

nomen werden anmerken, dass wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen, wie sie die Bereitstellung von finanziellen Mitteln und Expertise darstellen, ausnahmslos neben den intendierten, direkten Wirkungen „externe Effekte“, d.h. meist nicht intendierte, indirekte Wirkungen hervorrufen, die von (unbeteiligten) Dritten zu tragen sind. Deren Rechte sind vor allem in autokratisch geführten Staaten, wie die angeführten Beispiele China und Birma zeigen, beschnitten. Die Veröffentlichung enthält eine Fülle von wichtigen Informationen. Die meisten Beiträge erscheinen erstmals in (gekürzter) deutscher Übersetzung. Soweit die Originaltexte im Internet verfügbar sind, lassen sich terminologische Unklarheiten am einfachsten durch das Studium der Quellen ausräumen.

Wolfgang-Peter Zingel

Harish Kapur: Foreign Policies of India's Prime Ministers

New Delhi: Lancer, 2009. 444 S., USD 31,00

Harish Kapur was for several decades professor of international relations at the reputed Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. This book is a record of a long period of detailed research and analysis of India's foreign policy. Kapur argues convincingly that the prime ministers played a decisive role in shaping India's foreign policy and he examines the performance of all of them. Each chapter devoted to a prime minister first outlines his background and then discusses his contribution to global and regional foreign policy. This is followed by an analysis of the decision making process and an evaluation of the performance of the respective prime minister. Not all of the prime ministers get good marks and in some instances Kapur mentions their disinterest in foreign affairs, e.g. Lal Bahadur Shastri, Morarji Desai, Charan Singh, Vishwanath Pratap Singh, Chandra

Shekhar and H. D. Deve Gowda. Whenever the prime minister was not interested in foreign affairs, the foreign minister tended to play a more active role. Under more assertive prime ministers, the foreign minister tended to be no more than an assistant in this field. The Ministry of External Affairs often had to play second fiddle to the powerful Prime Minister's Office (PMO) which had been established by Shastri and which has grown in importance ever since.

Nehru's role as the architect of Indian foreign policy is well known. But Kapur also highlights the interest which Indira and Rajiv Gandhi took in foreign affairs. He states that Indira Gandhi in her second term almost emerged as a leading figure in global diplomacy. This was cut short by her assassination. Rajiv set a new pattern by his visit of China in 1988. The troubled relations between India and China are a special field of Kapur's interest. Among recent prime ministers he gives good marks to P.V. Narasimha Rao, Inder Kumar Gujral and Manmohan Singh. Narasimha Rao had served as foreign minister before he became prime minister and was very experienced in international diplomay. The same was true of Gujral who was both V.P. Singh's and Deve Gowda's foreign minister before he became prime minister in 1997. Kapur provides detailed insights into Gujral's foreign policy as he has been close to him since they first met as young men in Lahore in the 1940s. Gujral was a Communist in his youth, left the party in the 1950s but then followed a mildly leftist course in politics throughout his life. Kapur praises him for enunciating the „Gujral Doctrine“ which stressed that India should unilaterally cultivate good relations with its neighbours. Actually India's relations with the other states of South Asia have always been troubled and very few prime ministers could score any success in this field.

A.B. Vajpayee made an impact on India's foreign relations not only by opting for the atom bomb but also by establishing a Na-

tional Security Council and making other institutional innovations concerning the conduct of foreign policy. As far as the bomb was concerned he had the full support of Narasimha Rao. Kapur reports that when handing over power to Vajpayee in 1996, Narasimha Rao passed on a note to him: „The bomb is ready, you can go ahead with it“. Although Kapur deals very comprehensively with all other aspects of India's foreign policy, he does not pay much attention to the nuclear dimension. He does mention Vajpayee's bus trip to Lahore in February 1999 but he remains silent on the subsequent Kargil war, the first conventional war between nuclear powers. Pakistan relied on India's fear of nuclear escalation and India was severely handicapped by this when defending the Line of Control in Kashmir. Vajpayee took a calculated risk by ordering the Indian airforce to intervene in this war which greatly contributed to winning it – and thus to Vajpayee's victory in the elections of November 1999.

Manmohan Singh emerges as a very effective diplomat in Kapur's account. He has dealt firmly with many issues without much fanfare. Being rated highly by an expert like Kapur helps to set the record straight, because being a very quiet man, Manmohan Singh is often underestimated by people in India who are used to politicians who talk a lot and love to be in the limelight.

Dietmar Rothermund

Jonathan Woodier: The Media and Political Change in Southeast Asia: Karaoke Culture and the Evolution of Personality Politics

Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, Ma., USA: Edward Elgar, 2008. 384 S., GBP 95,00

Western scholars of the media in Southeast Asia face the problem that most of Southeast Asia's media, as well as most of the academic discourse on these media, are in lan-

guages other than English – notably Indonesian and Malay, but also Thai, Vietnamese, Burmese, Dutch, French etc. This is why the study of the media in these countries usually has to be based on a very good knowledge of the relevant languages – a fact that is reflected in the requirements of internationally respected programs of Southeast Asian Studies, e.g. in Leiden, London, Paris, Cornell etc. In this regard, research on the media (and politics, culture, history etc.) of Southeast Asia can be compared to, for instance, research on the media in Japan. Who would trust any academic contribution about Japanese media if the author does not know Japanese and does not refer to any Japanese source?

Unfortunately, the author of this book does precisely this: He relies exclusively on English-language material, without being able to check errors and mistakes. Consequently, much of the country-specific information, for instance on Indonesia, is simply wrong or highly distorted. To give a few examples: The Indonesian word *halus* (= refined) does not mean 'respect', as Woodier has it (p. 162), nor is the newspaper *Jawa Pos* spelled *Java Pos* (p. 160). The highly respected daily *Kompas* is not *Kompass* (p. 158), and the state television TVRI (*Televisi Republik Indonesia*) definitely not *Televesi Republik Indonesia* (p. 146). Woodier writes that President Megawati 'succeeded Walid (sic!) in 2000' (p. 157) – what he means is probably her succession to Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001. Similarly wrong is that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became President 'in 2005' (p. 156) – it was 2004. Highly nonsensical is also the assessment that 'Kompass (sic!) editorial line often reflected the views of radical Muslim groups' (p. 158), since it is well-known that *Kompas* is a newspaper with a Catholic background. There is even a scholarly monograph with that title, *Kompas 1965 – 1985: een algemeene krant met een katholieke achtergrond binnen het religieus pluralisme van Indonesië*, by De Jong (1990). Unfortunately, according to his bibliography, Woodier has not