Die koreanische Halbinsel in der strategischen Kalkulation Chinas und der USA

Abstract

The article seeks to describe the complicated strategic interaction between China and the United States with each other and with the two Korean states. It argues that the Six-Party Talks for the denuclearisation of North Korea have failed and that the US will not be able to achieve denuclearisation through sanctions or negotiations. After Gaddafi's fate Pyongyang will congratulate itself that it kept its deterrent against suspected American intentions of regime change. China's priority in North Korea is regime stability through economic assistance, investment, and the encouragement of political and economic reforms. Although North Korean military provocations in 2010 against South Korea have reinforced the alliances of the United States with South Korea and Japan and damaged the China-South Korea relationship China is both unable and unwilling to weaken North Korea in order to please the US. North Korea's relations with China and the US are both effected by North Korean distrust and suspicions. To control peace and stability on the peninsula American-South Korean contingency planning for regime implosion in the North would be wise, but in order to be effective they should be synchronized with those of China, which is politically not possible.