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**Measuring Conflicts in South Asian Countries
(1945-2002)**

by

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A SHORT HISTORY

In this contribution I would like to focus on the four countries in South Asia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as a region of conflicts, ask questions about the specific conflict constellations existing in the region and by applying indicator oriented empirical research to the four countries I try to explain the political confrontations occurring during the period between 1945 and 2002.

The profiles of the South Asian countries

The political history – foremost the colonial history – and the international environment of the region determined the demographic, ethnic, religious, economic and political map of each of the countries. The various waves of conquest, imperial domination by regional and international powers as well as internal struggles have shaped the conflictual map and, as a result, have run the risk of becoming a site of endemic conflicts (see below).

Thus the four countries of South Asia can not only be seen from their regional and international environment, nor can it be seen as an homogeneous entity with a regional organization of its own. East and Southeast Asian countries influenced their conflict behavior as well as the former superpowers of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and today's superpower of the USA. The internal diversities, the regional rivalries and the power struggle between the influence seeking powers made this region one of the most conflict driven of the globe. In addition, each of the four countries has internal sub-national confrontations.

There are examples of violent quarrels and there are examples of peaceful settlements. Foremost to mention the conflict intense quarrel between Pakistan and

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India about Kashmir, the internal conflicts of various groups about autonomy in India and Pakistan and the long standing strife for independence/autonomy of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.

The demographic differences are quite remarkable: there are countries with high population figures like India with almost 1 billion inhabitants (that will become the most populated country in the world in the near future) and there is the small country Sri Lanka with only 19 million people. Population density amounts to 1 (Pakistan with 175 people per square meter) to about 6 (Bangladesh with 981 people per square meter). The difference as to the per capita income amounts to approximately 1 (Bangladesh with 1475 US\$ p.c.) to 2 (Sri Lanka with 3056 US\$ p.c.). Two countries can be called democracies and two have so called transitional regimes. As to the religious composition only Pakistan and Bangladesh with approximately 97% and 87% Moslems possess a rather homogeneous monotheistic religion; the others have various religious settings, i.e. India with 83% Hindus, 11% Moslems, 2% Christians and Sikhs each; only 1% are Buddhists. Sri Lanka has approximately 70% Buddhists, 14% Hindus, 8% Christians and 6% Moslems. Since the beginning of modern times the Western World tried to export its civilization through imperial and colonial policies; also Islam through its conquests of Pakistan and India had some influence on the respective cultures. This civilizational split has been expressed by Samuel Huntington as the clash of civilizations. Each country has its own international or/and regional affiliation; after independence India inclined more towards the Soviet Union, whereas Pakistan strengthened its political links with China and lately with the United States.


The analysis of the region as a conflict region will be based on the following model of conflict development and determination.

This article is structured according to the following logic: First of all, the structural reality of a country's endangerment/insecurity and support/security as well as - deduced from this - its ability to resolve conflicts are operationalized and put into measurable quantities. In this way we identify the regime's political management capabilities and, independent of the measurements mentioned before, its character. Then, the variable 'conflict', which is to be explained, is presented and the modality of resolving conflicts is considered. Finally, an index of resolution is calculated that shows which states and which regimes can or could respectively best deal with conflicts. At the same time, the index serves to identify specifically endangered states and through pointing out the supporting factors to discuss the possibilities of non-violent ways to resolve conflicts.

A DYNAMIC PHASE-MODEL

The very basic and crude form of our dynamic conflict model is shown in figure 1 below. Each conflict passes through the three phases of initiation, escalation and eventually resolution of conflicts. The escalation phase starts with a latent conflict,

followed by a crisis, both still in a non-violent stage; then followed by the violent phases with a severe crisis and finally a war.²



Actors are on the one hand under stress from the environment and on the other driven by forces in support. Our empirical analysis is focused on the calculation of conflicts that have occurred in the region under consideration as the dependent variable and operationalized factors that as independent variables are meant to explain the conflict behavior of each of the states.

THE POLITICAL MAP SINCE 1945. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 'CONFLICTS'

Since 1945, considerable changes have taken place on the global political map and in corresponding political conflict patterns. As a result, many theoretical and methodological approaches to empirical conflict research are losing focus and are becoming increasingly inadequate to meet the new realities of conflict developments.

As principal changes that have taken place in the global political realm since 1945 we identify the following developments with their implications on the political, military, economic and socio-cultural global map for the South Asian countries:

² For explanation, see legend of Figure 2.

- the multiplication of the number of states. Also in the South Asian region new countries emerged after World War II during the process of decolonisation and as a matter of fact the decolonisation process started with the independence of India;
- the spread in number and scope of international and transnational organizations. Internationally the countries of the region did not organize themselves into an organizational framework;
- the growth of world production and world trade. The effects of globalisation and regionalization are not easy to determine. Economic interdependencies are given by Europe's dependence on oil and gas supplies;
- the end of the Cold War and changes in political systems and ideologies ('new world order', 'new world disorder', 'end of ideology', 'clash of civilizations' etc.) and with it the end of superpower rivalry as well as the end of the arms race. The end of the Cold War changed the priorities given to the various countries in the region;
- the decline of naive and brute power- and prestige-politics in some parts of the region - especially outside the OECD world - power politics is still the practice of the day;
- a new type of violence that may be called 'privatised' violence has been expressed by Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist attacks.

As described elsewhere³ we define conflict as the clashing of overlapping interests (positional differences) around national values and issues (decolonisation/independence/secession, self-determination, borders and territory, access to or distribution of domestic or international power, ideology, resources); the conflict has to be of some duration and magnitude of at least two parties (states, groups of states, organizations or organized groups) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their case. At least one party is the organized state. Possible instruments used in the course of a conflict are negotiations, authoritative decisions, threat, pressure, passive or active withdrawals, or the use of physical violence and war. We assume that each conflict passes through four phases of development: from latent conflict to crisis, to severe crisis and to war depending on its intensity.⁴ The criteria to distinguish one conflict from another are firstly the participants, secondly the issues and thirdly the intensity. If one of these features changes then we count it as a separate conflict.

The identification of specific features of a conflict starts with the idea that - all differences acknowledged - every conflict can be described with features which are common to all conflicts. In our data bank KOSIMO we have selected 28 variables which describe 693 conflicts that have occurred between 1945 and 1998. To quote

³ Pfetsch, Frank R. and Christoph Rohloff. *Kosimo: A Databank on Political Conflict*. In: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 37, no. 3, 2000, pp. 379-389; the data bank can be downloaded at www.kosimo.de.

⁴ For definitions, see Figure 2.

only some categories: *start and end, parties involved, regime type, issues in dispute, modalities of conflict resolution, fatalities etc.*

Compared to other quantitative approaches⁵ in conflict analysis the KOSIMO-databank focuses on the following aspects: it counts international as well as national conflicts; it is state centred, but takes also into account non-state actors; it is dynamic in the sense that it assumes four stages of conflict escalation.⁶

Conflicts in and among the South Asian countries

We now consider more closely the conflict situation in four states of South Asia. We do this by the empirical analysis of the conflicts as they occurred in the region after World War II (See Appendix III).

Table 1: Number of conflicts according to countries, weighted and unweighted

| Countries | Latent Conflict | | Crises | | Severe Crises | | Wars | | Total | |
|------------|-----------------|----------|--------|----------|---------------|----------|------|----------|-------|----------|
| | No. | weighted | No. | weighted | No. | weighted | No. | weighted | No. | weighted |
| Bangladesh | 2 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 21 |
| India | 1 | 1 | 7 | 14 | 15 | 45 | 5 | 20 | 28 | 80 |
| Pakistan | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 8 | 24 | 4 | 16 | 15 | 46 |
| Sri Lanka | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 12 | 5 | 18 |

Table 1 shows that India as the biggest country and with a highly diversified population is the most conflict driven country with altogether 28 conflicts (See also Appendix II). This country holds the record also with the weighting scores, that add up to 80 points.⁷ Next to India there is Pakistan with altogether 15 conflicts and

⁵ A comparative study by Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Sven Chojnacki. Sept. 2001. (*Scientific Necessity and Political Utility. A Comparison of Data on Violent Conflicts*; Wissenschaftszentrum P01-304) on the four quantitative approaches to the study of war, that by David Singer: the Correlates of War (COW) University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, now resettled at the University of Pennsylvania with Stuart A. Bremer; Peter Wallensteen: Conflict Data Project (CDP), Uppsala, Klaus-Jürgen Gantzel: AKUF and Frank Pfetsch: KOSIMO Heidelberg shows differences and similarities between the projects. This has to do with differences of definitions, differences in coding procedures, and differences in theoretical underpinnings. One shortcoming is a *lack of data on non-violent conflicts*; a second shortcoming of present day conflict research is *the lack of systematized data on domestic conflicts*. Related to the problem of operationalizing sub-national actors is the reliance on states as unitary and principal actors. This has become a third general drawback of databanks on conflicts. A fourth deficit is the *lack of compatibility among existing databanks*. Thus, KOSIMO made on the one hand use of existing information on conflicts, which were being transformed into the concepts developed in the project, and on the other hand, it was filled with data on additional conflicts through our own empirical research (Pfetsch, Frank R. and Peter Billing. 1994. *Handbuch nationaler und internationaler Konflikte*. Baden-Baden: Nomos; Pfetsch, Frank R. and Christoph Rohloff. 2000. *National and International Conflicts. New Theoretical and Empirical Approaches*. London et al.: Routledge.

⁶ Apart from the yearly update of the KOSIMO databank (available under www.HIIK.de), we publish at the end of each year a 'Konfliktbarometer' indicating the conflict activities during the year of consideration, available under www.Konfliktbarometer.de.

⁷ We weight latent conflicts with the factor 1, crises with 2, severe crises with 3 and wars with factor 4.

a weighted score of 46. Bangladesh with 9 (weighted 21) and Sri Lanka with 5 (weighted 18).

Figure 2 shows that the South Asian region as a whole is a rather conflict intensive region; during the 57 years after the end of World War II we count 44 conflicts all together, 31 violent with 9 wars and 13 non-violent conflicts.⁸


Most of the conflict occurred within and external to India as the biggest and most populated country. There are deep social, economic, cultural and political developments that endanger the Indian polity. There is, foremost, the difference between the two biggest religious groups of the Hindus and the Moslems, followed by differences between the central government and the regions some of which demanding autonomy such as that in Assam or even separation such as the Sikhs in Punjab. There are much more potentially or/and actually diversified regions that cause strain to the central government. The most overt and enduring conflict with two wars and various threats of war since 1947 has been, of course, that between India and Pakistan about Kashmir with its heterogeneous divided population.⁹ Besides this international and regional conflict there are internal disputes about autonomy and secession; to mention only the most open and visible that of Assam with its originally about 200 ethnic and linguistic groups (since 1973), some of them like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) or the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) demanding independence from the central government; there is also the Khalistan movement of the Sikhs in region of Punjab demanding autonomy (since 1981). The confrontation between Hindu nationalists, organized in the Bharatiya Party, and Moslems lead to the so called Ayodhya conflict (1984) that was initiated by various incidents.¹⁰

⁸ Reminder: the numbers are not identical with the numbers that indicate the participants, since in bilateral conflicts both participants are counted.

⁹ Descriptions can be found in Pfetsch, Frank R. (Ed.). 1990. *Konflikte seit 1945*. Volume on 'Asien, Australien und Ozeanien'; pp. 78-83, and in Pfetsch, Frank R. (Ed.). 1996. *Globales Konfliktpanorama, 1990-1995*, pp. 128-131.

¹⁰ More detailed descriptions, see Pfetsch, Frank R. (Ed.). 1995. *Globales Konfliktpanorama, 1990-1995*, pp. 156-159.

Figure 2: Conflict intensities



Legend: *Latent conflict* is a stage in the development of a conflict where one or more groups, parties or states *question* existing values, issues or objectives that have a national relevance. Latent conflicts must carry some identifiable and observable signs in order to be recognized as such. The positional differences and the clashing interests in a latent conflict must be articulated as demands or claims.

A *crisis* is defined as tensions that are expressed by means below the threshold of violence. Tense relations between the parties can reach a turning-point from where the use of force may become more likely. Economic sanctions, for example, are a means by which a latent conflict can be turned into a crisis. A crisis is - like a latent conflict - at all stages carried out by nonviolent means.

A *severe crisis* is defined as a state of high tension between two parties; they either threaten to resort to the use of force or they actually use physical or military force sporadically. The use of force in severe crisis must be limited to occasional border incidents, sea- or land-blockades, partial territorial occupations, brief arrests of people, e.g. opposition-leaders, or the confiscation of goods.

War: For operational reasons, we define war as a form of violent mass-conflict that is characterized by: *the fighting of at least two opponents with organized, regular military forces; the fighting is not sporadic; it lasts for a considerable period of time and the fighting is intense, that is, it leads to victims and destruction. The number of victims and the scope of destruction is high.*

Another longstanding (since 1956) internal conflict with external participation is that in Sri Lanka between the Tamil minority living in the North and North-East of Sri Lanka and organized in various groups and/or parties Tamil Eelam (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE; Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization, TELO; People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam, PLOTE; Tamil United Liberation Front, TULF) and other Tamil groups like the Sri Lanka Moslem Congress SLMC.¹¹ Lately this conflict de-escalated but still seems far away from a solution.

As to Bangladesh, besides the border conflicts with India and Myanmar there is the strife for autonomy in the North of the country by regional groupings at the Chittagong Hill Tracts (since 1991) and the rivalry between opposition groups and the central government since 1991.


Finally, in Pakistan besides the already mentioned Kashmir conflict there are various political and/or religious groups, foremost the Sindh, that destabilize the central government. Also the September 11 event put much strain on the central government that had to deal with the Afghan Taliban refugees on the one hand and with the international community, foremost the United States in their fight against terrorism.

There are differences as to the severity of such conflicts (see Figure 3):

- The most frequent, rather old standing and mostly violent type of conflict in this region was that within the countries on *ethnic, religious and regional autonomy* with 20 conflicts followed by 15 equally mostly violent colonial and independence conflicts, most of them occurring in multicultural India.
- Partly as a relict of the colonial era, partly as a consequence of state building thereafter, there are 14 *border and territorial* disputes between India and Pakistan, India and China, both of which were often violently disputed.
- There are 4 more recent types of conflict related to *resources*.
- Three major categories concern *conflicts related to specific countries*, i.e. first of all the 28 different conflicts within and external to India; secondly the conflicts within and exterior to Pakistan with altogether 15 conflicts mainly concerning Kashmir, then the mainly internal conflicts in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
- It is remarkable that no one issue in dispute was more non-violent than *violent*; in all the categories mentioned violence prevailed over non-violence.

¹¹ Detailed descriptions in Pfetsch, Frank R. (Ed.). 1990. *Konflikte seit 1945*. Volume on 'Asien, Australien und Ozeanien', pp. 142-150 and in Pfetsch, Frank R. (Ed.). 1995. *Globales Konfliktpanorama, 1990-1995*, pp. 144-147.

Figure 3: Issues by intensity



THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: CHALLENGES AND SUPPORT

As explanatory factors we concentrate on three clusters of factors: on *stress indicators* such as minorities (Gurr-Index, Vanhanen-Index), threats (military expenditures), political instability (refugees), unconstitutional changes (coups d'états), on *support indicators* such as integration in the surrounding environment (member of regional and international organizations, export quota), acceptance of the regime (participation in elections) or factors describing its governance (political stability and efficiency of governments); independently calculated the regime type is also of relevance (democratic, dictatorial, transitional); finally, we deduce from this the *potential* a country possesses in the management of conflicts.¹² By potential we mean the difference of calculated system supporting indicators and system challenging indicators. The positive values of the index constructed indicate a surplus of supporting compared to challenging factors.

There are also political challenges that emerged from within and among the countries of the region, that are not necessarily and explicitly expressed with the indicators selected such as

¹² Pfetsch, Frank R. *Konfliktbewältigung von Demokratien und Diktaturen. Vortrag Institut für Politische Wissenschaft, Universität Heidelberg, Mai 2002; see also Appendix I.*

- historically based mistrust and friction among ethnic groups;
- aggressive nationalism and sub-nationalism;
- social disruption in the light of radical economic reforms;
- Islamic fundamentalism;
- drug-trafficking;
- ecological threats;
- proliferation of biological and mass-destruction weapons.

From the numerous factors leading to war and peace, those which allow their operationalization and the transformation into measurable quantities are chosen. We assume that, by this, we capture the most relevant factors. The goal consists in establishing a priority list with all the countries on the globe according to the degree of their endangerment, support and resolution potential, and making it possible to anticipate the prognosis of the future of a state's conflict behaviour. This way, the dynamically applied model can serve as orientation for the interdependence of actions and effects, and for logical argumentations respectively.

South Asian countries according to their stress indicators

By grouping the challenging factors according to their degree of challenge we notice that in the nineties the most challenged countries have been India and the two neighbouring countries of Bangladesh and Pakistan (Tab. 2). The relatively (compared to the other three countries in consideration) most stable country with less threat is Sri Lanka. But on the whole, the index of challenge is for all of the four countries relatively high compared to the 158 additional countries for which the index was also calculated (for indicators, see Appendix I).

Whereas terrorist Islamic fundamentalism, migration, drug-trafficking, weapons of mass destruction are seen as threats to the outside world, social disruption, frictions among ethnic groups, sub-nationalism and the ecology are more threats internal to the four countries.

South Asian countries according to their support and management capability indicators

As to the potential support or security indicators the scale of indices ranges from higher ranked Sri Lanka and India (with rank 43, 45 and 49 for Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh out of 162 states counted) as potentially best equipped countries to the lesser equipped country of Pakistan.

South Asian countries according to their management capability indicators

As a result of our counting of support and challenge factors we observe that the potentially most stable country in spite of its ethno-national internal threat is Sri Lanka, the potentially most unstable country is India with its various internal and

external conflicts. On the whole, all four countries are situated in the second half of the scale with their rank positions between 51 and 73 for their capability to master challenges.

Table 2: South Asian countries according to their potentiality of conflict management

| Rank | State | Challenges | Rank | State | Support | Rank | State | Capability |
|------|------------|------------|------|------------|---------|------|------------|------------|
| 11 | India | 3,8 | 43 | Sri Lanka | 3,4 | 51 | Sri Lanka | 1,9 |
| 24 | Bangladesh | 2,5 | 45 | India | 3,2 | 67 | Bangladesh | 0,3 |
| 25 | Pakistan | 2,4 | 49 | Bangladesh | 2,8 | 71 | Pakistan | -0,3 |
| 34 | Sri Lanka | 1,5 | 53 | Pakistan | 2,2 | 73 | India | -0,6 |

Legend: The scale for the indexes for the challenges ranges from 5.5 as the most challenged country to 0.1 as the less challenged country; the scale for support lies between 9.5 with highest and 0.9 with the lowest support; finally, the capability index ranges from 8.3 to -4.6.

According to the latest evaluation for 2000 India and Bangladesh are counted as democracies whereas Pakistan and Sri Lanka figure among transition countries.¹³ However, regime change has been noticed, with the exception of India, for all the other countries. Bangladesh was counted as autocratic in the 80ies and non-democratic in the 70ies; only in the 90ies it figured among democratic and 'partly free' according to Freedom House. Pakistan was up to the 80ies autocratic or transitional and only in the 90ies democratic switching to transitional in 2000. Sri Lanka changed from democratic up to the 90ies to transitional at the end of the century. As to the normative index for the polities all four countries lived with restrictions concerning their freedom of participation and expression (India only in the 90ies).

Table 2 shows that the most challenged countries are the two democracies of India and Bangladesh; the relatively less challenged country of Sri Lanka shows a higher rank in its support index and with that bolster it manages to be top ranked as its potential capability to master conflicts is concerned. The most challenged country, India, is potentially less equipped to deal successfully with challenges. On the whole, the index of potential management capabilities shows no clear discrimination between the two democratic states and the transitional regimes.

CONCLUSIONS. EXPLAINING CONFLICT BEHAVIOR

The analysis shows that the South Asian region is diversified as to culture, economics, social and, therefore, does not show a homogeneous political entity. On the contrary, the indicators of challenges and security reflect this fragmentation and even segmentation. Accordingly, the map of political conflicts shows sub-regional clusters of conflicts such as:

¹³ For indicators and their operationalization, see Appendix I.

- Conflicts that are related to independence;
- Conflicts that result from the post-colonial area, that about state building with new regimes to be installed and about frontiers to be drawn. There were disputes after independence foremost about the dismemberment of former British India, i.e. the long standing Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan, the frontier conflict between India and China;
- Conflicts that have occurred within all four states (11 in India, 3 each in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) as internal ethnic and/or religious break out. Demands for autonomy and even secession could be observed in multicultural India with eleven of such clashes, foremost in Assam and Punjab; in Bangladesh foremost with the Shanti Bahini in the region of the Chittagong-Hill; in Pakistan with the Karachi upheavals and with the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.
- The conflicts that we observed in the four countries are mostly longstanding and enduring; as of the year 2002 one is in high tension (Kashmir) and another deescalating (Tamil in Sri Lanka).
- Especially the Kashmir conflict deserves a special and individual treatment since it is the most serious and endangering conflict with two nuclear powers involved, with already two wars having been fought and it accumulates not only ethnic and religious quarrels but also the support from both states. This conflict has features of the Cold War conflict (without blocks on both sides) in the sense that it hopefully does not escalate into a nuclear catastrophe if both sides are aware of the potential damage a war may produce. A negotiated solution may only be possible if both sides realize that they cannot win but rather lose. A hurting stalemate could bring the two sides to the negotiation table.

How does the dependent variable ‘conflict’ match the independent variables ‘challenge’, ‘support’ and potential ‘management capability’? Are there hints that the chosen variables contribute to the explanation of conflict behaviour of the countries under consideration?

It should be clear from the outset that the explanatory factors chosen are more or less quantitative structural factors that translate only indirectly psychological factors like perception, motivations, feelings of threat and/or security. Equally, this quantitative approach captures only some of the features of individual conflicts. Of course, each conflict has characteristics and a life cycle of its own. These case specific features are not all included in the data sets we compiled. Historians often claim that such a quantitative approach gets apples and oranges mixed up. The answer to this is that even though apples and oranges are different they have features in common, since they are both fruit, they both have a peel and kernels etc. Thus, the comparative quantitative approach captures such common to all features of conflicts and we claim that they are the most relevant ones and are able to express implicitly also features that are difficult to be expressed in numerical terms.

As a result of our exercise of measuring conflicts together with their driving forces we come to the following conclusion: By comparing the indices of the explanatory variables with the scores given to the country's conflict behavior we can conclude that the empirical evidence does not contradict the hypothesis that the selected factors can explain the political behavior of the countries. The country with the highest challenge and the lowest capability index, India, has also the highest score in conflict behavior. The country with the lowest challenge index, Sri Lanka, has also a low conflict record. In addition, Sri Lanka has the highest support and capability index of the four countries. These findings suggest that the selected factors may contribute to the explanation of the regional map in South Asia.

Appendix I: Indicators for regime variables

| Survey of all indicators and their operationalization | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <i>Indicator</i> | <i>Operationalization</i> | <i>Source</i> |
| <p>Regimes</p> <p>1. Democracies, subset OECD-States</p> <p>2. Transitory regimes</p> <p>3. Autocratic regimes</p> | <p>For the typology at the end of the nineties: Index of democracy by Vanhanen, Freedomhouse, polity values by Gurr and Index of democracy by Vanhanen. For the typology covering decades 40 to 2002 there are polity-values by Gurr and the index of democracy by Vanhanen.</p> <p>Gurr (Polity IV Project): For democracy: Competition about political participation; openness and competition about the recruitment of political staff; limitation of the executive. For autocracies: Competition about political participation; rule of participation; openness and competition about the recruitment of political staff; limitation of the executive. Values between +10 (highly democratic) to -10 (highly autocratic)</p> <p>Vanhanen: Competition, participation. Competition: 100 minus of the percentage of votes of the strongest party. Participation: Part of active electors of total population. Index of democracy (ID): Competition*participation/100</p> <p>Freedomhouse (State of freedom): Values between 1 and 7; 1 stands for the highest degree of freedom, 7 for the lowest one. F= free (average between 1.0 and 2.5), NF= not free (average between 5.5. and 7.0), PF= partly free (average between 3.0 and 5.5.)</p> | <p>Vanhanen/ Gurr/ Freedomhouse</p> |
| <p>Potential danger</p> | <p>Minorities according to <i>Vanhanen</i>: Heterogeneity = 100 minus the part of the largest group in a state; <i>Gurr</i>: The index of Gurr covers values between -7,03 to 2,10. -7,03 stands for the lowest, 2,10 for the highest probability concerning further rebellions of minorities or the escalation of existing rebellions of minorities (degree of protest/rebellion). For the index of endangerment the figures have been transformed in a proportional scale where -7,03 means an endangerment of 0% and 2,1 one of 100%.</p> <p>Political instability/crisis: number of refugees related to total population; refugees of country of origin are weighted with factor 1, those of country of destination with factor 0,33</p> <p>Endangerment: Military spending related to GNP</p> <p>Neighbouring countries: Number of neighbouring states</p> <p>Non-constitutional change of government; number of coups/attempted coups</p> | <p>Vanhanen 1990</p> <p>UNHCR: Statistical Overviews, different volumes</p> <p>SIPRI 2001</p> <p>Fischer Weltalmanach 2002</p> <p>KOSIMO</p> |
| <p>Security-causing factors</p> | <p>Acceptance of regime: voter turnout in % of total population</p> <p>Political integration: Number of memberships in alliances and systems of integration (weighted)</p> | <p>Vanhanen 1998</p> <p>Fischer Weltalmanach 2002</p> |

| | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| | Economic integration: export share | Worldbank: World development report 2000/01 |
| | Governance, conflict management: political stability of regimes and effectivity of governments (work) | D.Kaufmann/ A.Kraay, P.Zoido-Lobaton 2002 |
| Potential for resolution | Security potential minus endangerment potential, reduction from one level of escalation to another; win in a defensive war | KOSIMO |
| Conflicts 1: internal + neighbouring conflicts, weighted by intensity | Number of internal and neighbouring conflicts. Weighting with 4 for wars, factor 3 for serious conflicts, factor 2 for conflicts and factor 1 for latent conflicts according to KOSIMO. Data are related to indices | |
| Conflicts 2: Number of observed conflicts, without weighting, violent and non-violent conflicts | | |
| Actual resolution | International political (not economic) treaties concerning peace, armistice, independence, international arbitration, court decisions, constitutional amendment/new constitution, internal armistice, peace treaties. | |
| Date | All data for conflict resolution apply to the nineties. Conflict data and regime data are available for the five decades 1950 to 1999 | |

Appendix II: Conflicts according to issues

Decolonization, Independence, Secession

| Name | Start | End |
|------------------------------------|-------|------|
| India I (independence) | 1942 | 1947 |
| India II (partition) | 1942 | 1948 |
| India III (Junagadh) | 1947 | 1948 |
| India IV - Pakistan (Kashmir I) | 1947 | 1949 |
| India VI (Mahe) | 1948 | 1954 |
| India IX (Goa I) | 1950 | 1961 |
| India XI (Rann of Kutch I) | 1956 | 1964 |
| India XII (Goa II) | 1961 | 1961 |
| India XIV - Pakistan (Kashmir III) | 1965 | 1965 |
| India XVI - Pakistan (Kashmir IV) | 1965 | 1970 |
| India XVIII (Khalistan/Punjab) | 1992 | 2001 |
| India XVIII (Khalistan/Punjab) | 1981 | 1991 |
| India XXIII - Pakistan (Kashmir V) | 1988 | 1998 |
| India XXIII - Pakistan (Kashmir V) | 1999 | 2002 |
| Pakistan (Bangladesh II) | 1971 | 1971 |

National power

| Name | Start | End |
|-----------------------------|-------|------|
| India V (Hyderabad) | 1948 | 1948 |
| India XV (Rann of Kutch II) | 1965 | 1969 |
| India XIX (Assam I) | 1983 | 1984 |
| India-Nepal | 1989 | 1990 |
| Pakistan (Bangladesh III) | 1971 | 1971 |
| Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (uproar) | 1971 | 1971 |
| Sri Lanka (Tamils III) | 1987 | 1995 |
| Sri Lanka (Tamils IV) | 1995 | 2002 |

International power

| Name | Start | End |
|----------------------------------------|-------|------|
| India I (independence) | 1942 | 1947 |
| India VI (Mahe) | 1948 | 1954 |
| India IX (Goa I) | 1950 | 1961 |
| India XII (Goa II) | 1961 | 1961 |
| India XXII (Intervention in Sri Lanka) | 1987 | 1989 |

Border and Territory

| Name | Start | End |
|------------------------------------|-------|------|
| Bangladesh- India | 1999 | 2000 |
| Bangladesh- India | 2001 | 2002 |
| Bangladesh-Farakha | 1975 | 1999 |
| India III (Junagadh) | 1947 | 1948 |
| India VIII - Pakistan (Kashmir II) | 1949 | 1964 |
| India XI (Rann of Kutch I) | 1956 | 1964 |
| India XIV - Pakistan (Kashmir III) | 1965 | 1965 |
| India XV (Rann of Kutch II) | 1965 | 1969 |
| India XVI - Pakistan (Kashmir IV) | 1965 | 1970 |
| India XXII - Pakistan (Kashmir V) | 1988 | 1998 |
| India XXII - Pakistan (Kashmir V) | 1999 | 2002 |
| India-Pakistan (Siachen-glacier) | 1984 | 1991 |
| Sri Lanka (Tamils IV) | 1995 | 2002 |

Ethnic, religious Conflicts

| Name | Start | End |
|-----------------------------------------------|-------|------|
| Bangladesh (Chakma, Marma) | 1975 | 1987 |
| Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts) | 1971 | 1990 |
| Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts) | 1991 | 2001 |
| India II (partition) | 1942 | 1948 |
| India IV - Pakistan (Kashmir I) | 1947 | 1949 |
| India V (Hyderabad) | 1948 | 1948 |
| India X (Nagas) | 1950 | 1964 |
| India XIII (Mizo) | 1964 | 1972 |
| India XVIII (Khalistan/Punjab) | 1992 | 2001 |
| India XVIII (Khalistan/Punjab) | 1981 | 1991 |
| India XIX (Assam I) | 1983 | 1984 |
| India XX (Ayodhya) | 1984 | 1990 |
| India XXI (Assam II, Bodoland) | 1987 | 1997 |
| India XXI (Assam II, Bodoland) | 1998 | 2002 |
| Pakistan (Bangladesh I) | 1966 | 1970 |
| Pakistan (Bangladesh III) | 1971 | 1971 |
| Pakistan (Belushistan) | 1973 | 1976 |
| Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (Tamils I) | 1956 | 1958 |
| Sri Lanka (Tamils II) | 1983 | 1987 |
| Sri Lanka (JVP-Rebellion (-1989) (Tamils III) | 1987 | 1995 |

System Conflicts

| Name | Start | End |
|------------------------------------|-------|------|
| Pakistan (civil strife in Karachi) | 2001 | 2002 |
| Pakistan (civil strife in Karachi) | 1977 | 2000 |
| Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (Tamils I) | 1956 | 1958 |

Resources, Water Conflicts

| Name | Start | End |
|--------------------------------|-------|------|
| India XV (Rann of Kutch II) | 1965 | 1969 |
| India XXI (Assam II, Bodoland) | 1987 | 1997 |
| India XXI (Assam II, Bodoland) | 1998 | 2002 |
| Sri Lanka (Tamils IV) | 1995 | 2002 |

Appendix III: List of all conflicts

| Name | Start | End | Items and Issues | Intensity |
|-------------------------------------|-------|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|
| Bangladesh (Chakma, Marma) | 1975 | 1987 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy | Severe crises |
| Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts) | 1971 | 1990 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy | Crisis |
| Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts) | 1991 | 2001 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy | Latent conflict |
| Bangladesh-India | 1999 | 2000 | Territory | Crisis |
| Bangladesh-India | 2001 | 2002 | Territory | Severe crisis |
| Bangladesh-Farakha | 1975 | 1999 | Territory | Latent conflict |
| India I (independence) | 1942 | 1947 | Decolonization; International Power | Severe crisis |
| India II (partition) | 1942 | 1948 | Decolonization; ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy | War |
| India III (Junagadh) | 1947 | 1948 | Territory; Decolonization | Crisis |
| India IV - Pakistan (Kashmir I) | 1947 | 1949 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; Territory; Decolonization | War |
| India V (Hyderabad) | 1948 | 1948 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; Internal Power | Severe crisis |
| India VI (Mahe) | 1948 | 1954 | Decolonization; International Power | Severe crisis |
| India VII (Indus-channel) | 1948 | 1960 | Resources | Latent conflict |
| India VIII - Pakistan (Kashmir II) | 1949 | 1964 | Territory | Severe crisis |
| India IX (Goa I) | 1950 | 1961 | Decolonization; International Power | Crisis |
| India X (Nagas) | 1950 | 1964 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy | Severe crisis |
| India XI (Rann of Kutch I) | 1956 | 1964 | Territory; Secession | Severe crisis |
| India XII (Goa II) | 1961 | 1961 | Decolonization; International Power | Severe crisis |
| India XIII (Mizo) | 1964 | 1972 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy | Crisis |
| India XIV - Pakistan | 1965 | 1965 | Territory; Secession | Severe crisis |

| Name | Start | End | Items and Issues | Intensity |
|----------------------------------------|-------|------|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
| (Kashmir III) | | | | |
| India XV (Rann of Kutch II) | 1965 | 1969 | Territory; Internal Power; Resources | Severe crisis |
| India XVI - Pakistan (Kashmir IV) | 1965 | 1970 | Territory; Secession | War |
| India XVIII (Khalistan/Punjab) | 1992 | 2001 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; Secession | Crisis |
| India XVIII (Khalistan/Punjab) | 1981 | 1991 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; Secession | Severe crisis |
| India XIX (Assam I) | 1983 | 1984 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; National Power | Severe crisis |
| India XX (Ayodhya) | 1984 | 1990 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy | Severe crisis |
| India XXI (Assam II, Bodoland) | 1987 | 1997 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; Resources | Crisis |
| India XXI (Assam II, Bodoland) | 1998 | 2002 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; Resources | Severe crisis |
| India XXII (Intervention Sri Lanka) | 1987 | 1989 | International Power | War |
| India XXIII - Pakistan (Kashmir V) | 1988 | 1998 | Territory; Secession | Severe crisis |
| India XXIII - Pakistan (Kashmir V) | 1999 | 2002 | Territory; Secession | War |
| India-Nepal | 1989 | 1990 | National Power; Other | Crisis |
| India-Pakistan (Siachen-glacier) | 1984 | 1991 | Territory | Severe crisis |
| Pakistan (Bangladesh I) | 1966 | 1970 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy | Crisis |
| Pakistan (Bangladesh II) | 1971 | 1971 | Secession | Severe crisis |
| Pakistan (Bangladesh III) | 1971 | 1971 | Internal power; Autonomy | War |
| Pakistan (Belushistan) | 1973 | 1976 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy | Severe crisis |
| Pakistan (civil strife in Karachi) | 1977 | 2000 | Ideology, System | Severe crisis |
| Pakistan (civil strife in Karachi) | 2001 | 2002 | Ideology, System | Crisis |
| Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (uproar) | 1971 | 1971 | National Power | Severe crisis |
| Sri Lanka (Ceylon) (Tamils I) | 1956 | 1958 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; Ideology, System | Severe crisis |
| Sri Lanka (Tamils II) | 1983 | 1987 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy | War |
| Sri Lanka (Tamils III) | 1987 | 1995 | Ethnic, religious or regional Autonomy; National Power | War |
| Sri Lanka (Tamils IV) | 1995 | 2002 | Territory; National Power; Resources | War |

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