

hoodwinked in respect of important matters. Accordingly, decisions by the North, often seen as provocations and ideologically motivated, become understandable once Lim Dong-won puts them in their proper context. He compares resources and changes in the radius of action of North and South Korea. Sometimes the dialogue within the South was more difficult than with the North, partly due to the influence of conservative media (newspapers). In 1992 the North came forth with concrete proposals for joint pilot projects in the realm of economics and energy generation. The refusal of the South to consider them at that time contributed to the loss of influence of “pragmatic reformers” in the North, resulting in eight years of standstill in economic cooperation.

Lim Dong-won explains why and how North Korea reacted to a changed external environment, and in so doing elucidates the emergence of the nuclear crisis in the early 1990s. North Korea wants to use the nuclear card to secure the survival of its system and to establish diplomatic and economic relations with the USA, and in particular have sanctions lifted. The USA uses this card against the North Korean system. The author explains in detail how the overall political climate between Pyongyang and Washington at any given time directly impacts North Korea’s foreign relations in general. Specific proposals by the North were ignored by both President Lee Myung-bak of the South and the George W. Bush administration. The accounts of the different attitudes towards North Korea provide lucid insights in the diverse positions within the US administration; by the same token the author criticizes faults of North Korea.

The book is superbly written and a genuinely fascinating read. Lim Dong-won was a patient, skilful and successful peacemaker, unfortunately not a pacemaker because others interfered, slowed down, meddled in or even stopped the process of normalization and cooperation. All in all, *Peacemaker* is a very important book.

Werner Pfennig

WILLIAM A. CALLAHAN / ELENA BARABANTSEVA (eds.), *China Orders the World – Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press / Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011. XVI, 280 pages, £ 28.50. ISBN 978-1-4214-0383-0

HONGYI LAI / YIYI LU (eds.), *China’s Soft Power and International Relations*. (China Policy Series, 23). London / New York: Routledge, 2011. XII, 216 pages, £ 90.00. ISBN 978-0-415-60401-7

Both books are compilations of conference papers. “China Orders The World – Normative Soft Power and Foreign Policy” edited by Callahan and Barabantseva (2011) is dominated by Western writers with a focus on interpreting Chinese thinking on international politics. “China’s Soft Power and International Rela-

tions” edited by Lai and Lu (2012) contains more articles by Chinese writers (mostly based in Western countries) and concentrates on China’s policy development.

In Chapter 2 of “China Orders The World”, Zhao Tingyang juxtaposes the Western nation-state system and the ancient Chinese notion of empire (*Tianxia*). Zhao criticizes that Western democracy is a development of Western societies, and has never extended to others. He criticizes the United Nations as based on pluralism to please the developing countries and universalism to satisfy the developed countries; in this framework, conflict reduction through rational dialogue does not work, which encourages the strategic game of noncooperation (p. 31). He rejects the idea that the individual should be the starting point of political reflection, as politics deals with relations. In the next chapter, Qin Yaqing proposes a Chinese School of International Relations theory, comparing the hierarchic Confucian order with the anarchic Western order of sovereign states. Qin includes China’s experiences with colonialism and revolution, and the recent decades of Chinese economic reform, which lead beyond traditional Confucian thinking. He points out that the Western influence on China in the past 200 years has led to “severe identity anxiety” (p. 45). Drawing on the Chinese philosopher Xun Zi, Yan Xuetong reflects on the quality of political leadership; his thoughts on principled foreign relations and credibility reflect Chinese experiences since 1949. Yan presents the Vatican as far more influential than Singapore, even though it is much smaller and economically less powerful; and he contrasts it with the collapse of the Soviet Union at a time when it had significant hard power.

Callahan warns that the *Tianxia* model is very popular in China as a model of world order “in ways that go against China’s official policy of peacefully rising within the international system” (p. 92). He adds that, in the popular understanding of Chinese culture and ethnicity, the country’s national minorities need to be assimilated into Han civilization, while at the same time the overseas Chinese need to resist assimilation into their host countries. Callahan sees China’s harmonious world policy (announced in a speech by President Hu Jintao in 2005) as an example that uses the term civilization to frame international politics.

Christopher Hughes digs into some interpretations of the “China as substance, West as function” dichotomy. David Kerr discusses the relations between the Chinese government and Islam in Western China today and the historical experiences that have shaped them. He claims that China tolerates religion as individual belief, but rejects it as an ethic of a community. China’s motto of “harmony through diversity” is challenged by this interaction with Islamic traditions. A central weakness may be China’s focus on negotiating with states rather than with publics (which hints at China’s attachment to the Westphalian system). How will China reconcile civilizational harmony with its fears for its sovereignty on its Western borders? Regrettably, there is no chapter on the growing Christ-

ian community and how the Chinese government has adjusted to the spread of religion in recent decades.

Elena Barabantseva refers to Zhao Tingyang's 2005 book (*Tianxia tixi*, published in Chinese by Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe, Nanjing), in which he contrasts the traditional Chinese worldview of *Tianxia* (all under heaven) with the Western understanding of *Shijie* (world), which he calls "thin" (p. 188). She mentions that the Chinese term *Shijie* designates an ever-changing world, and the translation of cosmopolitanism is *shijie zhuyi*. In the next chapter, Sébastien Billioud quotes the Chinese Communist Party's objective to position the legal order in a higher normative order (p. 225) – a challenge shared by Western countries. "We need to stop talking about Chinese philosophy as if it were a singular coherent whole..." concludes Callahan (p. 264). My impression in reviewing the articles is that the Western criticism of *Tianxia* in this book overlooks hierarchic aspects in Western governments, and that we have a lot to gain from a deeper inter-civilizational dialogue. Another weakness of the book is an undercurrent of distrust towards China by Western writers. This contrasts with "China's Soft Power and International Relations" edited by Lai and Lu (2012), in which ample criticism of China is more specific and constructive.

Hongyi Lai ponders what an adequate definition of "soft power" would have to include, as science and technology are major factors in a country's standing. Soft and hard power are closely related and difficult to distinguish. Drawing on an international BBC poll of 2009, he concludes that the most popular countries, Germany, Canada and Japan, are all very developed and give significant amounts of foreign aid. He also notes that in this poll the US is still slightly more popular than China, despite the Iraq war. In Chapter Two, Yongnian Zheng and Chi Zhang reject the often uncritical acceptance of Western concepts by Chinese scholars, be it those of Samuel Huntington or Joseph Nye. The writers' reflections on the soft power of China indicate how difficult it is to transfer concepts to another culture, and how history plays a central role which cannot be replicated. Zheng and Zhang consider the Chinese economic model as attractive to the developing world, but they also mention the huge ecological problems.

David Scott describes how China is haunted by the Western "China threat" theory and lists the terms of public diplomacy that the Chinese leadership uses to counter this perception. China welcomes multipolarity, which works to restrain American power. In the longer term, multipolarity is interpreted as a historical trend independent of human will. Scott quotes Hu Jintao that multilateralism should be strengthened and the authority of the UN Security Council maintained, and Scott points out that China has a veto there. He quotes Odgaard and Biscop, that the unilateralism of the US is similar to that of China: both think they cannot rely on the goodwill of others for their safety and therefore are ready to act on their own and if necessary use force (p. 44).

China is very concerned that its economic rise should not alienate its neighbors, insists Dominik Mierzejewski. National reputation is considered as important as political and military power, yet being too cooperative towards the West could lead to public dissatisfaction. Mierzejewski cites Pang Zhongying that Nye's concept of soft power is not suitable for China since Chinese authorities cannot distinguish between soft and hard power; therefore Pang advocates "comprehensive power" which combines both. In the fifth chapter, Hongyi Lai presents China's cultural diplomacy, including the Confucius Institutes, founded in 2004 and the growing reach of the Chinese media, as tools to enhance the country's peaceful image, while acknowledging that China's new diplomacy will be limited by "defects in its political system" (p. 83). The chapter contains a wealth of information, such as that China hosts twice as many Indonesian students as the US. The author wonders what new cultural values China will offer to the world, as up to now its main attraction has been traditional culture.

Yiyi Lu gives an overview of China's international communication. After the 2008 Olympics the government decided to increase the reach of its media. In April 2009 the English-language *Global Times* was launched, and Arab language broadcasting was added on China Central Television (CCTV). Yet China's ability to communicate through foreign media is essential if it wants to reach an international audience. Domestically, the reluctance of bureaucrats to inform the public has been such a major problem that Premier Wen Jiabao in 2009 urged officials to take the initiative and organize a press conference to answer burning questions of the public before the government loses credibility. Lu describes the establishment of a government spokesperson system and the struggle to give these people sufficient competence to make them effective. She also mentions that few Chinese understand how Western media operate, since few have lived abroad; thus Kishore Mahbubani in Singapore is better at defending China than many Chinese experts (p. 113).

Cheng Jason Qian presents China's "harmonious diplomacy" as a new strategy and the furtherance of China's long-term diplomatic practice of peaceful coexistence. Its generosity to neighbors during the 1997 financial crisis is a noteworthy case of this. Qian calls China's new diplomacy "less confrontational, more sophisticated, more confident" (p. 123) and cites many examples. Merriden Varrall rejects the term soft power to describe China's foreign aid since 1949 and describes the changing historical circumstances in which foreign aid has been justified accordingly. In her view, leaders' responses to external challenges depend on national identity, which she calls "an unfinished project" (p. 156). Chapter Nine presents various public opinion surveys on the question "Is China rising at America's expense?" Among various interesting insights, China and the US are largely seen as positively correlated.

In the final, extremely detailed chapter, Suisheng Zhao summarizes the evolution of China's foreign policy as a rising power in the twenty-first century. He mentions the "unguarded remarks" of Xi Jinping during a 2009 visit to

Mexico, that foreign powers had eaten their fill and had nothing better to do than point fingers at China (p. 196). These remarks were subsequently deleted from Chinese media, but should be remembered and reflected upon on the international level. An unresolved academic debate with political relevance is the approach to international relations: Suisheng Zhao talks of “defensive realism” (p. 208). In order to overcome the zero-sum mentality of realism, which sees the international system as anarchic with states left to maximize their power in zero-sum mode, Varrall proposes constructivism (p. 138) to acknowledge that the current international system is under construction and the responses of leaders, and publics, to that process matter.

More than a hundred years later, the unprecedented changes that Kang Youwei predicted for China in 1897 (quoted in the article by Hughes in the volume of Callahan / Barabantseva (eds) “China Orders The World” 2011: 124) continue to unfold. Nowadays, Chinese social science and Chinese politics are evolving fast, and Western researchers and politicians will be challenged to follow these developments – expressed mainly in Chinese. The Western near monopoly on political theory will be eroded, especially as international awareness of the discrepancies between theory and political practice grows (see the article of Zhao Tingyang in: Callahan / Barabantseva (eds) 2011). The two volumes presented here provide much food for thought in many valuable articles which offer glimpses of the international challenges ahead for theory and politics.

*Sabine Grund*

ERNST LOKOWANDT, *Der Tennō. Grundlagen des modernen japanischen Kaisertums*. München: Iudicium, 2012. 164 Seiten, € 15,00. ISBN 978-3-86205-136-6

Ernst Lokowandt gilt sicherlich als der führende deutsche Experte für den Schinto und das japanische Kaiserhaus. Umso erfreulicher ist es, dass er nach seiner Emeritierung eine gründlich fundierte und gleichzeitig lesbare Einführung zur Rekonstituierung des Kaiserhauses zur Meijizeit vorgelegt hat, die gleichzeitig auch die Probleme der Moderne berührt.

Der überwiegende Teil des Bandes ist, wie im Untertitel ersichtlich, der historischen Genese des Kaiserhauses gewidmet, ohne die seine aktuellen Probleme, sein Verhalten und seine einzigartige öffentliche Rolle nicht verständlich sind. Denn trotz der von MacArthur redigierten Verfassung von 1946 ist der Tennō kein schlichter konstitutioneller Monarch nach europäischem Muster, der sich etwa wie in Skandinavien per Fahrrad durch die Innenstädte bewegen oder nach englischem Muster die Klatschseiten der einschlägigen bunten Presse nach Gusto füllen könnte. Als die einzigen Japaner sind der Kaiser und seine engste Familie von vielen demokratischen Grund- und Menschenrechten ausgeschlos-