

Contemporary Cultural Dynamics in Java*

Niels Mulder

Introduction

Most students of Javanese society are familiar with Geertz's classification of the Javanese in three religious streams, namely, *priyayi*, *santri*, and *abangan* (1960)¹. Whereas this tripartite classification has often been criticized (e.g. Koentjaraningrat 1963, Cruikshank 1972, Bachtiar 1973), the dichotomy between faithfully practising and nominal Muslims (*santri* versus *abangan*) is still considered to be valid. As a reification of social reality it guides the thinking of many scholars as if life in Java were static and not subject to change.

Nowadays there are good reasons to doubt the heuristic value of the *santri abangan* cleavage. Moreover, and this is often insufficiently appreciated, all Javanese, whatever their degree of Islamization, share in Javanese culture. That culture is not necessarily religiously expressed and contains a common vision of man, society, and the ethical conduct of life. In the first part of this article it will be described how the two mainstreams in Javanese culture seem to converge at present, at least as it appears at the level of the urban educated middle class.

The religious cleavage that was elaborated in Geertz's *The Religion of Java* seems to belong to a former structure of society that has vanished rapidly over the past twenty years. The ensuing changes in social relationships are expressed by a new weighting of the concepts of *rukun* and *laras* that serve to evaluate everyday experience. These changes are analyzed in the second part of this article.

The purpose of the article is therefore to amend some tenacious conceptualizing about Javanese society. This will be done by presenting a summary analysis of two cultural processes in order to indicate trends that can only be elaborated in book

* The point of view taken in this paper is from the town of Yogyakarta; most of the informants belonged to the educated middle class. This makes the interpretations special but hopefully also exemplary of trends, while providing a standard to measure developments elsewhere in Java.

1 For Javanese and Indonesian words that are not immediately explained, see Glossary.

length studies (Mulder 1988). Much of the data material was gathered during interviews with members of the educated middle class in the Central Javanese city of Yogyakarta against the backgrounds of my earlier research (Mulder 1980) and the observations, literary and journalistic inputs that three recent field stages yielded.

1. *Kejawèn*, Islam, and modernity

The deep and very pervasive substratum of Javanese culture is often called *kejawèn*, translated as Javanese-ness or even Javanism. The suffix -ism is felicitous because it suggests that *kejawèn* is a teaching and a praxis. As a philosophy of life, as a *Weltanschauung* it is complete in itself and remarkably consistent, containing a theology, a cosmology, a mythology, a metaphysics, and an anthropology. Although these elements have been elaborated in a variety of ways, they inspire a widely shared Javanese world view that, as a system of thought about social relationships, informs the ethics and common sense that legitimate the conduct of everyday life.

Before elaborating some cardinal characteristics of Javanism it should be made emphatically clear that Javanism is *not* a religion, although it may give rise to certain religious practices. Theologically it recognizes a Divine Principle (*ke-Tuhanan*) rather than a "personalized" or transcendent God. This Divine Principle, often referred to as Life (*Urip*), encompasses and pervades all existence; it constitutes its origin and destiny.

Cosmologically seen all belongs together, not in a haphazard way, but as a coordinated whole that is subject to preordination rather than volition. This preordination is known as the *ukum pinesthi* or *kodrat alam*, that is, the principle of necessity. The outcome of preordination, *kebeneran*, translates as truth, manifestation, and co-incidence. This cosmology is often illustrated by the *wayang purwa*, mythology that contains the Javanese elaboration of the Mahabharata cycle with the Bhagavad Gita at its core.

Anthropologically, man is part of it all, but in a special way. First of all he can choose, he has a will, and his choices may be uneducated (stupid or emotional or immoral) or educated (wise or conscious or moral). Secondly, man is considered to consist of two parts, a phenomenal (*lair*) and an inner (*batin*); to the phenomenal part belong the five senses and the capacity for rational thought; the inner part is secretive, constituting the line to his origin and containing a spark of Life Itself; to it belongs the sixth sense, the intuitive inner feeling (*rasa*) that is the instrument for deep insight and revelation.

At the level of the world view, social relationships should, like cosmic relationships, be well-ordered and coordinated. In the Javanese view of society such rela-

tionships are hierarchically organized, people being the occupants of certain status positions that relate to each other in morally unequal ways. Cosmologically seen the order of society is part of the total cosmic order.

From these considerations follows the *kejawèn* ethic, such as the imperative to seek *budaya*, that is, knowledge and wisdom. Because of that one will know one's place in the social order and in the order of Life; one will also know the task and the ethic that belong to one's place. One should live attuned to both orders. In one's phenomenal, *lair* existence one should respect the order of society, honour one's elders and superiors and be considerate of inferiors by measuring at oneself (*tepa slira*). One should care for harmonious relationships, at least outwardly so, and avoid all open conflict. To be able to do this one should not only have knowledge but be able to master oneself, one's drives and emotions, and cultivate and strengthen one's mind or inner self (*batin*).

In its widest sense this cultivation of the mind or inner self is known as *kebatinan*, or as *olah rasa*, which means the training of the inner feeling. A strong *batin* enables one not to be disturbed by whatever happens in the *lair* world, to be patient and wait for the right moment to act; it also enables one to accept life as it comes and to adjust oneself to it. It is also a training in sensing and feeling, to know when the right moment to act has arrived, to feel oneself attuned to cosmic happenings, to seek to be in step with the Divine Principle, or Life, and eventually to mystically seek unity with one's origin and destiny and to realize the Truth in oneself. It is only in this last, mystical sense that *kebatinan* has clear religious overtones, in all other senses it rather being the epitome of the *kejawèn* way to wisdom and an ethical life.

Whatever the case, to live attuned to whatever is greater than oneself, be it the order of society or cosmos, cannot be but moral and wise. The disturbance of that order is immoral and stupid. Since society is part of the total order, respect for its order may already signify respect for the order of Life and a way of honouring "God"². One's moral task is to fulfill one's life and position in the world and eschatological expectations are only weakly developed. Life is essentially in the here-and-now.

The *kejawèn* stress on *kebatinan* leads to a strong self-centredness. In one's *batin* one is important; the reality of society, its rules and sufferings should be accepted, but the real truth is contained in oneself. One's moral and ethical task is to cultivate the mind, seek wisdom, and fulfill one's place in a universe of unequal positions. Harmonious relationships with others guarantee an undisturbed *batin*/inner life while at the same time conflict avoidance, self-centredness, and self-fulfilment

2 In quotation marks "God" refers to the more immanent *kejawèn* concept; without, God refers to the more transcendent Middle Eastern idea.

foster a great measure of tolerance vis-à-vis other persons. In one's *batin* everybody is potentially free in a restrictive, well-ordered society.

People who cultivate their *batin* by way of ascetical exercises may do so for all kinds of secular purposes, such as solicitude (*prihatin*) about one's immediate course of life or the future of one's children. It is an expression of taking life seriously, of taking care. Some people practise *kebatinan* for a religious purpose, such as mysticism. Because there is no dividing line between the secular and the sacred in *kejawèn* thinking it is hard to say whether the *kejawèn* way of life is in itself an expression of *agami jawi*, that is, Javanese religion³. So much is certain, the *kejawèn Weltanschauung* fosters a religious attitude toward life, syncretism, and self-centredness while it devalues expectations about an after-life, institutionalized religion, and the fulfilment of its religious obligations.

At first sight an observer is struck by the vast differences between *kejawèn* and orthodox Middle Eastern religious conceptualization. In the latter thinking the centre of the universe is God and the course of history is His Volition; man is a mere creature who should live attuned and subjected to the will of God, if not, he is damned and incapable of a just life. In other words, a transcendent God is the measure of all things and man a mere servant, a slave who derives satisfaction and legitimation from following the rules and religious obligations set by God. Consequently man wants to discover and know God's will: hence the importance of the Koran, the Hadith, the Shari'a, and the religious scholars (*ulama; kiai*) who interpret and hand down the rules to go by.

Yet it is warranted to take a second look. Like in any place coming into contact with a high or universal religion, also Islam in Java was moulded into a Javanese image. Moreover, the Islam that reached Java had travelled a long way and taken on the mystical and esoteric traits of Sufism that fitted in well with Javanese thinking and religiosity. After all, a basically syncretist and tolerant mentality is a good receiving ground for new religious inputs. Gradually Islam could establish itself even at the *kejawèn* courts of the Javanese rulers who appropriated some of its paraphernalia (Koentjaraningrat 1980: 129-132) until nowadays almost all Javanese will acknowledge themselves as Muslims while blending Islamic thought and practice with older Javanese elements.

In recent history a typically cultural conflict emerged, first as an inner Islamic struggle, then gradually also along the line of *abangan* versus pious *putihan* ("sant-

3 If Javanese religion can be defined by its practices, I suggest that the observance of the *slametan* rituals, the paying of respect and prayer to deceased parents (also rulers and religious personalities) at their graves, and periodical offerings (*sesajen*) to spirits, may be considered as defining characteristics.

ri”) Islam, finally culminating in the political power struggle that marked the period from the preparation for Independence to the fall of Sukarno (roughly 1945-1966). This cultural conflict dates back to the late 19th century when the influence of orthodox and reformist Islam made itself felt in Indonesia. This influence caused and stimulated conscientization and emancipation movements among Javanese Muslims. In other words, a (religious) “way of life” began to be questioned and conscious choices needed to be made to establish a self-assured identity. In that conscientization process discussions developed about a Javanese versus an Arabian way of doing things, a traditional (*kolot*) versus a modern practice, Muslim reformism versus traditionalism, secular (colonial or national) state versus a Muslim society, and finally about the life styles and practices of committed versus non-committed Muslims.

This quest for identity also led to setting apart those who practise their religion faithfully (*putihan; santri*) from those who are not interested in the formal practice of religion (*abangan*). This cultural cleavage became aggravated when it acquired political dimensions, giving rise to disparate cultural communities, intolerance, and intensive ideological struggle. It was at that time that Clifford Geertz did the research for his monumental *The Religion of Java*.

For many years now the New Order government has been trying to defuse the conflict, first by a rather effective policy of depoliticization of the religious issue while supporting (national) policies of interreligious tolerance, by making religious (Islamic) education compulsory in all schools, by building religious, infrastructure (institutes for higher Islamic education, mosques, prayer houses), and by fostering a unifying national Pancasila ideology that transcends the religious diversity. These policies seem to have been remarkably successful.

At the same time the divergent Islamic communities have entered the modern world. If self-proclaimed righteousness once legitimized their isolation (and reputation for backwardness), now they have become emancipated in terms of modern education, leaving the *kolot* image behind while opening themselves up to the life of the nation (rather than orienting themselves almost exclusively toward Mecca), and by developing an openness and tolerance for others.

The combination of government policy and emancipation is resulting in a rapid acceptance of Islam by people who would not willingly identify with it some fifteen or twenty years ago when the *santri abangan* conflict was still in the open and an emotional issue. Especially among the educated middle class, acceptance of Islam is spreading rapidly now, first of all because it no longer implies a political choice, secondly because of the emancipation of large segments of the Islamic community, and thirdly because of the religious instruction their children receive in school.

Among these people there is a trend away from Javanism, especially from its hierarchical orientation, from its rituals and esoterism, and the practice of mysticism. To them the offer of congregational religions (especially Islam, but also Catholicism and Protestantism) seems timely and attractive in providing an identity and a hold in life. Whereas the practice of mysticism is an individual endeavour that is time-consuming and self-centred, the congregational Middle Eastern religions seem to offer a truth that is independent of the self, a book as revelation, and a theology that is reasoned and systematic, which is all very similar to university learning and eminently modern. In their modern lives there is less room for mystical speculation and more interest in organized religion.

Congregationalism may also attract members of the lower classes to join in Islamic practice. Often dispossessed and almost excluded from community life, their belonging to a moral community may boost their identity feelings and self-respect. Among the same classes, however, a new and strong interest in the coarser expressions of Javanese mysticism, such as magic, healing and invulnerability cults, have been noted. It may also be expected that the religious banner will still often be raised for basically political protest, especially in a time of declining economic opportunity and feelings of powerlessness and oppression.

On the whole, I expect a weakening of both the *kejawèn* tradition and Islamic isolationism, and thus a weakening of the opposed cultural identities. Both ways of life essentially belong to a past period, namely, the order of the Sultanates with its dominant *kejawèn* tradition. That order was the order of a politically stratified (two) class society in which commoners (and Muslims) were expected to accept the social hierarchy and their lowly place in it. That society has vanished. Now education has emancipated the commoners while giving rise to a mixed, educated middle class that is giving shape to a new Javanese-Indonesian culture. Consequently the *abangan putihan* opposition will no longer be the line along which conflicts are expressed, and so it should be. After all, *abangan* and *putihan*, although contrasting, belong together such as the red and white of the *sang Merah Putih*, that is, the noble Red White Indonesian flag.

2. The dynamics of value change

Background

The core institution of Javanese culture is the nuclear family. There the child is given the basic samples of order and taught how to behave. It learns the most basic of all values, namely, good order, and a whole set of behavioural strategies to maintain it.

Good order consists of a system of hierarchically ordered relationships among unequal moral positions, each of which holds its own set of prerogatives and obligations.

The system of relationships should be *laras*, that is, harmonious, which occurs when everybody knows his position, is careful in respecting the position of others, and faithful in his duties. Patience, humbleness, acceptance, politeness, avoidance, and withdrawal all help to keep it that way but, since friction is unavoidable in human relationships and avoidance and withdrawal impractical in family life, one is taught the value of *rukun*, of glossing over differences, of compromising, of living in friendship, of the willingness to reconcile. One could say that *rukun* is the way to harmonious community among people who are near to each other, not necessarily intimate, but close enough to have to live with each other.

These family-centred values served as samples for the conduct of life in wider society, that is, for life in one's immediate community with its emphasis on the value of *rukun*, *rukun* being necessary to survive and live together, to share, borrow, lend, etc., in other words, to grease the system of mutual obligations and working relationships.

The hierarchical dimension governed especially one's relationships with society beyond one's community, with unknown persons, with government and its functionaries, and all persons of rank and entitled to honour. That hierarchical order outside was not strange or vague, on the contrary, as the order of the Sultanate it was fully legitimate, accepted, and known. In the olden days that order even acquired sacred dimensions and like in the family, emphasis was placed on the faithful and selfless fulfilment of the duty corresponding to one's position in order to make the world a beautifully ordered place (*sepi ing pamrih, ramé ing gawé; mamayu hayuning buwana*).

Dynamics

Meanwhile it appears that the order of life is changing. Society has expanded and so have individual horizons. The encompassing hierarchical orders of the Sultanates have disappeared into thin air. Good knowledge of the intricate levels of the Javanese language is not taught any more and it has to compete with the national, more egalitarian language of school education, namely, Indonesian. The classics of Javanese culture, especially its *kejawèn* heritage, are threatened by the indifference and ignorance of a young generation that is oriented to the world outside and an eager consumer of Indonesian and imported mass cultural goods.

Formal education and expanding systems of communication have instituted

great opportunities for social and geographical mobility, have increased the distance between home and work, and replaced communal social control by anonymous living. Economic opportunities have diversified society, giving rise to a very small class of very rich and often politically influential people, a very sizeable middle class with considerable purchasing-power, both in towns and in the countryside, and a very vast mass of poor and very poor people who are left behind by the processes of development and who suffer from modernization. While many other relevant changes influence the cultural process, the above-mentioned will suffice to see what is happening to the system of social relationships, especially as articulated by the hierarchy, *rukun*, and *laras* values.

To begin with the macro-order of society, we may note that it is no longer limited to one's cultural horizon. Where formerly the area of social participation roughly coincided with the area of cultural intimacy (for instance, a *pesantrèn* education preparing for life in the local *ummat*, or one's *kejawèn* ideas being a good guide for life in the Sultanates), we find now a vague Indonesian order of society centring on far away Jakarta. That new order cuts across ethnic and cultural lines, uses a new language, and prepares children in school for a life in that wide and still ill-defined order.

It is not only by way of schools that Indonesia penetrates into the life world of its subjects ("citizens"?). Also government and administration descend from Jakarta to regulate their lives, to tell what is good and what is reprehensible, to propagate its Pancasila state ideology, and with the powerful instruments of state they try to force society into the image of their policies. Although the Indonesian Order still remains culturally distant and vague, it is definitely powerful and people have to reckon with its existence. That powerful order lacks the charismatic, sacred legitimation of the old Sultanates and does not constitute a well-ordered place where one has a clear idea of duty and obligation.

On the contrary, the vague social order of Indonesia constitutes a field of opportunity and mobility, for the rich and for the poor. Concurrent with its economic development and increase in the circulation of money, social relationships tend to be monetarized and social positions commercialized. Its status symbols are consumeristic, mass cultural, and alien to local ethnic traditions. If one wants to get on in life, one should act in that field.

The contradiction of the Indonesian field of opportunity and mobility is that it hardly promotes participation in nation building. Governmental and administrative practice is from the top down, political participation is discouraged, elections are mere legitimation-rituals, the population is expected to be depoliticized between elections (floating mass doctrine), social criticism is a dangerous activity, and culturally only few things are offered to identify with, such as Indonesian movies, In-

donesian *pop* and *dangdut* music, comic strips, and heavily censored newspapers.

All this makes for indifference that is only countered by the generally poor teaching of national history at school, the boring slogans of the "generation of '45", and nowadays the Pancasila courses. Interestingly these latter courses emphasize trust in the government and obedience to its authority (= to know and fulfill one's place) for the well-being and development of the nation, while recognizing that the prosperity of the whole sprouts from the inner order, or the strong and developed *batin* of the individuals that compose it.

It is of interest to note that this political cum ethical notion of good citizenship, with its loci in the inner order of the individual and the obedience to the state, is very *kejawèn* and contained in virtually all *kebatinan* teachings. After all, the Javanese cultural locus is the inner order of the individual, the fulfilment of social obligation merely being instrumental to its well-being and development.

This corresponds with Nakamura's analysis of the Muhammadiyah (modern Muslim) ideology. According to him that ideology is a doctrine for individual conduct based on Islam, that is, an ethical theory for individuals that lacks specific programmes for social reform or a political strategy to achieve them. An ideal society is a society in which everybody is a good Muslim and behaves as such (1983: final ch.). This thinking expresses the view that society is a mere aggregate of individuals and is asociological. Yet it appears to have deep cultural roots and it may be expected that it will reinforce the *kejawèn* conceptual bifurcation of life in an inner individual and an outer social realm; as such it may impede any whole-hearted participation in national processes, even if that would be appreciated by the authorities.

We may therefore conclude that the extension of hierarchy up to Jakarta has weakened its acceptance and legitimation, yet also that it may powerfully intervene in one's social and individual life. Hierarchy seems to belong to a vague order that is far from *laras*. The attractions of that order are opportunistic and consumeristic, while its vagueness and compulsion may stimulate self-centredness in its negative and in its positive *kejawèn* connotations; it may also stimulate a resurgence of ethnic-cultural identity and participation in religious life.

Focussing on community life, it must be noted that geographically circumscribed ties have become far less compelling than they once were. For many people the relevant sources of income and association are outside their community of residence, and especially those who have money, are now free to chose whether they want to be connected or not. For instance, formerly, if one wanted to have a job done, one was expected to ask a neighbour or a poor relative to help. That help, or favour, was expected to be returned at some time in the future and people were tied to each other by innumerable dyadic ties of give-and-take.

Nowadays, however, people who have the money will often prefer to hire and pay for labour or the things they need, freeing themselves that way from the network of mutual obligations. The same mechanism also frees the poor who find it more difficult now to create obligations to them on the part of the better off and who become more isolated from communal life in their locations. In their struggle for survival they become more dependent on each other or on migration to the big city (Sullivan 1980).

Of course, the ethic of neighbourly life still is *rukun* but substantially its significance does not amount to much any more. Communal *slametan* have become seldom, most celebrations and activities now centring around Independence Day. One is still expected to show interest on the occasion of a death in the neighbourhood but the compulsion of neighbourly relationships is a thing of the past. People greet each other; avoid open conflict, while being preoccupied by the world outside or by the exigencies of family life.

Whether the family is still the training ground it once was for life in the social order is debatable. The orders outside and inside are far from congruent these days and the vagueness outside may even be compensated for by tighter and more intimate relationships on the inside, since neither community nor wider society appear to be "natural" extensions of the family any more.

Life in the modern nuclear family is different from yesterday. Its inner hierarchy receives far less emphasis, which is often expressed by the choice of language in which children address their parents. Was it formerly the rule to address elders in *krama*, there is now a strong tendency to use *gnoko*, even with fathers, or to speak Indonesian. This corresponds with the expressed desire of fathers to abandon their formerly almost ritual position and to come closer to the other members of the family, to share in intimacy and warmth.

Children are much freer vis-à-vis their parents these days and more subjected to the discipline of formal education. Moreover, that school education clearly places a number of other authority figures in competition with the knowledge and the respect position of parents. Another trend is the growing consciousness of parents that they are not automatically entitled to respect because of their exalted position, but that they have to earn their children's respect by attempting to see life from the latter's perspective too.

The modern family tends to be less authoritarian, to devalue hierarchical position and ritual relationships, and to emphasize mutual understanding and communication, intimacy and trust (Hardjowirogo 1980). It is the most solid source of identity formation in a world that is increasingly vague and morally less compelling, yet it may be expected that the integrity of family life will need to be defended against the greater freedom of movement of the young, school wisdom, and the fascination

with the gadgets of consumerism. All these latter are a fertile ground to stimulate a youth counter-culture, generation conflict, and the puberty protest so familiar in Western societies. Whether the tendency toward *rukun* is strong enough to counter these inputs of modernity may be expected but it remains to be seen. The emphasis on order for its own sake seems to be disappearing, however.

Another trend that appears clearly is the tendency of strengthening the bonds of blood relationships. This should not only be understood as a predictable reaction against the increasing looseness and insecurity of ties in the world outside, but also as an attempt to keep and defend what one has. Especially among upwardly mobile middle class families a trend has been noted to formalize family relationships by organizing themselves into *trah* that trace common descent from an apical ancestor. Was this formerly a means by which nobility safeguarded the exclusiveness of their descent, it now has, among commoners at least, little to do with the impeccability of a pedigree and more with creating and defending an exclusive opportunity structure for its members (Sairin 1982).

References

- Bachtiar, H. W., "The Religion of Java: A Commentary". *Madjalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia* V: 85-115 (1973).
- Cruikshank, R. B., "Santri and Abangan. A Critique". *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* III/1: 39-43 (1972).
- Geertz, C., *The Religion of Java*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press 1960.
- Hardjowirogo, M., *Adat-istiadat Jawa*. Bandung: Patma 1980.
- Koentjaraningrat, Tindjauan Buku: "The Religion of Java" oleh Clifford Geertz. *Madjalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia* I: 188-91 (1963).
- Koentjaraningrat, "Javanese Terms for God and Supernatural Beings and the Idea of Power". In: R. Scheffold et al. (ed.), *Man, Meaning and History*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1980.
- Mulder, N., *Mysticism and Everyday Life in Contemporary Java*. Singapore: Singapore University Press 1980.
- Mulder, N., *Individual and Society in Java*. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press 1988. (*Individuum und Gesellschaft in Java*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, forthcoming).
- Nakamura, M., *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree*. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press 1983.
- Sairin, S., *Javanese Trah: Kin-Based Social Organization*. Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press 1982.
- Sullivan, J., *Back Alley Neighbourhood*. Clayton, Vic.: Monash University, Monash Papers 18, 1980.

Glossary

<i>abangan</i> (Jav.)	– nominal Muslim practising Javanese rituals of mixed Javanese, Hindu-Buddhist, and Islamic origin; a person who does not care for the practices and obligations of institutionalized Islam. Lit. “a red one”.
<i>krama</i>	– polite Javanese, spoken by inferior addressing superior.
<i>laras</i>	– social harmony, -equilibrium, -smoothness; well-ordered.
<i>merah</i> (Indon.)	– red
<i>ngoko</i>	– ordinary Javanese, spoken by superior addressing inferior and among intimates.
<i>pesantren</i>	– Islamic boarding school.
<i>priyayi</i>	– member of the class of administrators, civil servant; somebody rather highly educated.
<i>putihan</i>	– pious Muslim (<i>santri</i>); possibly called <i>putihan</i> because of the white prayer clothing. Lit. “a white one”.
<i>rukun</i>	– communal harmony.
<i>santri</i>	– pious Muslim (<i>putihan</i>).
<i>sepi ing pamrih</i>	– unselfish
<i>sepi rame ing gawe</i>	– working hard
<i>sepi mamayu hayuning buwana</i>	– adorning the world.
<i>slametan</i>	– communal religious meal with prayer for blessing and well-being.
<i>trah</i>	– descent group tracing common pedigree.
<i>umat</i>	– the Islamic community.
<i>wayang purwa</i>	– classical theatre performance.