

KAMPUCHEA: PATTERNS OF FACTIONAL CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL CONFRONTATION

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On December 5, 1981, the Central Committee of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), the organizational matrix of the Hanoi-imposed and -supported People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) headed by President Heng Samrin, announced at the close of its "second ordinary meeting" held in Phnom Penh, that Pen Sovan, the KPRP's secretary general and chairman (i.e. premier) of the Republic's Council of Ministers, had "been permitted to take a long rest in order to cure himself from illness." [1] Though subsequently PRK diplomats affirmed that Sovan really was "seriously ill," allegedly suffering from heart and nervous system ailments, informed sources agreed that Sovan's resignation had been forced and reflected a power struggle within the KPRP and PRK leadership. [2] Indeed, by March, 1982, diplomatic observers in Bangkok believed Sovan to be in Hanoi, being held under house arrest. [3] Sovan was said to have run afoul of his avowedly pro-Moscow political orientation which increasingly had begun to irk the Vietnamese. The latter maintain a 200,000-man military force in that part of Kampuchean territory that is under the PRK's control, and an estimated 5,000 civilian Vietnamese officials and party cadres "assist" and "advise" in the day-to-day operations of the PRK government.

A complex interplay of domestic Kampuchean rivalries and big power pressures appears to lie behind Sovan's sudden departure from office. That interplay is basic to an understanding of one of Southeast Asia's most intractable regional political problems, the continuing struggle over Kampuchea's future. Hence the Sovan incident and the circumstances surrounding it deserve perhaps a brief analysis.

First some historical background is in order. It will be recalled that on January 8, 1979, after weeks of border clashes, invading Vietnamese forces had driven out of Phnom Penh the "Democratic Kampuchea" (DK) government of President Khieu Sampan and premier Pol Pot. [4] DK guerilla remnants, some 40,000 strong, reconstituted themselves as a

counter-government, based primarily in the Phnom Kravanh (Cardamom Mountain) range and in Western Battambang province. The DK has continued to enjoy People's China's support, both in the diplomatic community and in the form of light arms supplied covertly by sea and over land with the connivance of Thai military.

It should be stressed that between Kampucheans and Vietnamese there are ancient ethnic and historic animosities. Moreover, Hanoi's dominance of the slowly developing Kampuchean communist movement, in the decades before Pol Pot forces in 1975 ultimately triumphed in the formal establishment of the DK, shaped political perceptions and resentments even among those Kampucheans who eventually joined the Vietnamese in driving Pol Pot from power. There are ironic parallels here. The Vietnamese since 1975 have increasingly come to depend on the USSR for direct military and economic assistance. William Shawcross, a recent visitor to Vietnam, notes that Moscow now provides virtually all of Hanoi's fuel needs and up to a million tons of wheat annually. Some 6,000 Soviets, and additional hundreds of East Europeans and Cubans, are presently at work in the now unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), and Western sources estimate that the cost to Moscow of maintaining Hanoi's military strength alone comes to about \$ 2 billion per year.[5] Among the proudly nationalistic Vietnamese such dependence, however necessary, has been deeply resented. Shawcross observes that today in Vietnam "the one phrase a Westerner needs to know is 'Khong Phai Lien So - I am not a Soviet.'" A delegation of the European parliament which travelled through the SRV in March and April, 1981, reported:[6]

"The Soviet 'advisers,' of which there are a fairly large number in the country, are apparently hated by the population. Two Russians were allegedly murdered in Ho Chi Minh City market just a week before our visit."

Sensitivities over heavy dependence on Moscow are aggravated by the stagnation and chaos of the SRV national economy. The Vietnamese Communist Party's Fifth Congress at the close of March, 1982, turned into a dreary litany of reports on unmet economic targets, serious shortages in all fields, from transportation facilities to pharmaceuticals, sharp self-accusations of leadership mistakes and bureaucratic bungling, and denunciations by party leaders of "opportunists, exploiters, smugglers" and other malefactors.

As SRV Premier Pham Van Dong put it delicately, "negative phenomena in economic and social life are still lingering." [7] Meanwhile, in the midst of its economic crisis, punctuated by further reports of a 200% annual inflation rate and serious malnutrition in parts of the country, SRV leaders, without success, have been trying to broaden their economic and diplomatic relationships including with the US, and thus lessen their country's deepening need of Soviet and East European assistance. [8]

It is in the context of this uneasy relationship between Hanoi and Moscow, that the Pen Sovan incident must be viewed. Of peasant stock, and since his youth identified with the Hanoi controlled Cambodian Communist movement, Sovan was educated primarily in Vietnam. Though active in the early seventies as a guerilla he did not join the Khieu Sampan-Pol Pot "Khmer Rouge" ("Red Cambodians," i.e. underground Communist party) during their final drive on Phnom Penh in 1975 to overthrow the Lon Nol regime. The reasons for his failure to do so are unclear. Was Hanoi even then uncertain about its future relationship with Pol Pot's Beijing-leaning DK, and "holding back", as it were, some Kampucheans in the SRV which it believed could be relied on to implement Ho Chi Minh's old vision of a single, Vietnam-dominated Indochina Communist state?

Perhaps we shall never know. Yet, even among those Kampucheans, like Heng Samrin and Pen Sovan, who eventually chose Hanoi's side in its deepening conflict with Pol Pot's DK, there were troubled memories about ancient historic Vietnamese-Cambodian animosities, aggravated further by (1) long-simmering disputes over the exact location of the frontier between Kampuchea and Vietnam, and (2) by ideological and policy differences over the role of the Communist parties in the respective Indochinese countries, particularly real or imagined claims by Hanoi to a paramount position in a future Communist Indochinese Federation. [9] After Vietnamese forces early in 1979 drove Pol Pot from Phnom Penh, installing Heng Samrin as President of the new PRK, the gratitude Kampucheans felt over having been liberated from the bloody holocaust of policy reforms unleashed by Pol Pot, began to give way to resentment over the large and continuing Vietnamese military and civilian establishment and its demands on the shattered Cambodian economy. Had one repressive regime merely been followed by yet another?

Shortly, Hanoi initiated a formal "colonization" of the PRK countryside, just as it earlier had undertaken in Laos. [10]

The earlier mentioned delegation of the European parliament which visited the PRK in 1981 was informed that access by foreign relief workers to parts of the Cambodian countryside was not possible because "certain eastern regions of the country have been occupied by Vietnamese peasants which the Hanoi government has established there." [11] The ubiquitous Vietnamese, the delegation found, were apparently creating the same effect in Kampuchea which the Soviets were causing in Vietnamese itself: "The Cambodian population who greeted the Vietnamese people as their saviour (as it had done for Pol Pot) no longer seems to appreciate their presence on its territory."

Meanwhile the Soviet presence in the PRK itself began to increase (by April, 1981 there were an estimated 200 to 300 Soviet "advisers"). Soviet weapons were being supplied directly to Kampuchean military via Kompong Som port, and a number of Kampucheans went to the USSR for pilot training. These developments irritated the Vietnamese who, reportedly, would prefer to have Russian assistance and influence in Kampuchea 'filtered' through Hanoi. By May, 1981 Pen Sovan was emerging as the key figure in the PRK leadership, seeking closer and direct relations with Moscow. In various addresses, Sovan began "playing down" the Vietnamese role in the Kampuchean Communist struggle, emphasizing instead the vanguard position of the Soviet Union in international Communism. In effect, Sovan appeared to be equating Soviet and Vietnamese contributions to the cause of Kampuchean "national liberation." To be sure, at no time did he ignore the Vietnamese role altogether, or avoid making a reference to the "effective military alliance" between the SRV, PRK, and the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR). But there was no mistaking Pen Sovan's nuances of policy emphasis and where they would lead: to a PRK, with its own direct Russian support base and much less dependent on Hanoi - an arrangement in keeping with Kampuchean nationalist ambitions, and freeing the Soviets, in turn, from the necessity of having to project their strategic interests in the region primarily through the SRV. For Sovan the need to broaden the PRK's international contacts appears to have been of paramount importance. [12]

Pen Sovan's fall from power was accompanied almost simultaneously by the arrest in Phnom Penh of about twenty of his principal lieutenants in the KPRP and the government. Among these were former Industry Minister Keo Chanda and former Foreign Trade Minister Tang Saroeum; Ros Samay,

former general secretary of the KPRP's principal mass support group, the "Front for Kampuchean National Salvation" and a former Economic Affairs Minister, apparently had been incarcerated earlier. On February 10, 1982, the Vietnamese News Agency announced that Chan Si, a deputy premier, and a Hanoi loyalist who had been named Head of the new PRK's General Political Department when the PRK was formally established, formally had been appointed to Sovan's post as PRK Council of Ministers Chairman. Head of State Heng Samrin continues in Sovan's place as KPRP's secretary general.

The PRK's spokesmen have attempted to put as good a face as possible on the whole affair. Thus, PRK Foreign Minister Hun Sen, in a March, 1982, press interview dismissed reports that Moscow-Hanoi rivalry had been a factor in Pen Sovan's ouster. Such reports were mere "insinuations to create discord," and "neither Moscow nor Hanoi has any interest in competing for influence in my country," he said. As for the PRK's relationship with Hanoi, Hun Sen declared that "our policy is not subservient to that of Vietnam," but, rather, is one of "cooperation." [13]

Pen Sovan's fall which undoubtedly came at Hanoi's behest, was not only a political defeat for the Soviets. Ironically, it tends to underscore as well certain long-term nationalistic affinities between elements of the KPRP and PRK leadership (though for the moment out of favor) and other factions contesting for power in Cambodia, among them the DK's "Khmer Rouge." Indeed, each of these other factions is driven by its own particular nationalistic considerations in relation to the SRV and the superpowers, just as the group around Pen Sovan appears to have been. For an understanding of the Kampuchean problem and its international ramifications, a brief look at the origins and composition of these contending factions is in order.

Next to the DK there also are the Moulinaka (from "Mouvement de Liberation Nationale du Kampouchea") founded in 1979, and FUNCINPEC (an acronym for "Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif") established two years later. Both are formally loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia's dominant postwar political figure until his fall from power in 1970. Moulinaka, reportedly, has a 3,000-man military force along the Thai-Kampuchean border. But FUNCINPEC's principal support base today appears to lie more in the Cambodian refugee community in France. The chief asset of both

groups, despite his often baffling policy pronouncements, is Sihanouk himself, almost the embodiment - considering the catastrophes which have befallen his people and his country since his 1970 fall from power - of Cambodia's lost "golden age."

A third faction is the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), headed by one of Sihanouk's former premiers, Som Sann. The KPNLF is said to have about 4,000 followers in its "army" along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Like Sihanouk's now virtually merged FUNCINPEC-Moulina-ka, the KPNLF has an indeterminate following among Cambodian exiles in France. KPNLF leaders, Son Sann included, have frequently charged that Sihanouk's organisations are essentially political, but that the KPNLF is a "true fighting force." Toward the close of March, 1982, Son Sann claimed, in fact, that units of his KPNLF had "repelled" a recent three-week-long Vietnamese military offensive designed to seize control of disputed border areas, and that both Vietnamese and KPNLF losses had been "heavy." [14]

It is well to stress that long before the emergence of Sihanouk's and Son Sann's present leadership positions in the anti-Vietnamese movement and in the configuration of their organisations there were complex personal and family rivalries, and a history of snubs and humiliations between Sihanouk, Son Sann, some leading present day DK figures, and their respective lieutenants. The rise of the Khmer Rouge organisation has been attributed by Son Sann and his followers to Sihanouk's own bad judgments and attempts at collaboration with them and the Vietnamese. While Sihanouk, in turn, has charged the KPNLF with a willingness to ally itself with the Khmer Rouge, despite the fact that Son Sann himself officially denounces the brutalities committed by Pol Pot's regime. After the 1975 establishment of the DK in Phnom Penh under Pol Pot's aegis, followers of Son Sann and Sihanouk began vying for support among exiled Cambodians, even as other anti-Communist resistance groups such as the Moulkhmer ("Movement pour le Soutien de la Liberté Khmer") were becoming active in Cambodia itself. The KPNLF was, in fact, formed out of five smaller, right-wing, "free Khmer" (Khmer Strei) resistance organisations, after Son Sann assumed the leadership of the principal organisation of Cambodian exiles in Europe, the "Association Générale des Khmers à l'Etranger" (AGKE). Indeed, neither Moulina-ka, nor the immediate organisational precursor of FUNCINPEC, were actually founded by Sihanouk; he assumed their leadership only after others had done most if not all

of the organisational spadework for a broad, anti-Vietnamese, Cambodian coalition.[15]

This pattern of factional rivalry is rendered still more complex by the murky underworld of the refugee camps inside and straddling the Thai-Kampuchean border, and by the political wheeling and dealing, including in arms supplies, among Thai officials and other would-be refugee leaders in the teeming Thai border towns. In mid-October, 1981, Prasong Sunsiri, general secretary of the Thai government's National Security Council, in an address to a conference on refugee problems convened by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees in Geneva, complained that despite acceptance of Indochinese refugees by various third countries the refugee population in Thailand had not diminished because of a continuing influx of new "displaced and illegal immigrants." Sunsiri said that at present there were 218,410 Indochinese refugees in camps and "holding centers" inside Thailand, of which 118,410 were Kampucheans and 100,000 were Laotians and Vietnamese. But, he said, there were an additional 300,000 Kampucheans precariously encamped along the Thai-Kampuchean border.[16]

Gang warfare among the human flotsam of the border reflects the struggle for power among rival political factions. In the middle of October, 1981, for example, rival bands of Kampuchean guerrillas killed twenty villagers during a battle for control of the lucrative black market at Ban Kok No Nong Do village in Thailand. The guerrillas belonged to a KPNLF faction called "the Free Khmers" led by Chea Chut, a onetime soldier in the forces of former Cambodian President Lon Nol. Some \$ 40,000 worth of "business" daily reportedly is transacted at Ban Kok Ko Nong Do alone, and "as much as half a million dollars changes hands daily along the border." [17]

In the border area new claimants to refugee or anti-Vietnamese guerrilla leadership quickly come and go. In the course of 1979, for example, there briefly emerged a shadowy "National Movement for the Liberation of Kampuchea." It was led by one André Oukthol, a former Cambodian student in France, now styling himself Prince Norodom Soriyavong. His claimed relationship to Prince Norodom Sihanouk has been rejected by the latter. At about the same time a former Cambodian captain in Lon Nol's army, one Var Sakhan, announced formation of a "Serika National Liberation Movement" with a refugee following.[18] Little has been heard from both these groups in the past two years, how-

ever. Various new "movements" among the border Kampuchians, all allegedly committed to fighting the Vietnamese, have announced themselves, only to disappear again as the political or economic fortunes of their founders and clients change.

It is apparent that corrupt Thai officials, arms smugglers and black market entrepreneurs, rival refugees bands styling themselves as "liberation armies," hapless Kampuchean villagers from all over the country seeking security, food and shelter amidst continuing military clashes, and feuding would-be or deposed Kampuchean politicians aspiring to power, all find the Thai-Kampuchean frontier a region of opportunity.

Interacting with, and, in a way, simultaneously and paradoxically seeking to diminish and yet aggravate Cambodian factional rivalry, are the policies of Indochina's Southeast Asian neighbors, particularly those in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), as well as such major powers as the US, People's China, and the USSR. ASEAN suspicion of People's China, the Sino-Soviet conflict, the US-Soviet confrontation, the Soviets' own strategic interests in Indochina, and the de facto US-ASEAN-China security alliance in the regions, all affect the complex pattern of rivalry among anti-Vietnamese Cambodian leaders. Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of this affective process has been ASEAN's repeated effort in the past two years to bring the three principal Cambodian factions, the DK, Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC-Moulinaka, and Son Sann's KPNLF, into a meaningful alliance. These ASEAN efforts, quite clearly, have been of particular concern to Beijing, the staunch supporter of the DK. They also have tended to sharpen Sino-ASEAN strains over the whole Kampuchean issue in relation to the future of Indochina.

Such strains have been particularly apparent since the special conference of the United Nations on the Kampuchean question, which met in New York on July 13, 1981. The conference was called for by the UN General Assembly's resolution of October 13, 1980 on Kampuchea, and was part of ASEAN's persistent effort over the past three years to bring mounting international pressure to bear on the Vietnamese to withdraw their forces from Cambodia. The New York conference was attended by 93 countries, 14 of them only as "observers." Despite the UN resolution urging "all parties" to the Kampuchean question to attend the conference, it was boycotted by the SRV, PRK, LPDR, USSR, and its Eastern bloc allies. Even before the conference met,

ASEAN had circulated some of its proposals it intended to present. In substance, these proposals had been formulated at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Conference in Manila, in mid-June, 1981. These proposals looked toward a ceasefire and withdrawal of all "foreign" forces from Kampuchea (i.e. the Vietnamese), establishment of a temporary UN presence buttressed by a UN military contingent pending free elections under UN supervision, the "disarming of the various conflicting factions" in Kampuchea, and formation of an international committee to "negotiate" with the SRV, the USSR, People's China and other "interested parties" to search for a permanent settlement. The Manila communique also "welcomed" efforts by various anti-Vietnamese factions to form a "united front." [19]

Well before the New York conference opened, People's China, ever alert to protect its client, the DK, had made it known informally that it opposed the "disarming" of contending Kampuchean factions, the sending of a UN peace-keeping force, or the establishment of any temporary UN administration in Kampuchea. [20] All these, in Beijing's view, would have the effect of eroding the position of the DK government as the only legitimate government of Kampuchea and occupant of Kampuchea's seat in the UN itself. Though Singapore's delegate and ASEAN spokesman, Professor Tommy Koh, at first stressed that the ASEAN call for a disarming of all Kampuchean factions was "not negotiable," the Chinese insisted that only the "Heng Samrin puppet force" be disarmed, and that the "patriotic forces" in Kampuchea be permitted to develop their own "necessary measures" to insure free elections. [21]

Deadlock threatened the New York conference, not least because the US quietly but firmly supported Beijing's position. [22] Ultimately, recourse was had to a vaguely worded French compromise resolution. This compromise resolution eliminated the ASEAN demand for the disarming of all Kampuchean factions and establishment of a temporary UN administration pending free elections. Instead, the French proposal called for unspecified "appropriate measures for the maintenance of law and order and the holding of free elections" following the withdrawal of "foreign" forces. Similarly, the French compromises called for unspecified "appropriate measures" to ensure that armed Kampuchean factions would not be able to prevent or disrupt free elections. [23]

Although ASEAN spokesmen pronounced themselves satisfied with this French compromise and with the results of the

New York conference, it was apparent that Beijing had won a diplomatic victory for itself and the DK. The 40,000-man Khmer Rouge force, after all, remains, thanks to Beijing's material and diplomatic help, the strongest anti-Vietnamese force in Kampuchea today. Whatever the configuration of power might be in Kampuchea after a hypothetical Vietnamese withdrawal, it would be a force to reckon with, unless the Heng Samrin PRK government suddenly acquired a great surge of popularity. In this connection, one should emphasize that the significance of the Pen Sovan incident, discussed at the beginning of this article, is that by the time free elections could be held after a Vietnamese withdrawal, the Heng Samrin government is likely to be perceived as a badly tainted Hanoi lackey. One might also note People's China's success at the New York conference in diluting ASEAN's original proposal to create an international committee to "negotiate" with the SRV, USSR, and other interested parties. The French compromise proposal ultimately adopted at the conference merely instructs the committee to "maintain contact" with the parties concerned.

Beijing's intransigence at the New York conference, and its ability to persuade the US to follow it in this instance, deepened ASEAN apprehensions about China's long-term intentions. There was particular concern in Malaysia and in Indonesia. Confronted with an active, if relatively small-scale and disorganized, Communist guerrilla insurgency along its border with Thailand, the Kuala Lumpur government remains suspicious of Beijing's tendency to distinguish between friendly official relations on a "government to government" level, and its refusal to disavow support for the mainly ethnic Chinese Malaysian insurgents on the grounds that this involves only "party to party" relations. [24] Indonesia suspended (though did not formally break) diplomatic relations with People's China in 1967, because of officially expressed belief in Chinese foreknowledge of and complicity in the abortive, 1965 coup attempt in various parts of Java. Powerful domestic Indonesian opposition continues to prevent any "normalization" of diplomatic relations with Beijing. [25] The Singapore government, meanwhile, has repeatedly asserted that it will formally exchange embassies with the Chinese only after the Indonesians have normalized their relations.

After the New York conference, suspicion in ASEAN deepened that People's China meant to prevent a political settlement of the Kampuchean question as long as possible. This, presumably, in the hope of "bleeding white" the SRV, and

at the same time make the Soviet commitment in propping up its Indochinese allies increasingly more costly. For all the ASEAN states, but especially for Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, a strong modernized China in the future requires a political counterweight or barrier in the region - and a viable, politically independent SRV, even one closely allied with friendly Cambodian and Laotian regimes, could play just such a role. Hence the distinction consistently made in diplomatic ASEAN circles between an unlawful Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and the existence of an independent and prosperous SRV. Indeed, it would appear that Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur in searching for a future regional balance of power arrangement, would go a long way in recognizing Hanoi's security interests in both Kampuchea and Laos - but not a blatant Vietnamese invasion and occupation as is now the case in Kampuchea. As early as March, 1981, Singapore's Deputy Premier for Foreign Affairs, S. Rajaratnam had emphasized that "We want an independent Vietnam" and that "If Vietnam fell under the domination of China, which remains the chief threat in our view," then the whole of Indochina "would be under the Chinese thumb." And Rajaratnam added: "I have told the Vietnamese: 'We want a prosperous Vietnam for which we will create no problems. All we ask of you is to leave Kampuchea'." [26]

It was against this background of heightened concern over Chinese policy (and apparent US acquiescence in that policy) that ASEAN after the New York conference turned with redoubled effort to the Kampuchean factional problem itself, in an effort to exert pressure both on China and the SRV. ASEAN was determined that China, through its DK client, would not be able to monopolize the anti-Vietnamese resistance in Kampuchea and enhance its own influence in the region. Compelling the DK to come to a tactical alliance with Son Sann's KPNLF and the Sihanoukists, thus also showing Beijing the necessity of accepting a "third alternative" in Kampuchea other than on DK-Chinese terms, could be achieved, it was thought, by a combination of new diplomatic initiatives and policy pronouncements.

In the weeks after the New York conference therefore Malaysian officials publicly began stressing that People's China constituted a far greater threat to Southeast Asian security than either the SRV or the USSR. [27] ASEAN also began urging Son Sann and Sihanouk to join DK representatives in discussions looking toward forming a single "united front" as an alternative to the Heng Samrin regime. In the back-

ground of these initiatives even then, as the present writer was informed by Singapore officials in July, 1981, lay the implied threat that ASEAN might cease its consistent support, especially at the United Nations, of the DK as Cambodia's only legitimate government (the time was to come, in early February, 1982, when Malaysian and Indonesian officials would voice such a threat openly). This would have been a heavy blow for Beijing as well as the DK.

One should also note that a unified, effective, "third alternative" countergovernment in Kampuchea, especially one that was assured of future UN endorsement, would be able to exert considerable pressure on Hanoi and Moscow. Thus far the prevailing factional division within the anti-Vietnamese Kampuchean opposition has permitted the Vietnamese and the Soviets to depict any alternative to Heng Samrin as having little credibility. Because of this factional conflict, Hanoi has felt confident that, in the long run, the international community would have to accept the PRK in the absence of any credible choice. Over the past three years the SRV and USSR have vainly sought to win legitimacy for the Heng Samrin regime at the United Nations. Such efforts would be even more seriously hampered by a broadened anti-Vietnamese coalition government that could cover up some of the bloody stigma that in the eyes of the world remain attached to the DK.

Prodded by Beijing's concern over the new ASEAN pressure policies the DK regime had little choice but to comply formally with ASEAN demands for a unity conference among the Kampuchean factions. For Sihanouk and his FUNCINPEC-Moulinaka, an ASEAN-endorsed unity conference would be a long stride toward regaining stature as Cambodia's quintessential political leader. Even so, however, the Prince's previous denunciations of the DK, and his known antagonism toward Son Sann's followers, offered little hope that such a conference could have long-term success. Son Sann, initially, proved even more reluctant: only a threat by his Thai military and other supporters that arms and supplies would be withheld from the KPNLF units along the Thai-Kampuchean border persuaded him to agree to meet with the DK and Sihanouk.

The result was predictable. The communique issued by Khieu Sampan (representing the DK), Son Sann, and Sihanouk on September 4, 1981, at the close of their brief two-day ASEAN-sponsored meeting in Singapore is among the more remarkable documents of the recent diplomacy on

the Kampuchean crisis, revealing not least for the depth of animosity in the domestic Kampuchean factionalism. Instead of agreeing to form any common front, coalition government, or alliance of any kind, the three conference participants decided merely to "express the desire" to do so. A lower level committee would be entrusted with the difficult task of implementation. It also was agreed that the political and armed forces of the conference participants would avoid any display of public disagreement between themselves.[28] Within 24 hours after the close of the conference, however, Sihanouk was already reported to have expressed his reluctance at having attended any meeting with what he termed "those warmongering" DK and KPNLF leaders.[29] And in subsequent weeks, there were to be frequent complaints by all parties of improper conduct by the other factions. For example, a Khmer Rouge army "political commissar," one Ny Kon, in late November, 1981, charged that Sihanouk was spending too much time abroad, and that Son Sann was involved in black market operations along the Thai border - therefore neither was qualified to head any anti-Vietnamese front.[30]

To be sure, and again under ASEAN pressure, representatives of the DK, the KPNLF, and the FUNCINPEC-Moulinaka in conformity with the decision of the Singapore conference began meeting in Bangkok. But, largely because of DK insistence on preserving a controlling role in any coalition regime as well as the name "Democratic Kampuchea" for it, Son Sann by the end of October 1981, announced he was unwilling to participate personally in such a coalition and to continue further negotiations. It was clear that there was a serious deadlock. A subsequent Singapore compromise suggestion, to have the three parties form a "loose" federation, retaining as much organisational autonomy as possible, ultimately was rejected by the DK. The DK insisted on a so-called "tight" alliance under "Democratic Kampuchea" name, and with de facto subordination of the KPNLF and Sihanoukists, as being the sine qua non for forming an effective anti-Vietnamese resistance government.[31] Son Sann repeatedly stressed, as e.g. again in a February, 1982, press interview, that he did not intend to become a "puppet" of the Khmer Rouge.[32]

But Sihanouk seemed more conciliatory. On February 21, 1982, the Prince announced that after a meeting in Beijing with DK President Khieu Sampan an agreement had been reached on the nature of the future alliance. According to

this agreement, "if one day" a tripartite coalition were to be formed, it would be "in the legal framework of Democratic Kampuchea," have a "minimum political program" in common, and would operate under "common rules," although the participating factions could retain their ideological freedom. [33] It appeared that Sihanouk, in effect, had given in to the DK's insistence on its own paramountcy in any future alliance government. The quid pro quo was announced two days later by the Prince himself: Beijing had agreed, Sihanouk announced on February 23, 1982, in the Chinese capital, to supply the 3,000-man FUNCINPEC-Moulinaka force with modern infantry weapons. [34]

ASEAN was less pleased with this arrangement: for Beijing and the DK appeared to have won over one of the two factions, i.e. Sihanouk's, in a way that could only strengthen the Chinese and DK monopoly on the anti-Vietnamese resistance movement in Kampuchea. As we have seen, particularly since the July, 1981, New York conference, ASEAN redoubled its efforts to make certain that a settlement of the Kampuchean question should not come at the expense of advancing Beijing's power in the Southeast Asian region. Quiet expressions to the Prince of ASEAN concern very shortly produced a new meeting between Sihanouk and Sampan in Beijing, presumably to clarify the results of their earlier agreement. This time Sampan and Sihanouk agreed to "observe the principle of tripartitism," giving assurances that in any coalition no side should "annex" or "dominate over other sides." [35] Sihanouk, meanwhile, emphasized that in his view there could be no effective coalition government without Son Sann's active and personal participation.

But the KPNLF leader, seeking new support from the Cambodian exile community in France, appeared in no hurry to make yet another effort at "tripartite" cooperation. A Thai press reported in mid-March, 1982, that Beijing was angered by Son Sann's allegedly "dilly-dallying tactics" and had decided to halt its military aid to the KPNLF, was denied by the Chinese. [36] The KPNLF's aid sources are Thai rather than Chinese, in any case.

By the spring of 1982 it was becoming evident that both Sihanouk's and Son Sann's followers were taking the position that if ASEAN, People's China, or for that matter the US, desired a meaningful, "tripartite" anti-Vietnamese alliance it could only be if the three main Kampuchean factions each proceeded from a position of strength, so that the DK would not be able to dominate automatically any future coal-

tion. ASEAN, as an organisation, has been unwilling to supply arms either to the Sihanoukists or the KPNLF, though, on occasion, Singapore officials have voiced their readiness to do so. Son Sann's repeated pleas to the US to give him weapons and direct aid have fallen on deaf ears in the American State Department. Indeed, the American position gives little hope that Kampuchean factionalism is likely to be solved soon, though U.S. officials never weary of stressing the danger to the region caused by the SRV invasion of Cambodia. In early January, 1982, the Reagan Administration, through US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John Holdridge, reiterated his government's position that it is not willing to provide more than "political and moral support" to anti-Vietnamese Kampuchians.[37] Holdridge added that what ASEAN chose to do in the matter was entirely its affair. In his remarks, Holdridge also clearly reflected the Reagan administration's preoccupation with the supportive role of People's China in the US' own confrontation of the USSR. "We see a strategic advantage in maintaining and if possible strengthening" the US' "strategic relationship" with China, Holdridge said, particularly as the Soviet Union was expanding its military power at a "very marked rate."

Playing an independent role in the Kampuchean crisis, e.g. by building up Sihanouk's or Son Sann's organisation, might well aggravate Washington's relations with Beijing, already strained over the Taiwan issue. US policy in the Kampuchean question, therefore, is essentially to let ASEAN and People's China take the lead, but also, where appropriate, as in the case of the previously mentioned July, 1981 New York conference, support Beijing in any policy rift with ASEAN. Yet, overtly, Washington also has kept on praising ASEAN's diplomatic initiatives to resolve the crisis, even though, as we have seen, there are growing doubts within ASEAN that its interests and those of China's necessarily coincide.

As for uniting the Kampuchean factions, the US is prepared for the long haul. In effect, the Reagan administration is endorsing a policy of delay, which will give the DK and Beijing constantly the opportunity to demonstrate that in any anti-Vietnamese coalition the Khmer Rouge must be dominant. Washington keeps denouncing the odious nature of Pol Pot's regime. But the practical effect of American policy which, in the words of Holdridge, takes into account that "the development of the non-Communist Khmer resis-

tance groups will be a long process which will require patience,"[38] is to perpetuate the primacy of the DK, Pol Pot, and their Chinese patron in the current anti-Vietnamese configuration. This may not be what the US intends. But events, particularly since the July, 1981, New York conference, leave little room for an alternative interpretation.

Moreover, the DK insistence that it alone be permitted to determine the legal and political framework of the anti-Vietnamese resistance, is likely to impel the other major factions to exact an ever higher price (in terms of arms and guarantees of "autonomy" in a united front) for their participation, thereby further imperiling whatever format or future a coalition might have. Growing perception in ASEAN of People's China as the "greater danger" in the region must also inevitably affect the willingness of Sihanoukists and KPNLF to join with the DK.

Toward the close of March, 1982, well after the Sihanouk-Sampan conference in Beijing, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, in a Dutch press interview, was asked if there were "certain divisions" within ASEAN with respect to the perception of People's China and the SRV. Mochtar replied that "We all see China as a threat: the variation is in the view of Vietnam." The latter was not considered an "immediate" danger, he said, because "they are stuck fast in Kampuchea and they are not a rich country." [39] That an Indonesian spokesman should be saying this sort of thing these days causes less of a surprise than that a similar view also now appears to be gaining in the Prem Tinsulanond government in Thailand. As ASEAN's so-called "frontline" state - i.e. the state not only most directly exposed to Vietnamese expansionism in the region, but also closest to the operational theatre of the anti-Vietnamese Kampuchean factions the Bangkok government has valued repeated Chinese assurances in the past that Beijing would not hesitate to come to the Thais' assistance in the event of a Vietnamese invasion or major attack. But by early 1982, as the effects of Chinese-DK intransigence in the Kampuchean question became ever clearer, uncertainty began to grow in Prem's cabinet over Chinese policy. Thai opinion now seems to vacillate between a tendency toward "disengagement," i.e. letting the quarrelling Kampuchean factions work out their own problems among themselves without the active ASEAN initiatives that characterized the past, and the position taken, among others by Thai Supreme

Commander General Sayud Kerdphol, that Thailand would do well to put some political and diplomatic distance between itself and Beijing.[40]

A too abrupt Thai policy change would be unthinkable. And, for good measure, Sayud has also been harping on the danger presented by Vietnam as the Soviets' "proxy" in the region. The latter argument appears to be a lever with which to seek more US military aid for Thailand (currently running at about \$ 90 million per annum in preferential arms sales and direct grants).[41] But after the fiasco of the "tripartite" Bangkok talks, and the Sampan-Sihanouk discussions, there is need for a new momentum if a meaningful coalition of anti-Vietnamese factions in Kampuchea is ever to be formed - and ASEAN seems weary of trying.

As for China, few now place much confidence in its assurances of flexibility to the Kampuchean factions - unless one is prepared to accept the proposition that Beijing has no influence over the DK's policies. In early February, 1981, for example, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang had voiced open support for Sihanouk or Son Sann to lead a united front anti-Vietnamese movement in Cambodia.[42] Indeed, in August, 1981, when Chinese tactics at the New York conference in preserving DK preeminence already had been abundantly demonstrated, Zhao Ziyang still was saying during a Singapore visit that (1) China was prepared to accept "any government - even a non-socialist one chosen by the Kampuchean people under UN supervised elections," and (2) that China had "no intention" on installing a regime in Kampuchea that would be obligated to or dominated by Beijing.[43] Considering the DK's position at the September, 1981 Singapore talks, and the subsequent failure of the Bangkok "tripartite" discussions, it is difficult to accept the above-cited Chinese assertions, unless one is convinced that in such a critical matter as this the DK leadership is free to follow its own policies.

Moreover, the Chinese have made it plain that the Kampuchean question is but one aspect of a whole pattern of conflict with the Vietnamese. This conflict pattern includes longstanding boundary disputes, allegedly "wanton persecution" of Chinese residents by the SRV government, and generally, a Vietnamese compliance with Soviet policies of "global hegemony," also in Southeast Asia.[44] Given the complexity of this pattern of Sino-Vietnamese conflict, the situation in Kampuchea becomes but one among several tac-

tical levers used by the Chinese in their long confrontation of the Soviet Union.

As ASEAN spokesmen from time to time have charged, Beijing seems intent on "bleeding Vietnam white" through the SRV's ever more costly involvement in Kampuchea.[45] But the "bleeding" process also affects the Soviet Union, which must shore up the SRV's weakened political economy. In short, and considering its antagonism toward the USSR, People's China has more to gain from keeping the conflict going in Kampuchea, than in finding a formula with which to end it. Certainly a formula which would weaken its client, the DK, through a possible "tripartite" alliance, would have little attraction for the Chinese, who, at relatively little cost to themselves, are drawing the Soviets deeper into a new Indochina quagmire. For this reason, as much as because of the disputatious nature of the respective Kampuchean factional leaderships themselves, the likelihood of an effective anti-Vietnamese coalition ever being formed seems remote - whatever vague rhetorical formulations one may on occasion hear, such as those at the Sampan-Sihanouk discussions in Beijing in February, 1982.

It seems to be China's and the DK's diplomatic tactic, meanwhile, to keep on giving enough encouragement to ASEAN so that efforts will continue to maintain the Sampan regime at least for the time being as the legitimate occupant of Cambodia's UN seat and its general standing in the world community. Such encouragement, thus far, has revolved around a prospective "third force" or alternative "tripartite" regime. Yet, every time that discussions begin to focus on the exact structure and policies of such an alternative regime, DK insistence that its legality be respected by other factions, and that the latter, in effect, merge with the DK in a genuine unity proved a major obstacle to agreement.

No exception to this was the June 22, 1982 Kuala Lumpur agreement among Sihanouk, Sann, and Sampan to form a loosely structured coalition government against the Heng Samrin regime and the Vietnamese. The coalition formally retains the name of "Democratic Kampuchea." Consensus in all decisions is required, and it was agreed that, in any case, "the present state of Democratic Kampuchea" would have the right to "resume its activities" as the "only legal and legitimate government of Kampuchea", including in the United Nations. Achieved only after great ASEAN-US pressure on Son Sann to mitigate his opposition to the DK, and

after Malaysian and Indonesian spokesmen indicated that they might not be willing to support the Sampan-Pot regime further in the UN unless Beijing persuaded its DK ally to agree to some sort of coalition, the Kuala Lumpur agreement seems mainly designed to safeguard the DK's UN seat for another year. In any case, even if the new coalition falls apart - which seems likely - Beijing will persist in its aid for the DK and continue its policy of "bleeding white" Vietnam and its Indochinese allies. A real solution to the Kampuchean problem just does not seem to be a matter of priority for the Chinese.

Comparatively, therefore, the USSR and its Indochinese allies increasingly may find themselves in the more difficult diplomatic and strategic position. To Moscow, at any rate, the SRV invasion and occupation of Kampuchea are legal, and in compliance with the wishes of the Cambodians as represented, by the Phnom Penh government of Heng Samrin. According to the Soviets, "the January, 1979 revolution" (i.e. the Vietnamese invasion) "swept away the Pol Pot regime," and Heng Samrin's government "is the lawful government of the people and is fully in control of the country." [46] The crux of the Kampuchean crisis lies in the aspirations for control over Southeast Asia by the "imperialists and Chinese hegemonists," who, in their machinations, also "seek to draw" the ASEAN countries into their schemes. So considered the Kampuchean struggle is but a part of the broader Chinese and imperialist effort to establish "a bridgehead for their expansionist ambitions in other parts of the world," including the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the rest of the Middle East. [47] Moscow, like Hanoi, dismisses the various anti-Vietnamese factions in Kampuchea as having no legal status and as doing the work of the odious Pol Pot, "the puppet of Beijing."

The Soviets also support the Vietnamese policy to establish direct or "regional" discussions between Hanoi and the ASEAN countries, over the Kampuchean crisis. This would have the effect of (1) drawing the problem out of the international (e.g. United Nations) arena, and (2) compelling ASEAN in effect to negotiate with Heng Samrin's representatives, thereby conferring de facto legitimacy on them. ASEAN consistently has refused these Soviet-backed Vietnamese overtures in the past three years. But according to Moscow it is China, again, which "is constantly striving to hinder moves toward dialogue between the ASEAN countries and the countries of Indochina." Still, Moscow, like Hanoi, perceives that today ASEAN is becoming more skeptical of

Chinese policy, and is moving toward "dialogue and peaceful coexistence with our countries." [48]

This position is also being echoed by Hanoi's Indochinese allies. In February, 1982, after the U.S. had donated medical supplies to Laos, the LPDR Minister of Information Sisana Sisane declared that "the US policy in Southeast Asia is not identical with that of the Chinese." He went on to say that in his view the U.S. was concerned lest People's China became too influential in Southeast Asia. For that reason the Americans believe it was necessary to establish contact with "the Communists in Indochina," because, said Sisane, "otherwise there may be bad consequences not only in Indochina but also in ASEAN." [49]

Despite the continuing tensions in U.S.-Indochinese relations since the Communists seized control of Saigon in 1975, [50] Washington has maintained its embassy in Vientiane. Even though Reagan administration officials vehemently reject the notion of "normalizing" diplomatic relations with Hanoi so long as the Vietnamese occupy Kampuchea, the American position is evidently not so rigid as to exclude relations with the LPDR. This is the more remarkable, since, proportionately, the Vietnamese military presence of 60,000 troops, and additional hundreds of Vietnamese civilian officials and party cadres in Laos, is as large as that in Kampuchea today.

Reluctantly, but inexorably, ASEAN is moving toward a realization that a "third alternative" strategy (even if the "third alternative" includes the DK as well) is unlikely to be productive, i.e. either in changing Hanoi's policy of seeking to retain its influence in Kampuchea, or in changing People's China's commitment to keep its proxy, the Sampan-Pot regime, alive. In a perceptive essay on Cambodia in this journal (ASIEN, April 1982, pp.23-48) Rudolf G. Adam has indicated that the anti-Vietnamese factions in Cambodia are too sharply divided to be able to create an effective and stable coalition government. As Adam has noted, the DK, at the most, has been interested in a "cosmetic change" in its political appearance in order to win broader international support. The accuracy of Adam's observation has not been vitiated by the earlier mentioned June 22, 1982 Kuala Lumpur agreement establishing a loosely structured alliance government among the DK, Sihanouk's Moulinaka-FUNCINPEC, and Son Sann's KPNLF. There is every indication that this coalition is little more than a temporary, diplomatic ploy, engineered by ASEAN and the US, with the

reluctant concurrence of Beijing, for the purpose of continuing pressure on Hanoi and its military presence in Cambodia.

The animosities between Sihanouk, Sann, and the DK leaders, certainly do not appear to have lessened. Reportedly, only "intense pressure" on Son Sann by his Thai backers induced him to accept the new coalition.[51] Sihanouk, the new President of the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, termed his decision to join the Khmer Rouge "agonising", impelled solely by a desire to rid Cambodia of "the Vietnamese cholera and the Soviet cancer".[52] Over the strong objections of both Sihanouk and Sann, DK political veterans, like former foreign minister Ieng Sary and defense chief Son Sen, were included in the Economic-Finance and Defense Committees, respectively, of the new coalition government. The Committees serve as a kind of cabinet. DK head of state Kieu Sampan will be the new coalition regime's Vice-President in charge of foreign affairs, and Sann, for the moment has accepted the largely ineffectual post of premier. The net effect of the distribution of powers in the new coalition government is to give de facto control over foreign relations to the DK, while the DK's military force, being the largest, also sets the thrust of the coalition's new military and security policies. The Kuala Lumpur agreement's specific right given to the DK that it can withdraw, and retain its exclusive legitimacy, is further indication of how little confidence the coalition partners have in each other.

Especially in Indonesia, ASEAN's largest state and its political pace-setter, there is little confidence that the new coalition will work. In Djakarta (and to lesser degree in Malaysian and Singaporean circles as well) conviction grows that sooner or later the ASEAN countries will have to intensify, or become more public about, their direct bilateral efforts to reach a rapprochement with Hanoi. Especially in Djakarta there was dismay over the controversy that erupted during the July 19-20, 1982 Singapore visit of Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. A Singapore charge that Thach had issued a "veiled threat" to assist Communist guerrillas in ASEAN countries if ASEAN continued its present anti-Vietnamese policy in Cambodia was denied by Thach. The controversy particularly troubled Indonesian quarters concerned to work out a diplomatic rapprochement with Hanoi, in which Vietnamese security influence in Cambodia is recognised in return for a new, "Finlandized" (but as autonomous as possible) Kampuchean government, perhaps one

headed again by the redoubtable Sihanouk. This, in short, would be a kind of return to the status quo in Cambodia ante 1970. To Indonesia, at any rate, the Hanoi announcement in mid-July, 1982 that it is withdrawing some of its troops from Kampuchea should not be dismissed out of hand. In Bangkok, however, ASEAN's "frontline" state, fear of future Vietnamese encroachment continues high. In persuading its ASEAN allies that a new policy departure toward Vietnam is inevitable, the Indonesians will have their most difficult time in the Thai capital.

Ever concerned over the long term modernization of China and its strategic effect on Southeast Asia, leading Indonesian and Malaysian military, political, and economic circles believe the time is fast running out in which agreement with Vietnam must be found, and the Hanoi regime itself be put on the road toward its own sustained economic growth so that it can become an effective future buffer state between China and the rest of Southeast Asia. The conflicts and longstanding animosities among the various Kampuchean factions are likely to be pushed aside as ASEAN, in the interests of its own emerging regional realpolitik, develops its own strategic and security priorities toward Vietnam as well as toward China and the other Superpowers.

Footnotes

- 1 Radio Phnom Penh, domestic service in Cambodian, December 4, 1981 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports, hereafter FBIS, December 7, 1981).
- 2 Agence France Presse despatch, Hanoi, December 8, 1981 (FBIS, December 9, 1981), Far Eastern Economic Review, December 18, 1981, p.16.
- 3 The Asia Record, March, 1982, p.4.
- 4 Justus M. van der Kroef, "Cambodia: From 'Democratic Kampuchea' to 'People's Republic,'" Asian Survey, August, 1979, pp.731-750.
- 5 William Shawcross in The Straits Times (Singapore), September 15, 1981-
- 6 The Straits Times, December 24, 1981.
- 7 VNA despatch, Hanoi, March 27, 1982 (FBIS, March 30, 1982).

- 8 The New York Times, December 28, 1981 and April 4, 1982.
- 9 On these Cambodian-Vietnamese differences see esp. Stephen P. Heder, "The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conflict," pp.158-186 in K.S. Sandhu, ed., Southeast Asian Affairs 1979 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1980).
- 10 Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Indochina Tangle: The Elements of Conflict and Compromise," Asian Survey, May, 1980, pp.477-494.
- 11 The Straits Times, December 24, 1981.
- 12 The New York Times, April 22, 1981; Far Eastern Economic Review, June 5, 1981, p.24; Pen Sovan, "Defend and Build the New Kampuchea," World Marxist Review, (UK edition), November, 1981, pp.14-21.
- 13 Asiaweek (Hongkong), March 5, 1982, p.14.
- 14 Agence France Presse despatch, Paris, March 25, 1982 (FBIS, March 26, 1982). In turn Sihanouk has criticized Son Sann for conducting a guerilla campaign from Thailand, "where he can be filmed by television cameras," adding that some 5,000 Sihanoukist guerillas were fighting the Vietnamese in Kampuchea. (Agence France Presse despatch, Paris, February 13, 1980; FBIS, February 14, 1980).
- 15 For an informative analysis of the Son Sann-Sihanouk rivalry see Roger Kershaw, "The Cambodian Non-Communist Opposition in the Present Impasse: A Diagnosis and a Proposal," Asian Profile, December, 1981, pp.509-525.
- 16 Nation Review (Bangkok), October 15, 1981.
- 17 The Bangkok Post, October 18, 1981 and The New York Times, October 19, 1981.
- 18 Justus M. van der Kroef, "Cambodia: A 'Third Alternative'?" Asian Affairs (New York), November-December, 1979, pp.105-116.
- 19 The Straits Times, June 19, 1981; see also the Manila conference communique in Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, June 18, 1981 (FBIS, June 18, 1981, and the remarks of Malaysian Foreign Minister Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen in Agence France despatch, Kuala Lumpur, July 8, 1981 (FBIS, July 9, 1981).

- 20 South China Morning Post (Hongkong), July 8, 1981.
- 21 New Nation (Singapore), July 16, 1981, and The Straits Times/July 17, 1981.
- 22 For U.S. support for People's China at the New York conference see, e.g. Bernard Nossiter in The New York Times, July 18 and September 20, 1981.
- 23 New Nation, July 14, 1981, and The Straits Times, July 17 and 18, 1981.
- 24 Asiaweek, September 4, 1981, p.14, and Far Eastern Economic Review, August 21, 1981, p.13.
- 25 Justus M. van der Kroef, "Normalizing Relations With the People's Republic of China: Indonesia's Rituals of Ambiguity," Contemporary Southeast Asia, December, 1981, pp.187-218.
- 26 Interview with Le Figaro (Paris), March 12, 1981 (FBIS, March 16, 1981).
- 27 See, e.g., the comments of Malaysian Foreign Minister Tan Sri Ghazali, as reported by Radio Kuala Lumpur, August, 15, 1981 (FBIS, August 18, 1981).
- 28 Agence France Presse despatch, Hongkong, September 4, 1981 (FBIS, September 4, 1981).
- 29 Agence France Presse despatch, Hongkong, September 5, 1981 (FBIS, September 15, 1981).
- 30 The Straits Times, December 21, 1981.
- 31 On the DK position see esp. the DK Information Ministry communique on the Bangkok "tripartite" discussions, in Voice of Democratic Kampuchea broadcast, October 13, 1981 (FBIS, October 16, 1981). On Son Sann see, e.g. Nation Review (Bangkok), November 2, 1981.
- 32 Asiaweek, February 5, 1982, p.15.
- 33 Xinhua despatch, Beijing, February 21, 1982 (FBIS, February 22, 1982).
- 34 The Asia Record, March, 1982, p.1.
- 35 The Beijing Review, March 8, 1982, p.13.
- 36 Nation Review (Bangkok), March 13, 1982 and Agence France Presse despatch, Beijing, March 15, 1982 (FBIS, March 15, 1982).
- 37 The Straits Times, January 8, 1982.

- 38 "Recent Developments in Indochina," Current Policy (U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., October 22, 1981), no.334, p.2.
- 39 Interview in NRC Handelsblad (Rotterdam), March 8, 1982 (FBIS, March 24, 1982).
- 40 Far Eastern Economic Review, March 19, 1982, p.14.
- 41 The Straits Times, January 8, 1982.
- 42 Ibid., February 2, 1981.
- 43 Ibid., August 12, 1981.
- 44 Zhou Guo, ed., China and the World ("Beijing Review," Foreign Affairs Series, Beijing, 1982), pp.105-118.
- 45 See, e.g., the remarks of Malaysian Foreign Affairs Minister, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, at the Commonwealth Conference in Melbourne, October 6, 1981, in Malaysian Digest (Kuala Lumpur), October 31, 1982, p.2.
- 46 V. Potapov, "International Solidarity With Kampuchea," Far Eastern Affairs (Institute of the Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow), 1981, no.4, pp.125-126.
- 47 Editorial, "Peace in Asia is a Common Concern of the Continent," Far Eastern Affairs (Institute of the Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow), 1982, no.1, p.9.
- 48 B. Vasilyev in Izvestiya (Moscow), March 1, 1982 (FBIS, March 11, 1982).
- 49 Far Eastern Economic Review, March 26, 1982, p.45.
- 50 "It is the policy of this Administration that normalization of relations with Vietnam is out of the question as long as Hanoi continues to occupy Kampuchea and generally remains a menace to other countries of the region." Statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, John H. Holdridge before the U.S. House of Representatives' Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, October 22, 1981. Current Policy (U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.), no.334, October 22, 1981, p.2.
- 51 Nation Review (Bangkok), June 18, 1982.
- 52 "President Sihanouk's Government," Asiaweek (Hongkong), July 2, 1982, p.11.