

DOKUMENT

Zwei Erklärungen des ROC- Government Information Office zur Wiedervereinigungsfrage

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Bei einer Veranstaltung am 24.10.1991 in Oxford gaben Vertreter des GIO Erklärungen zum chinesischen Wiedervereinigungsproblem ab, die hier in Auszügen nachgedruckt werden sollen.

Die Stellungnahme der VRCh ist in *CHINA aktuell* im Laufe der Jahre so häufig wiedergegeben worden, daß es hier keiner ausführlichen Darlegung bedarf. Nur soviel sei erwähnt, daß Beijing von der Formel "Ein Staat, zwei (gesellschaftliche) Systeme" (yi guo liang zhi), Taipei dagegen von "Einem Staat und zwei Regierungen" (yi guo liang fu) ausgeht. Diese Formulierungen spiegeln nicht nur semantische, sondern auch inhaltliche Unterschiede wider: Beijing möchte Taiwan als Verwaltungs- sowie Wirtschaftszone und die Regierung als (lediglich untergeordnete) Lokalregierung gewertet wissen, während andererseits die RCh-Regierung Taiwan als Modellzone behandelt sehen möchte und überdies die Gleichberechtigung beider Regierungen postuliert. Demgemäß wünscht Beijing Verhandlungen zwischen den beiden führenden Parteien KPCh und GMD, während Taipei zu Gesprächen zwischen beiden Regierungen laden möchte.

Zuerst seien Ausschnitte aus dem Vortrag von Dr. Hu Zhizhang, dem Generaldirektor des GIO, und dann einige Überlegungen des Direktors der Planungsabteilung beim GIO, Yang Zongke, wiedergegeben.

Die Reden wurden aus Platzgründen auf ihre wesentlichen Elemente gekürzt. Auslassungen sind jeweils mit einigen Punkten gekennzeichnet.

I. Zur Wiedervereinigungsfrage (Überlegungen von Hu Zhizhang)

1. Preface

... In fact, two political entities, both claiming to be "China", exist on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. The "Republic of China", is on Taiwan, while the "People's Republic of China" is on the mainland. The future development of the two entities may lead to three possible outcomes:

First, the Chinese communist regime abandons communism because of domestic developments, and China is united under a free and democratic system.

Second, the Chinese communist regime forces the Republic of China into non-existence by military force or other means, and China is united under the communist regime.

Third, Taiwan becomes independent of the Chinese communist regime, that is, so-called "Taiwan independence", which would result in "one China, one Taiwan" or "two Chinas".

Of course, we hope for the first outcome, while Peking, on its part, prefers the second. The "Taiwan independence" that a minority are calling for under Chinese communist pressure is supported by few in Taiwan and not likely to be recognized by the international community. Most people in Taiwan believe a unilateral declaration of independence is an invitation for the mainland to invade Taiwan.

2. "One Country, Two Systems": For What? For Whom?

Peking has proposed a "one country, two systems" model in which the Chinese communists would have the final say in all matters and Taiwan, like Hong Kong, would be allowed to maintain its present economic system and life-style but not be permitted to conduct its own foreign policy. To achieve their objectives, the Chinese communists have adopted a dual policy of (1) isolating the ROC internationally while not renouncing the use of force against Taiwan, and (2) encouraging trade across the Taiwan Straits, in an attempt to put pressure on the government through the people, and thus to use economics to influence politics. In addition, the Chinese communists refuse to treat the ROC government as an equal and only treat it like a local government. This is partly why they are calling for "party-to-party" talks, i.e. talks between the CCP and the Kuomintang, to discuss China's future.

This proposal completely ignores the reality of democratization and social pluralization in the ROC. On the mainland, the Chinese communists might be able to disregard the will of the people and confuse party with government, but in Taiwan all major affairs must be open to democratic discussion...

... Furthermore, the "one country, two systems" formula also suffers from the following defects:

First, in terms of polity, a single country simply cannot implement two systems because it must have a central government and establish various laws, regulations and administrative orders in order to govern the entire nation. So even though Taiwan might enjoy "a high degree of political autonomy" at first, ultimately it is cer-

tain that this would be lost with time. In other words, the "one country, two systems" formula is not an end in and of itself, but rather a process leading to a myriad of undesirable results...

... Second, the "one country, two systems" concept has not engendered much faith among the people of Hong-kong. ...

Third, judging by developments in the international situation, we can clearly see that around the world communism has withered to such an extent that it will soon be consigned to the ash heap of history. As for divided nations, German unification was the result of capitalist West Germany providing the economic means and political leadership for unifying with communist East Germany. In the competition between North and South Korea, capitalist South Korea is in a much stronger position vis-à-vis communist North Korea. The course of unification for these countries involves each being engaged in peaceful competition as a distinct international entity, and not "one country with two systems".

The progress of the ROC on Taiwan in contrast to that on the mainland is even more dramatic. There is no reason for us to forsake our international status and yield to an unrealistic, outdated, and ossified "one country, two systems" formula. Even the most unrealistic person must ask himself, if Taiwan were to give up all it has and accept the "one country, two systems" arrangement, except for arbitrarily accepting the autocratic rule of Peking, what would it gain? And what would it lose? The pluses and minuses here are quite evident. If the ROC government were to accept the "one country, two systems" formula, it would not only adversely affect all that the Taiwan area currently has, but would deprive our compatriots in the mainland area of an important hope for the future...

... In addition, revisions of many laws have allowed a level of people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits far beyond that of any prior period of exchange in the several thousand years of Chinese history. Current conservative estimates place Taiwan investment in the mainland at over two billion U.S. dollars. Visits to relatives in the mainland bring at least two billion U.S. dollars worth of foreign reserves to the mainland annually. Bilateral trade across the Taiwan Straits has already surpassed five billion U.S. dollars this year alone. Over 40 thousand letters, phone calls, telegrams, and faxes are exchanged every day. These exchanges indicate that the Republic of China would like to promote the pacification of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits and is capable of providing substantial assistance in modernizing the Chinese mainland.

3. The "Guidelines for National Unification": Pragmatism, Goodwill, and the Future of the Chinese Nation

What is more important is the *Guidelines for National Unification* which were adopted by the National Unification Council on February 23, 1991, and by the Executive Yuan Council on March 14, 1991...

... The *Guidelines for National Unification* include four parts: a Foreword, Goal, Principles, and Process. The essential points of the *Guidelines* are as follows:

- (1) They adhere to the principle of "one China", and seek China's unification.
- (2) They insist on peaceful unification, and oppose the use of force.
- (3) They set respect for the rights and interests of the people in the Taiwan area as a precondition for China's unification.
- (4) They state that the peaceful unification of China has no timetable, and its process is divided into three phases: near-, mid-, and long-term.

The *Guidelines for National Unification* stress the principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity for China's unification. In addition, the *Guidelines* hold that two sides of the Straits should take current reality as a foundation and establish a mutually benign relationship by not denying the other's existence as a political entity. The *Guidelines* are also fundamentally opposed to such ideas as "Taiwan independence", "two Chinas", "one China, one Taiwan".

In the near-term phase of exchanges and reciprocity set out in the *Guidelines*, the ROC government still maintains its policy of "no contacts, no negotiations, and no compromise", and is encouraging people-to-people contacts between two sides of the Straits. At present, the ROC government has set up the Straits Exchange Foundation to act as an intermediary organization for handling affairs concerning both sides of the Straits. The Foundation can hold direct talks on functional issues with its counterpart on the Chinese mainland to solve problems that arise from exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits...

... In the mid-term phase of mutual trust and cooperation, we hope that both sides of the Straits would establish official communication channels on an equal footing, and we propose joint development of the southeastern coastal area of the Chinese mainland to narrow the gap in living standards between the people on two sides of the Straits...

... In the long-term phase of consultation and unification, the *Guidelines* suggest that a consultative organization for unification should be established through which both sides, in accordance with the will of the people in both the mainland and Taiwan areas, and while adhering to the goals of democracy, economic freedom, social justice and nationalization of the armed forces, jointly discuss the grand task of unification...

4. Information Exchange Between Mainland China and the Taiwan Area

[Die Beijinger Gesetzgebung schränkt die Berichtsmöglichkeiten für Journalisten aus Taiwan ein, während sich Taipei gerade umgekehrt öffnet: Seit August 1990 wurden neun Festlandsjournalisten in Taiwan zugelassen]...

5. Initiatives & Responses: A Progress Report

[Initiativen der ROC-Regierung wurden von der VRCh immer wieder zurückgewiesen] ...

... During the past year, Peking's top leadership has mentioned more than 70 times their view to "militarily invade Taiwan". During the past month alone, every official news medium on the Chinese mainland has carried reports on the development and spread of "Taiwan Independence" with banner headlines. All news there concerning Taiwan has been either about first fights in the Legislative Yuan or about the ROC's "inappropriately" dealing with mainland fishing boats, causing some tension in relations between the two sides. On the other hand, Peking has been worried about the rapid spread of Taiwan's business influence in the Chinese mainland, even to the point of having difficulty keeping it under control. Recently, the Chinese communists have been considering partially tightening their policy toward Taiwan's businessmen. After assessing the international and domestic situations, Taiwan's internal development, and current Straits relations, Peking seems to have decided to "lower the thermostat" on relations across the Straits, and is once again moving toward a cooling off period... [Die Antwort der ROC darauf soll lauten:] "advancing when possible, but stepping back when necessary".

6. Prospects for the Future Unification of China

Since the government of the Republic of China liberalized civilian visits to the Chinese mainland in July of 1987, the people from both sides of the Straits have engaged in news, cultural, family, and indirect trade contacts. As a result mutual understanding has increased, and the disparity between the two sides has narrowed. Ethnic solidarity has made people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits firmly believe that unification is inevitable, because Taiwan's future is in the mainland, and the hope of China lies in Taiwan. We firmly believe that the best yardsticks for assessing the current phase of developmental relations between the two sides of the Straits are the five principles that President Lee brought up in "An Ideal New World Order". They include:

- 1) democracy and respect for human rights,
- 2) re-examining and elucidating the concept of sovereignty,
- 3) substituting negotiation for use of military might,
- 4) promoting a market economy system, and
- 5) strengthening regional security and promoting the concept of *Gemeinschaft* (common community).

The realization of these five principles is the foundation for cooperation between both sides of the Straits and is the basis for the future unification of China...

... Looking toward the future, if Peking is willing to get in step with the three major contemporary world trends - democracy, economic development, and international

reconciliation - and forthrightly implement internal political, economic and social reforms in order to gradually narrow the gap in lifestyles and ideologies of people on both sides of the Straits, if it is willing at the same time to renounce the pressure tactics of using military force and isolating Taiwan worldwide, and is willing to foster rational and peaceful exchanges of people on both sides of the Straits, then the prospects for the unification of China are bright. We believe that only a natural process of unification can really bring about a prosperous future for the Chinese nation. And only peaceful unification can meet the hopes and expectations of Chinese at home and abroad, and the world in general.

II. Überlegungen zur gegenwärtigen Berichterstattung diesseits und jenseits der Taiwanstraße (Yang Zongke)

Yang schildert zunächst die Praxis des Presseaustausches zwischen beiden Seiten der Taiwanstraße (Abschn.I-V) und beleuchtet dann die "Probleme", die bei dieser Arbeit immer wieder auftauchen (Teil V). Anschließend folgt ein Blick auf die Zukunft. Im vorliegenden Zusammenhang seien die Teile 6 und 7 zitiert.

6. The Problems Confronting Press Exchanges Between the Two Sides of the Straits

a) Legal and Normative Issues:

Basically, the Chinese mainland remains a society in the early stages of development. Lacking any concept of rule by law, the Chinese communist authorities impose various tangible and intangible restrictions on Taiwan reporters during the process of news-gathering on the mainland. The ROC *Statutes Governing the Relations Between the People of the Taiwan and Mainland Areas* regulating the rights and obligations of people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits are still under study by the Legislative Yuan. Consequently, without the proper legal framework, the provisional operating guidelines concerning cross-straits press exchange policy must then be implemented by executive order. Thus a lack of binding authority to the guidelines prevents them from being fully enforceable.

b) Problems related to Political Ideology:

Mainland media have always been under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in that they have to obey and be loyal to the party leadership, uphold party-like principles, and act as the mouthpiece of the CCP. With politics as the primary consideration, the mass media are there to serve the political authorities. The party-approved media line on Chinese national unification is consistent from high to low: it must be based on the "one country, two systems" formula. The rigid pattern of thinking obstructs a free flow of communication across the straits. Lacking in the knowledge of or consciously ignoring the diverse opinions emerged in a multiparty

political system, the attitude of the Peking authorities is a major obstacle to cross-straits exchanges. The CCP hardly understands the KMT's toleration of the "Taiwan independence" platform formulated by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as part of the process of democratization.

c) Socioeconomic Differences:

This high standard of living on Taiwan has made its publications comparatively expensive for mainland consumers. Characteristic of a diversified society, the quality of Taiwan press visitors to the mainland has been varied, some have given the mainland populace an impression of being arrogantly wealthy. The same phenomenon took place during the process of German unification after the destruction of the Berlin Wall. Some of the populace of East Germany had a bad impression of people in West Germany. Furthermore, all social resources in the mainland are under the control of the CCP. The lack of private enterprises has hindered the development of diversified exchange.

d) Issues of Press Freedom:

The CCP regard press freedom as an important tool for bringing about peaceful transformation and require the press to only serve the CCP. Their mass media quote the ROC *Guidelines for National Unification* out of context or twist their meaning, never daring to print them in full for the mainland public to read but instead regarding the *Guidelines* as a counter-revolutionary document. Yet the 226 newspapers published in the Taiwan area are free to express their own point of view. For example, the *China Times* published a special interview with Yang Shangkun on presenting a united front toward Taiwan, while important statements announced by ROC's leading figures have never been heard of in the mainland. Thus cross-straits exchanges in fact have no grounding in mutual confidence.

Moreover, the flow of information on Taiwan is rapid and grabs public attention. The ROC movie industry, TV broadcasting and other publications are prosperous. Some media interests, out of self-interest, use the media to exert pressure, thus creating enforcement difficulties. This press freedom is par for the course in Taiwan's democratic society, but could not happen on the mainland.

e) Problems of Cultural Differences:

The ROC on Taiwan uses the original forms of Chinese characters, while mainland China uses simplified forms. Thus, press and cultural exchanges between the two sides of the straits are affected by this difference to a certain extent. The CCP monopolizes control over all mass media in the mainland, thus creating different perceptions about news coverage than those arising from the hands-off style of Taiwan media management.

7. Conclusion - A Look toward the Future ...

...Without a doubt, the press exchanges across the straits form one of the links in the important task our government faces concerning its future policy toward mainland China. From the long-term perspective, it will definitely have a substantially deep and far-reaching effect on our popularization of "the Taiwan Experience".

The ROC has paved a smooth way for press exchanges across the straits, and is hoping for positive responses from the Chinese communists on the other side, and even more the soonest possible establishment of a unification consensus among all Chinese, both at home and abroad, thus allowing us all to join hands and "go the extra mile" for complete and open press exchanges across the straits. Let us all work together to create a beautiful new world where China in the future will be free, democratic, equitably prosperous, and unified.