Mobilization Chains under Communist Rule — Comparing Regime Transitions in China and Poland

Ewelina Karas

Summary

This paper examines the impact of societal mobilization on regime transitions from Communism in China (between 1949 and 1989) and Poland (between 1945 and 1989) respectively. One of the main theoretical arguments put forward by this article is that of a dynamic model of dialectical interactions between a mobilizing society and a nondemocratic regime. I argue that China and Poland share a unique political culture in the form of a mobilizing society that is able to generate meaningful resistance even under highly repressive conditions. The second puzzle addressed in this paper is why, given their similar domestic environments, the Polish regime collapsed in 1989 whereas the one in China — despite facing intense mobilization in the same year — was able to survive. These differences in transition outcomes will be explained by a number of independent variables: different modes of regime establishment (authentic revolutionary in China versus imposed in Poland), elite and opposition attitudes to democracy, regime cross-case learning, economic development, and the role of the religion.

Ewelina Karas is a Ph.D. student at the City University of Hong Kong.

Introduction

China and Poland once shared a common communist regime type, and furthermore have both faced repeated mass protests: in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980, and 1988/89 in Poland (Kamiński 2009), and in 1976, 1978–79, 1986–87, and 1989 in China (Baum 1994, Goldman 2001, 2005;). Moreover both have been in a process of regime transition for a substantial period of time by now.

Yet these two countries had very different political experiences in 1989. Whereas Polish civil society was able to generate enough pressure on the Jaruzelski regime to force it into a democratic transition in 1988–89 (Braun and Kaczmarek 2009), the Chinese regime opted meanwhile for heavy repression against demonstrators in Tian'anmen Square in the same year. After the suppression of the Tian'anmen protests, China continued with the economic reforms first started in 1978 — while also simultaneously limiting political liberalization (Baum 1994; Lai 2001; Thompson 2010; Tong 1997; Woo-Cumings 1999). Similarly, the regime in Poland had been willing to suppress previous protests by force. This was particularly true in the putting down of the Solidarność movement at its peak in 1981, events that were accompanied by martial law and long-term repression — putting a halt to Polish democratization for the next nine years. The "authoritarian resilience" (Nathan 2013) of both of these regimes raises the question of why the Polish democratic transition was ultimately successful while the Chinese one was not.

This paper aims to enhance our understanding specifically of regime transitions away from Communism. By analyzing the Chinese and Polish case studies through the prism of a new theoretical model of "mobilization patterns," it contributes to our further understanding of critical processes of dialectical interaction between regimes and societal forces — key components of the transition process (Figure 1, see Appendix). In addition it proposes a dynamic model of regime transition, in which the key variables of societal mobilization, the transition process, and transition outcomes are all interrelated (Figure 2, see Appendix). The regime is a framework for political and economic institutions, as well as for interactions between the state and society. These interactions between regime and societal mobilization condition, in turn, the particular path that a regime transition takes. As these variables are mutually dependent, then the model presented in this paper is dynamic.

Thus I will analyze the ways in which transitions from nondemocratic rule are conditioned and shaped by historical circumstances, ones unique to each country but that are nevertheless still patterned in predictable ways. The latter are determined by the nature and duration of regime control, and furthermore by the way in which previous protests were suppressed by the current regime or its predecessors (Linz and Stepan 1999; Mahoney 2001; Pierson 2000; Thompson 2002). Furthermore these transitions are affected by the means that the regime uses to obtain legitimacy and to handle threats to its grip on power, as well as by the initiative and timing of experimental moves toward liberalization. Also key are the degrees of security and

self-confidence that the regime's elites enjoy (Linz and Stepan 1999; Thompson 2002).

This article proposes, first, a reinterpretation of the common scholarly explanation of the Polish case as being that of a negotiated transition, and argues instead that the key explanatory factor for successful democratization in Poland was the constant societal pressure exerted on the regime — particularly in the form of recurring protests. I then, second, apply this revised perspective on the Polish case to the Chinese one as well. With a comparative historical analysis of the Polish and Chinese cases, the key similarities in the transition processes of the two countries can be explained in ways that would be missed if the alikeness of he dynamics unfolding between regime and society in both countries were not taken into consideration.

For this reason the paper traces historical parallels in the regime–society interaction dynamics experienced in the two countries, and uncovers crucial similarities between mobilization patterns. They also share highly similar political cultures of protest, which had an immense impact on the regime transitions experienced in China (between 1949 and 1989) and Poland (between 1945 and 1989). Both societies are characterized by unusually high mobilization levels, coming about as a result of the two countries being conditioned by similar historical factors — ones that shaped a unique political culture of "rightful resistance".[1]

Both societies experienced historical chains of uprisings prior to communist rule and ended up being trapped under a repressive form of communist rule. Furthermore mobilization was temporarily frozen in the totalitarian phase of Communism and gradually unleashed in the course of the transition process, producing long chains of protests against the regimes. Faced with strong bottom-up pressure, both regimes were vanguards in the ways that they dealt with popular mobilization. By coming up with a variety of innovative strategies, they set an example for other communist regimes located in both Eastern Europe and Asia. Whereas the Polish case represented a model case of democratization post-Communism in Eastern Europe, the Chinese one meanwhile was a model of authoritarian resilience for communist regimes situated in Asia and elsewhere (Nathan 2013; Thompson and Ortmann 2014; Zhao 2010; Yang and Zhao 2015).

In addition, comparison of the Polish and Chinese cases highlights the importance of the timing of the protests in relation to those occurring in other countries, as well as the complexity of interactive processes occurring over extended periods of time (Beissinger 2007; Huntington 1993). It is possible, for example, that the Chinese

---

1   This term, which is borrowed from O'Brien and Li (2006), originally described the struggle of Chinese villagers to defend their rights, which they believe can be delivered from the communist ideology that the Chinese regime still officially uses in order to legitimate its power and current regime policies. The term is used in this paper in its broader historical context, specifically as the right to resist unjust authorities.

regime would not have suppressed the demonstrations in 1989 if it had not learned a lesson from the Polish case in 1981 (Goldman 2005; Pam 2007; Wilson 1990). In sum, comparison of the Polish and Chinese cases of transition from communist rule involves considering several highly similar independent variables: regime type, transition patterns, mobilization patterns (both elite and societal driven), as well as political culture — which accounts, alongside also shaping similar mobilization chains, for the parallels in the interactions between ruling elites and civil society in both China and Poland.

In the final part of this paper I will examine the different outcomes of the transition paths in China and Poland, through the analysis specifically of a number of independent variables. I will explore the following key differences between the Chinese and Polish transition paths: the attitudes of political elites and members of the opposition to democratization, the way in which the regime was established and the extent to which it occurred independent from international factors, the role of religion, economic performance, and the learning effects of the key actors involved in the political game.

Defining transitions

The democratization literature defines the term "transition" as:

> [...] the interval between one political regime and another [...]. Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of the revolutionary alternative (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 6).

In a broader sense, transition is an ongoing process without a definite end — one involving various possible outcome scenarios, as well as different contours within the political framework. While O'Donnell and Schmitter's (1986) conceptualization focuses on a broad range of transitions from authoritarianism, the following definitions relate specifically to transitions involving communist regimes:

First, Tong (1997) identifies the transition from Communism as a threshold process that involves shifts within three dimensions: political, economic, and ideological. Moreover she claims that these three transitions do not have to occur simultaneously. Consequently, when the sustained departure from previous practices of the regime within any or all three of these dimensions can be observed the transition is definitively in motion.

Second, Johnson identifies the four features of communist transitions:

> 1. Changes within the structure of the political structure [toward more] collective leadership 2. less reliance on terror 3. changes in the structure of the economic system from a centralized command economy to a semi-centralized managerial system 4. in the case of externally imposed communist regimes, changes toward [more] independence and national Communism (1996: 5).

In this sense, all of the above-mentioned dimensions of change occurred in similar ways in China between 1976 and 1989 and in Poland between 1954 and 1989. However such changes are not steady processes, but rather exhibit a cyclical (*fang/shou*) flux. Baum (1994) characterizes Chinese leadership as torn between the desire for modernization and the wish to maintain political order. Consequently, the Chinese leadership follows a cyclical reform pattern: "They tended to follow each new round of liberalizing reform with an attempt to retain — or regain — control. Letting go (*fang*) with one hand, they instinctively tightened up (*shou*) with the other" (Baum 1994: 5).

The definitions of post-Communism transitions mentioned above furthermore come into line with Nathan's (2013) explanation of China's authoritarian resilience, as well as with Heilmann/Perry's (2011) concept of "adaptive governance." Due to institutional flexibility and to various innovative institutional mechanisms, the Chinese regime has demonstrated highly adaptive behavior toward both endogenous and exogenous challenges — including challenge to its authority from domestic society. Tracing the historical institutional earning experiences of the Chinese regime, Heilmann (2011), Perry (2011), and Heilmann and Perry (2011) illuminate its unique flexibility. This institutional adaptivity allows the Chinese regime to undergo ideological and economic transitions while at the same preventing political changes from occurring.

On the one hand the concepts of authoritarian resilience, adaptive governance, and policymaking through experimentation (Heilmann 2011) explain the lack of democratization experienced in China from a regime perspective. On the other, the concept of society-driven mobilization illustrates the similar adaptivity of the other side of the coin — society. Looking at the Polish case from this perspective, the communist regime there was constrained by Soviet dominance and the fear of possible military intervention by that country's troops (like in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968) — this limited its scope for adaptivity (Brown 2009). Furthermore the Soviet style of top-down governance did not fit to Polish political culture, and sparked additional resistance to the domestic regime (Goodwin 2001). Consequently, the Chinese regime has historically been more capable of adapting to the challenges of its own society, whereas the level of adaptivity of the Polish regime was much lower given the Soviet-related constraints. This imbalance contributed significantly to regime failure in Poland.

Nonetheless the Polish regime after 1956 still demonstrated an unusual degree of policy experimentation as compared to other Eastern European countries (especially regarding the variety of responses to domestic mobilization). Interestingly, the Polish "experiments" were met more tolerantly by the Soviet Union than those in other satellite states were. Soviet leaders were well aware that Polish society by and large rejected both communist ideology and Soviet hegemony. Gomułka was the

first communist leader in Poland to enjoy popular support from Polish society upon the commencement of his rule. This gave him enough leverage to persuade a Soviet delegation, led by Nikita Khrushchev, in 1956 that he would be able to keep mobilization in Poland under control henceforth. The Soviets therefore allowed him to apply a "national" version of Communism in Poland (Wieczorkiewicz and Błażejowska 2006).

This flexibility allowed the regime to tolerate a "Polish phenomenon of the grey zone". As Michnik characterizes it: "This is the zone where it was possible to live between — shall we say — the censor's pencil and the letter of the Criminal Code" (Michnik 1999). Regime toleration of the grey zone was supposed to be a pragmatic solution for ensuring successful coexistence between an externally imposed regime and rebellious society in Poland. Gomułka's initial success with controlled liberalization (Brzeziński 1960), which began with the "Polish September" in 1956, was also a model for the Hungarian "Goulash Communism" that later flourished between 1962 and 1989. However in both Poland and Hungary mobilization eventually spiraled out of control due to liberalization giving the opposition a means to an end, and by widening the opportunities structures for protest (Geremek 1999; Szabo 2009).

The experimental strategies of the Polish regime when facing societal challenge later gave an advantage to the Chinese regime, because it could deal with similar situations with the benefit of hindsight. Consequently the Chinese regime learned from earlier Polish experiences with regard to how to best contain mobilization. As Wilson puts it: "The Polish situation (of the Solidarność movement in 1980/81) presented itself to the Chinese leadership as a 'mirror' for China, reflecting in an exacerbated form problems and tensions also to be found in the PRC" (Wilson 1990: 260).[2]

As such, the current fragmented nature of mobilization in China is a direct consequence of a regime strategy of mixed responses to different societal demands (Nathan 2013). Popular resistance by workers (Feng Chen 2008), farmers (O'Brien and Li 2006), homeowners and petitioners (Cai 2010; Chen 2008; Chen 2013;), and environmental groups (Sun and Zhao 2008) has exerted serious pressure on the party-state in China ever since the 1990s.[3] In particular, the regime alternating its responses — "concessions," "concession with discipline," or "suppression" (Cai 2010) — to rightful resistance is an advanced approach as compared to the strategies of the Polish regime in the 1980s. In a speech to the Politburo in April 1990, Deng Xiaoping interpreted the major task for Chinese leaders: "First, grasp stability; second, grasp stability; and, third, again grasp stability. So long as we can do a good

2   For further information on the "A Mirror for Socialism" conception, see Rozman (1985; 1987).
3   Yang (2015) examines the relationship between fragmented mobilization and the effects thereof on protest success rates, and analyzes the possible scenarios for widespread dissent emerging in China. On the effects of social pressure specifically on the Chinese legal system, see Minzner (2011).

job of our work and maintain stability, it will be a counter attack against the things introduced by Gorbachev" (*South China Morning Post*, March 9, 1990; quoted in Wilson 1990: 278).

In sum, contrary to the interpretation commonly found in the literature that transition is equivalent to democratization, this paper — following the abovementioned concepts — adopts instead a broader understanding of the phenomenon. Following Tong (1997), transition is thus understood as a long-term process that has three key dimensions: political, ideological, and economic. Significant change in any of these three dimensions means that a communist regime is indeed in a transition process. This proposition of there being a society-driven chain of mobilization is based on the concept of transition patterns, which are often used to explain how the change from one form of political regime to another takes place. There are two ideal-types of transition process: negotiated transition and democratic revolution (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Saxonberg 1997; Thompson 2000; Thompson 2004). These will both now be discussed in more detail.

Patterns of transition

According to O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), domestic factors — especially either direct or indirect conflict erupting as a consequence of divisions between hard- and soft-liners (the two groups, according to these authors, present within nondemocratic regimes) — are predominantly responsible for first launching the transition process. Once the soft-liners are able to prevail in the conflict at hand, liberalization begins. By opening up certain spaces for autonomous either individual or group action, nondemocratic rulers may just be attempting to relieve societal pressures and to gain much-needed legitimation among domestic society without actually altering the structure of the regime itself. Consequently any relaxation introduced by the regime in the initial stages of transition rarely expands beyond the highly controlled restitution of certain individual rights. The initiators of the transition risk easily losing control over the process, because it usually produces the mobilization of society. O'Donnell and Schmitter describe this as a "resurrection of civil society" (1986: 26).

The more successful the regime elites are, the less they expect to face active and aggressive domestic opposition — and consequently the higher degree of control over the transition process they can have. This political constellation can lead to "democracy with guarantees" (Przeworski 1991: 72), or alternatively to "institutional compromise" (Saxonberg 1997: 22). These terms imply that regime elites are only willing to engage in negotiations when they can obtain guarantees that they will maintain a certain amount of power after the transition has been completed (Przeworski 1991; Saxonberg 1997). The negotiated transition pattern is outlined in Figure 3 (see Appendix).

The second ideal-typical pattern of democratic transition is, as introduced by Thompson (2004), the concept of democratic revolution. This model considers spontaneous, peaceful, urban-based, and cross-class popular uprisings to be key factors in the analysis of transition processes. In this context, the theoretical model of democratic revolution emphasizes the significance of peaceful protests to the process of toppling unyielding dictators.

The crucial factor in defining the transition pattern here is the unwillingness of the incumbent regime's elites to liberalize. As Thompson (2004) argues, a split emerging within a nondemocratic regime is not always necessary for democratization to take place. As the example of the GDR demonstrates, despite hard-liners being dominant among the leading political elites the regime still collapsed due to a mass uprising. Thompson criticizes the approach of the transition literature for being too elite-centered, and specifically because it emphasizes elite-initiated negotiations on the one hand while neglecting the importance of civil society on the other.

In this regard mass protests are often considered to be a possible threat to a democratic transition, because they are likely to disturb negotiations between the reformers within the regime and opposition moderates. Furthermore, as has been argued, popular uprisings have the potential to get out of control. The likely result is that under the pressure of mass mobilization the hard-liners will prevail within the regime and set back the transition process; the second most probable outcome is violent revolution, with it being led by opposition radicals (Huntington 1993; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). If hard-liners are dominant within the regime, though, there is no other available catalyst for carving out political openings besides popular uprisings against the nondemocratic regime. The second important characteristic of democratic revolution is that popular uprisings can create enough pressure on the regime to cause it to collapse, or at least to commence negotiations with the opposition (Thompson 2004). Figure 4 (see Appendix) summarizes the major events occurring in the democratic revolution model.

Rethinking the Polish transition

Current political science literature categorizes the Polish democratic transition as a negotiated one. Even though the various authors do acknowledge mobilization events in Poland prior to 1989, they nevertheless underestimate their importance by stressing the pacted nature of the transition (Castle 2003; Goodwin 2001; Huntington 1993; Linz and Stepan 1999; Saxonberg 1997, 2013). In an argument developed earlier in my research (Karas 2010), I posit rather that the mass protests occurring in Poland throughout its communist regime's history were in fact a crucial aspect for the later Polish transition process. Although they were repeatedly repressed and failed to topple the communist regime instantaneously, they still created immense pressure on the regime and forced it to reform and loosen its

control over domestic society. As such, categorizing the Polish transition as a negotiated one and thereby omitting the significance of ongoing social pressure is too simplistic an approach.

Thus, contrary to the common interpretation of the Polish case as that of a negotiated transition, this paper claims instead that successful democratization was possible in Poland due to huge anticommunist mobilization, which in the long term forced the regime in Poland to democratize. Similarly, in China mass mobilization has also played a crucial role in shaping state–society relations and the nature of the transition process. Consequently analyzing the Chinese transition from a Polish perspective can shed new light not only on the Chinese and Polish cases but also on transition theory in general.

I therefore explain the Polish and the Chinese transition cases with a theoretical model of dialectical interactions between a mobilizing society and a nondemocratic regime (Figure 2, see Appendix). The key element of the new transition model is the elite-/society-driven mobilization patterns. The articulation of these patterns draws upon the broader aforementioned conceptions of negotiated transition and democratic revolution. Whereas negotiated transition and democratic revolution are ideal-types of democratization, the elite-/society-driven mobilization model describes protests as a critical juncture in the regime transition process.

The historical origins of mobilizing societies in Poland and China

Strong mobilization despite a repressive incumbent communist regime was possible in both China and Poland because of the pre-communist experiences there with protest against ruling authorities that determined both regime–society relations and the attitudes of political actors. In both cases then societal mobilization has played a crucial role in shaping the political environment throughout the course of each country's history. Although Poland cannot compete with China's rich history of popular uprising that reaches all the way back to the Che rebellion of 209 BCE (Perry 2001), in both cases such uprisings had an immense influence on the shaping of state structures. Both the Chinese Qing empire (1644–1912) and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569–1795, with its origins in the Union of Krewo of 1385) had unique political structures compared to other states in Europe and Asia at the time (Davis 2006; Perry 2001).

In the cases of both China and Poland the right to resist unjust authorities was deeply embedded in political culture and legitimized by historical praxis. In China, the Confucian concept of "Mandate of Heaven" (*tiānmìng*) grants the emperors the right to rule under the condition that they had the ability to govern well and fairly. In the case that the ruler did not fulfil his obligations, the Mandate of Heaven would transfer to those who were fit to rule. In this respect the concept of Mandate of Heaven bestowed legitimacy upon the successful leaders of rebellions (Rowe 2009).

In Poland, the power of the king — which was limited by the nobility (*szlachta*) and characterized by the doctrine "the king rules but does not govern" (*Rex regnat et non gubernat*) — saw him be the manager of the government rather than exist as an absolute ruler. After 1573 the king was elected by the nobility. The founding concept of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth — "Golden Liberty" — included two legal instruments of rebellion: insurrection (*rokosz*), according to which the nobility had the right to organize an uprising against the king if he violated their freedoms, and confederation (*konfederacja*), the right to organize a rebellion on the basis of a common political goal (Davies 2006). This concept of rightful resistance was unprecedented and peerless, given the notion of the divine right of monarchs to rule prevailing in other European and Asian countries at that time.

In China and Poland the political culture that would lead to the emergence of societal challenge to state authority also had longstanding historical roots, and was connected specifically with the fight for national sovereignty. Both nations experienced a "century of humiliation" — *bǎinián guóchǐ* (1839–1949) in China and *okres zaborów* (1795–1918) in Poland — when they respectively declined from being multiethnic regional powers with vast territories to semi-colonies dominated by foreign powers. As a result of internal weakness and the suffering of military defeat by foreign powers, both states were forced to accept "unequal treaties" (*bù píng děng tiáo yuē/traktaty rozbiorowe)*. These resulted in the loss of territory, and also gradually of sovereignty too.

These developments triggered historical chains of social mobilization fueled specifically by patriotic sentiment (Davis 2006; Rowe 2009). In Poland, this chain can be traced back to the repeated national uprisings in 1794, 1806, 1830–31, 1846, 1863–65, 1918–1919, 1919–21, and 1944 occurring as part of the fight for independence (Davies 2006; Hahn 1995). In China meanwhile, protest movements and the struggle for an independent position vis-à-vis colonial powers played a crucial role in shaping the country's contemporary historical experience.

In this context, the Chinese Communist Revolution of 1949 emerged out of a historical trajectory of mobilization — and indeed can be traced back to the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and to student demonstrations in Beijing on May 4, 1919. The May Fourth Movement had a huge impact on the future development of civil society and cultural thought in China, and is associated with the New Cultural Movement of 1917–1921 that was led by intellectuals. The Movement stimulated the development of intellectual thought and the emergence of the country's two most powerful political centers: Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party (Chang 2001; Chow 2008; Rowe 2009).

Mobilization chains under communist rule

The concept of mobilization chains was first articulated on the basis of two specific theoretical approaches: "cycles of contention," as defined by Tilly and Tarrow

(2007), and "modular political phenomena," as conceptualized by Beissinger (2007). On the one hand, the model of cycles of contention explains the mechanisms of mobilization and demobilization arising in response to changes in the local environment with regard to both opportunities and threats. On the other, Beissinger's concept analyzes the learning effects of key actors in the course of contention. Both China and Poland had long chains of mobilization under communist regimes, beginning in Poland in 1954 and in China in 1976. In addition, both cases exhibit parallels in the way that the mobilization chains evolved over the course of the respective transition processes.

The first anticommunist protests were elite driven. In Poland, the death of Stalin triggered factionalism and started a domino effect in the Soviet satellite states. In China, the chaos of the Cultural Revolution led to the demise of legitimacy on the part of the Communist Party, and also created divisions among its elites — although Mao did remain the key leader of the party right up until his death (Dittmer 2002). The reformist leaders Deng Xiaoping and Władysław Gomułka were in China and Poland respectively prominent communist activists from the early stages of the struggle for power. Both had previously been purged from the party by hard-liners. In addition, the deaths of charismatic national leaders — Stalin in 1953 and Zhou Enlai in 1976 — triggered the first societal mobilization in each country (Baum 1996; Dittmer 2002; Goldman 2005; Holzer 2000).

Mao's death in 1976 led to a power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party. Similarly in Poland, the struggle for power continued as a result of the aforementioned domino effect occurring in the Soviet satellite states after Stalin's death in 1953. In both cases, despite the repression of these first popular protests, the next episode of mobilization still emerged shortly afterward. Furthermore in both China and Poland the next round of protest was led by revisionist intellectuals, and specifically students in Poland (1968) and the Democracy Wall Movement in China (1978–79). Neither of the initially popular leaders, Deng and Gomułka, hesitated to suppress mobilization when they felt it might endanger their own position of power (Holzer 1999; Zhao 2009).

The episodes of protest that followed — a chain of Polish strikes (in 1970, 1971, 1976, 1980), alongside urban unrest that included workers and students in China (between 1985 and 1986) — were triggered specifically by economic grievances. Although the extent and range of successful economic reform in China and Poland were very different, in both cases the level of social (in)security and rising economic pressures caused frustration, especially among the working class — thus triggering mobilization (Baum 1996; Goldman 2005; Holzer 2000). However the key difference between these economic-related protests was that Gomułka lost support from within the party — being thus replaced by Edward Gierek. The change of party leader in Poland took place under great societal pressure, coming after Gomułka had brutally cracked down on workers' strikes in 1970. The new Polish leader tried to

apply instead a mixed formula of repression and concession in dealing with protesters. Gierek's softer approach caused increased demands and mobilization in Poland, which culminated in the emergence of the Solidarność movement there in the 1980s (Geremek 1999; Skórzyński 2005). As Gierek was not able to handle mobilization in Poland, a hard-liner faction with Wojchiech Jaruzelski as the new leader prevailed in 1981. The regime now used military force to repress mobilization (Braun and Kaczmarek 2006).

In 1989 both China and Poland were once again in turmoil. What makes the comparison of the Polish and Chinese regime transitions so interesting is that in 1988/89 these two cases were far more similar to each other than they were to any other communist regime in existence at the time. Both regimes were based on Soviet-type institutions, both were searching for a way out of economic difficulties through reform, and both faced strong societal challenge. On the one hand, the communist leaderships in both were willing to initiate economic reforms and in this regard were reformist. On the other, both leaderships wanted to stay in power and thus used violence so as to repress protests and thereby keep challenge to their authority in check. In this regard both regimes acted like hard-liners in the political respect but were conversely reformist in the economic one. Due to this seeming paradox of politically hard-liner but economically reformist leadership, China and Poland do not fit easily into the categories of classic transitology. Furthermore both regimes faced greater societal challenge than other communist states did up until 1989, with both Poland and China having a long history of mobilization — both before the communist takeover and after the end of the Maoist/Stalinist periods. Yet the Chinese regime was able to survive, whereas the Polish one collapsed. Given the striking similarities in the evolution of both mobilization chains, the following question thus emerges: Why did the Polish regime collapse but the Chinese regime survive in the face of the popular mobilization of 1989?

Explaining different transition outcomes

The different transition outcomes in Poland and China in 1989 can be explained by a number of different variables: regime intra- and cross-case learning effects, origins of the regime, elite and opposition attitudes to democracy, economic development, and the role of religion.

First, an important difference between Tian'anmen Square and the Solidarność movement was the level of organization and cooperation existing between different segments of society in each case. Whereas in Poland the opposition developed from fragmented protests by solitary political actors into a major social movement, opponents of the Chinese regime did not join forces with each other in 1989. This difference in the evolution of group behavior in each case can be explained with the abovementioned model of modular political phenomena. On the one hand, the protesters in Poland learned from past events and improved their forms of protest.

Furthermore Polish mobilization chains started earlier (already in 1956) and were significantly longer as compared to those in China, where protests were "time-delayed" relative to their Polish counterparts (the first protests began in China in 1976).

Because of a stronger totalitarian tradition in the Chinese case, the opposition there was still very much influenced by this ideology — and therefore were more revisionist than revolutionary in nature. As such the majority of protesters did not fundamentally challenge the regime, but called rather for reform while also being critical of corruption within the Party. This is the key difference in attitudes as compared to the Polish context (and Eastern European opposition in general). The oppositions in Eastern Europe were disappointed with the failure of revisionist student protests in 1968 and the Soviet crackdown on the Prague Spring in the same year, which was the last hope for initiating a reformed version of Communism within the Soviet sphere of influence. As a consequence, the Polish opposition subsequently became dissident in nature and wanted to get rid of Communism altogether (Thompson 2001).

The Chinese regime followed developments in Poland very closely, and learned the "Polish lesson" that an alliance between intellectuals and workers could potentially pose a significant challenge to the regime. With regard to Polish developments in 1989, Deng Xiaoping noted that: "Concessions in Poland led to further concessions. The more they conceded, the more chaos [ensued]" (*South China Morning Post,* May 31, 1989; quoted in Wilson 1990: 272). Consequently, the Chinese regime set a clear limitation on such cross-class cooperation (Wilson 1990; Goldman 2005).[4]

In this way the internal learning effects strengthened the Polish opposition, whereas cross-case regime learning weakened the Chinese resistance movement — because that latter country's regime could draw on the experiences of its Polish counterpart in dealing with the problem of mobilization. Facing social mobilization in 1985–86, Deng clearly had the strategy adopted by the Jaruzelski regime in mind: "Praising the Polish government's handling of the Solidarność crisis in 1981, Deng said that the Polish leaders had showed 'cool and level-headed judgment.' Their attitude was firm […]. They resorted to martial law to bring the situation under control" (Baum 1994: 205). In addition, on observing the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe between 1988 and 1989, Deng concluded that: "There have been problems in Poland, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia because the hand of the government was too soft" (*South China Morning Post* April 28, 1989; quoted in Wilson 1990: 272).

---

4   Teresa Wright (2008) argues that Chinese students in 1989 were afraid to cooperate with other social groups because of the fear of regime repression. Indeed, the Chinese regime reacted with swift suppression in 1989 as soon as workers attempted to found — with support for it being sought from students — a Solidarność-like independent trade union (Goldman 2005).

Another key point to note is that, second, neither the communist regime nor indeed communist ideology had ever enjoyed strong legitimation in Poland; they had rather been imposed by the Soviet Union (Linz and Stepan 1999; Wieczorkiewicz 2009). This fact was crucial for the character of the Polish opposition. In addition, the threat of Soviet intervention made it possible for the communist regime in 1981 to put a halt to the challenge from domestic society through the imposition of martial law — thereby preventing regime change (Kamiński 2009; Süß 1999). In Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, Soviet interventions also bolstered the respective regimes effectively (Archie 2009; Furet 1996; Holzer 1995; Lévesque 1997; Süß 1999; Żaryn 2009).

The Chinese regime, in contrast, emerged as a result of a domestic communist revolution. In the long term, this different mode of regime establishment influenced the attitudes of both political elites and members of the opposition vis-à-vis democratization (Goldman 2005; Zhao 2009). On the one side, the revisionist attitude held toward the Chinese regime and a lack of specific goals weakened the Tian'anmen movement significantly (Thompson 2001). On the other, longstanding dissident and prodemocracy pressure from the Polish opposition in 1988–89 forced the regime contrariwise to surrender.

Here the question of the political aims of each respective opposition group will now be discussed further. Whereas the opposition in Central and Eastern Europe had clear democratic goals (Dudek 2009; Geremek 1999; Michnik 2009), the protesters in China meanwhile had only ill-defined ambitions (Goldman 2005; Pam 2007; Zhao 2009). Both the regime elites and the opposition members had different models for success that they each wanted to follow. Whereas the elites in Eastern Europe saw the European Union as a model to emulate, Chinese political actors decided instead to follow the model of developmental state such as Japan and South Korea (before democratization) — and especially Singapore (Thompson 2010; Thompson and Ortmann 2014; Nathan and Scobell 2012). China's subsequent economic success in spite of a lack of political liberalization has meanwhile itself turned the country into an attractive model of authoritarian resilience for other nondemocratic regimes worldwide (Nathan 2015; Zhao 2010).

The third important difference between the Chinese and Polish cases was the scope and effectiveness of the economic reforms implemented in each. On the one hand economic grievances sparked protests in both countries (in the 1970s and 1980s in Poland, in the 1980s in China), and in this sense the economic dimension did not cause a significant difference in their respective mobilization patterns prior to 1989. On the other, though, Gierek's experiments with massive borrowing from the West made the Polish regime extremely vulnerable to foreign influences. Western sanctions enacted after Jaruzelksi had imposed martial law in Poland literally destroyed that country's economy. The success of Deng's economic reforms, meanwhile, made the Chinese regime more robust against external influences and

increased the regime's capacity to execute effective control over domestic society in the aftermath of the Tian'anmen repression (Gallagher 2002; Holzer; 1995 Zhang 1993).

Fourth and finally, religion was also an important factor conditioning the different transition outcomes witnessed in China and Poland. First and foremost, this was because the Catholic religion was always a huge part of Polish political culture.[5] In addition the Polish Pope, John Paul II, elected in 1978 played a crucial role in bringing down the communist regime in his native country. This was because the Polish opposition movement gained through him a powerful ally abroad (Michnik 1999).

The role of religion in China is, conversely, ambivalent. On the one side religion has indeed played a historically significant role in Chinese political culture (Perry 2001).[6] Nevertheless religion did not play an important role in Chinese communist rule before the events of Tian'anmen Square. This puzzle can be explained with the help of Voegelin's (1993) concept of "political religion." Due to the revolutionary character of the Chinese regime, communist ideology enjoyed a high level of popular legitimacy and served as a "replacement" for traditional beliefs. Consequently, communist regimes eagerly repressed religions because they saw them as rivals for the minds of the people. Following Voegelin's argument, communist ideology existing as a political religion thus reinforced the domestic legitimacy of communist rule in China. Consequently Chinese Tian'anmen students had still in 1989 a revisionist approach to the regime at that time, whereas the Polish protesters were clearly outright dissidents by that point in time (Thompson 2001).

Conclusion: The dynamic transition model

This article has considered how societal mobilization affects regime transitions, and furthermore to what extent societal pressure can force the liberalization and even the democratic transition of an incumbent regime to occur. To these ends, the concept of mobilization patterns that has been presented here is crucial to transition research. In support of this, Figure 2 (see Appendix) illustrates the interaction dynamics between the regime and opposition groups during transition. The key element of the new transition model is the elite-/society-driven mobilization patterns. The proposed systematic of these mobilization patterns is llustrated in Figure 1 (see Appendix). These mobilization patterns draw for their articulation upon the broader conceptions of negotiated transition revolution and democratic revolution (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Saxonberg 1997; Thompson 2000; Thompson 2004). Whereas

---

5   The Catholic Church has historically played the role of guardian of Polish national identity, and furthermore has strengthened the spirit of rightful resistance throughout the country's history.

6   Most of the significant rebellions in Chinese history — the White Lotus Rebellion (1796–1804), Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), Du Wenxiu Rebellion (1856–1872), and Boxer Rebellion on the eve of the Qing empire's inauguration (1899–1901) — were religiously motivated (Perry 2001).

negotiated transition and democratic revolution are ideal-types of democratization, the elite-/society-driven mobilization patterns instead describe protests as critical junctures in the regime transition process.

In this respect, regime transition has also been analyzed here from a broader perspective than is normally the case. First, transition is seen here as a long-term process consisting of three key dimensions: political, ideological, and economic. Significant change in any or all of these three dimensions means that the regime is indeed in a transition process. Second, transition is not seen as being equivalent to democratization. Democratic transition is only one of many possible outcomes. Most significantly, though, the key engine of transition is seen as being the process of elite-/society-driven chains of mobilization, which affect both the mode and the scope of transition. Factors such as political culture, religion, nationalism, elite and opposition attitudes to democracy, regime intra- and cross-case learning effects, and economic development determinate the nature of the mobilization chains witnessed. These different variables affect the level and type of mobilization and transition outcomes experienced. As has been illustrated here for the cases of China and Poland, the fact that difference in variables which shaped the type of mobilization (democratic or revisionist) determined the transition outcomes, reinforces the argument about significant role of mobilization in regime transitions.

References

Ash, Timothy G. (1991): *The Polish Revolution. Solidarność.* New York: Viking; Penguin

Arendt, Hannah (ed.) (2004): *The Origins of Totalitarianism 1951.* New York: Schocken

Atshan, Nida; Tedla, Aden (2010): "Chinese students campaign for democratic reform (Tiananmen Square), 1989", in: *Global Nonviolent Action Database*, http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chinese-students-campaign-democratic-reform-tiananmen-square-1989, (accessed:/2013-12-20)

Backes, Uwe (2009): "Hybrides System des untergehenden Staates: Die DDR 1989–1990", in: Maćków, Jerzy (ed.): *Autoritarismus in Mittel- und Osteuropa.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften; GWV Fachverlage GmbH, 57–85

Balík, Stanislav; Holzer, Jan (2005): "Weak Opposition Takes Power: Czechoslovakia 1989–1990", in: Maćków, Jerzy (ed.): *Autoritarismus in Mittel- und Osteuropa.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften; GWV Fachverlage GmbH, 86–108

Bartoszewski, Władysław (2005): "Heutige Probleme bei den gesellschaftlichen Transformationsprozessen in Polen", in: Rosa, Hartmut; Meyn, Karl-Ulrich (eds.): *Bürgerbewusstsein und Demokratie in Mittel- und Osteuropa.* Jena: Glaux, 19–32

Beissinger, Mark R. (2007): "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions", in: *Perspectives on Politics*, 5.2: 259–276

Bernstein, Thomas P. (1999): "China: Growth without Political Liberalization" in: Morley, James William (ed.): *Driven by Growth. Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region.* Armonk: M.E. Sharpe

Baum, Richard (1994): *Burying Mao. Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping.* Princeton: Princeton University Press

Braun, Grzegorz; Kaczmarek, Robert (2009): "Towarzysz General" (Comrade General), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NQS91RErHCk (accessed: 2016-01-02)

Brown, Archie (2009): *Aufstieg und Fall des Kommunismus*, Berlin: Propyläen

Brzeziński, Zbigniew K. (1960): *Der Sowjetblock. Einheit und Konflikt.* Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch

Cai, Yongshun (2008): "Disruptive Collective Action in the Reform", in: O'Brien, Kevin J., *Popular Protest in China.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 163–178

— (2010): *Collective Resistance in China. Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail*. Stanford: Stanford University Press

Chang, Kai-Yuan (2001): "A Retrospect and Prospect of the Studies on the Revolution of 1911", in: *Chinese Literature and History*, 9: 4–5

Castle, Marjorie (2003): *Triggering Communism's Collapse. Perceptions and Power in Poland's Transition*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield

Chen, Feng (2008): "Worker Leaders and Framing Factory-Based Resistance", in: O'Brien, Kevin J., *Popular Protest in China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 88–108

Chen, Xi (2008): "Collective Petitioning and Institutional Conversion", in: O'Brien, Kevin J.: *Popular Protest in China,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 54–71

— (2013): "The Rising Cost of Stability", in: Nathan, Andrew J.; Diamond, Larry; Plattner, Marc F. (eds.): *Will China Democratize?* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 297–289

Chow, Kai-wing; Price, Don C.; Hon, Tze-ki; Ip, Hung-yok (eds.) (2008): *Beyond the May Fourth Paradigm. In Search of Chinese Modernity*. Lanham: Lexington

Chung, Jae Ho (2011): "Central-Local Dynamics: Historical Continuities and Insitutional Resistance", in: Perry, Elisabeth J.; Heilmann, Sebastian: *Mao's Invisible Hand. Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 269–297

Dallin, Alexander; Breslauer, George W. (2006): "Political terror in Post-Mobilization Stage", in: Johnson, Chalmers (1977): *Change in Communist Systems*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 191–215

Davies, Norman (2006): *Boże igrzysko. Historia Polski* (God's Playground. History of Poland). Cracow: Znak

Dillon, Nara (2011): "Governing Civil Society: Adapting Revolutionary Methods to Serve Post-Communist Goals", in: Perry, Elisabeth J.; Heilmann, Sebastian: *Mao's Invisible Hand. Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 138–165

Dikötter, Frank (2010): *Mao's Great Famine. The History of China's most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–62.* London: Bloomsbury

Dudek, Antoni (2009): "Karnawał 1980–1981" (Der Karneval 1980–1981), in: Collective authorship: *Zaczęło się w Polsce 1939–1989* (Es begann in Polen 1939–1989), Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, 129–164

Effra, Wolfgang von (1996): *Uncompromising Tibet. Culture, Religion, Politics.* New Delhi: Paljor

Friedrich, Carl J.; Brzeziński, Zbigniew K. (1999): "Die allgemeinen Merkmale der totalitären Diktatur", in: Jesse, Eckehard (ed.): *Totalitarismus im 20. Jahrhundert. Eine Bilanz der internationalen Forschung*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 600–617

Furet, François (1996): *Das Ende der Illusion*. München: Piper

Gallagher, Mary E. (2002): "Reform and Openness. Why China's Economic Reforms Have Delayed Democracy", in: *World Politics*, 54.3: 338–372

Geremek, Bronisław (1999): "Rolle Polens beim Sturz des Kommunismus in Europa", in: Geremek, Bronisław (ed.): *Über die demokratische Revolution in Europa 1989*. Dresden: Sächsische Staatskanzlei, Bürgerinformation

Glaser, Kurt (1964): *Die Tschecho-Slowakei. Politische Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Nationalitätenstaates.* Bonn: Athenäum

Głębocki, Henryk (2009): "Wojna z narodem 1981–1989" (Krieg mit der Nation 1981–1989), in: *Zaczęło się w Polsce 1939–1989* (Es begann in Polen 1939–1989), Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, 165–210

Goldman, Merle (2001): "The Twentieth Anniversary of the Democracy Wall Movement", in: *Harvard Asia Quarterly. A Graduate Student Publication affiliated with the Harvard Asia Center*, http://www.worldlymind.org/demmerl.pdf (accessed: 2015-07-05)

— (2005): *From Comrade to Citizen. The Struggle for Political Rights in China.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Goldstone, Jack A. (2003): "Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions", in: Mahoney, James; Rueschemeyer, Dieter (eds.): *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Goodwin, Jeff (2001): *No Other Way Out. States and Revolutionary Movements, 194 –1991.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Gordon, Richard; Hinton, Carma (1995): "The Gate of Heavenly Peace", http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZ4dwPk26Js (accessed: 2014-03-09)

Guo, Sujian (2006): *The Political Economy of Asian Transition from Communism.* Ashgate: Burlington

Fuller, Grahan E.; Lipman Jonathan N. (2004): "Islam in Xinjiang", in: Starr, Frederick: *Xinjiang. China's Muslim Borderland. China's Muslim*, Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 320–353

Hahn, Hans H. (1995): "Die Selbstverteidigung der Gesellschaft. Einige Bemerkungen zur Entwicklung einer politischen Mentalität", in: Holzer, Jerzy (ed.): *"Solidarität". Die Geschichte einer freien Gewerkschaft in Polen*. München: C. H. Beck, 9–21

Havel, Václav (1989): "The Power of the Powerless", in: Vladislav, Jan (ed.): *Václav Havel or Living in Truth. Twenty-two Essays Published on the Occasion of the Award of the Erasmus Prize to Václav Havel*. London: Faber and Faber, 36–123

Heilmann, Sebastian (2011): "Policy-Making through Experimentation. The Formation of a Discinctive Policy Process", in: Perry, Elisabeth J.; Heilmann, Sebastian (eds.): *Mao's Invisible Hand. Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 62–102

Holzer, Jerzy (ed.) (1995): *"Solidarität". Die Geschichte einer freien Gewerkschaft in Polen*. München: C. H. Beck

— (2000): *Komunizm w Europie* (Der Kommunismus in Europa). Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Bellona

Huntington, Samuel P. (1968): *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press

— (1993): *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. London: University of Oklahoma Press

Jha, Prem Shankar (2009): *Managed Chaos. The Fragility of the Chinese Miracle*. New Delhi, London: SAGE

Johnson, Chalmers (1977a): *Change in Communist Systems*. Stanford: Stanford University Press

— (1977b): "Comparing Communist Nations", in: Johnson, Chalmers: *Change in Communist Systems*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1–33

— (1982): *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy: 1925-1975*. Stanford: Stanford University Press

Kamiński, Łukasz (2009): "Polskie miesiące 1956–1980" (Polnische Monate 1956–1980), in: Collective authorship: *Zaczęło się w Polsce 1939–1989* (Es begann in Polen 1939–1989), Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, 97–128

Karas, Ewelina (2010): "Die polnische Transition als demokratische Revolution. Massenbewegung und Regimekollaps", M. A. Thesis, Friedrich-Alexander Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

Kohli, Atul (2004): *State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Kolodii, Antonina (2009): "Temporary Post-Communist Authoritarianism and Democracy. Ukraine 1990–1994", in: Maćków, Jerzy: *Autoritarismus in Mittel- und Osteuropa*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften; GWV Fachverlage GmbH, 138–164

Lai, David (2011): "The Coming of a Prosperous China with Strong Military Power", in: Zhu, Zhiqun: *The People's Republic of China Today: Internal and External Challenges*. Singapore: World Scientific, 357–384

Leftwich, Adrian (2000): *States of Development: On the Primacy of Politics in Development*. Cambridge: Polity

Lévesque, Jacques (1997): *The Enigma of 1989. The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe*. Berkeley: University of California Press

Li, Xing (2001): "The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited", in: *The China Review*, 1.1: 137–165

Linz, Juan J.; Stepan, Alfred (1999): *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press

Linz, Juan J. (2003): *Totalitäre und autoritäre Regime*. Berlin: Berliner Debatte Wissenschaftsverlag

London, Jonathan D. (2011): "Market-Leninism", in: *Social Science Research Network (2016)*, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934540 (accessed: 2016-01-27)

Dittmer, Lowell (2002): "Rethinking China's Cultural Revolution amid Reform", in: Chong, Woei Lien: *China's great proletarian Cultural Revolution: master narratives and post-Mao counternarratives*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,

Lowenthal, Richard (1977): "Development vs. Utopia in Communist Policy", in: Johnson, Chalmers: *Change in Communist Systems*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 33–117

Lübl, Eugen; Grünwald, Leopold (1969): *Die Intellektuelle Revolution. Hintergründe und Auswirkungen des "Prager Frühling"*. Düsseldorf: Econ Verlag

Maćków, Jerzy (2009): "Die posttotalitären Autoritarismen: Die Entwicklungen und Varianten", in: Maćków, Jerzy (ed.):*Autoritarismus in Mittel- und Osteuropa*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften; GWV Fachverlage GmbH, 325–349

Madsen, Richard (2013): "The Upsurge of Religion in China", in: Nathan, Andrew J.; Diamond, Larry; Plattner, Marc F. (eds.): *Will China Democratize?* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 175–189

Mahoney, James (2001): "Path Dependent Explanations of Regime Change. Central America in Comparative Perspective", in: *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 36.1: 111–141

McFaul, Michael (2005): "Transitions from Communism", in: *Journal of Democracy*, 16.3: 5–19

Merkel, Wolfgang (ed.) (1999): *Systemtransformation. Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften

Michnik, Adam (1985): *Takie czasy. Rzecz o kompromisie* (Diese Zeiten. Die Sachen mit dem Kompromiss). Warszawa: Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza

— (1999): "The Rebirth Of Civil Society. Public lecture presented at the London School of Economics on 20 October 1999 as part of the 'Ideas of 1989' Public Lecture Series", in: *Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science*, http://miszlivetzferenc.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Michnik_The-Rebirth-of-Civil-Society.pdf (accessed: 2015-12-15)

Minzner, Carl. F. (2011): "China's Turn Against Law", in: *The American Journal of Comaparative Law*, 59.06: 936–984

Ming Xia (2000): *The Dual Developmental State: Development Strategy and Institutional Arrangements for China's Transition.* Aldershot: Ashgate

Mommsen, Margareta (2009): "Systemübergang unter Gorbatschow und Jelzin: UdSSR/Russland 1987–1991–1999", in: Maćków, Jerzy (ed.): *Autoritarismus in Mittel- und Osteuropa.* Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften; GWV Fachverlage GmbH, 165–181

Nathan, Andrew J. (2013): "Authoritarian Resilience", in: Nathan, Andrew J.; Diamond, Larry; Plattner, Marc F. (eds.): *Will China Democratize?* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 65–77

Nathan, Andrew J.; Diamond, Larry; Plattner, Marc F. (eds.) (2013): *Will China Democratize?* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press

Nathan, Andrew J.; Scobell, Andrew (2012): *China's Search for Security.* New York: Columbia University Press

Naughton, Barry (1995): *Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform 1978–1993.* New York: Cambridge University Press

O'Brien, Kevin J. (2008): *Popular Protest in China.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press

— (2013): "Rural Protest", in: Nathan, Andrew J.; Diamond, Larry; Plattner, Marc F. (eds.): *Will China Democratize?* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 152–156

O'Brien, Kevin J.; Li, Lianjiang (2006): *Rightful Resistance in Rural China.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

O'Donnell, Guillermo; Schmitter, Philippe C. (1986): *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press

O'Donnell, Guillermo; Schmitter, Philippe C.; Whitehead, Laurence (eds.) (1986): *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Prospects for Democracy.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press

Pam, Anton (2007): "Eine gescheiterte Revolution? Die Bewegung vom Tian'anmen 1989 und ihre Niederschlagung", in: *Wildcat special edition: "Unruhen in China"*, 80: 52–58, http://www.rote-ruhr-uni.com/cms/IMG/pdf/pam_tiananmen.pdf (accessed:2016-01-05)

Perry, Elisabeth J. (2001): "Challenging the Mandate of Heaven. Popular Protest in Modern China", in: *Critical Asian Studies*, 33.2: 163–180

— (2008): "Permanent Rebellion? Continuities and Discontinuities in Chinese Protest", in: O'Brien, Kevin J.: *Popular Protest in China.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 205–217

— (2011): "From Mass Campaigns to Managed Campaigns. Constructing a New Socialist Countryside", in: Perry, Elisabeth J.; Heilmann, Sebastian: *Mao's Invisible Hand. Political Fundations of Adaptive Governance in China.* Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 30–62

Perry, Elisabeth J.; Heilmann, Sebastian (2011): "Embracing Uncertainty: Guerrila Policy Style and Adaptive Governance in China", in: Perry, Elisabeth J.; Heilmann, Sebastian: *Mao's Invisible Hand. Political Fundations of Adaptive Governance in China.* Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 1–30

— (2011): *Mao's Invisible Hand. Political Fundations of Adaptive Governance in China.* Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Asia Center

Pierson, Paul (2000): "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics", in: *The American Political Science Review*, 94.2: 251–267

Rowe, William (2009): *China's Last Empire. The Great Qing.* Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press

Rozman, Gilbert (1985): *A Mirror for Socialism. Soviet Criticism of China*. Princeton: Princeton University Press
— (1987): *The Chinese Debate About Soviet Socialism, 1978–1985*. Princeton: Princeton University Press
Przeworski, Adam (1991): *Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Saxonberg, Steven (1997): *The Fall. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland in a Comparative Perspective*. Uppsala: Uppsala University
— (2013): *Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism Regime Survival in China, Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Starr, Frederick (2004): *Xinjiang. China's Muslim Borderland. China's Muslim*. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe
Schubert, Gunter (2006): "Volksrepublik China", in: Petri, Mario; Schnier, Ulrich; Bellers, Jürgen (eds.): *Handbuch der transitorischen Systeme, Diktaturen und autoritären Regime der Gegenwart*. Berlin: Lit Verlag, 191–210
Skórzyński, Jan (2005): *Od Solidarności do wolności (From Solidarity to Freedom)*. Warszawa: Trio
Süß, Walter (1999): *Staatssicherheit am Ende. Warum es den Mächtigen nicht gelang, 1989 eine Revolution zu verhindern*. Berlin: Ch. Links
— (2004): "Von der Ohnmacht des Volkes zur Resignation der Mächtigen. Ein Vergleich des Aufstandes in der DDR 1953 mit der Revolution von 1989", in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (VfZ)*.3: 441–477
Szabó, Máté (2009): "Kompromiss als Erbe des Kádárismus: Ungarn 1989–1990", in: Maćków, Jerzy (ed.): *Autoritarismus in Mittel- und Osteuropa*. Wiesbaden: VS; GWV Fachverlage, 199–213
Tarrow, Sidney (1996): "Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics", in: *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 29.2: 415–417
— (2008): "Prologue: The New Contentious Politics in China: Poor and Blank or Rich and Complex", in: O'Brien, Kevin J.: *Popular Protest in China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1–11
Tilly Charler; Tarrow, Sidney (2007): *Contentious Politics*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers
Thompson, Mark R. (2000): "Demokratische Revolution statt Kulturkampf. Eine Erwiderung auf Huntingtons Thesen", in: *Internationale Politik*, 4: 47–54
— (2001): "To Shoot or Not to Shoot: Posttotalitarianism in China and Eastern Europe", in: *Comparative Politics*, 34. 1: 63–83
— (2002): "Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Regimes in Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism", in: *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 3.1: 79–106
— (2004): *Democratic Revolutions. Asia and Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge
— (2010): "Japans German Path and Pacific Asia's Flying Geese", in: *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 38.5: 697–715
— (2010): "Modernization Theory's Last Redoubt: Modernization and Democratization in East and Southeast Asia", in: Yin-Wah Chu (ed.): *East Asian Democracies after Twenty Years*. London: Routledge
— (2012): "Civil Society and Democracy: Towards a Taxonomy in Asia and Beyond", in: *SEARC Working Paper Series*, 123.2: 1–26
Thompson, Mark R.; Ortmann, Stephan (2014): "China's Obsession with Singapore. Learning Authoritarian Modernity", in: *Pacific Review*, 05: 433–455
Tong, Yanqi (1997): *Transitions from State Socialism. Economic and Political Change in Hungary and China*. Labham: Rowman & Littlefield
Vala, Carsten T.; O'Brien, Kevin J. (2008): "Recruitment to Protestant House Churches", in: O'Brien, Kevin J.: *Popular Protest in China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 108–126
Voegelin, Eric (1993): "Die Politischen Religionen", in: Opitz, Peter J. (ed.): *Eric Voegelin. Die Politischen Religionen*. München: Fink
Wieczorkiewicz, Paweł; Błażejowska, Justyna (2006): "PRL Świadkowie: 1976: Radom, Ursus, Płock..." (VRP Zeugen: 1976: Radom, Ursus, Płock...), in: *Newsweek Polska,* 48.10
— (2006): "PRL Świadkowie:Poczet sekretarzy 1"(VRP Zeugen: Organigramm der Staatssekretäre 1), in: *Newsweek Polska*, 40.2
— (2006): "PRL Świadkowie:Poczet sekretarzy 2", (VRP Zeugen: Organigramm der Staatssekretäre 2)in: *Newsweek Polska,* 41.3
Wieczorkiewicz, Paweł (2009): "Między dwoma wrogami 1939–1944" (Zwischen zwei Feinden 1939–1944), in: Collective authorship: *Zaczęło się w Polsce 1939–1989* (Es begann in Polen 1939 –1989). Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, 19–66
Wilson, Jeanne L. (1990): "The Polish Lesson –China and Poland 1980-1990", in: Studies in Comparative Communism, 23.3/4: 259–279

146 Ewelina Karas

Wright, Teresa (2008): "Student Movements in China and Taiwan", in: O'Brien, Kevin J.: *Popular Protest in China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 26–54

Woo-Cumings, Meredith (1999): *The Developmental State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press

Zhang, Baohui (1993): "Institutional Aspects of Reform and the Democratization of Communist Regimes", in: *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 26.2: 165–181

Zhao, Suisheng (2010): "The China Model: can it replace the Western model of modernization?", in: *Journal of Contemporary China*, 65.06: 419–436

Zhao, Ziyang (2009): *Prisoner of the state. The Secret Journal of Zhao Ziyang*. New York: Simon & Schuster

Żaryn, Jan (2009): "Komunizm po polsku 1944–1956" (Kommunismus in Polen 1944–1956), in: Collective authorship: *Zaczęło się w Polsce 1939–1989* (Es begann in Polen 1939–1989), Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Volumen, 67–96

Yang, Hongxing; Zhao, Dingxin (2015): "Performance Legitimacy, State Autonomy and China's Economic Miracle", in: *Journal of Contemporary China*, 24.91: 64–92, doi: pdf/10.1080/10670564.2014.918403 (accessed: 2015-01-12)

Yang, Ray Ou (2015): "Political Process and Widespread Protests in China. The 2010 Labour Protest", in: *Journal of Contemporary China*, 24.91: 21–42, doi:pdf/10.1080/10670564.2014.918395 (accessed: 2015-01-12)

Appendix

Figure 1: Mobilization Patterns

|	Elite-Driven Mobilization	Society-Driven Mobilization
Initiation	• Conflict between soft-liners and hard-liners within the regime • Soft-liners trigger the social mobilization and emerging opposition because they begin the liberalization phase ↓ • Soft-liners prevail in the regime thanks to societal pressure	• Hard-liner leadership • Political stagnation ↓ Revolutionary potential ↓ Mobilization of society • Revolutionary triggers
Transition	• Uncontrollable societal mobilization ↓	• Revolution (spontaneous, peaceful, urban-based, and cross-class) ↓
Consolidation	• Option 1: Regime suppress the revolution ↓ Adaptation of the political leadership to new situation, the demands posed by societal challenge will be met but with a time delay (ideological and institutional adjustments) (Examples: Poland 1956 and 1968, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, China 1978/79 and 1986/87) • Option 2: Negotiations between soft-liners and moderates of opposition (elimination of radicals) ↓ Implementation of negotiated agreements, extended liberalization but not democratization (Examples: Poland 1971 and 1980, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Soviet Union 1989–1991, Iran 1999)	• Option 1: Regime suppress the revolution ↓ Adaptation of the political leadership to new situation (Examples: Poland 1988, China 1989, Iran 2009) • Option 2: Regime collapse ↓ Formation of democratic structures (Examples: Poland 1989, Czechoslovakia, and GDR 1989)

Figure 2: Dynamics between Regime and Society

Figure 3: Patterns of the Transition Process: Negotiated Transition

Pattern of Transition	Negotiated Transition
Initiation phase	Conflict between soft-liners and hard-liners within the regime
	Soft-liners prevail
	Launching of liberalization phase ⅂
	Mobilization of the society's opposition
Transition phase	Negotiations between soft-liners and moderates of opposition (elimination of radicals) ⅂
	First free elections
Consolidation	Implementation of negotiated agreements

Figure 4: Patterns of the Transition Process: Democratic Revolution

Pattern of Transition	Democratic Revolution
Initiation phase	Hard-liner leadership
	Political stagnation
	Revolutionary potential ⅂, Mobilization of the society ⅂
	Revolutionary triggers
Transition phase	Revolution (spontaneous, peaceful, urban-based, and cross-class)
	Regime collapse
	First free elections