), 1937). See also fig. 11-15 for an impeccable caricature of GANDHI, who, while being mocked, all the same is placed among the prominent figures of the age.

29 For more about the Abyssinian Crisis itself and Ethiopian preparations to it, see Asfa-Wossen ASSE RATE; Peter LEWIS (transl.), Thomas PAKENHAM (foreword): *King of kings: The triumph and tragedy of emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia*, London: Haus Publishing Ltd. 2015 (originally published in German as *Der Letzte Kaiser von Afrika: Triumph und*

demonstrating Haile Selassie's heroism while comparing Abyssinia to China is a reprinted foreign cartoon quoting the “Unconquerable”, Bernard PARTRIDGE's famous work for *Punch* magazine. In this pictorial quote Haile Selassie replaces Albert I, king of the Belgians, as an unconquerable, just leader of his people opposing the aggressor.³⁰

Haile Selassie's exile, on the other hand, caused a couple of less amicable remarks because the cartoonists saw it as a flight: soon after the king left Ethiopia (May 1936) *Shanghai Manhua* published two cartoons, one mocking Haile Selassie's distress at hearing bad news from the motherland³¹ and another ridiculing his retreat as “inspection of foreign land” or “travelling for health”,³² the latter being an often-used pretext for Chinese politicians and militarists to leave the country after being moved away from power in the Republican years. Notwithstanding, Haile Selassie or a generalized dark-skinned figure did become a symbol of resistance and a metaphor for unjust hostilities involving innocent civilians and poorly armed soldiers. The main villain of the narrative, MUSSOLINI, was depicted eating the Africans, enslaving them, sitting on top of them, suffocating them, and generally killing them in various ways.³³ A frequently applied technique was to

Tragödie des Haile Selassie, Berlin: Propyläen Verlag 2013); Robert MALLETT: *Mussolini in Ethiopia, 1919–1935: The origins of Fascist Italy's African war*, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press 2015, chapters 6–7; John H. SPENCER: *Ethiopia at bay: a personal account of the Haile Selassie years*, Hollywood: Tsehai Publishers 2006, chapter 3; Bruce G. STRANG (ed.): *Collision of empires: Italy's invasion of Ethiopia and its international impact*, Abingdon, N.Y.: Routledge 2016.

30 Author unclear: “Ge you zunyan” 各有尊嚴 (Each has dignity). In: *SHMH* no. 5 (September), 1936. This cartoon is one of eight in a set with a common caption: “Such an easy-to-resolve Italo-Abyssinian conflict! Truly inexplicable Sino-Japanese strife!”, again comparing the situation in Ethiopia to Japanese encroachment, this time from the point of view of the League of Nations' passivity in both conflicts. The cartoon quoted by the author of “Each has dignity” (with explicit acknowledgement of that quotation) is a work by Bernard PARTRIDGE published in *Punch, or the London Charivari*, vol. 147 (21 October), 1914. The issue is available at Project Gutenberg: <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/28382/28382-h/28382-h.htm> (last access 2019, August 6).

31 HUANG Miaozi 黃苗子. “Wuyue manbi” 五月漫筆 (May cartoons). In: *SHMH* no. 2 (June), 1936. Here MUSSOLINI is represented in the shape of a radio transmitting bad news, and Haile Selassie steps on that radio with the comment “The newly-bought London apartment shall never have a radio.”

32 WENG Xingqing 翁興慶. “Zhongguo jizhe” 中國記者 (Chinese reporter...). In: *SHMH* no. 2 (June), 1936. Haile Selassie is drawn as an oversized head sticking out of a ship sailing under the British flag.

33 Some samples are: GU Ba 古巴: “Yi ri jian. Yi jiu san liu nian wuyue shiwei ri” 一日間. 一九三六年五月十五日 (In one day. 15 May 1936). In: *SHMH* no. 2 (June), 1936; TE Wei: “Xumu” 序幕 (Prelude). In: *DLMH* no. 3 (October), 1935; WANG Zimei: “Shenglizhe” 勝利者 (Winner...). In: *ZGMH* no. 7 (May), 1936; Idem: “Ershi shiji zhi Luoma gudian jingshen” 二十世紀之羅馬古典精神 (Roman classical spirit in 20th century). In: *MHJ*

portray him grotesquely larger than either Haile Selassie personally or an African in general, so that the injustice of the war and the stark contrast between the opponents are ever more evident (see fig. 11-16).

Among the things causing the biggest indignation in the eyes of Chinese cartoonists was the ineffectiveness of steps taken by the League of Nations. Out of the four images featuring the League in *Shanghai Manhua*, three satirize the insufficiency of its sanctions against Italy,³⁴ and in the issues of *Shidai Manhua* produced around the time of the Italo-Ethiopian war five out of nine references to the League relate to Abyssinia in some way.³⁵ The League's slow, tortoise-like reaction (see fig. 11-18), the limited scope and non-existent results of sanctions, the endless talks, speeches, and resolutions were all objects of sharp criticism from Chinese cartoonists. The same can be said of the international disarmament efforts generally: the *manhua* magazines printed both Chinese and foreign cartoons ridiculing the negotiations as talks between predators and prey at the time when deadly combat was going on.³⁶

no. 3 (June), 1936; Idem: Elaborate maneuvers. In: *MHJ* no. 8 (December), 1936; YAN Zhexi 嚴折西. “Yi ge wei ruo de guke” 一個胃弱的顧客 (A customer with a weak stomach). In: *SHMH* no. 10 (March), 1937; ZHANG E: “Mosuolini lishi de yiguan zhengce – feichu nuli!” 墨索里尼歷史的一貫政策——廢除努力! (Mussolini's sole historic policy – destroying slavery!). In: *SDMH* no. 23 (November), 1935.

34 GU Ba: In one day. 15 May 1936. In: *SHMH* no. 2 (June), 1936; CHEN Zhenlong: “Yi jiu san liu nian de huigu: wuyue, Yi tun A chenggong” 一九三六年的回顧: 五月, 意吞阿成功 (Remembering 1936: May, Italy successfully swallows Abyssinia). In: *SHMH* no. 9 (January), 1937; LU Zhensheng 陸振聲: “Guolian zaoxiang” 國聯造像 (The statue of the League of Nations). In: *SHMH* no. 5 (September), 1936.

35 ZHANG E: “The same complaint”. In: *SDMH* no. 15 (March), 1935; JIN Mo 金沫: “Jue-jiang de Mosuolini” 儲強的墨索里尼 (Stubborn Mussolini...). In: *SDMH* no. 23 (November), 1935; Manren 漫人 (lit. Cartoonist): “Zhong jie ku qi” 眾皆哭泣 (Audience all in tears). In: *SDMH* no. 28 (July), 1936; Photo by magazine's correspondent: “Wumian zhi wang Sailaxi lai Hua fang you” 無冕之王塞拉西來華訪友 (Crownless king Selassie comes to China to visit friends). In: *SDMH* no. 30 (September), 1936; also see fig. 11-17. It is reasonable to assume that the League's inaction in the case of the Abyssinian Crisis rang familiar to the Chinese who were dissatisfied by that body's measures taken after the Manchurian incident so that even more perceived parallels sprang up between China and Ethiopia.

36 One of the most outstanding examples of a foreign cartoon reprinted together with the whole text accompanying it is DERSO and KELEN's illustrated article about Mikhail LITVINOV, Soviet Foreign Minister and representative in Geneva (ZHANG Ruogu 張若谷: “Manhuajia yangguang zhong zhi Liweinuofu” 漫畫家眼光中之李維諾夫 (LITVINOV through the eyes of a cartoonist). In: *SDMH* no. 16 (April), 1935). A fable in the text compares the USSR to a bear that, upon listening to a lion's idea of banning horns and a bull's idea of banning fangs, suggests banning everything and just hugging each other. Another cartoon shows the literal simultaneity of diplomatic chitchat and dying in battle (TE Wei. “Zhanzheng yu heping tongshi jinxing zhe” 戰爭與和平同時進行著 (War and peace happening simultaneously). In: *DLMH* no. 5 (November), 1935). Since I have discussed Chinese

要熱烈地表現二十世紀的精神，兩個雕刻
師他理想中的作品
汪子美作




Figure II-13: WANG ZIMEI: “Yao relie de biaoxian” 要熱烈地表現
(To passionately express...)³⁷

The caption reads:

To passionately express the spirit of the 20th century, the two sculptors [produce] their ideal works.

perceptions of the League of Nations and disarmament efforts to some extent in an earlier paper, I have not gone into much detail here. See Mariia GULEVA: “Strangled China, Mighty Russia: The Sino-Japanese Conflict in *Krokodil* and Soviet Diplomacy in *Shidai Manhua*, 1931–1937”. In: *Bochum yearbook of East Asian studies*, vol. 40, 2017, pp. 97–131.

37 In: *DLMH* no. 5 (November), 1935.




Figure 11-14: Hu Tongguang: “Canguanzhe”
參觀者 (Visitor...)³⁸

The caption reads: Visitor:

Let me compare, study, consider a little!

38 In: *SDMH* no. 21 (September), 1935.




Figure 11-15: Ai Zhongxin: "Shijie dongwuyuan" 世界動物園 (World zoo)³⁹

The “animals” are, from the bottom left corner: [Chancellor of Austria, Kurt] SCHUSCHNIGG, [Franklin Delano] ROOSEVELT, [Mohandas] GANDHI, [Adolf] HITLER, [Benito] MUSSOLINI, JIANG Jieshi, [Joseph] STALIN, [the UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony] EDEN. The text in the middle of the page is not directly relevant.

39 In: SHMH no. 8 (December), 1936.



Figure 11-16: LU Shaofei: “You shengming li de luan” 有生命力的卵 (A vigorous egg)⁴⁰

The inscriptions indicate that the “egg” is Abyssinia and the green (possibly rock-like) creature is Italy.




Figure 11-17: ZHANG Wenyuan 張文元: “Hei bai hong” 黑白紅 (Black, white, red)⁴¹

The caption reads:
A reward given by a white man to a black man (probably it was a fatal mistake), the black man finally leaks some fresh red blood!

The speech addressed by the black man to the white man (probably it was a wasteful mistake), is the white man going to blush in embarrassment?

The text on a piece of paper in front of the Abyssinian spokesman (likely to be portraiture of Haile Selassie) can be a vague quotation of ideas expressed by the Ethiopian monarch in his speech to the League Assembly on 30 June 1936.⁴²

40 In: *SDMH* no. 20 (August), 1935. Cover.

41 In: *SDMH* no. 29 (August), 1936.

42 The text of the speech in Amharic and French is available online at World Digital Library: <https://www.wdl.org/en/item/11602/> (last access 2019, August 9).



Figure II-18: CHEN Yifan 陳依範 [Jack Chen]: “The League investigates”⁴³



Figure II-19: CHEN Haoxiong: “Xibanya Neizhan de guojihua” 西班牙內戰的國際化 (Internationalisation of Spanish Civil War)⁴⁴

The Chinese title is slightly different from the laconic English variant, which reads: Investigation committee of the League of Nations goes to an occupied country!

The left bull has “Popular Front” written on its side, the right one has “Fascists”. The two figures riding the right bull are inscribed “Germany” and “Italy” (that and iconographic traits make them recognizable as HITLER and MUSSOLINI). The placard between two animals reads “Spanish bullring”, while the document in the hand of the pilot (upper left corner, also note the Union Jack pattern on the tail of the plane) reads “Non-interference agreement”.

43 In: *SHMH* no. 9 (January), 1937. Jack CHEN is one of the most unusual figures of the cartooning circles of Shanghai. For his biography and impact see BEVAN: *A Modern Miscellany* (2016).

44 In: *SDMH* no. 29 (August), 1936.




Figure II-20: WANG ZIMEI: "Xibanya guominjun lingxiu" 西班牙國民軍領袖 (Spanish nationalist army leader...)⁴⁵

The captions under each cartoon read (right to left, top to bottom):

Adam and Eve / Infancy period / Eccentricity / Spanish dance with a fan / Tarzan manner / Faithful disciple / New Don Quixote / Pirate posture.

45 In: *SDMH* no. 35 (February), 1937. Such "psychological analysis" can be regarded as a re-interpretation of a strip by William SHARP, where an analysis of HITLER's psyche is offered. SHARP's cartoon was quoted in *SHMH* some half a year before this work by WANG ZIMEI was published (Willim (sic!) SHARP 威廉希浦: "Xitela zhi jingshen fenxi" 希特拉之精神分析 (Hitler's psychological analysis). In: *SHMH* no. 4 (August), 1936).



作字正義 !惜足不憐可，子踏小這你：說神平和對神戰

Figure 11-21: ZHANG Zhengyu:
“Zhanshen dui hepingshen shuo”
戰神對和平神說 (The god of war
tells the angel of peace...)⁴⁶

The caption reads: The god of war tells the angel of peace: You hussy⁴⁸, so pathetic that no pity is enough!



Figure 11-22: FENG Zikai 豐子愷：
“Shanzai lao yisheng” 善哉老醫生
(The good old doctor...)⁴⁷

The caption reads: The good old doctor listened, shook his head, frowned and said: this gentleman is very ill.

46 In: *DLMH* no. 3 (October), 1935.

47 In: *SDMH* no. 21 (September), 1935.

48 The phrase *xiao tizi* 小蹄子 used here is an abusive form of address to a girl (lit. “small hoofs”, thus a reference to bound feet, but not exclusively). An authoritative dictionary goes so far as to translate it as “bitch” in addition to “hussy” chosen here (WU Jingrong 吴景荣, CHENG Zhenqiu 程镇球 (eds.): “Xin shidai Han-Ying da cidian” 新时代汉英大词典 (New Age Chinese-English dictionary), Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan 2005, p. 1702). Such an offensive address creates the sense of falsehood in the following pitying remark.

The Spanish Civil War was depicted differently from the Abyssinian Crisis. While the civilians, innocent victims of the bloodshed, were pitied and mourned for, there was no symbolic hero of this conflict. When choosing tropes suitable for cartoons about the hostilities in Spain, the artists resorted to the images of bull-, crab- or cockfighting, endless ruins, and mutilated bodies, and, importantly, various representations of foreign manipulations in the events. For example, what might be a corrida scene gets turned into a clash between two bulls, the “Fascist” one of which is being ridden by HITLER and MUSSOLINI (see fig. II-19). In another bloodthirsty cartoon, Fascists “re-inflate” a fallen bull so that the animal can attack a torreador again⁴⁹ while, in the third example, HITLER singlehandedly roasts a whole (and very dead-looking) bull on a turnspit with a swastika-shaped handle.⁵⁰ The Communist interference is well visible in the crab-battle in the already quoted fig. II-1, where one of the crabs even grows a hammer and a sickle for pincers. Soviet and Fascist meddling is also satirized in a caricature of STALIN and HITLER about to engage in a fight while the much smaller figure of General FRANCO leads some swastika-tagged tanks into battle at their feet.⁵¹

FRANCO himself, as visible in Table II-2, does not appear in the cartoons very often although there is at least one whole-page strip demonstrating his “biography” in a very telling way (see fig. II-20). His figure appears in turns armed with multiple kinds of weapons, presented as a primitive barbarian, feminized, or mockingly glorified, all in the best traditions of caricature art. FRANCO’s friendly encounter with the skeletal embodiment of death present in this set is recreated in another of WANG Zimei’s multi-figure cartoons, where a skeleton entrusts FRANCO with a sword.⁵² This generally leads the cartoons’ readers to perceive FRANCO interchangeably as HITLER’s and MUSSOLINI’s protégé or as Death’s ambassador on Earth. This is further emphasized by the cartoons and photomontages

49 ZHANG Ding 張仃: “Zhu Jie wei nüe zhe zai zhe dang-er yao gei tamen tiaoting le” 助傑為虐者在這當兒要給他們調停了 (Those who help the tormentor are about to act as go-betweens). In: *SHMH* no. 2-1 (July), 1937. The character 傑 here substitutes Jie 桀, a tyrant of the mythological Xia 夏 dynasty.

50 AI Zhongxin: “Xibanya de mo ri” 西班牙的末日 (The last day of Spain). In: *SHMH* no. 11 (April), 1937.

51 WANG Zimei: “Shui you bu ping shi? Jin ri ba shi jun, shuang ren wei chang shi, shi nian mo yi jian” 誰有不平事? 今日把示君, 霜刃未嘗試, 十年磨一劍 (Who does unjust deeds? Today I show to you, the frosty blade as yet untried, the sword polished for ten years). In: *SHMH* no. 10 (March), 1937. The title of the cartoon is a reference to JIA Dao’s 賈島 (779–843) poem “The swordsman”, which has the same wording, but the four lines go in reverse order. A possible explanation is that such inversion creates an additional level of mockery toward the falsehood of foreign “good intentions” at meddling in the complications of internal strife.

52 WANG Zimei: “Assembly of heroes”. In: *SHMH* no. 10 (March), 1937.

presenting ruins of Spanish towns with either MUSSOLINI and HITLER “showing appreciation to Fascist warriors” against the background of wanton destruction⁵³ or women and children left homeless, alone, and desperate amidst desolation.⁵⁴ Moreover, the Chinese cartoonists did not miss the chance to explore the parallels between the Civil War of 1936–1939 and the century-old events of the Peninsular War (1807–1814) shown in Francisco GOYA’s “The disasters of war” (*Los desastres de la guerra*); *Shidai Manhua* published a selection of 7 prints from this series.⁵⁵ The cartoonists appear to have been outraged by the atrocities of a war inside one country, although so far I have found no cartoons directly comparing the Spanish events to China’s own recent fratricidal battles.⁵⁶ It is noticeable, however, that both the Abyssinian Crisis and the Spanish Civil War were often depicted

53 A vivid example is the anonymous photomontage: “Diao jin zhanchang tu”弔今戰場圖 (Grieving on today’s battlefield). In: *SDMH* no. 30 (September), 1936. Although the image is claimed to be a shot by “World Peace” news agency (世界和平通訊社攝), it is a clear montage of two photographs: one of a city annihilated almost to the ground and another of HITLER and MUSSOLINI walking side by side. Another case of similar photomontage is an anonymous work: “Ouzhou jiti anquan yundong chenggong”歐洲集體安全運動成功 (Success of Europe’s collective security movement). In: *MHJ* no. 6 (September), 1936. Here the background is a photograph of multitudes of people marching with flags and banners containing pacifist and Communist slogans (all in Spanish) and hammer and sickle emblems, while in the foreground are MUSSOLINI and HITLER shaking hands. Again this is quite obviously two images pasted together, although similarly the caption claims that the image was telegraphed by a news agency.

54 Author unstated: “Xibanya Neizhan zhong panjun qianxian mudu canzhuang ji”西班牙內戰中叛軍前線目睹慘狀記 (Eyewitness account of the tragedies at the front of the rebel army in the Spanish Civil War). In: *SDMH* no. 36 (March), 1937; WANG Zimei. “Zhanling Bierbo”佔領比爾波 (Occupying Bilbao...). In: *SDMH* no. 39 (June), 1937; Author unstated: “Canku de Xibanya Neizhan! Zhe ban wu linghun de qinshou!!”慘酷的西班牙內戰！這般無靈魂的禽獸！！ (The cruel Spanish Civil War! Those soulless beasts!!). In: *ZGMH* no. 14 (June), 1937.

55 GEYA 哥雅 [Francisco GOYA]: “Bai nian qian Xibanya Neizhan de canku yiji”百年前西班牙內戰的殘酷遺跡 (Ruthless traces of Spanish Civil War a hundred years ago). In: *SDMH* no. 30 (September), 1936. The translator, QIAN Boming 錢伯明, mistakenly calls the Spanish events of the 19th century a civil war, thus making them directly equal in their monstrosity to the horrendous hostilities of the day.

56 The only possible exception, and rather far-fetched at that, can be a set of drawings united under the title “Left and Right”. Here a tight-rope walker tagged “Spain” is balancing between left and right, while a neighbour image is that of Confucius dragged in the opposite directions by HITLER and STALIN. However, this is reference not so much to the civil wars in Spain and China or their victims, but rather to the choice the whole planet faced in the 1930s: the choice between Communism and Fascism as ideologies of totalitarian control. That is confirmed by yet another cartoon in the same set, where the whole globe is divided into a Taiji scheme with a hammer and sickle emblem and a swastika instead of two dots. HUANG Baibo 黃白波: “Zuo yu you”左與右 (Left and right). In: *SDMH* no. 36 (March), 1937.

either through photographic images or via strips of several cartoons. This is most probably a trend similar to the one analyzed by Susan SONTAG in *Regarding the Pain of Others* in a sense that photographs can act as clearer accusations because they add verisimilitude and create an illusion of eyewitness involvement.⁵⁷ Sets of several cartoons tied into a narrative chain of evidence aim to demonstrate the many faces of horror, and the Spanish Civil War thus becomes the crescendo of despair right before the full-scale eruption of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937.

Peace on Earth and Danse Macabre

The avalanche of aggressive acts, ubiquitous struggle for world dominance, the League's failure to uphold justice, and ultimate inability of countries and, more generally, humans to reach peaceful coexistence and security led the 1930s cartoonists to an unmistakably pessimistic outlook on the prospects of China, humankind, and the planet at large. The magazines provide a wide assortment of predictions, almost all of which forebode destruction of humanity.

The premonition of a new world war was a widespread feeling of the 1930s, not only in China, but also in the West. For example, Richard OVERY notes about Britain that: “[w]ar was regarded as unavoidable whatever the nature of modern humans or modern civilization. This was a profoundly pessimistic conclusion because a common assumption in the inter-war years was the relationship between the next war, if it came, and the end of civilization.”⁵⁸ It is precisely that premonition of doom that can be seen vividly in most of the cartoons included in the numbers of table 11-3. China was, of course, in a very vulnerable position, being among the first victims and participants of clashes which eventually fused into World War II. Being in a state of unannounced hostilities with Japan and torn by internal contradictions, China and its society had every reason for a grim view of the days to come. The word collocation “second world war” appeared in *Shidai Manhua*'s West-related cartoons in January 1936,⁵⁹ but the idea of a nearing global conflict

57 Susan SONTAG: *Regarding the Pain of Others*, N.Y.: Picador 2004, pp. 6, 116–122.

58 Richard J. OVERY: *The Inter-War Crisis 1919–1939*, 2nd ed., Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd. 2007 [1994], p. 47. See also chapter 8, “The voyage of the ‘Death Ship’: war and the fate of the world” in his other book (Richard J. OVERY: *The Morbid Age: Britain between the Wars*, London: Allen Lane 2009).

59 HUANG Miaozi: “Shijie di er ci dazhan de Shanghai kuangxiangqu” 世界第二次大戰的上海狂想曲 (Shanghai rhapsody of the second world war). In: *SDMH* no. 25 (January), 1936.

was envisioned earlier, first through questioningly tentative works containing military vocabulary or symbols (for example, a cartoon titled “New Front?” showing the march of Fascists against the background of crimson color⁶⁰), then through bolder depictions of forsaken corpses, total armament⁶¹ and gunpowder barrels⁶², and finally through the arrival of Mars or the god of war (*zhanshen* 战神) chasing the whole planet.⁶³ The opposition of the god of war and the angel of peace became a recurring motif for the *manhua* magazines.⁶⁴ While the angel (always a feminine winged creature) might try to leave the planet, the god of war, on the contrary, was very eager to get hold of it. He would poke the “belly” of the planet to see if it was “ready”,⁶⁵ or run around with a torch setting gunpowder on fire,⁶⁶ or invite the whole of humankind into a grave.⁶⁷

60 YE Qianyu 葉淺予: “Xin zhenxian?” 新陣線? (New front?). In: *SDMH* no. 1 (April), 1934.

61 Author unstated: “Ouzhou jindai shi de guocheng ji qi xian jieduan – zhanzheng yu heping yundong” 歐洲近代史的過程及其現階段——戰爭與和平運動 (The course of recent European history and its current stage – war and pacifist movement). In: *SDMH* no. 6 (June), 1934.

62 ZHOU Hanming 週汗明: “Wanyi-er (Xituola xiang)” 玩意兒 (希脫拉像) (Toy (Hitler)). In: *SDMH* no. 11 (November), 1934.

63 TAN Meizi 譚沫子: “Diqui ai hua” 地球哀話 (Earth’s pitiful words). In: *SDMH* no. 22 (October), 1935. This is the first appearance of Mars in *Shidai Manhua*.

64 See fig. 11-21. More examples are: Author unclear: “Heping zhi shen shi zhanshen de duishou ma?” 和平之神是戰神的對手嗎? (Is angel of peace an equal opponent to god of war?). In: *SDMH* no. 27 (June), 1936; MA Mengchen 馬夢塵: “Bu dikang zhuyi de xiang-zheng” 不抵抗主義的象徵 (Symbol of non-resistance). In: *SDMH* no. 28 (July), 1936; Author unstated: “Xin shi le tu” 新失樂圖 (New paradise lost). In: *SHMH* no. 1 (May), 1936, Cover; WANG Lijun 王立鈞: “Weixian de biaoyan” 危險的表演 (Dangerous performance). In: *SHMH* no. 2 (June), 1936; QING Ru 青如: “Shou qi” 受欺 (Bullied). In: *QZMH* no. 2 (April), 1935, p. 43. See also fig. 11-5, where the “War” is not Mars per se, but rather a skeletal embodiment of death, and yet the juxtaposition of war and peace is present.

65 CHEN Yifan: “Mars: Are they ready?” In: *SHMH* no. 12 (May), 1937.

66 CHEN Quanke 陳權可: “San ge huoyaoku” 三個火藥庫 (Three gunpowder magazines). In: *DLMH* no. 5 (November), 1935.

67 YU Yan 愚言: “Zhangshen shuo: ‘Zhe shi nimen zui anquan chu a’” 戰神說: “這是你們最安全處啊” (The god of war says: “This is the safest place for you”). In: *QZMH* no. 3 (May), 1935, p. 95.

Table 11-3: Quantity of references to a future war and planetary catastrophe in *Shidai Manhua* and *Shanghai Manhua* cartoons

	<i>Shidai Manhua</i>	<i>Shanghai Manhua</i>
Future war	54	20
God of war, Mars	5	6
Angel of peace	8	9
Dove of peace, olive branch	8	6
Macabre (skulls, mutilated bodies, skeletons, graves, etc.)	26	14
Planet, globe	13	14
Death personified	7	6
Peace on Earth in absence of humankind	6	5

In several cases the planet is depicted as a ball playfully tossed around by different powers, such as Mars himself, Japan, Fascists, or Communists, or else the earth turns into a bomb with the wick already on fire.⁶⁸ The very idea that the planet suddenly becomes so small and defenseless is accompanied by the perception of the world becoming sick (see fig. 11-22). This reflects a vast change in the angle of Chinese perceptions: from the imperial times of China as the centre of civilization and from the 19th century ideas of motherland besieged by barbarians to a new perspective, where civilization is still besieged and threatened by uncivilized warmongers, but it is not only China, and not even mainly China but, rather, it is the whole planet and human civilization nearing destruction and not getting any help from anywhere.

The pessimism of this outlook was explicitly conveyed in over a dozen cartoons foretelling the end of the world, establishment of a kingdom of death, and the total extinction of humankind. The words “the last day(s)” or “doomsday”, *mori* 末日, featured in several titles,⁶⁹ and the traditional idea of universal peace, *tianxia taiping* 天下太平, also turned into an apocalyptic vision of peace with no survivors. Perpetual wars (or the perception of wars becoming an inevitable

68 CHEN Shaobai 陳少白: “Zhanshen zhi xishua pin” 戰神之戲耍品 (Mars' trinket). In: *QZMH* no. 3 (May), 1935, p. 95; HUANG Baibo: “Left and right”. In: *SDMH* no. 36 (March), 1937; ZHAN Yihe 詹益和: “Hai wai qi tan” 海外奇談 (Of amazing things abroad). In: *SDMH* no. 17 (May), 1935; ZHANG Guangyu: “Hepingshen wu li zu di” 和平神無立足地 (The angel of peace has no foothold anywhere). In: *DLMH* no. 1 (September), 1935, Cover.

69 AI Zhongxin: “Kexue shijie de mo ri” 科學世界的末日 (Last days of the scientific world). In: *DLMH* no. 5 (November), 1935; HUANG Wenqing 黃文清: “Shijie mo ri” 世界末日 (Last days of the world). In: *SHMH* no. 3 (July), 1936; see also fig. 11-23.

element of existence) led to the obvious conclusion that at some point everyone would be dead and only after that the ultimate tranquility would be achieved (see fig. II-23). The statement that peace will prevail after everyone dies occurs several more times in different variations.⁷⁰ The appearance of corpses walking, skeletons dancing, and graves covering the surface of the planet was all in line with the idea of inevitable death. This trend can be found both in cartoons dealing with specific conflicts (e.g., Italian soldiers “returning from Abyssinia” in a train cart seen as a pile of uniform-clad corpses in a cartoon by TE Wei⁷¹) and in depictions of universal, cosmic calamity (most of those quoted in this paragraph are in said category).

The atmosphere created on the magazines’ pages by these ominous apparitions was further emphasized by the Danse Macabre cartoons of Death personified. Its arrival is announced by a relatively light-hearted work by MAI Lüzhī 麥綠之 where a skeleton is dancing next to a severed head of one who used to dream of a crown (see fig. II-25). The image references two Christian visual traditions at once: the ‘Dance of Death’ and Salome with the head of John the Baptist. As more conflicts erupted in the 1930s, the imagery became more sinister: the same MAI Lüzhī produced a vision of death in a much darker style only a year later (see fig. II-26).

70 LAN Weibang 藍蔚邦: “Zui hou, liang ge shengwu si le, shijie zhongyu heping le” 最後，兩個生物死了，世界終於和平了 (In the end, the two living creatures died, and the world was finally peaceful). In: *SHMH* no. 6 (October), 1936; LIAO Bingxiong: “The end of the great tragedy”. In: *SHMH* no. 1 (May), 1936; WU Zhen 吳震 and DA Lei 大雷: “Shijie zui xin xiangqi pu” 世界最新象棋譜 (World’s newest manual on playing chess). In: *SDMH* no. 14 (February), 1935; YAN Zhixi: “Pu tian tong qing tu” 普天同慶圖 (Universal rejoicing). In: *SDMH* no. 30 (September), 1936; YANG Bian 楊鞭: “Xian zhanzheng er hou heping” 先戰爭而後和平 (First war and then peace). In: *SDMH* no. 22 (October), 1935; see also fig. 11-24.

71 TE Wei: “Cong Abixiniya huilai” 從阿比西尼亞回來 (Returning from Abyssinia). In: *DLMH* no. 8 (January), 1936.




Figure 11-23: FENG Teng 馮騰: “Shijie mo ri, renlei cai you zhenzheng de heping” 世界末日，人類才有真正的和平 (Only in the last days of the world will humankind have real peace)⁷²

Characters on the hemispheres mark oceans and continents.




Figure 11-24: XIN Feng 信風: “Diqu de zongduanmian” 地球的縱斷面 (Vertical section of earth) (top). “Zhansi de guangrong” 戰死的光榮 (The glory of dying in battle) (bottom)⁷³

The caption to the top cartoon reads:

Sand layer – bones / Fertile layer – rotting corpses / Surface layer – debris / Atmosphere – poison gas / Cloud layer – airplanes / The times of the world's loneliness are not far away.

72 In: *SDMH* no. 22 (October), 1935.

73 In: *SHMH* no. 4 (August), 1936.




Figure 11-25: MAI Lüzhī [MAI Fangming 麥放明]: “Dazhan de qianye”
大戰的前夜 (The eve of the great war)⁷⁴

The caption reads:

When the skeleton dances in the palace of death, kings and emperors are still dreaming about crowns!



Figure 11-26: MAI Lüzhī: “Tianxia yingxiong, wei wo shi cong” 天下英雄，惟我是從 (Heroes of the world, obey me me...)⁷⁵

The caption reads:

Heroes of the world, obey me, ha! ha! I come again.

74 In: *SDMH* no. 12 (December), 1934.

75 In: *SDMH* no. 25 (January), 1936. The phrase “obey me” is a reworded idiom “always do as told” 惟命是從, lit. obey the fate, but here “fate” becomes “me”, i.e. death.

Other cartoonists engaged in depicting death, moved by China's own misfortunes and international plummet into disaster: Death walked over bodies of new-born baby soldiers, ran into battle carrying assorted weapons, smiled down on fields of the dead as a skull-faced Moon, threw corpses down cannon muzzles while wearing Papal robes, and dropped a bomb onto a city over the shoulder of the Pope of Rome.⁷⁶

Getting on with daily life

Shockingly, yet reasonably, this all-devouring whirlwind of apocalyptic visions existed parallel to a completely different world of daily life. The cartoons in this section are hard to categorize because the group is at once noticeable and yet so diverse and dispersed between many small issues that almost no patterns emerge. It is noticeable, because there are no less than 70 cartoons or even sets of cartoons from the *Shidai Manhua*'s 180 works related to the aspects of the West (around 15 items out of *Shanghai Manhua*'s 60), so this is by no means a small fraction. However, the wide range of topics appearing in this "daily life" group means that for each topic there are but a few cartoons. From the point of view of contents, there are items describing: cinema and celebrities; fine art and literature; foreigners in China; Christianity; architecture; fashions, lifestyles, and entertainment; Westernized Chinese; common people abroad; and foreign cartoon art.

76 TE Wei: "Yuce" 預測 (Prediction...). In: *MHJ* no. 7 (October), 1936; XU Yan 許炎: "Weilai de zhanshi" 未來的戰士 (Warrior of the future). In: *SHMH* no. 4 (August), 1936; Author unstated (reprint of foreign cartoons): "Shouhuo zhi yue" 收穫之月 (Harvest moon). In: *SDMH* no. 17 (May), 1935; TE Wei: "Luoma jiaohuang" 羅馬教皇 (Pope of Rome...). In: *SDMH* no. 23 (November), 1935; HU Dan 胡丹: "Bei tian min ren" 悲天憫人 (Lament [the state of] heaven and pity [the state of] man). In: *SDMH* no. 23 (November), 1935. The two cartoons satirizing the Pope's role in warmongering are probably a reaction to the Vatican's inactivity in preventing Italian invasion of Ethiopia in the previous month. For more about the relations between the Pope and Fascist Italy see: Lucia CECI; Peter SPRING (transl.): *The Vatican and Mussolini's Italy*, Leiden: Brill 2017. About the Vatican's relations with Fascist regimes in other countries see: Emma FATTORINI; Carl IPSEN (transl.): *Hitler, Mussolini, and the Vatican: Pope Pius XI and the Speech That Was Never Made*, Cambridge: Polity Press 2011; Karlheinz DESCHNER: *God and the Fascists: the Vatican Alliance with Mussolini, Franco, Hitler, and Pavelić*, N.Y.: Prometheus Books 2013. A startling example of cartoons envisioning China's own sufferings as Death's plough is a cartoon where a dystrophic peasant whips his bull to carry on plowing across a field of skulls; the whole cartoon done in black-and-red: ZHANG Ding: "Chun geng tu" 春耕圖 (SPRING plowing). In: *SDMH* no. 34 (January), 1937.

The last topic, including both reprints of Western (rarely Japanese) cartoons and lengthy explanations of the cartooning tradition, is one of the largest by quantity: nearly every issue of *Shidai Manhua* contains a special section (often more than one page long) devoted to introducing and demonstrating works of Miguel COVARRUBIAS, Honoré DAUMIER, Alois DERSO and Emery KELEN, David Low, Boris YEFIMOV (EFIMOV), Sapoijou (Georgy SAPOZHNIKOV), and generally French, British, German, American, and other “Western” cartoonists or whole magazines, primarily *Punch*, but also *Life*, *Simplicissimus*, *Krokodil*, *Tokyo Puck*, and others.⁷⁷ This reflects an important mission for *Shidai Manhua*, published through the efforts of SHAO Xunmei 邵洵美, its owner, and LU Shaofei, its editor: SHAO Xunmei was eager to prove that *manhua* magazines can be “serious”, and providing the evidence from foreign experience was in line with this idea.⁷⁸ Thus, in a sense, reproducing foreign cartoons as an example provided both glimpses of foreign lifestyles and a way to legitimize *manhua*’s own existence in China. *Shidai Manhua* was not the only periodical to reproduce such sets of foreign cartoons: *Wanxiang*, *Duli Manhua*, *Manhuajie*, *Shanghai Manhua*, etc. were also quite eager to familiarize their readers with the already mentioned foreign cartoonists and

77 GEWALUOBIYASI 哥瓦羅彼亞斯 [Miguel] COVARRUBIAS: “Moxige canjia geming jun de nüren” 墨西哥參加革命軍的女人 (Mexican women participating in revolution). In: *SDMH* no. 2 (February), 1934; [Bernard PARTRIDGE]: “Jue bu qufu” 絶不屈服 (Unconquerable). In: *SDMH* no. 10 (October), 1934; LI Baoquan 李寶泉: “Shi xiang manhua de linghun” 世相漫畫的靈魂 (The soul of worldly cartoons). In: *SDMH* no. 11 (November), 1934; WANG Dunqing: “‘Benzhuo’ xiansheng xiaozhuan” 《笨拙》先生小傳 (A short biography of Mr. “Punch”). In: *SDMH* no. 14 (February), 1935, continued in: *SDMH* no. 15 (March), 1935; Idem: “Manhua de xuanchuan xing” 漫畫的宣傳性 (The propagandistic nature of cartoons). In: *SDMH* no. 17 (May), 1935; Idem: “Meiguo youmo zazhi de jiantao” 美國幽默雜誌的檢討 (About American humour magazines). In: *SDMH* no. 20 (August), 1935; Idem: “Manhua de leibie” 漫畫的類別 (Kinds of cartoons). In: *SDMH* no. 21 (September), 1935; Idem: “Weilian GELUOPO qi ren ji qi zuopin” 威廉格羅泊其人及其作品 (William Gropper: man and his works). In: *SDMH* no. 22 (October), 1935; Idem: “Manhuajia de xiuyang” 漫畫家的修養 (Cartoonist’s cultivation). In: *SDMH* no. 23 (November), 1935; Idem: “Yingguo xinwenjie de manhua dashi LUO Dawei” 英國新聞界的漫畫大師 羅大維 (The great cartoonist of English journalism, David Low). In: *SDMH* no. 30 (September), 1936; Idem: “Ziji jiaoyu er chenggong de manhuajia MEI Feier” 自己教育而成功的漫畫家梅菲爾 (Self-taught successful cartoonist Phil MAY). In: *SDMH* no. 32 (November), 1936; Idem: “Xiyang lüxing manhua teji” 西洋旅行漫畫特輯 (Special edition of Western travel cartoons). In: *SDMH* no. 33 (December), 1936; Idem: “‘Benzhuo’ de changpian youmo” 《笨拙》的長篇幽默 (Long-format humour [pieces] in “Punch”). In: *SDMH* no. 38 (May), 1937; ZHANG Ruogu 張若谷: “Faguo shijiu shiji de manhua” 法國十九世紀的漫畫 (French 19th century cartoons). In: *SDMH* no. 18 (June), 1935. The list is not exhaustive.

78 For more about attitudes to pictorials and SHAO Xunmei’s endeavors see: BEVAN: *A Modern Miscellany* (2016), pp. 56–59.

magazines, as well as with others, e.g. Diego RIVERA, Mitchell SIPORIN, George GROSZ, in rare cases even giving a retrospective of cartoon art in China itself.⁷⁹ These reproduced foreign cartoons covered various aspects of politics, society, and entertainment, proving at once that foreigners laugh, too, and that cartooning can reach high artistic levels.

The other fields of Western creative endeavors reflected in *manhua* magazines include literature (references to GOETHE's *Faust*, GORKY (GOR'KI)'s life and creations, Henrik IBSEN's *A Doll House*, etc. can be found⁸⁰), architecture (in the form of either occasional photographs of streets and cartoons with cityscapes and skylines or rare pictorial jokes, e.g. relating to skyscrapers⁸¹), and, of course, stage and cinema. For China, as for the rest of the world, the 1930s became the age of talking pictures, and this triggered a huge demand for celebrities' photos and

79 Some examples are: Diego RIVERA: "Diyage Lifeila zhi bishua" 第亞戈·李費拉之壁畫 (Diego RIVERA's mural paintings). In: *WX* no. 1 (May), 1934; WANG Dunqing: "Jieshao Shanghai zui lao de yi ben youmo zazhi" 介紹上海最老的一本幽默雜誌 (Introducing Shanghai's oldest humour magazine). In: *DLMH* no. 2 (October), 1935; Idem: "Di yi hui shijie dazhan de manhua zhan" 第一回世界大戰的漫畫戰 (Cartoon war during WWI). In: *DLMH* no. 3 (October), 1935; Mitchell SIPORIN: "Xijuhua le de shijie zhengzhi zhongxin renwu" 戲劇化了的世界政治重心人物 (Theatricalized key figures of world politics). In *MHJ* no. 4 (July), 1936; Baolisi AIFEIMAOFU 鮑里斯·愛菲冒夫 [Boris YEFIMOV] 鮑里斯·愛菲冒夫: "Yi jiu san si nian yiqian shijie heping de yuyan manhua" 一九三四年以前世界和平的預言漫畫 (Prophetic cartoons about peace in the world before 1934). In: *MHJ* no. 4 (July), 1936; YU Er 魚兒: "Xiang ming shijie di yi liu manhuajia George Grosz" 尊名世界第一流漫畫家 George GROSZ (World-renowned master cartoonist George GROSZ). In: *MHJ* no. 5 (August), 1936; Weilian GELUOPU 威廉·格羅泊 [William GROPPER] 威廉·格羅泊: "Maxituan yi lan" 馬戲團一覽 (Circus at a glance). In: *SHMH* no. 5 (September), 1936; Autuo SUOGELUO 奧托·梭格羅 [Otto SOGLOW] 奧托·梭格羅: "Pingmin huangdi canjia pingmin baodong" 平民皇帝參加平民暴動 (Common emperor participates in common riot). In: *SHMH* no. 5 (September), 1936; Xisi LUOBINSHENG 錫斯·羅賓生 [W. Heath ROBINSON]: "Mei ri xing yi shan ju de tongzijun" 每日行一善舉的童子軍 (A boy scout who makes a good deed every day). In: *SHMH* no. 6 (October), 1936; Author unstated: "Xiyang xiaohua" 西洋笑話 (Western jokes). In: *SHMH* no. 10 (March), 1937.

80 ZHANG Guangyu: "Fushide laoren de beiai" 浮士德老人的悲哀 (Old Faust's grief). In: *SHMH* no. 7 (November), 1936; WANG Zimei: "Lu Xun fendou hua zhuan" 魯迅奮鬥畫傳 (LU XUN's illustrated biography). In: *SDMH* no. 32 (November), 1936; Idem: Crucifix. In: *SHMH* no. 6 (October), 1936; Idem: "Lu Xun yu Gao'erji" 魯迅與高爾基 (LU XUN and GORKY). In: *SHMH* no. 7 (November), 1936, Cover; LIU Zhongwei 劉仲煒: "Liuyue shiba ri zhe yi tian" 六月十八日這一天 (The day of June 18th). In: *Wanxiang Tuhua Yuekan* 萬像圖畫月刊 no. 1 (September), 1936; LU Shaofei: "Xin wan'ou" 新玩偶 (New dolls). In: *SDMH* no. 19 (July), 1935.

81 ZHANG Guangyu: "Xitele wan zi shangbiao de youlai" 希特勒卍字商標的由來 (Origins of HITLER's swastika emblem). In: *WX* no. 1 (May), 1934; Idem: "Pai yongchang" 派用場 (Putting it to use). In: *SDMH* no. 15 (March), 1935; WANG Dunqing (compil.): "Xiyang shehui dongtai de yi pie" 西洋社會動態的一瞥 (A glance at trends in Western society). In: *SDMH* no. 37 (April), 1937; see also figs. 11-9 and 11-27.

biographies, advertisements for movies, and news of world tours. Hollywood stars were eulogized and mocked,⁸² Tarzan and Charlie CHAPLIN reached the popularity of such a degree that their images were re-applied in political cartoons,⁸³ and one of the most popular cartoon characters, Niu Bizi 牛鼻子 (lit. “Ox-nose”), went into deep grief upon hearing the news that his “beloved Jena (sic!) HARLOW”, a Hollywood actress, died.⁸⁴ In other words, images of the West and Westerners created by imported films reverberated further by being reproduced and remade in printed cartoons.

Yet, if it came to commoners, not celebrities, and realistic scenery, not idealized city- or landscapes of Hollywood films, a reader of magazines would have a very vague idea of Western life. There are very few photographs, and even those are mostly of curious people or objects rather than what one might come across on a daily basis; the resulting image of ‘abroad’ would thus be a distorted picture.⁸⁵

82 For some examples see: Author unstated: “Zhaoyao Haolaiwu tiankong de si ke mingxing” 照耀好萊塢天空的四顆明星 (Four stars that shine in the sky of Hollywood). In: *WX* no. 1 (May), 1934; WANG Zimei: “Haolaiwu Shuihu renwu xuan” 好萊塢水滸人物選 (Selection of characters from Hollywood’s “Outlaws of the Marsh”). In: *SHMH* no. 4 (August), 1936; Author unstated: “Shi nian lai qianhou Meiguo shu Hua yingpian de jinbu guan” 十年來前後美國輸華影片的進步觀 (Progress of American films imported in China in the last 10 years). In: *SDMH* no. 37 (April), 1937.

83 For an example of Tarzan references see fig. 11-20, where FRANCO wears animal hide as a loincloth; a similar reference is applied to MUSSOLINI and STALIN in a cartoon by ZHU Jinlou 朱金樓: although here the commentary does not allude to Tarzan, the very idea of “primitive” clothes is visually quite close (ZHU Jinlou: “Xin ‘Shitu xing zhuan’” 新《使徒行傳》 (New “Acts of the Apostles”). In: *ZGMH* no. 9 (October), 1936). Charlie CHAPLIN figures in a cartoon clearly quoting the film “Modern Times”, while satirizing social and economic injustice through the appearance of a “capitalist” (AI Zhongxin: “Modeng shidai” 摩登時代 (Modern times). In: *SHMH* no. 3 (July), 1936). An even more explicit case is a cartoon where CHAPLIN appears thinking about China’s military and political troubles (see: HUANG Ling 黃陵: “Huoshao Hongliansi” 火燒紅蓮寺 (Burning the Red Lotus temple). In: *ZGMH* no. 6 (April), 1936).

84 HUANG Yao 黃堯 and XU Ruoming 徐若明: “Ying mi ‘Niu Bizi’ ru sang kao bi” 影迷《牛鼻子》如喪考妣 (Movie fan “Niu Bizi” is grief-stricken). In: *SDMH* no. 39 (June), 1937. Jean HARLOW was one of the most famous stars of the decade, a “sex goddess” as her official website calls her (note the very existence of a website for an actress who did indeed die on 7 June 1937; “Jean HARLOW, the official website”, 2019. Available online: <https://www.jeanharlow.com/>, last access 2019, August 12). The cartoon with Niu Bizi is a collage of photographed puppet Niu Bizi cropped into a drawing of sacrificial table before the funerary scrolls, amongst which a photograph of a very scantily dressed Jean HARLOW appears. The visual irony is reinforced by the title, since *ru sang kao bi* 如喪考妣 means “to be sorrowful as if one’s parents died”.

85 This is quite understandable given the specifics of a *manhua* magazine; more photographs appeared in other periodicals, such as the famous “Young Companion” (*Liangyou* 良友), but photographs are quite a different source, closer to cinema in some sense, and

Seeing foreigners inside of China gave a clearer understanding of their ways, and it also concerned the cartoonists much more, especially since the foreign presence in China touched upon the injured national feelings. For that reason, two narratives catch the eye: one is foreigners themselves, their lives and habits, and another is foreign influence – bad for the most part – on Chinese people and life. These two narratives are closely intertwined, with foreigners in China rarely shown as positive elements of urban daily life.

One group of foreigners living in China in the 1930s stands aside from other Westerners: namely, Russian emigrants. “White Russians”, *bai'e* 白俄, generally, were seen as an object of condescending disapproval from the cartoonists; being foreigners yet not enjoying any of the special rights in China, they attracted some sympathy as homeless exiles, but more often it turned into contempt or irritation, though rarely open hostility. This group produced an unpleasant and unfavorable impression on the Chinese and wealthier foreigners in China alike. Generally, the cartoons categorized Russian émigrés into three “professions”: “ladies”, tradesmen, and military men. While the “Russian ladies” (*Luosong taitai* 罗宋太太) – i.e. prostitutes – were seen as a bad influence and demonstrated the depths of immorality,⁸⁶ the other two groups invited other sentiments. Tradesmen, i.e. shop owners, restaurant keepers, tailors, and other representatives of honest toil, appeared to be the least obtrusive. The cartoonists ironically noted that White Russian stores were ready to serve anyone with money, including the Chinese; this visibly set them apart from the Western stores dealing in trade exclusively with Western clientele and discriminating Chinese.⁸⁷ It can be said that the cartoons did not produce an impression of objecting to the presence of Russian competitors.⁸⁸

deserve a separate study. It should also be kept in mind that technical difficulties of typography and black-and-white technique available in the 1930s meant that photography was hardly a very realistic medium.

86 Among the most typical cases of cartoons about Russian “ladies” plying the streets are: HUAZI 華子: “Xiafei lu shang de Flirtation” 霞飛路上的 Flirtation (Flirtation on Xiafei street). In: *SDMH* no. 7 (July), 1934; SHEN Yiqian 沈逸千: “Xiafei lu de yese” 霞飛路的夜色 (Xiafei street’s twilight). In: *SDMH* no. 21 (September), 1935.

87 Japanese stores attracted attention of a different kind due to calls for the boycott of Japanese goods although sometimes they appeared along with other foreign enterprises. For an example, see: WU Shiji 吳實基: “Zai Shanghai de waiguo dian huanying zhe women ne!” 在上海的外國店歡迎著我們呢! (Shanghai foreign stores are welcoming us!). In: *SDMH* no. 1 (April), 1934.

88 For example, see descriptions of Russian life, including prostitutes and business endeavors, on Avenue Joffre in Shanghai: HUAZI: “Flirtation on Xiafei street”. In: *SDMH* no. 7 (July), 1934. Another case, albeit not a cartoon but a text, is about a Chinese who prefers to eat cheaply, yet in a restaurant, thus choosing a Russian establishment: ZHU Qing 竹青: “Si yao mianzi” 死要面子 (To save face at all costs). In: *SDMH* no. 27 (June), 1936. However, the Russians’ readiness to serve whoever had money was not always noted – an example is

What they did object to, however, was the pompous behavior of former generals and ex-nobility, who, while being degraded to begging in the streets or working in the lowest ranks of city police, put on airs and looked down on the Chinese themselves.⁸⁹ Their pretense, “eagle-like” noses, and attempts to look “like nothing had happened” (*ruo wu qi shi* 若無其事) caused some sharp remarks from journalists, and the lack of gratitude to the country that sheltered “eternal exiles” triggered reactions verging on enmity – consequently the emigrants were called “Russian high-class beggars” (*Eguo de gaoji bisan* 俄國的高級畢三).⁹⁰ All in all, not many aspects of Russian daily life side by side with the local population were noted in the cartoons, and those matters that were commented upon ran along the lines of either pity or ridicule, but, unlike cartoons about other foreigners, no hint of China’s injured national pride was visible here.

It is unsurprising that the presence of the British in Hong Kong and Shanghai (as well as in other concessions) caused much more criticism. Of the 26 cartoons mentioning the UK, five do so in connection to Hong Kong (see table 11-1 above). Such references include the behavior of British or Hindu policemen and discriminatory attitudes of the British to the Chinese populace.⁹¹ Apart from the British, cartoonists were concerned about and sometimes outraged by the offenses of unspecified Westerners in China: those ranged from drunken sailors creating demand for prostitutes to a Chinese girl being raped by a member of an international circus touring the world.⁹² Interestingly, almost no blame was placed on foreigners for

a set of photographs, where several foreign stores’ windows are shown, and, although all stores are located in Shanghai, none have inscriptions in Chinese – a Russian shop appearing in this set shows how Russians were not always seen as welcoming Chinese customers. See: WU Shiji: “Shanghai foreign stores are welcoming us!” In: *SDMH* no. 1 (April), 1934.

89 A good example of textual description can be found in: OU Luluo 歐露羅: “‘Cha paisi’ ji” 《查派司》記 (On “checking the documents”). In: *SDMH* no. 19 (July), 1935.

90 LUO Shan 羅姍: “Allegretto”. In: *SDMH* no. 13 (January), 1935; LÜ Zhen 履箴 (WANG Dunqing). “Weishenme wo chuan zhongshanhuang” 為什麼我穿中山裝 (Why I wear Sun Yatsen-style suit). In: *SDMH* no. 12 (December), 1934; Piaobo wang 漂泊王: “‘Wuqiong’ de xiwang” “無窮”的希望 (“Inexhaustible” hope). In: *SDMH* no. 1 (April), 1934; WU Chang 無常: “Eren dalishi” 俄人大力士 (Russian strongman). In: *SDMH* no. 12 (December), 1934.

91 LIN Yan 林焱: “Lüxing manhua shouzha” 旅行漫畫手札 (Cartoon notes of a journey). In: *SDMH* no. 23 (November), 1935; JIN Mo: “Xianggang qiaobao huawai ji” 香港僑胞化外記 (Uncivilized compatriots in Hong Kong). In: *SDMH* no. 24 (December), 1935; LAO Ji: “Ji ren li xia de tongku xianzhuang” 寄人籬下的痛苦現狀 (Hard situation of living under another’s roof). In: *SDMH* no. 37 (April), 1937.

92 JIN Mo: “Huanghun de Zhujiang shui mian” 黃昏的珠江水面 (Dusk on Zhujiang river). In: *SDMH* no. 19 (July), 1935; LAN Weibang: “Street angel”. In: *SDMH* no. 9 (September), 1934; LU Zhixiang 陸志庠: “The most marvelous performance of the Isako’s circus – the rape of a young Chinese girl”. In: *SDMH* no. 17 (May), 1935.

the opium trade in *manhua* magazines' cartoons, although drug-addiction itself was frowned upon there as well as in other media. Prostitution, on the other hand, disgusted the cartoonists somewhat more, both in the case of Chinese girls selling themselves to foreign clients and in the case of foreign women giving a bad example, as already mentioned above.

Other foreigners and items of Western culture present in Chinese cities did not inspire warmer remarks either. Even things smaller than prostitution or the police's lawlessness, such as drinking Coca-Cola,⁹³ wearing exceedingly Westernized suits, and the existence of strip-tease shows, evoked criticism.⁹⁴ Nationalist feelings were offended by the mass popularity of dancing, learning and speaking English even among Chinese, listening to Christian priests, forgetting national celebrations, and generally being Westernized. At the same time, this was all in a form of cartoons, strange and foreign in themselves. The cartoonists, while mocking their compatriots' desire to be more European than Europeans, laughed at the over-conservative part of Chinese society as well. A good example of such dubious satire is apparent in fig. 11-28, where Confucius and some of his disciples find themselves in 1930s Shanghai. The oddness of it all is that for every situation there is a (more or less) suitable quotation from *The Analects*, but since every quotation loses its philosophical meaning, Confucius, the embodiment of Chinese traditions, gets degraded to the level of an old village bumpkin, surprised and disapproving of the new devices and manners, but eventually giving in to some of them.

A vivid example of a panoramic view of the West is fig. 11-27, done by WANG Dunqing. He was the most active propagandist of learning from foreign examples in cartoon art in *Shidai Manhua* and other magazines.⁹⁵ Yet in this case, he created

93 Prostitution is among the most frequent evils appearing in relation to the Westerners' effect on daily life. See: CAI Ruohong 蔡若虹: "Dushi li de seqing shangren" 都市裏的色情商人 (Pornography merchants of the city). In: *SDMH* no. 24 (December), 1935; JIN Mo: "Dusk on Zhujiang river". In: *SDMH* no. 19 (July), 1935; LAN Weibang: "Street angel". In: *SDMH* no. 9 (September), 1934. The Coca-Cola reference appears on a cartoon by TAO Mouji 陶謀基, where a fashionably dressed couple are sitting at the table sipping their drinks and discussing how stupid peasants suffer from lack of water. The two wonder, "why do the peasants even need water, when there is Hires and Coca-Cola?" It is hard to tell if the cartoonist meant to allude to the notorious "*Qu'ils mangent de la brioche*", but the perceived gap between the depicted couple and Chinese peasants suffering from drought is as wide as between the apocryphal princess and French commoners. TAO Mouji: "He guo le Hires" 喝過了 Hires (Drank Hires...). In: *SDMH* no. 8 (August), 1934.

94 LI Kangnian 李康年: "Yishu sixiang" 藝術思想 (Artistic thinking). In: *SDMH* no. 10 (October), 1934; LIU Xiyun 劉茜芸: "Shechipin" 奢侈品 (Luxurious items). In: *SDMH* no. 15 (March), 1935; ZHANG Zhenshi 張振仕: "Shui shuo fentong bu hui Ouhua!" 誰說糞桶不會歐化! (Who said that a dung barrel cannot become Europeanized!). In: *SDMH* no. 21 (September), 1935.

95 See notes 77 and 79 in this chapter.

a highly unattractive image of “Western civilization”. A row of naked dancers is followed by marching soldiers against the unsettling cityscape of factories, a cathedral, and windowless skyscrapers. All of these are seen as being blessed by a priest wearing a gasmask while the whole picture is a big playing card, a queen of hearts, whose pallid countenance adds to the eerie atmosphere of the cartoon. Although there is no direct statement of “bad influence” on Chinese culture, it is hardly wrong to assume that the cartoon warns against the temptations and pleasures of Western civilization, behind which trouble lurks. It is apparent that here, in the “daily life” narratives dealing with more “nationalist” issues, the contradictions between the “Chinese” and “foreigners” were still strong whereas in the “world politics” group, such contradictions moved further into the background.



Figure II-27: WANG Dunqing: “Xiyang wenming” 西洋文明
(Western civilization)⁹⁶

96 In: SDMH no. 15 (March), 1935.




Figure 11-28: GAO Longsheng 高龍生: “Kongfuzi you Shanghai” 孔夫子游上海 (Confucius wanders in Shanghai)⁹⁷

Captions to individual cartoons (right to left, top to bottom):

The Master said: Eight rows of dancers in the court, if he can bear to do this, what may he not bear to do!

The Master said: How can a large carriage be made to go without the crossbar for yoking the oxen to, or a small carriage without the arrangement for yoking the horses?

Yan Yuan, in admiration of the Master’s doctrines, sighed and said: I looked up to them, and they seemed to become more high!

The Master said: I will not be concerned at men’s not knowing me; I will be concerned at my own want of ability.

97 In: SDMH no. 22 (October), 1935. All captions are direct or slightly changed quotes from *The Analects*, so the translations given here are either verbatim or readjusted versions of James LEGGE’s translation: James LEGGE (transl., comm.): *The Chinese Classics with a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes*, vol. 1: *Confucian Analects. The Great Learning. The Doctrine of the Mean*, 3rd ed., Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc. 1991. Wade-Giles transliteration is changed into Pinyin here for consistency with the rest of the text.

Confucius having visited Nan Zi, Zi Lu was displeased.

The Master said: Do not eat [meat] which was not cut properly...

Qi, by one change, would come to the State of Lu.

The Master said: What the superior man seeks, is in himself. What the mean man seeks, is in others.

The Master said: The study of strange doctrines is injurious indeed!

When there was an abundance of provisions set before him, he would change countenance and rise up.

The Master said: He who offends against Heaven has none to whom he can pray.

The Master said: After the pouring out of the libation, I have no wish to look on!

The Master said: The filial piety nowadays means the support of one's parents, as for dogs and horses!

Well pleased and smiling, Confucius said: Why use an ox knife to kill a fowl!

The Master, when he entered the grand temple (probably by mistake it was the city god's temple), asked about everything.

It is said in the Book of Poetry: We should be apprehensive and cautious, as if on the brink of a deep gulf, as if treading on thin ice.

Concluding remarks

The cartoons produced in 1930s Shanghai present an eclectic mosaic of situations in which China, its people, and the world found themselves. Perceptions of the West and Russia intertwined with concern for China's misfortunes, and from the frequent news of military clashes on Chinese soil and further away arose the omnipresent fear of a global war which would leave the planet devastated and destroy humankind. The might of warmongers was emphasized by both the weakness of their victims and by the helplessness of international negotiations on peacekeeping and disarmament, as well as by the League of Nations' passivity. The cartoonists did not praise any of the Western powers: neither Communism, nor Fascism, neither liberalism nor capitalism appeared in a favorable light in the *manhua* form. This is in part due to the very nature of caricature, cynical and critical in itself, but

also to the sentiments of Chinese people who felt discriminated against and humiliated by “imperialists” and did not expect any support from the totalitarian regimes either. A cartoon, itself a Western phenomenon, was thus turned against the West by the Chinese. At the same time, the very fact that foreign practices assimilated quite easily into China’s daily life manifested itself in the production and mass popularity of *manhua* magazines and cartoon art. The visual clichés of world affairs (with the narrative of the West interwoven with the rest of the world) and those of foreign presence in China as well as of the life of Westerners abroad were fixed through the foreign medium of the cartoon with ease and readiness.

The inflow of information, including visual materials, allowed the Chinese society to better imagine the world outside its national borders, and the accumulation and absorption of this multitude of information brought with it the illusion of proximity and interconnectedness of events on the planet; comparisons between Abyssinian and Chinese problems as well as depiction of the Earth as a small globe in somebody’s hands demonstrate that for the cartoonists and (to some extent) their readers, China stopped being the only concern. The reconsideration of the foreign world visible through the cartoons provides evidence that the traditional paradigm of civilized center against barbarian periphery changed into a contraposition of peace-seeking humanity against power-hungry belligerents.

Nikolay SAMOYLOV

I2 Visual Images of the Soviet Union and the West in China (1950s–1960s)

Abstract. Visual images have a great impact on any nation's formation of perceptions about others. This is particularly typical of the countries where the literacy rate and levels of education are not considered very high. Politicians are highly aware of the role of visual images and their significance for political propaganda, and, therefore, work hard to construct effective images of themselves and “the others”. In the 1950s–1960s in the People's Republic of China, visual images (portraits, posters, cartoons) played a very important role in mass propaganda and were used to introduce official ideas to the public. In that period the image of America and the West as a whole was negative in China, and it did not change much. The image of the Soviet Union, in contrast, was entirely positive in the 1950s, but during the “Cultural Revolution” it underwent significant changes, in many respects becoming similar to the image of the West. All these changes were reflected through posters and cartoons. Based on a review of Chinese visual sources (posters, cartoons, and *nianhua*), this chapter aims to study how visual images functioned in China's public life in the 1950s–1960s. In this regard, the article is intended to provide a basis for understanding the issue and suggest future research directions in this area.

Keywords. China, the West, USSR, USA, Visual images.

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Study of Visual Images: Methodological Remarks

Upon conducting full-scale studies of the interrelation between states and nations at the present time, apart from economic, political, and cultural factors which must be taken into account, it is also necessary to consider images of any nation, which are related to social ideas and overall mentality of other ethnic groups. As Iver B. NEUMANN convincingly argues, an ever-present image of “the Other” not only influences the relations between different peoples in the obvious manner, but is also reciprocated in the development of political relationships between states.¹ Nowadays, this condition is taken into consideration in international activities of many countries and their foreign policy propaganda. This, as it were, determines the scope of the so called “soft power policy”, which explains why the way in which the countries and their representatives create an impression of other countries’ images on the global stage is one of the most important features of foreign affairs. In addition, based on the recently conducted research, there have been images and stereotypes of mutual perception between different nations throughout the course of known history. Likewise, preexisting forms of such images have been shown to influence their subsequent development.

Accordingly, studying national and ethnic images and stereotypes in the current context becomes extremely important in relation to scholarly and practical significance. It is required, not only to trace the evolution of images of various nations, by means of defining the tendency of their space-time development, but also to find causes for appearance and persistence of certain images representing other countries as being ‘alien’ and thus opposed to ‘native’ within a certain national mentality. Consequently, a certain amount of historical research, methods, and data from other disciplines (sociology, ethnology, social psychology, literary studies, etc.) are crucial and important in terms of practicality. It is impossible to understand the persistence or development of the images without an interdisciplinary approach.

It can be said that the continuity of images and stereotypes is generally an integral part of the general process of communication between societies and cultures. By implementing various scientific methods, scholars widely practice analyzing said characteristics. Currently it is possible to say that a new cross-disciplinary scientific trend, *imagology*, has entered the scholarly field. Imagology is considered to be an overarching academic discipline in humanities that examines the processes whereby images are formed, perceived, and transformed. By now, some

¹ Iver B. NEUMANN: *Uses of the Other. The 'East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, Borderline Series 1999.

results in studying images of Russia in China in the 20th century have been obtained. First and foremost, one should pay attention to the book written by famous Russian sinologist Sergey TIKHVIN SKY (1918–2018): *Chinese perceptions of the image of Russia*.² He was the first to suggest a detailed historical overview and analysis of Russia's image in China, with the 20th century included. A monograph by a young Russian researcher Natalia TEN was recently published and describes the up-to-date stage of evolution of this image.³ One should notice that the term “imagology” (*xingxiang xue* 形象学) in Chinese academic literature was used for the first time by MENG Hua in 2000.⁴ After a while, the relevant research on China's image in Russia and Russia's image in China was carried out. Attention should be paid to the interesting and substantiated monographs of SUN Fang and CHEN Jinpeng,⁵ and LI Suian,⁶ which represent a large period of history. More recently a joint research of Russian and Chinese scholars in this area has also been conducted.⁷

It needs to be stated that, for learning about the evolution of Russia's image in China in the 20th century, a set of circumstances relating to previous historic periods should be taken into account. First of all, the most important point to be made is that the process of mutual perception between the Russians and the Chinese was subsumed under a broader phenomenon of reciprocal interpenetration of two stable sociocultural traditions: one being Confucianism, and the other Russian Orthodoxy. For this reason, relevant ethnic images are heavily tied to the perception of another type of culture, other forms of social and political organization.⁸

2 Sergei TIKHVIN SKY: *Vospriiatiye v Kitae obrazu Rossii* (Chinese perceptions of the image of Russia), Moskva: Nauka 2008.

3 Natal'ia TEN: *Ot Pushkina do Putina: Obraz Rossii v sovremenном Kitae (1991–2010)* (From Pushkin to Putin: Image of Russia in contemporary China, 1991–2010), Moskva: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 2016.

4 MENG Hua 梦华: *Xingxiang xue yanjiu yao zhuzhong zongti xing yu zonghe xing* 形象学研究要注重总体性与综合性 (Imagological studies should focus on overall and comprehensive approach). In: *Zhongguo bijiao wenxue zazhi* no. 4, 2000, pp. 1–20.

5 SUN Fang, CHEN Jinpeng: *Eluosi de Zhongguo xingxiang* 俄罗斯的中国形象 (Image of China in Russia), Beijing: People's Publishing House 2010.

6 LI Suian 李随安: *Zhongguo de Eluosi xingxiang (1949–2009)* 中国的俄罗斯形象 (1949–2009) (Image of Russia in China, 1949–2009), Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe 2012.

7 Nikolai SAMOILOV, LI Suian: “Obraz Sovetskogo Soiuza v kitaiskikh uchebnikakh 1950-kh godov” (Image of the Soviet Union in the Chinese textbooks in 1950s). In: *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta* ser. 13, no. 4, 2012, pp. 14–22.

8 More details in: Nikolai SAMOILOV: *Rossiya i Kitai v XVII – nachale XX veka: tendentsii, formy i stadii sotsiokul'turnogo vzaimodeistviya* (Russia and China in the 17th – early 20th centuries: Tendencies, Forms and Stages of Socio-Cultural Interaction), St. Petersburg: Izdatel'skii dom Sankt-Peterburgogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta 2014.

In this context, examining visual images is crucial for general image studies. Visual symbols have long been a central component of political communication, and their importance has increased as the visual medium of television and the internet has become the dominant source of political information. Politicians understand the significance of visuals and work equally hard to construct effective image bites. In short, visual images play a central role in constructing political images. Despite their central position in political communication, these visual symbols have historically been overlooked in research. Based on a review of the growing and substantial literature, this chapter argues that it is time for political communication scholars to delve deeper into how visual symbols function in public affairs. To that end, this chapter seeks to provide a theoretical and literature basis to facilitate this change in focus and to suggest future avenues for research in this area.

W.J.T. MITCHELL reconsiders visual culture to be a form of life and contends in his book *Picture Theory* that nowadays we can speak of a new “Turn” i.e. the “Pictorial Turn”. This turn will supplant the study of culture as we have known it under the sign of the “Linguistic Turn”: “It is the realization that spectatorship (the look, the gaze, the glance, the practices of observation, surveillance, and visual pleasure) may be as deep a problem as various forms of reading (decipherment, decoding, interpretation, etc.) and that visual experience or “visual literacy” might not be fully explicable on the model of textuality.”⁹ In *Picture Theory*, the book that many scholars consider to be one of the seminal texts on the Pictorial Turn in contemporary philosophy,¹⁰ W.J.T. MITCHELL aims to identify the picture as the subject where various disciplinary traditions (from philosophy to semiotics, from the arts to media studies) finally converge into visual studies. He explains that it is impossible to consider the visual as a “pure” field of representation that stands in extrinsic relation to the verbal: “The interaction of pictures and texts is constitutive of representation as such”.¹¹

A significant transformation of historical studies takes place under the influence of the recent Pictorial Turn, both in terms of a set of sources and in terms of methodology. The development of visual anthropology has also become an obvious factor and contributed to the development of the Pictorial Turn in the studies of history. Today, historians studying various manifestations of visualization use new tools for collecting and recording data. The growing popularity of historical photographs and documentaries, museum installations, and historical recon-

9 W. J. Thomas MITCHELL: *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1994, p. II.

10 Alberto MARTINEGRO: “From the Linguistic Turn to the Pictorial Turn – Hermeneutics Facing the ‘Third Copernicus Revolution’”. In: *Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics* vol. 5, 2013, p. 302.

11 MITCHELL: *Picture Theory* (1994), p. 5.

structions testifies to the intensification of the role of visual images in historical research. New methodological approaches to the study of visuality make it possible to reexamine the mechanisms of image formation, as well as the use of images for political and ideological purposes. Visual studies and studies visualization have become the trend these days.

Undoubtedly, visual studies cannot be equated with image studies; the latter covers a far broader scope. In this sense, MITCHELL's argument can stand that the study of visual images is just one component of a larger field. However, one should bear in mind that this component is an extremely important one. MITCHELL also recognizes the difference between a picture and an image.

I like to start from the vernacular, listening to the English language, in a distinction that is untranslatable into German: 'you can hang a picture, but you can't hang an image.' A picture is a material object, a thing you can burn or break. An image is what appears in a picture, and what survives its destruction – in memory, in narrative, and in copies and traces in other media.¹²

To this convincing idea one can only add that the difference between "picture" and "image" in Russian and Chinese is even greater, and the contents of the concept of image is much more multifaceted.

Visual images have a great impact on the forming of any nation's perceptions about other peoples. This is particularly typical of the countries where literacy rate and levels of education are not very high. It is obvious that visual images have long been a central component of social, political, and cultural communication, and their importance has increased in our time, as the visual environment of television and the internet has become the dominant source of information. In many cases, visual images play a central role in building political images. Politicians are highly aware of the role of visual images and their significance for political propaganda, and, therefore, work hard to construct effective images of themselves and "the others". However, despite the crucial place of visual images in political communication, scholars have, for a long time, ignored these images in their studies.

12 MITCHELL: *Picture Theory* (1994), p. 16.

The Role of Visual Images in 1950's Chinese Political Propaganda

In the 1950s–1970s in the People's Republic of China (PRC), visual images (portraits, posters, and cartoons) played a very important role in mass propaganda and were used to introduce official ideas to the national consciousness. After 1949 most posters and cartoons that appeared in China had to promote the main ideological principles of the Communist Party, including its foreign policy. MAO Zedong and other leaders of communist China suggested socialist realism, as it had been practiced in the Soviet Union since the pre-War period, to be the best tool to develop new ideas and forms of art. It provided a positive view of life, represented in the rosy colors of optimism, though largely seen through a political lens. Socialist realism in the USSR was focused on industrial constructions, power stations, collective farms, and the working people.

In the first decade of the PRC times, many Chinese artists studied painting and applied art in Soviet art academies; others were educated by Soviet professors who came to teach in Chinese art institutions. Therefore, the influence of socialist realism was very strong. Posters and pictures that appeared in China after the formation of the PRC contain evident and well-recognized elements of socialist realism, inspired by the examples from the Soviet Union. However, additionally, they were also featured with many characteristics of *guohua* 国画 (traditional Chinese paintings) and *nianhua* 年画 (folk paintings) – sweet colors applied in soft gradations or a combination of black contours with bright flat colors.¹³

At the same time, in the first years after the formation of the PRC, a peculiar type of fine art, the *xin nianhua* 新年画 (new *nianhua*), developed actively in China, combining all the forms and techniques of traditional *nianhua* painting with new propaganda tasks.

After 1949, both pictures and posters with realistic plots (socio-political, historical, and portraiture) became most widespread. The household genre also underwent active transformation. At that time, it was also associated with socio-political issues and had to demonstrate the advantages of socialism. Artists had to cover important social events. MAO Zedong's ideas on the general accessibility of art and on the priorities of socialist values over art exerted a significant impact on

13 Stefan LANDSBERGER: *Chinese Propaganda Posters: From Revolution to Modernization*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 1995; "Chinese Posters: Propaganda, Politics, History, Art", 2020, March 26. Available online: <https://chineseposters.net/index.php> (last access 2020, April 21).

xin nianhua 新年画. Such aspects as “general accessibility” and political programming brought about a tremendous narrowness of the new *nianhua* genre.

Many Chinese artists who created *xin nianhua* 新年画¹⁴ turned to realistic oil painting techniques as this genre had everything that was needed to show a new life of ordinary people and “their struggle for the brighter future”. Taking realistic symbols as the basis, the artists constructed new visual images. They sought to demonstrate to the audience the drama of the revolutionary years, the pathos of victory, the exploits of real people, achievements of the country, portraits of leaders and outstanding figures. Many of them tried to create a synthetic style that combined elements of European paintings with Chinese folk painting traditions. In these works, attempts can be seen to preserve the direct techniques of folk art: the brightness of silhouettes, the rhythmic combination of color spots and symbolism of images. For the better development of contemporary themes, painters began to use new materials and techniques. There appeared a great variety of technical means of printing, including black and white and color woodcuts, color lithography and color printing.

More often artists were assigned enlightening and propaganda tasks. The works of this period were devoted to the themes of grandiose economic construction, military victories, glorification of the heroes of labor, struggle against illiteracy, and clarification of new laws and regulations. Since the main consumer group of *xin nianhua* belonged to Chinese peasants, most of the images were devoted to the political course of the Communist Party in terms of the agricultural sphere and social transformations of villages. These were stories about the agrarian reform, the creation of agricultural brigades, agricultural cooperation, struggle to increase production rates and harvest output. In accordance with the literacy program, *Nianhua workshops* printed numerous pictures promoting culture and education (see fig. 12-1).

Today, St. Petersburg State University Library’s collection contains three folders of *xin nianhua* pictures (*xin nianhua xuanji* 新年画选集) printed in a typographic manner in Beijing in 1950.¹⁵ Among the pictures, predominant are examples showing peasant life and agricultural activities, but there are also *nianhua* related to foreign affairs. Although these *xin nianhua* differ greatly from traditional *nianhua*, their creators, nevertheless, clearly borrowed a number of easily recognizable traditional ideas, images, forms and details from old *nianhua* and

14 From this point onwards, the terms *nianhua* 年画 and *xin nianhua* 新年画 remain indicated in Pinyin in italic but without Chinese characters unless necessary.

15 *Xin nianhua xuanji* 新年画选集 (*Anthology of New Year paintings*), vol. 1–2, Beijing: Rongbaozhai xinji 1950.

Chinese medieval paintings. All visual images were understandable for both urban and rural population.



Figure 12-1: *Du bao tu* 讀報圖 (Reading newspaper).¹⁶ *Xin nianhua* in the form of a traditional lunar calendar.

16 Designer: LI Qun 力群. From the collection of St. Petersburg State University Library (Oriental Department).

“Laodage”:

Visual Images of the Soviet Union in China in the 1950s

In 1950 the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, which established close relations and cooperation in different areas. The Treaty was supposed to foster the rapprochement of the socialist countries in their struggle against imperialism. In the 1950s, large-scale propaganda campaigns launched both in the USSR and in China were to create extremely positive images of “fraternal peoples” and “brothers forever”. Their goal was to arouse a feeling of mutual understanding between the two nations and bring the Soviet people closer to the Chinese, who could serve as a valuable ally in the USSR’s struggle against the United States. Communist China was interested in receiving economic, military, scientific, and technical assistance from the Soviet Union, as well as in the training of qualified personnel. Economic co-operation became an important component of the bilateral relations and enabled China to achieve fruitful results in industrial growth. It also helped to supply China with Soviet weapons and equipment for modernization of the Chinese army, navy and air force, changing it from a primitive and poorly equipped armed force into a modern one; the largest in Asia. For all these reasons, mass propaganda campaigns were carried out on a grand scale in both countries, and visual images played a particularly important role in these campaigns.

The central idea for this visual propaganda was set to present JOSEF STALIN with MAO ZEDONG as the major pillars of Sino-Soviet friendship. Their figures took central position everywhere because in the 1950s “China Stalin” became the image and symbol of peace and socialism all over the world. Images of STALIN and MAO standing side by side were intended to symbolize not only the strength of the two communist nations, but also to personify the power of the entire socialist camp. On the posters, two powerful figures of the communist leaders opposed the entirety of the imperialist West (fig. 12-2). The poster designed by LI BINGHONG with portraits of STALIN and MAO amidst people in folk dresses dancing on the Red Square and Tiananmen is accompanied with the slogan: “The Sino-Soviet Alliance for Friendship and Mutual Assistance promotes enduring world peace”.¹⁷ Portraits of the two communist leaders are present even on the *nianhua* along with celebrating children (fig. 12-3).

17 LI Binghong (黎冰鴻). In: Chineseposters.net. Available online: <https://chineseposters.net/artists/libinghong.php> (last access 2020, April 29).



Figure 12-2: “Under the banner of STALIN – MAO Zedong forward, to victory!”.¹⁸ Poster.



Figure 12-3: “Zhong su youhao wansui” 中蘇友好萬歲 (Long live the China-Soviet friendship).¹⁹ Xin nianhua.

18 Designer: LI Zongjin 李宗津. Narodnyi Kitaï (People’s China). 1952. No. 22, p. 10. From the collection of St. Petersburg State University Library (Oriental Department).

19 Designer: ZHAO Min 赵敏. From the collection of St. Petersburg State University Library (Oriental Department).

In the 1950s, a large number of posters and other illustrations were published to familiarize the Chinese people with the phenomenon of the Russian teacher who would provide them with assistance. The Soviet people were portrayed as good friends, *laodage* 老大哥 (the “elder brothers”), from whom Chinese people were supposed to learn everything about modernization. This idea was to be promoted in many propaganda posters. The “elder brother” was always represented with the position of a teacher, while the Chinese were depicted as attentive pupils, absorbing every word spoken by their teacher. At that time, a large number of posters and *xin nianhua* appeared in China, depicting well educated skilled Soviet people (engineers, professors, agronomists, doctors, experienced workers) who taught their Chinese counterparts and helped them fulfil new scientific and technological achievements, as well as offer them practical recommendations (fig. 12-4). On these posters Soviet people always looked more mature and more experienced than their Chinese “comrades” and students so that the image of an “elder brother” was even strongly visualized. On one of the *xin nianhua* pictures, one can see Soviet specialists with the Gold Stars of the Heroes²⁰, which was meant to show the ordinary Chinese people that the most honored Soviet citizens were sent to help them (fig. 12-7). Posters and paintings usually demonstrate the moment of communication between Soviet specialists and their Chinese counterparts or students. In one of them, a reputable Soviet engineer is explaining something to a young Chinese (fig. 12-5). In another, an elderly Russian worker is sharing his experience with a young Chinese friend, which takes place in front of a huge modern factory building (fig. 12-6). Another poster “Great friendship, fraternal feelings!” designed by WANG Naizhuang (王乃壯) shows steelworkers (Russian and Chinese) engaged in steelmaking together while it is clearly visible that it is the Soviet engineer who is controlling the steel melting process. The image was based on a photograph published in *China Reconstructs* (August 1955).²¹

Many posters and pictures portray friendly meetings of Chinese workers and peasants with guests from the Soviet Union as well. These show how warmly and cordially the Chinese greet their “elder brothers” (fig. 12-7). One of the *nianhua* shows that the Chinese meet Russian friends in the same way as they celebrate New Spring, New Year (fig. 12-8).

20 The Gold Star medal (in Russian: “*Zolotaia Zvezda*”) was a special insignia that identified recipients of the title “Hero” in the USSR.

21 Great friendship, fraternal feelings! In: Chineseposters.net. Available online: <https://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-866.php> (last access 2020, April 29).




Figure 12-4: “Elder brother from the USSR”.²² *Xin nianhua*.



Figure 12-5: “*Xuexi sulian xianjin jingyan jianshe women de zuguo*
學習蘇聯先進經驗建設我們的祖國 Study the Soviet Union’s
advanced experience to build up our nation”.²³ Poster.

22 Designer: WU Dezu 武德祖. *Narodnyi Kitaĭ* (People’s China). 1952. No. 3-4, p. 40. From the collection of St. Petersburg State University Library (Oriental Department).

23 Designer: DING Hao 丁浩. *Narodnyi Kitaĭ* (People’s China). 1953. No. 21, p. 19. From the collection of St. Petersburg State University Library (Oriental Department).



Figure 12-6: “Study the advanced production experience of the Soviet Union, struggle for the industrialization of our country!”²⁴ Poster.



Figure 12-7: “*Huanying sulian pengyou* 歡迎蘇聯朋友
(Welcome to Soviet friends)”²⁵ *Xin nianhua*.

²⁴ Designer: LI Zongjin 李宗津. *Narodnyi Kitai* (People’s China). 1953. No. 4, p. 19. From the collection of St. Petersburg State University Library (Oriental Department).

²⁵ Designer: DENG Shu 邓树. From the collection of St. Petersburg State University Library (Oriental Department).



Figure 12-8: “Youyi xinchun 友誼新春 (Friendship’s New Spring)”.²⁶
Xin nianhua.



Figure 12-9: “Xin Zhongguo de ertong 新中國的兒童
(New China Children)”.²⁷ *Xin nianhua.*

26 Designers: WEN Tao 文韬, WANG Huizhi 王慧芝. From the collection of St. Petersburg State University Library (Oriental Department).

27 Designer: ZHANG Ding 张仃. From the collection of St. Petersburg State University Library (Oriental Department).

Through such visual images, often created in the form of *nianhua* which were accessible to the common people, even illiterate and poorly educated peasants perceived the idea that the Soviet people were true friends and “elder brothers” of the Chinese. Captions of these *nianhua* are often very concise and easy to read. Numerous Chinese posters and photographs in different magazines were designed to reflect the success of the Soviet Union in industrial construction, science, and art, and the victories of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War. Images of the first Soviet space satellites (*sputnik*), atomic icebreakers, and other achievements of the USSR in the use of peaceful atom appeared on the Chinese propaganda posters designed by LI Lang (李浪) and SONG Xishan (宋锡山), in 1958.

The impression of fraternal friendship between the Soviet people and the Chinese were usually supplemented with appropriate slogans and appeals on such posters. These slogans were supposed to strengthen “the elder brother” image: “The Soviet Union is an example to follow”, “Study the Soviet Union's advanced economy to build up our nation”, “Study the advanced production experience of the Soviet Union, struggle for the industrialization of our country”, “Study the Soviet Union, to advance to the world level of science” etc. A special series of posters was devoted to military cooperation between the USSR and China. As a rule, representatives of the two friendly armies or navies were portrayed. They were portrayed as strong young men as well as “brothers-in-arms”. These visual images were usually accompanied by specific slogans such as: “Long live the friendship between the peoples and armies of China and the Soviet Union” or “The Sino-Soviet alliance is invincible in the world”. In contrast, the capitalist world and Old China were painted in dark colors, and unpleasant images were used.

“Paper Tigers”: Visual Images of the USA and the West in China at the Time of the Korean War

“Paper tiger” is the English translation of the Chinese term *zhilaohu*²⁸ (纸老虎). It refers to something or someone that claims to be powerful and threatening, but is actually ineffectual and unable to withstand challenge. The expression became

²⁸ Originally, “paper tiger” is an ancient description used in Chinese culture. It first appeared in Western literature and was translated into English in the book *The Chinese: A General Description of the Empire of China and Its Inhabitants* (published in 1836) by Sir John Francis Davis, a British diplomat and sinologist who served as chief superintendent of British trade in China from 1833 to 1848 and governor of Hong Kong from 1844 to 1848.

popular as a catchphrase which MAO Zedong first put into practice and used against his political opponents, and later was actively applied in communist China to criticism about Western imperialism, particularly the U.S. government. MAO first introduced his concept of “paper tigers” in August 1946 in his talk with the American journalist Anna Louise Strong (1885–1970): “All reactionaries are paper tigers. In appearance, the reactionaries are terrifying, but in reality, they are not so powerful. From a long-term point of view, it is not the reactionaries but the people who are powerful.”²⁹ This was a very important statement by MAO concerning the international and domestic situation not long after the end of World War II. There, MAO Zedong put forward his famous slogan to the masses: “All reactionaries are paper tigers!”. This thesis armed the people ideologically, strengthened their confidence in victory and played a significant role in the People’s War of Liberation. Just as LENIN considered imperialism a “colossus with feet of clay”, so MAO Zedong regarded imperialism and all reactionaries as “paper tigers”; both dealt with the essence of the matter. This thesis is a fundamental strategic concept for the revolutionary people. Later on, plenty of times he compared imperialism with a “paper tiger”:

To destroy the rule of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism in China, it took the Chinese people more than a hundred years and cost them tens of millions of lives before the victory in 1949. Look! Were these not living tigers, iron tigers, real tigers? Nevertheless, in the end they changed into paper tigers, dead tigers, and bean-curd tigers. These are historical facts. Have people not seen or heard about these facts? There have indeed been thousands and tens of thousands of them! Thousands and tens of thousands! Hence, imperialism and all reactionaries, looked at in essence, from a long-term point of view, from a strategic point of view, must be seen for what they are - paper tigers. On this, we should build our strategic thinking. On the other hand, they are also living tigers, iron tigers, real tigers that can devour people. On this, we should build our tactical thinking.³⁰

After MAO’s speeches the “paper tiger” image was used everywhere in China. With such an image, it was much easier to motivate and mobilize the masses to fight against imperialists, and MAO Zedong actively used it:

29 “Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong” (August 1946). In: *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 4, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press 1961, p.100.

30 Speech at the Wuhan Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (December 1958). In: *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. IV, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press 1961, pp. 98–99.

I have said that all the reputedly powerful reactionaries are merely paper tigers. The reason is that they are divorced from the people. Look! Was not HITLER a paper tiger? Was HITLER not overthrown? I also said that the Tsar of Russia, the emperor of China and Japanese imperialism were all paper tigers. As we know, they were all overthrown. U.S. imperialism has not yet been overthrown and it has the atom bomb. I believe it also will be overthrown. It, too, is a paper tiger.³¹

In October 1950, just one year after the People's Republic was founded, the Chinese People's Volunteers stepped in to support North Korean communist forces in the Korean War (1950–1953). The Korean War marked the period of a strong rise in patriotism among Chinese people. After the beginning of the Korean War, the USA officially became China's main foreign opponent and most vicious enemy. The slogan "Resist America and Support Korea!" was very popular in mass propaganda and was supplemented by another one: "Defend Home and Motherland!".

The war time provided numerous opportunities to demonstrate Americans and other "Western imperialists" in an extremely disgusting guise. American soldiers murdering and looting in Korea became popular characters on Chinese posters and caricatures. Sometimes ugly and revolting military men on the Chinese caricatures resembled the U.S. president Harry TRUMAN or general Douglas MACARTHUR, the commander of the American troops in Korea. A popular theme in political propaganda of that time was the accusation that the USA was engaged in bacteriological warfare against Chinese.

During the Korean War, there appeared a considerable number of propaganda posters illustrating the victories of the North Korean army and Chinese People's Volunteers. These were posters designed in a realistic manner or in the form of caricatures. The Americans and their allies were shown either as defeated and captive (in realistic posters), or as miserable and puny midgets on whom the young and strong Chinese and Korean warriors were easily cracking down (via caricatures). After the start of the Korean War, the United States officially became China's main foreign adversary. The war provided numerous opportunities to show Americans in a bad light. At that time, Chinese propaganda posters and caricatures formed the common Chinese perception of American imperialism as a "Paper Tiger", which could easily be coped with and defeated (cf. fig. 12-9). The image of American imperialism and the United States in the form of a paper tiger played a highly important role in the education of Chinese children after the Korean War. Americans in the form of paper tigers appeared in children theater plays, puppet shows, posters hung around in schools and kindergartens, and even in the English language textbooks. An important theme in Chinese newspapers and

31 Speech at the Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties (November 18, 1957). In: *Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung*, Beijing 1966, p. 46.

magazines at the time of the Korean War was the accusation that the U.S. military forces were engaged in bacteriological warfare against China.³² On this occasion, the Chinese and North Korean officials repeatedly made their statements.³³

It has been suggested that starting from 1952, the American activities included the utilization of disease carrying rats, insects, and other vermin on the Chinese territory. In response, the Chinese government organized mass inoculation campaigns within the framework of the Patriotic Health Campaign to combat unhygienic conditions in urban and rural areas, and to annihilate potential disease spreading animals and insects. The Patriotic Health Campaign started in 1952 after the appearance of the first “poisonous insects”. The American germ-warfare in North Korea had been reported earlier, but in 1952 Chinese officials linked these reports with the occurrence of domestic epidemics. In March 1952, some accounts confirmed the spraying of germs by Americans in Manchuria and Qingdao. Since then, Chinese newspapers began to publish articles and information notes which set out more and more facts about the germ-warfare that moved to China itself. Under the circumstances the Chinese government established a special committee for epidemic prevention and launched programs for anti-epidemic injections. Poster propaganda of anti-epidemic activities was an integral and important part of that campaign. The image of the USA and American soldiers on the anti-epidemic posters became violent and negative. Their images were connected with the images of disease-carrying rats and insects. On the poster “Resolutely cut off the bloody and criminal hand of the American aggressor that spreads germs!” is written and it depicts the bloody hand of American imperialism, decorated with the dollar sign symbol, swastika, and the Japanese flag, with a disease carrying rat; injections and the hygiene campaigns were directed against the germs “spreading by American imperialism”. Another poster designed by YE Shanlu (叶善策) was given the caption: “Everybody must take precautions against epidemics to smash the germ warfare of American imperialism”.³⁴ Therefore, the Patriotic Health Campaign and the visual propaganda they employed played an important role in promoting the negative image of the USA and the West in the 1950s China.

At that time the image of the United States became equal to the image of the West in China. The West was almost identified with the United States. Other

32 “Against U.S. Bacteriological War: A Statement by the P.P.C.C. and Democratic Parties of China issued on March 8, 1952”. In: *People's China*, March 16, 1952, pp. 3–4; “Foreign Minister Chou En-lai's Statement of March 8, 1952”. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5; “Down with the Germ-War Criminals! Editorial”. *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.

33 “U.S. Germ-Warfare Denounced: Statements by the Korean and Chinese Foreign Ministers on U.S. Bacteriological Warfare in Korea”. *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35.

34 “Patriotic Health Campaign (1952)”. Available online: <https://chineseposters.net/themes/patriotic-health-campaign.php> (last access 2020, April 23).

Western countries were mentioned rather rarely, let alone depicted. In addition to the United States, only satirical images of West Germany, which was positioned as an American satellite and semi-colony, can be seen in Chinese caricatures of the 1950s. The cartoons most often demonstrate how America is reviving German militarism (*junguo zhuyi* 军国主义). Another caricature shows Berlin divided into two parts: light (East Berlin) and dark (West Berlin). In this picture the divided city is similar to the image of traditional Chinese dualistic symbol *yin* 阴 and *yang* 阳 (dark-bright, negative-positive).

National Liberation Movements, the Second Indochina War, and the Image of the USA in China

Shortly before and during the Cultural Revolution in China, American imperialism and the West as a whole continued to be heavily criticized. As the self-proclaimed leader of the so-called Third World, China supported many national liberation movements and radical revolutionary parties in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This struggle was seen as part of a global movement in which the “countryside” (the Third World states) would fight against the “cities” (developed and industrialized countries of the Second and First Worlds) and conquer them. In many ways, China supported the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist wars, that is, the armed struggle of the peoples of the Third World against Western imperialism, propagating its own experience of the armed struggle against the Kuomintang (*Guomin-dang* 国民党, the Nationalist Party, in China until 1949 and in Taiwan since then). Due to the insufficiency of Chinese economic and military potential, the support was only moral for friendly nations and radical revolutionary parties in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In this sense, visual propaganda played a big role (cf. fig. 12-10).



Figure 12-10: “*Baowei heping!* 保衛和平! (Defend peace!).³⁵ Poster.

35 Designer: SU Guojing 苏国惊. *Narodnyi Kitaï* (People's China). 1952. No. 7-8, p. 19. From the collection of St. Petersburg State University Library (Oriental Department).

A large number of anti-imperialist posters aimed at supporting the national liberation movements were there to convince the Third World countries to support their struggle against the United States and Western countries.³⁶ Chinese posters of the time called for: “Vigorously support the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America” and persuaded the “awakened peoples” to “form the possible united front in order to win the war against imperialism”. Visual images of Americans and other Westerners in these posters were very repulsive in appearance. They were portrayed in the form of wretched little men trying to oppose the rise of national liberation movements. Sometimes they were depicted in the form of wolves or other predatory animals. In any case, the muscular and well angulated representatives of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America swept them out of their way.

During the Second Indochina War (1957–1975) the renaissance of the “Paper Tiger” image can be seen. At that time China not only kept a close watch on the U.S. military activities south of its borders (in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), but tried to support anti-American forces in that region. A potential spillover of hostilities into the Chinese territory seemed rather possible, as the PRC had taken side on Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The struggle of the peoples of Indochina (especially the Vietnamese) against the American intervention provided inspiration to many Chinese artists in the 1960s to the early 1970s, and their posters strongly influenced the popular consciousness leading to the rise of patriotism. The slogans “Down with American imperialism!” and “American imperialism is the common enemy of all the people in the world!” became increasingly frequent at that time. A huge number of Chinese posters of the 1960s–1970s depicted Vietnamese partisans (and even Vietnamese children) who heroically fought against the American invaders. “American imperialism must be beaten!” was also the frequently used slogan on Chinese posters of that time.

On some posters, the scene of parachuting American pilots being shot down in the sky of Vietnam is also found. One of the pilots has the face of the U.S. president Lyndon JOHNSON, who was responsible for escalating the Vietnam War. This example proves that Chinese artists as the authors of propaganda posters sought to visualize the image of the enemy by adding the features of a concrete politician. Welcoming the victories of the Vietnamese partisans, Chinese propaganda tried to bring their struggle to the level of an absolute and emphasized its global significance.

36 “Foreign Friends: National Liberation Movements”. Available online: <https://chinese-posters.net/themes/liberation-movements.php> (last access 2020, April 23).

Images of the USSR from the Time of the Sino-Russian Split

While the image of America and the West as a whole was still negative in China and did not change much, the image of the Soviet Union, in comparison, was entirely positive in the 1950s. However, during the Cultural Revolution period significant changes can be noted in many respects as the image of the Soviet Union was becoming similar to the image of the West. The transformations were mostly reflected on posters and cartoons.

When the Sino-Soviet split started in the 1960s and especially after the 1969 border conflict over Zhenbaodao 珍宝岛 (or Damanskii) Island, the most explicit Chinese propaganda was directed against the USSR. During this period, there appeared a great number of posters that called for *Dadao Su xiū* 打倒苏修 (fighting against the Soviet revisionists), who, like the Western imperialists before them, were depicted as vile ugly dwarfs. Sometimes “Soviet revisionists” were portrayed along with “American imperialists”. On the posters both were being swept out of the way by the valiant *Hongweibing* 红卫兵 (Red Guards). The slogan “All peoples of the world, unite, to overthrow American imperialism, Soviet revisionism and reactionaries of various countries!” became very popular in the course of the Cultural Revolution. MAO Zedong’s political opponents who were attacked by the Red Guard were often called the “Chinese Khrushchevs” on propagandist posters.

Typical examples of the Maoist propaganda at the turn of the 1970s were the publications of political comics. In the comics “Soviet spy arrested” was described in a typical spy story. It was about a spy group from the USSR Embassy, which engaged in espionage by the order of the Soviet government. In the suburbs of Beijing, a spy cache was made for the spies. Police and security services seized evidence from them proving their espionage. The Soviet Embassy officers abused their diplomatic status, tried to undermine the sovereignty of China and violated the generally accepted norms of international law by engaging in espionage, and they thus committed a crime. The Chinese government deported the Soviet spies from the country in protest against the actions of the Soviet authorities. The appearance of such publications contributed to a change in the image of the Soviet Union in China, especially among the younger generation.

Finally, it is noteworthy that at the period of the Cultural Revolution and the Sino-Soviet Split, “Soviet revisionists” and the Soviet Union were never called “paper tigers”, despite the fact that numerous posters appeared against both American imperialism and Soviet revisionism. The former (i.e. American imperialism) was represented in Chinese propaganda posters and caricatures as a paper tiger, which could be easily coped with and defeated, and this perception of America

was effectively indoctrinated in China. The last poster with the caption “Imperialism and all reactionary forces are paper tigers” was published in January 1971. A few months later the Ping-pong diplomacy started, which paved the way for a visit of president Richard NIXON to Beijing in 1972.

Min-Chin Kay CHIANG

I3 “Reviving” the Russian Orthodox Church in Taiwan

Abstract. As early as the first year into Japanese colonization (1895–1945), the Russian Orthodox Church arrived in Taiwan. Japanese Orthodox Church members had actively called for establishing a church on this “new land”. In the post-WWII period after the Japanese left and with the impending Cold War, the Russian community in China migrating with the successive Kuomintang government brought their church life to Taiwan. Religious activities were practiced by both immigrants and local members until the 1980s. In recent decades, recollection of memories was initiated by the “revived” Church; lobbying efforts have been made for erecting monuments in Taipei City as the commemorations of former gathering sites of the Church. The Church also continuously brings significant religious objects into Taiwan to “reconnect” the land with the larger historical context and the church network while bonding local members through rituals and vibrant activities at the same time. With reference to the archival data of the Japanese Orthodox Church, postwar records, as well as interviews of key informants, this article intends to clarify the historical development and dynamics of forgetting and remembering the Russian Orthodox Church in Taiwan.

Keywords. Russian Orthodox Church, Russia and Taiwan, Russian émigrés, Sites of Memory, Japanese Orthodox Church.

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An Orthodox church in the Traditional Taiwanese Market

In winter 2018, I walked into a traditional Taiwanese market in Taipei and surprisingly found a Russian Orthodox church at a corner of small alleys deep in the market. Later I figured out that this whitewashed old concrete building was a ghost money¹ and incense shop before being turned into a church. The pictures of the church aroused great interest of friends, including those who lived in the neighborhood, without realizing that it was a Russian Orthodox church. A strong feeling of alienation was clearly there the moment one steps into the church from the hustle and bustle of the lively market. On the white façade of the church building, a sentence written in Chinese characters says: “*Jidu fuhuo le*; 基督復活了 (Christ is risen)”. This shows not only an important religious message, but also a message from the Church² to the local community: *fuhuo le* (復活了) in Chinese could also mean “revived” (see fig. 13-1). Efforts to “revive” the memory of a Russian Orthodox church on this island have been made by the Church through religious activities as well as recounts of its history.

With relatively few research on the Russian Orthodox Church in Taiwan, this article is based on the data of *Seikyō jihō* 正教時報 and *Seikyō shinpō* 正教新報 published by the Japanese Orthodox Church; *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* 臺灣日日新報; and data collected through on-site visits and interviews. It also aims to sort out the historical development of the Russian Orthodox Church in Taiwan. Overall, the religious development of the Orthodox Church has been closely related to various political transitions in Taiwan. This indicates chronologically unavoidable disruption and disconnection. Through the study of current data, three phases of the Russian Orthodox Church in Taiwan can be identified: The Japanese Period of the Harisutosu seikyōkai ハリストス正教会 (Haristos/Khristos Orthodox Church) (1895–1945), the Post-WWII White Russian Period (1949–1980s), and the Post-1990s “Revival” Period.

1 Also known as “joss paper” or “hell money” used during the religious rites for offering to ancestors, ghosts, or the deities.

2 As a particular Christian organization, thus uppercased.



Figure 13-1: Church building in November 2018
Photo taken by Min-Chin Kay CHIANG

Japanese Period of the Haristos Orthodox Church ハリストス 正教会 in Taiwan (1895–1945)

The beginning of the institutionalization of the Orthodox Church in Taiwan cannot be separated from its development in Japan. The Russian Orthodox Church as an organization was founded in Meiji Japan and soon successfully attracted numerous followers. In 1900, the membership reached 25,700, which was double the number of Presbyterians and almost half of the total number of Catholics. The number increased to 32,000 at the end of the Meiji period.³ This was quite surprising especially when the Russo-Japanese relation was challenged by the Tripartite Intervention in 1895 by France, Germany, and Russia. Most researches attributed the success to St. Nikolai (St. Nikolai), a charismatic missionary who introduced the Orthodox Church to Japan.

Nikolai (1836–1912; baptized as Ivan Dmitrievich KASATKIN) arrived in Hakodate 函館, Hokkaidō in 1861 as a chaplain at the Russian consulate. In 1868 he baptized his first three converts including SAWABE Takuma 沢辺琢磨 (1833–1913), originally a Tosa 土佐 samurai and an adopted son of a Shintō priest in Hakodate. He later became the first Japanese Orthodox priest in 1875. The conversion of SAWABE indicated that the social atmosphere veered toward Christianity in the Meiji period. The Meiji government was eager to promote the image of new Japan as a modern country. In the late Tokugawa period and the early Meiji period, many young ex-samurais were looking for a new direction in life; they were attracted by the charismatic Nikolai and the image of the Christian Church which linked to the advanced social ideology, although the Orthodox Church seemed to affiliate more with the conservative in Russia. With the assistance of SAWABE, Nikolai was able to expand the mission in northeast Japan and set up the first church in Sendai. In 1872 Nikolai moved to Tsukiji 築地 in Tokyo and since then Tokyo has become the headquarter of the Japanese Orthodox Church.

Although in 1889 the Meiji Constitution (Dai-Nippon Teikoku Kenpō 大日本帝國憲法, The Constitution of the Empire of Japan) finally announced religious freedom, which must be under the condition of not violating the social order and one's obligations as the subject of the country and the emperor,⁴ the Christian

3 BALLHATCHET, H. J.: “The Modern Missionary Movement in Japan: Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox”. In: Mark MULLINS (ed.): *Handbook of Christianity in Japan*, Leiden: Brill 2003, pp. 35–68.

4 Cf. the clause no. 28 of the Constitution of the Japanese Empire: “Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.” In: “The Constitution of the Empire of Japan –

religion had long been banned especially during the Tokugawa period (1603–1868). In the Meiji period, the government pursuing Western modernization chose to be affiliated with the Church while pushing for the integration of religious and political regimes under the Emperor at the same time. Moreover, the interest in Christianity of some intellectuals overlapped with their human rights movements that might pose challenges to the status of the Emperor as the sole authority. The tension between religion and political power was inevitable in Meiji Japan, and was further exacerbated by the nationalist competition and colonial expansion in the early 20th century. In 1895, among other war profits, Japan seized the Liaodong Peninsula and Taiwan from Qing China; yet in the same year, Russia, Germany, and France intervened in the negotiation. In the end, Russia took away two treaty ports, Lüshun and Dalian, in north-east China. This event directly triggered the Russo-Japanese War from 1904 to 1905. This was the social atmosphere, in which Nikolai started his evangelical work and developed the Russian Orthodox Church in Japan. The tension could be felt in criticism against the construction of “Nikorai-dō” in 1891.

“Nikorai-dō ニコライ堂 (the Nikolai church)” refers to the cathedral built in Tokyo in 1891. With the elaborate Byzantine tower and ornaments, the impressive architecture received criticism not only from the public but also from the Church itself. Overlooking the Imperial Palace, the cathedral was criticized for its height; at the same time, the coworkers were against the construction plan due to the Church’s financial difficulty. Eventually the building was completed per Nikolai’s wish to build a *site of memory* that would become a part of the cityscape. The criticism against the “Nikorai-dō” represented the unenthusiastic relation between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Meiji authority. When the Russo-Japanese nationalist tension rose, Nikolai showed great flexibility in localizing the Orthodox Church in Japan. With a relatively open attitude to local customs, death related rites in particular, he was also well aware of the intertwining relationship between religion and the political regime. He was considered adept at dealing with it. As he approached his Japanese coworkers during the Russo-Japanese War, he encouraged them to pray for Japan while he himself refrained from public prayer events; he had to remain loyal to his country. In this way, he was able to maintain the Orthodox Church’s expansion even during the tense period of Russo-Japan relation and after his death in 1912.⁵

Birth of the Constitution of Japan”. Available online: <https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c02.html#s2> (last access 2020, May 3).

5 BALLHATCHET, H. J.: “The Modern Missionary Movement in Japan: Roman Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox”. In: Mark Mullins (ed.), *Handbook of Christianity in Japan*, Leiden: Brill 2003, pp. 35–68.

Japan took over Taiwan from the Chinese Qing Dynasty in 1895. Following the colonial government, Japanese religious groups came to Taiwan out of religious, as well as colonial, impetus. The Japanese Christian Church was one of the earliest and initiated its first missionary activity in 1896. Before the Japanese period, Christianity had already reached Taiwan when the major population, Han Taiwanese and Austronesian-speaking indigenous groups had various local beliefs. In the 17th century, the Dutch V.O.C. (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) brought the Dutch Reformist Church (De gereformeerde kerk) to southern Taiwan while Spanish Dominican missionaries came to the northern part around the same time. Both had some impacts on the indigenous groups yet reduced when the Dutch and Spanish powers retreated from Taiwan in the late 17th century. Before the Japanese colonial government took control in 1895, both the Dominicans and the Presbyterians were the major Christian groups on the island in the late 19th century as several Taiwanese ports were opened to Western traders under the Treaty of Tianjin (1858). In 1859, the Catholic Dominican Church from Manila became widespread over the entire island of Taiwan while the Presbyterian Church was brought to the southern area by British missionaries in 1865. In 1872, the Canadian missionary MACKAY brought Presbyterians with him into the north.⁶

At the time when the Japanese took over Taiwan, Japanese Christian Churches were introduced to the island by various interest groups, including the Nihon Kirisuto Kyōkai / *Riben Jidu Jiaohui* 日本基督教會 (Church of Christ in Japan), Nihon Seikōkai / *Riben Shenggonghui* 日本聖公会 in Japan (the Anglican-Episcopal Church NSKK), Nihon Kumiai Kirisuto Kyōkai / *Riben Zuhe Jidu Jiaohui* 日本組合基督教 (Congregational Christian Church of Japan), Nihon Mesojisuto Kyōkai 日本メソヂスト教会 (The Methodist Episcopal Church in Japan), Nihon Seikyōkai / *Riben Shengjiaohui* 日本聖教會 (Japan Holiness Church), Salvation Army, and the Greek Orthodox Church⁷ etc.⁸ The “True Jesus Church” was also brought over from China in the early period of Japanese colonization. According to the report of *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* on July 18 in the year Shōwa 2 (1927), there were 168 assembly places, 223 missionaries, 2,374 Japanese, and 38,177 Taiwanese believers (including Han Taiwanese and Austronesian indigenous population). These numbers included all Christian sects of Catholic, Presbyterian, Japan Congregational Church, the Anglican-Episcopal Church in Japan, Orthodox

6 WU Xueming 吳學明: “Zhongzhan qian zai Tai jidu{jiaopai} guanxi zhi yanjiu” 終戰前在臺基督教派關係之研究 (Research of Christianity in Taiwan Before the End of the Second World War). In: *Taiwan Wenxian* 臺灣文獻 (Taiwan Historica) No. 63:4, 2012, pp. 101–136.

7 It was actually the Russian Orthodox Church yet appeared as Greek Orthodox Church in the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* many times.

8 WU Xueming: “Zhongzhan qian zai Tai jidu{jiaopai} guanxi zhi yanjiu” (2012).

Church, and Holiness Church. The total number of the Christian population was at 40,551, out of 126,534 of all religious believers in Taiwan.⁹ The Orthodox Church was already included in the statistics in 1927. It means that the Orthodox Church was one of the identifiable Christian Churches in the mid-Japanese colonial period.

The establishment of the Orthodox Church in Taiwan was inseparable from the will of Nihon Harisutosu Seikyōkai 日本ハリストス正教会 (the Orthodox Church in Japan). According to the record of *Seikyō shinpō* 正教新報, the official publication of the Orthodox Church in Japan, on September 1, 1901,¹⁰ the author Isaiya MIZUSHIMA (イサイヤ水島行楊 MIZUSHIMA Kōyō) mentioned that “the call for sending missionaries to Taiwan had been loud a few years ago. It has been even louder since Taiwan became a part of the imperial land of Japan”.¹¹ Fr. Simeon (YUKAWA Kinji 湯川謹次) was assigned to visit Orthodox followers in Taiwan and to inspect the missionary work in September and October 1901. It could be inferred from the record that before 1895 there had been discussion among the Orthodox Church in Japan about expanding the missionary work into Taiwan. Moreover, in 1901 there were already 29 Orthodox believers in Taiwan.¹² Fr. Simeon YUKAWA was assigned to visit Taiwan again in 1903 and asked for a regular priest to reside in Taiwan. By examining the diary of Nikolai and the *Seikyō shinpō* in this period, TSUKAMOTO Zenya 塚本善也¹³ found that the Orthodox Church, especially Nikolai himself, had been enthusiastic about sending a regular priest to Taiwan and yet was intervened by the eruption of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. The war directly impacted on the finance of the Russian Orthodox Church.

9 “Quandao ge jiaohui xiankuang he shendao fojiao jidu xintu ji shier wan liu qian wubai sanshisi ren” 全島各教會現況合神道佛教基督信徒計十二萬六千五百三十四人 (Current state of the religions of the whole island including Shinto, Buddhist, and Christian religions: the total number of believers are 126,534). In: *Kanbun Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* 漢文臺灣日日新報 (Chinese-language Taiwan Daily), no. 4, 1927, July 18, p. 4.

10 Isaiya MIZUSHIMA Kōyō イサイヤ水島行楊: “Shimeon YUKAWA-fu no Taiwan-gyō o okuru” シメオン湯川父の臺灣行を送る/水島行楊 (Seeing Fr. Simeon YUKAWA off to Taiwan). *Seikyō shinpō*, no. 498, 1901, September 1, pp. 5–8.

11 Ibid., p. 5.

12 “Taiwan-jima zaijū shinto” 臺灣島在住信徒 (The believers residing in Taiwan). *Seikyō shinpō*, No. 502, 1901, pp. 18–19. On the website of *Orthodoxy in Taiwan*: in 1901 the “Christ the Savior Parish” was established in Taiwan. In 1900 there were 15 or 17 believers, and went up to 29 the following year. The number reached forty-four in 1903. See. OrthodoxWiki contributors: “Orthodoxy in Taiwan”, 2016, May 16. Available online: https://orthodoxwiki.org/Orthodoxy_in_Taiwan (last access 2019, December 8).

13 TSUKAMOTO Zenya 塚本善也: “Nihon Harisutosu seikyōkai no Taiwan dendō” 日本ハリストス正教会の台灣伝道 (Missionary Work of the Japanese Haristos Orthodox Church in Taiwan). In: NAKAMURA Yoshikazu 中村喜和 et al. (eds.): *Haruka nari: Waga kokyō – Ikyō ni ikiru III 遙かなり、わが故郷・異境に生きる III* (Faraway Homeland – Living in a Foreign Land III), Yokohama: Seibunsha 2005, pp. 157–169.

As Japan and Russia competed for the control over northeast China and Korea, in November 1903, only a few months before the Russo-Japan War, a report on *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* states that, “[d]ue to the tension between Japan and Russia, the priest Nikolai announced that he would return to Russia and would not fund the missionary work in Japan. Hence the Japanese missionaries and servants were anxious about this possibility”.¹⁴ Under such circumstances, the pastoral work was still officially launched in Taiwan in 1911. The priest Fr. Titus KOSHIYAMA (KOSHIYAMA Shō 越山照) arrived in Taiwan in July and the Christ/Haristos Orthodox Church (Kirisuto seikyōkai 基督正教會) was officially founded.¹⁵ In the *Seikyō shinpō* in August 1911, “the official beginning of the missionary work in Taiwan” was announced and documented by one article entitled “Important record of the Board of the Church”).¹⁶ On September 21, 1911, the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* reported the missionary plan of KOSHIYAMA:

The priest of the Orthodox Church KOSHIYAMA Shō (越山照) arrived in Taizhong and founded the assembly place on the 14th of this month. He used this as the base and sent missionaries to Taipei, Tainan and important locations on the island to fully promote the Orthodox belief. This church belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church.¹⁷ KOSHIYAMA has been ordained by Bishop Nikolai, as aforementioned; this time he was assigned as priest to the Taiwan parish. Furthermore, the number of believers living on the island including the Secretary Officer SAITŌ (齋藤), Councilor SAKURAI (柵瀬) et al., are around fifty.¹⁸

However, KOSHIYAMA did not stay in Taiwan for long. TSUKAMOTO suggested that KOSHIYAMA was not in the service in Taiwan even before August 1912.

After Fr. Titus KOSHIYAMA, the priest Antoniī TAKAI (TAKAI Makio 高井万龜尾) was assigned to continue the missionary work in Taiwan. With the main base in Nagasaki, he only visited Taiwan annually. The *Seikyō jihō* 正教時報 carried detailed records of his two visits: February 4 to March 7 in 1913; and February 28 to March 31 in 1914. He arrived in Keelung port (Jilong gang 基隆港) and visited Taipei, Miaoli (苗栗), Taichung (Taizhong 台中), Chiayi (Jiayi 嘉義),

14 “Eguo zhengjiaopai shuaishi” 俄國正教派衰勢 (Decline of the Russian Orthodox Church). In: *Taiwan Nichinichi shinpō*, 1903, November 7, p. 4. (Article in Chinese.)

15 “Kirisuto seikyō dendō kaishi 基督正教傳道開始 (The Start of Evangelical Work of the Christ/Haristos Orthodox Church). In: *Taiwan Nichinichi shinpō*, 1911, July 22, p. 1.

16 “Sōkōkai jūyō kiji” 總公會重要記事 (Important record of the Board of the Church). In: *Seikyō shinpō*, 1911, August 1, no. 736, p. 10.

17 It was actually the Russian Orthodox Church.

18 “Kirisuto seikyōkai kaisetsu” 基督正教會開設 (Founding of the Christ/Haristos Orthodox Church). In: *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō*, 1911, September 21, p. 2.

Kaohsiung (Gaoxiong 高雄), and Pingtung (Pingdong 屏東).¹⁹ From his travelling route, Orthodox followers in the early 1910s seemed to aggregate mainly in the cities, especially along western Taiwan. In 1915, Fr. Foma (MAKI Tsunetarō 真木常太郎) replaced TAKAI and served as the resident priest in Taiwan until 1930. He resided in Chiayi in southern Taiwan. Although Fr. Foma MAKI was the official priest assigned by the Japanese Orthodox Church, his activities were rarely shown on the *Seikyō jihō* or the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō*. In comparison, both frequently reported about the activities of the Taipei Orthodox Church conducted by MATSUDAIRA Yoshihiro 松平慶宏 who was already active in the late 1890s by frequently appealing to Nikolai for a resident priest position in Taiwan.

The prevailing activities of the Russian Orthodox Church in Taiwan could be seen from the *Seikyō jihō* 正教時報 published by the Orthodox Church of Japan. The Taipei Harisutosu Seikyōkai 臺北ハリストス正教會 (Taipei Haristos Orthodox Church) was officially established on December 13th, 1916 with MATSUDAIRA’s efforts. The Female Society of Taipei Orthodox Church was founded in the following year.²⁰ Self-funding his missionary work, MATSUDAIRA applied to the Taipei state government for establishing the church and received official approval. The number of newly baptized believers reached 48; with another 27 believers migrated from the Japanese mainland, the total number of believers reached 75 in 1919. However, MATSUDAIRA and his family moved back to Japan in May 1919, three years after he founded the Taipei Church. During the period from late 1916 to 1919, the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō* published weekly reports on Sunday activities of the Taipei Orthodox Church²¹ with little reference to MAKI’s activities; mainly concerning his visit to the church in Taipei. The frequent reporting on the Taipei church ceased in 1919 after MATSUDAIRA’s departure. Even though the priest MAKI Tsunetarō kept his residency in Chiayi and later carried on the missionary work in Taipei, after MATSUDAIRA’s leave, there were nearly no important religious activities in Taiwan recorded by the *Seikyō jihō* during this period. The last related record before WWII was in 1934, a detailed note on the proto-priest TAKAI Makio’s trip to Taiwan.²²

19 “Takai shisai Taiwan kikō” 高井司祭臺灣紀行 (Record of the priest TAKAI’s visit to Taiwan). In: *Seikyō jihō*, vol. 2, no. 7, 1913, April 5, pp. 49–55.

20 “Taihoku seikyō fujinkai setsuritsu” 臺北正教婦人會設立 (Founding of the Female Society of the Taipei Orthodox Church). In: *Seikyō jihō*, 1917, August 15, p. 42; “Taihoku seikyōkai” 臺北正教會 (Taipei Orthodox Church). In: *Seikyō jihō*, 1918, January 15, pp. 34–35.

21 The Church located at MATSUDAIRA’s house at the address Bajiazhuang (八甲庄) in the current Wanhua District in Taipei.

22 TAKAI Makio: “Junkai nisshi” 巡迴日誌 (Diary of the visit). In: *Seikyō jihō*, vol. 23, no. 3, 1934, pp. 30–32.

TAKAI's visits were recorded in vol. 22 no. 3 in 1933 and vol. 23 no. 3 in 1934 by the *Seikyō jihō*.²³ Both records showed that after 1930, the Orthodox Church in Japan assigned TAKAI to Taiwan again and restarted the annual religious visit after 1930. This was related to MAKI's death on November 27, 1930.²⁴ During these two trips, different from his previous visits in the 1910s, TAKAI went to a larger area including eastern Taiwan. It is noteworthy that several names of Russians were mentioned during his second trip in 1933 when visiting Taipei, Chiayi, Kaohsiung, and Tainan.²⁵ The report on April 9, 1925 of the *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpo* indicated that “[t]hirty Russian sellers still resided on the island.” Whether they are related to the Orthodox believers aforementioned or to Belo emigrants (a term for white émigrés, especially Russian émigrés) staying after the Russian Civil War (1918–1922) remains unanswered.²⁶

Through two detailed records of TAKAI's Taiwan visits, it is clear that Russian Orthodox Church believers were distributed all over western Taiwan and part of the east coast in the early 1930s. Most of time, he stayed in Taipei, and then the area between Chiayi and Tainan. This is not surprising because the priest MAKI based in Chiayi. Yet the considerable number of believers in Taipei showed the impact of frequent evangelical activities conducted by MATSUDAIRA before 1919. We can also see different groups of immigrants from the Japanese mainland to Taipei. Furthermore, as shown in the record, most believers he visited were Japanese, few Russians and only one mention of Taiwanese. This indicated the ethnic composition of believers in the 1930s. The activities of the Orthodox Church went down after the mid-1930s under the impacts of MAKI's death and the prewar atmosphere.

The Orthodox Church in the Japanese mainland was seriously affected by the Russian Civil War particularly due to the shrinkage and eventually cut of financial support from Russia. Salaries of priests, catechists, and clerks were cut off; schools and related organizations were suspended. The situation worsened in the pre-WWII period. In 1939 Japan announced that they began the wartime “national mobilization,” and intended to control and appropriate religions, treating them as the nationalist and imperialist propaganda instruments. On the one hand, the Ministry of Education led the policy to unite religions, putting them into the officially defined “orthodoxy”; on the other hand, the National Army promoted a “Pan-Asian Orthodox Church” as an anti-Soviet propaganda tool. Under these conditions, in

23 Hence it is suggested that the visits were at the end of 1932 and 1933.

24 TAKAI visited the “widow” of MAKI and held the farewell ceremony for him. Cf. “TAKAI chō-shisai no Taiwan junkaiki” 高井長司祭の臺灣巡回記 (Record of the visit of proto-priest TAKAI). In: *Seikyō jihō*, vol. 22, no. 3, 1933, pp. 15–20.

25 TAKAI Makio: “Junkai nisshi”. In: *Seikyō jihō*, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 30–32.

26 TSUKAMOTO: “Nihon Harisutosu seikyōkai no Taiwan dendō” (2005), pp. 157–169.

1940 the Japanese Orthodox Church cut off the link with the Russian Orthodox Church and was forced to accept the new Bishop through the Manchuria Diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia. The Church almost stopped running in 1944 when most of the first generation of Church leaders passed away.²⁷ As a result, it is not surprising to see the Church become inactive in Taiwan after the mid-1930s as the principal Church in Japan was undergoing large changes.

The Postwar Period

After the war, the elites of the Japanese Orthodox Church in Tokyo applied to the Moscow Patriarchate or the “American Metropolia” for a Russian Orthodox “rescue mission”. The result was out of hand with the ongoing Cold War separation of blocs and their affiliates.²⁸ In 1947, the bishop of the American Metropolia, Benjamin (BASALYGA) of Pittsburgh, visited Japan, led pastoral tours, and ordained ten people as new clerics. Yet the full recovery of the Japanese Orthodox Church came only when the activist Metropolitan Irenaeus (Irinei) (BEKISH) took charge of the Japanese Church in 1953. According to KHARIN (2011), “It was undoubtedly under Irenaeus ‘the reconstructor’ that the Japanese Orthodox Church regained coherence and entered a new ‘American’ phase in its existence, which would last until the major U.S.-USSR ecclesiastical settlement of 1970, and in many cultural trends until the present”.²⁹

Similar to the Japanese Orthodox Church after the war, the Orthodox Church in Taiwan also entered the new era with the Cold War realignment. After WWII, Taiwan was ceded by Japan to the reign of Kuomintang (*Guomindang* 國民黨, the Chinese Nationalist government, henceforth KMT) led by CHIANG Kai-shek (蔣介石 JIANG Jieshi) in China. Defeated in the following Chinese Civil War by the Communist Party, the KMT government retreated to Taiwan in 1949. Affiliated to the Western Bloc led by the U.S. in the Cold War, the KMT government in Taiwan was against the USSR-led Eastern Bloc and the Communists from the People’s Republic of China.

27 KHARIN, I. N.: *Self-Realization of the Japanese Orthodox Church, 1912–1956*, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 2011.

28 Ibid., pp. 70–71.

29 Ibid., pp. 72.

As opposed to the prewar period, the call for an Orthodox Church in Taiwan emerged from another community: the émigré Russians. When the KMT government resettled in Taiwan, some Russians joined the retreat and formed a new group of Orthodox believers. In response to their call, the Bishop John (Ioann) (SHAKHOVSKOI)³⁰ took his first visit to Taiwan during the Korean War (1950–1953). In 1957 the Metropolitan Irenaeus (BEKISH) from Tokyo visited Taiwan and hosted services in a family style church named John the Baptist until the mid-1960s.³¹

According to Gleb RAHR (RAR),³² during his stay in Taiwan from 1957 to 1960, he met several Russians who had come to Taiwan through different means: George Konstantinovich ELSNER (Georgii Konstantinovich ÈL'SNER), the owner of Café Astoria in Taipei where the Russian community gathered, had moved to Taiwan from the Russian emigrant colony of Shanghai; Yury (Юрий) Romanovich LARIKOV, a former member of the Kolchak army, worked in an artillery laboratory of the Chinese National Army (ROC).³³ There was also a comparatively larger group of Russian women who immigrated with their husbands, mostly members of the Flying Tigers (American Volunteer Group or AVG) or officers of the Chinese National Army. The last immigrant group was Russian women from Xinjiang

30 See introduction in: OrthodoxWiki contributors: “John (SHAHOVSKOY) of San Francisco”, 2012, March 11. Available online: [https://orthodoxwiki.org/index.php?title=John_\(Shahovskoy\)_of_San_Francisco&oldid=107655](https://orthodoxwiki.org/index.php?title=John_(Shahovskoy)_of_San_Francisco&oldid=107655) (last access 2019, December 14).

31 LAI Yingchuan: “‘Luoye Shenggen’ yi ‘Huhua Chunni’? Shitan Taiwan ‘Baie’ de Lisan Jingyan (1949–1989) (Yi Wuchangjie yiduan qihao ji Yige eguo jiazushi huiyilu weili)” 「落葉生根」抑「護花春泥」？試探臺灣「白俄」的離散經驗(1949–1989) (以《武昌街一段七號》及《一個俄國家族史》回憶錄為例) (‘Stayers’ or ‘Passers-by’? A Preliminary Research on the Diasporic Experiences of Belo emigrants in Taiwan (1949–1989) (Memoirs of No. 7, Sec. 1 of *Wuchan Road and the History of a Russian Family*). In Section of Digital Collection of the Library of the National Chengchi University (ed.): *Zhenshi yu Xiangxiang: Bainian Tai-E Guanxi Lueying* 真實與想像: 百年臺俄關係掠影 (Reality and Imagination: One Hundred Years of Russia-Taiwan Relation), Taipei: Chengchi University Library 2018. pp. 257–277.

32 Gleb RAR: *I budet nashe pokolen'e davat' istorii otchet: Vospominaniâ* (...And our generation will report to history: Memoirs), Moskva: Russkiy put' 2011.

33 “Gregore R. LARIKOVE”, i.e., Y. R. LARIKOV, was born in Siberia and graduated from a military school in 1916. He followed the Russian army, retreated to Japan through Russian Kamchatka after the Russian Revolution, and then moved with the army to Shenyang in China. He advised the Chinese military government to develop canons and artillery as a Russian advisor, and later joined the Chinese army in 1936 to design artillery. He became a Chinese citizen in the same year. See JIAN Jinzhui 簡錦錚 and XIE Zhufen 謝祝芬: *Minxing Kafeiguan* 明星咖啡館 (Café Astoria), Taipei: Ink 2015, p. 107.

(China) who fled to Taiwan through India.³⁴ Gleb RAHR described their migration route to Taiwan. Some Russians settled in Chinese Turkestan during the period of the Russian Empire. At times of the Russian Civil War, thousands of refugees from Orenburg, Ural, and Semirech'e Cossacks flooded into Chinese Turkestan and thereafter established the Orthodox Church parishes, Russian primary schools and a Russian gymnasium in Urumqi. During the Chinese Civil War, the young officers of the 9th Army of Kuomintang bastioned in Xinjiang married Xinjiang Russians.³⁵ They then moved to India with their husbands for internship and fled with the KMT government to Taiwan in 1949. Their living conditions were bad with underpaid army salaries and the negative image of Russian wives in the KMT army career. In some other cases, such as the mother of Mrs. Lidia CHANG (or Nina CHANG) who was married to Councilor CHANG Ta-tien (ZHANG Datian 張大田), both (Nina and her mother) were Russians from Harbin, China.

RAHR and his family came to Taiwan in 1957 from Germany as he worked as the director of the Free Russia Radio. When invited to Taiwan, RAHR was working for the NTS (Narodno-Trudovoï Soiuz, the National Labor Union) in West Germany and the NTS had an agreement with the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (APACL) and the KMT government to broadcast radio programs to Russia and Siberia from Taiwan. The Free Russia Radio was set up by the Free Radio under the funding from the U.S. parliament under the terms of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty³⁶ after the Korean War. In 1957, the Russian radio station was set up in Tamsui (Danshui 淡水), a district of the current New Taipei City. This “meant that the number of Russian émigré intelligentsia increased”.³⁷ As a journalist, RAHR was actively involved in promoting Orthodox Christianity and Russian culture, and “had great impact on reuniting the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia with the Moscow Patriarchate amid the dissolution of USSR”³⁸. In his memoir, RAHR provides the names of Russian colleagues at the Free Russia Radio Station including Dima IVANOV, Kostia FEL'ZING, and Dima ZHANG (a half Chinese, half Russian radio engineer). Their salary and living standard were similar to the members of the Flying Tigers; much different from those from Xinjiang.

34 See English translation in Gleb RAR: “Historical Notes about Orthodox Church Life in Taiwan during 50–60 years of 20 cent” (Kiril MIRAKOVSKI, trans.). Available online: http://orthodox.cn/localchurch/taiwan/glebrar_en.htm (last access 2019, August 14).

35 As the local population in Xinjiang, the Uighurs and Kazakhs, were a nomadic population and Muslims as well, the Russians preferred to marry the Chinese officers who also had the problem of finding spouses since local Uighurs and Kazakhs did not like the Chinese.

36 The official full title is “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of China”.

37 LAI: “‘Stayers’ or ‘Passers-by’?” (2018), p. 264.

38 Ibid.

Many of the aforementioned groups left Russia after the 1917 Revolution and moved to China through Siberia. Nearly 300,000 White Russians were in this wave of emigration and settled in China in the 1920s.³⁹ Some of the former anti-Bolsheviks army members assisted the KMT in military trainings and equipment maintenance in China and followed the KMT's retreat to Taiwan after 1949. Mostly Orthodox believers, they formed the major group to request for building a Russian Orthodox church in Taiwan after the war. A couple among the earliest arrivals in Taiwan, Roman Nikolaevich and Liudmila Glebovna REDLIKH invited the Metropolitan Irenaeus (BEKISH) from Tokyo in 1957⁴⁰ and had divine services at their home in Taipei.⁴¹ After that, the family of RAHR continued this role in 1958. As RAHR moved to Japan in 1960 and his and his wife's role was replaced by A. A. and E. R. PERUAN. Since the REDLIKH's, the RAHR family and the following PERUAN's resided at the same house overlapping or at different times, this location in Taipei was the most active Orthodox religious place of the period. In RAHR's memoir, one photo reveals that Metropolitan Irenaeus chaired the Orthodox service in a room with an iconostasis at RAHR's house; and the other shows Metropolitan Irenaeus on the three-wheeled rickshaw in front of the RAHR's house. RAHR particularly mentions that the time when Metropolitan Irenaeus served the liturgy on September 11 1958, the day of the Beheading of St. John the Baptist, the Taipei parish gained a patron saint. Around 40 people attended the service.

An article in the Japanese *Seikyō jihō* documents the visit of the Metropolitan Irenaeus (BEKISH) from April 2-9, 1959, one of his annual visits between 1957 and 1959. According to the article, believers in Taiwan reached around 100 in 1958; mostly from Russia, the U.S., China, and Greece. There was no church, hence they gathered at RAHR's home for religious activities. During Irenaeus' visit, 15 people were baptized including 14 Chinese and one Russian child.⁴² This description suggests that a larger portion of locals, although not sure whether they were Chinese immigrants or local Taiwanese, converted to Orthodox Christianity in the late 1950s.

39 CHEN Tianquan 陳天權: “Dongzhengjiao chuanru Xianggang licheng” 東正教傳入香港歷程 (The Journey of the Orthodox Church to Hong Kong): <https://www.master-in-sight.com/東正教傳入香港歷程/> (Accessed 20 August, 2019).

40 Based on the memoir of Gleb RAHR.

41 The address was: No. 18, Lane 132, Jianguo North Road, Taipei City (台北市建國北路132巷18號).

42 “Irinei daishukyō. Taiwan hōmon saru” イリネイ大主教 台湾訪問さる (The visit of Patriarch Irenaeus to Taiwan). In: *Seikyō jihō*, no. 834, 1959, May 5, p. 12.

The last record directly related to Taiwan in the Japanese *Seikyō jihō* was in the edition of January 20, 1965 (Shōwa 40),⁴³ describing the five day visit of the Metropolitan of Japan Vladimir (NAGOSKY),⁴⁴ the American Air chaplain Peter ZURNOVICH, and Fr. Kirill ARIHARA (有原) from December 26-30, 1964. As described by the author, the total number of Orthodox believers in Taiwan in the 1960s was around 200, most of which lived in the area of Taipei. They did not have a church to go to; believers expected to have a resident priest who could plan building their own church. During the five-day visit, Taipei, Taichung, and Chiayi were the three major cities where services were held. The locations remind the distribution of believers in the pre-war period. However, the relationship between the believers before and after the war seemed to be disconnected. This is reflected in the content of the report, written by the only Japanese member of the group, Fr. Kirill ARIHARA: “After an approximately two-and-a-half-hour flight we arrived in Taiwan, which until twenty years earlier had been Japanese territory but which was now a foreign country. After reaching a place where many Japanese believers had lived, there was a kind of lonely feeling.”⁴⁵ Moreover, the report showed that priests of the Episcopal Church long helped to perform services for sickly or dying amongst Orthodox followers in Taipei since there had been no regular resident Orthodox priest. The situation was similar to that in the prewar period.

Although the believers in Taipei planned to initiate building their church, the expectation has never been fulfilled. Similar to the 1950s and 60s, the religious activities continued to be held at a believer’s home or a Catholic church, for instance the Holy Family Church Taipei during the 1970s.⁴⁶ However, the religious activities became very few. Some former Orthodox believers joined the Catholic Church instead. The anti-communist propaganda and the political atmosphere of White Terror until 1987 quieted down many local believers; the image of Russians was very often directly linked to communism and the USSR. JIAN Jinzhui 簡錦錐, the Taiwanese partner of Café Astoria, recalled the 1949 negotiation to rent the place for the cafe, in which the property owner immediately refused to let the house to the “communists” when he noticed that other partners of the cafe were

43 “Taiwan no seikyōto o tazunete” 台湾の正教徒を訪ねて (Visiting the Orthodox Christians in Taiwan). In: *Seikyō jihō*, no. 901, 1965, January, p. 7.

44 “In March 1970, Abp. Vladimir was elevated to the rank of Metropolitan by the Moscow Patriarchate when the Patriarchate granted autonomy to the Church of Japan” in: OrthodoxWiki contributors: “Main page”, 2017, October 19. Available online: <https://orthodoxwiki.org/> (last access 2019, December 14).

45 English translation by Fr. John BARTHOLOMEW quoted from the website of the “Orthodoxy in China”. See: “Taiwan jiaotang” 台灣教堂 (Churches in Taiwan). Available online: <http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/taiwan/index.html> (last access 2019, December 15).

46 Interview with Fr. Kirill at the Taipei Elevation of the Holy Cross Church, Songshan District, Taipei. 2018, November 27.

Russians⁴⁷. The political situation also made White Russians hesitant to stay in Taiwan. The Korean War in the early 1950s caused the fear that communists of the People's Republic of China may eventually capture Taiwan. Many chose to emigrate to Australia, Brazil, the U.S., and other countries in the 1950s and 1960s.⁴⁸ It suggests that the composition of Orthodox believers in Taiwan was in constant change. Believers in the 1980s either left or deceased, and religious activities soon became inactive. Many local Orthodox Christians either converted to Catholicism or completely retreated from the Christian religion. As Taiwan was under White Terror until 1987, the fear of being labeled as a communist suppressed some local believers who couldn't even dare admit their Orthodox belief.⁴⁹

After the Second World War, the number of Orthodox Christians in Taiwan increased from 100 in the 1950s to 200 in the 1960s. Although Taiwan was ceded from Japan in 1945, the Cold War placed the development of the two Orthodox Churches in the same bloc. Missionary work of both Churches was taken care of by the U.S.-channeled Orthodox priests. The Japanese Orthodox Church rebuilt relations to the Moscow Patriarchate in 1970 and became an autonomous Church while Taiwan was still cared for by the U.S. army chaplains in the 1970s. Since the U.S. army withdrew from Taiwan in 1979 after the U.S. ended the official relationship with the Republic of China, the Orthodox U.S. army chaplains have not continued to cover Taiwanese believers. This may be the core reason of the drastic drop of Orthodox religious activities in Taiwan in the 1980s.

The Orthodox Church in Taiwan After the 1990s

Orthodox religious activities started to become more active again only after the 1990s when the global and domestic political circumstances changed. In 1991, the USSR dissolved and Taiwan also went through an intensive process of democratization after lifting herself out of the Martial Law in 1987. Liberated from the Chinese Nationalist “anti-communism and anti-USSR” propaganda, the new political environment started up new diplomatic relation between Taiwan and Russia. In 1992, Taiwan and Russia signed the mutual agreement for establishing the Moscow-Taipei Coordination Commission on Economic and Cultural Cooperation

47 JIAN / XIE: *Café Astoria* (2015), p. 74.

48 Ibid., p. 80.

49 Interview with Fr. Kirill at the Taipei Elevation of the Holy Cross Church, Songshan District, Taipei. 2018, November 27.

(MTC). As a result, the MTC in Moscow was founded in July 1993 and the MTC in Taipei was officially set up in December 1996. In 2002, the semi-governmental Taiwan-Russia Association was founded. In September 1993, the direct flight route between Taipei and Moscow was approved by both countries. With this welcoming environment, it attracted more Russians to Taiwan as well as lead the believers to call for establishing an Orthodox parish in Taiwan.⁵⁰

Noticing the demand from Orthodox Christians in Taiwan, the proto-priest Dionisiï POZDNIAËV from Hong Kong visited Taiwan first in 1999 and thereafter every two years to deliver divine liturgies.⁵¹ In 2005, Bishop Ilarion ALFEEV from the Moscow Patriarchate visited Taiwan. Later, the Moscow Patriarchate sent personnel three times to examine the possibility of building a parish in Taiwan.⁵² Yet, due to the Church’s financial situation, the official announcement of establishing the parish was postponed to 2012. Fr. Kirill SHKARBUL⁵³ was assigned by the Moscow patriarch to rebuild the parish. In February 2013, the Taipei parish was officially “reactivated”. This was aimed at “reviving” the Taipei Orthodox Church founded in “1901” during the Japanese colonial period. This Church, based in Taipei City,⁵⁴ was named the Taiwan Orthodox Christian Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (*Taiwan jidu zheng jiaohui – Mosike da mu shouzuo* 台灣基督正教會-莫斯科大牧首座).⁵⁵

In Taiwan, there has been another Orthodox church active since the 1990s: the Orthodox Church in Taiwan (*Taiwan jidu dongzhengjiao hui* 台灣基督東正教會), belonging to the Orthodox Metropolitanate of Hong Kong and Southeast Asia under the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. The Church is based in Xindian, New Taipei City, and is led by Fr. Jonah (李亮).⁵⁶ The Metropolitanate of Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, led by Metropolitan Nektarios TSILIS, in fact started religious activities in Asia earlier than the Moscow Patriarchate. The parish in Hong Kong was established in 1997, and Fr. Jonah assigned by the Metropolitanate as the priest of the Taipei parish in 2001. The Church was officially

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.

52 More information can be found on “Brief History of Taiwan Orthodox Church” (*Taiwan zheng jiaohui jian shi* 台灣正教會簡史). In: “Taiwan jidu zheng jiaohui” 台灣基督正教會 (the Orthodox Church in Taiwan). Available online: <http://orthodoxchurch.tw/> (last access 2019, December 15).

53 Fr. Kirill SHKARBUL’s nationality is Canadian.

54 The location was moved from Songshan District to Zhongzheng District in July 2019. It was named the Taipei Elevation of the Holy Cross Church (Taibei juyang sheng shizi jiaotang 台北舉揚聖十字教堂).

55 “Taiwan jidu zheng jiaohui” 台灣基督正教會 (the Orthodox Church in Taiwan). Available online: <http://orthodoxchurch.tw/> (last access 2019, December 15).

56 V. Reverend Archimandrite Jonah MOURTOS. Fr. Jonah is of Greek nationality.

registered by the government in 2004. In response to the “reactivation” of the Taipei parish of the Moscow Patriarchate, the Metropolitan Nektarios issued an encyclical letter in June 2013 to denounce the deed of having “created a schismatic ‘Church’”.⁵⁷ The tension between the two parties rose over time.

The Taiwan Orthodox Christian Church (Moscow Patriarchate) was officially registered with the government in 2016. According to Fr. Kirill, there were already four regular locations in November 2018 for divine services of the Russian Orthodox Church in Taiwan: Taipei, Hsinchu (Xinzhu 新竹), Taichung, and Kaohsiung. Here is the number of attendants in Taipei: Regular attendants for the Sunday service are around 20; attendants in the two most important services, Christmas and Easter, are around 60. The total number of “claimed” believers is around 500-600. The number of attendants at other places is similar. Half of the attendants are from the former USSR region such as Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia; around 30 percent from Taiwanese locals and the rest from other countries, including the U.S., the Philippines, and Greece. The services are thus held in three languages: Mandarin, English, and Russian.⁵⁸ During one observation visit, the number of attendants to the New Year ceremony in Taipei on January 6 2019 were around 24-30, among which nine were Taiwanese.

Conclusion: Building Sites of Memory for Being Orthodox

Orthodox Christianity arrived in Taiwan with Japanese followers amid political transition in the late 1890s. The early development of the Orthodox Church in Taiwan was hence inseparable from the Japanese Orthodox Church built by Nikolai (later known as St. Nikolai of Japan) from the Church of Russia in the Meiji period of Japan. Under Nikolai’s anticipation of integrating Taiwan into the pastoral area and assistance, Fr. Simeon arrived in Taiwan in 1901 while the official resident priest, Fr. Titus (KOSHIYAMA), was assigned a decade later in 1911. With Nikolai passed away in 1912 and the later strong impacts of the Russian Civil War on the Japanese Orthodox Church, the Church in Taiwan rather refrained from external influence. This may also be due to Taiwan Church’s ‘autonomous’ status particularly in terms of finance during most of the Japanese colonial period. The

57 Ecumenical Patriarchate Orthodox Metropolitanate of Hong Kong and South East Asia (OMHKSEA): “Excommunication of the Schismatics in Taiwan”, 2013, June 10. Available online: <http://www.omhksea.org/archives/4619> (last access 2019, December 15).

58 Interview on November 27, 2018.

influential catechist MATSUDAIRA had himself devoted time to introducing Orthodox Christianity to Taiwan from the late 1880s. He had the parish of Taipei officially established in 1916 without financial support from the Japanese or Russian Orthodox Church. After his leave in 1919, the resident priest Fr. Foma (MAKI) continued divine services until 1930 albeit less active. Without the resident priest, the Orthodox Church in Taiwan gradually lapsed into inactivity before the Second World War.

After the war, Taiwan was no longer a part of the Japanese territory and thus the connection to the Japanese Orthodox Church was also cut off. Moreover, as a result of being affected by the Cold War, Orthodox Christians, both in Japan and Taiwan, could only seek to follow Russian Orthodoxy through the U.S.-affiliated channels and mainly within the context of Russian émigrés. Noteworthy is that at this stage the Orthodox Christian community in Taiwan was vastly different from the community under Japanese rule. Postwar Russian émigrés and their families became the core of the community. However, this composition changed again after the 1960s as many of them were gone and left the Church to local Orthodox Christians. In the 1980s, the Church further subsided after the separation of the official relationship between the U.S. and the Republic of China. During the Cold War, the Orthodoxy in Taiwan had little connection to the Moscow Patriarchate.

In the 1990s, the change of the political-economic context of Taiwan played an influential role. With another group of Orthodox Christians emerging with new demand, two Orthodox churches were built in Taiwan subsequently. Under the tension between Orthodox Patriarchate of Moscow and Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, retrieving the connection to authority for the canonical development history became important. On the official website of the Taiwan Orthodox Christian Church (Moscow Patriarchate), the “Brief History of [the] Orthodox Church in Taiwan” particularly focuses on the year of 1901 when Nikolai assigned Fr. Simeon to Taiwan. September of that year saw the start of the priest’s annual visits and believers’ regular meetings at a gathering place. Although the Taipei Orthodox Church was only officially registered by the government in 1916, its missionary work, as written on *Taiwan Nichinichi Shinpō*, began in 1911. The year 1901 is recognized as the beginning for the “revival” of the “Taipei Christ the Savior Orthodox Church” (*Taipei jidu jiushizhu zhengjiaotang* 台北基督救世主正教堂). In February 2013, the believers in Taiwan celebrated the 112th Anniversary of the Taipei Christ the Savior Orthodox Church and the Anniversary of Church’s “reactivation”. The icon of St. Nikolai was fixed on the wall near the entrance to present the historical link and the “origin”. The Church also regularly brings significant religious objects into Taiwan in order to “reconnect” the country, the

larger historical context, and the church network while trying to bond local members through rituals and vibrant activities.



Figure 13-2: Icon of St. Nikolai at the Russian Orthodox church in Taipei
Photo taken by Min-Chin Kay CHIANG

In the long process of development in Taiwan, the Orthodox Church never had a fixed location and architecture as the physical church. Believers usually gathered in their peers' residence. Before the war, the place of MATSUDAIRA at the address Bajiazhuang (八甲庄) in the current Wanhua (萬華) District in Taipei often appeared on newspaper as the site for divine liturgies before 1919. Believers needed to use Anglican churches and asked Anglican priests for important rituals most of the time. During the postwar period, private houses, such as the house of the RAHR's at Jianguo North Road in Taipei, were used for services, so were Catholic churches. The previous gathering places in Taipei are mostly gone due to urban

rezoning or reconstruction. Even the site used by the Russian Orthodox Church has, since 2012, also become unsecure; the Church had to move to a new address in Taipei in July 2019. Fr. Kirill mentioned during the interview about the church’s intention to set up monuments at some previous gathering locations to commemorate the history and to connect the Russian Orthodox Church to Taiwan.

Particularly in the competition for “orthodoxy” after the 2000s, the Russian Orthodox Church in Taiwan has been trying to connect itself to the past through “naming”, recounts of historical events and acts of materialization. In the “reviving” process, the Orthodox Church in Taiwan seems to support the idea of building the “sites of memory”. These “sites of memory” come from the modern fear that “there is no spontaneous memory, that we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize celebrations, pronounce eulogies, and notarize bills because such activities no longer occur naturally”.⁵⁹ Whether in material or non-material form, Pierre NORA’s popular notion of “sites of memory” implicates the intention for a fixed, bounded place to anchor memories and memorialization. It further triggers the question of whose memory this would be. As the historical narration of the Orthodox Church has always been in relation to immigrant believers coming and leaving due, largely, to the political transitions in Taiwan, how local believers react to the version of narration, and whether the struggle of the denominations may or may not be compatible with their theological understanding will be the core of further investigation.

59 Pierre NORA: “Between Memory and History: *Les lieux de mémoire.*” In: *Representations*, no. 26, 1989, pp. 7–24. Quoted from p. 12.

I4 The Attitude of Harbin Towards European Architecture (1949–2019)

Abstract. Over the last 70 years (1949–2019) in the People's Republic of China (PRC), the attitude of people from Harbin 哈尔滨 (the Harbinese) toward European architecture has changed at various times, which reflects Harbin's tortuous process of perception and acceptance of European culture. Harbin city is the product of the Chinese Eastern Railway built in the late 19th and early 20th century, where consulates of 17 countries were established and various schools of European architecture were presented. More than 10 years since the founding of the PRC the relationship between China and the Soviet Union remained friendly. China launched a campaign for the so called *Xuexi Suliān* 学习苏联 (Learn from the Soviet Union) and actively introduced Soviet culture, including architectural art. During this period, a number of buildings in European or, precisely speaking, Soviet style were built in Harbin. The remains of such architecture stayed under protection at the same time. In the course of the Sino-Soviet confrontation period, especially during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese society showed hostility to foreign historical and cultural heritage. Regarding European architecture (mainly Russian architecture) as the mark of the colonial era, the proof of a Russian invasion under the Tsarist regime, and the symbol of disgrace to the nation, the Harbinese took actions to destroy said architectural buildings. In the wake of the Cultural Revolution, China entered the historical period of *Gaige Kaifāng* 改革开放 (Reform and Opening). Chinese society has undergone tremendous changes since then, and so have the thoughts and values of the Harbinese accordingly. They have come to realize the aesthetic value of the relics in European architecture and acknowledge that these relics are precious pieces of cultural heritage. As a result, a new attitude toward European monuments in Harbin is adopted; a caring attitude toward restoration and preservation of the old, but also construction of the new, buildings in European architectural style.

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Therefore, Harbin has been provided with a different European characteristic from other cities in China. Harbin's care for European architecture at the time of the Reform and Opening shows the spirit of the era in which China as a whole has been actively integrating, and enthusiastically learning and adopting foreign culture. In this article, the term "European architecture" can be used interchangeably with "Russian architecture" and "Soviet architecture" in some cases for two reasons: first, there are many types of architecture involved in this article. It is more convenient to use the term European architecture. Second, Russian architecture/Soviet architecture is the product of Russia through studying Western European culture, which is a variety of European architecture.

Keywords. Harbin, European architecture, Russian architecture, Soviet architecture, Perception.

Buildings in Soviet Architectural Style in the 1950s

The PRC was founded on October 1, 1949. China soon established an alliance with the Soviet Union, and both states began a period of friendly relation for more than 10 years. The campaign "Learn from the Soviet Union" sprang up in China, which brought in aspects of Soviet culture on a large scale, including architectural art. Given this background, buildings in Soviet architectural style were being built everywhere in Heilongjiang 黑龙江.

Heilongjiang Province used to border the Soviet Union; a certain number of Russian expatriates were living in the Chinese territory. In addition, of the total 156 projects of technical assistance in industrial enterprises by the Soviet Union (hereinafter "156 projects"), 23 were arranged in Heilongjiang Province. The friendly atmosphere of China and the Soviet Union in this province was ever stronger as opposed to inland provinces, the Soviet style buildings there thus also outnumbering those anywhere else. The Soviet style buildings constructed during this period mainly include the Harbin Institute of Technology Main Building, the Harbin Workers Culture Palace, and the Harbin Youth Palace.

The construction of the magnificent Harbin Institute of Technology Main Building (henceforth HIT Main Building, fig. 14-1) began in August 1959 and was completed in 1965. It consists of 13 floors above ground and one floor underground with the total height of 75.61m and a total mass area of 17,923 m². Fully equipped with a lobby, an auditorium, conference rooms, and VIP rooms, the building as such adopts a frame structure, which belongs to the socialist ethnic architectural style of the former Soviet Union. It absorbs, and derives from, a variety of European architectural

styles, standing grand and stately with its breathtaking majesty. The mechanical building (1954) and the motor building (1955) were built respectively on the east and west side of the HIT Main Building. With the same shape and scale, both buildings also fulfill a sense of architectural eclecticism. These three buildings altogether form a complete and spectacular building complex.¹

It is commonly known that the HIT Main Building imitates Moscow University. The former is a simplified and miniature version of the latter. This imitation embodies the spirit of times during “Learn from the Soviet Union” and the Sino-Soviet friendship. In addition to Harbin Institute of Technology, the Heilongjiang University and the Northeast Forestry University incorporate Soviet architectural style in their own main building as well (fig. 14-2).

The Harbin Workers Cultural Palace was completed in November 1957 in the Russian Baroque style. The main structure is a total of 3 floors. The internal structure is designed for cultural and artistic functions, providing venues such as a concert hall, theatre, rehearsal studio, lecture hall, library, and chess and card room etc. The Workers Culture Palace was the largest public venue for cultural events in Harbin as well as the largest workers cultural palace in the country at that time. From its completion until early 1990s, the Workers Culture Palace served as a venue for large scale cultural events in Harbin (fig. 14-3). There have been performances by Matsuyama Ballet Company from Japan, Berlin Police Orchestra from Germany, and A.V. ALEKSANDROV Twice Red-bannered and Red-starred Academic Song and Dance Ensemble of the Soviet Army from the Soviet Union (now the Alexandrov Russian Army Song and Dance Academic Ensemble from Russia).²

The Harbin Youth Palace is located in the Stalin park by the Songhua River (fig. 14-4). The construction with a concrete block structure in modernist style was finished on May 4, 1961. The Old Harbin Measuring & Cutting Tool Factory also belonged to one of the “156 projects” assisted by the Soviet Union, which was built in accordance with eclectic architecture. It is now used as a hotel (fig. 14-5).

1 “Finalist for the Architectural Creation Award - the Harbin Institute of Technology Main Building”, 2010, July 9. Available online: http://www.chinaasc.org/project>Show_article3A.aspx?id=573 (last access 2010, December 14).

2 “Past and present of the Harbin Workers Cultural Palace”. Available online: <http://z943631.blog.163.com/blog/static/16626521320106210563973/> (last access 2010, December 2).




Figure 14-1: The HIT main building³



Figure 14-2: The main building of Heilongjiang University⁴

3 “Finalist for the Architectural Creation Award - the Harbin Institute of Technology Main Building”, 2010, July 9.

4 “Dongbei diqu gaoxiao qian shi ming, zhe liang suo 985 gaoxiao shei shi di yi?” 东北地区高校前十名，这两所 985 高校谁是第一？(The first ten higher education institutions



Figure 14-3: The Harbin Workers Cultural Palace
Photo taken by LI Suian



Figure 14-4: The Harbin Youth Palace
Photo taken by MEI Qingji



Figure 14-5: The Old Harbin Measuring & Cutting Tool Factory
Photo taken by LI Suian

of Dongbei region, which one of these two leading institutions is at the top?). Available online: <http://mini.eastday.com/a/180921204814246.html> (last access 2020, March 10).

Apart from Heilongjiang Province, there were several Russian style and Soviet style buildings, e.g. the “China-Soviet Friendship Building” and the “Palace of China-Soviet Friendship”, in Beijing 北京, Shanghai 上海, Guangzhou 广州, Changsha 长沙, Wuhan 武汉, and other main cities. All these buildings carry a symbolic representation, depicting the relation between China and Russia as solid as rock and the loftiness of friendship between their people. They are preserved to this day, offering the people of China a strong visual impact.

Among all, the Soviet Exhibition Hall in Beijing and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Building in Shanghai are the most famous buildings, of which Soviet architects participated in the design and construction (fig. 14-6, 14-7). Given the Romanesque and Gothic elements used on its exterior decoration, as well as the Russian classical architectural style for its main structure, the exterior of the Soviet Exhibition Hall (now Beijing Exhibition Hall) clearly follows that of the Admiralty Building in St. Petersburg (built in 1806–1823).

Due largely to its arresting and unique figure in Russian classical style, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Building (now Shanghai Exhibition Center) still stands out from numerous skyscrapers in Shanghai today. It is awarded as the “Top 10 Shanghai architecture” for the period from 1949–1989 and the golden prize of “Top 10 classical architecture selection for the 50th Anniversary of the PRC”.

It is common for China and other countries within the socialist community to build Russian style buildings and Soviet style buildings given the high prestige of the Soviet Union in the 1950s. The same can be said for the House of the Free Press (Casa Presei Libere) in the Romanian capital Bucharest, and the Palace of Culture and Science in the Polish capital Warsaw, the HIT Main Building in China is modelled after the design of the Main Building of Lomonosov State University in Moscow. It is a valid example of China being passionate about Soviet architectural art, imitating the famous Soviet Russian architecture, besides expressing China’s friendship with the Soviet Union and its adherence to the Soviet model.



Figure 14-6: The Soviet Exhibition Hall (now Beijing Exhibition Hall)⁵



Figure 14-7: The Sino-Soviet Friendship Building
(now the Shanghai Exhibition Center)⁶

⁵ “Yi ge 30 wan pingfang mi zhanguan – Beijing shi fou xuyao?” 一个 30 万平方米展馆—北京是否需要? (A 300,000 m² exhibition hall - is it needed in Beijing?), 2014, July 31. Available online: <http://news.expoon.com/c/20140731/9709.html> (last access 2019, December 10).

⁶ “Shanghai zhanlan zhongxin” 上海展览中心 (Shanghai Exhibition Center). Available online: http://dp.pconline.com.cn/sphoto/list_1876387.html (last access 2020, March 10).

The Harbinese Destruction of Russian Style Buildings During the Cultural Revolution

A 10-year cultural revolution began in China in the 1960s. Ironically, although this political storm was called “the Cultural Revolution”, what happened instead was actually a cultural destruction indeed. Foreign cultural heritage was damaged, but Chinese cultural heritage also suffered.

In this period, there was a trend of extremist thought in Chinese society (usually called “ultra-left” thought in Mainland China), which manifested itself in hostility toward intellectuals but also historical and cultural heritage. Extreme thoughts led to extreme behavior such as the persecution of intellectuals across the country, the destruction of scenic spots and historical sites, and the burning of books. The Confucius Cemetery in Qufu 曲阜, Shandong Province 山东省, was damaged; Confucius’ grave was dug out. The Red Guards also planned to demolish the imperial palace of numerous former Chinese emperors, the Forbidden City. However, the palace was fortunately spared from demolition thanks to the military protection dispatched by ZHOU Enlai 周恩来 (1898-1976).⁷

In such a social environment, the recognition of foreign cultural heritage happened to be seriously mistaken for which the remains of Russian architecture in China were treated as the symbol of colony and the disgrace to the nation. Sino-Soviet relations broke down in the early 1960s, and both states then engaged in confrontations with each other for almost 20 years; military clashes along the border also occurred. Under these circumstances, the Russian architecture had to bear another blame — the mark of “Tsarist Russia” (Тsarskaiā Rossiia) and “Soviet revisionism”, and the proof of Russian invasion under Tsarist regime. Such prejudices led the Red Guards to speedily destroy any related architecture. The famous St. Nicholas Cathedral and the Holy Annunciation Church in Harbin were no exception.

Named after Saint Nicholas, the Harbin St. Nicholas Cathedral was designed by architect I.V. PODLEVSKIИ of the Orthodox Church and built in 1900. The icon of the mother of God above the main entrance but also the frescoes inside the cathedral were painted by Russian artist D.I. GLUSHCHENKO. As the logs were red pines brought from Canada, the interior decorations were transported from Moscow including the relics, holy icons and the big bronze bell which was manufactured by a family factory in 1866 in Tyumen (Tiumen'), Russia. From its location

⁷ “‘Wenge’ shi po si jiu, weihe Gugong mei shou chongji?” ‘文革’时破四旧，为何故宫没受冲击? (Why did the Forbidden City survive the destruction caused by the Cultural Revolution and its breaking of the Four Olds?), 2011, September 2. Available online: <http://history.people.com.cn/GB/205396/15572764.html> (last access 2012, February 6).

on top of Qinjiagang 秦家岗 (now the Nangang district 南岗区) facing the Harbin Railway Station, this cathedral was a classic work of the Orthodox Church and a landmark in Harbin (fig. 14-8).

SONG Hui 宋挥, a photojournalist of Heilongjiang News and Photo Agency, was a witness of the Red Guards demolishing the cathedral. Here is his description of the situation at that time:

“On August 23, 1966 morning, my colleague Wan Jiyue 万继跃 and I accompanied the volleyball team of the Albanians in Harbin and held interviews with them for the upcoming match. The team was received by our province vice governor, Sun Xiqi 孙西岐. The Albanians lost three consecutive games to us, so we formed another team to play - the Federation of Trade Unions. They finally managed to defeat us once. It was about eleven o'clock after the match was over at the stadium in Nangang (across the street from the northeast of the St. Nicholas Cathedral). Back in the international travel agency, looking from the windowsill on the second floor we saw huge crowds of people at the “Lama Tai” 喇嘛台 (namely the St. Nicholas Cathedral). Two men and one woman even climbed to the top of it, chanting slogans and giving speeches with all the fervor. Many long placards of slogans were hanging around the cathedral, which mainly expressed the idea of destroying the signs of imperialist aggression against China, and the den of feudalism, capitalism, and revisionism. Many participants in the destruction were workers and students mainly from secondary schools and partly from colleges; no specific information was given about where exactly they worked or studied though. Everyone was wearing an armband. The Albanian guests were very interested, and the team leader went downstairs to watch. Some students approached him and asked whether he supported their revolutionary action. The leader expressed his support and voiced his opinion in a seemingly decent and beautiful manner. I went closer to the cathedral to take photos with my camera. A tall man suddenly came up. His name was Li 李, and he said he was a [second] year student of [the] mechanical department at Harbin Institute of Technology. A moment ago, they reportedly found someone from Denmark who did not support them, so they exposed his film and took him out. Worried that I was a special agent, Li was going to snatch my camera. I showed my press card and told him that I am a photojournalist accompanying the volleyball team from Albania. I said this was precious history material and were to be left to commemorate this revolutionary action. Li promised to let me freely take pictures but also gave me a special treatment: [f]our people each in the front and in the back led me into the cathedral. As I went inside, the students were busy smashing things and burning the scriptures or something. The smoke and dust inside were suffocating. I aimed my camera at them. Moving up and down I took two rolls in total with my Rollei camera (12 rolls each, 6x6). After the photos came out, I lent them to Li and a teenager wearing glasses called Chen 陈 from the Harbin Sport University to have a look. Then I came out from the inside and heard that the two men and the woman [just mentioned at the beginning] could not get down from the top of the cathedral. The vice governor Sun told the director of the public security bureau to send a fire

ladder to take them down. ... After a long weary day, at midnight, the whole cathedral collapsed with a loud crash. The situation outside the cathedral was shot by my colleague Wan until the scene was cleared. The leader of the entire demolition was SU Guangming 苏广铭 (the National Model Worker and worker at the Harbin Vehicle Factory); some other model workers were also involved.”⁸

DONG Jixiang 董吉祥, employee of the Harbin Railway Station, was just a junior high school student at that time. Hearing people shouting “remove the ‘Lama Tai’!”, he also went to take a glance. It was around eight or nine o’clock in the morning. A ceremony was held where the host announced and asked SU Guangming to give a speech to the crowd before they chanted slogans and began to tear down the cathedral (fig. 14-9, 14-10). DONG could see many in the crowd were workers. Considerable security measures were taken to prevent people from being hit by accident; ropes were put around the scene, and many people were keeping order. No one was allowed to go in and out as they liked.⁹

The misfortune of the St. Nicholas Cathedral also fell on the Holy Annunciation Church in Harbin (KHarbinskiĭ blagoveshchenskiĭ khram) a few years later (fig. 11). Built in 1900 and completed in May 1903, this is a Russian Orthodox church in Byzantine style located at the intersection of the Jingcha Street 警察街 (now Youyi Road 友谊路) and the Zhongguo Street 中国大街 (now Zhongyang Street 中央大街) in the Daoli District 道里区. The fire broke out on February 23, 1918 before it was rebuilt in the same year until 1919.

8 “Faxian zhi lü – xiaoshi de jianzhu” 发现之旅 – 消失的建筑 (Discovery journey — disappearing architecture). Available online: <http://jilu.cntv.cn/humhis/xiaoshidejianzhu/class-page/video/20100420/100004.shtml> (last access 2011, March 1). Cf. United States Central Intelligence Agency: “Albanian Visitor Lauds Red Guard Activities”. In: *Daily Report: Foreign Radio Broadcasts, No. 166–170*, Ohio: Ohio State University 1966, August 27.

9 FAN Zhengmei 范正美: “Zhui meng zhi si” 追梦之思 (Reflection on chasing dreams). In: FAN Zhengmei: *Qiu meng zhuisi* 秋梦追思 (Reminiscence of autumn dreams), Beijing: Higher Education Press 2007. DONG Shi 董时: “Ni gu la jiaotang bei hui jishi” 尼古拉教堂被毁纪实 (On-the-spot report of the destruction of Harbin St. Nicholas Cathedral). In: DONG Shi: *Lao zhaopian* 老照片 (The old photographs), Jinan: Shandong Pictorial Publishing House 1997, pp. 50–54.



Figure 14-8: St. Nicholas Cathedral in Harbin¹⁰




Figure 14-9: The Red Guards destroying the St. Nicholas Cathedral
Photo taken by WAN Jiyue

10 ZHOU Zongshu 周宗澍: “‘Manzhou heishou dang’ biji – ben shu zhong de Ha’erbin miaoxie” 《满洲黑手党》笔记——本书中的哈尔滨描写 (Notes of the Manchurian Mafia – Description of Harbin in this book), 2018, January 29. Available online: <https://book.douban.com/review/9111538/> (last access 2020, March 10).



Figure 14-10: The Red Guards destroying the St. Nicholas Cathedral
Photo taken by WAN Jiyue



Figure 14-11: The Blagoveshchenskaia Church
(the Russian name of the Holy Annunciation Church in Harbin)¹¹

11 “Ha’erbin Bulageweiysikaya jiaotang” 哈尔滨布拉格维因斯卡娅教堂 (Blagoveshchenskaia Church in Harbin), 2011, February 19. Available online: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4dee14e30100okni.html (last access 2011, March 1).

The second reconstruction took place in 1930 and finished in 1941. With tremendous artistry and exquisite architecture, it was known in the Far East area as the most magnificent and spectacular church which had a capacity of 1,200 worshipers. As it was demolished in 1970, the structure of the church was said to be very sturdy that it took several times to dynamite but still it was not completely bombed out. The remaining part of the church can be found in the building of Harbin Architectural Designing Institute today.¹²

The Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church (KHram v chest' Iverskoī ikony Bozhieī Materi) in Harbin was severely damaged as well, although it survived the demolition (fig. 14-12 to 14-14). It is a typical Russian Yaroslavl style (stil' īaroslavskikh tserkvei) multi-domed church. The architecture shows the pattern of the Greek cross and the prominent Russian Byzantine style. The five onion shaped domes stand tall and straight. The iron eaves are in the Art Nouveau style. The apses, arches, doors, and windows under the eaves are all Roman style. It is uniquely elegant and beautiful especially above the bell tower where the onion-domed pedestal and the Roman style apses are joined to complement each other. All that is left now is the orphanage, an outbuilding left with exquisite shapes and rich details, showing the bright colors of mosaics at the entrance of the building.

In 1927, under the initiative of archpriest Dimitrii VOZNESENSKIi and the liberal artist BARANOVA-POPOVA of the Kiev Conservatory, the Harbin Musical Training Institution was founded in the Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church to provide piano, violin, and vocal classes, and nurture numerous music talents. The church suffered severe damages during the Cultural Revolution. The onion-shaped domes on the church were pulled down. Other outbuildings vanished except the orphanage. After the Cultural Revolution, the internal structure and external walls were ruined; the church was surrounded with broken scaffolds.¹³

Although the St. Sophia's (Sofiia) Church in Harbin was not completely removed, it had almost fallen to pieces. It was once used as a warehouse and surrounded by messy buildings. Not only did the Russian buildings in Heilongjiang suffer, but also the Soviet Martyrs Cemetery in Lüshun 旅顺, Liaoning Province 辽宁省, was destroyed.

12 "Harbin Central Bookstore - Architectural Picture Exhibition of Harbin Churches". Available online: <http://shequ.kongfz.com/225766.html> (last access 2011, March 1).

13 XU Ping 徐平 and JIN Xin 金鑫: "Ha'erbin ni huifu bainian Sheng Yiwei'er jiaotang bing jiang pijian guangchang" 哈尔滨拟恢复百年圣伊维尔教堂并将辟建广场 (Harbin intends to restore the century old Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church and open a square), 2005, March 25. Available online: <http://heilongjiang.dbw.cn/system/2005/03/25/050006981.shtml> (last access 2011, March 1).



Figure 14-12: The Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church¹⁴



Figure 14-13: The Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church after its domes being removed¹⁵



Figure 14-14: The Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church after its domes being removed¹⁶

14 “Jiu ying – Ha’erbin Sheng Yiwei’er jiaotang” 旧影 – 哈尔滨圣伊维尔教堂 (Old Photographs — The Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church in Harbin), 2017, December 8. Available online: https://www.sohu.com/a/209175462_350855 (last access 2020, March 10).

15 2015, July 3. Available online: <https://touch.travel.qunar.com/comment/3818452?from=client> (last access 2020, March 10).

16 Ibid.

Buried in the cemetery were Soviet pilots who fought alongside the Chinese army during the Korean War. At times of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, vandalizing the cemetery became a way for the Chinese to vent their dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union.¹⁷ In summary, the period of the Cultural Revolution was a special one in which the construction of Russian style buildings ceased in Heilongjiang, and the remains of colonial Russian architecture were ignored, antagonized, and destroyed.

The Revival of Russian Architecture in the Era of Reform and Opening

Following the end of the Cultural Revolution, China entered a new historical period. The reformists under the core leader DENG Xiaoping 邓小平 led the ideological liberation movement and promoted the policy of Reform and Opening. Given that extreme ideologies over the course of the Cultural Revolution were now abandoned, ideologies and values of Chinese people changed significantly.

This new historical period sees the Harbinese no longer showing the hostility to colonial European architectural remains. LI Shuxiao 李述笑, a specialist in the history of Harbin, puts forward his viewpoint that European architectural remains in Harbin are the witness to colonial history rather than the criminal evidence of colonial history. To put it simply: the colonizers are guilty, but the European architecture left by them is not.

The Reform and Opening period brought huge progress to the thoughts and concepts of people from Harbin - realizing the aesthetic value of European architectural relics, but also recognizing that as appreciation and pursuit of beauty are human instincts, these relics are precious relics of human cultural heritage. The disregard and destruction of these monuments during the Cultural Revolution do not necessarily mean that people from Heilongjiang province had no spiritual demand for aesthetics at that time, but that this spiritual demand of the Chinese in general was suppressed and distorted by fanatical ideology in the course of the revolutionary movement. After the revolution ended, Chinese gradually recovered their normal aesthetic psychology. It is such a stark contrast of how the European buildings were looked at between the era of the Cultural Revolution and that of

17 “Yi ge Zhong Mei Su xinzhaobu xuan, yanshou le 50 nian de mimi” 一个中美苏心照不宣、严守了 50 年的秘密 (A secret strictly guarded for 50 years by tacit consensus among China, the U.S. and the Soviet Union), 2010, July 6. Available online: <http://news.yorkbbs.ca/world/2010-07/399028.html> (last access 2011, March 1).

DENG Xiaoping; in the former the Red Guards looked at them with hostility and hatred while in the latter the Harbinese looked at them with admiration and praise.

Finally, it is necessary to point out that commercial considerations are a huge driving force for the restoration and rebuilding of European architecture in Heilongjiang. The European architectural remains exclusive to Heilongjiang as a region adjacent to Russia are the unique tourism resources, which cannot be found in other provinces. Heilongjiang strives to develop tourism by highlighting the “European style” and “Russian atmosphere” as their own regional characteristics to enhance the popularity of their hometown and to attract domestic and foreign tourists. Heilongjiang’s largest city Harbin and the border city Manzhouli 满洲里 are particularly successful examples. In order to boost tourism, no effort has been spared to enrich the exotic atmosphere in these two cities. To be precise, it is to attach great importance to restoring and conserving the European architectural buildings as the remaining historical heritage while new buildings in European style are to be constructed. Apart from the various factors in advocating the revival of the foreign architecture in Heilongjiang, the following three approaches have been taken to fulfil the task.

Restoration and conservation of old European style architecture

Government officials are in charge of this approach as a project. This is not only applied to individual European style buildings, but also to the streets and the communities with many such buildings, which are entirely renovated and transformed into a lively European-esque hotspot.

Let’s take Harbin as an example. In order to preserve and make use of European architectural heritage, the Harbin municipal government has established the notion for more than 30 years: “not only to preserve historical buildings, but also to preserve the surroundings”; “not only to preserve the historical districts, but also to preserve the urban patterns, structures, and characteristics” [of these districts]. Following a set of main tasks has been also undertaken:

1. To draw up protection laws and regulations for famous historical cities and accordingly to preserve historical and cultural heritage: approved by the municipal government, the “administrative measures for the protection of buildings, streets, and districts in Harbin city” were implemented on January 2, 1997. The “Regulations for Preserving Buildings and Areas of Harbin City” were also issued in 2001.

2. To clarify the scope of protection: after three times of approval by the municipal government, 247 buildings and 14 blocks were listed for protection and confirmed.
3. To map out a series of specific plans: There have been more than 200 plans that effectively guide the corresponding projects such as the master plan for the conservation of famous historical cities, the comprehensive renovation plan for plaza 1 and 2 of Zhongyang Street, and the reconstruction plans for the plaza 1 to 3 of the St. Sophia's Church Square.

The specific maintenance and conservation work can be divided into three stages:

1. From 1984 to 1996. A stage to conduct research, investigation, restoration, and maintenance of historical and cultural sites and protected architecture units.
2. From 1996 to 2001. Second stage to undertake comprehensive renovation in the surroundings of the historical and cultural sites and protected architectural buildings such as both sides of Zhongyang Street, Jingyu Second Street 靖宇二道街 in the Daowai 道外 area, and the St. Sophia's Church Square etc.; to remove the majority of buildings which were privately or improperly constructed during the 10 years of social unrest, in order to reproduce the historical features of the city.
3. From 2002 to the present. The third and final stage to work on the entire region. The pedestrian area of the Zhongyang Street, the Russian Style Town at Sun Island, and the blocks with Jewish architecture have already been well renovated.¹⁸

The Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church and the St. Sophia's Church can be taken as examples to show the way Harbin preserves the Russian style architecture. With reference to information from GUO Changwu 郭长武,¹⁹ it helps shed light on how Harbin managed to refurbish the badly damaged Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church with a new look (fig. 14-15 to 14-20).

18 YU Binyang 俞滨洋: “Cong Ha'erbin lishi wenhua mingcheng baohu yu chengshi fuxing kan Huayuan jie lishi jiequ de guihua yu fazhan” 从哈尔滨历史文化名城保护与城市复兴看花园街历史街区的规划与发展 (Viewing the planning and development of historical blocks in Huayuan Street through the protection and revival of the Famous Historical and Cultural City Harbin). Available online: <http://www.upp.gov.cn/view/ghdt/article/013127.html> (last access 2011, March 1).

19 GUO Changwu 郭长武: “Chengshi de jiyi – Sheng Yiwei'er jiaotang” 城市的记忆 – 圣伊维尔教堂 (The memory of the city – the Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church), 2018, November 24. Available online: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_c0a5d5890102y7ip.html (last access 2019, February 1).



Figure 14-15: Restoration starting with clearance of the surrounding area –
April 13, 2017²⁰



Figure 14-16: Restoration of the exterior finished first without the domes –
October 25, 2017²¹

20 GUO Changwu: “Chengshi de jiyi – Sheng Yiwei’er jiaotang” (2018).

21 Ibid.



Figure 14-17: Seven wrought onion shaped domes waiting to be mounted²²




Figure 14-18: Mounting the domes on the church – December 6, 2017²³

22 GUO Changwu: “Chengshi de jiyi – Sheng Yiwei’er jiaotang” (2018).

23 Ibid.




Figure 14-19: The completely restored version of the Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church²⁴



Figure 14-20: The restored Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church and the newly built North Square of Harbin Railway Station²⁵

24 “Ha’erbin Sheng Yiwei’er jiaotang” 哈尔滨圣伊维尔教堂 (The Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church in Harbin), 2018, June 26. Available online: <https://www.douban.com/photos/photo/2526240762/> (last access 2019, June 24).

25 “Ha’erbin Sheng Yiwei’er da jiaotang” 哈尔滨圣伊维尔大教堂 (The Great Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church in Harbin), 2018, August 25. Available online: <https://weibo.com/ttarticle/p/show?id=2309404276882186052783> (last access 2019, June 24).

The restoration process of the St. Sophia's Church is similar to that of the Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church (fig. 14-21, 14-22). A tourist attraction with European characteristics was set up around the St. Sophia's Church as the core of the square. In addition of the above mentioned two churches, other churches in Harbin have also been renovated, such as the two neighboring ones on Dongdazhi Street 东大直街 shown below (fig. 14-23 to 14-28).

Two streets in Harbin have been transformed into Russian featured streets due to an extensive amount of Russian architecture being found there. One of them is the above-mentioned Zhongyang Street (known as Zhongguo Street (China Avenue) during the colonial period, fig. 14-29, 14-30). Thanks to the concentration of Russian architecture, this street is also called Harbin's “Arbat Street” 阿尔巴特街 (the famous old street in Moscow). Now it has been renovated into a charming pedestrian street of a high national standard.

The reconstruction of the Harbin Railway Station in recent years has reflected Harbin's persistence in maintaining the Russian featured look of the city (fig. 14-31 to 14-34). The main body of the former Harbin Railway Station is shown below. It was the design of architect Ignacy CYTOWICZ who adopted the Art Nouveau architectural style that was popular in Russia and Western Europe. The original “Russian feature” disappeared in 1988 after the Harbin Railway Station was rebuilt. Another round of reconstruction was launched in November 2015, with the goal of restoring its appearance to its earlier form to highlight its Slavic nature. Completed in November 2019, the renovated version as such has been deemed to be successful in relinking the historical context of Russian architecture with Russia-featured look of the city.




Figure 14-21: The restored version of the St. Sophia's Church
photo taken by ZHAO Tianhua




Figure 14-22: The night scene of St. Sophia's Church²⁶


26 “Ha’erbin – xuexiang – Yabuli – Malapali – menghuan jiayuan” 哈尔滨-雪乡-亚布力-马拉爬犁-梦幻家园 (Harbin – Snow Village – Yabuli – Horse sleigh - Dreamland). Available online: <https://www.tuniu.com/tour/210411883> (last access 2020, April 10).



Figure 14-23: Two neighboring churches on Dongdazhi Street
photo taken by LI Suian



Figures 14-24 and 14-25: Harbin Nangang Christian Church
photo taken by LI Suian



Figures 14-26 and 14-27: Church of the Intercession, Harbin
photo taken by Li Suian




Figure 14-28: Church of the Intercession – Subordinate

cemetery pavilion for prayers

photo taken by Li Suian



Figure 14-29: Zhongyang Street
photo taken by ZHAO Tianhua



Figure 14-30: Night scene of Zhongyang Street²⁷

²⁷ Available online: <http://travel.qunar.com/travelbook/note/5148920> (last access 2020, April 10).



Figure 14-31: The main area of the former Harbin Railway Station²⁸



Figure 14-32: The Harbin Railway Station in 1988
photo taken by Li Suian

28 LUAN Deqian 莱德谦: “Ha Shi 68 sui Fu Xingzhong jia zhong zhencang liang zhang hanjian caise mingxinpian, bashi nian qian mingxinpian chongxian lao Ha zhan ‘fangrong’” 哈市 68 岁富兴中家中珍藏两张罕见彩色明信片, 八十年前明信片重现老哈站“芳容” (Two rare colored postcards have been collected at 68-year old Harbiner Fu Xingzhong's home, the “beautiful countenance” of old Harbin station reappears on the eighty-year-old postcard). In: *Shenghuo bao* 生活报 (Life) no. 9, 2017, March 25. Available online: <http://epaper.hljnews.cn/shb/20170325/265194.html> (last access 2020, June 16).



Figure 14-33: The sketch of the reconstruction result presented at the Harbin Railway Station

photo taken by LI Suiyan



Figure 14-34: The Harbin Railway Station today

photo taken by LI Suiyan

New construction and reconstruction of Russian style buildings

The Harbinese have expressed their enthusiasm for European architecture not only through restoration and maintenance but also through largescale new constructions, especially over the past 20 years. Despite MA Zhongjun 马忠骏 as one of the Harbinese participants in the construction, it was extremely rare to see Harbinese-built European architecture in the early 20th century. At that time, Russian architecture was basically imitated and combined with Chinese architecture, and the “Chinese Baroque” style was thus produced. From the end of the century onwards, the Harbinese were able to construct typical Russia-style buildings on a scale much larger than before. It is no exaggeration to say that a huge trend has emerged in increasing Russian style buildings in Harbin over the past ten years.²⁹

On top of that at the leading role of the local government, some individuals managed the reconstruction very well in the current upsurge of Russian style buildings. During the colonial period, almost no one from Heilongjiang province had the skills to handle typical European architecture. However, there appeared a wealthy class in the beginning of the 21st century, and some of them put their investment in the reconstruction of Russian style buildings. Among all of them, HUANG Zuxiang 黄祖祥 was the most noticeable while the resort park, the Volga Manor, he invested in has earned an increasing reputation in both China and Russia.

Compared with the government, individuals like HUANG pay more attention to detail and quality when it comes to building Russian style architecture. The responsibility for the entire construction plan, design of specific buildings, and supervision of construction of the Volga Manor was all assigned to Russian architects. Dozens of exquisite and unconventional buildings have been built in the manor, forming a panoramic view and fully showing the splendidness of Russian classical architecture. It is more than apt to call the Volga Manor a miniature museum of Russian classical architecture. Even more commendable is that some classical architectural buildings which long disappeared in Russia or became debris

29 The imitation of foreign architecture also happened in other regions of China. A government office building in Anhui resembles the White House in the USA typical medium-sized German town in a Bauhaus style was constructed in Anting Town, Shanghai, 2006. There stands the copied statue of GOETHE and SCHILLER. The romantic town Hallstatt, Austria's world cultural heritage, is also being copied in Guangdong Province. The town's mayor, Alexander SCHEUTZ, is discontent with the Chinese version of Hallstatt and has asked UNESCO for help. UNESCO officials said that the consent to copy in such a manner should in principle be obtained from the corresponding country. Cf. “De mei: Zhongguo mimi fuzhi Aodili xiao zhen” 德媒：中国秘密复制奥地利小镇 (German media: China secretly copies Austrian town), 2011, June 20. Available online <http://world.people.com.cn/GB/14946613.html>.

and ashes because of the brutal Red Guards have been added on the lands of the manor. Without Huang's efforts, these buildings would not have reappeared in the suburbs of Harbin.

The gate of the Volga Manor was modelled after that of a castle which no longer exists on the outskirts of Irkutsk, Russia (fig. 14-35, 14-36). In Nizhny Novgorod (Nizhniï Novgorod), the hometown of Soviet writer Maxim GORKY (Maksim GOR'KI) in Russia, the exhibition hall of a jute mill was built in 1896 and demolished in 1925. After more than 80 years the jute mill has been reproduced in the Volga Manor, right at the reception center (fig. 14-37). The Volga Hotel in the manor was another reproduction of architectural work also originally built in Russia in 1896 and destroyed in 1925. The Pavlov Castle, tumbled down after two tumultuous centuries in Russia, is also modelled after and newly built here inside the resort park (fig. 14-38).

Among numerous European style buildings newly built in Harbin since the period of Reform and Opening, even some public facilities have also adopted European architecture, such as blood donation centers shown below. The public toilet in the Cultural Park has also been seen as one of the most special toilets in Harbin city. In a contemporary Harbin, you can see helmet shaped domes and Gothic spires on top of newly constructed buildings. They altogether constitute a perfect skyline of Harbin. Even several bus shelters and kiosks are featured with beautiful elements of European architecture as well to decorate the city (fig. 14-39 to 14-43).



Figure 14-35: The Volga Manor
photo taken by ZHAO Tianhua



Figure 14-36: Main gate of the Volga Manor³⁰

30 Available online: <http://www.mafengwo.cn/sales/2605839.html?cid=1030> (last access 2020, April 10).



Figure 14-37: Reception Center of the Volga Manor with

the rebuilt St. Nicholas Cathedral

photo taken by Li Suiyan



Figure 14-38: The newly built Pavlov Castle in the Volga Manor

photo taken by Li Suiyan



Figure 14-39: Blood donation center in European style in Harbin
photo taken by Li Suian



Figure 14-40: The public toilet in a European style in the Harbin Cultural Park
photo taken by Li Suian



Figures 14-41, 14-42 and 14-43: European design adopted

on newly constructed buildings

photos taken by Li Suian

Using European architecture as the theme of painting and sculpture

Painters, ice sculptors, and photographers in Harbin use the preserved historical European architectural buildings as the subject matter, that is, the objects they paint, and reflect this in their artistic creations. The artistic genre of their works is thus incredibly special. For example, the historical building in the first picture below used to be the official residence of the director of the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) Company, built in 1920 in the Art Nouveau style with a wood and brick structure (fig. 14-44, 14-45). The painter WANG Huandi 王煥堤 took this residential building as a model for his gouache painting (fig. 14-46 to 14-48).

In his published collection *Ha'erbin shuicai biji*³¹ 哈尔滨水彩笔记 (My Gouaches of Harbin), the paintings depict European, and especially Russian, architecture. As an artist, he hopes to strengthen the diplomatic relationship between China and Russia by means of folk art instead of governmental diplomacy. In June 2019, he presented his collection as a gift to the Russian Ambassador to China Andrey Ivanovich DENISOV (Andrej Ivanovich DENISOV).

On the other hand, watercolor painter CHEN Song 陈松 hopes to reflect history through his painting. As he believes that buildings in various styles in Harbin are actually expressive of their times, he has recreated in his works the look of those buildings in earlier days.³² In his collection *Yi tiao jie yu yi zuo cheng* 一条街与一座城 (A historical street in a historical town), the first piece “Painting 001” is the Restaurant Miniatur³³ built in 1927 representing an Art Nouveau building with a wood and brick structure.

31 WANG Huandi 王煥堤: *Ha'erbin shuicai biji – xian hua shuicheng* 哈尔滨水彩笔记 - 闲画水城 (My Gouaches of Harbin – leisurely painting of a city in watercolor), Harbin: North Literature and Art Press 2019.

32 “Shuise de yongtan: CHEN Song ‘Yi tiao jie yu yi zuo cheng’ xilie shuicai zuopin” 水色的詠嘆: 陳松《一條街與一座城》系列水彩作品 (The sigh for the days gone by in watercolors: the series of watercolor pictures *A historical street in a historical town* by Chen Song), 2018, June 29. Available online: <https://www.xuehua.us/2018/06/29/%E6%B0%8B%E8%89%B2%E7%9A%84%E5%92%8F%E5%8F%B9%EF%BC%9A%E9%99%88%E6%9D%BE%E3%80%8A%E4%B8%80%E6%9D%A1%E8%A1%97%E4%B8%8E%E4%B8%80%E5%BA%A7%E5%9F%8E%E3%80%8B%E7%B3%BB%E5%88%97%E6%B0%84%E5%BD%A9%E4%BD%9C/zh-hk/> (last access 2020, March 19).

33 Transliteration of Russian “*Miniatyr*”. Cf. Nikolay Petrovich KRADIN (Nikolaï Petrovich KRADIN): “From the history of Russian culture park creation in Harbin” (2013). Available online: <https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/8388098/np-kadin-kadin-nikolay-petrovich-doctor-of-architecture-pjau> (last access 2019, February 26).



Figures 14-44 and 14-45: The residence of the director of CER Company today
photo taken by LI Suiyan



Figure 14-46: WANG Huandi's gouache painting using the residence of the director of CER as the model
photo taken by WANG Huandi




Figure 14-47: WANG Huandi's gouache using the residence of director of CER as the model
photo taken by WANG Huandi




Figure 14-48: Cover of “My Gouaches of Harbin – leisurely painting of a city in watercolor”
photo taken by WANG Huandi

In 1927, the head office of the American Thriftoor Bank was set up at 3 Zhongyang Street, moved to Shanghai in 1934, and subsequently closed in 1935. This historical building was unfortunately removed at the end of the 20th century but is represented in “Painting 008”. Needless to say, CHEN Song has tried to paint the former look of the buildings based on historical photographs (fig. 14-49 to 14-51).

Unlike WANG Huandi’s and CHEN Song’s painting method, two other Harbinese artists, YOU Kunlun 由昆仑 and LI Gangfeng 黎纲峰, portray the Russian architecture in Harbin in a different way, with pen and ink drawings. The historical look of the aforementioned architectural buildings at Zhongyang street such as St. Sophia’s Church and the Restaurant Miniatur are finely drawn in detailed black and white tones by YOU Kunlun (fig. 14-52, 14-53). Another outstanding pen drawing by him is the “Wangguo Foreign Firm”, a historical building built in 1922 with a two-story concrete block structure in eclectic architectural style located at 130 Zhongyang Street (fig. 14-54). The pen and ink works by LI Gangfeng (also known as a sculptor) are as impressive as those by YOU Kunlun. Just take a look at his refined drawings of both the past and present of St. Nicholas Cathedral (fig. 14-55, 14-56). During the national struggle against the new coronavirus 2019 (2019-nCoV), LI presented a picture to advise Harbin citizens to wear masks with the picture of the St. Sophia’s Church in Harbin wearing a surgical mask and the slogan “Behave yourself, wear a mask!” (fig. 14-57).

Harbin, just as other cities in China, has launched a campaign called “creating a civilized city” to improve the image of the city. Moreover, the Harbin Municipal Government has also carried out publicity campaigns in order to promote the core values of socialism for instance. In the course of these campaigns, many posters and billboards have been produced, posted on the walls and the streets. The government has been used to adopting churches and other European architectural buildings as the cultural symbols of Harbin on the layout of these posters and billboards. Below are some examples:

Next to the picture of the St. Sophia’s Church, the slogan in green on the top right reads “Ni wo gong jian wenming Ha’erbin” 你我共建文明哈尔滨 (Let us create a civilized Harbin) with the catchphrase in the middle “Hongyang hexin jiazhiguan, chuangjian quanguo wenming cheng” 弘扬核心价值观, 创建全国文明城 (Promote core values; create a national civilized city) and the message at the bottom reads “Welcome to Harbin” (fig 14-58).

On the next poster (fig. 14-59), one can see the upper part of several churches. The slogan in purple reads “Langman dingxiang cheng, wenming Ha’erbin 浪漫丁香城, 文明哈尔滨 (Romantic Lilac City; civilized Harbin). As lilac is the representative city flower of Harbin, Harbin is hence also renowned as the “Lilac City”.




Figures 14-49 and 14-50: A historical street in a historical town –
Paintings 001 (left) and 008 (right)³⁴



Figure 14-51: A historical street in a historical town – Painting 003

34 “The sigh for the days gone by in watercolours: the series of Gouaches in Yi tiao jie yu yi zuo cheng” 一条街与一座城 (A historical street in a historical town) by CHEN Song, 2017, May 10. Available online: http://www.sohu.com/a/139560923_713474 (last access 2019, November 2).



Figures 14-52 and 14-53: St. Sophia's Church by You Kunlun (left) and The Restaurant Miniatur by You Kunlun (right)



Figure 14-54: Wangguo Foreign Firm by You Kunlun



Figure 14-55: St. Nicholas Cathedral before demolition by Li Gangfeng



Figure 14-56: Rebuilt St. Nicholas Cathedral in the Volga Manor by Li Gangfeng



Figure 14-57: St. Sophia's Church wearing a surgical mask by Li Gangfeng



Figure 14-58: Poster with St. Sophia's Church
photo taken by LI Suian



Figure 14-59: Poster with the upper part of several historical churches
photo taken by LI Suian

The text at the top left corner of the following poster (fig. 14-60) reads “Yi sheng suo ai – wei geng hao de jiayuan xingdong” 一生所爱 – 为更好的家园行动 (Love for all generations; action for a better hometown). The building standing next to the church is the office building of the Songpu Foreign Firm in the colonial period at Zhongyang Street.

The slogan in the following left picture (fig. 14-61) reads “Da shu cong zhongzi kaishi, wenming cong yanqian zuo qi” 大树从种子开始, 文明从眼前做起 (Huge trees grow from small seeds, a civilized city starts right before our eyes). The slogan in the right picture (fig. 14-62) reads: “Jingcai rensheng lu, wenming di yi bu” 精彩人生路, 文明第一步 (A civilized city is the first step on the way to a wonderful life). The following billboards show the combination of St. Sophia’s Church and the face of the national hero LEI Feng (on the right, fig. 14-64) as well as the slogan (on the left, fig. 14-63) “Zai pan wenming chuangjian xin gaofeng, yingzao zhenxing fazhan hao huanjing 再攀文明创建新高峰, 营造振兴发展好环境” (Let’s establish a new level of civilization; let’s build, revitalize and develop our environment in a good way).

Every winter, ice sculpture artists in Harbin treat European architecture as their most important source materials. Their ice sculptures present a fantasy art world across the backdrop of the dark night. Here are some pictures of the scenes (fig. 14-65 to 14-68).

Even the traditional screens made in Harbin are decorated with the European architectural buildings (fig. 14-69). Such screens usually belong to Chinese furniture. It used to provide concealment in a room but it has more recently become a highly decorative work of art. Playing the role of a decorative ornament to embellish the house and beautifully enhance the living room, the screens contain cultural features embedded in the shape, pattern, and text, which reflects the taste of the owner. The photograph below presents a good example of an elegant five panel folding screen made in Harbin featuring Chinese calligraphy and European architecture in a traditional Chinese painting.

From right to left, the first panel shows the title of the screen in golden print “Bing cheng yinxiang” 冰城印象 (Impression of the icy city – Harbin). The building on the second panel next to the title panel is the Italian building “Palazzo di Gibello-Socco” (Gibello-Socco Palace), which was the former Consulate of Italy in Harbin during the colonial period³⁵. The remaining three panels show the

35 ZHUANG Haowen 莊皓文: “Ha’erbin zui mei weilan yuan Yidali lingshiguan Jibieluo-Suoke dalou yi lei baohu weilan yi chaichu” 哈爾濱最美圍欄原義大利領事館基別洛索科大樓一類保護圍欄已拆除 (The most beautiful fence in Harbin, the original Italian Consulate Building, Palazzo di Gibello-Socco, has been demolished), 2019, September 1. Available online: <https://kknews.cc/world/nl69ae2.html> (last access 2020, March 19).

classical Russian buildings in Harbin which have already been mentioned: St. Sophia's Church (the middle panel), the Songpu Foreign Firm (the fourth panel) and St. Nicholas Cathedral (on the far left).



Figure 14-60: Poster with a European Church and
Songpu Foreign Firm at the center
photo taken by Li Suan



Figures 14-61 and 14-62: Billboards with a slogan and church picture
photos taken by Li Suan



Figure 14-63 and 14-64: Billboards of pictorial combination with slogan (left) and Lei Feng (right)
photos taken by Li Suian



Figures 14-65 and 14-66: Scenes of ice sculptures of European architecture³⁶

36 “Ha’erbin – Manzhouli – Haila’er – Hulunbei’er wu ri you. Yong zhe de lücheng.”
哈尔滨-满洲里-海拉尔-呼伦贝尔 5 日游。勇者的旅程。(Harbin – Manjur -



Figures 14-67 and 14-68: Scenes of ice sculptures of European architecture
photo taken by ZHAO Tianhua



Figure 14-69: Five panel folding screen made in Harbin
featuring European architecture
photo taken by CHEN Wenlong

Hulunbuir five-day travel. A trip for the brave.) Available online: <https://www.tuniu.com/tour/210062117> (last access 2020, April 4).

Harbinese cherishing European architecture through the nostalgia for the St. Nicholas Cathedral

At times of the Reform and Opening movement, there was strong condemnation in Harbin of what the Red Guards brutally did against the St. Nicholas Cathedral during the Cultural Revolution. Meanwhile, people in Harbin felt regretful and nostalgic for the disappearing architecture. Driven by these mixed feelings, the Harbinese took subsequent action.

First, the cathedral mindlessly torn down by the Red Guards has been recreated in the Volga Manor in a perfect replica (fig. 14-70). In order to perfect the recreation, Nikolay Petrovich KRADIN, PhD in architecture, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Architecture and Construction Sciences (RAACS), professor of Architecture and the Urban Planning Department of Pacific Nation University (Khabarovsk), was invited to be the leading designer. Dr. KRADIN is an active participant in the restoration of Russian monuments as well.

As the original St. Nicholas Church was designed in the former Russian capital St. Petersburg, the relics, holy icons, and bronze bells inside the church were transported from Moscow to Harbin. HUANG Zuxiang, major investor in the Volga Manor wanted to see the replica designed, measured, and built in exactly the same way as the original cathedral. He, his team, and Dr. KRADIN cooperated to achieve this goal with several key methods. First, they imported the same kind of logs and timber used for the original cathedral from Russia. Secondly, they looked for and hired only those skilled craftsmen who are capable of the meticulous refined carving and conforming to blueprints of the original cathedral, especially the proportions. Third, they ordered most of the interior and decorative objects, be it bronze bells, holy icons, candlesticks etc., from Russia. Even the styles and colors of some of the tables and chairs were consistent with those of the original cathedral. All in all, they skipped no tiny detail, such as where nails are used and where not, what size and shape of the decorative patterns on the outer wall are taken and so forth, in order to recreate an architectural copy of the original one.³⁷

³⁷ PENG Bo 彭博 and XU Jiandong 徐建东: “Ha Shi xiangfang ‘Fu’erjia zhuangyuan’ chongxian Eluosi jingdian jianzhu” 哈市香坊“伏尔加庄园”重现俄罗斯经典建筑 (Volga Manor in Harbin recreates Russian classical architecture). Available online: <http://house.focus.cn/newshtml/680494.html> (last access 2011, March 17). Cf. Nikolay Petrovich KRADIN: “From the history of Russian culture park creation in Harbin” (2013).



Figure 14-70: Newly built St. Nicholas Cathedral in the Volga Manor
photo taken by Li Suian



Figure 14-71 and 14-72: Miniature version of the St. Nicholas Cathedral
near the original location
photos taken by Li Suian



Figure 14-73: The carved drainage cover of the cathedral near Harbin West Railway Station Square
photo taken by *Li Suian*



Figures 14-74, 14-75 and 14-76: From left to right - the carved drainage cover opposite the North Theatre, near the Qiulin Company and opposite HIT Main Building
photo taken by *Li Suian*

It was a great dedication of both Chinese and Russian teams in the reconstructing of the historical Russian architecture on Chinese soil. Now that the resultant replica towers in front of them makes them feel gratified by and large, but they truly wanted the replica to leave nothing to be desired. Dr. KRADIN, in particular, continues to believe things could have been done better. After the completed reconstruction, this critical architecture expert took a long walk through the Volga Manor day after day, looking at the architectural buildings, scrutinizing them in silence and pondering over some tiny detail or another. One day, he found a fly in the ointment of the replica and said to a Chinese team member and colleague “The roof color of the cathedral is too light, that gets mixed up with the color of the sky.”³⁸

Another example to prove Harbin’s nostalgia for the St. Nicholas Cathedral can be found around 200 meters away from the original location of the cathedral. A miniature version has been built there as a street decoration, which is very eye-catching day and night. Furthermore, you can find carved images of the cathedral even on some drainage covers on the street (fig. 14-71 to 14-76).

European Architecture in Other Chinese Cities and Conclusion

Toward the end of the discussion, it is worth talking about the Chinese attitude toward another specific type of European architecture, that is, namely German architecture. The destruction European architecture suffered during the Cultural Revolution was not limited to Harbin but in fact everywhere in China. Just as the Red Guards and their fellow revolutionary groups in Harbin demolished the St. Nicholas Cathedral built by Russians, the Red Guards in Qingdao 青岛, Shandong Province, also tried to blow down a Catholic church built by Germans for the same reason: it represented a colony. The German church made the invasive colonization unforgettable and reminded Chinese people of the colonial disgrace. Consequently, attempts were made to pull down this church, and yet the violent demolition teams were unsuccessful because the church was too sturdy (fig. 14-77, 14-78).

38 GAO Mang 高莽: “Zhongguo you ge ‘Fu’erjia zhuangyuan’” 中国有个“伏尔加庄园” (A “Volga Manor” in China). Available online: http://www.cass.net.cn/show_news.asp?ID=281239 (last access 2011, March 20).



Figure 14-77: The sturdy surviving Catholic church in Qingdao
photo taken by Li Suian



Figure 14-78: Marital couples taking pictures in front of the church
photo taken by Li Suian

Similar to the situation in Harbin, the attitude of people from Qingdao toward this church since the act of Reform and Opening has changed fundamentally. The Catholic church, like many other European architectural buildings left by the Germans, is treated as an important part of Chinese cultural heritage. Careful renovation has also been done to the church. It is now a sightseeing place in Qingdao as well as a popular spot for young marital couples.

Nevertheless, the significant architectural achievement of Germany in China, the Tianjin-Pukou Railway 津浦铁路 Jinan Station 济南站 (a.k.a Jinan Old Railway Station) completed in 1909³⁹, did not survive the removal commanded by ignorant officials in 1992 (fig. 14-79). Furious at the unscrupulous officials of those days, people in Jinan now are all missing the old railway station and hoping to see this great German station building realized once again. NIU Changchun 牛长春, head officer of the Jinan Planning Bureau, states that “The Old Jinan Railway Station with a mixture of Gothic and eclectic architecture is hardly forgettable among Jinan citizens. Especially in recent years, a group of the NPC (National People’s Congress) representatives of Jinan, members of the CPPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) and many Jinan residents have repeatedly proposed that the integration project of the new Jinan North Square Station should show the characteristics of the Old Jinan Railway Station. This is not only a cultural symbol of Jinan, but also a nostalgia complex of the entire Jinan [area]”.⁴⁰

A typical medium sized German town in a Bauhaus style was constructed in Anting Town 安亭镇, Shanghai, 2006 (fig. 14-80, 14-81). There stands the copied statue of GOETHE and SCHILLER originally from Weimar, a city symbolizing German culture (fig. 14-82). The replica of this popular statue is also reported to be found in Cleveland, Milwaukee and San Francisco. The design of this new community in Shanghai was conducted by nearly a hundred German designers from more than ten German design firms including ASP, GMP, ABB, IFB, W & R, A + W, B + S, Zahn, Behnisch & Partner etc. Professor Albert SPEER, chief planner of the world expo Hannover, Germany in 2000, was the leader of this group of German designers. In 2010, he came to Anting New Town to inspect the results and commented: “This looks really like an authentic German town”.

39 Cf. LI Hongmei: “On the Architectural and Cultural Value of Jinan Old Railway Station”. In: *CS Canada* vol. 10, no. 6, 2014, pp. 158–161. DOI: 10.3968/5071.

40 FU Xiaoying 付晓英: “Jinan lao huoche zhan: Juejue chaichu yu caoshuai fu jian” 济南老火车站：决绝拆除与草率复建 (The Jinan Old Railway Station: Opposition to destruction and hasty reconstruction), 2013, September 6. Available online: http://qd.ifeng.com/xinwenzaobanche/detail_2013_09/06/1192265_0.shtml (last access 2019, February 6).



Figure 14-79: The Jinan Old Railway Station
photo taken by LU Shen



Figures 14-80, 14-81 and 14-82: Anting Town and the copied statue of GOETHE and SCHILLER⁴¹

41 “Anting xinzen – Wanke Anting xinzen jiage” 安亭新镇 – 万科安亭新镇价格 (Anting New Town – Prices for Vanke’s Anting New Town), 2019, January 1. Available online: <https://www4.freep.cn/id1836523.html> (last access 2019, June 24).

Looking at all the examples we have discussed in this article, one can confirm that European architecture has become a symbol of beauty in the eyes of the people of Harbin and an indispensable part of Harbinese culture. The buildings of this kind of architecture like the St. Sophia's Church, the Holy Iveron Icon Orthodox Church and so on have become landmarks in Harbin. The modified Harbinese attitude toward European architecture after the Reform and Opening period reflects the reformed spirit of the era in which China as a whole has been actively integrating into the world and enthusiastically learning from foreign culture. Such positive attitude and the actions taken in Harbin are the epitome of all people of China. To conclude, the spread of European architecture in Harbin, but also across the whole of China, embodies the twists and turns of how modern China has come to accept Western culture.

(translated from Chinese by Neshric TIMOTHY)

Gotelind MÜLLER

15 Whose Heritage? Western and Russian Tombs on Chinese Soil as Tangible Sites of Alterity

Abstract. Among the enduring forms of tangible Western and Russian heritage in Greater China there are not only buildings or statues, but also tombs and cemeteries. These tell their own history of place which may well be at variance with the one locally preferred, and they are, as opposed to buildings for example, evidently not open to potential adaptive “reuse”. At the very most, they can be reframed. Neither can they be simply transferred to museums as one may do with a statue. Their existence and the question of their preservation pose a particular challenge to the present-day surrounding society since they are not only representing but also materially hosting “foreign dead”, i.e. “ancestors” of “others” whose physical remains are interred in Chinese soil. In short, “their” memory is not – or not necessarily – “our” memory from the viewpoint of the culture and society they are situated in. On a political level, this entails potential diplomatic issues, and also extends to issues of colonialism and post-colonialism. On the other hand, the tombs and cemeteries also speak of Western/Russian views of death, religion and the body, and they visually manifest those to the Chinese society surrounding them today. This study therefore argues for the importance to not only look into Western and Russian material heritage of, and for, the living in Greater China, but to include also the remaining dead. These stand for (local and translocal) history and foreign agency in the past at large, but also more personally for the very individuals and their different societal roles; and their material legacy links them to the place far from their own homes and to the context of a foreign society and culture. Cemeteries, while reminding everyone of the common fate of a finite existence shared by all human beings, are nevertheless culturally inscribed, and thus foreigners’ tombs are a material and visual presence of alterity physically grounded in a Chinese context.

Keywords. Cultural heritage, Greater China, Cemeteries, Military, Religion.

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Modern-day heritage politics in Greater China have to deal with the question of what to do with the particular material legacy represented by locally extant Western/Russian tombs and cemeteries.¹ Should they be kept, and if so how, for whom, and by whom? Since it is not only tombstones but also human remains that are involved, any decision is bound up with issues of piety, if not religion. Tombs are personal and private, but they can be made to serve also politics and be “nationalized”. While memorials concern the living more than those remembered, physical remains in a cemetery remind the living that the dead cannot be completely left out of the picture; they “demand” their share of attention,² whatever might be attached to their tombstones above ground, and in whatever context they are placed by others. Although their tombstones are – to use Alois RIEGL’s terminology – “intentional” (gewollte) monuments with historical commemorative value (Erinnerungswert), their “present-day value” (Gegenwartswert) is questionable and relative according to whom they are for,³ however being attached to human remains as they are, they are simply more than just monuments.⁴

At times, the picture becomes additional complicated by further players, namely – in our case in Greater China – with the Japanese when they were masters at some locations. For example, in Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period, Western cemeteries were “used” to serve diplomatic agendas, most notably with the “French Military Cemetery” in Keelung (Jilong 基隆) set up for French casualties during the Sino-French War of 1884/85 (fig. 15-1). Since the Japanese who held Taiwan as their colony from 1895 to 1945 had no reason to commemorate the Qing soldiers (and local volunteers) who fought against the French in 1884/85, they turned the foreign site, i.e. the French military cemetery, into a museum-like site, which was, in 1923, even visited by the Japanese crown prince (the later Shōwa Tennō 昭和天皇) (1901–1989). This, in turn, did not render the site particularly

1 Cf. for just one of many similar cases, here in South Asia, Ashish CHADHA: “Ambivalent Heritage: Between Affect and Ideology in a Colonial Cemetery”. In: *Journal of Material Culture* vol. 11, no. 3, 2006, pp. 339–363.

2 Cf. Thomas W. LAQUEUR: *The Work of the Dead: A Cultural History of Mortal Remains*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2015, with a focus on Western Europe.

3 For the terminological system of RIEGL which provided a basis for international heritage preservation concepts, namely the Venice Charter (1964), see Ernst BACHER (ed.): *Kunstwerk oder Denkmal? Alois Riegls Schriften zur Denkmalpflege* (Work of Art or Monument? Alois Riegls Writings on the Preservation of Monuments), Wien et al.: Böhlau 1995. An English translation of the main part of his major work in this regard is: Alois RIEGL: “The Modern Cult of Monuments, its Charter and its Origin”, transl. by K.W. FORSTER and D. GHIRARDO. In: *Oppositions*, no. 25, 1982, pp. 21–51.

4 Similarly, RIEGL had been careful about religious monuments, since here, too, additional factors beyond art and matter come into play.

endearing to the Taiwanese population.⁵ There were apparently larger designs planned by the Japanese to turn the site into a showcase memorial, but the French pointed out that the site was a cemetery and thus a commemorative place. This reveals the difference of a “heritage site” for those somehow involved (i.e. the French standing for the “bereaved” and caring for those buried) and those merely “managing” the site (the Japanese, aiming at some benefit from what is visible above ground). In Lüshun 旅順 in Manchuria, in turn, the victorious Japanese took over the place formerly held by the Russians during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05 and were the ones to bury most of the Tsarist dead there, here successfully setting up a showcase cemetery after the war, with classical-style mausoleum and (Latin) marble crosses included (fig. 15-2, 15-3, 15-4). This means that what is to be seen in this “Tsarist” part of the present-day cemetery is, in fact, a Japanese construct of “Westernness” with references to Greek antiquity with the “mausoleum”, and to Christianity in a broad sense by the crosses, but not explicitly “Russian” in visual appearance.⁶ In fact, Western European models, namely the Victorian “fashion”, spread all over the British Empire and imitated beyond,⁷ were likely on the Japanese mind for setting up a “state-of-the-art” cemetery.

5 See Gotelind MÜLLER: *Challenging Dead: A Look into Foreigners' Cemeteries in Macau, Hong Kong, and Taiwan*, Heidelberg and Berlin: CrossAsia-Repository 2018, available online: DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11588/xarep.00004145>, p. 30. For the “touristic value”, see XU Yuliang 許毓良: “Jilong Faguo gongmu kao” 基隆法國公墓考 (Study on the Keelung French cemetery). In: *Taiwan fengwu* 臺灣風物 (“The Taiwan Folkways”) vol. 52, no. 2, 2002, pp. 111–137, there pp. 130–131. The 1923 visit of Crown Prince Hirohito 裕仁 to Taiwan has been studied by WAKABAYASHI Masahiro since the 1980s in various articles. See, e.g., WAKABAYASHI Masahiro 若林正丈: „Sen kyūhyaku nijūsan nen Tōgū Taiwan gyōkei to ‘naichi enchō shugi’” 一九二三年東宮台灣行啓と“内地延長主義” (The 1923 Taiwan visit of the Crown Prince and the “ideology of extension of the homeland”). In: *Iwanami kōza: Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi 2: Teikoku tōchi no kōzō* 岩波講座。近代日本と植民地 2。帝国統治の構造 (Iwanami symposium: Modern Japan and the colonies 2: The structure of imperial rule), Tokyo: Iwanami shoten 1992, pp. 87–119.

6 It might be mentioned that at the time the Japanese cast themselves in the role of the defenders of Western civilization against the “oriental” Russians. Cf. Naoko SHIMAZU: *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009. As it seems, the Greco-Roman “mausoleum” in Lüshun de facto did not contain any human remains and thus is a memorial building only.

7 Cf. James Stevens CURL: *The Victorian Celebration of Death*, Stroud: Sutton Publishing 2000.



Figure 15-1: Keelung: French Military Cemetery: monument to the French officers, soldiers and marines who died during the Sino-French War in Keelung ©2018



Figure 15-2: Lüshun: Soviet Military/ “Martyrs” Cemetery: Japanese-built “mausoleum” for Russian war dead erected after the Russo-Japanese War ©2018



Figure 15-3: Lüshun: Soviet Military/ “Martyrs” Cemetery: Japanese-built individual tombs of Russian officers erected after the Russo-Japanese War ©2018



Figure 15-4: Lüshun: Soviet Military/ “Martyrs” Cemetery: Example of collective tomb for Russian war dead at single battle sites erected by the Japanese after the Russo-Japanese War ©2018

The defeated Russians themselves were only allowed in 1912 to take an active part again in the cemetery which hosted their own dead,⁸ setting up a large Orthodox cross with an icon of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker and a tiny chapel dedicated to St. Equal-to-the-apostles Vladimir,⁹ thus “Russianizing” the cemetery (fig. 15-5).



Figure 15-5: Lüshun: Soviet Military/ “Martyrs” Cemetery: Restored Tsarist huge cross for the Russo-Japanese War dead ©2018

8 See Gotelind MÜLLER: *Ambivalent Remains: China and the Russian Cemeteries in Harbin, Dalian and Lüshun*, Heidelberg and Berlin: CrossAsia-Repository 2019, available online: DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11588/xarep.00004181>, esp. pp. 49–55.

9 According to architectural historian LEVOSHKO, it was probably to be kept small as to not tower over the Japanese-built mausoleum. S.S. LEVOSHKO: “Arkhitekturnye traditsii pamiatni v pravoslavii: khramy-pamiatniki pavshim voinam na Dal'nem Vostoke (k 100-letiiu russko-ijaponskoj vojny 1904–1905 gg.)” (Architectural traditions of memory in Orthodoxy: sanctuary-monuments to fallen soldiers in the Far East (to the 100th anniversary of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905)). In: V.G. BABIN (ed.): *Makar'evskie chteniia: Materialy chetvertoi mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii (21–22 noiabria 2005 goda)* (Macarius readings: Proceedings of the fourth international conference (November 21–22, 2005)), Gorno-Altaisk: RIO GAGU 2005, 7 pages, there p. 5. Paper available online via the index page: <http://e-lib.gasu.ru/konf/mak/arhiv/2005/index.html>.

The controversial icon designed for Lüshun to ward off “paganism” which did not arrive in time for the Russo-Japanese war, understandably never made it to the place during the years of Japanese occupation. It is somewhat ironic that it is now installed in a consecrated copy at the time of a Chinese Communist regime officially subscribing to atheism, although here the potential “anti-Japanese” association is most probably much welcome. Needless to say, for the faithful the icon has more important connotations than politics, but it is kept publicly inaccessible most of the time by the cemetery administration anyway.¹⁰

Another factor making things even more complicated is the fact that “Western” cemeteries were not necessarily exclusively “hosting” “Westerners”, if one thinks, for example, of the British military which is commemorated today in Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemeteries, in the Greater China area represented in Hong Kong: “British military” included also Indians and other “non-Westerners” (fig. 15-6, 15-7). And also in terms of a religious perspective, beyond the Christians there are also Jews, and these include – beyond the European/Russian Jews buried in Harbin and Hong Kong until today – also the so-called Baghdadi Jews from British India (and Iraq), whose tombs are still to be found in Hong Kong. Many Sephardic Baghdadi Jews as well as Ashkenazic Russian Jews had also been buried in Shanghai once, but there no Jewish cemetery has survived, just scattered tombstones and some single (relocated) tombs, e.g. of the influential Baghdadi KADOORIE family in the “international cemetery”.¹¹ This leaves Harbin with the “largest Jewish cemetery of East Asia” as the only one in mainland China which mostly “hosts” Ashkenazic Russian Jews,¹² and Hong Kong with a mixed Jewish representation of Sephardim and Ashkenazim (fig. 15-8, 15-9).

10 The chapel in Lüshun is usually closed to the public.

11 See Gotelind MÜLLER: *Between History, Heritage, and Foreign Relations: Extant Westerners’ Cemeteries in Guangzhou and Shanghai*, Heidelberg and Berlin: CrossAsia-Repository 2018, available online: DOI: <https://doi.org/10.11588/xarep.00004163>, p. 17 and p. 31.

12 See MÜLLER: *Ambivalent Remains* (2019), pp. 26–30.



Figure 15-6: Hong Kong: Sai Wan War Cemetery (Commonwealth War Graves Commission) ©2018



Figure 15-7: Hong Kong: Sai Wan War Cemetery: some non-Briton / non-Christian tombs ©2018




Figure 15-8: Harbin: Jewish cemetery: restored tombstones and name plaques ©2018



Figure 15-9: Hong Kong: Jewish Cemetery ©2018

With these caveats in mind, and with the awareness that in a more general vein “foreigners” in the area also included Muslims and Indian Parsees in terms of religion,¹³ as well as Vietnamese, Koreans, Mongolians, and the numerous Japanese in terms of ethnicities, most of the “foreign dead” still to be found in the Greater China area are Westerners or Russians. Apart from the Jewish dead, they are for the most part Christians. With the Soviets, finally, a secularized form of burial made its way to China as well. Whereas the orthodox Russians, especially in the pauper cemeteries, sometimes used wooden crosses which easily decayed, the more frequent case was tombs in stone, and these had, by the very nature of the material, better chances to “survive”.

Thus, what the Chinese encounter today are these remaining tangible visual-material sites of alterity. Still, not all cemeteries are exclusively “foreign”, and in some cases there is a mixture of foreign and Chinese graves in the cemeteries, usually in those cases where Christian denomination is the defining criteria. For example Harbin’s “Orthodox cemetery” hosts Russian as well as Chinese orthodox, or Hong Kong’s Catholic cemetery “St. Michael’s”, while visually being dominated by “Western” tombstone design with statues and angels (fig. 15-10), from the start hosted whatever Catholic, regardless of nationality. In fact, the Catholics insisted on rejecting the “race” segregation suggested by the British colonial authorities and integrated the Chinese Catholics from the very start.



Figure 15-10: Hong Kong: St. Michael’s Catholic Cemetery ©2018

13 Beyond the Sino-Muslims (*hui* 回), there are also, e.g., Arabic traders’ tombs. Notable foreign Muslim populations were usually present at places of trade. The Parsees, in turn, still have a running cemetery in Hong Kong, while the ones in Macau and Guangzhou are historical.

On the other hand, an important factor was the question of who is running the cemetery: if it is the municipality, then there is no reason to exclude whoever lives there. The “Hong Kong Cemetery” (earlier also named “Protestant” or “Colonial Cemetery”) thus became fairly mixed in time in the sense that it not only took in the equally foreign Japanese, but also a substantial number of (selected) Chinese, though being visually defined by “Western” tomb architecture and the garden cemetery design popular since the 18th century in Britain (fig. 15-11).¹⁴ The most mixed of all, though, is the Macau “S. Miguel” cemetery which, in spite of having a large part of Christian crosses and statues and a chapel (fig. 15-12), now provides also clearly visible signs of Buddhist, Daoist, and other creeds (fig. 15-13). And the longer a cemetery is used beyond the “colonial” or foreign-imprinted period, the more it obviously changes. Thus, while the “Hong Kong Cemetery” is basically closed today, the Harbin “Orthodox Cemetery” and the “S. Miguel” cemetery in Macau are still fully in use (though numbers between the two differ substantially, given the tiny Orthodox parish in Harbin) (fig. 15-14). This, in turn, also means that for “heritagization”, mainly the closed cemeteries are those available for such a process, while cemeteries still running are not easy to protect as heritage, as they are continually changing. Furthermore, funerary policies are a decisive factor as well; while old tombs may be protected, the newer ones usually are only set up on slots leased for some time and will be replaced. Thus, only those sections of a running cemetery, i.e. the oldest ones that are “perpetual tombs”, will remain, while other tombs are designed to be replaced as to not run out of space. While “heritagization” implies tombstones and artwork above ground are to be kept, newer tombstones are already set up with the knowledge that they will be there only for some time (and as long as there are relatives caring for said tombstones). This binds tombs more strictly to the bereaved and the people interred, while “heritagization” rather focuses on the durable artwork above ground (and possibly the prominent character of the particular person interred).

14 For a brief overview on the development of cemeteries in Western Europe, see James Stevens CURL: “A Short History of the Cemetery Movement”. In: Richard BARNES: *The Art of Memory: Sculpture in the Cemeteries of London*, Kirstead: Frontier 2016, pp. 7–41.




Figure 15-11: Hong Kong: Hong Kong (Protestant/Colonial) Cemetery ©2018



Figure 15-12: Macau: S. Miguel Arcanjo Cemetery ©2018



Figure 15-13: Macau: S. Miguel Cemetery: different creeds ©2018



Figure 15-14: Harbin: View into the Orthodox Cemetery ©2018

With the Soviet burial tradition which has left a profound imprint on the PRC by its so-called “martyrs’ cemeteries” (*lieshi lingyuan* 烈士陵园/ *lieshi gongmu* 烈士公墓), which are most prominent in Manchuria, another tangible visual-material site of alterity is created. (This cemetery type would also serve as a model for similar cemeteries for Chinese Communist “martyrs”.) Here it is the celebration of “the cause” for which a “martyr” laid down his (or sometimes: her) life, by which, as Reinhard KOSELLECK aptly remarked, “the visible legitimation of what for one died swallowed the reason why one died”,¹⁵ and also how. Although the “heroes” (as the Soviets called them, while the Chinese used “martyr” in English for *lieshi* 烈士 in Chinese) died for “a cause”, their commemoration picks up Western traditions of mourning, from antiquity to Christian symbolism,¹⁶ turning them, however, into a secularized form. The individuals are “nationalized” in the process and no longer are “of their families”. In the Soviet case of the ones who died in China, the majority were Red Army soldiers, and thus the military topic is paramount (fig. 15-15). (Some civil Soviet specialists who died in China are included, however, as are family members of the Red Army where the latter was stationed for some more time as in the Lüshun 旅顺 - Dalian 大连 area, including Jinzhou 金州). The design of these military tombs was not only for the dead, but more pronouncedly for the living, stressing the educative function of these “martyrs’ cemeteries” for the younger generations. Heritage is thus also integrated into education programs, e.g. in the patriotic education programs in the PRC.¹⁷ But also in Hong Kong, the “Stanley War Graves Commission Cemetery” (fig. 15-16) has been assigned an educative function.

15 Reinhardt KOSELLECK: *Zur politischen Ikonologie des gewaltsamen Todes: Ein deutsch-französischer Vergleich* (On the political iconology of violent death: a German-French comparison), Basel: Schwabe & co. 1998, p. 8.

16 For a “classical” overview of the development of funerary monuments from antiquity to the Renaissance in an art-historical perspective, see Erwin PANOFSKY: *Tomb sculpture: Four lectures on its changing aspects from Ancient Egypt to Bernini*, London: Phaidon 1992 [1964]. For Western views on death through time, see Philippe ARIÈS: *Western Attitudes Toward Death from the Middle Ages to the Present*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1974. See also Michel VOVELLE: *La mort et l’occident de 1300 à nos jours* (Death and the Occident from 1300 to our days), Paris: Gallimard 1983.

17 Thus, the Lüshun Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery is today officially Chinese graded heritage and integrated into patriotic education programs.



Figure 15-15: Harbin: Soviet Military/ “Martyrs” Cemetery ©2018




Figure 15-16: Hong Kong: Stanley Military Cemetery (Commonwealth War Graves Commission) ©2018

The Stanley Cemetery not only hosts representatives of the British military, but also volunteers who participated in the fight against the Japanese when the latter attacked and took Hong Kong in 1941 (and during their occupation also killed oppositional people in the concentration camp located in close proximity to the cemetery). As George MOSSE has pointed out, the inclusion of volunteers' tombs adds a particular emotive value to such cemeteries for the surviving community.¹⁸

While Western and Russian tombs at times create some aspects of "nostalgia" even for local Chinese inhabitants, e.g. in Harbin or Shanghai,¹⁹ other places have started to playfully integrate them as is the case in Keelung in Taiwan with the "French Military Cemetery" which is today included in local Ghost Festival activities; an important part of local intangible heritage. On the other hand, the tangible monumentality of Soviet military commemoration has left a deep impression with Chinese visitors.²⁰ The large figures transport a Western-coded monumentality on deathscapes unknown before in the Chinese context (fig. 15-17).²¹ Chinese tombs,

18 Cf. George MOSSE: *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990, chapter 2.

19 For Harbin, see the Harbin writer [WANG 王] Acheng 阿成 who reflects on local history and repeatedly refers to the foreign cemeteries, e.g. in *Haerbinren* 哈尔滨人 (Harbiners), Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe 2014; or in: Acheng: *He shangdi yiqi liulang: Youtairen Haerbin binanji* 和上帝一起流浪。犹太人哈尔滨避难记 ("The Jews in Harbin", lit.: Wandering with God: record of the Jews seeking refuge in Harbin), Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe 2008. ([WANG] Acheng should not be confounded with the more well-known Chinese writer and playwright [ZHONG 钟] Acheng). The famous "Shanghai nostalgia" already grew into a whole genre in the 1990s already.

20 Cf. TIAN Zhihe on the Lüshun cemetery: TIAN Zhihe 田志和: *Yongheng de huainian: Zhongguo tudishang de Sulian hongjun bei ta lingyuan* 永恒的怀念。中国土地上的苏联红军碑塔陵园 (Eternal cherishing: Monuments and Cemeteries for the Soviet Red Army on Chinese soil), Dalian: Dalian chubanshe 2010, pp. 194–195. Monumentality flows from LENIN's early advocacy of "monumental propaganda". Cf. his comments to Anatolij Vasil'evich LUNACHARSKIJ (1875–1933), the responsible Commissar, pushing him into action, referred to by Christina LODDER: "LENIN's Plan for Monumental Propaganda". In: Matthew Cullerne BOWN and Brandon TAYLOR (eds.): *Art of the Soviets: Painting, Sculpture and Architecture in a One-Party State, 1917–1992*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press 1993, pp. 16–32. And more recently and comparatively: Leah DICKERMAN: "Monumental Propaganda". In: *October* no. 165, summer 2018, pp. 178–191.

21 There were some first moves in this direction by the GMD in Republican times, though, for example with the large SUN Yat-sen tomb in Nanjing. Still, these mainly referred to Chinese traditional architecture with some Western models (e.g. the LINCOLN memorial) included, notably with the huge statue of the deceased. As, e.g., UNFRIED has pointed out, Stalinist monumental sculptures, in turn, functioned as a semisacred form, based on Tsarist monumentality, and as a religious substitute. Berthold UNFRIED: "Denkmäler des Stalinismus und 'Realsozialismus' zwischen Ikonoklasmus und Musealisierung" (Monuments of Stalinism and 'real socialism' between iconoclasm and musealization). In: *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften* (Austrian Journal of Historical Studies) no. 5,

traditionally not placed in “cemeteries”, were typically individual tombs set up at some hill site, if available, or at best gathered in an area where, e.g., a native-place organization looked after a proper burial, if families were not at hand.²² In the case of foreign cemeteries (if open to the public), Chinese tourists are coming to look at other peoples’ graves which the Chinese usually would not do. A cemetery as a place to visit and stroll through (à la Père Lachaise in Paris) is a fairly new phenomenon in China, which is also connected to the aspect of visual experience. Without much “interesting” things to see above ground, no one would probably visit but for the relatives, not to mention Chinese folk beliefs which rather suggested to avoid contact with death beyond what was deemed absolutely necessary. “Romantic” involvement with death was, in the end, a Western phenomenon.

The topic of “heritagization” implies the question as to the connection of this “other” to the “self”, and what it means for the construction of the categories of “Russian” / “Western” in Chinese minds via this particular form of tangible and visual-material sites that are cemeteries. First of all, the fact as to what remains (or has been rebuilt) today is largely the outcome of choices on the Chinese side: either these cemeteries were seen as useful, e.g. in terms of foreign policy (fig. 15-18),²³ or they are directly linked to the “self”, e.g. via the Soviet (or others) “help” given to China to fight against the Japanese in WWII, or against the U.S. during the Korean War (1950–1953). Those cemeteries were to be kept for political reasons in the PRC to show China’s indebtedness to this legacy, and also in Hong Kong, e.g., the “Stanley Cemetery” which has also retained this connotation of foreign help following the post-handover times.

1994/2, pp. 233–258. And architect Louis KAHN has famously enlarged the definition of “monumentality” to be “a spiritual quality in a structure which conveys the feeling of its eternity, that it cannot be added to or changed”. Louis I. KAHN: “Monumentality”. In: Paul ZUCKER (ed.): *New Architecture and City Planning*, New York: Philosophical Library 1944, pp. 577–588, there p. 577.

22 Cf. the study on Shanghai by Christian HENRIOT: *Scythe and the City: A Social History of Death in Shanghai*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2016.

23 This does at times include cases where it was deemed unwise to upset foreigners, as with the Shanghai “International Cemetery”, now part of the “Song Qingling Memorial Park”, where remains were moved to and reburied (but without original tombstones of pre-PRC times which obviously had, in the meantime, been destroyed) with new name plaques above ground. These foreigners seem to be mostly “normal” people without any particular “political” problem. Another example is in Canton/Guangzhou 广州 which mostly “hosts” sailors, merchants etc. but also the first U.S. resident minister to China in the 19th century. Cf. MÜLLER: *Between History* (2018).



Figure 15-17: Lüshun: Soviet Military/ “Martyrs” Cemetery: Central stele with monumental bronze figures to both sides ©2018



Figure 15-18: Guangzhou: Foreigners’ Cemetery ©2018

Some cemeteries are cared for by foreign institutions, e.g. the War Graves Commission cemeteries in Hong Kong, while in some cases the official administering entity is local with foreign entities just helping with care (e.g. with the Tam-sui/Danshui 淡水 “Foreigners’ Cemetery” in Taiwan where nowadays the Canadian Chamber of Commerce cares for cleaning, or in Keelung where the French Le Souvenir Français gives a hand). Another motivation for upkeep is religion: Churches, e.g., run some cemeteries like the Catholic Church does with “St. Michael’s” in Hong Kong, or the (now autonomous Chinese) Orthodox Church with the orthodox in Harbin, while in the Soviet cemeteries (which de facto sometimes “host” Tsarist or “White” tombs, too) the Russians were, directly or indirectly via some private agency in between, caring for restorations, though only carefully involving the Russian Orthodox Church.²⁴ As for the Jews, only Hong Kong has a local community looking after the cemetery, while in Harbin the “Jewish Cemetery” is historical and cared for by the municipality.

As for the construction of what “Russian” and “Western” means to the Chinese with regard to the cemeteries, “Russian” was largely perceived as either “orthodox” with iconic architectural features like onion domes on churches and “orthodox” crosses in cemeteries, or Soviet. (The “mixed” Jewish legacy is in Chinese, at least PRC, eyes not “Russian”, e.g., but connected to Israel in spite of “hosting” tombs mostly predating that state’s founding.) While, in fact, in contexts where “Russianness” is no issue, also Russians used, e.g., Latin crosses, in the contexts where distinction was perceived needed, the “orthodox” cross was prevalent. This can be seen, e.g., in the “Hong Kong Cemetery” where the Russians tend to stress their specificity by orthodox crosses with the lower slanted crossbeam between all the Latin ones (or other tombstone designs) around (fig. 15-19).

24 E.g., Russian Orthodox priests also visited the Harbin “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery” or the Lüshun “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery” to pray there for the “compatriots” interred. While the former is purely “Soviet”, the latter is, as mentioned, “hosting” many Tsarist and “white” tombs. At the reopening ceremony after restoration of the large Lüshun cemetery, the Russians invited, beyond the Russian Orthodox, also a rabbi and a mufti, due to the fact that the Tsarist (and partly the Red) armies were multi-cultural and multi-religious, and thus the cemetery also has some non-orthodox tombs. See MÜLLER: *Ambivalent Remains* (2019), p. 61.



Figure 15-19: Hong Kong: Hong Kong Cemetery: some Russian graves ©2018

In this sense, although the context is Christian, the particular denomination was clearly expressed. On the other hand, Soviet secularized cemeteries were perceived by the Chinese as the model of how a “modern” and “socialist” cemetery should look like. Still, in spite of some early pushes for cremation in the Soviet Union, basically the Soviet practice did not uproot the Russian orthodox tradition of earth burials,²⁵ while the Chinese Communists since the mid-1950s advocated cremation with more and more vigor,²⁶ though opposition was not easy to overcome here either. In fact, only since the 1980s was the push for cremation more thoroughly implemented,²⁷ and only very few people (Muslims, e.g.) exempted. This, in turn, bespeaks the fact that earth burial became a privilege, and the embalming of MAO Zedong 毛泽东 (1893–1976), in imitation of LENIN (1870–1924),

25 Orthodox Church Law prohibited cremation. MERRIDALE mentions that although there was a tendency to argue for cremation in the early Soviet Union among the Bolsheviks, the topic was not followed through. Catherine MERRIDALE: *Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Twentieth-Century Russia*, New York: Viking 2000, pp. 133–136, p. 142, pp. 280–282.

26 For the development in China, see the Shanghai Funeral Museum catalogue: *Shanghai Binzang Bowuguan* 上海殡葬博物馆 (“Shanghai Funeral Museum”), n.p. [Shanghai], n.d. [2009 or after]. The argumentation picked up on those Soviet precedents that had argued for it, most extremely with the Bolshevik and Central Committee Member Mikhail Stepanovich OL’MINSKIĬ (1863–1933) who declared he wanted to be used “rationally” after his demise as fertilizer to demonstrate his material-atheist view on death. Cf. MERRIDALE: *Night of Stone* (2000), p. 142.

27 Cf. *Shanghai Binzang Bowuguan* [n.d.], pp. 78–79.

and of him alone, underlines this development further.²⁸ More recently, even tombs are becoming considered a nuisance, and thus “green burial” with ashes dispersed is advocated which, needless to say, also has its advocates in the West as “modern” and “ecological” beyond saving space and money for care after relatives might have moved away.²⁹ In terms of military tombs, it is furthermore noteworthy that while in the West the tradition of not differentiating any longer in tombstone outlook between ranks was established in the 20th century, the Soviets kept the differentiation, and also in the cemeteries located in China, a “graded” treatment of the Soviet dead was practiced. In other words, in the Red Army, a “democratization” was not taken up.

MAO Zedong had sanctioned the differential treatment of death in his own ideological way by referring to the Han-dynasty scholar SIMA Qian’s 司馬遷 *Shiji* 史記 (Record of the Historian, roughly 100 BC) and his statement that death can be weightier than Mount Tai 泰山 or lighter than a feather, depending on what someone’s life ended for.³⁰ This means that it is down to posterity to decide on whose death “counted” and thus on the question as to whose tomb was to be preserved. Thus, MAO also suggested to exorcize all “unwelcome” “ghosts” of the past, including the foreigners not deemed “helpful” for China. MAO, in fact, commented in this way on the Hangzhou West Lake tombs during his stays there where he complained of the many tombs surrounding him. These tombs were of outstanding Chinese of the past, but also of several Western foreigners, including the missionary parents of the last U.S. ambassador to GMD-governed China, John Leighton STUART, he himself being born in Hangzhou, whom MAO had famously ridiculed on his leave when the Communist takeover was imminent.³¹ This past, in

28 Cf. Frederic WAKEMAN Jr.: “MAO’s Remains”. In: James L. WATSON and Evelyn RAWSKI (eds.): *Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1988, pp. 254–288.

29 As KONG has pointed out, this led also to a new kind of “placeless and immaterial space for the dead”, i.e. a cyberspace where the dead can be memorialized instead. (Lily KONG: “No-Place, New Places: Death and Its Rituals in Urban Asia”. In: Joanne Punzo WAGHOREN (ed.): *Place/No-Place in Urban Asian Religiosity*, Singapore: Springer 2016, pp. 49–70. This development, though, has been mainly spearheaded by Japan – which strangely has not been covered in this volume on “Urban Asian Religiosity”).

30 Cf. MAO’s piece: “Serve the People” (wei renmin fuwu 为人民服务) on the death of the Red Army soldier ZHANG Side 张思德. See also the chapter “The Cult of the Red Martyr” by Hung-tai CHANG: *Mao’s New World: Political Culture in the Early People’s Republic*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 2011, pp. 213–234.

31 Interestingly, in a move to ameliorate U.S.-PRC relations, in 2008, i.e. more than four decades after STUART’s demise, his ashes were interred according to his last wish near West Lake; without publicity in China but reported in U.S. media. See David BARBOZA: “John Leighton Stuart, China Expert, Is Buried There at Last”. In: *The New York Times*, November 19, 2008, p. A16.

other words, was deemed a burden “haunting” the living, and should be removed (and their representatives symbolically put to the ultimate death)³² to sanitize the present and build a future unburdened.

Since these posterior contexts for presentation and “heritagization” very much depended on the local situation, let us turn to a “system-specific” observation with 1. Macau and Hong Kong for colonial (Portuguese and British) contexts, both then having been “handed back” to the PRC in the late 1990s; 2. with Taiwan which has gone through several shifts, including Japanese colonialization and then the GMD authoritarian rule up to present-day democratic rule; and finally 3. the Chinese mainland which has not only undergone a decisive rupture with the Communist takeover but partly also earlier, namely in Manchuria, due to the Japanese-Manchukuo rule.

Macau and Hong Kong

Here the colonial authorities could largely implement policies from their respective homeland. For the Portuguese, this meant that the “city of the name of God”, as Macau was proudly called, was since their fixed settlement in the 16th century conceived of as a Catholic city. While most of the Chinese living there would transfer their dead back to their native place, those buried in the tiny area (which only in 1871 became an official colony of the Portuguese) were Westerners and Catholics who, as was the custom of the time in Europe in the 16th century and beyond, were buried in churchyards around their parochial church. In time, though, Macau as an important entrepôt was also confronted with the problem of non-Catholics who happened to die in the area. At first, this was handled by transferring those outside of the city walls, but since the Chinese villagers living close by did not welcome burials of foreigners in a territory they considered their own, a strong sense of unsafety of the tombs pushed for a burial space inside the city walls also for non-Catholics. In spite of official Portuguese regulations that no soil was to be “given away” on the one hand, and Catholic Church law on the other which prescribed that only Catholics may be buried in Catholic consecrated soil, the English

32 As scholarship on iconoclasm and the Western ancient tradition of *damnatio memoriae* in their effects on tombstones and epitaphs has made clear, the destruction of tombstones and epitaphs was conceived of as “the ultimate murder, the ultimate death” in the words of Karl GUTHKE. (See his *Epitaph Culture in the West*, Lewiston et al.: Edwin Mellen Press 2003, p.1).

East India Company which had a residence in Macau, finally managed to strike a deal to set up the “Old Protestant Cemetery” with a first burial in 1821 inside the city walls on private ground (fig. 15-20).³³



Figure 15-20: Macau: Old Protestant Cemetery ©2018

With changed legislation in Portugal in the mid-19th century, though, all inner-city cemeteries were to be closed, and thus all burials were now transferred to the area outside of the city walls.³⁴ In this context, the present-day “S. Miguel” cemetery was set up, and also the “Old Protestant” one was closed and a “New Protestant Cemetery” opened instead. The more aggressive assertion of Portuguese control also in the area beyond the city walls (which were to be removed subsequently)

33 It might have helped that in Rome the “non-Catholic cemetery” (Cimitero Acattolico) was opened at the same time (though it was not the first in Italy which was the “Old English Cemetery” in Livorno). Since the “Old Protestant Cemetery” of Macau was placed (and remained) inside the former city walls, this also means today that it is covered (and thus protected) by the UNESCO world heritage site of Macau’s historic center, unlike any other cemetery.

34 By this, the Portuguese state not only aimed at ameliorating inner-city hygiene in line with similar moves in many other Western countries at the time, but also tried to wrest authority (and burial fees) from the Church. By additionally transferring the say on the dead from priests to modern doctors who had to certify death (against payment), these changes sparked widespread resistance in Portugal at the time. See LAQUEUR: *The Work of the Dead* (2015), pp. 307–308.

led to repeated clashes with the Chinese villagers living there at first, but ended with Macau's being officially acknowledged as a Portuguese "colony" by the Qing government, and through this act also the cemetery area for the Portuguese was secured. Since the municipality was in charge of the "S. Miguel" cemetery, the Catholic Church, however, was no longer able to claim the cemetery exclusively for Catholics. Furthermore, after Portugal became a republic, in 1912 an outright policy of secularization also meant that the cemetery became "pluralized": on principle, now every citizen was entitled to be buried in "S. Miguel" (or any other of the municipal cemeteries established in the meantime), regardless of religion. This made for "S. Miguel's" already mentioned mix of creeds, "hosting" tombs of Catholic bishops of a diocese which once "governed" large parts of East Asia, besides tombs with Buddhist or Daoist visual markers, and covering a wider range of ethnicities.

Hong Kong, in turn, reflects the British colonial administration's preoccupation with "racial" differentiation: cemeteries were at first only designed for Westerners, while it was assumed that the Chinese, who usually lived there only temporarily, would in any case transfer their dead back to their place of origin. Much more than Macau, Hong Kong was seen from all sides, both Chinese and Western, as a temporary abode where death would only occur by chance. Still, the fact was that, not the least because of diseases and frequent plagues but also because of the military, there were many deaths occurring, and thus the British had to quickly set up cemeteries. This they did for the Anglicans/Protestants, but given the many Irish amongst the troops, also almost immediately for the Catholics, too. In time, beyond the military personnel, more and more civilians flocked to Hong Kong. While the Catholic Church ran the "St. Michael's" cemetery where, as mentioned, foreign as well as Chinese Catholics were buried, the "Hong Kong Cemetery", as it is called today, was originally intended for British Anglicans/Protestants only, at first denying Chinese access even in life.³⁵ Basically, since the "Hong Kong Cemetery" was run by the municipality, it could, however, not easily refuse non-British and non-Protestants in the long run, but given that the Catholics had "St. Michael's" next door, only those Catholics refused there, e.g. if they had joined Freemasonry, were taken in. Furthermore, in time, also Armenians and Russian Orthodox, but also the equally "foreign" Japanese as well as some (Christian)

35 Cf. Ko Tim-Keung: "A Review of Development of Cemeteries in Hong Kong: 1841–1950". In: *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. 41, 2001: pp. 241–280, there p. 247. It should be noted that by 1880 the British "Burial Laws Amendment Act" settled the older divisive burial issues between the Anglican Church and various non-Anglican Protestant denominations by the state, granting them access to graveyards equally. (On the problems before, see LAQUEUR: *The Work of the Dead* (2015), pp. 161–182).

Chinese were included.³⁶ On principle a zoning approach was intended, although this was only partly realized in practice. After Japanese Buddhist burial customs led to complaints from some Westerners, they were simply pragmatically concentrated in a far-off angle up the hill. Muslims, Jews, Hindus and Parsees had set up their own cemeteries anyway. Still, both “St. Michael’s” as well as the “Hong Kong Cemetery” are visually strongly Western-coded in tombstone design which apparently also appealed to some non-Westerners, namely the Christians. The establishment of specific cemeteries for *Chinese* Protestants, in turn, “relieved” the “Hong Kong Cemetery” of caring for those under normal circumstances, while a special Eurasian one cared for those of “mixed” descent neither being counted as “Western” nor “Chinese” in British colonial taxonomy.³⁷ The “Hong Kong Cemetery”, though, retained an aura of “superiority”, since well-known Chinese as well as Eurasians would rather apply for (and were admitted to) the “Hong Kong Cemetery” instead of going to the Chinese Protestant or the Eurasian or the “Chinese Permanent Cemetery”, the latter being modeled upon the “Hong Kong Cemetery” for non-Christian upper-class Chinese.³⁸ In a sense, the “Hong Kong Cemetery”, like “S. Miguel” in Macau, received those that had no other “specialized” cemetery to go as, for example, the Muslims or Parsees had in both places, but, unlike Macau, the “Hong Kong Cemetery” retained this aura as the “best” choice, if available, i.e. had something of a “class” distinction to it. In fact, one had to apply for getting in. And, unlike “S. Miguel”, the “Hong Kong Cemetery” is now, as mentioned, basically closed. For the British military, in turn, which had at first also been buried there, the War Graves Commission Cemeteries were set up which reflect the World Wars and are closed today as well.

In terms of material and visual markers, the Westerners’ tombs and burial practices differed from the traditional Chinese one: as mentioned, the idea of an (often fenced-in) cemetery was set against the typically individual Chinese hillside burial mounds. The “garden cemetery” as a European/Western development since the late 18th century which appeared also in the “Hong Kong Cemetery”, for example, acted as a role model,³⁹ and was appreciated also by some Chinese (although death

36 For a “thick description” of the “Hong Kong Cemetery”, see Patricia LIM: *Forgotten Souls: A Social History of the Hong Kong Cemetery*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press 2011. See also LIM’s database: https://www.hkmemory.hk/collections/hong_kong_cemetery/about/index.html.

37 Cf. MÜLLER: *Challenging Dead* (2018), p. 13.

38 For the different cemeteries, cf. KO: “A review” (2001) and MÜLLER: *Challenging Dead* (2018), pp. 12–15.

39 Cf. Ken NICOLSON: *The Happy Valley: A History and Tour of the Hong Kong Cemetery*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press 2010, pp. 5–7. It should be noted that in the colonial setting the British often erected more lavish tombs than those they had at home. Cf. CURL: “Short history” (2016), p. 12, with reference to British India.

is largely tabooed in Chinese culture and tombs of ancestors only visited at special occasions, and never tombs of “others” on top of that). The simplicity of Western burial practices (e.g. no valuables in coffins), the gravity of funeral processions and interment services etc. were also a diverging feature from Chinese custom. The crosses, including the orthodox ones for Russians, e.g. in the “Hong Kong Cemetery”, statues as, for example, in the Catholic ones, and different tomb designs with stones flat or upright, columns etc., were also noted by the Chinese as peculiar. In this regard, also the Jewish tombs in Hong Kong’s “Jewish Cemetery” did not diverge very much, that is except for their inscriptions. In other words: tomb designs in the “Jewish Cemetery” which in any case is also much less frequently visited and thus less “present” for Chinese viewers do not substantially differ from, for example, the “Hong Kong Cemetery”. Typically, the Sephardic Jews used tomb architecture similar to the British with a preference for horizontal layout, while the Ashkenazic Jews rather opted for vertical headstones.⁴⁰

In terms of heritage preservation, this means that in Hong Kong (and partly in Macau) the visual markers of foreignness in the cemeteries are, since the hand-over, largely “museum-like” to the Chinese public. Those tombs that stand for “problematic” or, in a Chinese perspective, “ambivalent” if not “dissonant” heritage when recording people and events lauded by the colonizers but condemned by the Chinese, are a challenge.⁴¹ While statues could be easily removed from townscapes, in cemeteries things are less easy.

In fact, the Westerners buried represented various “sorts” of foreigners: not only women (often “wives of”) and children, but also men with various professions such as: merchants, missionaries, physicians, sailors, or military staff. In Chinese eyes, especially in the post-colonial era, the foreigners were either “good”, “neutral”, or “bad”, depending on their former role and attitude via-à-vis the local society. This, in turn, means that the heritage preservation of today confronts the question as to whose heritage is deemed desirable to be preserved, especially if there are no relatives laying claims to them, and whether it is possible (e.g. for diplomatic reasons) to clear those whose heritage is not deemed desirable. The strategies followed differ: in Macau’s “S. Miguel”, for example, the politically

40 Although most Jews abhor a physical representation of the deceased, the Hong Kong “Jewish Cemetery” has one Russian tombstone with a photo – something typical for Russian Orthodox cemeteries and also often seen in Harbin’s “Jewish Cemetery”. In fact, also elsewhere Jewish tombstone layouts resemble those of the respective majority culture. In Hong Kong, therefore, British as well as Russian influence is mirrored in the “Jewish Cemetery”.

41 For the concept of “dissonant heritage”, see John E. TUNBRIDGE and Gregory J. ASHWORTH: *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict*, Chichester: Wiley 1996.

controversial tomb and statue of Macanese Colonel Vicente Nicolau de MESQUITA (1818–1880) who had once “fought for” Macau against the Chinese and thus was a hero in the colonial perspective but a villain in the nationalist Chinese one, is still in place after the handover (fig. 15-21), although his statue in town had already been razed by rioters during the times of the Cultural Revolution in the neighbouring PRC that also led to turmoil in Macau. Thus, the “S. Miguel” cemetery and MESQUITA’s tomb there is the only place where this piece of history still survived with a material legacy, however here, with tombstone architecture connected to his physical remains. This case, though, also has additional layers to it, connected to MESQUITA’s individuality. MESQUITA died by suicide after having killed his wife and one daughter (and wounded two further of his children), arguably out of a psychic crisis. This crisis is said to have, at least partly, been triggered by his feelings of being discriminated against as someone of “only” (mixed) Macanese decent, since he was not adequately awarded for his decisive services by the Portuguese. Given the whole background, his interment had at first been a problem. Catholic canon law did not allow for a Catholic burial in such a murder/suicide case, and it was only after years that he was posthumously rehabilitated and granted reburial in the same “S. Miguel” cemetery, shifting him from a not consecrated section to the consecrated one, being close again to his family, and this time the burial was done with full military honors.



Figure 15-21: Macau: S. Miguel Cemetery: monument to MESQUITA ©2018

In Hong Kong, in turn, the memorial column to controversial British trade envoy and Royal Navy officer William John NAPIER (1786–1834) who figured in the trade issues between Britain and China in the years leading to the Opium War (1839–1842) and who was indirectly responsible for the British choosing Hong Kong as their foothold subsequently, was transferred from the “Hong Kong Cemetery” to the Hong Kong Museum of History after the handover. NAPIER had died in Macau in 1834 after his failure to negotiate better terms of trade with the Chinese in Guangzhou 廣州, had first been buried in Macau’s “Old Protestant Cemetery” and then was shipped back home to Scotland where he is ever since lying in peace. His memorial column had resurfaced in Hong Kong after WWII and was put in the “Hong Kong Cemetery” by the colonial authorities, but with the post-hand-over transfer to the museum it was tellingly turned from a (positive) memorial into a (controversial) historical exhibition piece. The absence of his physical remains facilitated, of course, this recontextualization.

Taiwan

While the situation in Macau and Hong Kong was fairly stable due to the long colonial rule of the Portuguese and British up to the late 1990s’ handover, in Taiwan things went through several shifts. When in 1895 the Japanese received Taiwan as one of the spoils of war from the Qing to become their very first colony, Westerners’ cemeteries were already in place, namely in the South in today’s Tainan 臺南 and Gaoxiong/Kaohsiung 高雄 (both today no longer extant as cemeteries),⁴² and in the North in Danshui/Tamsui and Jilong/Keelung. Both the “Foreigners’ Cemetery” in Tamsui (fig. 15-22) and the “French Military Cemetery” in Keelung are officially declared heritage sites today, but during the Japanese colonial period they served foreign policy agendas of the Japanese: the Tamsui cemetery adjacent to the tomb of Canadian missionary George Leslie MACKAY (1844–1901) and those of his missionary staff, Taiwanese or foreign, was first cared for by the British who often represented also other nationalities who did not bother to open own representations on the island (fig. 15-23). Thus, either the respective embassy in Tokyo or the British (and a few other) consuls on the island were caring for those other nationalities that did not have representations there during the

42 Of the Kaohsiung cemetery, some tombstones have been found in the area. For an attempt to reconstruct this cemetery’s history, see David Charles OAKLEY: *The Story of the Takow Foreign Cemetery*, Gaoxiong: Gaoxiong shizhengfu wenhuaju 2016.

Japanese colonial period (1895–1945). After the GMD government took over Taiwan in 1945, the fate of the cemetery in Tamsui as well as of the “French Military Cemetery” in Keelung was again closely connected to the diplomatic sphere, and after the British gave up their diplomatic representation in Taiwan, the U.S.-Americans and finally the Canadians stepped in in Tamsui, while the local Presbyterian Church which runs the secondary school on whose grounds the MACKAY tomb is located, keeps an eye on the site and de facto provides access to both the missionary cemetery around the MACKAY tomb, and the foreigners’ cemetery.



Figure 15-22: Tamsui: Foreigners’ Cemetery ©2017



Figure 15-23: Tamsui: “MACKAY Cemetery” around the highest monument of MACKAY ©2017

In Keelung, in turn, the physical remains of some of the mid-level French commanders and troops of the Sino-French War 1884/85 who mainly died from diseases and were interred in Taiwanese soil, were centralized over time (fig. 15-24), if they had not been shipped back home like the remains of the main figure Admiral Amédée COURBET (1827–1885) who had succumbed to disease, died during the final stage of the war on his ship, and had been transferred back from the Pescadores to receive a state funeral in France already at that time. The longstanding debates about the Keelung “French Military Cemetery” in a society that did not historically share the European treaty convention of respecting cemeteries of friend and foe,⁴³ however, show the difficulty for the local society to accept such a “foreign” cemetery with the dead buried there representing one-time “enemies” until only recently when the place was relabeled a “Memorial Park of the War between the Qing and the French”, thus reframing the cemetery as a space of education and leisure rather than commemoration of the dead foreigners. Here, too, things were additionally complicated by the fact that the Japanese colonial administration which governed Taiwan after defeating the Qing, used the French cemetery, as already mentioned, for its own diplomatic agendas. The GMD government which took over Taiwan after WWII, was from the start rather hostile, and even more so when France switched her diplomatic allegiance to the competing PRC, playing up nationalist issues. However, in Keelung, being one of the major sites of the “February 28 incident” of 1947 with the GMD’s crack-down on Taiwanese opposition and its subsequent White Terror, local feelings toward the GMD were mixed as well.⁴⁴ In contrast, in Tamsui’s “Foreigners’ Cemetery” with its civilian dead adjacent to the tomb of Canadian missionary Reverend MACKAY, who represented a more “positive” Sino-Western relationship with his educational, medical, and charity endeavors, things were overall less controversial.

In summary, in Macau, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, the physical remains of the most controversial figures standing for the colonization of, or historical military confrontation with, the Chinese had anyway already been transferred back to their homelands, leading to a rather de-emotionalized present-day attitude toward this foreign heritage.

43 One should, however, note that in Europe this implied mutuality, while in Taiwan, for example, the relation was only “unilateral”.

44 Cf. MÜLLER: *Challenging Dead* (2018), pp. 27–33.



Figure 15-24: Keelung: French Military Cemetery: remains of Lieutenant JEHENNE relocated from the Pescadores ©2018

Chinese mainland

Most of the foreigners' cemeteries once on Chinese soil have, however, disappeared. While in some places of trade mainly civilians had been buried, usually divided along religious lines, other places featured military cemeteries. Those still extant are typically connected to WWII. There had once also been cemeteries with, for example, the foreign Boxer War casualties (military or not), but their commemoration was and is anathema to the Chinese society, and thus they have been levelled. Most of the Chinese mainland only went through a major change with the Communist takeover, but in Manchuria the Japanese had intervened already previously. Especially in Southern Manchuria in the Kwantung (Guandong) 關東 Leased Territory which the Japanese claimed from Russia after their victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05, the Russian cemeteries were reshaped (as in Lüshun) or newly set up (like in Jinzhou) (fig. 15-25) by the Japanese who buried the fallen Russians after the war and used this for projecting their own nation positively to the world. In Jinzhou and, above all, in Lüshun/Port Arthur, both today

part of the Dalian municipality, the Japanese imitated, as mentioned, Western cemetery and tomb designs when burying their dead Tsarist foes.⁴⁵ Lüshun stood out as the showcase cemetery par excellence, inviting the Russian Orthodox Church as “guests” at the pompous opening in 1908 and trying to use the small but fledgling Japanese Orthodox Church as a mediator.⁴⁶ In northern Manchuria, though, with Harbin the Japanese role became decisive only later after the “Manchurian Incident” of 1931 and the subsequent founding of the “puppet state” Manchukuo, although in terms of cemeteries and their layout the Japanese role was here rather ephemeral.

In all of Manchuria, however, the 1945 “August Storm” of the Soviets who “liberated” the area from the Japanese, left an enduring imprint via the military cemeteries set up for the Soviet casualties. By this, they now also introduced Soviet (military) burial practices to the Chinese society which up to then only knew Christian or Jewish cemeteries as standing for “Westerners” or “Russians”. Memorialization of “heroes”, as the Soviets called the fallen Red Army members, with red starred tombstones and identification of rank, and, at times, army division, e.g. with emblems of tanks or air planes, was a new, secular style (fig. 15-26, 15-27). Army casualties augmented further during the Korean War, mainly with aviators (fig. 15-28). With the Soviets stationed in the Dalian-Lüshun area in 1945–1955 who lived there with their families, and Soviet advisors coming to the early PRC, also Soviet civilian tombs came to be added in time (fig. 15-29). While the “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemeteries”, as they are called by the Chinese, introduced also a socialist monumentality to the field of cemeteries, as mentioned, they provided an example for Chinese “martyrs” (and high-level cadres) and their burial,⁴⁷ and they showed how one could integrate such places into socialist education activities.

45 However, some elements at the cemetery were similar to burial fashions as used (or taken over) by the Japanese for themselves at the time, e.g. to bury the officers individually but the normal soldiers together. Given the high numbers of the rank-and-file Russian soldiers claimed, they must have been cremated before as was customary to the Japanese burial fashion, though official Japanese regulations at the time requested to bury the orthodox Russians in “their” fashion, i.e. with earth burials. For the Japanese burial fashion for the Russo-Japanese War military casualties, see Naoko SHIMAZU (2009), esp. p. 125.

46 For more on this, cf. MÜLLER: *Ambivalent Remains* (2019), pp. 52–53.

47 Cf. the Babaoshan 八宝山 Cemetery in Beijing for the highest-level cadres (most no “martyrs”). See Hung-tai CHANG: *Mao’s New World* (2011), pp. 224–232. But “martyrs’ cemeteries” were set up all over China to remind the locals of the sacrifices others had taken upon themselves, obliging the living generation to continue their unfinished task.



Figure 15-25: Jinzhou: Soviet Military/ “Martyrs” Cemetery: Memorial to the Russo-Japanese War dead first buried by the Japanese and later memorialized by the Tsarist government ©2018




Figure 15-26: Dalian: Soviet Military/ “Martyrs” Cemetery: Soviet officers’ tombs with red starred headstones (photo of deceased missing), flat ones for soldiers ©2018



Figure 15-27: Jinzhou: Soviet Military/ “Martyrs” Cemetery:
Example of Soviet tombstone featuring the symbol of the
military unit (tank) (photo of deceased missing) ©2018



Figure 15-28: Lüshun: Soviet Military/ “Martyrs” Cemetery:
The Soviet aviators’ section of the Korean War ©2018




Figure 15-29: Lüshun: Soviet Military/ “Martyrs” Cemetery:
post-1945 children’s section ©2018

The fact that today the largest “foreigners’ cemetery” in mainland China is the “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery” in Lüshun which de facto hosts, beyond the Soviets, above all Tsarist dead of the Russo-Japanese War who are out of question to memorialize for today’s Chinese since they were as imperialist as the Japanese in Chinese view, throws into relief the problem of the national and the private. The Soviet dead who “fell for the socialist cause” and more specifically “for China” are nationalized and to be remembered, the more monumental the better. The others, though, should be levelled in Chinese perspective. Only diplomatic relations put a brake on this to not annoy the Russians who see all those dead as “compatriots”, but the complicated story of how earlier Russian/Soviet cemeteries were to be renovated and who would, and could, be informed about this, shows the Chinese ambivalence and sensitivity toward these foreign cemeteries.⁴⁸ And it shows the bifurcation between the Tsarist or “White” religious Russians (and religious Westerners) and the atheist Soviets in Chinese perception. In fact, the present-day official Russian appreciation of the Tsarist and “White” legacies vs the ambivalent attitude toward the more divisive Soviet one, is criticized by the Chinese. The latter, in fact, try to pose as the “true heirs” to “the cause” the Soviet “martyrs” died for.

48 For more on the renovation process, see MÜLLER: *Ambivalent Remains* (2019), pp. 56–62 for Lüshun, and pp. 34–37 for Harbin.

On the other hand, a purely “historical” cemetery like the civilian Jewish Cemetery in Harbin, though “religious” as well, is today less problematic and readily used for bilateral relations with Israel, helped by the fact that it is hosting relatives of some outstanding Israeli politicians, including former prime minister OLMERT (fig. 15-30). Tellingly, the fact that most of those Jews were from Russia or the Russian Empire is of no importance to the Chinese (and apparently also to the present-day Russian authorities), and materially speaking, their tombstone outlooks are strongly orientated toward Western fashions which had also been picked up in late Tsarist Russia, often only by a Star of David and by the tombstone inscription “outing” their being Jewish.⁴⁹ However, different from the Hong Kong “Jewish Cemetery”, e.g., in the PRC the Cultural Revolution intervened heavily for the fate of cemeteries in general, as they were easy to attack and a “classical” feature of Red Guard destructive activism, if they had not been damaged earlier in the brief mid-1950s campaign triggered by MAO’s Hangzhou “impressions” mentioned above. While the Shanghai Jewish cemeteries did not survive (only some tombstones), the one in Harbin did, though with clear signs of destruction (fig. 15-31). Also elsewhere in China, notably with Shanghai and its once numerous foreigners’ cemeteries, but also in Guangzhou, the Cultural Revolution heavily intervened. While in some cases the tombstones (if not necessarily the human remains beneath) could be (re)assembled in the 1980s, in other cases the human remains were transferred but the tombstones had gone lost, as seems to be the case with China’s most well-known “foreigners’ cemetery” in Shanghai: the “International Cemetery”, as it was once called, now part of the “Song Qingling Memorial Park” (fig. 15-32).⁵⁰ Most notably with “controversial” figures of importance and, above all, religious figures, destruction in the Cultural Revolution could almost be counted upon, and thus the tombs of clergy were particularly singled out for attack, as, for example, can be seen with the Orthodox Russian (and Chinese) clergy in the still used Harbin “Orthodox Cemetery” (fig. 15-33) (or, to a lesser extent, in the Dalian “Soviet Martyrs’ Cemetery” which had been an, above all civilian, cemetery in the hands of “White” Orthodox clergy up to the 1940s, with Soviet tombs then added later).⁵¹ But also Guangzhou’s protestant missionaries’ tombs, e.g. the ones of well-known medical missionary John KERR and family, which have been recently restored at a new location (fig. 15-34), fared no better.⁵²

49 There are, of course, exceptions, e.g. with the “oriental-looking” Jewish tombstone in Lüshun of a young woman from present-day Ukrainian Ternopol (MÜLLER: *Ambivalent Remains* (2019), p. 50), or with the tomb of the religious key figure, rabbi Aron Moshe KISELEV (1863–1949) in Harbin (*ibid.* pp. 29–30), which are peculiar.

50 See MÜLLER: *Between History* (2018), esp. pp. 22–33.

51 See MÜLLER: *Ambivalent Remains* (2019), pp. 42–47.

52 See MÜLLER: *Between History* (2018), pp. 11–12.



Figure 15-30: Harbin: Jewish cemetery: Newly restored tomb of Ehud OLMERT's grandfather ©2018




Figure 15-31: Harbin: Jewish Cemetery: Reassembled tombstone ©2018



Figure 15-32: Shanghai: SONG Qingling Memorial Park: Foreigners' Cemetery: small concrete slabs in place of tombstones ©2018



Figure 15-33: Harbin: Orthodox Cemetery: Plea to not destroy the tombstone at Father Valentin Semënovich BARYSHNIKOV's (1906–1962) tomb (backside) ©2018



Figure 15-34: Guangzhou: Protestant Cemetery: Missionary KERR family tombs ©2018

While the tombs of the pre-PRC times tell of a religiously pluralized “West” and an either Orthodox or Jewish “Russia”, the Soviet tombs became, as mentioned, role models for a secularized dealing with death. Since the 1950s the Chinese argued strongly for cremation to do away with the Chinese custom of earth burial, but the arguments now combined the practical ones of hygiene (which was a problem not only because of numbers but also since the Chinese rather put up mounds than bury the dead deeply) or of saving land for “productive” uses, with the more ideological of the body as material, which should and could be burnt, therewith also going against “feudal” superstition which were deemed prevalent with traditional funerary customs. Care for the living instead for the dead, was the main motto, and cities had set targets to “free” themselves of cemeteries, thus causing transfers at best, while at the worst levelling for Chinese dead and their tombs ensued.⁵³ Once completed, the space occupied by the dead foreigners whose living compatriots usually had had to leave the country after the Communist takeover (excluding some socialist “brother nations”) had to be “dealt with”, too. While at first burial practices not conforming to the new cremation standard, e.g. with the

53 See Thomas MULLANEY (ed.): *The Chinese Deathscape: Grave Reform in Modern China*, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2019. Digital volume available online: <https://chinesedeathscape.supdigital.org>.

Orthodox earth burials, were still allowed, finally cremation was to be pushed through nationwide. In this, the Chinese went beyond the Soviets, as mentioned, who also had less problem with space. MAO's call to do away with the many signs of "ghosts" around West Lake was a call heeded, although ironically he himself became a "socialist embalmed", given the Soviet precedent with LENIN.⁵⁴

Concluding remarks

However the Western and Russian tombs on Chinese soil fared throughout time, today those remaining are visual material sites of alterity working against a "structural amnesia" (CONNERTON).⁵⁵ While to the Chinese viewer they present mostly religious, but also secular, ways of dealing with death, either private or more monumentally nationalized, the remaining dead speak of the past and Western/Russian agency of their time in a foreign land. In all cases, it has been of high importance for the local authorities to stress that no matter who is interred, and which material markers of foreignness might be above-ground, the soil is and will remain Chinese. But beyond national(ist) sensibilities, arguing out of the defensive, heritage politics also offer on the positive side the possibility to discover (and protect) the

54 For a comparative view, see Gwendolyn LEICK: *Tombs of the Great Leaders: A Contemporary Guide*, London: Reaktion Books 2013, chapter 2. Notably, MAO, who had signed the Communist cremation pledge back in the 1950s, had already chosen a family tomb slot at the Babaoshan Cemetery together with his last wife, JIANG Qing, revisiting it several times in his last years which shows he obviously cared, but at the time of his death (1976) it was out of question for his successors to carry this out, and thus MAO was embalmed and the Memorial Hall on Tiananmen Square created. (Cf. Ross TERRILL: *MAO: A Biography*, rev. and exp. ed., Stanford: Stanford University Press 1999, p. 457.) Needless to say, JIANG Qing who committed suicide in 1991 while serving her life sentence following MAO's demise, did not make it into that chosen family tomb slot of the prestigious Babaoshan Cemetery either, but was buried in a "normal" cemetery in Beijing by her (and MAO's) daughter.

55 Cf. CONNERTON's different types of forgetting: Paul CONNERTON: "Cultural Memory". In: Christopher TILLEY et al. (eds.): *Handbook of Material Culture*, London: Sage 2006, pp. 315–324, there pp. 319–322. A more recent update can be found in: "Seven types of forgetting" in: Paul CONNERTON: *The Spirit of Mourning: History, Memory and the Body*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011, chapter 2, pp. 33–50. "Structural amnesia" – unfortunately the type least spelled out by CONNERTON – connotes a patterned forgetting due to structures of a society to which something has no further social relevance. Those tombs that were a heritage too "dissonant", have undergone "repressive erasure", instead, and thus are no longer physically extant, e.g. the foreign Boxer War casualties.

manifold layers historical encounters between cultures engendered, and how this may relate meaningfully to the present. Given the enduring material presence of cemeteries, they provide a visual and tangible starting point for digging out (instead of corpses in a Red Guard fashion)⁵⁶ the multiple stories enclosed, large and small, local and translocal, telling of a richer interwoven past than some present-day narrow interests may frame for achieving some specific short-term aim. For better or for worse, this heritage is a “shared” one, and a “coming to terms” with history entails also making peace with the dead. Nolens volens then, the shifts in perceptions of Westerners and Russians also reflect the continuities and changes Chinese self-perception has undergone in the 20th century and over the larger area of Greater China, and the contingency of the respective forms this has taken.

56 One of the most extreme acts during the Cultural Revolution regarding tombs was to not only destroy tombstones but even dig up human remains and scatter (or performatively humiliate) them. The case of Confucius and his most recent descendants became widely known in China but was only the tip of the iceberg. Cf. SANG Ye and Geremie R. BARMÉ: “Commemorating Confucius in 1966–67: The Fate of the Confucius Temple, the Kong Mansion and Kong Cemetery.” In: *China Heritage Quarterly*, no. 20, December 2009. Available online: http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/scholarship.php?searchterm=020_confucius.inc&issue=020. Apart from politics, this was also to drive home the point of materialism and to ward off any potential “superstition” on the part of the living. It had also “socialist” antecedents in Soviet attacks on “White” enemies’ tombs (and in itself is in any case a practice with an unfortunately long prehistory, East and West: cf. LAQUEUR: *The Work of the Dead* (2015), pp. 103–106).

Nikolay SAMOYLOV

Concluding Remarks

Abstract. The concept of “imagology” has recently entered the circulation of humanitarian sciences. Imagology is a scientific discipline with the subject of images of “the Other” (“alien” nations, countries, cultures). Imagology is interdisciplinary in nature: its sources are languages, culture (both mass and elitist), various types of arts, literature, folklore, semiotics, ethnopsychology, ethnology, cultural studies, history, political science and others. Imagology as science studies the dynamic natural image of the foreign culture, which has been historically formed. Studying the materials obtained from these sources and scientific disciplines, imagology seeks to generalize them and develop some common paradigms of the reception of “the Others” in the space of one national consciousness or another. The sources for historical imagology are materials of national history, archival documents, and memoirs.

Keywords. Imagology, Image, Perception, Stereotype, China.

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The origins of imagology are as ancient as the history that begins with cultural differentiation, according to the principles of “we” and “they”, “I” and “the Other”, with mutual perception and mutual representations as well as with mutual familiarization. In other words, imagology studies the elements of the cultural unconscious. Imagology is also a new scientific direction, and, therefore, its subject and research methods are not yet completely defined.

Some scholars consider imagology to be a part of historical studies and argue that it should investigate perceptions of other peoples and countries that arose in the public consciousness of a particular nation at a certain historical stage. Sources for historical imagology are usually taken from materials of national and world history. They are archival documents, as well as memoirs, from which information can be obtained on how the representations of one people about another were formed and changed throughout history. Painting, visual arts, and cinematography also reflect perceptions of other cultures contained in artistic forms.

Others, first of all, turn their attention to literary texts. Literary scholars prefer to talk about “artistic imagology”, which is mastered by comparative literary criticism. Unlike historical imagology, the material of which is highly reliable, artistic imagology has a different kind of authenticity: literature, with all its conventions, is able to fully, vividly recreate the atmosphere of human relations; mentality, characters, speech, stereotypes of everyday consciousness are all formed in one national or social environment or another. At the same time, “artistic imagology” requires an interdisciplinary approach, i.e., attracting data from history, cultural studies, ethnopsychology, but also data on national character, lifestyle, behavior, customs, religion, etc.

Cultural anthropologists and sociologists believe that the goal of imagology is to study the ideas of the participants in a cultural dialogue and their perceptions about each other.¹

The ultimate perspective of image studies is a theory of cultural or national stereotypes, not a theory of cultural or national identity. Imagology is concerned with the representamen, representations as textual strategies and as discourse. That discourse implicitly raises a claim of referentiality vis-à-vis empirical reality, telling us that nation X has a set of characteristics Y, yet the actual validity of that referentiality claim is not the imagologist’s to verify or falsify. The imagologist’s frame of reference is a textual and intertextual one.

¹ Joep LEERSSEN: “Imagology: History and method”. In: Manfred BELLER and Joep LEERSSEN (eds.): *Imagology: the Cultural Construction and Literary Representation of National Characters; a Critical Survey*, Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi 2007, p. 27.

Researchers who work in the sphere of cultural paradigms have their own point of view of the formation and functioning of images and stereotypes. They presuppose that the ability to understand “uncommon” and “foreign” phenomena and their communication processes is one of the most important problems in the history of culture. On the other hand, cultural anthropologists state that the intention to understand “foreign” culture enables a person to exceed the bounds of his own world and plunge into other cultural spheres. It is very important for the development of his own culture. Nowadays, being influenced by globalization, this statement is becoming more and more *en vogue*.

As for political scientists, the study of the rules according to which the images of “the Other” could be created and introduced into public consciousness is considered the most important task of imagology.

Another group of scholars prefers to study national stereotypes, which are distributed in the ideas of one nation relative to another and have both positive and negative sides. The positive side of national stereotypes is that they, as it were, accumulate and store in short form, with the already existing experience of interethnic communication. The negative side of national stereotypes is known even more as it can be the basis for the development of chauvinism. Thus, the basis of stereotyping is the historical experience of the people and the experience of interaction between the nations. A factor that prompts the cognition and appreciation of any “alien”, “other” culture is often a surprise at an unusual, unfamiliar one. In the context of cultural globalization, the question of how the implementation of perceptions and representations of “strange” nations, and the transformation of these stereotypes (true and false) occur in the mass consciousness should be very acute. In addition, the development of imagological studies is currently associated with the need to promote mutual understanding between peoples and has a definite humanitarian goal.

More recently, philology and cultural anthropology have been added to the variety of human sciences, methods and approaches used in this multidisciplinary endeavor. It is impossible to understand the dynamics, mechanisms and certain ways of how a definite image of a country or a nation forms, or to understand the transformation of that image into a stable stereotype, without applying the data of sciences delineated above.

Scholars usually studying the problem within the framework of psychological paradigms consider the concept of real and imagined images of any nation or ethnic group to be the subject matter of ethnic self-consciousness. On the subject of ethnic stereotypes, one can safely assume they are formed on the basis of ethnic imagery systems; they are generalized, stable, and highly charged; they are composed through historical aspects of interethnic relations; and they regulate their

carriers' perception and way of conduct. A great influence of ethnic stereotypes on interethnic relations is described in many works by modern social psychologists and ethno-psychologists, who mention that ethnic stereotypes reflect cultural and historical peculiarities of parties to ethnic relations: ethnic stereotypes and ethnic auto-stereotypes, while depicting judgment-based and standard components of an ethnos (as a sociocultural system) serves as a driving force for the self-identification in ethnic communities and cultures continuum. Emotive and estimative character of ethnic stereotypes is one of the crucial points. There are three parameters of an ethnic stereotype's emotive and estimative component: ambivalence, expressiveness and target-orientation. These are important characteristics of an ethnic stereotype, because they depict its "imagery". Ethno-psychologists consider stability and rigidity to be another important quality of ethnic stereotypes. However, a degree of relativity to this stability is also recognized.

Ethno-psychologists, while conducting applied research, pay much attention to the formation of ethnic stereotypes and their functioning on the basis of cultural, common and other specific features of an ethnic community determined through the course of history. In this respect, it is noticed that ethnic stereotypes are the components of a national mental makeup and the basis of national self-image formation. At this point, meaningful results in the sphere of development of the concept of ethnic stereotypes have been achieved. Ethnologists declare that ethnic stereotypes have an absolute effect on peoples' behavior and that they can form ethnic antipathies or good feelings, pushing nations apart or pulling them together. They can also predetermine human behavior in any situation.

Russian historian and anthropologist A. S. MYL'NIKOV, while developing an ethnological component of research in imagology and stressing its interdisciplinary nature, comes up with the term "ethnic imagology". Its main components are: 1) The creation of an ethnic/ethnocultural worldview which tends to be different from one nation to another during different historical periods; 2) The study of the formation of ethnic/ethnocultural stereotypes and activities concerning different nations and their representatives; 3) The development of a set of issues connected with researching concepts of national character, ethnic mindset, and phenomena that generate relevant ethnocultural stereotypes. Consequently, the analysis of this set of issues is bound to be carried out by taking account of groupwide sociocultural imagery that usually differs from general ethnical imagery; 4) The examination of the historical memory phenomenon that through an interrelation of ethnic, spatial and diachronic factors secures a continuity of ethnic/ethnocultural traditions from the past into the present and the future.²

2 Aleksandr MYL'NIKOV: "Ètnicheskaià imagologija" (Ethnic imagology). In: *Kur'er Peterovskoi Kunstkamery* (Messenger of Peter's Kunstkamera) 1999, no. 8–9, p. 16.

According to the concept of A. S. MYL'NIKOV, the main branches of ethnic imagology are: worldview, ethnocultural stereotypes, ethnic mindset and historical memory which altogether offer opportunities for understanding ethnopsychological mechanisms on systemic levels. Perception is the component of ethnic imagology that depicts public feelings and conscience, and, as MYL'NIKOV states, “it is as unbiased as the things it depicts”³.

Thus, from the contemporary point of view, nowadays, imagology is considered to be an overarching academic discipline in humanities that examines the process whereby any images (country, nation, culture, etc.) are formed, perceived and transformed. The main point in conducting imagology research is the certain way different ethnic groups, countries and cultures figuratively perceive something “un-common”. The specified imagology subject matters are: 1) stable images objectified in literature (literary studies); 2) national images and ethnic stereotypes, and the ways they influence society (in ethnology); 3) stereotypes of any language (linguistic imagology); 4) mutual perceptions of participants in a cultural dialogue regarding each other (in culture studies); and 5) images of social function (in sociology).

At the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century the interdisciplinary research space of historical imagology has been, and continues to be, expanding and become conceptually saturated. Methods of imagological studies are based on concrete historical analysis of the collective representations of other peoples and states, as well as analysis of ethnic, national, cultural, auto- and hetero-stereotypes, the ways of their formation, the ways of functioning and transformation processes in the context of “we” and “they” relations. Having mastered historical anthropological, sociopsychological and cultural approaches, historical imagology has accumulated a significant amount of empirical research. The focus was on the complex processes of the formation of ethnic representations and the creation of national identity. With respect to the studies of historically formed stereotypical views of foreigners, multi-genre texts are used to reveal heterogeneous pictures of the world.

Comparative historical analysis of national images provides an opportunity for studying historical dynamics of the formation of the views, which, in turn, allows us to comprehend the historical features of the development of different societies and cultures. In this regard, the perceptions and the stereotypes formed on their basis are the object of study by means of historical imagology. The study of national images is a comparative undertaking; it addresses cross national relations rather than national identities. According to J. LEERSSEN's conception:

³ Ibid., p. 17.

this indicates that national characterizations are often specific instances and combinations of generic moral polarities, and that our way of thinking in terms of national characters boils down to an ethnic political distribution of role patterns in an imagined anthropological landscape. It is in this comparatist aspect that imagology holds out a challenge and a promise for future research.⁴

The key methodological principles of the imagological research program are gradually receiving more approval. First of all, one of the principles is the need to take into account the psychological component of the process of forming ethnic and national representations and images as a mixture of truth and fantasy, diligent observation and gross misconceptions. It is also very important to study prejudices regarding “Others” and high self-esteem in the context of various processes taking place in various areas of activity and external relationships of society at specific points in its history. That is why the study of individual and collective ideas about other peoples (leaving aside the question of their conformity to reality or its distortion) opens the way to the penetration into the spiritual life of the society in which these ideas are formed and function.

The formation of mutual perceptions, images, and stereotypes occurs in the process of sociocultural interaction of two or more nations. Sociocultural interaction of two countries is significantly more complex than simple bilateral cultural contacts or cultural interference. In this case, historians face the interaction processes between both different cultures and different societies. These societies and cultures are characterized by different levels of economic and social relations, religion and spiritual life. These differences allow discussion of the varying degrees, phases and modules of that interaction process which is inherent in sociocultural communities at defined stages of their social and cultural development.

Sociocultural interaction of countries and peoples is not a constant proximity despite being geographical. Arising and moving forward in a historical continuum, each nation passes through various stages, constantly replacing each other and depending on their relative development at each discrete historical stage. Sociocultural interaction represents the process of these concrete parameters, the ramifications and requirements of societal actions, their cultural, social and historical characteristics, but also the external influence of worldwide historical development or the phenomena of regional order. In addition to the aforementioned factors, history also provides many examples of artificial and spasmodic development of these specified processes.

On the basis of methodological approaches and the specified data of research fields described above, first of all, we must define the connection between the

⁴ Joep LEERSSEN: “Imagology: History and method” (2007), p. 29.

following concepts, such as “perception”, “stereotype”, “prejudice” and “image” in order to study their formation and development within the framework of social ideas and collective consciousness of any nation.

We consider “perception” to be an impression about another nation or country and primary apprehension of this impression in an individual’s mind. More frequently, “perceptions” occur on the basis of available information, which can either be fragmentary or systematic (personal impressions and data obtained from other people, literature, or under the weight of mass communication media). It must be taken into account that this information can be subjective, unilateral, unreliable or even false. “Perceptions” can be easily changed. Also, they can be stable, positive as well as negative. The main point is that they are always oriented on an individual’s mind. A set of perceptions forms a model that is strong enough to influence stereotypes and form the images.

“Stereotype” (ethnic, national) in its turn is depicted as a component of collective consciousness. It is a stable representation which is set in the public mind and which consists of standardized collective experiences one receives during the process of communication (within a family, an educational institution, a community or a state). “Stereotypes” can be based on both objective knowledge and misunderstandings formed in the society or created under the pressure of propaganda. They can often be transformed into persistent forms lingering in the minds of some groups of people or even nations.

“Perceptions” and “stereotypes” sometimes can cause “prejudice”, i.e., a negative attitude toward any ethnic group, nation or state. Ethnical prejudice often becomes an element of a global public mindset. They can engender various theoretical constructs. On the basis of these constructs, many geopolitical and foreign policy concepts are formed in an objective way or perhaps only to conform to a certain political environment. A famous American psychologist Gordon ALLPORT (1897–1967) conducted research on the sources of prejudice and the role of prejudice in the structure of national character. He tried to use sociological as well as historical approaches and psychological data while writing his book *The Nature of Prejudice*⁵.

The combination of “perceptions”, “stereotypes” and, in some cases, “prejudice” forms the “image” of a nation: a specific collective portrait which is projected into its collective consciousness. On the basis of this, we can state that an “image”, globally speaking, turns out to be an objective phenomenon which consists of sets of perceptions and stereotypes depicted in different spheres of public life and mass consciousness.

The joint German-Russian project provided by sinologists from Heidelberg and St. Petersburg universities, which is a basis for this book, was aimed at

⁵ Gordon ALLPORT: *Nature of Prejudice*, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books 1958.

investigating shifts and continuities in Chinese perceptions of Russia and the West during the 20th century. The shifts and continuities were studied in three major areas: 1. The field of socialization via an investigation into normative descriptions of Russia and the West in Chinese school textbooks which define images of “the Other” from childhood onwards; 2. The field of literature and Chinese fictional representations of Russia and “the West” consumed by the Chinese reading public; 3. The field of social, political and ethnic perceptions as reflected in visual sources.

The chosen areas of research are determined by their significance for understanding the processes of image formation. The time-frame includes the whole of the 20th century, from Tsarist Russia through the Soviet Union to post-Soviet Russia, then from the two World Wars through the Chinese transition from Imperial China to the Republic, and finally to the People’s Republic. The time of the Sino-Soviet split, the end of the Cold War, and the new situation in the world after 1989, as well as its effects on China, are also interesting for detailed study. The focus on “Chinese” perceptions, in turn, covers not only mainland China in the 20th century but also post-1945 Taiwan. These choices in terms of spatial and temporal coverage are to lead to a multifaceted research on how Chinese perceptions of Russia and “the West” shifted, and, where possible, continuities might be detected.

The first block of the articles was devoted to the Chinese school textbooks. The perceptions of other countries and their history constructed by school textbooks are extremely important because they form the schoolchildren’s views, which remain with them for their entire life. Textbooks usually demonstrate that the content of these texts reflects complex and multidirectional trends in the academic and political environment of the societies.

In the time between 1900 and 1949 (the late Qing and Republican period), both Russia and the West in Chinese history textbooks were described through the same categories, which define their image as either liberals and leaders of progress, or aggressors and imperialists. Chinese textbooks from that period associated Russia with the West but often presented Russians as the most despotic and aggressive representatives of the Westerners. At the same time, it can be said that Russia stood in a certain opposition to all the rest of the Western countries. There is a dual image of the West in Chinese textbooks. The image of the Western countries in the textbooks on national Chinese history, due to aggression and wars, was mostly negative. In the world history textbooks, Western countries were portrayed as not only the imperialists but also act as the authors of concepts such as human rights and the constitution and liberalism. They were the creators of the Industrial Revolution and proponents of the development of science and progress. Since the 1930s, when Kuomintang came to power, the textbooks have become extremely nationalistic.

They stress China's contribution to world culture, stating that many inventions came from China and helped Europe develop.

The PRC school history textbooks began with an idealization of the USSR in the 1950s. School textbooks published in the People's Republic of China in the 1950s, as well as the accompanying teaching materials, to a large extent, had copied similar textbooks and training programs used in the Soviet Union. This was especially true of textbooks on world history. In the 1950s, many Soviet historians visited China and contributed to the development of world history teaching programs in Chinese universities and schools. It is therefore unsurprising that Chinese textbooks on general history sought mostly to emulate Soviet publications. Special emphasis is laid on the Industrial Revolution, which was the driving force behind the development of colonialism. China enters the stage of world history as a victim of Western colonialism, which is seen as the result of capitalism and an expression of worldwide class struggle according to Leninism. It is shown how the West is presented as an aggressor and how Marxism and the Communist Party are seen as legitimate defenders of China.

With the split of the PRC-Soviet ties, a disenchantment with post-Stalinist USSR ensues, and the PRC regards itself as the only true proponent of communism. Western "progress" and "achievements", in contrast, are deconstructed by exposing their inhumane nature, especially in the 1950s. With the "Reform and Opening" politics and the "Four Modernizations" beginning in the late 1970s, the West was cautiously credited for technological innovation.

In the 1980s, during the "Four Modernizations", a more positive image of the West appeared in China and was added to the history curricula and textbooks. Scientific innovation during the Industrial Revolution now won high praise. In the 1980s, European history was instrumentalized to legitimize the Chinese Reform and Opening policy. As the policy of the PRC was being altered, the concept of history was likewise modified. The DENG Xiaoping Era's idea of the Chinese future was technocratic and modernized, or even westernized. Therefore, a new interpretation of the world history and a more positive image of the West appeared in Chinese textbooks.

Actual information on world events is just one aspect of world history education. Our studies show that the underlying use of the said information always speaks to the present and should be also understood as allegory, parable or coded propaganda to legitimize domestic policies and the status quo of national identity. This may be especially seen and pronounced in the shifts and rifts in PRC world history textbooks. This is especially noticeable in the shift and schism in the PRC textbooks on world history.

In recent decades the image of the Western countries and Russia has been defined by Chinese political and economic policies aimed at its integration into the world's global institutions. For this purpose, previous historical concepts gave way to a new theoretical framework. From this point of view, China became regarded as an integral part of the global historical process led by the West to form a unified world political and economic system. Western countries received, in historical textbooks, much more positive assessment as the main leading states contributing to the formation of the world economy system. At the same time, this global history concept is used in Chinese textbooks as a tool for building national identity and supporting the domestic political agenda.

Apparently, the image of Russia in modern Chinese and Taiwanese textbooks is slightly different from that of rather positively assessed Western countries. Textbooks on both sides of the Taiwan Strait try to demonstrate that Tsarist Russia always had development strategies of outward expansion. They detail the issues of land expansion by Russia in the Far East.

Taiwanese textbooks give even more negative assessments in the section on the history of China even though there has been a steady improvement in bilateral relations between Russia and Taiwan since the 1990s. This might be attributed to the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist rhetoric of the 1950s and 70s, which is left unattended since the main focus is put on the revision of proper Taiwanese history. Chinese and Taiwanese textbooks give different assessments of the 1917 revolution, the key event in the history of Russia with world implications. Chinese textbooks describe the October Revolution as a turning event in the world history, suggesting a non-capitalist model of social development. The later Soviet experience of socialism is seen as an example of bad implementation, and thus a warning against mistakes that could be made on the way. In Taiwanese textbooks, the revolution of 1917 is consistently shown as the result of military upheavals, which did not bring relief to the people but rather deprived the country of democracy and freedom.

Formation of literary perceptions and Chinese fictional representations of Russia consumed by the Chinese reading public were demonstrated by the authors of the book on the background of the history of Russian literature in China.

The introduction of Russian literature to China dates back to 1872. Sometimes it was driven by the intention to expose the evils of the aggressive northern barbarians, sometimes by the desire of Chinese literati to learn the revolutionary experience of Russia in the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. Although initially the translation of Russian literature was lagging behind the Western literatures, after the May Fourth movement in China in 1919 and the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, it started to attract more and more attention. After the split of the GMD and the CCP in 1927 and the rupture of diplomatic relations between China

and the USSR in 1929, the promotion of Soviet literature became not only problematic but also a rather dangerous affair. Nevertheless, it was at the beginning of the 1930s that the translation of Russian and Soviet literature underwent significant acceleration. In the 1930s, the Russian and Soviet literature became the second most frequently translated foreign literature in China, and, from the 1940s up to the end of the 1980s, it was dominating foreign literature. The contribution of left-wing literati to the translation and promotion of Russian and Soviet literature in China at the beginning of the 1930s is widely acknowledged. However, their ideological rivals, i.e., Chinese nationalists, did not ignore Russian literature either. Communist and nationalist literati each had their own reasons to address Russia and created distinct images of Russia and Russian literature in their publications.

The third group of texts examines representations and visual images of Russia and the West in the 20th century China. “Representation is a relatively new word in the historian’s vocabulary. Instead of the concrete and factual, scholars interested in understanding the past are turning to thought and images”.⁶ Contemporary trends in historiography are less concerned about the distinction between reality and imagination. Visual images (pictures, cartoons, photos, films, sculptures, architecture, etc.) usually inform the historians in specific ways. No doubt, the use of visual materials does not replace the documental sources. Nevertheless, it creates new opportunities for understanding some of the trends of the past. By studying visual images, we can definitely present new visions of the history.

Materials presented with visual images are extensive and diverse. Their form and content can be influenced by ethnic and religious beliefs, myths or a game of imagination, but commonly, politics and ideology. As shown in our book, visual images that need to be studied are extremely diverse: *nianhua*, cartoons, caricatures, political posters and even cemeteries.

The Late Imperial China period is represented by traditional Chinese folk woodblock printings. The appearance of new visual images of foreigners and foreign realities in China during that period is considered through the prism of traditional folk thinking. Paintings can be divided into three main groups: images related to Christian missionaries in China, images on historical and political themes, and traditional benevolent paintings depicting Western advances in science and technology. Each group was addressed to a specific “consumer”. Woodblock prints associated with the activities of Christian missionaries in China, well-wishing pictures with images of Western realities, as well as images on historical and political topics that became particularly popular in early 20th century. It is probably for this reason that images with western “curiosities” make up the most

6 Yulia MIKHAILOVA and M. William STEELE (eds.): *Japan and Russia: Three Centuries of Mutual Images*, Folkestone: Global Oriental 2008, p. 1.

numerous groups. This fact once again confirms that the art of *nianhua* was extremely responsive to changes in Chinese society and, among other things, brought the information about the latest achievements to every corner of the country.

The Republican period shows a diverse and fluid picture of Chinese perceptions of Russia and the West – Cartoons which appeared at that time were a foreign medium; which was eagerly accepted and adapted to local tastes. Through this foreign medium, Russia and the West were depicted interchangeably together and apart, as sources of inspiration and of danger, as governments and as commoners. The cartoonists recognized the key threats of the decade to be coming from totalitarian states, imperialist interests and militarist zeal, and yet the division into Axis and Allied powers was not always clear at that time. The premonition of a looming global war drove a part of Chinese society into visualizing the future as a clash of defenseless humanity and unstoppable warmongers, a conflict not of country against country, but of civilization against barbarianism. However, this massive threat did not completely overshadow the more mundane matters of daily life, where new films, intricate designs and celebrity trivia were still a part of what the Chinese read about the West and about Westerners' existence in China. Some issues, such as British presence in Hong Kong or foreign sailors' drunken behavior in Shanghai, were the cause of indignation while others, like achievements of painters, cinematographers or writers, would be praised and admired. In this cultural sphere "the West" and "Russia" could be mixed together. The only sphere where "Russians" were most often quite clearly separated from "Westerners" was the narrative of Russian emigrants living in China and standing well apart from both Chinese and other foreigners.

After the creation of the People's Republic of China, in the 1950s–1970s, visual images presented in the form of pictures, portraits, posters and cartoons played a very important role in mass propaganda and were used to introduce official ideas to the public consciousness. After 1949 a lot of posters and cartoons that appeared in China had to promote the main ideological principles of the Communist Party, including its foreign policy. In that period, the image of the USA and the West as a whole was negative in China and did not change much. The image of the Soviet Union, in contrast, was entirely positive in the 1950s, but underwent significant changes during the Cultural Revolution, becoming similar to the image of the West in many respects. All these changes attained their reflection in posters and cartoons.

Accordingly, the articles by the German, Russian, and Chinese scholars presented in this book reveal a wide range of issues and problems associated with the formation of perceptions of Russia and the West in China, and their changes, continuities and contingencies on the base of imagological framework. This

publication opens the door to further research in this area and offers food for thought not only to sinologists, but also to sociologists, anthropologists and literary scholars.

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This book aims at investigating changes and continuities in Chinese perceptions of Russia and the West during the 20th century, paying heed to the fact that the respective ascriptions and “frontlines” were historically contingent: who and what represented “Russia” or “the West” at a given time and at a given place? Was “Russia” part of “the West”, or not? And if it was, in which regard? Which factors – foreign or indigenous – led to changes in Chinese perceptions and representations and why? With such questions in mind, this book was taking shape, growing out of a German-Russian project funded by the DFG-RFBR. The German-Russian research team from Heidelberg University and St. Petersburg State University worked on exploring the topic together with colleagues from mainland China and Taiwan, concentrating on three major areas: 1. The field of socialization via a look into normative descriptions of Russia and “the West” in Chinese school textbooks which define images of the “other/s” from childhood on; 2. The field of literature and Chinese fictional representations of Russia and “the West” consumed by a Chinese reading public; 3. The field of visual and material manifestations which define images of the “other/s” in their own medial way and make them accessible also to a public far from purely discursive levels and to those who do not actively look for them.

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