

Hauptstreitpunkte zwischen den unterschiedlichen „Befreiungsbewegungen“ nach. Dabei spielt die Kulturrevolution keine Rolle, einzig die Drei-Welten-Theorie bildet den Bezug zu China. Jens Benicke seziert das bundesdeutsche Verhältnis der RAF zu den K-Gruppen und findet dabei nur wenig substantielle Bezüge zu Mao und zur Kulturrevolution. Sowohl die RAF als auch die K-Gruppen hätten sich in ihrer Theorie vorrangig auf Lenins Schriften und weniger auf Mao bezogen. Die Auseinandersetzungen mit der Revolutionsstrategie, der Gewaltfrage und dem deutschen Herbst (also der Auseinandersetzung mit dem deutschen Terrorismus) stehen in diesem Beitrag im Vordergrund.

Die letzten beiden Beiträge von Stefan Gehrig und Laura Diehl schließlich setzen sich eingehend mit dem Einfluss maoistischer Ideologie und dem Mao-Bild der westdeutschen 1968er-Bewegung auseinander. Während Gehrig sich vor allem mit der Frage der strategischen Funktion maoistischer Dogmen für den terroristischen Guerillakampf der westdeutschen Protestbewegung auseinandersetzt, untersucht Laura Diehl die einseitige Rezeption der Kulturrevolution durch die westdeutsche 1968er-Bewegung. Dabei geht sie weit aus ausführlicher und systematischer auf die ideologische Durchdringung der 68er-Bewegung mit maoistischer Theorie und Ideologie ein als es die anderen Beiträge vermochten. Sowohl die Schriften der Frankfurter Schule als auch die Rezeption der Rotgardisten-Bewegung in antiautoritären Zirkeln werden von ihr aufgegriffen.

Im Schlusskapitel analysiert Barbara Mittler, welche politischen Gruppen – von Faschisten bis hin zu Kommunisten – sich welcher Propaganda für welche Zwecke bedienen. Dabei geht sie auf drei Aspekte ein: die Irrelevanz transportierter Propagandainhalte für die Rezipienten (affirmative/ subversive Funktion, S. 209), die Abhängigkeit des Erfolges von Propaganda von der Popularität der benutzenden Medien (Plakatkunst, Musik, etc.) und schließlich die Langlebigkeit von Propagandaformen und -inhalten durch weiterhin

bestehende soziale Grundprobleme. Mittler geht letztlich der Frage nach, warum Mao und der mit ihm verbundene Propagandakult heute gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt stiftet und in den Kanon der „kulturellen Essentials“ mit eingegangen ist (S. 214). Die Entkoppelung historischer Sachverhalte aus ihrer historischen Einbettung und ihre Umfunktionierung zu Projektionsflächen für soziale Bewegungen werden im Schlussteil zur Erkenntnisklammer dieser Publikation (S. 216). Leider wird diese virtuose Schlussbetrachtung, die sich über die unterschiedliche Rezeption von Propaganda in Karikaturen, in US-Anti-Nazi-Filmen über ihre absurden kontra-indizierten Auswirkungen und ihre Verankerung in der Populärkultur erstreckt, durch den konstruiert wirkenden Bezug zum vorliegenden Band entschleunigt. Der phrasenhafte Verweis auf Maurice Halbwachs, um die Konstruktionsleistung von Erinnerungsvorgängen aus der Gegenwart heraus zu betonen und damit herauszustellen, dass Mao und die Kulturrevolution Projektionsflächen waren, ist keine neue Erkenntnis.

Insgesamt eine anregende und informative Lektüre für alle, die immer schon wissen wollten, wie viel oder wenig Mao tatsächlich in den Köpfen der deutschsprachigen Linken steckte.

Nora Sausmikatz

**Jörg Mahlich, Werner Pascha (eds.):  
Innovation and Technology in Korea.  
Challenger of a Newly Advanced  
Economy**

Heidelberg, New York: Physika-Verlag, 2007, 297 S., USD 99,00

With 19 expert contributions this volume covers the full ground on everything one might want to know about Korea's technology policy. Korea as a divided medium sized country, regionally isolated and economically sandwiched between high tech Japan and low and medium tech China, with emerging India looming large as well, it needs to cope with

global technology competition and has the ambition to be a leader – somewhere. Like in Japan all instruments of contemporary research policy are employed. As in the rest of the world their effectiveness remains difficult to establish. *Prima vista* it would seem that most R&D is done good and well by Samsung, LG, SK and Hyundai Motors. Deduct those four *chaebol* and very little seems left.

True or false? This volume is set to investigate this assumption. It is sensibly divided into three parts, covering Korea's macroeconomic setting in general, moving on to more detailed research policy issues (public private partnerships, R&D and FDI, patents analyses, foresight studies etc), and finally analyzes salient sectors, like nanotechnology and telecommunications.

In their introductory chapter the editors outline the factors behind Korea's surprising recovery after the 1997 crisis with a gross savings rate of 29% and a gross domestic investment rate of 26% (2002). Yet Korea has left the stage of simple capital and labour exploitation. The old industrial policies of a lax competition policy, the promotion of industrial champions, etc., have become less relevant. Also traditional technology policy based on the simple extrapolation of past trends and with its "reverse engineering" of copying more advanced models has long come to its end. New growth was achieved with productivity improvement through innovation and technology change. As a result human capital with its concomitant individualization and social diversity has grown in importance. For an improved industry/science nexus the role of smaller hi tech companies has become decisive (p. 8).

Martin Hemmert of Korea University, Seoul, focuses on Korea's innovation system, and spells its sequencing in greater detail. There were three phases: until the 1970es: the introduction and imitation of foreign technologies, as part and parcel of Park Chung-hee's industrialization policies. Then in the 1980es the *chaebol* led the formation of industrial R&D. The more effective use of foreign R&D then

had been a major motive (p. 14). Since the 1990es Korea has built up its own basic research capacities. In only three decades it has succeeded to catch up with the technologically leading nations. There is consensus that in a high income country low labour costs were no longer possible, and that the old recipe of competitiveness based on the low cost production of commodities and of low priced products of reasonable quality was no longer an option. With 3% of BIP devoted to R&D expenditure there is now a lot of input into research efforts. Yet perhaps due to an inevitable time lag there is still relatively little output measurable in patents, scientific papers, technology sales, and in new products and processes.

Three quarters of R&D is still done by the business sector, especially large firms (i.e. the *chaebol*), with Samsung Electronics accounting for 28% alone. If one adds Hyundai Motor, LG Electronics and SK (Sunkyong), they add up to 40% of Korea's total R&D. Since the 1997 crisis, following the dismissals of entire research departments, a sizable segment of small, yet fast growing research companies has equally sprung up (p. 20).

Yet there are evident weaknesses in Korea's innovation system, starting with the continued dependency of most supplier industries on foreign technology. There is also a lack of skilled technicians. Korean style management with its autocratic CEO probably assures maximum efficiency and organizational flexibility, yet it stifles creativity and technological breakthroughs. Publicly funded research (accounting for a sizable 0, 6% of GDP) remains under government control. There are six different ministries and agencies with overlapping and sometimes conflicting objectives in charge with fragmentation as an obvious consequence. Due to the nationalist mindset of Korean firms and organizations, also international links frequently are underdeveloped (p. 30).

Thanks to its Confucian roots the Korean education system gets excellent international reviews, like in the OECD's Pisa tests. Yet it

focuses on memory and learning skills for exams. In companies graduates usually need retraining for problem solving skills. Universities have traditionally defined themselves as institutes of higher learning. Only very gradually they are assuming research functions. Yet their research capacities are still low.

With these uneven interests the triple interaction between business, universities and the government, including public laboratories, remains problematic.

As a result in the areas of *chaebol* interest, like electronics, automotive engineering and telecommunications, Korea is part of the global technological leadership, based on its good knowledge base in engineering and its strong national propensity for knowledge and engineering. In other sectors weaknesses remain (Pascha, p. 56).

Jin-hyo Joseph Yun examines the relation between technological capacity and FDI inflows. Clearly FDI which had increased to 13% of GDP during 1997 is a major channel for technology transfers. During the technological imitation phase FDI was restricted to foreign capital participation below 50%. Foreign technology licencing was taxed. The acquisition of foreign know how for the targeted heavy and chemical industries was channelled through the Korean Institute of Science and Technology. Then the national efforts were relatively minor. Only 0,6% of GDP was allocated to R&D. 18.000 researchers were employed (1980). After 1994, due to WTO rules and OECD membership, the liberalization of FDI was accelerated, and shot up to \$ 10,6 bio (1999). With an advanced innovation system in place the number of Korean researcher had gone up to 160.000 (2000) in parallel (p. 42).

Kwan Rim, the head of a Samsung research institute, takes his company as a case study. A touch of corporate PR is therefore understandable. As no 1 in the global memory chip market it spends \$ 2,9 bio on R&D, mostly in the electronics field. He vividly supports the macro pressures for technology driven economic readjustment: Hourly wages have

multiplied by 22 from \$ 0,32 (1975) to \$ 6,71 (1999). Yet since one decade Korea's GDP is stuck at a level just above \$ 10.000, as Chinese products displace Korean ones on the US and Japanese markets (p. 64).

Although not known to be a hi tech profession, there is also a chapter by Joon Hwa Rho on auditing in Korea. Yet it is interesting in its own right. Traditionally the government had assigned auditors to companies. This assured their independence, but did little improve their quality. Since 1982 auditors have to compete for clients. As a result two major auditors signed clean bills of health for Kia Motors and for the Daewoo group and failed to detect their accounts manipulations prior to their eventual bankruptcies (p. 89). As punishment both auditing firms were dissolved.

On public-private partnerships in R&D Matthew Shapiro observes that Korea in the late 1980es replicated such US schemes with high hopes for spill over and accelerated commercialization. As vehicles for public-private knowledge transfers Korean public labs were supposed to educated industrial researchers and to provide counselling to industry. (p. 102). Thomas Roediger-Schlaga cautions on the fundamental differences between public research, which as open science strives for a maximum expansion of knowledge, while corporate research strives for proprietary technology, and keeps its more promising findings as long as possible secret (p. 123).

In a major analytical chapter Bernhard Dachs, Jörg Mahlich and Georg Zahradnik do a patent analysis of Korea's research performance. Globally Korea's share increased from 0,3% (1990) to 1,5% (2000). The improvement rate is impressive, the overall share is not. In an impressive effort the authors confirm the obvious: The *chaebol* run the R&D show. Forget SMEs, public institutes, public-private joint ventures *et tanti quanti* (pp. 144). In electronics core competences are exercised by Samsung and LG, in instruments by Samsung, in process engineering by LG and SK, in mechanical engineering by Hyundai Motors, and in civil engineering and consumer

goods by LG alone. The four *chaebol* in question are blessed by a broad asset base in terms of finance, organization and human resources, being able to employ the best domestic and foreign trained scientists. Their risks are spread and they enjoy government support. This is good enough.

Following up on this research, Keun-yeob Oh and Taegi Kim find that foreign patents especially in ICT are more effective for productivity gains than Koreans ones (p. 167). Perhaps this is because foreigners control ICT core technologies, they surmise.

The use of Technology Foresight (TF) is presented by Dominik Schloßstein. He states that 70/80% of economic growth is based on new and better knowledge. How wonderful and justly this rewards better brains and intellectual sweat. Unfortunately a raw material and energy price boom as from 2007 has rewarded the opposite, no brains and little sweat, namely countries sitting by happenstance on these deposits, from Angola to Azerbaijan, granting them R&D free, albeit dubious high growth and transitory selective prosperity.

Yet in spite of such imponderabilia TF is done world wide for market responsive science and technology policies. There seems consensus that simple extrapolations of past trends resulting in a "unique future" are no longer of use. (p.177). After all predictions are famously difficult especially when they concern the future. Yet by now the reader already knows that Korean strengths lie in semi conductors and mobile communications, followed by petrochemicals, shipbuilding and automobiles (p. 179). Good to know that interactive expert surveys and Delphi studies with their disinterested bounded rationality agree. Claudia Steindl, who like many of the authors and discussants is from the Austrian Research Centre, reports that 1000 foresight studies have been identified world wide (p. 196). Further techniques include mind mapping, brainstorming at expert panels, and SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opposition, threats) analysis.

Iris Wiczorek does a very thorough yet sobering analysis of the nanotechnology sector in Korea. In 2000 the US had triggered the global technology race in the field, and in 2002 Korea announced to become a world leader in nanotechnologies by 2010, which was later revised to 2015 (p. 212). Training and research budgets were suitably expanded. By 2004 11% of public R&D subsidies were spent on nano alone. While the precise number of private companies involved is not known (p. 216), Samsung and LG Electronics are active. Yet most of the work is done in public institutions, since the applications base for nano tech (like for bio tech) in Korea still remains weak. This also applies to the scientific paper output of Korean researchers. Theirs has a world share of 2,2% compared to 42% of the US, 15% of Japan, 14% of China and 13% of Germany (p. 225).

With a history of the telecoms sector Rüdiger Frank covers a more successful industry. Originally state developed as a strategic sector under Park Chung-hee (1961-79), the industry was systematically deregulated under foreign pressure since 1981. Once the Korean players were considered strong enough, foreign competitors were allowed in (p. 240). Since 2002 the largest operator, Korean Telekom, is entirely privatized. Clearly Koreans with 38 mio mobile phones, 20 mio PCs and 12 mio broadband internet users are the world's greatest telecom enthusiasts. This must have impressed on the author who on occasion (pp. 246) engages in an overkill of unexplained jargon like "IT839 strategy", "HSDPA/W-CDMA", "DMB/DTVService", "U Home service" and a similar alphabet soup. Perhaps we don't really need to know. Yet also in the advanced IT industry, including electronics, China is moving up. Whether Korea can stay ahead "remains to be seen", the author concludes (p. 251).

Sunil Mani covers the innovation of the industry which is clearly private sector driven (p. 285). In hand sets and base stations Samsung and LG enjoy a combined 15% global market share, with ranks 3 and 5 respectively.

Impressive though this appears, it is not a comfortable position, given the sector's razor thin profit margins and the rapidity of its innovation cycle.

Finally In-Soo Han introduces the "Code Division Multiple Access" (CDMA) which as a wireless technology has been introduced as a Korean standard in difference to the rest of the world which uses GSM. It is supported by the Ministry of Information and Communication which donated \$ 100 mio to "designated manufacturers" and reflects its desire for "technological independence" (p. 295). So much for global openness and world leadership.

Albrecht Rothacher

### **Peter Backhaus (Hg.): Japanstudien - Familienangelegenheiten**

Jahrbuch des Deutschen Instituts für Japanstudien, Band 19, München: Iudicium Verlag, 2007, 284 S., EUR 23,00

Der Sammelband ermöglicht vielfältige und detaillierte Einblicke in das japanische Familienleben. Aus unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln wird die derzeit unterstellte Krise der Familie in Japan betrachtet. Die Publikation ist eingebettet in die Reihe Japanstudien des DIJ.

Die insgesamt zehn Beiträge lassen sich in drei größere Themenbereiche einteilen. Die ersten drei beleuchten die Familie aus historischer Perspektive. Danach folgen ein soziologischer Teil mit vier Beiträgen und ein Schlussabschnitt über die Darstellung des japanischen Familienlebens in den Medien.

Der Sammelband beginnt mit einer Einführung in das Thema von Herausgeber Peter Backhaus. Zahlenmaterial und Medienberichte werden dazu verwendet die Krise, in der sich die japanische Familie zu befinden scheint, darzustellen. Eingebettet in den Forschungsschwerpunkt des DIJ „Herausforderungen des demographischen Wandels“ ist das Thema der sinkenden Geburtenraten ein zentrales Thema, dass die Familie als nach

wie vor wichtigsten Ort der Reproduktion in den Mittelpunkt der Diskussion stellt. Dies zeichnet auch gleichzeitig die hohe Relevanz dieser Publikation aus.

Die historische Betrachtung beginnt mit dem Beitrag von Andrea Germer, die in ihrem Artikel „Staat, Nation und Familie: Zum Verhältnis von Feminismus und Nationalstaat in Japan, 1918-1945“ die Integration der japanischen Frauenbewegung in den Prozess der Nationsbildung und der damit einhergehenden Militarisierung des Landes untersucht. Ihr Argument lautet, dass die Einbindung unterschiedlicher Frauenbewegungen in das totalitäre System der 30er und 40er Jahre zu einer gegenseitigen Interessenverwirklichung der Frauen und des expansiven Nationalstaats führte. Ob es bei dieser Einbindung der Frauen auch eine Oppositionsbewegung gab, bleibt im Beitrag jedoch offen.

Im Mittelpunkt des zweiten Beitrags „Zwischen Öffentlichkeit und Privatheit: Die moderne Familie in Japan und Deutschland bis 1945“ steht ebenfalls die Ideologie von Familie und Mutterschaft vor und während des Krieges. Michikoe Mae und Julia Schmitz untersuchen in komparativer Perspektive, wie Familien in Japan und Deutschland mit wachsender Totalisierung in beiden Ländern zunehmend als Teil der öffentlichen Sphäre begriffen und so vom Staat für dessen Zwecke instrumentalisiert wurden. In beiden Fällen schwindet die Abgrenzung zwischen Öffentlichem und Privatem durch eine rigorose Geschlechtertrennung. Der Vergleich zwischen Deutschland und Japan ist hier sehr gut gewählt. Sowohl Andrea Germer als auch Michikoe Mae und Julia Schmitz beleuchten in ihren Beiträgen ein wichtiges Themenfeld der Vergangenheitsbewältigung durch Aufarbeitung und Bereitstellung von Wissen.

Beschlossen wird der historische Teil mit dem Beitrag „Die kulturelle Prägung des weiblichen Rollenverständnisses durch die Instrumentalisierung (neo)konfuzianischer Traditionen in Südkorea und Japan von Momoyo Hüstebeck. Die Autorin geht hierin dem augenscheinlichen Widerspruch nach, dass