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Towards China's Integration into the Aid Donor Architecture: Learning from Chinese Participation in International Regimes

Stefan Stähle

Abstract

China's increasing involvement in Africa seems to pose a serious challenge to the established aid donor community. A competition between the so-called Beijing Consensus and the Post-Washington Consensus could undermine regional and international efforts for supporting a reformist agenda towards market economy development and liberal democracy in Africa and could thus propel regional instability. Since most suggestions for an engagement strategy toward China regarding its economic activities in Africa lack a clear understanding of China's motives to join such a regime, this article analyses China's past behaviour in other international regimes. It recommends combining international pressure with pragmatic assistance in order to affect China's cost-benefit analysis. A structured approach could provide pragmatic experience in the field, informal and formal dialogues, and an institutional structure that takes into account Chinese interests. Beijing could be gradually familiarised with the aid donor regime, using the effects of practical learning and small-group socialisation. (Manuscript received March 10, 2008; accepted for publication April 29, 2008)

Keywords: Africa, China, development aid, international regimes, socialisation

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Studie

Auf dem Weg zur Integration Chinas in die internationale Geber-Architektur: Was wir von Chinas Partizipation an internationalen Regimen lernen können

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Abstract

Chinas wachsendes Engagement auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent scheint eine ernsthafte Herausforderung an die etablierte Geber-Gemeinschaft darzustellen. Ein Wettbewerb zwischen dem so genannten Beijing-Consensus und dem Post-Washington-Consensus könnte regionale und internationale Bemühungen um Unterstützung einer Reformagenda im Hinblick auf die Entwicklung von Marktwirtschaft und liberaler Demokratie in Afrika unterminieren und auf diese Weise die regionale Instabilität befördern. Da die meisten Empfehlungen für eine Strategie der Einbindung gegenüber China im Hinblick auf die wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten des Landes in Afrika kein klares Verständnis der Motive aufweisen, die China zum Beitritt zu einem derartigen internationalen Regime bewegen könnten, analysiert dieser Aufsatz Chinas vergangenes Verhalten in anderen internationalen Regimen. Die Studie empfiehlt, internationalen Druck mit pragmatischer Hilfe zu kombinieren, um so Chinas Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse zu beeinflussen. Ein strukturierter Ansatz könnte pragmatische Erfahrungen im Feld, informelle und formelle Gespräche sowie eine institutionelle Struktur bieten, die chinesische Interessen berücksichtigen würde. Auf diese Weise würde Beijing allmählich mit dem internationalen Geber-Regime unter Zuhilfenahme von praktischem Lernen und der Sozialisation in kleinen Gruppen vertraut gemacht. (Manuskript eingereicht am 10.03.2008; zur Veröffentlichung angenommen am 29.04.2008)

Keywords: Afrika, China, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, internationale Institutionen, Sozialisation

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Introduction

China's rise as an economic actor in Africa evokes a mixture of admiration, astonishment, and anxiety in the rest of the world. While economists hail the dynamism of Chinese investment on the continent, strategists foresee a fierce competition for natural resources between China and Western countries, and development aid workers are worried that Beijing could undermine recent efforts toward beneficial change in African societies. In fact, the implications of China's growing economic role in Africa are complex and multi-faceted, and the impact of its swift rise as a leading economic player in the region is not yet apparent. However, there is a legitimate concern among the established aid donor community that Chinese activities in Africa are fundamentally challenging the principles of modern development policy.

As the key institution of traditional aid donors, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has defined some guidelines and good practices to ensure sustainable development in aid receiving countries. While the compliance with these norms certainly leaves room for improvement, all DAC members have generally agreed on reducing poverty, on fostering good governance, and on appraising the environmental impact of their aid projects. This stands in stark contrast with China's alleged practice of exploiting crude oil and minerals, collaborating with corrupt regimes, and damaging social and environmental standards with its trade, investment, and development aid. These allegations offer cause for concern that Beijing could repeat the same mistakes that traditional donors are now trying to avoid. In order to prevent this from happening, this article proposes a framework to engage China in a structured dialogue on its economic activities in Africa with the objective to fully integrate Beijing into the existing aid donor regime.

In the English language literature on this subject, several institutional arrangements and norms have been proposed for integrating China into the aid donor regime: China could take part in the OECD-DAC (Gill et al. 2007b:19; Tjønneland et al. 2006:39) and become a supporter country to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which aims at strengthening governance in extractives industries (Tjønneland et al. 2006:39; Wild & Mephram 2007:65). While a single African strategy towards China might not be desirable given the different contexts and countries on the continent, regional forums such as the

African Union (AU) and its New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) might nonetheless provide a platform for coordinating African responses to China's economic presence (Gill et al. 2007b:19-20; Wild & Mephram 2007:63). The AU has already taken steps to establish an African secretariat to ensure that it speaks with one voice at the next Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (Davies 2007:30). China could be invited to AU and NEPAD meetings or to meetings between established donors and the South African Development Community (SADC) or other regional economic communities (Davies et al. 2008:10; Tjønneland et al. 2006:38).

Avenues for trilateral dialogues between institutions could be opened if Beijing became a regular participant of the African Partnership Forum (APF), an initiative of the G8 which comprises African governments, Western donors, and international organisations (Tjønneland et al. 2006:38; Wild & Mephram 2007:66). Likewise, the established donor countries could be involved in the FOCAC (Wild & Mephram 2007:66). Davies (2007:98) suggests that the European Union (EU) should set up a forum similar to FOCAC and share their experience with this institution. However, Berger and Wissenbach (2007:22) draw a somewhat sober conclusion in their assessment of the potential for trilateral cooperation between Africa, China, and Europe. Their research conclude that Europeans and Chinese have quite different views on many key issues regarding Africa and that Africans are missing strong governmental institutions with the resources to help lead the dialogue around Chinese investment in the region.

In fact, most Chinese scholars welcome China's growing political and economic ties with Africa while recognising the increasing potential for conflict with Western actors (see for example Liu 2006, 2008; Zhou 2006; Zhang 2006). Some authors criticise conditionality of aid offered by traditional donors like the EU and Japan (Li 2008; Zhong 2001). Zhang (2003) even implies that Japan's collaboration with Western donors has damaged its reputation in Africa. Other researchers have recently tried to refute the argument that Beijing's interest in Africa is primarily resource-driven (He 2007b:24; Liu 2006; Zhang 2007). While rejecting the idea of a Chinese neo-colonialism, He (2006:25-27) recommends that Beijing should encourage Chinese companies to respect social and environmental standards in Africa, provide assistance to ailing industries, monitor the outcomes of development aid more effectively, and engage into a dialogue with African societies. Only Li (2007:12-13) mentions EITI as a tool for China's integration in existing institutions and norms, but regards this initiative as

problematic. Yet both Li (2007:86-87) and Xu (2008:75-76) encourage dialogues around controversial issues in multilateral settings, though fail to propose any concrete suggestions.

None of the proposals for China's integration into the aid donor regime have thus far systematically considered China's potential motivation for participating in such a regime or suggested a coherent engagement strategy for Beijing. This article¹ would like to contribute to this debate by providing an understanding of China's behaviour in international regimes and its rationale for joining them in the first place. Drawing mainly on empirical studies of Chinese international behaviour, it uses the assumptions of regime theory rather eclectically. While institutionalist arguments may explain China's cost-benefit calculation prior to the accession to certain regimes, social constructivists can demonstrate how the internalisation of norms in small groups contributes to intensified participation.

This article first provides Chinese and international views of defining the aid donor regime and then provides a historical overview of China's growing involvement in Africa. It goes on to summarise the current debate around the Chinese impact on African development. Key features of China's participation in international regimes and the motivation behind Beijing's decision to join these institutions in the first place are presented next. The final section proposes the framework for a structured dialogue with Beijing on multiple levels in order to enhance its full integration into the aid donor regime on the basis of these findings.

Definition of the Aid Donor Regime

Regimes are commonly defined as "institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations" (Krasner 1983:1). However, one must first define the norms, rules, and procedures that constitute the aid donor regime. All major bilateral donors of development

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aid are organised in the DAC in order to increase the effectiveness of their efforts in supporting sustainable development. The DAC provides statistics on aid to developing countries, serves as a source for good practices in development cooperation, and issues guidelines to its members on aid effectiveness, good governance, poverty reduction, evaluation, gender, and environmental standards. The compliance with these guidelines is monitored in regular peer reviews of each member's aid programme. The DAC also plays a key role in ensuring the implementation of the 2005 Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness, which defines the relationship between aid donors and recipients the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual accountability. As a non-DAC member, China has signed the Paris Declaration in its capacity as a recipient of development aid.

There is also the question of how to define development aid. According to DAC, development aid is understood as Official Development Assistance (ODA). These are grants or loans to developing countries, which are undertaken by the official sector, promote economic development and welfare as their main objectives, and are offered at concessional financial terms of at least 25 percent. ODA can be granted as financial flows or technical cooperation. Grants, loans, and credits for military purposes are excluded. However, China's definition of development is much broader due to a blurred distinction between aid and economic cooperation as well as a lack of standardised criteria for aid (Davies 2007:50-51; Davies et al. 2008:2).

Funds earmarked as development aid in the budget of the Chinese Ministry of Finance are actual ODA distributed as grants, interest subsidies for interest-free and concessional loans, or technical assistance. Yet, Chinese leaders and officials often refer to trade concessions, commercial loans, and sometimes even foreign direct investment as development aid since these instruments are also regarded as beneficial to the development of a country (Davies et al. 2008:18-19). Hence Chinese aid is often provided as packaged deals comprising grants, concessional lending, and debt relief, but also trade, investment, joint ventures, and commercial loans (*ibid.*:56). Many of the Chinese promises made at the 2006 FOCAC in Beijing are commercial in nature, including the promotion of trade and investment zones and the China-Africa Development Fund (*ibid.*:26, 28). Beijing also counts debt relief towards its aid commitments, though this is also a controversial practice among DAC members (*ibid.*:7).

For the purpose of this article, the norms of the established aid donor regime

are defined by the DAC guidelines and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. This does not imply, however, that these norms are necessarily tied only to the DAC as an institution. Since DAC guidelines and good practices also address the impact of trade and investment rather than just of ODA, China's economic activities in Africa are also captured by this regime.

China's Involvement in Africa

Among Western observers, China's presence in Africa is often misperceived as a fairly new phenomenon. However, trade links between China and Africa stretch back centuries to the Song Dynasty (Taylor 2006a:16). Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1956, China has extended its assistance to African countries (Bräutigam 1998:45). Yet Beijing's priorities towards Africa have shifted over the past decades as a result of changes in China's national development and its position in the international system.

During the first phase in the 1950s and 1970s, Beijing's policy in Africa was primarily motivated by ideological and strategic considerations. When Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated and Moscow cut off its development aid to Beijing in 1960, China was eager to increase the number of its allies on the continent in order to counter both Soviet hegemony and capitalist imperialism. Beijing tried to project an image as a leader of the developing world in the anti-colonial struggle by providing arms and military training to African rebel groups (Taylor 2006a:25-31). Competing with Taipei for international recognition, Beijing also increased its development aid to newly independent countries in Africa (Bräutigam 1998:39-40). In 1964, Premier Zhou Enlai announced eight principles guiding Chinese development aid (Davies 2007:40). Yet trade with Africa remained limited at that time (Konings 2007:347).

In the second phase from 1978 until 1989, China's interest in African development faded as the country focused on its own economic modernisation. Beijing joined IMF and World Bank and began to accept bilateral development aid and foreign investment from established donor countries (Bräutigam 1998:40). As economic growth became a top priority, China preferred to enjoy a peaceful and stable climate for trade and commerce in the 1980s. As a result, it ceased its direct involvement in armed struggles in Africa (Taylor 2006a:50). In 1982, Premier Zhao Ziyang declared four principles for Chinese economic and technical cooperation with Africa as the result of which China focused its attention on those countries from which China could benefit economically (Bräutigam

1998:51; Konings 2007:348-349; Li 2007:72; Taylor 2006a:57). Thus Chinese development aid to Africa declined with funding becoming smaller-scale for shorter periods (Taylor 2006a:61).

Since the beginning of the third phase from 1990 until today, China has regained its economic and political interest in Africa. Internationally condemned by the Western powers after its violent suppression of student protests in 1989, Beijing renewed and enlarged its contacts with Africa. As part of this diplomatic offensive, China offered its African counterparts development aid, established commercial linkages, and expanded trade with the continent (Bräutigam 1998:52-53; Konings 2007:349; Taylor 2006a:66). Beijing's more inclusive approach to African development was marked by the inception of the FOCAC in 2000, a new institutional framework for its multilateral engagement with Africa. At the last FOCAC in 2006, Beijing made several pledges to Africa such as to double its development aid by 2009 (Davies 2007:24-25). Beijing also issued its China's Africa Policy in 2006, which highlighted political equality, mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation, and cultural exchange (Konings 2007:351). As a result, China has signed an increasing number of cooperation and aid agreements with its African partners since 2000, most of which promote infrastructure projects (Davies et al. 2008:6-7). Sino-African trade has grown dramatically (Wang 2007:5-8). In recent years, economic and political relations between China and Africa have become more intense, more complex, and more institutionalised.

Four key drivers may explain China's renewed interest in Africa: First and foremost, Africa is perceived as an emerging market for Chinese companies whose expansion is beneficial to China's economic development. Second, Africa is rich in natural resources, including petrol and minerals, which enhances China's energy security. Third, China views the developing countries in Africa as its partners against Western hegemony in multilateral institutions and desires therefore to cast its image as a power that cares for the interests of the developing countries. Fourth, Beijing wants to ensure that Taipei's diplomatic space on the continent remains limited (Bräutigam 1998:33; Burke et al. 2007; Davies et al. 2008:4; Glosny 2006:15; Konings 2007:351; Taylor 2006a:69, 205). Like any other donor country, China's development aid is an integral part of its foreign policy towards Africa and thereby serves its national interests. While it has been involved in shaping African development for decades, it is only recently that China has the economic clout to make a real difference. In this sense, China is in fact an emerging donor of development aid.

China's Impact on African Development and Beyond

Although China's economic presence in Africa has been quietly growing for several years, it was not until recently that the number of studies and policy papers focusing on China-Africa relations has proliferated, particularly after Beijing hosted a high-profile FOCAC in 2006 (see for example Alden 2007; Gill et al. 2007a; Lake & Withman 2006; Meidan 2006; Niquet 2006; Tull 2005). There is a growing body of literature reviewing the impact of Chinese trade, investment, and development aid on African societies (see for example Broadman 2006; Burke et al. 2007; Davies 2007; Davies et al. 2008; Wang 2007). From the donor's perspective, the debate has evolved along two central questions: What is in it for Africa? What is the likely impact on the established aid donor regime?

Regarding the benefits to African countries, most studies conclude that it is still too early to make comprehensive judgements and that further analysis is needed (Davies 2007:29; Schüller & Asche 2007; Tjønneland et al. 2006:15). Preliminary assessments suggest that Chinese trade and investment produces both winners and losers in African economies. Chinese demand for African natural resources has contributed to increasing prices of raw materials and improved the terms of trade for Africa (Goldstein et al. 2006:111). However, peripheral regions like Central Africa will benefit less from this China-driven boom since Chinese imports of energy resources and raw materials concentrate primarily on just a very few African countries (Broadman 2006:80-81; Holslag 2006:161-164). This focus on the exploitation of natural resources reminded the former South African President Thabo Mbeki of a colonial relationship (Mallet 2007). Moreover, if these windfall profits are not wisely invested in Africa's development, social inequalities and rent-seeking behaviour are likely to be nurtured, especially in resource-rich countries (Taylor 2006b:946-950). While African consumers may benefit from cheaper Chinese merchandise, labour-rich industries in Africa, especially the textile sector, will suffer from Chinese competition (Goldstein et al. 2006:111-112). Furthermore, Chinese companies in the infrastructure sector are accused of bringing in their own labour force, which does not imply any knowledge transfer to local workers. But recent studies suggest that Chinese labour was primarily employed for supervising, engineering, and other senior level tasks involving technical expertise (Corkin & Burke 2006:80; Davies et al. 2008:17).

Regarding the ultimate impact on the aid donor architecture, there is a

growing concern among established donors that Chinese business practices will eventually thwart international efforts to promote beneficial change in African societies (see Manning 2006). Since Beijing requires virtually no political pre-conditions for its development aid, it collaborates with controversial regimes such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, whose leaders are accused of serious human rights violations. The former World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz and the President of the European Investment Bank, Philippe Maystadt, have publicly criticised China for its disregard for transparency, human rights, and environmental standards in their lending practices (Crouigneau & Hiault 2006; Parker & Beattie 2006). As African countries gain easier access to Chinese funds without undertaking financial reforms, China's lending policy has also raised the issue of debt sustainability (Davies 2007:86-89).

Taken together, China's approach to development aid, the so-called Beijing Consensus, predicated upon non-interference in domestic affairs and the promotion of sovereign integrity, fundamentally challenges the controversial Post-Washington Consensus of multilateral donors, which usually requires the liberalisation of particular sectors of the economy, the privatisation of public services, and compliance with certain social and environmental standards (Alden 2007:105; Gu et al. 2007:17; Ramo 2004:3-6; Thompson 2005:2). Confronted with two competing models, African counterparts may now play off China and the established donor community. This could lead to a race to the bottom to lower standards and undermine regional and international efforts for supporting a reformist agenda towards market economy development and liberal democracy in Africa such as NEPAD. Thus, China's economic involvement in the region poses a serious challenge to the established aid donor regime.

Some students of international relations view this phenomenon as just another case of the ongoing power shift between states and regions from a unipolar to a multipolar world order. According to neorealist thinking, emerging powers like China are inherently dissatisfied with the status quo and seek to upset the established international order. Just like imperial Germany and Japan threatened the international system at the beginning of the 20th century, China's rise would now challenge existing norms, institutions, and the distribution of power. Given its sheer size, rapid growth, and increasing assertiveness, the Chinese re-emergence as a driver of global change could lead to instability, conflict, and war (Brzezinski & Mearsheimer 2005; Gu et al. 2007:2-7; Kreft 2006). With regard to the development aid regime, this struggle for the prevailing development

concept between newcomer and establishment could not only damage attained achievements, but could even propel regional instability.

To prevent such a worst case scenario from unfolding, traditional donors could engage with China in order to fully integrate China into the existing aid donor regime. Advocates of engagement strategies argue that participation in a regime will change state behaviour in a more cooperative direction. In international regime theory, there are two main strands of thought which may explain these behavioural changes: institutionalism and constructivism. States are either motivated to cooperate in international regimes because of material cost-benefit calculations or because of the internalisation of pro-social values.

As the mainstream approach of international regime theory, institutionalism is based on the assumption that states are self-interested actors which have:

Consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in order to maximise their utility in view of those preferences. (Keohane 1984:27)

States cooperate in certain issue-areas if they share common interests which they can realise only through cooperation. Regimes facilitate cooperation by reducing uncertainty about the preferences of other participants, thus reducing information costs (*ibid.*:245, 247). Moreover, international regimes help to shape the reputations of their members regarding their degree of norm-conforming behaviour (*ibid.*:94). According to rationalist thinking, states will join established regimes if the expected benefits from accession to the regime outweigh the costs of participation.

In contrast to institutionalist assumptions, social constructivists claim that social interaction of states in an international regime will gradually change the perception of their preferences. Socialisation refers to the “processes by which the newcomer – the infant, rookie, trainee for example – becomes incorporated into organised patterns of interaction” (Stryker & Statham 1985:325). Social environments consist of institutions, which try to transmit to the new member the predominant norms of the social structure. The newcomer processes these norms and mediates the development of foreign policies with other agents and with the institution. These norms have become so internalised by the newcomer that they are taken for granted. In order to measure the degree of socialisation, Johnston (2008:23-26) distinguishes three microprocesses: mimicking (copying of behavioural norms of the group in order to navigate through an uncertain environment), social influence (sensitivity to status markers bestowed by a social

group by social backpatting and opprobrium), and persuasion (internalisation of fundamentally new causal understandings of particular norms and values).

Theoretically, an effective engagement strategy could attempt to integrate China into the aid donor regime by altering the results of China's cost-benefits calculation or by creating an institutional environment that is conducive to state socialisation. This article argues that China's decision whether or not to join a regime is mainly based on a rational cost-benefit calculation. But socialisation processes within a regime can explain why China has become more involved over time once it had joined the regime.

China's Participation in International Regimes

As China's role in international affairs is growing, so are the numbers of empirical studies on Chinese participation in international regimes. Some authors examined China's participation in multilateral organisations in general or focused on its voting behaviour in the United Nations (Chan 2006; Economy 2001; Kent 2001, 2007; Kim 1995, 1999; Lanteigne 2005; Morphet 2000; Wang 1999, 2005; Wang 2000). Others concentrated on China's involvement in certain international regimes such as security (Gill 1999; Johnston & Evans 1999; Swaine & Johnston 1999), peacekeeping (Fravel 1996; Stähle 2008), trade (Feeney 1998; Pearson 1999, 2006), finance (Lardy 1999), environmental protection (Economy 1998), and human rights (Kent 1999; Nathan 1999). These studies provide the basis for an analysis of certain patterns and motives for China's behaviour in international regimes and for joining them in the first place.

China's Accession to Regimes

If China acts as a rational actor, it will calculate the cost and benefits of its accession to an international regime. An empirical analysis of China's past behaviour may distinguish four kinds of situations that finally led to the accession to the regime (see Harding 2002; Johnston & Evans 1999:248).

- **Costless accession.** In many cases, joining international regimes came almost at no costs for China. Its accession to IMF and World Bank provided Beijing with access to technical expertise, foreign aid, and information in order to advance on its development path, but involved few costs or constraints (Economy 2001:232; Pearson 1999:165). China's involvement in these institutions also enhanced its prestige and international standing, particularly vis-à-vis Taiwan. Moreover, integration helped strengthening the position of domestic

reformers and their agenda (Pearson 1999:165).

- Benefits outweigh costs. In other cases, Beijing realised the significant costs of membership, but also perceived that the benefits would ultimately outweigh the costs. This was particularly apparent when China negotiated its accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The Chinese leadership was aware of the threat posed by deeper integration to entrenched economic interests, especially those of state-owned enterprises. At the same time, major developed countries raised the costs by tougher bargaining. But when the leadership was able to use WTO accession to overcome domestic resistance against political reforms, the benefits finally exceeded the costs involved (see Pearson 1999:182-191). In the case of regional security, China did not participate in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) until an understanding was reached that the status of Taiwan would never be put on the agenda of these institutions (Johnston & Evans 1999:257).
- Benefits outweigh costs after China lowered its costs. In few cases, China joined international regimes that it once rejected only after it had improved its own situation up to the point where the costs of membership seemed acceptable. While negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), China continued to develop its nuclear arsenal and ratified this treaty not until its nuclear weapon testing was completed (Kent 2007:80). Beijing seemed to have deliberately tried to delay the CTBT talks in order to complete the modernisation of its nuclear warheads in time (Swaine & Johnston 1999:106).
- Limitation of increasing image costs. In certain cases, China reluctantly acceded to international regimes not primarily to enjoy the benefits but rather to limit the increasing image costs. Staying away would have isolated Beijing from the rest of the international community and would have damaged its reputation among developing countries. It finally signed onto the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the CTBT largely because international support for non-proliferation of nuclear arms has grown considerably after the end of the cold war (Chan 2006:140; Kent 2007:83-84; Swaine & Johnston 1999:108-109). After France had declared that it would accede to the treaty, China was the only declared nuclear state in the early 1990s that was not a party to the NPT. When Beijing attempted to delay the CTBT talks in 1996, it had to worry about its image among a large group of developing countries (Swaine & Johnston 1999:107).

These empirical findings imply that China does indeed calculate its costs and benefits before deciding whether or not to join an international regime. If this mainstream institutionalist argument can be generally assumed, the international community could try to change China's equation of costs and benefits in order to make its accession to the development aid regime more attractive. It could try to increase the overall benefits, raise the image costs, or reduce the overall costs in China's calculation. However, what exactly constitute these costs and benefits can be derived from empirical studies about China's participation in international regimes.

China's Behaviour in Regimes

Empirical studies about its participation in international regime suggest in general that China is reasonably compliant with its international obligations, has done little to alter existing rules, and has become more supportive of multilateralism over time (Chan 2006:204; Kent 2007:2, 4). While refusing to cooperate in multilateral institutions for ideological reasons in the 1970s, China had joined practically all important institutions of the United Nations and the vast majority of international treaties by the 1980s. In the 1990s, Beijing remained highly sceptical of multilateral structures that could constrain its sovereignty, but its behaviour became more assertive and proactive in the new millennium (Chan 2006:73-74; Kim 1999:45-46). Certain patterns of Chinese behaviour can be distinguished across different regimes.

- Defence of national sovereignty. China is widely regarded as one of the strongest defenders of a traditional concept of national sovereignty against encroachments on the principles of territorial integrity, national independence, and non-interference (Kim 1999:51; Wang 1999:92). Beijing had difficulty in accepting on-site inspections according to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the CTBT and in assenting to tighter reporting requirements on conventional arms in the Asia-Pacific (Kent 2007:81; Swaine & Johnston 1999:103, 111). In the WTO, China attempted to contain the unpopular Trade Policy Review process, which it regarded as a humiliating review on its human rights situation (Pearson 2006:250). On many occasions, however, China's approach to sovereignty has proven to be more flexible than its claimed position. Throughout the 1990s, China was rather sceptical of U.N. peacekeeping missions and opposed the use of force by the blue helmets. Yet over time, Beijing has become more enthusiastic about supporting even

robust peacekeeping operations (Stähle 2008:648-649; Wang 1999:76-80). This suggests that China can overcome its concerns over sovereignty where compromises help to enhance its international image as a responsible power or to avoid direct confrontation.

- Reputation for responsibility. China has a great concern for its international image as a cooperative and responsible actor (Oksenberg & Economy 1999:21; Swaine & Johnston 1999:93, 119). Chinese newspapers and official statements such as the *2005 White Paper on China's Peaceful Development Road* refer frequently to this ambition (see for example Jing 2006; Xiong 2007; Xiong 2008). It makes China vulnerable to social backpatting and opprobrium from major powers and developing countries (Johnston & Evans 1999:252). Thanks to potential image costs caused by outside pressure, China has accepted basic international norms and governing procedures in several regimes, including arms control and human rights (Foot 2001:37; Nathan 1999:151; Swaine & Johnston 1999:119). If the image costs were lacking, however, there was little incentive for China to maintain a cooperative approach (Economy 2001:247).
- Avoidance of confrontation. China usually avoids direct confrontation and does not wish to stand alone in blocking international action (Foot 2001:37). Beijing has been reluctant to cast a veto in the U.N. Security Council unless it can build coalitions with like-minded states to lower its image costs (Kim 1999:61, 65, 72; Swaine & Johnston 1999:119). Acting as an obstructionist would damage its reputation in the United Nations and its relations to major powers. As a result, Beijing does not always strongly stand by the principles it declares and is even prepared to negotiate its sovereignty rather than imposing a veto (Kim 1999:72; Morphet 2000:165; Wang 1999:80). The only exceptions to this tendency are decisions on the international status of Taiwan (Morphet 2000:164; Wang 1999:80-81).
- Feeling of inexperience. As newcomers to an established institution, Chinese diplomats often feel unconfident, prefer to keep a low profile, and remain rather cautious (Johnston 2003:132). They prefer to listen and learn in order to improve their ability to use the system to their own ends. China's first WTO mission lacked staff, expertise, and budget. While these diplomats did not feel comfortable with the WTO rules and operative norms, they were nonetheless busy learning about them (Pearson 2006:245, 256). By following closely the mechanisms of the Dispute Settlement System, they studied how to defend

China's interests in this WTO body more effectively (Gu et al. 2007:12-14). At the same time, the demand for expertise requires an expanding bureaucracy, which then develops its own normative and organisational interests. In the negotiations for China's accession to WTO, the former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) was able to gain much greater authority within the central policy apparatus. As a result, it became MOFTEC's self-interest to advocate deeper and broader involvement in the trade regime (Pearson 1999:188-189). The need for technical specialists also creates the opportunity for the exchange with foreign experts (Economy 2001:244, 251; Swaine & Johnston 1999:104).

- Fear of domination. As China perceives itself as a weak state, especially with regard to security issues, it is more likely to support regimes where the rules apply to all parties equally. Regimes clearly organised and led by industrial democracies or dominated primarily by the United States of America are more likely to be resisted (Oksenberg & Economy 1999:22). Fearing that the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could set the agenda against its will, Beijing preferred to cooperate in informal, impartial, and consensus-based settings such as ARF (Johnston & Evans 1999:257; Wang 1999:86). In general, Beijing favours to create its own regional institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the East Asia Summit, which try to exclude the United States of America (Shambaugh 2006:65-66, 73-76).
- Demand for special treatment. In its international relations, Beijing frequently insists on a special treatment as a developing country. China joined the Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone layer only after the international community had agreed to establish a multilateral fund to offer financial compensation and transfer of technology (Economy 2001:242). In the talks about limiting greenhouse gas emissions, Beijing quickly agreed on the historic responsibility of the developed world and demanded that they would need to bear the financial burden (Chan 2006:157, 163; Economy 2001:246). However, China has been reluctant to join the Like-minded Group, an informal grouping of developing countries in the WTO, despite its claim to represent the interests of the developing world. In the United Nations, it participates in the G77, but only under the heading "G77 plus China", which clearly states its special status. In the G24, the grouping of developing countries in IMF and World Bank, China has just observer status

(Kim 1995:407). Such an approach allows Beijing to maximise its negotiating flexibility and to manoeuvre between both the developed and developing agendas. It claims to represent the interests of the developing world on issues in which it has a stake, but remains silent on those in which it has not (Kent 2001: 137, 150-151; Pearson 2006:252, 254).

In sum, Samuel Kim (1999:76) depicts these Chinese behavioural patterns in international regimes as “maxi-mini diplomacy”: Beijing seems to view participation in multilateral institutions as a cost-effective way to obtain the maximum benefit for itself while paying the minimal cost. Behind closed doors, China tries to extract maximum payoffs in exchange for not blocking a decision in the U.N. Security Council (Kim 1999:54, 61-62). This observation suggests that Chinese compliance in various regimes depend largely on its cost-benefit analysis, a phenomenon which is of course not unique to China (Chan 2006:140; Nathan 1999:159; Swaine & Johnston 1999:118-120).

China's Socialisation in Regimes

While rationality can generally be assumed, Chinese behaviour in international regimes cannot be solely explained by rationalist assumptions. In fact, social constructivists show that China has not only increased the quantity, but also the quality of its participation in international regimes over time (Johnston & Evans 1999:236). In his research about Chinese participation in multilateral security institutions in Southeast Asia, Johnston (2003:133-139) demonstrates that China's comfort level within ARF has grown while its agenda became more institutionalised and intrusive over time. Beijing not only accepted additional working groups after refusing them at first, it even volunteered to co-chair such a meeting by 1996. China also accepted to discuss about topics which were previously deemed as being too intrusive. Moreover, committed Chinese participants of ARF helped other states to draft proposals for ARF-related activities in ways that would make them more acceptable to the central leadership in Beijing.

Johnston & Evans (1999:241-242, 254-255) also found evidence for socialisation processes in small groups of experts. In the context of China's arms control diplomacy, several nuclear weapon scientists were sent to participate in major conferences and workshops abroad, coming back with the feeling that they spoke a common language with their foreign peers. This enhanced both the inter-agency and international exchange on arms control issues and encouraged the develop-

ment of a more independently minded thinking among younger arms control specialists. In order to prepare the Chinese participation in ARF and CSCAP, a number of diplomats and military officers had been sent to foreign universities and participated in trainings and seminar programmes. Over time, some of those have been influenced by interactions with multilateralists from other states, and the official Chinese discourse on ARF adopted the language of common security (Johnston 2003:127-130, 132; Johnston & Evans 1999:262-264).

Towards an Effective Engagement Strategy

An effective strategy for the integration of China into the aid donor architecture needs to understand how China thinks when confronting the situations whether or not to join a regime. The analysis of China's past behaviour in international regimes suggests that China is a rational actor that calculates costs and benefits of an accession. The behavioural patterns of Chinese behaviour in international regimes indicate what kind of costs and benefits Beijing is actually taking into account. While there is little question that China follows a rational actor model in its decision for or against accession, the findings of social constructivists on the effects of small group socialisation shall be taken into consideration when designing an effective engagement strategy towards China.

On the cost side, China's sovereignty in dealing with African countries as it pleases would be considerably constrained. Beijing would need to provide clear-cut data about its current mix of commercial and concessional loans to Africa, to manage its engagement according to international norms such as the DAC guidelines, and to coordinate its development aid policy with both African partners and other donors. Given China's inexperience with the norms and institution of this regime, it would fear to be easily dominated by traditional donors. More importantly, by joining an established donor institution such as OECD, even just as an observer, China would automatically call into question its status as a developing country. This could provide its current donors with an argument for phasing out their development aid to China, just like Japan has already started to do (Davies 2007:33). But such a step would also deprive Beijing of its dual role as both recipient and donor of development aid, which gives China all its tactical flexibility in leaning sometimes to the developed camp, sometimes to the developing camp. It is exactly for this reason that China has always insisted on the term "South-South cooperation" with regard to Sino-African relations (Berger & Wissenbach 2007:7, 23; Davies 2007:51; Gu et al. 2007:21).

On the benefit side, China's accession to the aid donor regime would certainly increase its reputation among Western powers as a responsible actor on the global stage. Since China is currently playing a dual role as both recipient and donor of development aid, it could bring in both perspectives. It could try to actively shape the existing regime according to the needs of developing countries, which would increase its reputation also among its African partners. Beijing would thereby reduce its image costs and the risk of being isolated. By joining institutions such as OECD, China could gain access to expertise on the effective implementation of development aid projects and on economic development in general, but rarely to information that would not have been available elsewhere.

From a Chinese perspective, it appears currently less obvious why Beijing should join an institution and should accept its norms, which it had no role in establishing (Glosny 2006:16). In order to make the membership in the established donor community more attractive to China, the only rational way to influence its cost-benefit balance towards the benefit side would require increasing the potential image costs it would suffer from not joining the regime, decreasing the overall costs by providing a non-threatening institutional design, and increasing the benefits to be gained once it has started to participate in the regime. Therefore, an effective strategy would comprise negative and positive incentives at the same time: international criticism of China's non-cooperative behaviour, an attractive institutional framework, and inducements for Chinese actors to become more involved. Since China's potential benefits from accession to the aid donor regime are rather limited, its ultimate motivation for joining the regime would stem from the prospect of thereby limiting its increasing image costs. Joining the regime would thus appear less costly than staying out of it.

International Pressure

In this strategy, firm and sustained pressure on Beijing is a crucial element for ultimate success. To many development aid workers and China experts, however, the effectiveness of criticising China for its engagement in Africa is highly questionable for three reasons:

First, Western criticism of China would appear hypocritical and illegitimate given the poor record of unkept promises towards African development by established donors, the complicity between some major powers and dubious regimes in Africa, and the controversial structure, processes, and methods of the current development aid regime in general (Davies 2007:100-101; Wild &

Mephram 2007:70). What is more, China's involvement in Africa had undeniably positive effects on the continent as the what-is-in-it debate suggests. While there is no doubt that the behaviour of some donor countries and the current aid donor regime leave much to be desired, pointing to the mistakes of others do not make bad things better either. If Western donor countries admit their own mistakes, practice what they preach, and express their willingness to engage in a mutual exchange with China about how to enhance the effectiveness of modern development aid, their concerns are certainly to be taken seriously (Davies 2007:100-101; Wild & Mephram 2007:71). To voice criticism should not mean to demonise China from a higher moral ground, but to address legitimate concerns also shared by many stakeholders in Africa.

Second, a few China hands keep insisting that open criticism of Beijing would only lead to entrenched positions. Yet China's reaction highly depends on who is criticising it and how. Given China's attachment to a good reputation among the developing world, disapproval about its involvement on the continent would be most effective if it was primarily raised by its African allies (Gu et al. 2007:20; Wild & Mephram 2007:64). In fact, critics of China do also exist in Africa, particularly among non-governmental activists (see Alden 2007:123-125; Alden & Davies 2006:93-94; Manji & Marks 2007; Sidiropoulos 2006). Moreover, as has been shown, China's empirical record of international behaviour has proven these sceptics wrong – China is in fact vulnerable to appeals to its reputation as a responsible power. Nathan (1999:159) points out that it was indeed the combination of international pressure and assistance that successfully supported an internal evolution towards improved human rights standard in China, achieving greater results when it was firm and lesser results when it was weak.

In fact, there is evidence that Beijing's authorities have been affected, at least to a certain extent, by sustained international criticism of its Africa policy (Wild & Mephram 2007:67; Schüller & Asche 2007:2): At the end of 2006, China's political actors were by and large taken by surprise of the sharp criticism by Western donors. The government was forced to justify its development aid policy to Africa in the media (see Zhao 2006; *China Daily* 2006d; *China Daily* 2006c; *China Daily* 2006a; *China Daily* 2006b; Bing 2006; *China Daily* 2007; He 2007a; Xu 2007; Zong 2007). In 2007, Premier Wen Jiabao made official announcements that China was willing to consolidate communication and cooperation with the international community on that matter. With regard to its critical role in the

U.N. Security Council, China's diplomacy had been under pertinent pressure of justification for blocking a military intervention to stop human rights atrocities in Sudan's western region Darfur. This international pressure further increased when a group of famous Hollywood actors campaigned for calling the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing "Genocide Olympics". Hollywood director Steven Spielberg warned that he would resign from his position as artistic adviser to the Olympic Games unless China acted and stopped the bloodshed in Darfur. As a result, Beijing quickly appointed a Special Envoy to Darfur, who was busy shuttling between Beijing and Khartoum until some progress was achieved (Holslag 2007:5-6). So international pressure on China does indeed work.

Third, there exists another concern that single countries might be too weak to make a difference and easily played-off against each other if they dared to criticise Beijing. Therefore, the role to put pressure on China would naturally fall to the United States of America as the most powerful international actor, but European donor countries could also mandate the EU to address these concerns regularly in its political dialogue with China. African countries could channel their criticism through the AU. In any case, firm outside pressure on China would change its cost-benefit analysis for participation in the development aid regime significantly. By joining the regime, China would limit its increasing image costs and accommodate its critics in African and Western countries.

Non-Threatening Institutional Design

The established donor community would need to make accession to the regime less costly to China by providing the least threatening institutional framework possible. To this end, Beijing should not be given the impression that it could be singled out or dominated by major powers once it had joined the regime. Joining an existing international donor institution like OECD as it stands is hardly attractive to Beijing, unless it is invited together with other emerging economies in a separate grouping. A more promising model in this regard is the so-called Heiligendamm Process, which invites China and four other emerging economies as the G5 to the G8 summits. This model would allow China to continue its dual role as aid recipient and donor without feeling singled out. An involvement in regional organisations and its initiatives such as the AU, SADC, or NEPAD would certainly appeal to Beijing as long as China remained the sole non-African observer and the rivalry between different AU members would keep this institution weak. Yet such a construct would remain ineffective.

In contrast, APF and any institutional solution with FOCAC as its core could be most enticing to China. If the APF membership was to be expanded not only to China but also to other emerging economies similar to the G5, the Chinese would not need to fear isolation and could continue to play their ambiguous role, claiming to represent the developing world while discussing donor issues. An additional structure around the FOCAC – enlarged by EU members, G8, or others – would provide the softest way of integrating China as it had been created by the Chinese themselves. It would accommodate Beijing's preference to keep the FOCAC process (Davies 2007:104). As a first step, China's African partners would need to encourage Beijing to institutionalise this forum, to refer to the 2005 Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness, and possibly to agree to a set of guidelines similar to DAC. Established donor countries could then apply for observer status in the FOCAC.

Benefits for Accession

Besides enhancing its international image as responsible actor, China would gain access to international expertise on best practices of aid delivery once it had joined the regime. If traditional donor countries could provide such knowledge prior to accession and offer more information about the norms which constitute the regime, this might reduce China's inhibition against its full participation. Chinese officials could familiarise themselves with international standards and processes so that they would not feel inexperienced when China actually joined the aid donor regime later on. Moreover, the training of officials and experts in the field could create a bureaucratic demand for bringing in Chinese perspectives also in official institutions. So providing expertise prior to accession could actually accelerate Beijing's decision to join the regime.

To this end, traditional donor countries could offer technical assistance for enhancing China's capacities in managing its development aid to African partners and provide informal channels for communication on critical issues. Several authors have already suggested engaging China in formal or informal bilateral or trilateral dialogues (Davies 2007:33, 98; Gill et al. 2007b:22-23; Tjønneland et al. 2006:38, 40). These dialogues promise to be most successful if carried out in informal settings similar to a Track II approach. Usually, informal, non-governmental formats (Track II) are used for discussing those politically sensitive issues in a non-committal way that China regards as too controversial to be addressed in official, governmental meetings (Track I). Since participants of the

Track II formats are often government officials who also participate in Track I negotiations, the discourse on the issues at stake is in fact not discarded.

At first, these dialogues with China should aim at gaining common ground and building mutual trust among the participants, starting with less-controversial topics such as poverty alleviation, urban development, and humanitarian aid. Over time, however, the discussion would gradually evolve into more intrusive areas such as aid harmonisation, responsible lending, and corporate social responsibility in the construction sector and in extractive industries (see Tjønneland et al. 2006:40; Wild & Mephram 2007:65). In contrast to formal membership in a development aid institution, China's participation in informal dialogues would allow to reap limited benefits without paying the costs. Beijing would not need to worry about official interferences into its policy towards Africa or about fulfilling formal obligations. Instead, these dialogues provide venues for mutual learning in order to learn about the norms of the regime.

Additionally, Track II dialogues should be accompanied by and closely linked with technical training about structures, processes, and methods of the aid donor architecture in order to reduce China's scepticism against certain norms and institutions. Similarly, major WTO members had assisted China in building the required capacities to participate effectively in the trade regime, which made accession eventually less costly to China (Chan 2006:89-90). Established donor countries could provide technical assistance in three forms of pragmatic cooperation, in addition to an ongoing informal dialogue process:

- Joint studies and workshops: Academic think tanks in China and an established donor country could undertake joint studies about the impact of Chinese and Western development aid in Africa. Fostering linkages between experts in the field and an exchange of expertise about standards, methods, and results, these studies would support small-group socialisation. In joint workshops, the findings of these studies could be disseminated among the aid donor community and relevant policy-makers in China.
- Trilateral field visits: An established donor country could arrange field visits for Chinese officials and academics to its development aid projects in Africa. Such trilateral missions could identify common goals, standards, and methods in addressing-certain issues relevant to sustainable development over a longer period of time. This could support the Department of Aid to Foreign Countries at MOFCOM in its current effort to develop criteria for aid provision. In this context, Beijing might be encouraged to discuss the Paris Declaration

from an emerging donor's point of view. The field visits could mirror the topics discussed in the Track II process at the practical level while allowing the Chinese side to make its own learning experience.

- Capacity development: Chinese capacities to manage and implement modern development aid projects could be enhanced through expertise provided by traditional donors. Beijing has been thinking about restructuring its development aid bureaucracy, which is scattered across different agencies with competing interests (Davies 2007:43-47; Glosny 2006:18-21). Since China has not yet defined a distinct development policy or set up a new Chinese agency responsible for development aid, technical assistance to China's institution building could help shaping its future policy. A few Chinese universities, some of them linked to MOFCOM, have already started to create new graduate programmes on international development policy to train the future generation of officials in the respective administration. Established donor countries could advise these academic institutions on drafting progressive curricula on sustainable development aid strategies.

Several initiatives for exchanges between Chinese actors, established donor countries, and international organisations are already under way (see Berger & Wissenbach 2007:23; Davies 2007:35, 96; Wild & Mephram 2007:68). In 2005, Chinese representatives participated in a DAC outreach forum held in Paris, followed by a visit of then-DAC Chair Richard Manning in Beijing in 2006 (Davies 2007:52; Glosny 2006:8). In 2008, World Bank and China's Export-Import Bank agreed on donor collaboration in African infrastructure programmes (Davies et al. 2008:22). The Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection and the International Finance Corporation decided to cooperate in the introduction of the 2003 Equator Principles, which commit financial institutions to sustainability, responsibility, accountability, transparency, sustainable markets and governance, and to the do-no-harm principle (Xun 2008; Yu & Ding 2008). Among all bilateral donors, Great Britain's Department for International Development is most advanced in organising informal dialogues with Chinese and African counterparts (Davies 2007:69, 96; Glosny 2006:8). The Chinese participants of these conferences disseminate these inputs among their audience (see International Poverty Reduction Center in China 2008).

While all these developments are promising, a structured and coordinated approach is still missing. Pragmatic cooperation provides an ideal platform for trust-building, but needs to be tightly linked to Track II dialogues in order to

achieve real progress also at the political level. In sum, a structured effort to engage China into the aid donor regime should comprise at least four elements, which work at different levels.

First, technical assistance provides pragmatic learning experience and expertise in managing standards, methods, and results of development aid, which may lead to converging normative views between Chinese and Western participants. Second, closely linked to this practical experience, less-controversial topics of African development should be discussed in a Track II dialogue, but the agenda would gradually move towards more sensitive issues like anti-corruption policies when mutual trust is growing among the participants. Exposed to small-group socialisation, Chinese experts and officials could familiarise themselves with the norms and methods of the development aid structure in a non-committal environment and were likely to redefine their interest so that joining the development aid regime might appear less costly to them. Third, a Track I dialogue at the political level could reflect progresses made in the Track II dialogue. By appealing to China's image as a responsible power, criticism could be addressed in this setting, openly or behind closed doors, thereby increasing China's image costs. Fourth, bilateral or multilateral efforts should be undertaken to provide a non-threatening arrangement for China's institutional integration in the regime. Such an institutional solution should respect the Chinese concern for its dual status as recipient and emerging donor. It could comprise the APF or the FOCAC, extended by established donors, or the OECD plus the G5. This combination of pressure and assistance will influence China's cost-benefit calculation in ways that makes full and formal participation in the aid donor regime more attractive. At the same times, it provides for socialisation processes among Chinese participants.

Conclusion

China's re-emergence as a global power and its economic presence in Africa will undoubtedly change the way how development aid is provided in the future. Any attempt to impose Western norms on China or to dictate Beijing how to conduct business with its African partners will most likely fail. However, to integrate China into the established aid donor regime, which may thereby be subject to change, is a legitimate interest in order to avoid that attained development achievements in Africa are undermined. Empirical research on Chinese behaviour in international regimes suggests that Beijing is a rational actor who calculates the

costs and benefits before joining an international regime. It also shows that there are certain behavioural patterns, which indicate what exactly constitute these costs and benefits. Since there is little incentive for China to join an international regime that is likely to restrict its sovereignty in dealing with its African partners as it pleases, an effective engagement strategy would need to make accession most attractive to Beijing.

Traditional donors should combine three policies in order to affect China's cost-benefit analysis in such a way that joining the aid donor regime appears beneficial to Beijing: First, they could increase Beijing's image costs by exerting international pressure on China. Second, the traditional donor community could reduce China's costs for accession by providing a non-threatening institutional arrangement. Third, individual donor countries could increase the benefits for China by providing technical assistance for enhancing China's capacities in managing its development aid to African partners. To this end, China's cost-benefit calculation could be manipulated by a combination of structured pragmatic learning experiences in the field, informal and formal dialogues at different levels. Even prior to accession, traditional donors could start informal Track II dialogues on the delivery of modern development aid and organise trilateral field visits to Africa in order to allow for pragmatic learning experiences. These measures would expose small groups of Chinese and Western experts and officials to the processes of small-group socialization as suggested by social constructivists. Additionally, traditional donors would increase the international pressure on Beijing in formal Track I arrangements, openly or behind closed doors, by appealing to China's image as a responsible power. At the structural level, the aid donor community would need to think about a non-threatening institutional arrangement for integrating China into the aid donor regime.

Early involvement of Chinese experts and officials in these activities may contribute to a redefinition of their perceptions and preferences so that joining the aid donor regime appears less costly and thus more appealing to them. Gradually, China could be socialised into the aid donor architecture and become one of its major proponents. This would ensure that China's rise is not perceived as a threatening challenge – neither by African partners nor by the established donor community – but rather as a valuable contribution to sustainable development in Africa.

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Contours of China's "Africa Mode" and Who May Benefit

Cot bone? Eine Skizze des chinesischen Afrika-Engagements

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Abstract

China's engagement with Africa introduced a paradigmatic to the first decades of post-independence Africa, and is therefore a 1990s-phenomenon and complementary to such as the geographical and regional spatial delimitation the Chinese program from other Western approaches. This article first looks to Africa's beyond-1990s and under its terms of engagement, which implies its transformation of periods. Furthermore, it aims to delineate the contours of the latter's relation to China's strategy since it is argued that Africa's post-independence development has not been China's main priority, although this, and other policy options, remain crucial dimensions of development efforts in Africa are not ultimately reflected since China's role in Africa's politics is far beyond Africa's necessary policy space in a multi-polar world. (Asche 2007: 15-18)

Keywords: China, Africa, aid engagement, post-independence policy, trade policy

Introduction

China's Africa policy struck its surprise, at least in Africa in the decade, when Sino-African relations took an exponential option. Trade figures soared to 35 billion USD in 2006, with African sources providing a third of China's crude oil and becoming an essential supplier for minerals (IMF 2007). As the same time, political ties between Africa and China intensified considerably. A number of state-backed studies have also analyzed the economic and political dimensions of the African events. Building on these pieces of research, a search for the African Development Administration tried to clarify Sino-African ties (Schaller 2006). The main observation is, naturally, China's economic development in Africa rests on resource, structural and increases in four regions: