

Im Fokus

The 2008 Beijing Olympic Torch Relay: Chinese and Western Narratives

Der Fackellauf der Olympischen Spiele 2008 in Beijing: Chinesische und westliche Berichterstattung

Kingsley Edney

Abstract

This article investigates the events of the Olympic flame's international journey leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. It focuses on the symbolism of the torch relay and argues that rather than serving as a symbol of international unity and harmony, the relay has strengthened both the Chinese national narrative of victimisation at the hands of foreign powers and the Western narrative of an authoritarian and illiberal China. The article also notes that the response by some overseas Chinese to the attacks on the torch have undermined attempts to use the Olympics to boost the country's international image, and that these overseas displays of nationalism represent a potential future problem for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Keywords: China, Beijing Olympics, symbols, nationalism, international image

Introduction

Promoted as the "Journey of Harmony", the route travelled by the Olympic torch around the world in the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games was the longest ever attempted, travelling through 22 cities outside the Chinese mainland. The relay soon became the focus of conflict between human rights activists and supporters of China, however, with attacks on the torch in London and Paris sparking outrage among Chinese all around the world. This short article first describes the key events surrounding the international section of the torch relay before offering a brief analysis of the Olympic flame's controversial journey, arguing that the association between the riots in Tibet and the Olympic torch relay highlighted the ongoing disconnection between Chinese perceptions of victimisation at the hands of international forces – as well as their sense of

grievance that China's domestic progress is not being recognised in the West – and Western suspicion of what is seen as a brutal and authoritarian Chinese government. Rather than acting as a symbol of universal Olympic values and bringing the world together to support the Beijing Games, the torch became the focus for highly emotional symbolic calls for human rights and national unity – each based on its own strongly entrenched cultural-historical narrative. Pro-Tibet protests and the controversy over the role of the flame attendants further exposed the CCP's political stake in the Olympics to an international audience. At the same time, the aggressive nationalism of some Chinese protesters served to undermine the attempts of the CCP to use the Olympic torch to generate global goodwill towards the Beijing Olympics and China.

The International Torch Relay

As the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (BOCOG) was preparing for the start of the 2008 Olympic flame's international "Journey of Harmony", demonstrations to mark the 49th anniversary of the CCP takeover of Tibet turned into serious riots in Lhasa on 14 March, with unrest spreading to many other areas with significant Tibetan populations. This led to the People's Armed Police locking down the Tibetan capital and closing the provincial border, as well as a number of other areas in which protests had occurred, to foreign journalists. Occurring only ten days before the torch-lighting ceremony at Olympia, the riots focused international media attention back on China's human rights record – particularly in Tibet – despite arguments from the Chinese side that Tibetans were the perpetrators of violence in Lhasa and therefore could hardly be seen as innocent victims (Xinhua 2008d).

At the torch-lighting ceremony in Olympia security officials failed to prevent a Reporters Without Borders representative with a protest flag from briefly interrupting the speech by BOCOG head Liu Qi, and pro-Tibet demonstrators later also voiced their anger with the CCP in scuffles with Greek security personnel along the torch route, although these episodes went unreported in the official Chinese press. After this less-than-perfect start the torch left for a fairly calm period of travel, going from Beijing to Almaty in Kazakhstan, then on to Istanbul and St. Petersburg.

When the torch arrived in London, however, it was met by a number of protest groups eager to express their disapproval of Chinese government policies. Members of the local Chinese community came out to show their patriotism

and support for the Games, and there were many other people out to simply cheer on the torch, but the dramatic attempts by protesters to grab the torch, obstruct its path, and even put it out with a fire extinguisher became the major headline around the world. Organisers were forced to put the torch on a bus or alter the route three times during the relay and approximately 35 people were arrested (Taylor 2008). This time the Chinese government did allow the protests to be reported inside China and condemned Tibetan separatists for their attacks on the Olympic flame, which they argued belonged to the whole world, not just China. Chinese media reports repeatedly emphasised the small scale of the protests, did not mention any causes not directly related to the Tibet issue, and talked up criticism of the protesters by both Chinese and non-Chinese residents of London (Xinhua 2008b). Footage posted on Chinese video-sharing websites such as Tudou and Youku showed displays of Chinese patriotism and pro-China supporters engaged in shouting matches with Tibetan supporters, but not the pro-Tibet protests on their own (Tudou 2008).

A similar scene greeted the Olympic flame when it arrived in Paris the following day. 18 arrests were made as attempts to extinguish the torch continued, and a protest banner was hung from the Eiffel Tower. As in London the torch was forced onto a bus a number of times and the torch (not the flame itself, which is kept in a back-up lantern) was extinguished by organisers, although reports varied as to how many times it was actually put out. When the mayor of Paris authorised a banner supporting human rights to be hung at the location of a planned reception for the torch, organisers decided to bring the relay to an early close (Leveque & Boulet-Euchin 2008). Chinese government statements later emphasised that although the organisers had deliberately extinguished the torch for safety reasons, contrary to what they saw as inaccurate international media reports the “sacred flame” itself had continued to burn throughout the relay (Xinhua 2008c).

As Chinese anger grew over the hostile reception the torch received in Paris from not only protesters but also French politicians, the story of disabled Chinese torch bearer Jin Jing emerged to grab the attention of China’s Internet users and official media outlets. Jin, a fencer who had lost a leg to cancer, was waiting with an unlit torch for her section of the relay to begin when she was attacked by a Tibetan protester who tried to grab the torch from her. Only lightly guarded, as she was not yet carrying the actual flame, they struggled briefly before the man was apprehended without succeeding in his attempts to wrest the torch

from her hands. A Chinese photographer waiting with Jin to record her turn in the relay captured the incident on film, with one image – the Tibetan man in a blur of motion, face distorted in anger, wrestling with a vulnerable one-legged woman in a wheelchair – being particularly powerful (see China.com 2008). Jin was hailed as a hero for her courageous spirit and what were seen as her patriotic actions in defending the torch. On returning home to Shanghai she was interviewed on Chinese state television, many Chinese Internet users claimed that her story had moved them to tears, and Chinese Internet portal Sohu even set up a web page dedicated to her (Sohu.com 2008). This outpouring of emotion was followed by an Internet manhunt for the attacker, resulting in a Tibetan man in the United States (who protested his innocence) receiving death threats from enraged Chinese (Yi 2008).

When the torch arrived in San Francisco organisers and local police were well prepared for strong protests from both critics and supporters of China. Protesters from the group Students for a Free Tibet scaled the Golden Gate Bridge to hang giant banners prior to the beginning of the relay, and a candle-lit vigil in support of the Tibetan cause addressed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu and actor Richard Gere was held the night before the event. Although the decision by organisers to cut short and change the relay route prevented any direct attacks on the torch itself, it also took the Olympic flame well away from where spectators were waiting to view it, leaving many confused and disappointed.

Chinese public anger at the torch's Paris reception found an outlet in rumours that a major shareholder of French supermarket chain Carrefour had donated money to the Dalai Lama. Calls to boycott the stores, which have a highly visible presence in China, swept the Internet, and thousands turned up to protest in a number of Chinese cities (Soong 2008). Former heroine Jin Jing quickly became the target of nationalist attacks after expressing concerns that a boycott of the French chain would harm local Chinese workers (Li 2008).

Although there were many Chinese supporters at the London, Paris and San Francisco legs of the relay, after the scenes in Paris there was a concerted effort, especially by international students using online bulletin boards and word-of-mouth, to mobilise the Chinese overseas to support the torch and oppose Tibetan independence. Pro-China demonstrations were held that weekend in cities around the world; protests held in Australia and other countries were not only reported within the country but also received favourable media coverage on the Chinese mainland (Xinhua 2008e).

Meanwhile, concerns about the Chinese torch attendants began to be aired in the international media, particularly in the UK but also other relay host countries such as Australia. They were labelled “thugs” by the chairman of the Organising Committee for the 2012 London Olympics Lord Sebastian Coe, and “robots or watchdogs” by Olympic judo champion and head of the French Olympic Committee’s athletes’ commission David Douillet (who was also a torch bearer in Paris), despite the Chinese attendants having a seemingly small part to play in the actual physical protection of the torch compared to local police (Murphy 2008).

The torch relay then proceeded in a largely peaceful and orderly manner, though with heightened security, through Buenos Aires, Dar es Salaam, and Muscat before arriving in South Asia. Police and relay organisers in New Delhi took security measures to new extremes as they shortened the city’s relay leg and closed off the route to all but a few specially selected members of the public. With 70 torch bearers and the route reduced to only 2.3 kilometres, each relay participant could only carry the flame for a few seconds before passing it on to the next runner. Beginning the day before the relay, authorities rounded up 250 Tibetans, but despite these measures a “Torch for Tibet” event run at the same time attracted high profile support, with International Olympic Committee member Nafisa Ali and a former defence minister both attending (Dikshit 2008).

When the torch relay made its way through the streets of Canberra after arriving from Southeast Asia, the Australian media’s attention remained firmly fixed on the confrontations between Tibetan and Chinese supporters and the conflict between the Chinese and Australian authorities over the role of the Chinese flame attendants (for example, see Farouque et al. 2008; Maley 2008). More than 50 busloads of Chinese supporters travelled to the Australian capital for the relay in an attempt to overwhelm Tibetan demonstrators by weight of numbers. There were a handful of arrests, the majority being Chinese supporters rather than pro-Tibet activists. Clashes between demonstrators critical of the Chinese government and nationalistic young Chinese also took place in Japan and South Korea as the torch continued on its journey, with the South Korean protests in particular generating popular local condemnation of the violence used by Chinese students (Choe 2008; Kim 2008).

Within China the CCP seemed to be following the usual pattern of initially allowing expressions of nationalism and issuing condemnatory statements but gradually reining in domestic nationalist sentiment before it could cause ongoing

problems. Although anonymous threats were made towards Western journalists, in general the domestic protests were much more peaceful than either those along the torch route or previous episodes of anti-Japanese anger in 2005 and anti-American protests in 1999. By late April, as the torch moved through Pyongyang, Ho Chi Minh City and finally to Hong Kong and Macau, the state media was publishing calls for more rational expressions of nationalism (Qin 2008). Until early May Chinese Internet search engines blocked results for Carrefour (*Jialefu*), presumably to dampen down the movement calling for a boycott of the French stores during the May Day holidays.

Diverging Perceptions

At an international level the torch relay had been expected to be a chance for the Chinese government to publicise and generate goodwill towards the Beijing Olympics, and part of a broader “charm offensive” designed to improve foreign perceptions of China and reduce fear generated by the country’s increasing power (see Kurlantzick 2007). Domestically, the international relay also represented an opportunity to shape a symbol that would strengthen perceptions that China has made major progress in recent years under the guidance of the CCP and that this Chinese progress is being recognised around the world, thus promoting national pride and boosting the CCP’s legitimacy. In order to take advantage of this opportunity the Chinese authorities attempted to present the torch relay in a way that emphasised the Olympic flame’s universal appeal based on the values of peace and friendship contained in the concept of “Olympism”. At the same time, they attempted to place it within a domestic discourse in which the Beijing Games are a collective dream of the entire Chinese nation. By appealing to collective values this strategy attempted to reduce perceptions that the CCP is using the Olympics to pursue its own interests.

Instead of generating international goodwill, however, the torch relay has highlighted the ongoing difference between widely held Western and Chinese perceptions and values, while heightening mutual suspicions of the “politicisation” of the Games by both Western activists and the CCP. In addition, the Chinese nationalist emotions generated by the conflict over the torch, while to some extent challenging Western perceptions of the level of support enjoyed by the Chinese government over the Tibet issue and further marginalising domestic critics of the Olympics, pose problems for the CCP. Nationalist displays can undermine the CCP’s attempts to use the Olympics to improve its image in order to reduce

fears of a rising China, especially when Chinese “patriotic demonstrations” in other countries turn violent.

The controversy surrounding the journey of the Olympic torch around the world is often framed in public debate in terms of the politicisation of the Games and whether or not it is appropriate to mix sport and politics. However, the issue of politicisation – both of the torch relay and the Olympic Games in general – is more usefully analysed as a struggle between competing political narratives that each claim legitimacy based on an appeal to the universal, while attempting to undermine rival positions by labelling them as simply a reflection of the other side’s narrow and selfish interests. In order for symbolic action such as the Olympic torch relay to be effective – that is, to generate an emotional reaction in order to gain the public’s sympathy or spur them to respond in the desired manner – it must be de-politicised in the eyes of its target audience. It cannot be perceived as being merely a cynical attempt at manipulation if it is to connect with its viewers or listeners in an effective manner (Alexander 2006:55-56).

For the Olympics to become more than just a sporting event and be successful at generating an emotional response in their viewers – whether this response serves the goals of the IOC or those of the Chinese government – they must be seen to transcend the narrow political interests of particular actors and appeal to underlying shared values. Thus the IOC and Chinese organisers have appealed to the universalism of the Olympic spirit to try to generate international enthusiasm for the Games. Domestically, the Chinese government has attempted to portray the Olympics as the collective dream of the Chinese people and a symbol of China’s progress and growing international status in order to generate emotions of national pride in all Chinese, not just those in the host city. At the same time, the IOC and Chinese officials have often labelled unwelcome outside interference in the Games as attempts to politicise the event, hoping to discredit protests such as those on human rights by showing them to be selfish, narrow-minded, and contrary to broader shared interests. After the torch passed through London and Paris Chinese organisers lashed out at pro-Tibet protesters, claiming that attempts to politicise the Olympics were “bound to fail” and arguing that the Olympic flame belonged to the whole world and therefore attacks on the torch would only anger people everywhere (Xinhua 2008a).

Protest groups have responded to Chinese and IOC accusations of playing politics by arguing that the Chinese government has itself already politicised the Olympics through its attempts to turn the Games into a showpiece for the CCP’s

achievements (for an example of an activist group's summary of China's past politicisation of the Games, see Save Darfur Coalition 2008). They were aided in their attempts to do this by the torch relay's historical origins in the 1936 Berlin Olympics (Bowlby 2008), which provided added weight to the critique of the way the Olympic flame was represented by the IOC and Chinese authorities. To counter Chinese and IOC accusations that they were simply pushing their own narrow political position the torch relay protesters also attempted to place their actions in the context of a liberal human rights narrative in which their legitimacy, as well as their emotional appeal, was based on concepts such as freedom and self-determination. While making universalist claims based on human rights discourse, pro-Tibet protesters also tried to reconstruct the torch relay as a symbol of Chinese state oppression in order to generate a sympathetic response in their audience. The protesters were able to draw on ingrained Western perceptions of CCP authoritarianism and repression, as well as a widespread Western cultural narrative strongly linking Tibet, Buddhism, and the Dalai Lama with idealised notions of peaceful spirituality, to help achieve this goal.

During the earlier coverage of the Lhasa riots, the focus of the international media rapidly shifted from the violent demonstrations themselves to suspicion towards the Chinese authorities' ongoing actions in the absence of media scrutiny. In coverage of the torch relay protests there was also a shift in focus, particularly in the UK and Australia, from the violent actions of the pro-Tibet protestors to criticism of the Chinese flame attendants. After they were branded as thugs and robots in London and Paris, it also emerged that the flame attendants were drawn from the ranks of the People's Armed Police – the organisation charged with regaining control after the riots in Tibet. This established a strong link between the flame attendants and the heavy hand of the Chinese authoritarian state. In the lead-up to the Australian section of the relay the local officials (and even the Prime Minister) were at pains to emphasise that the Chinese authorities would not be involved with any of the security provided in Canberra, clearly worried about a public backlash from the perception that a foreign (and largely unpopular) government might be interfering in Australian internal security arrangements. By the time the torch completed its Canberra leg the dispute between Australian and Chinese organisers over the role of the Chinese security officials, and a minor altercation between an Australian police officer and a flame attendant along the relay route, had become the focus of much public attention. The association between the Chinese state and the Olympic torch – clearly manifested in the

form of the flame attendants – further exposed the relay as a political project launched to advance the interests of the CCP, undermining Chinese and IOC appeals to the universalism of the Olympic spirit.

At the same time as underlying Western suspicions towards the Chinese state were brought to the surface during the torch relay, Chinese demonstrators were drawing on their own shared cultural-historical narratives in both their calls for unity and their attacks on the political interests motivating their opponents. Although the national pride generated by the Beijing Olympics among Chinese within the country as well as overseas can help to promote the belief that China is steadily improving under the guidance of the CCP, thus shoring up party legitimacy and creating positive interest in China around the world, the extreme actions of some of the nationalist protesters were a setback to Chinese efforts to show a friendly face to the world and assuage fears of their country's rising power.

The domestic efforts of the CCP to downplay their own interests in the Games by representing the Beijing Olympics as the collective dream of the Chinese people, while of course unable to persuade everyone (Ling & Lee 2007), has enjoyed considerable success in attracting volunteers and generating enthusiasm for the Games in China. However, CCP efforts to associate the Olympics with collective emotions of national and cultural pride, when combined with the widespread sense of anger at the Western interpretation of the riots in Lhasa, meant that attacks directed at the Olympic torch were treated as symbolic attacks on the Chinese people themselves – attempts by jealous and hostile forces to embarrass China, spoil the Olympic party for their own selfish reasons and, ultimately, to split and weaken the country – generating emotions that led to a nationalist backlash. This kind of angry response to perceived foreign insults has been a strong theme in the history of Chinese nationalist movements.

With Chinese Internet users around the world accusing the Western media of anti-China bias in its coverage of the Lhasa riots (see the website www.anti-cnn.com), and the Chinese government's attempts to frame the issue as one of separatism and criminal actions rather than religious freedom or human rights, strong collective memories of China's humiliation, exploitation and division at the hands of foreign imperial powers reinforced the need for national unity in the face of an external threat. One Chinese protester at an anti-Carrefour demonstration made the connection clear with a placard that included the statement "strongly oppose the 1860 French-British invasion of China" (Wenxue

City 2008). The Chinese media specifically encouraged this focus on the issue of Tibetan separatism throughout the relay by studiously ignoring protests along the torch route not directly related to the Tibet issue, such as those criticising China's support for the Sudanese and Burmese governments or calls for the stronger protection of human rights from groups such as Reporters Without Borders. Fear of domestic chaos (*luan*), of which the riots in Tibet were a potent reminder, remains for many Chinese a powerful reason to support a strong central government. This stability is seen as essential if the economic and social gains made during the reform era are to continue. The patriotic demonstrations that were held by overseas Chinese during the weekend following the London and Paris legs of the torch relay drew heavily on this narrative of national unity and solidarity, while labelling the Western media "liars" and attacking attempts to split the motherland. Even some overseas Chinese who were usually more critical of the CCP came out in support of the relay, citing the progress achieved by China as reason to continue to encourage and engage the country, rather than isolate and criticise it (Pierson 2008).

As the attacks on the torch symbolised for many Chinese both widespread ignorance in the West about China and a deliberate and selfish attempt to use human rights as a means to prevent China from taking its rightful place as a respected great power, the emotional response by many overseas Chinese, especially international students, reinforced Western narratives of China as authoritarian and intolerant of free speech. As some Chinese protesters in Canberra attacked Tibetan supporters, tried to cover Tibetan flags and banners with much larger Chinese flags, and generally used their superior numbers to drown out the Tibetan message, many Australians expressed their anger in letters to newspapers and online over what was perceived to be a foreign and undemocratic attempt to silence legitimate free expression, and emphasised what they saw as a connection between the repressive actions of the Chinese government in Tibet and the Chinese students in Australia. In Seoul the public responded angrily to Chinese students' use of similar tactics, with even the Prime Minister commenting on the negative impact of the protests on relations between the two countries (Xiao 2008). These actions by Chinese nationalists, even though they only represent a minority of demonstrators, have undermined the Chinese government's attempts to reduce the fear of a rising China among its neighbours.

When Chinese demonstrators call for national unity in the face of foreign threats this can strengthen the position of the CCP, but when these calls for unity become demands for state action this can constrain CCP policy strategy and even undermine public faith in the party's ability to govern in the best interests of the Chinese people. During the torch relay, however, there were no widespread demands that the Chinese state take strong action against foreign countries, except perhaps an expectation that there would be some official statements condemning the actions of the pro-Tibet groups and supporting the Chinese demonstrators. Despite the absence of any serious challenge to CCP legitimacy or its existing policies in this case, the involvement of overseas Chinese in the torch relay may represent a future challenge to the party's desire to limit the more damaging effects of excessive nationalism, as nationalist movements within China interact with those outside the direct influence of Chinese censors. When ethnic Chinese were targeted in Indonesian race riots in 1998 the CCP was able to suppress the spread of information in China and thereby prevent the emergence of nationalist demands for action (Brady 2008:52).

In the future, however, the outright suppression of information will be much more difficult if Chinese – especially international students – around the world take a leading role in promoting the nationalist cause. It is not yet clear whether this kind of overseas nationalism will develop its own momentum or be largely responsive to the mood within China's domestic – and in particular its online – media environment. Given that the most active demonstrators were international students who are likely to still have strong links with the mainland online community that is the source of much nationalist sentiment, it would seem that CCP efforts to manage nationalism domestically may also influence these overseas groups. However, the popularity of overseas-based Chinese Internet forums as well as the use of non-Chinese platforms such as Youtube to spread nationalist messages may create ongoing problems for the CCP when the next perceived insult to China ignites nationalist anger.

Conclusion

While organising and executing successful Olympic Games in Beijing present some serious logistical challenges to the Chinese government in areas such as the environment, transport, security, and communication, it also demands that the CCP pay close attention to the symbolism of the Games if it is to achieve its goals of improving China's international image and generating a positive patriotic

response in the Chinese population. The torch relay is essentially an exercise in symbolism as it travels the world during the period immediately before the Games, designed to generate international and domestic excitement about the upcoming event and emphasise the significance of these particular Olympics. During the torch relay, however, the appeals by the IOC, Chinese government, and sports organisations to the universal values of “Olympism” that the torch is intended to represent, were overshadowed first by the powerful symbolism of the attacks on the torch by human rights activists and then by the nationalist Chinese backlash against those attacks.

The conflict between the “pro-Tibet” and “pro-China” viewpoints during the international section of the torch relay did encourage some dialogue and questioning of existing assumptions about the other side, and there were many people outside China who also expressed the view that the Olympics should not be the focus of political protests. In general, however, the heightened emotions generated by the symbolism of the events of the Olympic torch relay exposed serious underlying differences between Chinese perceptions of national pride in China’s rising power – and a sense of victimisation at the hands of international forces – and the liberal (largely, but not exclusively, Western) human rights narrative. Although such differences are not necessarily permanent or irreconcilable, the events of the international section of the Olympic torch relay have resulted in the highlighting, rather than transcendence, of those contradictions. The torch relay has made it much more difficult for the CCP to successfully downplay its own political stake in the Beijing Olympics and appeal to the universalism of the Olympic spirit in order to generate international goodwill towards China and reduce fear of its rising power.

References

- Alexander, Jeffrey C. (2006), “Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance Between Ritual and Strategy”, in: Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen & Jason L. Mast (eds.), *Social Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.29-90
- Bowlby, Chris (2008), “The Olympic Torch’s Shadowy Past”, in: *BBC News*, 5 April. Online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7330949.stm> (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Brady, Anne-Marie (2008), *Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield

- China.com (2008), *Girl Who Protect the Olympic Flame with Body(4)*, 9 April. Online: http://english.china.com/zh_cn/news/society/11020309/20080409/14775788_3.html (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Choe, Sang-hun (2008), "Chinese Clash With Protesters in Seoul", in: *The New York Times*, 27 April. Online: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/world/asia/27cnd-torch.html?_r=1&ex=1367035200&en=fd684a01a092de31&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&oref=slogin (accessed 22 May 2008)
- Dikshit, Sandeep (2008), "Olympic Torch Relay Run Peaceful", in: *The Hindu*, 18 April. Online: <http://www.hindu.com/2008/04/18/stories/2008041857970100.htm> (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Farouque, Farah, Chris Hammer & Brendan Nicholson (2008), "Destination Canberra: Will the Olympic Torch Cause a Flare-up?", in: *The Age*, 24 April. Online: <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2008/04/23/1208743040332.html> (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Kim, Tae-jong (2008), "Anti-Chinese Sentiment Looms After Torch Relay", in: *The Korea Times*, 28 April. Online: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2008/04/117_23257.html (accessed 22 May 2008)
- Kurlantzick, Joshua (2007), *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*, New Haven: Yale University Press
- Leveque, Thierry & Chrystel Boulet-Euchin (2008), "Olympic Flame Falters On Chaotic Paris Visit", in: Reuters, 7 April. Online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL0772655920080407?virtualBrandChannel=10112> (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Li, Zhaohua (2008), "Hero to Traitor: The Difference a Day Makes", in: *China Digital Times*, 19 April. Online: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/04/nationalists-paris-torch-relay-hero-now-a-traitor/> (accessed 22 May 2008)
- Ling, Bonny & Trevor Lee (2007), "Where is the 'Frugal Olympics'? Internet Voices Protest Extravagance", in: *China Rights Forum*, no.3, pp.54-61
- Maley, Paul (2008), "Chinese Students Bully Torch Crowds", in: *The Australian*, 25 April. Online: <http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23595689-2702,00.html> (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Murphy, Francois (2008), "French Officials Slam Chinese Torch Security", in: Reuters, 8 April. Online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL0883815520080408?virtualBrandChannel=10112&pageNumber=3&sp=true> (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Pierson, David (2008), "Chinese Americans Feel Sting of Olympic Protests",

- in: *Los Angeles Times*, 11 April. Online: <http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-tibet11apr11,0,7759679.story> (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Qin, Li (2008), “Ba aiguo de jiqing hua wei qianjin de liliang” (Turn patriotic passion into progressive force), in: *Xinhua*, 29 April. Online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2008-04/29/content_8071966.htm (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Save Darfur Coalition (2008), “Darfur Groups Cry “Foul”: China Has Long Politicized the Olympics”, in: *Savedarfur.org*, 14 February. Online: http://www.savedarfur.org/newsroom/releases/darfur_groups_cry_foul_china_has_long_politicized_the_olympics/ (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Sohu.com (2008), *Gandong quan shijie de Zhongguo nühai* (Chinese girl who touches the whole world), April. Online: <http://2008.sohu.com/torch/chinese-girl/> (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Soong, Roland (2008), “Carrefour in Hefei: A Photo Play”, in: *EastSouthWest-North*, 26 April. Online: http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20080426_1.htm (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Taylor, Jerome (2008), “Olympic Spirit Comes to Britain”, in: *The Independent (Online Edition)*, 7 April. Online: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/olympic-spirit-comes-to-britain-805390.html> (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Tudou (2008), *Lundun youxing – yu ZD chongtu* (London demonstration – conflict with ZD [Tibetan separatists]), 8 April. Online: <http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/ki4SEgcGiJ4/> (accessed 9 April 2008)
- Wenxue City (2008), *Qun qing ji fen: 19 ri Qingdao dizhi Jialefu de zhuangguan changmian* (Crowd feelings incite anger: 19 [April] Spectacular scene of Qingdao Carrefour boycott), 20 April. Online: <http://news.wenxuecity.com/messages/200804/news-gb2312-575884.html> (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Xiao, Qiang (2008), “South Korea to Charge Chinese Students for Torch Relay Violence”, in: *China Digital Times*, 28 April. Online: <http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2008/04/anti-chinese-sentiment-looms-after-torch-relay/> (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Xinhua (2008a), *Beijing Olympic Spokesman Condemns Attempts to Sabotage Torch Relay in London*, 7 April. Online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/07/content_7930465.htm (accessed 7 May 2008)
- (2008b), *Lundun jingfang daibu jishaoshu pohuai Aoyun shenghuo chuandi “Zangdu” fenzi* (London police arrest very small number of “Tibetan se-

- paratists" who damaged the Olympic torch relay), 7 April. Online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/sports/2008-04/07/content_7931274.htm (accessed 7 May 2008)
- (2008c), *Waijiaobu chengqing waidianbao huojuzai Bali chuandi zhong beipo ximie yi shi* (Foreign ministry clarifies the matter of foreign news agency reports that the torch was forced to be extinguished during the Paris relay), 8 April. Online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/sports/2008-04/08/content_7936057.htm (accessed 7 May 2008)
- (2008d), *FM: China Indignant, Opposed to U.S. House Resolution on Tibet*, 11 April. Online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-04/11/content_7956263.htm (accessed 7 May 2008)
- (2008e), *Shijie duo guo huaren fan "Zangdu" aiguo youxing* (Patriotic demonstrations opposing "Tibetan independence" by Chinese in many countries around the world), 14 April. Online: http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2008-04/14/content_7970922.htm (accessed 7 May 2008)
- Yi, Sandra (2008), "Utah Man Receiving Threats After Case of Mistaken Identity", in: KSL, 13 April. Online: <http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=3074908> (accessed 7 May 2008)