

nach Indien stark an, und das Land wurde schließlich zum weltweit größten Kunden der Weltbank und der IDA.

Der dritte Fünfjahresplan für die Zeit von 1961 bis 1965 wurde im Vorfeld durch die von der Weltbank entsandte internationale Wirtschaftsmision schon beeinflusst. In ihrem Bericht übertrugen sie ihre Beurteilung der ökonomischen Situation auf die Perspektiven des dritten indischen Fünfjahresplanes. Im Rahmen des vierten Fünfjahresplanes von 1969 bis 1974 stand die Stärkung der nationalen "Self-Reliance" im Mittelpunkt. Die Verfasserin zeigt jedoch auf, daß es im Kontext dieser Zielsetzung zu der vorgesehenen Reduktion ausländischer Kapitalhilfen nicht kam. Erst durch die Grüne Revolution kam es gesamtwirtschaftlich zu einer gewissen Entlastung, wodurch sich auch das Konfliktpotential zwischen der indischen Regierung und der Weltbank verringerte.

Abschließend wendet sich Glietsch den neueren Entwicklungstendenzen seit Mitte der 80er Jahre zu. Sie sind durch eine rasch zunehmende Außenverschuldung Indiens und den Liberalisierungskurs, der Mitte der 80er Jahre durch Rajiv Gandhi eingeleitet wurde, geprägt. Obwohl das Buchmanuskript offensichtlich 1992 abgeschlossen wurde, fällt die Analyse dieser sehr turbulenten Phase seit Mitte der 80er Jahre zu knapp aus.

Das Verdienst der Autorin ist es, daß sie den Einfluß der Weltbank auf wirtschaftliche Entscheidungen und Entwicklungsprozesse in Indien systematisch aufgearbeitet hat. Dabei hat sie sich auf wesentliche Zusammenhänge beschränkt. Ihre Analyse zeichnet sich somit weder durch eine große Breite noch Tiefe aus. Sie vermittelt jedoch in jedem Fall dem interessierten Leser in allgemeinverständlicher Sprache einen guten Überblick.

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S.D. MUNI, *Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis*. Oslo/New Delhi: International Peace Research Institute. Sage Publications India, 1993. 259 pages, £ 27.50.

The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority has become one of the most enduring ethnic civil wars in South Asia. Up to now, all efforts to find a political compromise guaranteeing a devolution of power for the Tamils have failed. Apart from the various proposals put forward by both parties, the Indian intervention from 1987 to 1990 was the most prominent attempt of a foreign power to end the conflict by acting as a third party mediator. This episode is at the cen-

tre of *Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis*, by S.D. Muni, an Indian scholar and specialist in international and regional affairs. The book consists of two parts, analysis of events and a documentary appendix of 66 pages. Unfortunately there is no separate bibliography. Muni's study is mainly restricted to the Indian side, and in the first chapter, "A Framework of India's Approach Towards its Neighbours", he argues that India's South Asia policy is, first of all, guided by security aspects and that "Indian policy has opted to advance its security interests at the cost of seeking ideological harmony in the neighbourhood" (p. 27). The second chapter deals with "India's Concerns in Sri Lanka". Sri Lanka's geostrategic significance for India's security is discussed here at great length. The historical background of the ethnic conflict is given, however, only four pages (p. 40-44). Chapter three provides an overview, from the riots against the Tamils in Colombo in 1983 to the events in July 1987. Muni describes the various negotiations and points to the attempts of the UNP-government to internationalize the conflict by looking for Western support. This and the danger of a spill-over of violence to the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu, he argues, caused Indira Gandhi to react in order to find a political solution. After the peace proposals of December 1986 failed and the military situation turned in favour of the Sri Lankan forces, the Rajiv Gandhi government was faced with the dilemma that it could "neither stand the victory of the Sinhala hegemonic state nor the establishment of a separate Tamil state" (p. 83). This was the starting point for a direct intervention by the air-drop action of relief supplies over Jaffna in June 1987. The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987 and the development of Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) in order to disarm militant Tamil groups, especially the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), are dealt with in chapters four and five. India's air-drop action in favour of the Tamils showed the UNP-government that no international protest would be forthcoming against Indian violations of Sri Lanka's sovereignty. About two months later the Agreement was signed, giving Sri Lanka a new administrative system and also accommodating India's security concerns. In his evaluation of the role of the IPKF, Muni points to the political and military constraints they had to face when their mission to disarm the LTTE turned into open warfare. The lack of a concise political strategy on the part of India led to a confusion which hampered military operations and finally led to the retreat of the IPKF in 1990. The last chapter provides some theoretical reflections on India's peace keeping efforts, stating that "the option of military involvement is not the best way for India to respond to internal conflicts in its neighbourhood" (p. 183).



Muni's study gives a very detailed account of the different stages of the Indian intervention. Its main value lies in the analysis of the political and security constraints of Indian foreign policy makers in dealing with the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka. On the basis of his interviews with Sinhalese, Tamil and Indian politicians, military leaders and intellectuals, Muni is able to give a very good picture of the various stages of the negotiations which finally led to the Peace Agreement.

The study presents a conventional Indian view of problems of regional security, based on the premise that regional powers like India have a legitimate interest in the internal affairs of their neighbours. Therefore infringing upon the national sovereignty of a neighbouring country by dropping relief supplies is an undertaking which is beyond criticism. Here one misses a more critical approach which also takes the security concerns of smaller countries into account. The author's approach sometimes leads to contradicting lines of argumentation. He may be right in maintaining that to "argue that Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis was the result of India's moral and material support to militant Tamil groups is nothing but a manifestation of political motivation and distorted historical understanding" (p. 46). But at the same time he shows in great detail how militant Tamil groups were given political, financial and military support by Indian authorities. The reader is thus led to wonder whether the conflict would not have taken another course if India had followed a more rigid policy of non-intervention against Tamil groups. The underlying problem of the Indian side, namely, how to develop a coherent regional policy when too many actors are following their own short-term political interests, is unfortunately not dealt with.

Keeping his position in mind, Muni puts forward a series of convincing arguments, for example that the presence of the IPKF has secured the unity of Sri Lanka by giving the Sri Lankan forces the possibility of ending the JVP violence in the south (p. 157/158) and that the IPKF contributed to the "reactivation of democratic political process throughout the island" (p. 151). From a different perspective, however, one could ask whether the JVP violence in the south would have been so strong if the IPKF had not been deployed. The second argument simply does not take into account the Provincial Council elections in the south and western parts of the country.

Muni's tinged view of Indian regional policy leaves certain motives for the intervention in the dark. This can be seen by looking at his argument concerning Trincomalee harbour. According to him the Tamil militants were trained by the RAW (Research and Analysis Wing of the Indian Intelligence) in order to gather information about movements of Western

ships in Trincomalee (p. 45). But on the other hand, Muni makes it clear that "in the context of improved strategic understanding between India and the USA ... since late 1984 ..." the visit of US naval ships could not have been prejudicial to Indian security interests (p. 112). Moreover, "India could easily monitor military movements in and around Trincomalee from its own coasts and presence in the Indian Ocean" (p. 143). If that is the case, why then train Tamil militants? It seems that Indian interests went beyond mere security concerns.

Despite these shortcomings Muni demonstrates how the various conflicts are intermeshed in South Asia and how internal conflicts can create bilateral or international tensions. Muni shows the often divergent assessments and the dilemmas of Indian foreign policy makers in dealing with the Sri Lankan crisis. At the same time he makes clear that the problem of balancing the dynamics of ethnic conflicts with national security concerns will remain on the agenda of Indian policy makers.

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BEN KIERNAN (ed.), *Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: the Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community*. (Monograph Series 41). New Haven, CT.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1993. 335 pp. ISBN 938692-49-6.

This book is the compilation of the papers and informal presentations given at the two-day conference "Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia," held on 21-22 February 1992 at Yale University Law School under the auspices of the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights. The contributors include many well-known scholars, including Kate Frieson, May Ebihara, Judith Banister and E. Paige Johnson, Gregory H. Stanton, Serge Thion, Chanthou Boua and Ben Kiernan who also edited the volume and wrote the introduction. As for the unifying themes underlying these papers, Ben Kiernan explains that the discussions presented in this volume address the role of the Khmer Rouge and that of the international community as "two aspects of Cambodia's international existence" (p. 16).

In the first chapter, "Revolution and Rural Response in Cambodia, 1970-1975," Kate G. Frieson discusses some of the economic, political, and sociological factors that she believes inhibited mass support for the Khmer Rouge; factors that also worked to prevent opposition to the Khmer Rouge after the establishment of their regime. Frieson substantiates her