

**Becker, Elizabeth: When the War Was Over, The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and its People.**

New York: Simon and Schuster 1986, 502 pp.

**Chanda, Nayan: Brother Enemy, the War After the War.**

San Diego/New York/London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publ. 1986, xiv, 479 pp.

Both of these books are too late, with too little that has not already appeared in several works by specialist scholars.

BECKER's "attempt to tell the full story of the Kmer Rouge" pretends to be based largely "on original research" (Becker, p.14); while CHANDA's history of contemporary Indochina, inevitably centered on Cambodia, is much more a history of diplomatic relations than a treatment of events within the country; and his claim to originality is in the interviews with "all the protagonists and many of the foreign observers" (Chanda, p.x).

In spite of their claims, both writers rely very heavily on their academic predecessors - BECKER sometimes raiding their work without acknowledgement, while CHANDA, although generally careful not to depend on work which he does not wish to cite, could have shown some courtesy to pathbreakers Grant EVANS and Kelvin ROWLEY, "Red Botherhood at War", in those sections, such as pp. 237-9, where he follows them paragraph by paragraph, if not sentence by sentence, and with much of the same source material (Evans and Rowley, pp.50-53).

As historians they have neglected the first task, source criticism, and have stumbled into some strange positions and inconsistencies.

BECKER, for instance, has adopted the Pol Pot line on the formation of a party, at a 'First Congress' in 1960 (Becker, pp.87, 104), while CHANDA recognizes that three national parties were really set up in 1951 (Chanda, p.57), that the meeting in 1960 was "a clandestine party congress", not the founding (Chanda, p.59). The trouble with the BECKER line (following Pol Pot and Stephen Heder) is that Cambodian communists believed they had a party in the 1950s; when Ith Sarin, whom BECKER cites favourably (Becker, p.155-7), wrote about his sojourn with the communists in 1972 he learned that the party had been founded in 1951; and that date was not challenged within the party until 1976, when the Pol Pot faction wished to obliterate early links with Vietnam (Becker, p.279, Chanda, p.82). As Thiounn MUM said, "we switched to the date 1960 in order to disconnect ourselves from the ICP", a strictly political move (Becker, p.310).

BECKER's purpose is to show that there was never a serious split between Pol Potists and another group more favorably disposed toward Vietnam, that when the Pol Pot group was taking control in the 1960s they were at one with Hanoi, that the break between Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1970s was because of legitimate Cambodian nationalist fear of Vietnamese domination, which has now been realized with the PRK.

Its leaders, this way, are just Pol Potists who had to save their skins at the last minute, and who have now become puppets of Vietnam.

Thus East Zone chief So Phim, who as CHANDA says "maintained a close relationship with the Vietnamese Communists" and "was suspect for keeping the East Zone relatively prosperous" (Chanda, p.250-2), must be charged with "fighting the Vietnamese too zealously" in 1976 (Becker, p.275). "Nowhere", she alleges, "in the record is there a hint of (his) being a close friend of Vietnam" (Becker, p.307), nor of his dissent from the Pol Pot line. Although he "doubted the seriousness of... (a) Vietnamese threat" (Becker, p.315), and refused to execute suspected traitors who "were his trusted lieutenants" in 1977 (Becker, p.315) when such doubt would have signalled not just dissent but high treason, he was just "Machiavellian" accepting "Center policy direction and demands" to avoid interference (Becker, p.306). She admits he was late "in adopting communal eating and in some areas resisted orders to abolish the concept of private property" (Becker, p.307), which constituted dissidence, and might be seen as admiration for Vietnamese methods, a view BECKER will not countenance, preferring to claim that for this he was "accused of being too slavish an admirer of the Chinese model of cooperatives".

CHANDA has not been embarrassed to note real conflicts in Democratic Kampuchea, and he blames the Pol Pot line for the increasing hostility to Vietnam which split the Cambodian party down the middle. Still he feels obliged to throw a sop to those who would tar the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) with the Pol Pot brush and this leads him too into confusion, centered on Heng Samrin, whom PRK enemies charge with fleeing only because he was in trouble for incompetent soldiering.

Following variously Stephen HEDER, Ben KERNAN, and unnamed sources, CHANDA has Heng Samrin in late 1977, inferentially for good work against the Vietnamese, promoted to chairman of "Route 7 Battlefield", bordering Vietnam, "effectively ... deputy chairman of the Eastern Region military staff" (197) and commander of the 4th Division under the Center (Chanda, p.206), which person was allegedly shot by a Pol Pot loyalist after the December 1977 attack (Chanda, p.213), while "Commander of the 4th Division Heng Samrin ... with about thousand of his loyal troops ... headed for the jungle" after the May 1978 conflict between East and Center (Chanda, p.253). Hun Sen had already fled after refusing to participate in the September 1977 attack on Vietnam, and a brother of Heng Samrin, also a division commander was among those officers from the East Zone rounded up and killed in April-May 1978 (Chanda, pp.197,251).

The climate of both books, and a main interest of CHANDA's is the international relationships as Cambodia and Vietnam fought, while the U.S. entered into negotiations with Vietnam and China.

While BECKER's treatment is anti-Vietnamese, CHANDA indicates that Vietnam was unjustifiably provoked by Cambodia and unreasonably

attacked by China. He considers that the change of government in 1979 brought improvement to Cambodia, while BECKER (p.444) retails lies about Vietnamization in that country; and CHANDA has more sympathy for those Americans, such as HOLBROOKE and VANCE, who wanted normalization of relations with Vietnam, than for the Brzezinski group who wanted to line China up against the Soviet Union. The reader who wishes to be informed about these matters will ignore BECKER for CHANDA - but perhaps would do even better with the more academic treatments. For CHANDA's contribution to history is too often name-dropping dressed up with the devices of second rate fiction - "Darkness fell like fate on Saigon" (Chanda, p.1), Oksenberg "sat silently with a scowl on his face" (Chanda, p.265) during negotiations at which CHANDA was not present - little more than anecdotal froth obscuring rather than illuminating the factual picture. CHANDA even seems to have pulled back when the interview technique might have elicited something new, but dicey. U.S.-Vietnamese negotiations got off to a good start in 1977, and again looked promising in the fall of 1978, but it was too late. One of the reasons they had been frozen for ten months was theft of State Department cables for Vietnam by Ronald Humphrey, which led to expulsion of the Vietnamese ambassador to the U.N. in February 1978.

As CHANDA gives it to the reader in widely spaced dribbles, when the Woodcock mission was making good progress in Hanoi in March 1977, Kenneth Quinn, a longtime analyst of Cambodia communism, told Woodcock that another member of the team had left a fiancee behind in Saigon, and Woodcock interceded successfully with the Vietnamese (Chanda, pp.141-2). Quinn unaccountably took a similar case, that of Ronald Humphrey, to the Swedish Embassy in Hanoi, not the best place, one would think, for American diplomats to ask favours (Chanda, p.155). A little later "in the summer" (Chanda, pp.155-6) Quinn tipped off the FBI that a spy might be at work for Vietnam, and he suspected Humphrey. Following this, apparently, during the May-June negotiations with the Vietnamese in Paris Holbrooke, warned by the FBI, was worried, in Quinn's words, that they "may well have seen our negotiating instructions" (Chanda, pp.153-4); and he appeared cooler to the Vietnamese than usual.

The cables which Humphrey and David Truong allegedly stole, CHANDA finally tells us, were "Of limited importance ... some not classified at all" (Chanda, p.268), thus they had not given the Vietnamese an edge in negotiating, and the chronology of events, contrary to CHANDA's step-by-step presentation, makes clear that U.S. authorities had known that at the time.

These events would have been worth further pursuit by a hotshot investigative journalist. In 1977-78 it was not just Vance's general normalization versus Brzezinski's China card. There was a third line-preservation of Democratic Kampuchea as a weapon against Vietnam, and

Quinn had been a very early government researcher into the nature of Pol Pot's 'Communism' (Becker, p.164-5). CHANDA, however, is no more willing than BECKER to pursue U.S. responsibility for troubles in Indochina, and his wide access to participants has fallen short out its promise.

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Noordin Sopiee, Chwe Lay See, Lim Siang Jin (eds.): **ASEAN at the Crossroads: Obstacles, Options and Opportunities in Economic Co-operation.**

Kuala Lumpur 1987, 577 S.

Das Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia veranstaltete vom 13.-22. März 1987 auf Anregung der sogenannten "Group of Fourteen" in Kuala Lumpur einen ersten ASEAN Economic Congress, auf dem vor 400 geladenen Gästen die im hier vorgelegten Band veröffentlichten papers vorgetragen und diskutiert wurden. Die "Group of Fourteen" wurde 1986 gegründet und setzt sich aus Abgeordneten der Industrie- und Handelskammern der sechs ASEAN-Staaten zusammen. Ihr Aufgabenbereich wird in der Einleitung zu vorliegendem Band wie folgt umschrieben: "The Group of Fourteen will explore, study and recommend all possible measures and concrete steps with regard to trade and other areas that can be taken to foster economic co-operation and integration in the ASEAN Community of Nations".

Nach 20jähriger erfolgreicher Zusammenarbeit auf politischem Gebiet ist man sich in den ASEAN-Ländern also durchaus bewußt, daß die gleichfalls schon im Gründungsdokument (Bangkok 1967) geforderte Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit noch viel zu wünschen übrig läßt. Zwar habe es in verschiedenen Bereichen (ASEAN Industrial Projects [1976], Preferential Trading Arrangements [1977], ASEAN Industrial Complementation Scheme [1981]) schon Erfolge auf dem Papier gegeben, so der derzeitige Vorsitzende der "Group of Fourteen", Dato Paul Leong Khee Seong, Malaysia, bei seiner Eröffnungsrede vor der internationalen Konferenz. Aber angesichts der Möglichkeiten und der Notwendigkeit sei der Erfolg der ASEAN in wirtschaftlicher Zusammenarbeit bisher alles andere als beispielhaft, "it is a record of protracted negotiations, exasperation and frustration". Den Grund, warum das Ergebnis so unbefriedigend sei, sieht Dato Paul Leong in ökonomischem Nationalismus und nationalem Egoismus, der immer noch eine bestimmende Kraft in der Region sei. Er müsse überwunden werden, Impulse dazu seien bisher nur von privaten Unternehmern ausgegangen. Ihnen müßten die Regierungen unbedingte Unterstützung gewähren, damit dieser Geist des Unternehmertums weiter um sich greifen könne und nicht abgewürgt würde. Er bewirkte mehr als alle Zollpolitik und