

Islamization of the Ulama and their places of learning in Pakistan 1977-1984

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Introduction

The Islamization process under President General Zia ul Haq has brought about some new trends regarding the Muslim theologians (*ulama*) and their places of learning, the religious schools (*dini madaris*).

As a dependent country Pakistan has been developing its policies and implementing its development strategies in pursuance to the aspirations raised by the metropolises reflected in the demands of the worldmarket as defined by the world system theory.(1) The process of determination had started before the creation of Pakistan.

Not only was the economic and administrative set-up of British India developed on colonial perceptions but also the educational system rendering it to a 'dependent education'.(2) At the same time the traditional education as represented in the *dini madaris* was neglected by State authorities and thus became marginalized.(3) This tradition was further pursued by the rulers of Pakistan. The theologians (*Ulama*) - since the majority of them was not directly part of the strategies implemented by the representatives of metropolitan interests and demands - became more conservative and individualistic, leaving the secular functional approach to the formal education sector. The dysfunctional education of the *Ulama*, the policy-makers thought, could hardly contribute anything to their conception of national process and progress. Accordingly the *dini madaris* and the *Ulama* were considered to be outdated and outdatedness had no place in modernizing Pakistan.

However, both, the *dini madaris* as well as the formal education display particular functions in a dependent system. The *dini madaris* have been serving the purpose of absorbing a large part of the society that is not able to afford formal education. In this regard one may mention the high ratio of 'drop outs' from the formal sector going into religious schools.

Thus the marginalized sector of education fulfilled certain functions. But it also inherited a high degree of potential measures, if needed, in political as well as in economic crises.

In contemporary Pakistan these measures can be understood as part of the Islamization process under President General Zia ul Haq which itself reflects the high degree of dependence in economic as well as in normatic terms. Even if the Islamization might seem to be something very indigenous, it is reducible to symbolisms on the one hand and the

State's desire to control autochthonous and autonomous institutions on the other; both in order to trickle down its ideology.

The paper is mainly based on empirical data which will display the theorems given above. It is divided into three periods:

1. the Ayubian Era (1958-1969),
2. the Bhutto Era (1971-1977) and
3. the Zia Era (1977-?).

The measures undertaken by the previous regimes are highlighted while those of the current are dealt with at length. Accordingly, the proposals of a 'National Committee on Dini Madaris' (NCDM), the curricular developments, the equivalence of the *dini madaris* certificates with those of the formal sector of education, the *Zakat* issue and the reaction of the *Ulama* vis a vis these measures are elaborated.

It has been assumed that the *dini madaris* and the *Ulama* are realizing new functions and are displaying new developments in the wake of the massive State intervention.

However, the approaches of all the different regimes are characterized by State intervention and the tendency towards centralization and unification thus reflecting a continuity of State interests.

The Ayubian Era

The *Ulama* of Pakistan seem not to have felt the need to organize themselves and their places of learning vis a vis the Pakistani state until 1959 although a few minor attempts were made in the 1950s.

In 1959 the Government had promulgated the 'West Pakistan Waqf Property Ordinance 1959' not only to "improve the quality of Waqf properties"(4) but also to curb the *Ulama's* position and to establish Government rule over autonomous institutions. However, since there was no monolithic block of *Ulama* to face the official threat from a common platform, groups of religious scholars formed according to different schools of thought, schools that had emerged mostly in 19th century British India.(5)

In Pakistan four main organizations of *dini madaris* emerged:

- The Deobandis founded the 'Wafaq ul madaris il 'arabiyyah' in Multan in 1959,
- the Brelwis the 'Tanzim ul madaris il 'arabiyyah' in Dera Ghazi Khan in 1959 while
- the Ahle Hadith founded the 'Markazi jam'iiyyat Ahle Hadith' in Lyallpur in 1955.
- The Shia *dini madaris* came together under the 'Majlis-e nazarat-e shi'a madaris-e 'arabiyyah' in Lahore in 1958.

The Jama'at-e Islami has been organizing its religious schools since 1982 under the 'Rabitatu-l madaris il islamiyyah' with its centre in Lahore. One may assume that the incentives of the Jama'at display the politics of the *Rabitatu-l 'alam il islamiyyah*, the Muslim World League.

These newly formed organizations of the *dini madaris* have affiliations to political parties which recruit their members mostly from the students of their respective school of thought.

The main task of these organizations were to update the curricula, to organize the *dini madaris* and to unify the examination systems. All the four organizations did not succeed in enacting their demands and programmes. Rather, the failures of these *madaris* organizations show the incapability of the religious schools and the *Ulama* to tackle the 'challenges' as were felt by the Islamic avantgarde. This avantgarde is a product of colonial traditions and pursues integrationist interests, i.e. integrating the Islamic value-system into colonial stuctures. A considerable part of the *Ulama* on the other hand seem to pursue an isolationist approach rejecting the integration of colonial norms.(6) In the curricular field these developments implied that the *Ulama* had adopted the perception of their being backward, a perception being cultivated since the colonial penetration especially among the Islamic avantgarde. Analogous to the formation phase of the *dini madaris* not only the 'Auqaf Ordinance 1961' was promulgated but also a strategy elaborated to modify and to modernize the religious schools attempting to convert the *Ulama* into 'modern mullas'. This strategy was further pursued by the setting up of the "Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology" and the "Islamic Research Institute" in 1962. The intention was to make Islam compatible with the 'challenges of time'.

Regarding the reconstruction of the *dini madaris* curriculum a National Committee was set up to elaborate a new syllabus. According to the report of this committee the *Ulama* were to take "full part as citizens ..." while the task was to ... "widen the outlook of the Darul Uloom students and to increase their mental horizon". This was, however, only possible if "unnecessary non-religious subjects" were reduced from the current syllabi.(7) The secondary level (classes 6 to 12) was to be subject to i.a. Mathematics, English, Social Sciences, Modern Arabic Grammar, Modern Arabic Rethorics, more Hadith and Koran at the cost of Philosophy, Logic and certain books on Islamic Law. The highest level (*Al'la* <instead of '*ala*'>; classes 13 to 15) included Modern Philosophy, English and Hadith.

This approach implied a different notion of Islam by the bureaucracy, a notion aiming at implementing modernity and development strategies. Thus, religious education was not only confined to Koran, Hadith and Fiqh but implied the teaching of modern subjects. The underlying policies of these attempts were not only to curtail the *Ulama*'s influence through State agencies like the Auqaf Departments, but also to integrate them to a certain degree. They should modernize the nation "help(ing) the Government and the society by selling fertilizers, opening poultry farms, distributing high yield seeds to farmers" etc.(8), indicating the overall strategy of the time, that was the "Green Revolution". These strategies aimed i.a. at reaching at least 45,000 students and teachers in more then 400 *dini madaris*.

The Bhutto Era

While Ayub's approach towards the *Ulama* was a more aggressive one (9) Bhutto preferred to propagate the obscure Islamic Socialism pursuing rather a pacifying strategy towards the *maulanas* and *muftis*.

The Bhutto constitution being an outcome of mutual consensus of nearly all segments of the society gave a handsome portion of power to the *Ulama* through the 'Islamic Provisions'. Accordingly the composition of the 'Council of Islamic Ideology' (CII) was changed: While there had been very few *Ulama* in this institution during the Ayub regime their share under Bhutto increased up to 5 in relation to 8 'seculars'. In fact, the CII was to produce yearly reports of its activities and had to submit a final report after seven years of its appointment. On the basis of that report the Parliament and the Assemblies were to bring the laws of the Republic in accordance with the Shari'ah within two years. Thus Pakistan was supposed to be islamized by 1981.(10)

Regarding the religious schools, the certificates of these institutions were proposed to be recognized as equivalent to B.A. for the purpose of the *dini madaris* graduates to teach Islamic Studies and Islamic Ideology in colleges. In order to have access to other institutions and positions English was made compulsory for the young *maulanas*.(11) This compulsion, however, was rejected by the *Ulama* while the universities mostly did not appreciate the equivalence scheme.

The proposals of the CII in 1975/76 reaffirmed these suggestions: There should be total integration of the *dini madaris* with the formal system while the overall problem of lack of schools was to be tackled through the mobilization of the *dini madaris* as centres of learning. This displayed a pragmatic rather than a religious approach. By the end of the Bhutto era the Government felt the desire to revise the *dini madaris* curricula which could not materialize due to internal pressures the regime had to face. However, an attempt was made to introduce i.a. "the new scientific and economic sciences" to the Imams and Khatibs under the auspices of the Auqaf Department via the newly established *Ulama*-Academy.

Under Zia ul Haq

With the promulgation of the Islamic system by the then General Zia ul Haq the *Ulama* and the *dini madaris* underwent certain changes.

The military regime seemed to have capitalized from the fact that the 'Pakistan National Alliance' (PNA), vindicated by a considerable part of the society was demanding *nizam-e mustafa*, the Muhammadan order; hence the Islamization was proclaimed as the only way to adopt. Islamization thus being the policy for the next years to come, it was a basic requirement for the regime to bring the *Ulama* and the religious schools

in line with its policy and to secure their support as constituency of the islamizing junta. Moreover, the regime had been organizing 'Ulama- and Mashaikh-Conventions' from time to time. The CII was to be one more catalyst in this regard: In fact, the number of *Ulama* increased from five in 1974 to eight in 1977 compared with eight and six 'seculars' respectively. This tendency became even more vigorous in the composition of the CII in 1981: 11 *Ulama* vis a vis eight 'seculars'.

National Education Policy 1979 (NEP)

Just in the light of the 'National Education Conference 1977' which had stressed ideology and pragmatism as the fountainheads of the education policies, the NEP and 'Implementation Programme 1979' stated to be "recognizing the great potentials of our indigenous institutions and patronizing them". Once more integrative steps were proposed by the State functionaries and a whole chapter was dedicated to the *dini madaris* system. Realizing that the religious schools "are doing all this (i.e. free education, boarding and lodging) on self-financing basis by raising donations and through other measures without costing anything to the national exchequer" the concerned policy makers set up a five years' budget for the *dini madaris*, heavily underestimating the financial needs of these religious institutions representing only 9% of the *madaris*' income in 1979.

The 'National Committee on Dini Madaris' and its aftermath

Consequently a committee was set up in order to conduct a survey. Its proposals once more aimed at bringing the "madrassahs in consonance with the requirements of modern age on the one hand and the basic tenets and spirit of Islam on the other"(12) implying a different notion of Islam and what ought to be taught in the religious institutions.

Accordingly a modernized curriculum was produced granting at least one third of the teaching time to modern subjects and enlarging the time frame. The modern subjects were Islamic History, General Science, Economics, Political Sciences, Comparative Religion, Urdu, Persian while the books for most of the new subjects were to be prescribed by the Department of Education (see also Appendix: Different Curricula).

Concerning the administrative set-up a 'National Organization of Dini Madaris' was proposed which was partially to be supervised by the Government while financially the *dini madaris* were to be sponsored by the Central Government and the Auqaf Departments. However, it was stated clearly that the Government had no intention to intervene in the internal affairs of the *dini madaris*.(13)

This approach meant not only to unify the *dini madaris* and to streamline them with the concept of 'basic needs' but was also to produce material desires among the *Ulama* and their disciples.(14) These material desires were to be fulfilled through 'Islamic technics' like the implementation of the *Zakat* system (Islamic taxes; a divine duty).

The Islam propagated by the State - the official or State Islam - has always had the tendency to curb autonomous and autochthonous developments. As can be seen from the conception of State-Islam stated above, it is quite different from that being prevalent at the grass-roots level, be it the Tariqah-Islam as represented by the vast majority of Pakistanis or be it the Shari'ah-Islam as represented by the religious authorities, the *fuqaha* and *ulama*. In order to stabilize the power of the State and its defenders and thus to cement the status quo the official Islam - in contrast to Shari'ah- and Tariqah-Islam - is used in a way to overrun all autonomous movements.

The need for reform (*islah*) was felt by different segments of the society, except a part of the *Ulama* from the Deobandi school of thought (the Shia will not be considered here). They rejected the proposals of the 'National Committee on Dini Madaris' by launching a nation-wide campaign calling the Government 'secular' (*la dini*); lit. without religion) and expressing their fear of becoming its toys and thus be controlled and subjected. The campaign succeeded partially because of a well planned organization of the 'Wafaq ul Madaris il 'arabiyah' having an elaborate network of religious schools.

Tab.1: Maslak-wise Dini Madaris and their affiliations in Pakistan

	1960	1971	1979	1983/84	Jan.1984
Deobandi	233	292	354(158)	(945)	(1097)
Brelwi	98	123	267(189)	(557)	
Ahle Hadith	55	47	126 (67)	(56)	(76)
Shia	18	15	41 (16)	(116)	
Jamat'at-e Islami	(13)	(41)	(57)	(107)	
not available	55	390	900		

(Figures in parantheses display the affiliated *dini madaris* only.)

Sources: Ahmad I p.705-708; Ahmad II pp.691; Halepota Report pp.194-197; different lists and registers of the respective schools of thought as well as personal talks in Jan./Feb.1986 in Lahore and Multan with the concerned authorities.

Table 1 indicates the popularity of the different schools of thought (popularity is quantified according to the numbers of *dini madaris*). The Deobandi school of thought is the most popular in Pakistan followed by the Brelwi and the Ahle Hadith. These are followed by the Shia and the Jama'at-e Islami madaris. All schools of thought except the Deobandis manifest their concentration in the Punjab and display very little dissemination through *dini madaris* in other provinces, at least upto 1979.

Besides this elaborate network there is the possibility of influencing through family ties: It is argued that the main *dini madaris* that led the campaign are the property of one or two families being descendants of the famous Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi. Finally the campaign received momentum by the non-conformist approach of Mufti Mahmud, the leader of the PNA against Bhutto and the president of the 'Wafaq ul Madaris'. Accordingly the 'Draft Ordinance' for the *dini madaris*, elaborated by the concerned Ministry and resembling very much the Ordinance of the Islamic University 1980 had to be given up.

Equivalence and Curricula

With the new announcement of the equivalence of the *dini madaris* certificates with the formal schools certificates in 1982 a new dimension emerged. This equivalence was to be granted only if the *dini madaris* were to produce a 16-years-curriculum with a considerable part of 'modern subjects'(15), just in conformity with the demands of the Halepota Report. The Wafaq as well as the Brelwi Tanzim produced modified syllabi, nevertheless not changing much of their subjects. Both schools of thought were able to stretch their curricula from 8 to 9 years to 16 years thus claiming the entitlement of equivalence (subjects like Diniyat, Urdu and Persian were prerequisites for the Dars-e Nizami anyway (compare Appendix: Different Curricula)).(16) Once more the *dini madaris* organizations succeeded in preserving parts of their autonomy at least for the time being.

As can be seen from Table 1 the number of affiliated *dini madaris* of each school of thought increased considerably during the last years. This is due to the equivalence of the *dini madaris* certificates on the one hand and the financial support through the *Zakat* system on the other. In fact, the affiliation is being undertaken with the view towards being recognized by official norms. An interesting development, however, is - what can be called a formative phase - among the different *dini madaris* and the Wafaq/Tanzims as can be seen from Table 1; the Deobandis have been able to disseminate their cause even in other provinces, especially in Sindh. Similar tendencies can be disclosed for some other schools of thought. While the majority of the Brelwis and the Ahle Hadith is still confined to the Punjab the Shia have been developing the Northern Areas to be their stronghold. The Jama'at-e Islami on the other hand have preferred to propagate their cause in the North West Frontier Province.

With the equivalence scheme we not only witness a sharp increase in the number of *dini madaris* but also in the number of graduates which has been spectacular. While the production of *Ulama* was 5,611 during 1960 to 1980 it increased during 1981 to 1985 to 6,230 (see: The boom of graduates).

These developments imply a considerable potential and mobility among the *dini madaris* and their leaders, in fact of all schools of thought. However, they have been developing this eagerness of dissemi-

nation and institutionalization only in reaction to the attempts of intervention made by the State, that is to say that the motivational incentive was produced by the officials. Moreover, one may see a tendency towards regionalization among different schools of thought and thus a concentration of different Islams in different regions.

Zakat

The main measure introduced by the Government was, however, the *Zakat* system that was implemented in 1980 and which brought about a considerable change in the financial matters and pattern of the *dini madaris*. The 'Zakat and Ushr Ordinance 1980' (ZUO) once more is an example for a religious matter elaborated upon not by religious scholars but basically by a secular body and implemented in its most pragmatic form. The ZUO had been a target of severe criticism, both from the *Ulama* as well as from the 'seculars'. However, in order to pacify the theologians - who, however, mostly considered and still consider the ZUO not to be in accordance with *Shari'ah* - a *Zakat* scheme was installed according to which a considerable part of the society was to benefit, i.a. the *Ulama* and their disciples. In accordance with the pattern of disbursement prescribed by the 'Central Zakat Administration' (CZA) the 'Provincial Zakat Administrations' (PZAs) have to disburse with a fixed scheme providing i.a. 10% for the *dini madaris* and their students annually from the 'Provincial Zakat Funds' (PZ Funds). But in the years 1980-84 merely 98,303,700 Rupees were transferred to the *dini madaris* representing 3.5% of the total *Zakat* money disbursed. The following year, however 9.4% was transferred to the *dini madaris* alone. This meant a remarkable increase in the money disbursed to the *Ulama* and their students.

Zakat money is the right of the poor and as such had to be disbursed accordingly. Thus it should be assumed that *Zakat* from the PZ Funds was to be disbursed among those *dini madaris* which have low incomes and could not look after their students properly. One main finding of the Halepota Report was that the *dini madaris* had lower incomes than expenditures. Accordingly, it was one of the main demands of the 'Committee on Dini Madaris' to support the *dini madaris* financially. The policy-makers, however, tended to sponsor the 'prominent' *madaris* and their students. In fact, those receiving *Zakat* at least during the first disbursements were well established *dini madaris* and hence had considerable budgets.(17)

The start of disbursement was made by giving *Zakat* to 825 *dini madaris* through PZAs making only 47% of the 1,745 *dini madaris* surveyed in the Report of 1979. In the subsequent years we see a steady increase of *dini madaris* as well as beneficiaries except in 1983/84. The number of 825 *dini madaris* increased to 1,373 *dini madaris* in 1982/83 and reached 2,273 in 1984/85, a nearly three fold increase. Simultaneously, the number of benefitting students increased from 67,201 in the

first year to 11,050 in 1984/85 implying that nearly twice as many students benefitted in 1984/85.(18)

In order to benefit from the *Zakat* scheme the *dini madaris* have to be registered and hence are subject to scrutiny. This scrutiny also implies an exposure of the privacy and autonomy of the *dini madaris*, a fact that produced problems as we will see later.

A 'PZ Ulama Committee', consisting of *Ulama* of different schools of thought on equal members - at least in Punjab - looks after the *dini madaris* affairs. This committee has framed a scheme according to which the *dini madaris* were to be sponsored. The first scheme which only provided funds ranging from 10,000 Rupees to 20,000 Rupees annually/*dini madaris* was too limited to bring about a change in the *dini madaris* pattern and was therefore enhanced. While the first scheme had categorised the *dini madaris* into three levels, the scheme of 1981/82 provided ten categories, ranging from 15,000 Rs to 70,000 Rs annually/*dini madaris*. Moreover, the criteria to receive a certain *Zakat* amount were no more confined to the number of students only but were enlarged to the curricula also. Now the first three categories of *dini madaris* had to offer the highest standards of learning (*daurah hadith*; since the equivalence scheme this stage is equal to M.A.). These three categories are followed by two 'secondary' categories (*mauquf 'alaiyyah*; now equal to B.A.) and two *dars-e nizami* categories (the classical religious course in the subcontinent, usually six years of study). These seven categories are followed by three categories of memorization and reading of the holy Koran (*hifz* and *nazirah*). The scheme in 1982/83 enhanced the funds for the *dini madaris* reaching its peak in 1983/84: now the highest amount for those institutions having more than 200 boarders and offering *daurah hadith* as well as *dars-e nizami* and spending more than 300,000 Rupees on construction costs annually received 300,000 Rupees from the PZ Council. This amount meant an increase of 300% for the higher levels during the years 1981-84 while the middle categories (secondary = *mauquf*) display a somewhat modest increase. The categories from *mauquf* downwards to the tenth category (*hifz* and *nazirah*) however suffer from a policy neglecting them. In fact, we witness relatively little increase in these categories ranging from 33% to 50% during the same period.(19) This implies a particular policy towards the *dini madaris* displaying the intention to support the larger *dini madaris* which are mainly to be found in urbanized areas at the cost of smaller ones which are prevalent in rural areas. Notwithstanding the increase of the number of beneficiaries - which is primarily because of the tremendous increase of small and new established *maktabs* (small *dini madaris*) - there seems to be further urban hegemony at the cost of what is called "ruralization of education".

It has been estimated that the *Zakat* being disbursed by the Government among the *dini madaris* bears a significant impact. The overall increase in the budgets of the *dini madaris* is mainly because of the *Zakat* money pouring in from the PZ Councils. Admittedly, there are

some differences among the *dini madaris* concerning *Zakat* share in their budgets. It can, however, roughly be said that this share amounts to one third of the total income of a *madrasah* per year. At the same time the PZA's donations are equal to 50% of the traditional *Zakat* income received by *dini madaris* through private channels. The PZ Fund amount has been increasing steadily - as we have seen - thus bearing a momentum of dependence. However, at the same time, it is calculated that the traditional sources of income for the *dini madaris* were not affected by the ZUO. The reluctance of the CZA towards smaller *dini madaris* poses the question as to how indigenously institutions can eradicate illiteracy if they are not sponsored properly. The decline of *Zakat* payments to the smaller and remote *dini madaris* was probably to stop the 'mushroom-growth' of the *dini madaris* (see also: Equivalence and Curricula).

Mushroom-growth

Table 2 shows the tremendous increase of the *dini madaris* in Punjab from 1974 to 1985 (other provinces display similar tendencies).

Tab.2: Registered institutions in Punjab, 1974-1985*

Year of registration	Total number of regd. institutions (abs.) (%)		dini madaris (abs.) (%)		Private Schools (abs.) (%)	
1974	117	(100)	21	(17.9)	-	-
1975	444	(100)	38	(8.6)	-	-
1978	815	(100)	175	(21.5)	17	(2.1)
1983	966	(100)	389	(40.3)	199	(20.6)
1984	2,222	(100)	588	(26.5)	354	(15.9)
1985	1,793	(100)	481	(26.8)	110	(6.1)

* For the years 1984 and 1985 Sargodha and Gujranwala Divisions have not been subject to investigations.

Source: Investigations in the Punjab Stock Company. Lahore: Punch-house (16./17./23.Feb.1986).

In fact, the increase of these institutions has outnumbered all other kinds of institutions registered during this period for educational and religious purposes under the 'Societies Act 1860'. This is especially true for the more remote areas where formal education - here represented through private schools - is restricted due to different problems. In the rural areas, we witness the substratum for the mushroom-growth of the *dini madaris* being mostly confined to the teaching of Koran, some degree of primary education and being located in mosques. Accordingly, the percentage of *dini madaris* in relation to the total number of registered

institutions in urbanized divisions like Rawalpindi and Lahore is much lower than that in rural divisions like Dera Ghazi Khan and Bahawalpur. While the former two display 58 and 140 *dini madaris* (both 17% of their total number of registered institutions) respectively in 1984, the corresponding figures for Dera Ghazi Khan and Bahawalpur divisions are 85 *dini madaris* (58%) and 134 *dini madaris* (60%) respectively. The data on the 'private schools', however, reflect a different but corresponding picture. Here the divisions of Rawalpindi and Lahore show many more private schools than the other two divisions.

The peak of both, the *dini madaris* and the private schools was in 1983/84 while both declined in 1984/85. Concerning the private schools this might indicate the saturation of the market in the more urbanized areas. The *dini madaris*, however, seemed to have responded to the *Zakat* disbursement policy indicating a commercial character of the new established *dini madaris*. Moreover, it has been possible for the State to channel and control the *dini madaris* via *Zakat*.

The boom of graduates

As hinted at earlier there has been a significant increase among the *maulanas* in general and among different schools of thought in particular. From Chart 1 we may derive the following statements: From 1960 to 1985 (26 years) a total number of 11,841 'registered' *maulanas* were produced in Pakistan. Out of these 11,841 *maulanas* 69% were produced only between 1978 and 1985 while in the 18 years, from 1960 to 1977 it had been merely 3,643 or 31%. Since 1981, which was the year of the implementation of the Equivalence scheme as well as the consolidation of the *Zakat* scheme, the number of graduates increased spectacularly. While there were only 1,968 graduates during the early period of President General Zia (1978-80), their number became 2,629 during 1981-83. In the following two years the production of the *maulanas* reached its culmination point with 3,601 or 30% of all graduates (this tendency might go on for the next years to come).


As can further be seen from the chart we may witness a very sharp increase of the number of graduates of the Ahle Hadith, who have been organizing its graduates from 1978 onwards. Their relative share is but only 11%.

The Brelwis, who have been organizing their graduates more comprehensively since 1974 have been producing 30% of all 'registered' *maulanas* (3,557). A constant number of graduates can be seen from 1978 onwards.

The Deobandis once more display the most popular stand. The Wafaq has been producing 57% of all the 11,841 *maulanas* during the years under scrutiny. As can be seen, the Wafaq is active since 1960. The sharpest increase, however, is during 1984 and 1985.

The Shia have been starting to produce graduates under the auspices of their Wafaq since 1984 and have been able to produce at least 229 graduates or 2.56% of the total number of the graduated *maulanas*.

Chart 1: Number of different schools of thought
 Data based on registers of different schools of thought



It can further be elaborated that the Brelwis and the Ahle Hadith seem to have reacted much earlier to the official measures implemented by the Government than the Deobandis and the Shia. While we can see a sharp increase of the first two schools of thought since 1978, we witness an equivalent increase for the latter two only from 1984 onwards. There is no doubt that the Shia and parts of the Deobandis are not conformists; this might be a reason of their delayed positive reaction to the official policies. The Brelwis and the Ahle Hadith who have heavily been profiting from the *Zakat* scheme seem to reflect a more conformist character even if there are some exceptions among their *Ulama*.

We may conclude that the number of graduates has been increasing significantly just - as it seems to be - in conformance with the Zia regime's policies. The problem for the regime, however, will arise when these officially recognized *maulanas* will not be integrated properly, i.e. if they become a mismatch. Then there is the possibility of their becoming a boomerang for the regime.

Identifying the graduates

While identifying the graduates of the *dini madaris* regarding their places of origin as well as places of graduation one may acquire insight into the geographical and social background of the 'clergy' in Pakistan. This has been done here paradigmatically for the students and *maulanas* of the Brelwi school of thought. These students have been candidates in the examinations conducted under the guidelines of the 'Tanzim ul Madaris il 'arabiyyah' in *dawah hadith*, the highest degree of religious learning.

According to Table 3 the minority of the Brelwi candidates belong to the Punjab province (73%) followed by Azad Kashmir, North West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan.

Tab.3: Province and year-wise dissemination of Brelwi graduates

Province of origin	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	total	%	Population in 1981
Punjab	110	89	82	61	107	316	765	73.0	47,292,441
Sindh	10	7	4	10	13	37	81	7.7	19,028,666
NWFP	14	17	9	6	4	38	88	8.4	11,061,328
Baluchistan	1	1	4	2	2	10	20	1.9	4,332,376
Azad Kashmir	10	11	10	5	14	36	86	8.2	
others	-	-	-	1	-	7	8	0.8	
total	145	125	109	85	140	444	1048	100.0	84,253,644

Source: Registers of the graduates of the Tanzim ul Madaris il 'arabiyyah for the years 1974-1979, Lahore (cyclostyled), calculations thereof and 1981 Census Report of Pakistan, Islamabad 1984.

The main centers of origin are Sahiwal (143 = 13.6%) and Multan districts (86 = 8.2%) while Dera Ghazi Khan and Muzaffargarh districts together comprise 91 graduates (8.7%). It may be noted that very few graduates come from Lahore, Rawalpindi and Faisalabad districts (total 66 graduates = 6.3%), implying a rural rather than urban background of the *maulanas* of the Brelwi school of thought. In fact, most of the graduates originate from remote areas around the respective *dini madaris* usually staying there upto graduation. Their family background is that of small landholders and/or landless peasants while only 215 graduates (20.4%) could claim to descend from traditional religious families.(20)

Concerning the places of graduation 840 graduates (80.2%) who have graduated in Punjab can be analysed as follows:

Tab.4: Places of graduation of Brelwi Ulama in Punjab, 1974-79

District/Town	Number of graduates
Multan	183
Sahiwal/Okara	169
Lahore	162
Faisalabad	158
Rawalpindi	64
others	104
total	840

Source: Registers of the graduates of the Tanzim ul Madaris il 'arabiyyah for the years 1974-1979, Lahore (cyclostyled), calculations thereof.

Once more Multan and Sahiwal districts turn out to be the main centres while Lahore and Faisalabad have been gaining students because of their having traditional Brelwi centres of learning. Rawalpindi attracts merely 64 graduates. The total number of *Ulama* having been graduated in Sindh is 180 while 144 graduated in the *dini madaris* of Karachi. The North West Frontier Province represents 20 graduates mainly in Peshawar, Mardan and Bannu. Baluchistan comprises only 0.8% of the students.

These findings display the areas of recruitment as well as settlement of the Brelwi Ulama. It has been argued that before partition the Brelwi school of thought was not very popular in the present Pakistan and was confined to what is now India. With the migration (*hijra*) in 1947 lots of East-Punjabi refugees became resident of those areas which are called canal colonies. From here the Hindu citizens had migrated to India and thus a place of living was provided for the Muslim migrants. Moreover,

the predominance of veneration of holy men in the Punjab - especially in and around Multan, Sahiwal and Dera Ghazi Khan districts - gave room for the dissemination of the popular, peasant oriented Brelwi school of thought.

The Deobandi graduates have different ideological centres, their stronghold being the North West Frontier Province and Afghanistan while Dar ul 'Ulum Haqqaniyyah, Akora Khattak (Peshawar district) is the centre of the production of the Deobandi Ulama, at least up to 1980. Once more the graduates originate from rural areas, few of them coming from religious families. The centres of recruitment are Mansehra, Afghanistan, Mardan Peshawar, Bannu, Dir and Dera Ismail Khan districts (according to predominance) while the only outstanding districts of a province other than the North West Frontier Province are Multan and Muzaffargarh.

It may be pointed out that one third of the Deobandi *Ulama* are produced in the Dar ul 'Ulum Haqqaniyyah while about 22% of these graduates originate from Afghanistan. Indeed, the ties to Afghanistan are very old and date from the days of the beginning of the Dar ul 'Ulum Deoband in India.(21)

The Ahle Hadith graduates display a different picture, being confinable mainly to a few districts of the Punjab which can be called the commercial centres of this province like Faisalabad, Okara, Qasur, Sahiwal and Gujranwala, while only 7.1% could claim to descend from religious background.

It may be concluded that the majority of the *dini madaris* graduates - and thus the *ulama* - originate from areas not having been directly targets of development strategies on the one hand and displaying a relatively high number of tenants on the other.(22) This can be traced for the Brelwis as well as for the Deobandis as well as for the Ahle Hadith schools of thought. One may say that the migration even in this sector of education towards urban centres can be seen as a result of regional disparities brought about by tendentious planning. This is very striking since there has been a large shift from the graduate producing areas like Peshawar and Multan to Karachi during the last few years. The emerging conflict potential in Karachi can also be seen on that background.

Jihad, Islamization and the Ulama

In order to mobilize the masses for the defence of the geographical borders, old traditions and perceptions of *Ghazi*, *Shahid*, *Jihad* and *Mujahid* have been revived from time to time as has been for example the case during the Ayub regime. The 'Soviet Threat' to ideological Pakistan has been a nightmare for the regimes; the reasons for which may be varied and numerous. Being determined externally, the Pakistan/Islam ideology is to build a buffer against the communist chimare. In fact, the *Ulama* of Pakistan felt tantalized by socialism, even if it was an 'Islamic Socialism' (what ever it may be). With the prelude of *nizam-e mustafa* and the Zia regime the *maulanas*, *muftis* and their students seem to have

gained ground fighting against the irreligiousness (*la diniyat*) of communist ideology. The CII on the other hand has always been proposing to suspend all agnostic and socialist tendencies and the removal especially of teachers and professors from their posts if they were known to hold such views. These proposals have been put into practice by the Zia regime.

The Jama'at-e Islami, one of the political parties in Pakistan, which is known for its close cooperation with the Government seems to have a clear-cut approach towards socialism. It is assumed, that the Jama'at is heavily engaged in the Afghanistan *Jihad*. This is not only indicated by its contribution to the *Jihad* by material it publishes but also by the fact that the Jama'at has been constantly building up religious schools in the North West Frontier Province. It is striking that 19 out of 20 *dini madaris* in these areas were established after the Soviet intervention 1979 and 13 out of these 20 were established in Dir district and Bajor Agency (23), both areas directly linked to the Afghanistan territory. This is only one branch of the *dini madaris* and *Ulama* engaged in *Jihad*. The Deobandi school of thought for its part claims to be the actual leader in the *Jihad* being fought in Afghanistan. Especially the Dar ul 'Ulum Haqqaniyyah in Akora Khattak (which has been producing one third of the Pakistani Deobandi *Ulama*) is of the view that the leading *mujahidin* have studied in this Dar ul 'Ulum. Consequently the Afghan issue is dealt with exhaustively in its monthly magazin *al Haq*.(24) Although any evidence of direct military training in this *dini madaris* could not be located there is no doubt that *Jihad* is disseminated at least morally; in fact, about 40% of the 600 boarders there are from Afghanistan and a lot of them reportedly go for *Jihad* and "this does not disturb the classes during the year". This indicates the support of *Jihad* in Afghanistan by this Dar ul 'Ulum.

The latest official survey on *dini madaris* conducted by the Ministry of Education displays a keen interest in the religious educational institutions of the North West Frontier Province which were surveyed exhaustively while all other provinces were neglected. One reason for this tendency might be the consideration to mobilize the *dini madaris* as centres of resistance to the Soviet threat in one way or the other. According to the information from the concerned Ministry there were 7,002 Afghan students in the *dini madaris* of the North West Frontier Province in 1982 representing 9% of the students of that province. Accepting ethnic links among the Pakhtuns of Pakistan and Afghanistan a mobilization of *dini madaris* students for the *Jihad* seems to be very easy.

Resistance

The *Morning News* from Karachi stated: "Since the introduction of the Zakatsystem, the Deeni Madaris have voiced complaints that their source of private donations have dried" while according to our calculations this

is not the case and cannot be verified. However, a considerable resistance among the *dini madaris* and the *Ulama* during the Islamization period under President General Zia ul Haq cannot be denied. *Zakat*, therein proves to be one of the main pegs of criticism and political resistance.

While the CZA was of the view that the *dini madaris* should be subject to bookkeeping and auditing and should be supervised in order to guarantee a proper *Zakat* flow, this bureaucratization of religious education was rejected by a large number of *Ulama*. They argued that this meant a supervision of the internal affairs of the *dini madaris* and an usurpation of the *Ulama's* status not only by the State but also by the students. Moreover, since the *dini madaris* were affiliated to one political party or the other, this intervention implied a political supervision and control of the parties by the State. The CZA cited the daily Urdu *Jasarat* according to which the Sindh *dini madaris* were not accepting the *Zakat* amounts disbursed by the PZA. Formally it was because the *Zakat* system was not according to the *Shari'ah* and the *muftis* had not agreed upon it yet (25), basically this approach had political implications. Once more this was a campaign launched by the Deobandi organization "Wafaq ul Madaris il 'arabiyyah" which had proclaimed the boycott of the *Zakat* system in June 1981. According to the 'education director' of the Wafaq the *Zakat* is held to be a political bribe (*siasi rishwat*) and could not be accepted. This was in line with the *fatwa* given by Mufti Mahmud in 1980, the then leader of the PNA. It has been said that nearly all Sindh *dini madaris* affiliated with the Wafaq were not taking *Zakat* "because of the particular situation of Sindh".(26) This can be verified by the fact that neither the PZA Sindh has yet (autumn 1986) chalked out a scheme for the disbursement of *Zakat* among the *dini madaris* nor was the amount distributed among the religious schools worth mentioning. In fact, during the first three years of the *Zakat* system the Sindh *dini madaris* received merely 1.8% out of the total amount disbursed among them from the PZAs. Similarly there were only 45 *dini madaris* (1.3% of all benefitting religious schools in the three years) profiting from the scheme in Sindh. Admittedly the numbers of both, the *dini madaris* and the students as well as the amounts disbursed increased rapidly since 1984. But this was mainly because of the recipients belonging to schools of thought other than the Deobandi one.

As has been said earlier the Deobandi *dini madaris* were increasing in number in the province of Sindh and at the same time do not receive *Zakat*. Simultaneously there is a heavy resistance in Sindh, forcing the State to intervene even more radically. On the other hand those schools of thought that are not very popular in Sindh (vide above) are being supported heavily by the State. Thus the State might have the opportunity to intervene into provincial upheavals through conformist *Ulama* and their places of learning.

We may state that the *Zakat* has been trickling down to the *dini madaris* especially among the Brelwis and the Ahle Hadith even in Sindh. A fraction of the Deobandis continues the tradition of political resistance that was reflected also in the 16 years curriculum dealt with earlier (see also Appendix: Different Curricula). Moreover, since every school of thought and Wafaq/Tanzim is affiliated with a political party on one way or the other the resistance of the *dini madaris* might be reflected in the political parties which have been legalized lately. One may say that some *dini madaris* represent vehicles of regional nationalism.

Conclusion

The issues of *Zakat* and curricula only constitute a fraction of the Islamization policy and the resistance which is voiced by heavy criticism not only among the *Ulama*. The basic idea underlying the reformist approach of the present regime towards the *Ulama* is to reintegrate them into given structures - only up to a certain degree - and mobilize them for its interests. Pakistan has been displaying a high degree of dependency on external and alien pressures enacted mostly by a small ruling elite in Pakistan. This segment being part of the international system and being integrated into the internal circles of the world culture aims at subjecting all other segments of the society - as defined by world system theory, one of them being the *Ulama* and the *dini madaris*. In fact, the victims are not only integrated partially into the establishment but are also given new tasks. *Jihad* and the defence of the ideological orders is only one of the facets. The other - the more far-reaching one - is to disseminate the current official policy through media and students of the *dini madaris* themselves, mainly in order to pave the way for the establishment of new markets even in remote areas and to consolidate areas which have not directly been subjected to modernizing development strategies. How far this approach through the media has been successful is yet to be seen. But considering the increase in the number of *dini madaris* and the students as well as the increase in the budgets of these religious schools one might expect some results. The *dini madaris* themselves have been pragmatic - by receiving financial remunerations from the companies (mostly joint ventures with foreign enterprises) advertising in their magazines on the one hand and appreciating *Zakat* on the other. The price they pay is their submission under the imperatives of the world-market which is inherent in the Islamization policy of the regime. The new formation phase among the *dini madaris* and the *Ulama*, as a result of State intervention, may furthermore facilitate a total taking over of the *dini madaris* by the Government that would finally mean the internationalization of the internal markets.

The patronism that the *dini madaris* and the *Ulama* are experiencing from the Zia regime is not just an altruistic approach but an attempt to get the official ideology trickled down to the grass-roots. In this regard we may conclude that the Islamization of the *Ulama* and the religious schools as it is pursued by the State is running successfully, however if not with dubious means then at least with a clear integrationist approach. Moreover, the Islamization has proved to be more what can be called a strategy of continuity and pragmatism rather than a 'nativistic' approach even if there are some instances of indigenization by using 'Islamic technics' and idioms.

Notes

- (1) See Sangha, D. (ed.) *Foripower Kapitalismen: Wirtschaftssysteme und Politik* (1981); Sangha, D. *Wirtschaftssysteme und Politik*; Pfänder, R. *Ökonomien* (Frankfurt, M. 1982); Ghosh, K. *States, I.R. Imperialism and South Asia*, New York 1976; Gardai, H./Rasid, J. (eds.) *Muslims, the Moon & Disharmony: the political consciousness of Muslims in the Arab States*, London, Zed Press 1982; Alavi, H. *Islamism: an introduction to the Ideology of Developing Societies* (London 1982).
- (2) Compare Goldschmidt, D. & al. (eds.) *Die Dritte Welt als Entwicklungszwischenstufe* (Frankfurt, M. 1982); *Welt und Entwicklung* (Frankfurt, M. 1982).
- (3) Literature on religious or traditional education is very rich especially for the period after the creation of Pakistan. One may mention Salim S. Manji, *Hind & Pakistan: two muslims in a modern world* (Lahore, Islamic Publications 1982); Haque, Ziaul Muslim, *Religious education in Pakistan* (Islamic Studies (II), Vol. 14, Islamabad 1975, pp. 27-30). Besides these two comprehensive works one finds also the work of Ahmad, N. *Islamic madaris & religious education in Pakistan* (Lahore, Anjuman-e-Hayat-e-Islami, Pakistan 1972) (Ahmad, N. *Islamic madaris & religious education in Pakistan* (Lahore, Anjuman-e-Hayat-e-Islami, Pakistan 1972) (Urdu) (Ahmad, N. *Islamic madaris & religious education in Pakistan* (Lahore, Anjuman-e-Hayat-e-Islami, Pakistan 1972) (Urdu) (Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan (GoP), Ministry of Education, Report on the study of the madaris in Pakistan (Urdu) (Islamabad, Report, Govt. Ministry of Education, 1984 and 1986 (Urdu).
- (4) Waqf, pl. Auqaf are religious endowments.

Appendix

Tab.5: Different Curricula

Subject matter	1a	1b	1c	2	3	4
Koran, reading, memorizing		x	x	x	x	x
Morphology	x	x	x	x	x	x
Syntax	x	x	x	x	x	x
Arabic		x	x	x	x	x
Biography of the prophet (Sirat)			x	x	x	x
Arithmetic	x	x	x	x	x	x
Pakistan Studies			x			
General Sciences			x			
English			x			x
Islamic Law/Tradition			x			
Natural Sciences			x			
Social Sciences			x	x	x	x
Islamic Law	x	x	x	x	x	x
Methods of Islamic Law	x	x	x	x	x	x
Logic	x	x	x	x	x	x
Arabic Literature	x	x	x			x
Tradition of Literature			x			
Rhetorics	x		x	x	x	x
Koraninterpretation	x	x	x	x	x	x
Tradition	x	x	x	x	x	x
Methods of Tradition	x	x	x	x	x	x
Principles and Scholastic	x	x	x	x	x	x
Philosophy	x	x	x	x	x	x
Islamic History		x	x	x	*	x
Economics			x	x	*	
Political Science			x	x	*	
Cultural Sciences			x	x	*	
Methods of Koraninterpretation	x		x			x
Law of Tradition			x			
Comparative Religion			x	x	*	
Discussions (Munazara)	x					x
Prosody	x					
Religious studies (Diniyat)				x	x	x
Urdu			x	x	x	x
Persian			x	x	x	x()
Exercises (Tamrin)				x	x	
Morals (Ikhlaiyyat)		x		x	x	x
Law of Inheritance (Fara'id)		x		x	x	x
Dictation		x				x

- 1a = Dars-e nizami; see Halepota Report, pp.122, 135 and 147-155.
 1b = Eight years curriculum of the Wafaq ul Madaris il 'arabiyah; see Halepota Report, ibid.
 1c = Proposal by the 'National Committee on Dini Madaris 1979'; see Halepota Report, ibid.
 2 = Wafaq proposal only partially implemented in 1983; see Solah Sala Nisab-e ta'lim (tajwiz), Multan 1983, Wafaq ul Madaris.
 3 = Wafaq proposal implemented in 1984; see Solah Sala Nisab-e ta'lim (mansur), Multan 1984, Wafaq ul Madaris.
 4 = Tanzim proposal implemented in 1983; see Solah Sala Nisab-e ta'lim (mansur), Lahore 1984, Tanzim ul Madaris and own elaborations.
- * = These subjects are supposed to be taught after graduation (fura-ghat) in a special course (darjah-e takhassus); compare pp.7, 21 and 39.
 () = Persian is prerequisite for the Tanzim courses.

Notes

- (1) See Senghaas, D. (ed.): *Peripherer Kapitalismus*. Frankfurt a.M. 1981(3); Senghaas, D.: *Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungspolitik; Plädoyer für Dissoziation*. Frankfurt a.M. 1978(2) and Gough, K./Sharma, H.P. (eds.): *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia*. New York 1973; Gardezi, H./Rashid, J. (eds.): *Pakistan, the Roots of Dictatorship - the political economy of a praetorian State*. London: Zed Press 1982; Alavi, H./Shanin, T. (eds.): *Introduction to the Sociology of 'Developing Societies'*. London 1982.
- (2) Compare Goldschmidt, D. et al. (eds.): *Die Dritte Welt als Gegenstand erziehungswissenschaftlicher Forschung*, in: *Zeitschrift für Pädagogik*, Weinheim 1981, who give a good account on these developments.
- (3) Literature on religious or traditional education is very scarce especially for the period after the creation of Pakistan. One may mention Salim S.Muh.: *Hind o Pakistan men musulmanon ka nizam-e ta'lim o tarbiyyat*. Lahore: Islamic Publications 1980 (Urdu) and Haque, Ziaul: *Muslim Religious education in Indo-Pakistan*, in: *Islamic Studies (IS) Vol.14/1*, Islamabad 1975, pp.271-292. Besides these two comprehensive works one finds a couple of surveys: Ahmad, N.: *Ja'izah madaris-e 'arabiyah islamiyyah maghrabi Pakistan*. Lahore: Anjuman-e Himayat-e Islam Press 1960 (Urdu) (Ahmad I); Ahmad, N.: *Ja'izah madaris-e 'arabiyah maghrabi Pakistan*. Lahore: Himayat-e Islam press 1972 (Urdu) (Ahmad II); Government of Pakistan (GoP), Ministry of Religious Affairs: *Report qaumi kamiti bara-e dini madaris Pakistan*. Islamabad 1979 (Urdu) (Halepota Report); GoP, Ministry of Education, Islamic Education Research Cell: *Pakistan ke dini madaris ki fihrist*. Islamabad 1984 (Urdu).
- (4) Waqf, pl. Auqaf are religious endowments.

- (5) See Metcalf, B.D.: *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900*. Princeton University Press 1982.
- (6) For the development of Islam as a theology towards ideology see Schulze, R.: *Die Politisierung des Islam im 19. Jahrhundert*, in: *Die Welt des Islam*, Vol.XXII (1982), pp.103-116. For the concept of integrationist and isolationist see Schulze, R.: *Islamische Kultur und soziale Bewegung*, in: *Peripherie* Nr.18/19 (1985), pp.60-84.
- (7) See: Report of the Committee set up by the Governor of West Pakistan for Recommending improved Syllabus for the various Darul Ulooms and Arabic Madrasas in West Pakistan. Lahore 1962, p.1 and p.9.
It may be noted here that the first survey on *dini madaris* in 1960 was mainly financed by the American based Asia Foundation.
- (8) *Pakistan Observer*, Dacca 13.3.1968.
- (9) Ayub Khan: *Friends not Masters*. Oxford University Press 1967, specially p.194.
- (10) See Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, Part IX, Para 230(4).
- (11) Qurtas 'amli/pishnamah bara-e kamiti ma'adalah isnad dini wa jami'i, 25.8.1982 UGC, Islamabad 1982 (Urdu); see also UGC: *A Guide to the Equivalences of Degrees and Diplomas in Pakistan*. Islamabad 1978, p.84.
- (12) Halepota Report, p.115.
- (13) Halepota Report, p.89 and pp.102-109; similar demands had been raised by the CII in 1978: *Consolidated Recommendations etc.*, p.34.
- (14) It had been categorically rejected by the founder-member of the Dar ul 'Ulum Deoband Maulana Qasim Nanotawi (1832-1880) to receive any kind of official and/or Government aid; compare Ahmad I, pp.723-734, Ahmad II, pp.684-686 and Haque, p.282; see also Faruqi, Z.H.: *The Deoband School and the demand for Pakistan*. Lahore n.d., p.26.
- (15) UGC (publ.): *Higher Education News*, Vol.II/10, Islamabad, October 1982, pp.1 and 8; see also: Notification: *Equivalence of Dini Asnad with the University degree*, UGC 17.11.1982 (mimeo).
- (16) The Ahle Hadith are still in the process to produce an enlarged syllabus while the Jama'at-e Islami is in its embryonic phase concerning curriculum development and is accordingly not recognized by the Ministry of Education.
- (17) F.e. the twelve largest *dini madaris* in North West Frontier Province that received at least 40,000 Rupees (highest amounts) from the PZ Council in the first year's disbursement were running well and had surplus budgets in 1970; compare also Ahmad II, pp.404-449.
- (18) Calculations on the basis of data provided by the CZA, Islamabad.
- (19) Compare *Az-Zakat*, Vol.I/1, Islamabad 1981, p.22; the calculations have been made on the basis of data provided by the PZA Punjab.

- (20) Calculations are based on the registers. For the religious background the titles of the father (*maulana, hafiz, qari* etc.) have been assumed to be the criteria.
- (21) See also Rizvi, S.Mahbub: *Tahrikh Dar ul 'Ulum Deoband*. Delhi 1977, Vol.I, pp.295 et passim (Urdu) and Metcalf, *op.cit.*, p.134. The Deobandis had always had a good connection to Afghanistan via Lahore and Peshawar.
- (22) For the land patterns see Khan, Mahmood H.: *Underdevelopment and agrarian structure in Pakistan*. Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd. 1981.
- (23) See Ta'aruf; *Rabitatu-l madaris il islamiyyah Pakistan*, Lahore 1984; see also Harald, July 1986: Interview with Ataullah Mengal, p.56 and *The Muslim*, 4.2.1986.
- (24) This Dar ul 'Ulum is easily accessible being located on the Grand Trunk Road about 50 km from Peshawar next to the military compound of Nowshehra. For the *Jihad* propaganda see al Haq, Vol.19/3, pp.6-9; Vol.20/12, pp.9-15. Vol.21/1, pp.5-13 et passim.
- (25) CZA, *Proceedings*, Vol.II, Islamabad 1983, p.249 and p.303 (Urdu).
- (26) The information on the Sindhi situation was provided by the concerned officer of the Wafaq in Multan on 2.2.1986. The Sindhi situation is characterized by the increasing ratio of criminality on the one hand and by a strong nationalistic stand on the other. Both, however, can be seen as outcomes of deprivation; compare also Harald, especially Sept.-Dec.1986.