

Xun, auch Mao Zedong befürwortete die Latinisierung, bevor er sich nach Gründung der VR China dagegen aussprach und sie zugunsten der unmittelbar in Angriff genommenen Vereinfachung der Schriftzeichen (1956) und der parallel verlaufenden Einführung eines lateinischen phonetischen Alphabets, des *Pīnyīn* 拼音 (1958) verwarf.

Teil V umfasst den Anhang (S. 323–379) und besteht aus einem sieben-seitigen linguistischen Glossar, der 20 Seiten umfassenden Bibliographie, einer kritischen Nachbemerkung zur deutschen Ausgabe und einem ebenfalls 20 Seiten umfassenden Index.

Alle zwölf Abbildungen zum chinesischen Schriftsystem sowie eine Karte zur linguistischen Geographie Chinas sind zwischen der Einleitung und dem ersten Teil eingeschoben, während die neun Tabellen in den Text eingestreut sind.

Erst am Ende des Buches hat der Leser das Ausmaß der Fakten und Mythen begriffen, die der Autor hier zusammengetragen und kenntnisreich behandelt hat – durch Einbeziehung der Herkunft und Geschichte, der Sackgassen und Holzwege, der Einwände und Gegenargumente, durch Vergleiche mit anderen Sprachen, Schriftsystemen und Schriftreformen. Das Buch, zuweilen humorvoll und geradezu spannend zu lesen, ist im sprachlichen Duktus bewusst offen gehalten für alle möglichen Leser, Laien wie Experten. Zwanzig Jahre nach seiner Erstveröffentlichung wird es einen postmodern geschulten Linguisten zumindest wissenschaftsgeschichtlich interessieren. Dem nicht-linguistischen Sinologen sowie allen anderen, die sich mehr wünschen als bloß oberflächliche Einblicke in die Besonderheit und Problematik der chinesischen Sprache und Schrift, deren kulturelle und politische Bedeutung, sei dieses Buch wärmstens empfohlen.

*Gudula Linck*

LIM DONG-WON, *Peacemaker. Twenty Years of Inter-Korean Relations and the North Korean Nuclear Issue. A Memoir*. Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University / Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012. 415 pages, US\$ 28.95. ISBN 978-1-931368-27-8

About 20 years ago it looked quite promising. Between 1989 and 1992 numerous high level meetings took place involving representatives from South and North Korea. Both Prime Ministers signed an “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North”. There was also a “Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”. In June 2000, the top leaders of both sides met for the first ever inter-Korean summit, a second one took place seven years later. Hundreds of meetings at various levels were held every year. More than 1.7 million tour-

ists from the South have visited a specially developed and designated area in the North; and near the border, on northern territory; a sprawling industrial complex under South Korean management employed about 53,000 workers from the North. Apart from official meetings of politicians, the military and businessmen, members of separated families also met and prisoners were released.

This was a period characterized by high hopes and expectations as well as by concrete results. Twenty-two years later relations between the South and the North are back at square one, and in the meantime the North has detonated two nuclear devices. Those who want to know what went so utterly wrong and why are strongly advised to read *Peacemaker* by Lim Dong-won. He explains the process that led to the successful meetings and also delineates misunderstandings, lost years, missed opportunities and identifies those who failed to seize such opportunities. Besides describing and evaluating, the author makes his own assessments and opinions perfectly clear.

During these critical 20 years the retired general, diplomat and former minister was involved in inner-Korean relations, serving with distinction in different positions. Despite many disappointments and alarming setbacks he remains sanguine. He discerns changes in the North: when “the people’s lives have improved and when the information and culture of the outside world are accessible, the people’s perception will change, bringing change to their society.” (p. xv) “... unification is the goal and a process at the same time. Unification is no longer an issue of the future, but something that is taking place in the present.” (p. 374)

The subtitle of the book is “A memoir by Lim Dong-won”. While the author does indeed briefly outline his life, the major part of the volume deals with political developments. Their significance, rather than a chronological arrangement, determines the structure of the book. The text is enhanced by 18 photographs, six documents and a detailed 22-page index; there are also short biographical notes on important personalities. A chronological table of events and a document of the second summit meeting (October 2007) would have been useful. We are provided with lots of information on the author’s cooperation with Kim Dae-jung, especially about conceptualizing, implementing and modifying the “Sunshine Policy” prior to and during the latter’s presidency.

We read about the inner workings of the complicated quadrangular relationship between the two Koreas, the USA and China. The book is immensely rich in detail, but never confusing; we learn a lot about negotiations, illustrated with quotes. With regard to strategies *vis-à-vis* the North, it becomes evident that in South Korea there was little coordination between ministries, within the leadership and with private economic activities (Hyundai Corporation). Lim Dong-won decrypts formal statements of leading North Koreans.

Besides official meetings there were secret contacts: between the two Koreas, the South and China, and the North and the USA. The book helps us to understand the mistrust harbored by the North and why its leadership feels

hoodwinked in respect of important matters. Accordingly, decisions by the North, often seen as provocations and ideologically motivated, become understandable once Lim Dong-won puts them in their proper context. He compares resources and changes in the radius of action of North and South Korea. Sometimes the dialogue within the South was more difficult than with the North, partly due to the influence of conservative media (newspapers). In 1992 the North came forth with concrete proposals for joint pilot projects in the realm of economics and energy generation. The refusal of the South to consider them at that time contributed to the loss of influence of “pragmatic reformers” in the North, resulting in eight years of standstill in economic cooperation.

Lim Dong-won explains why and how North Korea reacted to a changed external environment, and in so doing elucidates the emergence of the nuclear crisis in the early 1990s. North Korea wants to use the nuclear card to secure the survival of its system and to establish diplomatic and economic relations with the USA, and in particular have sanctions lifted. The USA uses this card against the North Korean system. The author explains in detail how the overall political climate between Pyongyang and Washington at any given time directly impacts North Korea’s foreign relations in general. Specific proposals by the North were ignored by both President Lee Myung-bak of the South and the George W. Bush administration. The accounts of the different attitudes towards North Korea provide lucid insights in the diverse positions within the US administration; by the same token the author criticizes faults of North Korea.

The book is superbly written and a genuinely fascinating read. Lim Dong-won was a patient, skilful and successful peacemaker, unfortunately not a pacemaker because others interfered, slowed down, meddled in or even stopped the process of normalization and cooperation. All in all, *Peacemaker* is a very important book.

Werner Pfennig

WILLIAM A. CALLAHAN / ELENA BARABANTSEVA (eds.), *China Orders the World – Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press / Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011. XVI, 280 pages, £ 28.50. ISBN 978-1-4214-0383-0

HONGYI LAI / YIYI LU (eds.), *China’s Soft Power and International Relations*. (China Policy Series, 23). London / New York: Routledge, 2011. XII, 216 pages, £ 90.00. ISBN 978-0-415-60401-7

Both books are compilations of conference papers. “China Orders The World – Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy” edited by Callahan and Barabantseva (2011) is dominated by Western writers with a focus on interpreting Chinese thinking on international politics. “China’s Soft Power and International Rela-