

Opposition in the Philippines: Marcos and his Enemies before Martial Law

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Saw the film Julius Caesar...Superb acting but it reminded me of the conspiracy going on now against me by all the envious men who had failed. Remind me to have the guards around me always. I have often wondered why Caesar had no protection when he was assassinated.
[Ferdinand E. Marcos, diary entry, March 1, 1970]

Has the alleged greed of a certain individual acquired imperial dimensions? Marcos Augustus?... Who knows, we may one day wake up to find an empire in our - or his? - hands.
[Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., March 27, 1971]

With the overthrow of Ferdinand E. Marcos by the "people power" revolt of February 1986, the Philippines underwent a dramatic transition from dictatorship to democracy.¹ It soon became apparent, however, that what had occurred was less a revolutionary transformation of the country's politics than a restoration of many of the old practices of the highly clientelistic and often violent pre-martial law political system dominated by the economic oligarchy. Under the presidency of Corazon C. Aquino and a congress elected in 1987, most social reforms have been shelved while reports of corruption are commonplace and infighting is intense. Meanwhile, dissident factions of a politicized military and a large communist guerrilla movement have been trying to overthrow the political system altogether. Although the new government has so far survived a number of coup attempts and an ongoing insurgency, a presidential election scheduled for May, 1992 is sure to be a rough and tumble affair that is unlikely to help solve the country's many problems. That the flaws of contemporary Philippine democracy are often directly linked and in many ways structurally similar to pre-martial law politics makes it useful to take another look at the period immediately before the advent of authoritarianism. At that time, an oligarchic political game that had been played according to democratic ground rules since the country's independence in 1946 was coming unraveled as Marcos began 'cheating' and his opponents trying to 'punish' him for it. With a number of the presidential candidates and other elites in current Philippine politics exhibiting authoritarian tendencies, the country's weakly institutionalized democracy may be in for another round of democratic rule breaking.

Breaking the Rules

In many ways, Marcos was a Filipino Caesar. Even before he established a dictatorship, the opposition felt he had crossed the political Rubicon by using "guns, goons, and gold" to win an unprecedented second term as President in 1969. Marcos spent more state patronage resources than any Philippine president had before to insure his re-election, although he wrecked the economy by doing so. He also tried to gain electoral advantage through personal control over the military which had largely remained non-partisan since the early 1950s. Once re-elected, Marcos showed signs of being unwilling to surrender office at the end of his constitutionally final term. He suspended the writ of habeas corpus which

the opposition saw as a dry run for dictatorship, floated plans to field his wife as a presidential candidate, manipulated the Constitutional Convention to create a parliamentary system in which he could (if need be) rule as Prime Minister, and threatened to declare martial law. In the first section of this paper, precisely how Marcos broke the 'rules' of the Republic of the Philippines's 'political game' - limited use of government patronage, the neutrality of the military, and succession - will be examined.

Traditional oppositionists considered themselves not power hungry Cassiuses but honorable Brutuses trying to save the country's democracy. The traditional opposition was composed largely of politicians in the out of power Liberal Party but also some members of the ruling *Nacionalistas* alienated from Marcos. Ideologically identical and sharing an elite social composition, these two parties dominated electoral politics in the pre-martial law Philippine Republic. Anti-Marcos politicians felt justified in opting for unconventional and often brutal political strategies to try to defeat (or even kill) the sitting President. They cooperated with new, violent opposition groups - the communists and the Muslim secessionists - which arose largely out of the 1960s student movement in the Philippines. How the opposition tried to challenge Marcos will be the theme of the second part of the paper.

Despite the temporary success of the opposition with a stunning electoral victory in the 1971 local and senatorial elections, the President's politician opponents were unable to keep him from changing the political game altogether with the declaration of martial law the following year. Ironically, by fighting Marcos' authoritarian ambitions so vigorously, the opposition polarized the political climate to such an extent that martial law seemed an attractive alternative to many Filipinos and foreigners. While traditional oppositionists were poised to win the next presidential election, Marcos had won the loyalty of the military and the U.S. government which proved the crucial constituencies he needed to implement martial rule.

The 'Inevitable' Collapse of Clientelistic Democracy

It has been suggested that clientelistic politics in the Philippines had been undergoing a long term decline before the declaration of martial law.² As traditional landlord-tenant relations eroded with the commercialization of agriculture and the electorate expanded due to rapid population growth, demands for national government patronage during elections increased, outstripping the limited revenue-generating capacity of the state. This resulted in rising campaign expenditures by the ruling party and growing fiscal strain on the government. It seems to follow from this view that the financial crisis precipitated by Marcos' overspending in the 1969 election was but the culmination of this worsening political business cycle. Several scholars have claimed that pre-martial law elections were also becoming more violent, with campaign related killings during the Marcos regime continuing an upward trend begun under earlier administrations.³ This can be related to the decline of clientelism argument by suggesting that with weakened patron-client ties politicians had to employ force more frequently to win at the polls. Moreover, Marcos' plans to remain in power beyond his constitutionally limited tenure were also not unique. Several incumbent presidents ap-

parently considered staying on in office despite their electoral defeat.⁴ In a weakly institutionalized, clientelistic democracy such as the Philippines before martial law, the temptation to hold onto the major source of patronage - the state budget - through retention of the presidency was great.

Overspending and Violence during Elections under Marcos

Such structural arguments about the vulnerability of clientelistic democracy to breakdown do not pay sufficient attention to a key process variable: Ferdinand Marcos. In election years in the 1950s and 1960s campaign costs did increase and the government did run deficits to finance ruling party candidates. But most Presidents practiced austerity in years in which no polls were held and never precipitated a major economic crisis by overdoing during elections. Table 1 shows how Marcos failed to stabilize government fiscal policy in off election years as Presidents Diosdado Macapagal and Carlos Garcia had done:

Table 1: Government Net Receipts in Non-Election Years, 1958-1968

Year	President	Net Receipts (million Philippine pesos)
1958	Garcia	17.8
1960	"	46.9
1962	Macapagal	88.8
1964	"	75.3
1966	Marcos	- 86.7
1968	"	- 85.3

Source: Harvey A. Averch, John E. Kochler, and Frank Denton, *The Matrix of Policy in the Philippines* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) p. 101.

With an already overheated economy, Marcos' massive spending during the 1969 polls caused the country's biggest financial catastrophe since heavy expenditures by incumbent president Elpidio Quirino in the 1949 elections precipitated a similar economic crisis.⁵

Similarly, although Filipino elections after independence had always been quite violent, there was an upsurge in poll related killings during Marcos' presidency. Donald Lane Berlin points out that after the use of the Philippine military in electioneering during polls held under President Quirino, the armed forces remained relatively neutral in polls during Magsaysay's, Garcia's, and Macapagal's presidencies.⁶ But Marcos undertook the largest reorganization of the armed forces in Philippine history, promoting his relatives and loyalists from his home province of Ilocos within the officer corps. During his first term in office, the Philippine Constabulary set up several "special forces", paramilitary groups linked to regular military units that were often "loaned" to politicians and landlords friendly to the Administration.

Like voter participation, violence was probably higher in 'local' elections (i.e. non-presidential polls in which gubernatorial and mayoral offices were contested) in the pre-martial law Philippine Republic because the stakes were great-

er for provincial politicians and the electorate than they were during purely national balloting.⁷ However, Philippine military reports carried in the press indicate that the level of killings and injuries during local elections was relatively constant under three different Presidents from the mid-1950s onward until the particularly violent election of 1967, the first non-presidential polls held under Marcos:

Table 2: Deaths and Injuries during Non-Presidential Elections, 1955-1967

Year	President	Deaths	Injuries
1955	Magsaysay	34	38
1959	Garcia	24	?
1963	Macapagal	23	59
1967	Marcos	75	108

Source: The 1967 and 1963 figures are drawn from the "PC Report on Electoral Terrorism," *Philippines Free Press*, Nov. 17, 1969, pp. 5 and 63. The 1959 figure is cited in Willem Wolters, *Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1984) p. 143 and the 1955 one from "Not a Game," *Philippines Free Press*, Nov. 12, 1955, p. 8.

It is impossible to say how much of this increased bloodshed is directly attributable to increasing militarization under Marcos. But it is striking that more than twice as many killings occurred in the 1967 election than in any since 1955. This sharp rise in electoral violence is perhaps best explained by Marcos' aggressive efforts - including the use of military and para-military forces - to bring his party victory even in provinces and towns previously controlled by the opposition. As will be examined below, this brought violent reaction from many an oppositionist, which may have contributed as much to the growing death toll as the administration's own actions.

The 1969 presidential elections were also marred by terror, although according to official statistics less so than those of 1967.⁸ Terrorist acts were reported by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in 12 provinces. Many were attributed to "special forces" of the Philippine Constabulary whose chief, Brig. Gen. Vicente R. Raval - a Marcos crony from World War II, openly defied the COMELEC during the elections.⁹ As Berlin writes: "not since the very first presidential political contests of the independent Philippines, those of 1946, 1949, and 1953, was military electioneering so extensive."¹⁰

Unlike several Latin American countries, the Philippines had no tradition of *continuisimo*. There was no precedent for overstaying in office and no established formula for legitimating it. Despite reluctance to surrender the perquisites of power, all incumbents before Marcos found it wiser to stick to their legal tenure. There were a number of indications, however, that Marcos would not relinquish power at the end of his second, constitutionally final term. In February 1970, he began warning that the declaration of martial law might be necessary, a threat he made repeatedly over the next two years. In late 1970, a secret propaganda office

of Malacanang began hinting that Imelda Marcos might run for President as a stand in for her husband and Marcos later confirmed that he was considering fielding Imelda for the Presidency.¹¹ In August, 1971 he suspended the writ of habeas corpus after the bombing at a Liberal party political rally at Plaza Miranda. When the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the act in *Lansang v. Garcia*, oppositionists (correctly it turned out) claimed Marcos had received a blank check for martial law.¹² No sooner was the writ restored, than Marcos was accused of manipulating the Constitutional Convention through bribery to adopt a parliamentary system in which Marcos could run for parliament from his home district of Ilocos and then re-gain power as premier.¹³ By summer, 1972 talk was again rife of martial law which reached its height when Senator Aquino exposed "Oplan Sagittarius" on September 13 which the opposition Senator said was a blueprint for martial law. Never before had a Philippine President explored so many ways publicly to keep himself in power.

Opposition Anger

The *Philippines Free Press* reported that "[n]o election since 1949 has touched off louder cries of fraud and terrorism than the last one."¹⁴ It was commonly believed that Marcos had ignored "with impunity the ground rules of our kind of politics."¹⁵ Marcos had simply gone too far, further than any President since Quirino's disputed victory in 1949. Since then, elections had been expensive and violent but not excessively so. The traditional opposition's reaction was similar to what it had been in 1949. After their candidate was defeated by Quirino in fraudulent elections in that year, outraged followers of opposition challenger Jose Laurel launched a brief rebellion in his home province of Batangas. After the 1969 polls, rebellion was threatened again as the "high strung partisans" of Osmena were warning of "revolution and assassination".¹⁶

Seeding the "First Quarter Storm"

Marcos' second term began with the so called First Quarter Storm. For the first three months of 1970 often violent student demonstrations, directed at both at Marcos and the U.S. government engulfed Manila.¹⁷ The First Quarter Storm has been vaguely explained as the "outpouring of popular anger".¹⁸ More specifically, demonstrators were from radical and moderate student groups. The *Kabataang Makabayan* (KM, Patriotic Youth) founded by Jose Maria Sison and a splinter group (which later reconciled with Sison), the *Samahan ng Demokratikong Kabataan* (SDK, or Democratic Youth Organization), were at the forefront of the student demonstrations. Moderate groups, such as the National Union of Students headed by Edgar Jopson, a student of the Jesuit University, Ateneo de Manila, were also involved.

Marcos has claimed that opposition politicians helped organize, fund, and publicize the demonstrations.¹⁹ Sergio Osmena, Jr. led a group of Liberal Party leaders which apparently had close contacts with radical students and their eminence grise, Jose Sison after the 1969 election. Sison had reportedly met with Liberal "Young Turks" - Benigno Aquino, Jr., Ramon Mitra, Jovito Salonga, and Gerardo Roxas - as early as October, 1968.²⁰ According to one opposition

source, Aquino had several student radicals on his payroll.²¹ Aquino also had ties to moderate student activists. His brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa, was a major financier of a leading Christian democratic group.²² In a Senate privilege speech, Aquino praised the activists, saying he and his Liberal colleagues "felt that our place was with the students," and condemned the brutal police suppression of their demonstrations.²³

Aside from working directly with the young demonstrations, the traditional opposition also saw to it that the First Quarter Storm protestors received sympathetic treatment from much of the Manila media. Then radical student leader (and now businessman and conservative political activist) Fernando Barican described the positive reaction of the press as the most significant contribution the old-guard opposition made to the student protests.²⁴ The most pro-student, anti-Marcos newspapers and magazines during this period, the *Manila Times*, the *Philippines Free Press*, *Graphic*, and the *Manila Chronicle* were all owned by oligarchs who either were allied with opposition politicians or had been alienated by the administration.²⁵ The Roceses, publishers the *The Manila Times* and several other newspapers, were close allies of Senator Aquino. Teodoro Locsin, another Aquino ally, often gave good press to the students' social revolutionary demands in his *Philippines Free Press* despite harshly putting down a labor strike among his own staff. *Graphic* magazine publisher J. Antonio Araneta, one of the richest industrialists in the country, was related by marriage to the Liberal Party President, Senator Gerardo Roxas. The Lopez brothers - Vice President Fernando and *Manila Chronicle* publisher Eugenio - used their newspaper to attack Marcos after they were denied the economic concessions they had sought from the government. The Lopezes and their *Manila Chronicle* were strongly pro-Marcos in the 1969 campaign in which Fernando was re-elected Vice President. But then Marcos refused them permission to build a lubricating oil factory and a petrochemical complex as well as to purchase Caltex Philippines and the reclaimed areas of Laguna Bay for an industrial complex after the Lopezes had apparently declined to give him a large percentage of the shares as he had demanded. To the Lopezes, Marcos had broken the rules under which they had profited so handsomely during several different administrations.²⁶

By supporting the student demonstrations, the opposition was able to turn the moral tables on Marcos within a year. Like Richard Nixon after his record breaking re-election in 1972, Marcos had seemed to be in a very strong position at the beginning of his new tenure in office. But the First Quarter Storm soon left him as discredited and embittered as Nixon would be after the Watergate revelations. Although most *Manilenos* disagreed with student radicals' revolutionary aims, the demonstrators succeeded, with the help of a sympathetic media, in creating a generalized sense of instability and crisis and in making Marcos appear responsible for the social ills that led to such protests.²⁷

Building Up Opposition Coercive Resources

Cries of revolution by student demonstrators in Manila were lent a certain credibility by reports coming out of Central Luzon beginning in mid-1969 of a new communist insurgency. At the same time, the Manila media began discussing the emergence of a Muslim secessionist guerrilla movement in Mindanao and Sulu.

Although traditional oppositionists blamed Marcos for the conditions that gave rise to these new armed groups, it appears that some of them were in fact involved in their formation. The old-guard opposition was playing a brazen double game against Marcos in which the 'social causes' of demonstrations and guerrilla warfare were denounced while the communists and Muslim secessionists behind them were secretly assisted. But the opposition strategy was not only to erode Marcos' popularity, but also to challenge his coercive advantage in many provinces. Government para-military forces were deployed in certain provinces to help tip the balance towards pro-Marcos politicians in the 1967 and 1969 elections. This national intervention in local politics made it difficult for provincial candidates not allied with Marcos to maintain the "balance of terror" with their own private armies. By allying with student radicals, who were helping create a new communist party and a Muslim secessionist movement, traditional leaders were able to add 'muscle' to their local election campaigns.

Aquino and the New People's Army

Politicians in Tarlac and other Central Luzon provinces often turned to remnants of the *Huk* guerrilla army, which had been on the decline since the mid-1950s, to supplement the intimidation their private armies could practice against opponents.²⁸ Therefore, it is not surprising that *Tarlaqueno* Benigno Aquino, Jr., a local politician in the province before he was elected senator, had close ties to the *Huks*. Aquino's original contacts with the guerrillas came through his older step brother, who through his World War II guerrilla connections had set up a meeting between Aquino, then a newspaper reporter, and *Huk Supremo* Luis Taruc. Aquino helped arrange Taruc's surrender to the government in 1954. As a mayor and later governor, Aquino, by his own admission, kept in close touch with the remnants of the *Huks*, who by then had largely taken up banditry.²⁹ Aquino used his large private army, which he equipped with his over 100 gun arsenal, to keep the guerrillas in line.³⁰

Aquino's stable relationship with the *Huks* was destroyed after the 1965 election. To help his brother win election to Congress and improve his vote total in Central Luzon, President Macapagal reportedly struck a deal with *Huk* Commander Alibasbas, an alliance which Aquino somewhat disingenuously said he had nothing to do with. Marcos, who was Macapagal's challenger for the presidency, was reported to have later allied with a rival *Huk*, Commander Sumulong.³¹ After Marcos was elected President, he punished Aquino by cutting off funds to the "enemy" governor, firing Aquino's provincial appointees, replacing the provincial Philippine Constabulary commander with an Administration loyalist, and sending military and para-military reinforcements into the province.³² Alibasbas was killed by the military and Aquino claimed 1,500 died in the "genocide" committed by the regular Armed Forces and the "Monkees" (a pro-government, para-military force) in his province between 1966 to 1971.³³ Feeling the military pressure, Aquino decided to run for the Senate instead of seeking re-election as governor, a position which was won by his wife's cousin, but close Marcos ally, Eduardo Cojuangco.

To restore the balance of terror in Tarlac, Aquino apparently encouraged a subordinate of the pro-Marcos *Huk*, Commander Sumulong, to break away and form his own guerrilla faction. The renegade, Commander Dante (Bernarbe

Buscayno), had reportedly become disillusioned with Sumulong's mafia like corruption and held him responsible for the death of a colleague who had been trying to reform the *Huks*.³⁴ Sumulong charged that Aquino and his political sidekick, Congressman Jose Yap, "poisoned Dante's mind so that they could use him and his men in intimidating voters in the election."³⁵ It is said that Aquino gave substantial help to his new *Huk* ally. He reportedly let Dante and his armed band use his wife's family plantation, Hacienda Luisita, as a training ground and refuge from Sumulong's vengeance, provided them with food and medicine, and printed Dante's book on good guerrilla behavior.³⁶

But Aquino was not content to be just another politician with a *Huk* in his pocket. Journalist Gregg Jones, in an authoritative count of the origins of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), reports that Aquino arranged for Dante to meet Jose Maria Sison, who had just founded the new communist party.³⁷ Aquino was apparently hoping a strong new guerrilla army would emerge which would help him fight a dangerously powerful President. The rendezvous sometime in early 1969 led to the merger of Dante's peasant army and Sison's party of student activists into the New People's Army (NPA), which would later become the most potent revolutionary force in the Philippines since the *Huks* at their height in the early 1950s. A military task force sent into Tarlac to hunt down the new guerrilla group forced the NPA to largely abandon the province by late 1970 and move to Isabela province where Aquino's ally Faustino Dy was preparing to run for governor in 1971. Dy was accused of meeting with Sison to discuss NPA plans for establishing a guerrilla base in the province.³⁸ At his trial after martial law, Aquino was charged with helping Lieutenant Victor Corpus plan and carry out the raid of the Philippine Military Academy armory in December, 1970 and then defect to the NPA in Isabela. Another prominent opposition politician associated with Aquino, Chavit Singson, was also accused of cooperation with the NPA. Singson had run and lost against Marcos ally and warlord, Congressman Floro Crisologo, in the extremely bloody 1969 election in Ilocos Sur and was a candidate for governor against Crisologo's wife in 1971. Crisologo himself claimed two *Huk* guerrillas had been sent to Ilocos Sur to help Singson's campaign.³⁹

Before the 1971 election, Aquino said:

If Singson makes it in Ilocos Sur and Dy in Isabela, I don't care if we lose everywhere else. Our cause will have been vindicated. These are the two spots most cruelly oppressed by the Marcos military machine. If we win in them, then we know we have pierced his armor. That's consolation enough.⁴⁰

In Isabela, the military Task Force Lawin had been sent in to fight the NPA which it accused Dy of supporting. In Ilocos Sur, Singson complained the military was partial to Crisologo.⁴¹ Congressman Crisologo was assassinated in the Vigan Cathedral, in Ilocos Sur, in October, 1970. Although there has been much speculation that Marcos was behind the killing due to a falling out between the President and the Congressman over the control of the tobacco monopoly in the province, a source close to the assassinated Congressman suggested Singson and even Aquino were considered suspects by some.⁴² Whatever the truth of these accusations, the victory of Dy and Singson in 1971 gave the impression that

candidates who enjoyed Aquino's, and possibly the NPA's, support could 'play' politics rough enough to beat Marcos backed candidates at their own deadly 'game'.

The Making of Muslim Secessionism

After the 1969 election, Marcos found himself fighting on many fronts. Not only were there demonstrators in Manila, communist guerrillas in Tarlac - and later Isabela and elsewhere, but also a "brewing rebellion" in Muslim Mindanao and Sulu.⁴³ Muslim traditional oppositionists had been particularly angered by stiff political competition from Marcos backed candidates who they believed were supported by the Philippine military. In Cotabato Province, five time Liberal Governor Datu Udtog Matalam was forced to step down in 1967 when a strong challenge by a rival, *Nacionalista* affiliated faction forced him to field a younger candidate who could campaign more vigorously.⁴⁴ In 1969, Congressman Salipida Pendatun, Matalam's brother-in-law, fended off another challenge by the pro-Marcos provincial faction but was almost assassinated in September, 1970.⁴⁵ Conditions deteriorated further when the former Cotabato Philippine Constabulary Commander, Colonel Carlos Cajelo, ran for governor in 1971 against the Matalam candidate. According to T.J.S. George, Cajelo was accused of backing a para-military group, called the *Ilagas* (Rats), which was terrorizing Muslims in "the *Nacionalista* Party's all-out bid to win Cotabato".⁴⁶

In Lanao del Sur, the Alonto and the Lucman families had ruled the provincial roost for years until the Marcos supported Dimaporo clan tried to extend its influence from its traditional bailiwick, Lanao del Norte, southward. Macacuna Dimaporo defeated Domocao Alonto for governor of Lanao del Sur in 1967 and when the former ran for congress in 1969 he beat incumbent Raschid Lucman. In an interview, Alonto attributed the "bloody elections" during these years to para-military forces linked to Dimaporo and indirectly to Marcos.⁴⁷ In Sulu, a political leader of the losing Liberal congressional candidate Alawi Abubakar and three others were killed in an ambush during the 1969 election.⁴⁸

Muslim oppositionists were looking for outside assistance in their bloody factional conflicts with pro-administration candidates. The so-called Jabidah massacre in March, 1968 provided them with the pretext. A young military trainee was fished out of Manila Bay off Cavite province and brought to the governor, Justiano Montano, who was a vocal Marcos critic. Montano called in his Liberal allies Aquino and Raschid Lucman who heard the survivor's tale of the shooting of Muslim special troops after a mutiny on Corregidor Island where they were training. While Aquino denounced the killings in the Senate, Lucman helped two Muslim student activists, Nurulladji Misauri and Abul Khayr Alonto, nephew of Domocao, organize demonstrations against the massacre of Muslim soldiers.⁴⁹ Lucman - who had a checkered past including a scam involving a ship used to transport Muslim pilgrims to Mecca, rumors of timber concessions, and a large private army - saw political advantage in using his clout to help the young Muslims.⁵⁰ For his part, Misauri, a leader of the Philippine Muslim Nationalist League and the most influential Muslim student activist, felt he needed the support of traditional political leaders to realize his hopes for an independent Islamic state even though he was a radical who was highly critical of the feudal style politics of the few prominent Muslim families.

In alliance with student activists, the old guard Muslim politicians set up several secessionist groups with armed components. The Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) was founded six weeks after the Jabidah massacre by Datu Matalam. Misauri helped write the group's manifesto which allowed Matalam to wrap his government estimated 800 men (with 2,200 reservists) private army in the Islamic cause. A worried Marcos met with Matalam, appointed him Presidential Advisor on Muslim affairs, and gave the MIM leader his gold watch.⁵¹ Similarly, in September, 1969 Domocao Alonto established *Ansar el Islam* which also had a number of student activists and, according to military intelligence estimates, 150 armed men in its ranks. Other secessionist organizations were established in Zamboanga, where radical Muslim youths set up the Green Guards, and in Jolo and Basilian, where traditional oppositionists founded *Kalimatuh Sahadat*.

These newly established secessionist organizations received substantial foreign assistance. In 1969, 90 Muslim youth activists connected with the MIM and other groups were given guerrilla training arranged by the Malaysian government which had become worried about Marcos' intentions after speculation that special force training on Corregidor was designed to carry out an invasion of Sabah which had been claimed by the Philippines.⁵² While the Malaysians had a territorial dispute with Manila, the Libyans and later the Saudis contributed money (Muammar Al Qadhafi's government gave a reported \$1 million between 1971 and 1972 alone) to the Muslim rebels largely because they believed Filipino Muslims were being persecuted by the Christian government.⁵³ In the run up to the 1971 elections partisans of the Muslim Independence Movement in Cotabato clashed repeatedly with the *Ilagas* backing the Christian candidate Cajelo, who emerged victorious in the gubernatorial race. There were also a number of gruesome massacres of civilians related to the polling. A bitter contest in Sulu, which also ended in victory for the Administration backed candidate, cost many lives. Princess Tarhata Alonto Lucman, wife of Congressman Lucman and sister of Domocao Alonto, won the governorship in Lanao del Sur against the candidate of another Muslim family, the Dimaporos, in a bloody contest. In Lanao del Norte, the pro-Marcos Dimaporos defeated their Christian Liberal Party rivals. Here too there was violence structured along Muslim-Christian lines except in this case Muslims were backed by the Administration and Christians were in the opposition. Violence briefly subsided in all of the Lanao region after the polls until a special election, held two weeks later in the two provinces to determine the outcome of an undecided senatorial race, revived the 'Muslim-Christian' conflict in which members of both religious group took opposite sides in the two provinces.

Record Violence and Opposition Electoral Success

The human cost of this heightened factional conflict was high. The 1971 election was the most violent election in Philippine history with a reported 223 killed and 250 wounded. Seventy three, or about one third of the election related deaths, occurred in the six provinces (of a total of 45 in which killings were reported) where traditional politicians were said to be allied either with communists or

Muslim secessionists.⁵⁴ There were of course other factors involved in these high levels of bloodshed, but the existence of new armed groups allied to opposition politicians to counter the militarization of pro-Marcos candidates made violent confrontation more likely. Table 3 shows the death and injury count in each of these six provinces:

Table 3: Killed and Wounded during the 1971 Election in Provinces in which Opposition Politicians were reportedly backing Communists or Muslim Secessionists

National rank	Province	Killed	Wounded
1	Cotabato	19	3
2	Ilocos Sur	17	16
3	Sulu	17	7
6	Lanao del Sur	11	6
12	Tarlac	6	2
27	Isabela	3	3

Source: Filemon V. Tutay, "Bloodiest Election Yet," *Philippines Free Press*, November 20, 1971, p.4.

This increased bloodshed may have helped the opposition perform better electorally in these provinces. Badly outgunned in 1967, the opposition won only one of six gubernatorial races in these six critical provinces in Luzon, Mindanao and Sulu. With their added coercive resources in 1971, however, the Liberals were victorious in three of the six provinces where the NPA or Muslim secessionists were said to have been helped by opposition politicians.⁵⁵ This was part of a general trend for the opposition party, which captured only 12 governships of in 1967 but nearly double so many, 23, in 1971.⁵⁶

The 1971 Election Comeback

The 1969 election had been a debacle for the Liberal party. Two years later, however, the party scored a remarkable comeback in senatorial elections. What accounts for this abrupt change of fortune? Alliances with new armed groups which may have helped the opposition gain more votes in violence prone provinces have been discussed. In addition, the Liberals benefited from a split in the *Nacionalista* party. For his election in 1965 and re-election in 1969, Marcos had put together an alliance of several prominent family factions - most significantly the Lopezes, the Puyats, and the Laurels - under a single party label. The break-away of these three political clans from Marcos by 1971 made several prominent *Nacionalistas* as much a part of the opposition as the Liberals. In the eyes of many fellow party members Marcos had committed two sins. First, he was not passing around the economic and political spoils of office to other family factions. How Vice President Lopez broke with Marcos after his family was denied economic concessions has already been discussed. Senator Gil Puyat felt Marcos

had rendered him politically powerless despite Puyat being Senate President and head of the *Nacionalista* Party. An angered Puyat left the country during the 1971 campaign and went on leave as party president while two of his close associates openly joined the opposition: Senator Eva Estrada Kalaw ran for re-election as a guest candidate of the Liberals and Senator Jose Diokno resigned from the *Nacionalista* party. In the House of Representatives, Jose Laurel, Jr. was replaced as Speaker in early 1971 by Cornelio Villareal, who was willing to carry out the President's commands more obediently.

Secondly, Marcos was breaking the rules by threatening to field his wife Imelda as *Nacionalista* presidential candidate in 1973. Senator Salvador Laurel, Fernando Lopez, and other presidential aspirants expected the nominee to come from another faction in the party. It was unprecedented for one clan to dominate the presidency indefinitely. A spokesman for the Laurels summed up the dissident *Nacionalista* sentiment with a pun: he said the President was turning the NP (*Nacionalista* Party) into the MP (Marcos Party).⁵⁷

Discontented *Nacionalistas* meant increased patronage resources for the opposition. Eugenio Lopez probably provided material support for the Liberals which added to the already substantial campaign contributions made by other rich industrialists like Salvador Araneta.⁵⁸ Although Marcos outspent the opposition again in 1971, most observers did not believe the gap was as great as it had been in 1969 - both because the Liberals had more money and the Marcos government faced greater financial constraints.⁵⁹ Dissident *Nacionalistas* also helped deliver their baliwicks to the opposition through their patron-client ties to voters. For example, in Batangas province, a traditional *Nacionalista* stronghold in which their senatorial candidates normally swept 8-0, the Liberals won 6-2 in 1971. This was largely the result of the dominant *Nacionalista* politicians in the province - Jose Diokno and the Laurel brothers, Salvador and Jose - supporting most of the Liberal party senatorial bets.⁶⁰

Nacionalista Senator Jose Roy described how "the biggest issue" against Marcos, namely "graft and corruption", undermined the ruling party's 1971 campaign:

Talagang suya na ang tao sa amin [Our people are really fed up] - that's why we lost. When the people are mad, no amount of money can buy their support. This is the time proven lesson of our political history.⁶¹

With this moral advantage, the opposition could help offset the extra patronage resources the Administration enjoyed because of its control of state coffers. Using a slogan the opposition would revive against Marcos during the 1986 'snap' election, one Liberal Party candidate told the crowd at a 1971 campaign rally: If the Administration distributes money "to buy your votes, *tanggapin ang pera, ilagay sa bulsa, pero LP pa rin ang balota!*" [take the money, put it in your pocket, but vote for the Liberals].⁶²

The bombing of a Liberal Party campaign rally at Plaza Miranda, Manila in August, 1971 gave the opposition a moral boost. Two grenades were hurled at the speakers platform, killing several bystanders and severely injuring a number of prominent Liberal politicians. The opposition immediately blamed Marcos whose charge that it was the work of the communists was dismissed as

ridiculous.⁶³ By suspending the writ of habeas corpus after the bombing, Marcos seemed to show opposition warnings of dictatorship were justified. Liberal senatorial candidate Jovito Salonga, who topped the balloting in 1971, described the opposition's Manichean vision of the bombing and its aftermath:

It was a night of shame. It was a night of violence. The forces of evil apparently triumphed... Suddenly the skies all over the country darkened. The President suspended the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, and threatened immediate arrests of so-called Communist suspects... The night of shame and terror was transformed into a day of victory for the Filipino people.⁶⁴

By characterizing the threat the Plaza Miranda bombing posed to Filipino democracy in quasi-religious terms, Salonga could equate the victory of the Liberals with the salvation of the Filipino people.

Preparing for 1973

After their victory in 1971, the Liberals could "smell political blood in the air" for the 1973 presidential election.⁶⁵ For the first time since 1951, the ruling party had lost a senatorial election held before a presidential poll. In that year the opposition had defeated Quirino's candidates in a foreshadowing of Magsaysay's overwhelming victory for the presidency in 1953. The Liberal's triumph in the 1971 national senatorial elections seemed to show public opinion had shifted equally decisively against Marcos. Table 4 shows the results of non-presidential election senatorial results since 1947:

Table 4: Number of Senatorial Seats Won by the Ruling and Opposition Party in Non-Presidential Election Years

Year	Ruling Party	Opposition Party
1971	2	6
1967	6	1
1963	4	4
1959	5	3
1955	7	1
1951	0	9
1947	6	2

Note: In 1967 one independent candidate was elected. There were nine candidates elected in 1951 as an extra seat was contested to fill a vacancy in the Senate.

Given their apparently bright electoral prospects, the Liberal Party began to prepare in earnest for the 1973 presidential election. The party president, Gerardo Roxas, and secretary general, Aquino, maneuvered for the nomination. Roxas

seemed to have the inside track. His father-in-law, J. Amado Araneta, one of the richest industrialists in the country, was preparing to finance his campaign while the Araneta owned *Graphic* magazine would be its mouthpiece. Roxas had played "Santa Claus" to Liberals by being the chief financier of the 1971 senatorial campaign and could expect to collect on these political debts.⁶⁶ Not only could Aquino match Roxas' patronage resources, however, he could also 'play' politics rougher than the Liberal Party President while at the same time taking the moral high ground against Marcos. Through his wife he had access to the Cojuangco fortune, based largely on huge landholdings in Tarlac. Despite Fernando Lopez's publicly announced intention to seek the presidency, the Lopezes were apparently considering throwing their support behind Aquino.⁶⁷ Through his ties to a number of warlords - including Singson, Dy, and Montano - Aquino had the biggest collection of rough political characters in the Philippines aside from Marcos himself. Perhaps most importantly, Aquino was the master of the *bomba* speech, a spectacular disclosure of corruption in the administration. From the Jabidah massacre to the Plaza Miranda bombing, he was the most aggressive of the Administration's critics through his many privilege speeches in the Senate and numerous interviews given to the press. It helped, of course, that two of the most influential Manila publications, *The Manila Times* and the *Philippines Free Press*, were openly sympathetic to him, thanks in large part to the close personal relationship he enjoyed with their publishers. Aquino was preparing to make Marcos' moral failings the centerpiece of his campaign, much as Magsaysay had done against Quirino in 1953 and Aquino's wife Corazon would do against Marcos in 1986.

E tu, Brute?: Assassination Attempts Against Marcos

Despite the Liberals high hopes for winning the presidency in 1973, some oppositionists apparently tried to assassinate Marcos in 1972 at a time he was manipulating the Constitutional Convention to opt for a parliamentary system that would abolish presidential elections as well as threatening to declare martial law which would mean the end of polls altogether. Assassination had been a widely practiced part of local politics in the Philippines since the Commonwealth era. Marcos himself was convicted of assassinating his father's political opponent in 1935 (although thanks to then Supreme Court Chief Justice Jose Laurel, Salvador's father, Marcos was exonerated on appeal). But national politics had been more civil, with no President or Cabinet official being murdered during the pre-martial law Republic. The only other President who was reported to have faced an assassination plot was Quirino, which is revealing because the latter was also accused by the opposition of stealing an election and plotting to stay in office.⁶⁸ It appears that several leaders of the opposition rationalized breaking the taboo on killing an incumbent President by arguing Marcos threatened to destroy the system altogether. Observers of Philippine politics have long been skeptical of Marcos' claim that Sergio Osmena, Jr. and the Lopez brothers were trying to kill him. However, a number of persons implicated by Marcos in this incident confirmed these charges in large part in interviews with the author.⁶⁹ In an almost comic effort, eight different assassination attempts were foiled by Marcos' tight security

and infiltration of the conspiracy as well as the plotters' bad luck and plain incompetence.⁷⁰ But the conspirators were not short on imagination. They planned, among other things, to dynamite the road over which Marcos would drive, bomb his speaker's platform, blow him up on a golf green, explode a flag pole, employ an assassin who would escape in a scuba suit, and shoot Marcos from a soundproofed Volkswagen Kombi painted with the insignia of the World Health Organization parked outside *Malacanang* palace.

Marcos Outmaneuvers the Opposition

Traditional oppositionists had successfully 'punished' Marcos for breaking the political 'rules of the game'. His use of military intervention in local elections had been answered in some provinces with support for communists and Muslim secessionists. His vast state patronage resources had been addressed in part through attrition within his own party - most notably the Laurels and the Lopezes - but more importantly through the moral appeals which would neutralize the impact of Marcos' financial advantage. The opposition had much less success, however, in keeping Marcos from trying to change the political game entirely. Moreover, the opposition had so polarized the political climate that martial law seemed an attractive alternative to many Filipinos.

There is evidence that Marcos understood the advantages political polarization would bring him. After blaming the opposition for demonstrations, he started funding some student groups of his own.⁷¹ In his diary, he hoped such protests would continue "so that we could employ the total solution."⁷² He consistently exaggerated the threat Marxist and Islamic rebels posed. His agents had infiltrated the Key Stone Cops-like assassination conspiracy which he later used to extort properties from wealthy enemies. A series of bombings that occurred in the Manila area shortly before martial law have been attributed to Marcos by several intelligence officials.⁷³ After rebelling against Marcos in February, 1986, Juan Ponce Enrile admitted that the ambush of his car, which Marcos claimed had precipitated the martial law declaration, was faked.

Like Snowball's battles and Napoleon's dogs in George Orwell's *Animal Farm*, the opposition was winning elections but Marcos gaining the loyalty of the military, which proved more decisive in the end. He reshuffled top military commanders once again shortly before martial law to make sure he enjoyed the absolute loyalty of the top brass. The high officers of the "Rolex Twelve", so named because they were each supposedly given a watch by the President, helped Marcos carefully plan martial law months in advance.⁷⁴ His constant warnings about threats from the "oligarchy", communists, and Muslim secessionist may have convinced many military men that national security was endangered. Marcos increased the size of the armed forces from 45,000 to 60,000 and more than doubled its budgetary allocation before martial law. Marcos' success in wooing the armed forces was demonstrated by a survey taken shortly before martial law showing 98% of the country's top officers approved of emergency rule.⁷⁵

Similarly, Marcos had won the trust of U.S. government officials while discrediting his opponents, particularly Aquino. Marcos signalled to the Americans that there all important military bases were safe with him (although at the price

of higher rent). After the 1971 election, Marcos had reshuffled his Cabinet packing it with several U.S. trained technocrats who were looked upon highly by the Americans. Marcos' success in convincing the U.S. government that he would protect their interests can be measured by the fact that while the Americans strongly criticized Korean President Park Chung Hee's declaration of martial law, there was little American protest against Marcos' turn to authoritarianism one month earlier. Moreover, the U.S. government substantially increased military and economic aid to the new Philippine dictatorship. Marcos also courted American businessmen by promising he would overturn nationalistic Supreme Court decisions that endangered their Philippine property rights. The letter of congratulations the American Chamber of Commerce in the Philippines sent to Marcos after the declaration of martial law was his reward for skillful handling of American businessmen.

But Marcos was not content to prove his own credentials to the U.S.; he destroyed the opposition's at the same time. Aquino saw this clearly when Marcos told the *New York Times'* Henry Kamm in an interview that Aquino was a communist. Aquino responded:

The question arises: why did he say these things to a New York Times correspondent and, later on, to a Newsweek writer? I think one of his purposes was to frighten away American support of Liberal Party candidates... Here, pointing at me, is an Allende, the Philippine counterpart of the Chilean Communist who is giving the Americans such trouble...⁷⁶

Aquino was not a radical, of course, but a traditional politician working with the communists when it suited his interests. In the old democratic system such an arrangement might well have been successful. Few observers doubt Aquino would have been elected had polls been held in 1973.⁷⁷ But the contest turned out instead to be over whether martial law would succeed, and that depended largely on military and U.S. approval. In such a competition, Aquino's ties to the radical left were certainly not helpful. Just before martial law, Aquino seems to have realized how precarious his position had become. Dictatorship was becoming a more attractive option to the U.S. Out of desperation, Aquino apparently told the U.S. embassy that if he were elected president, he would declare martial law to bring order to the country.⁷⁸ But once Aquino had accepted this undemocratic theory, Occam's razor applied. If martial law was necessary, then why should the U.S. not support Marcos who already was President and did not have dangerous connections to the communists? So instead of becoming president, Aquino became Marcos' first prisoner, charged as a subversive. The likely winner under the old rules of the game, Aquino became a victim when the rules themselves were altered.

Notes:

- 1) An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European Conference on Philippine Studies in Amsterdam, April 22-25, 1991. The author would like to thank Prof. Dr. Bernhard Dahm, Prof. Alexander Magno, Manfred Fuchs, and James Putzel for comments on that draft.
- 2) Thomas C. Nowak and Kay A. Snyder, "Clientelist Politics in the Philippines," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (Sept. 1974) 3, pp. 1147-1170 and "Economic Concentration and

- Political Change in the Philippines," in Benedict J. Kervliet, ed., *Political Change in the Philippines: Studies of Local Politics Preceding Martial Law* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1974) pp. 153-241.
- 3) Willem Wolters, *Politics, Patronage and Class Conflict in Central Luzon* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1984) p. 143 and Robert B. Stauffer, *The Philippine Congress: Causes of Structural Change* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975) p. 32.
 - 4) Resil Mojares, *The Man Who Would Be President: Sergio Osmena and Philippine Politics* (Cebu: Maria Cacao, 1986) p. 155.
 - 5) Robert E. Baldwin, *Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: The Philippines* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975) pp. 21 and 72-8.
 - 6) Donald L. Berlin, *Prelude to Martial Law: An Examination of Pre-1972 Philippine Civil-Military Relations* (Ph.D Dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1982).
 - 7) On higher voter participation in local elections, see Hirofumi Ando, "Voting Turnout in the Philippines," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, XIII (1969) 4, pp. 424-441. Unfortunately, there has been no careful study of election related killings in the pre-martial law Republic. Statistics gathered by the author largely from the *Philippines Free Press* for most elections 1951-1971 support the generalization that local polls tend to be more violent than presidential ones.
 - 8) According to Philippine Constabulary figures reported in Filemon V. Tutay, "A 'Peaceful' Election," *Philippines Free Press*, November 22, 1969, p. 10, 47 were killed and 58 injured during the 1969 campaign.
 - 9) **Report of the Commission on Election to the President of the Philippines and the Congress on the Manner the Election held on November 11, 1969** (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1971) pp. 13-15 and 49-52. On Raval, see Berlin, *Prelude to Martial Law*, op. cit., p. 188.
 - 10) *Prelude to Martial Law*, op. cit., pp. 200-201.
 - 11) Isabelo T. Crisostomo, "Imelda for President?", *Philippines Free Press*, December 12, 1970, p. 18. Shortly before the 1971 election, Marcos mentioned the possibility of his wife running for president.
 - 12) Rolando V. del Carmen, "Constitutionality and Judicial Politics," in David A. Rosenberg (ed.), *Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979) p. 89.
 - 13) Edward R. Kiunisala, "The Hand of Malacanang," *Philippines Free Press*, June 3, 1972 p. 4 and "For Dogs Only," *Philippines Free Press*, September 2, 1972, pp. 4 and 46.
 - 14) "Post-Election Tensions," *Philippines Free Press*, December 20, 1969, p. 5.
 - 15) Napoleon G. Rama, "The Future of the Opposition," *Philippines Free Press*, November 22, 1969, pp. 4 and 67. Emphasis added.
 - 16) "Post-Election Tensions," op. cit.
 - 17) A good account of the First Quarter Storm based on his dispatches as a *Philippines Free Press* reporter is Jose F. Lacaba's, *Days of Disquiet, Nights of Rage: The First Quarter Storm and Related Events* (Manila: Asphodel Books, 1986).
 - 18) Mojares, *The Man Who Would Be President*, op. cit., p. 147.
 - 19) President Ferdinand E. Marcos, *Progress and Martial Law* (Manila: no publisher given, 1981) pp. 14- 15.
 - 20) Eduardo Lachica, *Huk: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971) p. 182 reports that the "Young Turks" of the Liberal Party met with "one of the China scholars" who, it is clear from the context, was Sison.
 - 21) Salvador Araneta was interviewed by Michael P. Oranato, *Salvador Araneta: Reflections of a Filipino Exile* (Fullerton, CA: California State University, Fullerton, the Oral History Program, 1979) p. 30.
 - 22) Author's interview with Father Romeo Intengan, S.J., a former *Hasik Kalayaan* (Sowing Freedom) leader, Quezon City, May 23, 1989.
 - 23) Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., **Black Friday, January 30: Speech by Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., Senator of the Philippines, February 2, 1970** (Manila: Ninoy Aquino Position Papers, 1970) p.38.
 - 24) Interview by the author and Cristina Luz, Makati, June 7, 1989.
 - 25) Rosalinda Pineda-Ofreneo, *The Manipulated Press: A History of Philippine Journalism Since 1945* (Manila?: Solar Publishing Corporation, 1986, 2nd edition) chapter five.
 - 26) "Political War - and Martial Law," *Philippines Free Press*, January 23, 1971, p. 3.
 - 27) While Napoleon G. Rama, "Where the Demos Went Wrong," *Philippines Free Press*, March 14, 1970, p. 4, pointed out the demonstrations were unpopular, the *Free Press* and many other papers nonetheless viewed them as the inevitable result of an unjust society and a corrupt administration.

- 28) Lachica, *Huk*, *op. cit.*, chapter 12: "The Politics of Central Luzon".
- 29) Lachica, *Huk*, *op. cit.*, p. 215; Lucy Komisar, *Corazon Aquino: The Story of a Revolution* (New York: George Braziller, 1987) p. 34; Nick Joaquin, *The Aquinos of Tarlac: An Essay on History as Three Generations* (Manila: Solar Publishing Co., third edition, 1986) pp. 330-1; Sandra Burton, *Impossible Dream: The Marcoses, the Aquinos, and the Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Warner Books, 1989) pp. 66-7; and Isabelo T. Crisostomo, *Cory: Profile of a President* (Quezon City: J. Kriz Publishing Enterprises, 1986) pp. 63-4.
- 30) Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy* (New York: Times Books, 1987) p. 106.
- 31) Lachica, *Huk*, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-217.
- 32) Joaquin, *The Aquinos of Tarlac*, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-309.
- 33) Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., "Man of the Year," *Philippines Free Press*, January 8, 1972, p. 47.
- 34) Lachica, *Huk*, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-147.
- 35) Lachica, *Huk*, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
- 36) Besides Lachica, pp. 165-166, Komisar, *Corazon Aquino*, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-6 makes this claim based on an interview with Luis Taruc on Nov. 13, 1986.
- 37) Jones, *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) pp. 27-30.
- 38) Enrique C. Dimacali, "Leader of a Troubled Province," *Examiner*, January 22, 1972, p. 5.
- 39) Jose F. Lacaba, "I Have Gun, Will Run for Office," *Philippines Free Press*, October 18, 1969, p. 68.
- 40) Quoted in Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., "Man of the Year in 1973," *Philippines Free Press*, January 8, 1972, p. 2.
- 41) Michael Duenas, "Showdown in Ilocos Sur," *Philippines Free Press*, April 29, 1972, p. 36.
- 42) Author's interview, anonymity requested.
- 43) Filemon V. Tutay, "A 'Peaceful' Election," *Philippines Free Press*, November 22, 1969, p. 11.
- 44) T. J. S. George, *Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980) pp. 130-133.
- 45) Filemon V. Tutay, "Targets of the Year," *Philippines Free Press*, January 2, 1971, p. 2.
- 46) George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
- 47) Author's interview with Domocao Alonto, Makati, May 25, 1989.
- 48) Edward R. Kiunisala, "The 'Costliest' Election," *Philippines Free Press*, November 15, 1969, p. 66.
- 49) Aquino delivered a privilege speech, "Jabidah! Special Forces of Evil?" on March 28, 1968. The author discussed Aquino, Lucman, and the student activists' role in the Jabidah affair in an interview with Abul Khayr Alonto, Greenhills, Metro Manila, Philippines, May 30, 1989.
- 50) Lela Garner Noble, "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines," *Pacific Affairs*, (Fall, 1976) 49 p. 411.
- 51) George, *Revolt in Mindanao*, *op. cit.*, p. 136 reports Matalam claimed to have returned the Marcos gift "lest his followers think he was 'bought for a mere watch.'"
- 52) Reports of the training appeared in Manila newspapers in March, 1970 which were subsequently confirmed by a number of sources, for example by former Moro National Liberation Front central committee member Sali Wali quoted in Nelly Sindayen, "Start of MNLF in South Recalled," *Bulletin Today*, October 12, 1980, pp. 1 and 18.
- 53) W.K. Che Man, *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990) pp. 139-142 and Noble, "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines," *op. cit.*, pp. 409-411.
- 54) Filemon V. Tutay, "Bloodiest Election Yet," *Philippines Free Press*, November 20, 1971, p. 4.
- 55) In 1971 the Liberals won governorships in Lanao del Sur, Isabela, and Ilocos Sur. In 1967 they were victorious only in Cotabato.
- 56) Included in the opposition governorships won in 1971 are independent candidates Osmundo Rama (brother of the *Philippines Free Press* reporter) of Cebu and Juan Frivaldo of Sorsogon, Bicol who were well known as anti-Marcos.
- 57) Michael Duenas, "What will the NPs do Now? - III," *Philippines Free Press*, November 27, 1971, p. 6.
- 58) Vice President Fernando Lopez told reporter Edward R. Kiunisala that his brother Eugenio supported all the Liberal Party candidates. Given the Lopezes wealth and their interest in seeing Marcos' candidates defeated, it is likely they contributed financially to the opposition as well. See "What Will the NPs Do Now? - II" *Philippines Free Press*, November 27, 1971, p. 4.

- 59) Edward R. Kiunisala, "Moment of Truth," *Philippines Free Press*, November 13, 1971, p. 2 and Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., "Why the Liberals Won," *Philippines Free Press*, November 20, 1971, p. 7.
- 60) Duenas, "What Will the NPs Do Now? - III," *op. cit.*, pp. 6 and 58.
- 61) Edward Kiunisala, "What Will the NPs Do Now? - II," *op.cit.*, p. 4.
- 62) Edward R. Kiunisala, "Campaigning with the LP," *Philippines Free Press*, October, 1971, p. 50.
- 63) Evidence has recently come to light indicating that Marcos may have been telling the truth. Victor Corpus, the Philippine military officer who defected to the NPA, claimed, based on information he gathered as a party leader, that the communists were in fact responsible. See *The Sunday Times* (Magazine of *The Manila Times*), January 25, 1987, p. 7. Gregg Jones, *The Red Revolution*, *op. cit.*, chapter 5, "The Ghosts of Plaza Miranda" makes a very persuasive case that Corpus account is accurate.
- 64) Quoted in H.C. Molina, "Remember Plaza Miranda!" *Philippines Free Press*, September 2, 1972, p. 42.
- 65) Mojares, *The Man Who Would Be President*, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
- 66) Napoleon G. Rama, "Scramble for Presidential Nomination," *Philippines Free Press*, January 22, 1972, p. 7.
- 67) Wurfel, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) p. 18.
- 68) Carlos Quirino, *Apo Lakay: The Biography of President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines* (Makati: Total Book World, 1987) p. 120.
- 69) Among the people Marcos had accused of involvement in the assassination plot who were interviewed by the author the only contested issue was whether the Lopezes were involved or not. In an interview, Eugenio Lopez, Jr. (Pasig, May 2, 1989) said there was an assassination plot but that he and his family were not involved. Sergio Osmena, III (Sergio Osmena, Jr.'s son, by telephone, September 9, 1989), John Osmena (Sergio Osmena, Jr.'s nephew, Manila, June 22, 1989), and Renato Tanada (a prominent Marcos oppositionist and son of former Senator Lorenzo Tanada, Quezon City, April 25, 1989) all confirmed the existence of the plot. There were some hints of Lopez involvement but only one source, not for attribution, confirmed it categorically.
- 70) The eight are detailed in Marcos, *Progress and Martial Law*, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17.
- 71) Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator*, *op. cit.*, p. 125 cites Philippine and American intelligence officers who says Marcos "organized demonstrations" including several in front of the U.S. embassy. Alex Bello Brillantes, *Dictatorship and Martial Law: Philippine Authoritarianism in 1972* (Quezon City: Great Books Publishers, 1987) p. 49, interviewed two high ranking aides to Marcos who claimed the President funded student protests. Former Marcos spokesman Adrian Cristobal told Burton, *Impossible Dream*, *op.cit.*, p. 76 that both the Marcos and the opposition financed youth protest rallies.
- 72) Cited in Theodore Friend, "What Marcos Doesn't Say," *Orbis*, 33 (Winter 1989) 1, p. 103.
- 73) Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator*, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-119 and 242.
- 74) Brillantes, *Dictatorship and Martial Law*, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-47.
- 75) Cited in Reuben R. Canoy, *The Counterfeit Revolution: The Philippines from Martial Law to the Aquino Assassination* (Manila: Philippine Editions, Third Printing, 1984) p. 23.
- 76) Quoted in Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., "Who Helped the Iluks?" *Philippines Free Press*, October 2, 1971, p. 47.
- 77) Wurfel, *Filipino Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
- 78) Burton, *Impossible Dream*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.