Internationales Asienforum, Vol. 44 (2013), No. 3–4, pp. 223–226

Japan and Southeast Asia
Editorial

CLAUDIA DERICHS*

This issue of *Internationales Asienforum / International Quarterly for Asian Studies* addresses genuine aspects of intra-regional relations between Japan and Southeast Asia. The topics presented here were delivered at the Annual Conference of the Association for Social Science Research on Japan in 2012. This conference was sponsored by the Japan Foundation and the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) and held at the conference centre of the Catholic Diocese of Rothenburg-Stuttgart in Weingarten, Germany. The event brought together scholars from Japan and Southeast Asia for two and a half days to discuss a range of issues on the topic of "Japan and Southeast Asia: Varieties of an Intra-regional Relationship".

The backdrop of the conference discussion was a shared understanding that German scholars of Southeast Asia and Japan are generally unaware of the intra-regional research conducted by their colleagues in Asia. Furthermore, it was felt that relations between Japan and Southeast Asia are a productive topic, since Japan's standing as a regional power in Asia is shaped to a considerable extent by its relationship with Southeast Asia. In some respects, Japan has been a role model for Southeast Asia – historically, as the first non-Western country to conquer a Western power, and economically, as a "leading goose" (in terms of the "flying geese" model of regional economic development) in the more recent past. Since the late 1990s, the nations of the region have moved in parallel rather than in a flying geese formation in terms of economic reform and economic exchanges. At the same time, significant political transitions and changes have occurred. Japan has been the major donor of development aid to Southeast Asia for many years; it has been an occupying and colonizing power in the region during World War II; and it has exerted a lot of soft power and cultural influence on

* CLAUDIA DERICHS, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Marburg, Germany; derichs@staff.uni-marburg.de

Southeast Asian societies in the postwar period. Despite several setbacks since the early 1990s, among them the so-called bursting of the economic bubble, and despite a decrease in the share of total OECD merchandise trade, Japan is still a leading economic power. Although the triple catastrophe of earthquake, tsunami and nuclear power plant disaster of March 2011 has left its mark on society, politics and the economy, the manner in which the Japanese people coped with this disastrous situation is widely admired. At the same time, though, the government's crisis management has been criticised.

Southeast Asian nations have looked to Japan as a destination for students and labour migrants. The Philippines, for instance, signed a bilateral contract with Japan on the employment of Filipino care workers. Japanese companies have set up branches in Southeast Asia and thereby learned about various kinds of diversity management, since most of Southeast Asia's societies are multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious. Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia have first-hand experience in dealing with the devastating effects of tsunamis, floods, typhoons and earthquakes. Apart from sharing geographically grounded destinies, Japan and Southeast Asia cooperate at the regional level and in various organizational formats. Thanks to the multi-layered framework of regional cooperation, both Japan and Southeast Asia are centres of gravity in the global economy.

At the conference relations between Japan and Southeast Asia were addressed by scholars from various disciplines, including, among others, historians, social scientists, economists, anthropologists, gender experts, linguists and specialists in cultural studies and law. The spectrum of topics was as varied as the chequered history of the region and the relations between Japan and its regional neighbours. We believe they merit attention because Europeans in particular tend to view the world through the prism of West-East or North-South relations. Inter- and intra-regional perspectives outside the triangle Asia-Europe-USA are often treated as secondary in mainstream area studies. As a counterweight, in this volume we have collected examples of perspectives on Japan and Southeast Asia from an intra- as well as extra-regional vantage point. We consider this selection an enriching academic exercise for committed scholars and interested readers alike.

A historian's view is presented in Vincent Houben's article on "Eurasians and Japan". Houben describes the tensions among inhabitants of mixed European-Asian origin in the Dutch East Indies. Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia before and during World War II compelled acknowledgement of Japan as the regional power and, hence, forced many Eurasians to take sides: either with Europe, i.e. the Dutch in the case of what was later to become Indonesia, or with Asia, i.e. Japan. The slogan "Asia for Asians"

did not fully appeal to Eurasians; nor did they feel exclusively European. The article reflects a rarely researched part of the early twentieth century entanglement between Japan, Southeast Asia and Europe.

Patrick Heinrich also deals with Japanese imperial expansion and the colonization of parts of Asia. He takes a critical look at the spread of the "Japanese language in Japan, Taiwan and Korea", thereby drawing attention to Japan's neighbours in East Asia. His central argument is that Japan applied very similar methods and persistence to spreading its language in its colonies as it did within its own state. The attempts to enforce the spread of Japanese as the main, if not the only, language of public conversation and education met with different reactions in the regions where the policy was applied (i.e. in Ainu Mosir in today's northern island Hokkaido, in the Ryukyu islands, in Korea and in Taiwan). The invention of a Japanese nation united by language had repercussions that are still felt today – particularly in Japan itself, where this notion of a united nation hinders a thorough discussion of Japan as a multicultural society.

Another linguistically inspired study is that by Jun'ichiro Iwasaki on "Neologisms in Japanese and Vietnamese". Iwasaki's research reveals an interesting part of a rarely acknowledged past of the Vietnamese language and the history of ideas. By looking at how Chinese and Japanese characters competed in familiarizing Vietnamese society of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with newly introduced Western terms and concepts, Iwasaki traces an important social transformation in Southeast Asia. Western intellectual intrusion, accompanied by translations of hitherto unfamiliar concepts such as *liberté, egalité, fraternité*, undermined the influence of the Chinese language in Vietnam. Iwatsuki hints at the explicitly political underpinnings of this process, which eventually marginalized the literati who expressed their ideas in Chinese-character based Vietnamese rather than in Latin script.

In her contribution on "Politics and Religion in Myanmar", Buddhist scholar Keiko Tosa sheds light on the situation of Burmese Buddhists. Her account of the demonstrations by Burmese Buddhist monks in 2007 is based primarily on her extensive and intensive fieldwork in Myanmar. Tosa's article reveals several interesting aspects of the relationship between politics and religion. It analyses how the state has encroached on religious organizations and how the hotly contested field of religion has become highly politicized. At the same time, religious activity provides – more or less – the only channel for the articulation of dissent and discontent. The state's accommodation with Buddhist organizations as providers of regime legitimacy, which has been consequently pursued by the military junta, bears the inherent risk of being criticized by the *sangha* (Buddhist monastic "clergy") and, hence,

of losing legitimacy. This relationship between state and *sangha* is significantly different from that in Japan, where the Buddhist clergy is fairly independent and largely irrelevant for the legitimacy of the ruling regime. The fact that Japanese Buddhist organizations and initiatives displayed active solidarity with their fellow monks in Myanmar illustrates a particular dimension of transnational Buddhism.

We hope this collection of topics and perspectives will increase interest in further collaboration among European and Asian scholars of Japan and Southeast Asia. The conference and the articles presented here should, thus, be considered as a snapshot of a fruitful cooperation that will encourage more collaborative scholarly projects in the future.

Internationales Asienforum, Vol. 44 (2013), No. 3–4, pp. 227–237

The Indonesian Eurasian Community and Japan

VINCENT HOUBEN*

Abstract

This article deals with connections between the rise of Japan, Indonesian nationalism and the Eurasian community between 1900 and 1942. It shows how Dutch official and public assessments of Japan as an external threat differed over time. The same was true of Indonesian views of Japan. Eurasians were caught in the middle between Dutch conservatism on the one hand and Indonesian nationalism on the other. Different choices on this domestic issue also resulted in different positions towards Japanese expansionism. Therefore, in this period Indonesian and Japanese historical dynamics became entangled.

Keywords

Japan, Indonesia, Eurasians, history

Introduction

In Southeast Asian history, the rise of Japan as a dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region in the early decades of the twentieth century, the emergence of Indonesian nationalism and the changing social position of Eurasiansin the Dutch East Indies are usually described as three separate histories. The only entanglement observed by historians so far is that Indonesian nationalists were aware of the fact that Japan had emerged as the first non-western modern nation able to confront western colonial powers in Asia. Japanese military victories, particularly those at Mukden and Tsushima in 1904–05, raised the spirits of the indigenous peoples in Southeast Asia, creating the expectation that the era of white supremacy was drawing to a close. Up to now, most historical studies on Japan's role in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, concentrate on the war period itself. They fail to note

* VINCENT HOUBEN, Institut für Asien- und Afrikawissenschaften, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany; Vincent.Houben@cms.hu-berlin.de

that prior to military conquest, Japan had already influenced intra-regional developments in what it designated as the Southern area (*nanyo*). The Japanese impact on pre-war social relations in future Indonesia has so far been ignored.[1]

Elly Touwen-Bouwsma has written on the Eurasians in Java during the Japanese occupation. After the fall of Singapore (February 1942), the Japanese wanted to revamp the ethnographic landscape of the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Japanese now stood at the apex of a racial order that excluded Westerners and, thus, consisted of indigenous peoples and national minorities. Eurasians[2], however, belonged to neither of the categories identified and their status was determined by their readiness or refusal to support the Japanese cause. In order to divide Eurasians and Europeans, a segregation policy was pursued. This policy offered better treatment to those Eurasians who accepted their Asianness. In addition, the degree of Asian descent or blood was used as a marker to determine whether someone was European or Asian (Touwen-Bouwsma 1997). Matthias Zachmann points out that the role of race in Japanese foreign policy was in fact an internally contested issue, as some state institutions advocated a "pure blood theory" and others a "mixed blood theory", aimed at cultural assimilation rather than racial segregation. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was a similarly complex phenomenon in Japanese policy given that, on the one hand, it clearly underlined Japanese claims to hegemony but, on the other, out of an awareness of relative weakness, it sought to co-opt Southeast Asian elites and, thus, allowed room to manoeuvre (Zachmann 2013).

This short study tries to make a case for the historical entanglement of the rise of Japan, Indonesian nationalism and Eurasian bifurcation in late colonial society in the Dutch East Indies, i.e. before the start of the Second World War in Asia. The main question here is how changing international relations within the broader East Asian region shaped political and social

1 I thank Prof. Urs Matthias Zachmann of the University of Edinburgh for his useful comments on this essay.

2 Cribb defined Eurasian/Indisch as follows: "The meaning of Indisch lurks somewhere between ethnicity – mainly mixed race Indo-European/Eurasian – and culture, standing for the whole complex of cultural adjustments between East and West which took place in the Indonesian archipelago and which involved not only Europeans and indigenes, but also Chinese and other Asians. Indisch culture was marked by distinctive uses of language, dress, cuisine, entertainment, recreation, housing, family structure, and so on, all of them, loosely speaking, hybrids between Western and Asian cultures. The term identity, however, implies both a collective identity and a sense of the political implications of that identity." (IIAS Newsletter 2003, referred to by Joost Coté and Loes Westerbeek (2005)

dynamics in future Indonesia. My main focus will be on the period between 1910 and 1940, a time in which certain trends that emerged from the 1910s onwards, culminated in a new conjuncture, marking the beginning of the Pacific War and the subsequent struggle for Indonesian independence. My narrative is based mostly on Dutch-language sources and secondary literature, which have until now been underrepresented in global history debates on Asia.

Background: Japan and the Dutch East Indies

Japanese-Netherlands Indies relations were embodied in the Japanese minority that lived in the Dutch colony. Their numbers were small but increased over time, from 500 in 1900 to 8,000 in 1940. Still, compromising three per cent of the total population in 1930, the Japanese minority was a tiny group compared to an indigenous population of 61 million. In the beginning most of the Japanese were females, who worked as domestic servants or as prostitutes (*karayuki-san*). In the course of time, however, more males arrived – mostly fishermen, shopkeepers and medicine sellers. Social solidarity organizations or *Nihonjinkai* (associations of Japanese), began to emerge at the end of the nineteenth century.

The modernization of Japan since 1854 enhanced its status as a sovereign actor in the international sphere, initially through a series of trading agreements with western powers. The British-Japanese treaty of 1894 was based on the principle of reciprocity and induced other western countries, including the Netherlands, to establish similar relations with Japan, granting both sides privileged access to each other's markets and establishing legal equality between the Japanese and the Europeans, especially with regard to the administration of justice. Changes in the relations between Japan and the West impacted upon Southeast Asia too (see Kratoska 2003). Besides their fear of being commercially outmanoeuvred by other, bigger colonial powers, the Dutch were worried about Japan's possible plans for the colonization of New Guinea in the far eastern corner of the Dutch colony, where their de facto presence was weak. The Dutch were aware of the fact that Japan's leverage had increased and that this needed to be reflected in the formal status of the Japanese. In contrast to other Asians who lived in the Dutch East Indies, the Japanese, therefore, were granted European legal status in 1899.

The Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05 impressed Dutch colonial officials, since it made it clear that a new major, modern Asian power had arrived on the scene in the Far East. However, there was no feeling of alarm at

this stage since all were convinced that Japanese expansion would be confined to Northeast Asia. After 1905 economic and political relationships between the Dutch East Indies and Japan were steadily upgraded. In 1907, the Dutch appointed a military attaché in Tokyo; two years later the Japanese opened a consulate in Batavia. In 1912, a Dutch-Japanese treaty on trade and shipping accorded Japan "most favoured nation" status. In 1913, a new Japanese government came to power headed by Admiral Yamamoto Gonbei, an advocate of expansion towards the South. In 1914, however, Japan declared that it would respect Dutch neutrality in what was to become World War I.

During the interwar period, Japanese economic activities in the Dutch East Indies increased markedly, since the Archipelago was rich in natural resources and labour reserves and also within strategic reach. The First World War had disrupted shipping between Europe and Southeast Asia, which contributed to a reorientation of the Dutch East Indies' economy towards Asia. Cheap Japanese industrial exports to the Indies increased rapidly. Japanese companies obtained agricultural and mining concessions on Borneo and other islands. The Nanyo Kyokai (South Seas Association), established in 1915, and the activities of the *zaibatsu*, Japanese banks and large trading companies, were instrumental in this growth in the Japanese commercial presence in the Dutch East Indies (Post 1996).

After World War I, the Dutch adopted an accommodative attitude towards the Indonesian nationalist movement and their fear of Japan subsided temporarily. However, communist uprisings in 1926–27 led to repressive policies towards Indonesian nationalism in the 1930s. The effects of the Great Depression deeply affected colonial society and also hurt the Europeans. At this juncture, it became clear to most Indonesian nationalists that independence from the Dutch could only be achieved through a struggle between "us" and "them", in which non-cooperation was the only viable strategy. Furthermore, as Japan adopted a policy of military expansion within and beyond China, both the Dutch and the Indonesians became increasingly aware of the threat of a Pacific War. Economic penetration was now followed by Japanese political manoeuvring, as they tried to gain a foothold in preparation for military conquest, something advocated strongly within Japanese naval circles.[3] The private sector also argued in favour of a southward advance, notably the Greater Asia Society led by opinion maker Shimonaka Yasaburo. In reaction, in 1935 the Dutch East Indies Government installed a Bureau of East Asian Affairs (Dienst der Oost-Aziatische Zaken, DOAZ) in

[3] The Japanese army supported a northern advance theory (*hokushin-ron*), whereas the navy argued in favour of a southern advance (*nanshin*).

order to monitor Japanese policy and the behaviour of Japanese citizens in the Dutch East Indies. It was manned by Sinologists and Japanologists who could translate press articles and government publications. Thus, the Dutch were well informed about the main developments in Japanese politics and monitored the activities of the Japanese in the Dutch East Indies on a regular basis.

Representations of Japan among Dutch and Indonesians in the East Indies

We are well informed about Japanese perceptions of Southeast Asia through the work of Ken'ichi Goto (see: Kratoska 2003), but much less so the other way around. In 1987, Elsbeth Locher-Scholten published a series of short studies on the ways in which Japan was represented in pre-war Indonesia, the contents of which are summarized in this section. A distinction has to be made between official views, contained in the official documents of the time, and the public views of different population groups – particularly the Dutch and the Indonesians.

Awareness of Japan in Indonesia became more prominent in the Dutch colonial sphere following the events of 1904–05. In Dutch government reports, suspicions were quickly raised that the Japanese who resided in the Dutch East Indies were involved in espionage of some sort. Seeing no immediate danger, however, colonial officials in the Indies were more relaxed about this matter than for instance Dutch diplomats in Japan. This attitude changed after 1913, when a report from the Ministry of Colonies in The Hague pointed out Japan's lack of natural resources in contrast to its fast growing population. As a result, first economic and then political expansion could be expected. The Dutch were worried that Japan would try to co-opt Indonesian nationalists by propagating that Asia belonged only to Asians. Concerns about espionage re-emerged and this time were taken more seriously. A Japanese trade organization of the time, the Eastern Asia Cooperative Association (EACA), was suspected of being a front organization for Japanese intelligence .

While most government reports were still sober in tone, the Dutch press in the Indies became increasingly worried about Japan after the outbreak of World War I. Shocked by developments in China, there was an acute awareness of the danger that Japan would decide to expand southwards and an explicit comparison was made to Germany's conquests in Europe. Ample mention was also made of Japanese publications on the Dutch East Indies, such as for instance a 1916 article by the Japanese journalist

Yosaburo Takekoshi, entitled "The First Step in Our Naval Policy". This piece of writing advocated the conquest of Java and Sumatra in order to provide a strategic line of defence in the Sunda Straits and to free the indigenous population from the plight of Dutch rule. Takekoshi had visited Southeast Asia in 1908 and two years later published a widely read account of his travels under the title *Nangoku-ki* (A Record of Southern Countries). In 1917, another book entitled *A Survey of the South Sea Area* was published by the Japanese naval officer Hosaka, in which an economic expansion to the South was strongly advocated. Another article by Takekoshi followed, in which he urged his fellow countrymen to buy up land in the Dutch East Indies, while at the same time complaining about the unjustified anti-Japanese attitude of the Dutch, even though the Japanese merely wanted to cooperate. Indonesians were portrayed as having blood ties with the Japanese, which justified the Archipelago falling to Japan in the future.[4] Making such Japanese publications available to Dutch readers in the Indies clearly produced feelings of insecurity. Towards the end of World War I suspicions of Japan, as reported in the Dutch press in the Indies, lessened and the focus shifted towards improving relations and acquiring a better knowledge of Japan itself.

Indonesian images of Japan were, as could be expected, quite different from the Dutch ones. The relevant frame of reference here was the rising consciousness of being Asian within the context of an increasingly dynamic, but also pluralist nationalist movement. The Japanese victory of 1905 had an awakening and energizing effect on Indonesian nationalism, which was at that time still in its infancy. Subsequently, however, stances differed according to the relative positions within a broad nationalist movement, which ranged from the pro-Dutch elitist Budi Utomo (BO) to the radical Indonesian Communist Party. At first, Budi Utomo reiterated Dutch concerns about Japanese expansionism and signalled that living in a Dutch colony was by far preferable to being under Japanese rule. In the 1920s, BO worries became less outspoken and feelings of admiration combined with Panasianism prevailed. Islamic nationalists, united within Sarekat Islam, were not obsessed with a possible Japanese threat, which they thought was a matter for the Dutch only. Japan was clearly an example to be emulated, since it had successfully adopted the positive aspects of western civilization, particularly its technology. Nevertheless, reservations were expressed about Japanese capitalist exploitation of labour. At the same time, however, the import of

4 In order to facilitate the smooth expansion of the Japanese Empire, a mixed blood theory was adopted, in which the Japanese people were represented as a highly cultured mixture of different Asian peoples (Oguma 2002).

cheap Japanese goods was applauded. The Indonesian communists, on the other hand, were much more negative because Japan, a capitalist and imperialist country, exhibited many of the characteristics of European colonizing nations. They also doubted whether the Japanese assumption of power in the Indies would mean a turn for the better for the indigenous population.

During the 1930s, the dominant representations of Japan changed on both the Dutch and the Indonesian sides. This was in part a reaction to Japanese propaganda activities in the Dutch East Indies themselves. In 1931, a Japanese-Malay press was established, with journals such as *Bendee* and *Astra*. From 1933 onwards, Japan started to promote itself as a protector of Islam, and contacts with nationalist leaders and Indonesian journalists were stepped up. A new Japanese-Malay newspaper, *Sinar Selatan* (Light of the South), was established 1938 in Semarang. Anti-western pamphlets, printed in Tokyo, were distributed through consulates and trading agencies.

Due to Dutch repression of the Indonesian nationalist movement, which included the arrest and exile of key nationalist leaders, Panasiatic ideas started to become widely advertised in the Indonesian nationalist press. While Sukarno, the future president of Indonesia, openly identified common interests between the Indonesians and the Japanese, other nationalist leaders, such as Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir, were more cautious. Hatta visited Japan in 1933 and came to the conclusion that Panasianism was not based on the equality of Asian peoples and that Japanese imperialism was a threat. In his view independence could, therefore, only be achieved through self-help and not through dependence on Japan. The socialist Sutan Sjahrir was against fascism of any kind, including the Japanese version of it. Islamic views remained ambiguous: Japanese cruelties in China were condemned, but Japan's pro-Islamic initiatives were praised.

In Dutch circles in the 1930s Japan was called the "yellow peril" and presented as an acute threat to Dutch interests. The dominant image was that of big clouds building up in the Pacific portending a devastating storm. Japanese economic and military expansion were the twin themes that dominated government and European public discussions. In the face of Japan's military might, a feeling of inferiority existed within the colonial army and navy, which implied dependence on the British and American presence in Asia. The conviction was widespread that, for Japan, oil was the main motive to "free" this part of Asia.

Elsbeth Locher-Scholten argued that representations of Japan shifted more on the Dutch than the Indonesian side. She distinguishes six periods of Dutch images of Japan: between 1899 and 1912 the initial, still largely unspecified feelings of distrust, between 1912 and 1918 a temporary deep fear of Japan, between 1918 and 1931 a positive reservation, between 1931 and

1937 feelings of a distant, but increasing threat, from 1937 till 1941 a feeling of silence before the storm, and from July 1941 onwards the image of an enemy. Racial prejudice seemed to have played almost no role whatsoever. In contrast, on the Indonesian there were hardly any shifts in the image of Japan. Only a small minority saw Japan as an enemy. Instead feelings of ambiguity prevailed: Japan was both an example of successful modernization and nationhood and, at the same time, a threat to the indigenous industry (Locher-Scholten 1987: pp. 497–507).

Eurasians and their self-definition between Asia and Europe

The social position of the Eurasians needs to be evaluated in the context of the complex attitudes about Japan's role in the Dutch East Indies and the increasing tensions between Dutch and Indonesians. In late colonial society, Eurasians still occupied, for the most part, a relatively privileged position. Apart from a group of impoverished Eurasians, who lived among the Indonesians in indigenous villages or city quarters (*kampong*), most were clerks and junior civil servants and thus belonged to the lower middle class. However, they were always in an inferior position vis-à-vis the white immigrants, which illustrates that class and status distinctions were racial in character (Touwen-Bouwsma 1997: p. 34; Houben 2009: p. 81). The internal pressure in colonial society generated by the Indonesian nationalist movement and the external pressure of the threat of Japan soon caused a schism within Eurasian circles. The majority decided to associate themselves with the Dutch, against the Indonesian nationalists and the Japanese. A minority took the opposite stance.

The Indische Partij (IP) was established in 1911 as a radical, anticolonial organization within the Eurasian community. It professed Panasianism and advocated an independent future for all the peoples in the East Indies, free of Dutch rule. Indonesians were welcomed as members. The leader of the IP, E.F.E. Douwes Dekker (1879–1950), a Eurasian adventurer who had fought in the Boer War in Southern Africa and studied in Japan, saw the country as an example for the Indies and encouraged young people to pursue an education there. IP's existence was short-lived. It was disbanded by the Dutch authorities in 1913 and Douwes Dekker and two Indonesian leaders were exiled to the Netherlands.

Most of the radical followers of Douwes Dekker turned to Insulinde, a party established in 1907 which was allied with the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV) until 1916. Insulinde was thought to have entered into relations with Japan. It was rumoured that Douwes Dekker travelled

around with letters of recommendation from Japanese statesmen and now used the slogan "Asia for the Asians" instead of "the Indies for the Indies people" (Saffrie 1992: p. 92). After his return to the Dutch East Indies in 1918, Douwes Dekker established a private business school in Bandung (West Java), the Ksatrian Institute, where Japanese was offered as one of the subjects. Shortly before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Douwes Dekker was arrested again, accused of having transferred sensitive information to the Japanese consulate general, and subsequently interned in Surinam, a distant Dutch colony in the Caribbean (De Bruin 1990: pp. 38–39).

A monumental biography of Douwes Dekker provides more detailed information on the activities of this Eurasian political leader with regard to Japan. The colonial government was suspicious of his interest in Japan and of the way in which the Ksatrian Institute rendered a positive picture of and encouraged further study in Japan. Study materials prepared by him commented on the "correct statemanship" of Japan in Korea and that the anti-Chinese boycotts were "unacceptable". Douwes Dekker invited Hiroshi Nagashima to work as a professor of Japanese at his school. He thought that learning this language was important because of the increasing role of Japan in world trade. In mid-1936 Douwes Dekker published a book on the history of East Asia; the colonial government confiscated all 517 copies because it was thought its contents would poison the minds of Indonesian students. The author was tried on the charge that the textbook was a piece of pro-Japanese propaganda. In the end he had to pay a fine and his teaching licence was revoked (Van der Veur 2006: Chapter 13). Anti-colonialist and an admirer of Japan, Douwes Dekker was viewed as a double threat by the Dutch colonial administration.

In contrast, the Indo-European Association (Indo-Europeesch Verbond – IEV, established in 1918) opted for the Dutch cause, since it wanted to promote the socio-economic position of the Eurasians as a buffer between Europeans and Indonesians (Touwen-Bouwsma 1997: p. 35). Indonesians were barred from membership. Nevertheless, the IEV became more critical of conservative Dutch policies in the 1930s as it was driven largely by metropolitan interests, whereas the future of the Eurasians was in the Indies and not in Europe. Equal opportunities for pure Dutch and people of mixed descent also proved to be illusory. The IEV, therefore, supported an Indonesian petition in the People's Council (Volksraad) which, taking the American example in the Philippines as its model, called for more autonomy in a future Dutch-Indonesian union. However, a real rapprochement with Indonesian nationalism remained out of the question as the colonial government made some conciliatory gestures to appease moderate Eurasians (Meijer 2004: pp. 138–173). Contrary to Eurasian radicals, the IEV community was rather

wary about Japanese expansion and formed a subsidiary section within Dutch public opinion. Between 1930 and 1942, the party journal *Onze Stem* (Our Voice) deemed Japan to be a "danger", although there was some optimism in the early 1930s that Japan's aggression would remain confined to China. Later, the expectation was voiced that in the event of a European war, Japan would use the opportunity to establish its hegemony in Asia. In 1937, doubts were raised about the Japanese premier Hayashi Senjuro's assurance in parliament that Japan had been "saturated" in terms of expansion.

Concluding observations: translation and entanglement

In her study of wartime race relations in Indonesia, Elly Touwen-Bouwsma referred to a "suppressed racial tension which had existed before the war between the Eurasians and the Dutch, on the one hand, and between the Eurasians and the Indonesians on the other […]" (Touwen-Bouwsma 1997: p. 47). Race and cultural orientation were important markers of difference which drove the growing segmentation of late colonial society in the Dutch East Indies. Eurasians as mediators were increasingly outmanoeuvred and had to take sides, i.e., align themselves with either the Dutch or the Indonesians. This included their position on Japan.

The material presented above suggests that positive or negative representations of Japan were incorporated into the rising social and political tensions within the Dutch East Indies. A radical and anti-colonial Eurasian minority, as epitomized by Douwes Dekker, defined its Asianness in the form of connectedness with Japan, at least at a symbolic level. A Japan-friendly attitude had the potential of proving to the Indonesians that a new middle ground existed where Eurasians and Indonesians could meet – that of an Asian modernity on which all those born in Asia could build and for which Japan was the perfect example. In contrast, the more conservative Eurasian majority associated themselves with Dutchness. This involved adopting a highly sceptical image of Japan and opting against the political and social emancipation of the Indonesian inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies. Taken together, this case study shows that Indonesian and Japanese histories are entangled in complex ways that go beyond simple emulation or brutal occupation.

References

Bruin, Rodney D. (1991): De Indo-Europeaan in de geschiedenis van Nederlands-Indië. In: Wim Willems (ed.): *Indische Nederlanders in de ogen van de wetenschap*. Leiden: COMT, pp. 26–51.

Coté, Joost / Loes Westerbeek (eds) (2005): *Recalling the Indies. Colonial Culture and Postcolonial Identities.* Amsterdam: Aksant.

Houben, Vincent (2009): Boundaries of Race. Representations of Indisch in Colonial Indonesia Revisited. In: Harald Fischer-Tiné / Susanne Gehrmann (eds): *Empires and Boundaries. Rethinking Race, Class and Gender in Colonial Settings.* New York / London: Routledge, pp. 66–85.

Goto, Ken'ichi (2003): Changing Japanese Perceptions of Southeast Asia. In: Paul Kratoska (ed.): *Tensions of Empire. Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World*. Athens: Ohio University Press / Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 3–23.

Locher-Scholten, Elsbeth B. (1986): European Images of Japan and Indonesian Nationalism before 1942. In: J. von Goor (ed.): *The Indonesian Revolution*. *Conference Papers Utrecht, 17-20 June, 1986*. Utrecht: Instituut voor geschiedenis der Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, pp. 9–23. (= Utrechtse Historische Cahiers 7 (2/3)).

Locher-Scholten, Elsbeth B. (ed.) (1987): *Beelden van Japan in het voorloorlogse Nederlands Indië*. Leiden: Werkgroep Europese Expansie.

Meijer, Hans (2004): *In Indië geworteld. De twintigste eeuw*. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.

Oguma, Eiji (2002): *A Genealogy of "Japanese" Self-Images*. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press.

Post, Peter (1996): Characteristics of Japanese Entrepreneurship in the Pre-War Indonesian Economy. In: J. Th. Lindblad (ed.): *Historical Foundations of a National Economy in Indonesia, 1890s–1990s*. Amsterdam: KNAW, pp. 297–314.

Touwen-Bouwsma, Elly (1997): Japanese Minority Policy. The Eurasians on Java and the Dilemma of Ethnic Loyalty. In: Peter Post / Elly Touwen-Bouwsma (eds), *Japan, Indonesia and the War*. Leiden: KITLV Press, pp. 31–50.

Saffrie, P. (1992): De Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging en Insulinde, 1914–1917. In: Wim Willems (ed.): *Sporen van een Indisch verleden 1600–1942*. Leiden: COMT, pp. 87–97.

Veur, P.W.J. van der (2006): *The Lion and the Gadfly. Dutch Colonialism and the Spirit of E.F.E. Douwes Dekker*. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Zachmann, Urs Matthias (2013): Race and International Law in Japan's New Order in East Asia, 1938–1945. In: Rotem Kowner / Walter Demel (eds): *Race and Racism in Modern East Asia: Western and Eastern Constructions*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 453–473.