

Korea as a Factor in Indo-Soviet Relations, 1947-50

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While the impact of the Korean War, which broke out as a result of North Korea's invasion of the South in June 1950, on Indo-American, and to some extent on Indo-Soviet, relations has been discussed by several writers, there has been very little attention paid to the fact that India's stand on the Korean question in the earlier period played a major role in determining Moscow's view of India's independence and its foreign policy. While after June 1950, New Delhi's stand on the Korean developments drew some warm applause from Russia, in the earlier period New Delhi's support to the U.S. position on Korean unification only led to disillusionment in Moscow. This paper will analyse India's position on the Korean question in the pre-1950 period, and will seek to determine the impact it had on the course of Soviet-Indian relations.

The Problem of Korean Unification and India's Stand at the United Nations in 1947

Korea emerged from the Second World War with the northern portion (north of the 38th parallel) occupied by Soviet troops and the southern half by the U.S. Army. Even if the wartime co-operation between Washington and Moscow had continued in the postwar period, it would have been difficult for the two sides to agree to some joint steps for its unification; with the outbreak of the Cold War, however, this was an almost impossible task. It was no surprise, therefore, that the Joint Commission appointed under the Moscow Agreement of 1945 with the objective of bringing about a unified, independent Korea failed to achieve anything. In the meantime, Moscow went about establishing a Communist regime in North Korea. In the South, a non-Communist if not democratic, regime was gradually coming into existence. The U.S. did make some proposals toward the country's reunification in the first half of 1947, but Moscow found them quite unacceptable.¹

1 Texts of these diplomatic exchanges are included in *Documents on International Affairs, 1947-1948* (London, 1952), pp. 680-96.

The United States now decided to turn to the United Nations, where at the 1947 session of the General Assembly it submitted a resolution recommending that "the occupying Powers hold elections not later than 31 March 1948", and that an assembly and a national government be established soon after the elections.² It also proposed the establishment of a United Nations Temporary Commission to facilitate and expedite the implementation of the provisions of the resolution, which included the withdrawal of the occupying forces after the establishment of a national government. A Soviet resolution, however, proposed to the U.S. Government "the simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from southern and northern Korea respectively at the beginning of 1948, thereby leaving to the Korean people itself the establishment of a national government of Korea."³

India's approach to the problem of Korea's reunification was determined by its concern with the threat of Communist expansion in Asia,⁴ as well as by the fact that it had just gone through the agony of partition and wished to avoid a similar outcome elsewhere. These two considerations brought her close to the American objective of realizing a unified, non-Communist Korea. From the very beginning, therefore, the Indian delegate, B. R. Sen, criticized the Soviet approach as one that would delay the achievement of Korea's independence.⁵ On another occasion, Sen said that the Soviet resolution would "lead only to confusion, since there was no Korean Government which could take over the administration of the country."⁶ Replying to the Ukrainian delegate D. Z. Manuilsky's statement that "It was impossible to hold free elections ... in the presence of foreign troops and under the fictitious control of a United Nations commission"⁷, the Indian delegate said,

The argument of the U.S.S.R. that the presence of foreign troops would be a hindrance to the holding of free elections in Korea, to say the least, was in contradiction with the

2 U.N., General Assembly, *Official Records*, Second Session, Political Committee, Annex 16b, doc. A/C.1/128, 17 October 1947, p. 604.

3 *Ibid.*, Annex 16g, doc. A/C.1/232, 29 October 1947, p. 607.

4 For example, India's first ambassador to the U.S., Asaf Ali, in his conversation with U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall in February 1947 talked of danger from "the great northern neighbor which now casts its shadow over two continents, Asia and Africa" (Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, 26 February 1947, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1947, Washington, D. C., 1972, 3: 148). Hereafter cited as *FRUS*.

5 U.N., General Assembly, *Official Records*, Second Session, Political Committee, 90th meeting, 30 October 1947, p. 269.

6 *Ibid.*, 91st meeting, 30 October 1947, p. 285.

7 *Ibid.*, 92nd meeting, 4 November 1947, p. 292.

assertion that free and unanimous elections had taken place in Northern Korea while U.S.S.R. troops were present.⁸

This was quite a bitter attack on Manuilsky, one which he was not likely to forget. India not only criticized the Soviet resolution but also expressed her support for the American resolution, with some suggested changes. The Indian delegate proposed, among other things, that "the election should be held on the basis of adult suffrage ... and by secret ballot."⁹ In an amendment to the original U.S. resolution, India also proposed that the elections should be held under the supervision of the U.N. Commission and not conducted by the occupying powers as provided in the resolution.¹⁰ These suggestions were included in the revised U.S. draft,¹¹ which was later approved by the Political Committee.¹² At the suggestion of the U.S., India was also named as one of the members on the proposed commission.¹³ In the General Assembly, therefore, India voted in favor of the revised U.S. draft and against the Soviet resolution.¹⁴

Speaking for the Soviet Union, A. A. Gromyko said the proposed commission would only work as "a screen concealing the unilateral activities which are in fact being carried on by the United States of America in South Korea and which ... are designed to convert Korea into an American colony ..."¹⁵ Thus in Soviet eyes, India, by being a member of the commission, would actually be serving U.S. interests. Gromyko refused to participate in the voting on the American resolution.¹⁶

Manuilsky, whose statement was earlier criticized by the Indian delegate in the Political Committee, now said that he would "like to say a few words to our Indian friends." Reminding India of the support the U.S.S.R. had provided to New Delhi on the treatment of Indians in South Africa,¹⁷ he said,

8 Ibid., p. 302.

9 Ibid., 91st meeting, 30 October 1947, p. 285.

10 Ibid., Annex 161, doc. A/C.1/237, 4 November 1947, p. 609.

11 Ibid., Annex 16c, doc. A/C.1/218 Rev. 1, pp. 605-6.

12 Ibid., 94th meeting, 5 November 1947, p. 307.

13 Ibid., p. 306.

14 U.N., General Assembly, *Official Records*, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, 112th meeting, 14 November 1947, p. 858.

15 Ibid., 111th meeting, 13 November 1947, p. 829.

16 Ibid., p. 832.

17 For Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov's eloquent support on India's position on South Africa during the 1946 session of the U.N. General Assembly, see U.N., General Assembly, *Official Records*, Second Part, First Session, Plenary Meetings, 42nd meeting, 29 October 1946, p. 834.

We deeply sympathize with the delegation of India in its fight against the South African policy of racial discrimination. We consider that the Indian delegate is defending an absolutely just cause which we, basing ourselves upon consideration of principles, will support in the Political and Security Committee today. We have the right, however, to ask this of the delegate of India: Are you not weakening your position in view of the treatment of the native population and the Indians by the Union of South Africa? In the circumstances, how can you justify your support of this resolution without contradicting yourself? ¹⁸

Manuilsky ended his long statement with an ominous warning: "By casting your vote in favor of the Korean Commission, you will create a new hotbed of discord, which will be fraught with grave consequences. Remember that."¹⁹

India's Role in the U.N. Commission

Despite the Soviet opposition, the U.N. Temporary Commission, with the mandate of supervising elections and bringing about the formation of a National Government, flew to Korea in January 1948. It was led by K. P. S. Menon, a senior official in Indian foreign ministry. It was accorded what Menon described as "an unforgettable reception,"²⁰ but one in which there was not a single Communist leader present.²¹

Menon put emphasis on the preservation of Korea's unity from the very beginning. In his first statement after arriving in Korea, he said,

The thirty-eighth parallel was not meant to divide Korea forever. It was considered to be a military necessity though, in fact, that necessity never arose. Yet this minor military expedient has so far continued to be a major political obstacle in the way of the unification of Korea.²²

On January 15, in a public address in the Seoul Stadium, Menon said, "Whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder."²³ He spoke in the same vein in a

18 U.N., General Assembly, *Official Records*, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, 112th meeting, 14 November 1947, p. 853.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 858.

20 K. P. S. Menon, *Many Worlds; An Autobiography* (London, 1965), p. 252.

21 *New York Times*, 15 January 1948, p. 13.

22 "Koreans Greet U.N. Commission; Hear Indian Make Plea for Unity," *ibid.*

23 Menon, *Many Worlds*, p. 254.

broadcast on January 21, this time eliciting much praise from General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the U.S. forces in Korea.²⁴ He later wrote, "Korea was indivisible, whether one looked at the problem from an economic, political or historical point of view. Deep down in the heart of every Korean, whether in the North or the South, was this longing for unity."²⁵ But the Soviets could hardly be expected to look at this problem solely on the basis of these considerations. Having established a foothold in North Korea, Moscow was not prepared to let it come under any government in the South which it knew would be under U.S. influence. Therefore it was not interested in the kind of unity for which Menon and other members of the commission were working.

In an effort to establish contact with the Soviet authorities in the North, Menon sent a letter to Lieutenant General G. P. Korotkov, Commanding General of the Soviet forces in Korea, on January 16. In his letter Menon said that he was seeking a meeting with the Soviet general "to exchange appropriate courtesies."²⁶ Korotkov did not reply to Menon's letter; instead Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko informed the U.N. Secretary-General:

... we find it necessary to remind you of the negative attitude taken by the Soviet Government toward the establishment of the United Nations Commission on Korea as already stated by the Soviet delegation during the second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.²⁷

A similar reply was also sent to the U.N. Secretary-General by the Ukrainian delegation.²⁸ Still retaining some hope that the Soviets might not be so inflexible, the commission sent three envelopes on January 23 addressed to General Korotkov and two to General Kim Il Sung, Chairman of the People's Committee of North Korea, containing copies of Menon's public speech in Seoul on January 14, his broadcast on January 21, and press announcements and discussions with Korean personalities.²⁹ But despite the efforts made by the American liaison officer stationed in Pyongyang to deliver these letters on January 30, January 31, February 1, February

24 Joseph Jacobs (U.S. political adviser in Korea) to the Secretary of State, 24 January 1948, *FRUS, 1948* (Washington, D. C., 1974), 6: 1085.

25 Menon, *Many Worlds*, p. 254.

26 U.N., General Assembly, *Official Records*, Third Session, Supplement No.9 (A/575 Add.1), First Part of the Report of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, vol. 2, Annexes I-VIII, p. 6.

27 *Ibid.*

28 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

29 *Ibid.*

2, and again on February 3, the Soviet authorities still refused to accept them. The commission was finally informed by the U.S. military authorities that the Soviets "would neither sign for nor accept the letters ..."³⁰

After being rebuffed by the Soviets, the commission decided to concentrate on studying the situation in South Korea.³¹ The commission also continued to stress the theme of unification, an effort which, according to Menon, began to have some effect across the 38th parallel. Menon describes the reaction of the North:

... The Government of North Korea therefore began to abuse the Commission in choice language, as "hirelings of the American dollar", "puppets consisting of henchmen of American imperialists, bent on converting Korea into an American colony" and "brokers who want to fatten the pocket of the United States of America, as well as their own, by selling under false pretences, the small nations of the world, including Korea."³²

The commission was therefore unsuccessful in establishing any contacts with the North. There was no other course left to it but to report to the Interim Committee of the General Assembly to seek its advice for further action. Since the Soviets had opposed the setting up of the committee in the preceding year, from their viewpoint, as Peter Calvocoressi has put, "an illegal commission was [now] seeking instructions from an illegal committee."³³

The extent to which official Indian policy regarding Korea followed the American line is evident from the difference in viewpoints apparent at Lake Success between Menon, the Indian Chairman of the U.N. Commission, and P. P. Pillai, at this time India's Permanent Representative at the United Nations.

Although Menon's initial statements had been welcomed by U.S. authorities in Korea, he was criticized by them when he did not favor Washington's desire to hold elections only in South Korea and establish a separate government in Seoul. Joseph Jacobs, the U.S. political adviser, called him a member of the "British bloc" or "anti-American bloc."³⁴ Under Menon's direction – and supported by the Canadian, Australian, and Syrian delegates – the commission decided by a vote of 5 to 3 against holding elections only in the South.³⁵ Later, presenting the commission's report to

30 Ibid., pp. 7-8.

31 Menon, *Many Worlds*, p. 253.

32 Ibid., p. 256.

33 *Survey of International Affairs, 1947-1948* (London, 1952), p. 318.

34 Jacobs to the Secretary of State, 12 February 1948, *FRUS, 1948* (Washington D.C., 1974), 6: 1107.

35 Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to the Secretary of State, 14 February 1948, *ibid.*, p. 111.

the Interim Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, he spoke forcefully of the need of preserving Korea's unity. He also warned the committee that if the unity of Korea was not restored and if two states were allowed to come into existence in Korea, they were bound to come into collision with each other.³⁶

Despite Menon's statement, the U.S. decided to proceed with the holding of elections in the southern part of Korea and thereby to establish a pro-Western government there. When Menon informed the U.S. that the Indian delegation at the U.N. had asked for instructions from New Delhi and had been told by the Indian government not to support the U.S. move,³⁷ Secretary of State George Marshall decided to approach New Delhi directly. He instructed U.S. ambassador Loy Henderson to meet with the Indian officials, saying that the "Department earnestly hopes Indian delegation may be instructed to support U.S. position."³⁸ Apparently, Henderson's direct approach and explanation of U.S. position changed New Delhi's stand. He was able to report to Washington on February 26 that "the Indian delegation at the U.N. had been instructed to follow a policy 'in substance' the same as proposed by the U.S. Government."³⁹

Acting at the U.S. suggestion, the Interim Committee now decided to instruct the commission to implement its program in such parts of Korea as were accessible to it.⁴⁰

It is interesting to note that both Australia and Canada voted against the U.S. proposal, while the Indian delegate Pillai, as freshly instructed by New Delhi, supported it.⁴¹ Writing years later, Menon was still critical of Pillai's vote, saying that "India had always taken pride in saying that she would put principle before expediency ..."⁴²

Within the commission also, India now supported the move to hold elections in the South. On March 12, by a vote of 4 to 2 with two abstentions, the commission decided to hold elections on May 9. India voted in favor along with China, the

36 Menon, *Many Worlds*, pp. 256-57. See also U.N., General Assembly, *Official Records*, Third Session, Supplement No. 10 (doc. A/583), Reports of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly (5 January-5 August 1948), p. 19.

37 The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 24 February 1948, *FRUS*, 1948 (Washington, D.C., 1974), 6: 1127.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 1128.

39 *Ibid.*

40 U.N. General Assembly, *Official Records*, Third Session, Supplement No. 10 (doc. A/583), Reports of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly (5 January -5 August 1948), p. 21.

41 Menon, *Many Worlds*, p. 257.

42 *Ibid.*, pp. 257-58.

Philippines and El Salvador; Australia and Canada, in accordance with their stand in the Interim Committee, voted against the decision, while France and Syria abstained. Interestingly enough, Menon voted to implement the decision of the Interim Committee. But now he was "speaking as a delegate of India" and was obviously carrying out the instructions of his government.⁴³ Not only this, the new Indian chairman of the commission, Bahadur Singh, even praised the work of the American authorities regarding the arrangement of the elections.⁴⁴ The Soviet reaction to this move was naturally one of strong disapproval and condemnation. A Soviet writer later said, "All the Korean people in the North and in the South received the decision about separate elections with profound resentment."⁴⁵

Boycotted by the leftist and moderate parties and marked by much violence,⁴⁶ the elections took place on May 10. But the judgment of the U.N. Commission was that they represented "a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the commission and in which the inhabitants constitute approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea."⁴⁷ Consisting largely of the supporters of Dr. Syngman Rhee, a veteran nationalist but a conservative and a strong anti-Communist, the new national assembly adopted a constitution for the "Republic of Korea", and elected Rhee as President. The new government was formally inaugurated on August 15, thus ending the American Military Government. It was clear from the statements of both General MacArthur and President Rhee that the authority of the new government would be regarded as extending over the whole of Korea.⁴⁸

43 U.N., General Assembly, *Official Records*, Third Session, Supplement No. 9 (doc. A/575), First Part of the Report of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, vol. 1, pp. 28-29.

44 "U.S. Aid to Koreans Lauded", *New York Times*, 13 April 1948, p. 54. General Hodge found Singh's views very "refreshing", apparently comparing him with Menon whose emphasis on Korean unity had been attacked by the U.S. See Jacobs to the Secretary of State, 8 April 1948, *FRUS, 1948* (Washington, D.C., 1974), 6: 1176-77.

45 F. I. Shabshina, "Koreia posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny", in Ye. M. Zhukov (ed.), *Krizis kolonial'noi sistemy* (Moscow, 1949), p. 274.

46 *Survey of International Affairs, 1947-1948*, p. 320; and *The United States in World Affairs, 1948-1949* (New York, 1949), pp. 306-7.

47 U.N., General Assembly, *Official Records*, Third Session, Supplement No. 9 (doc. A/575), First Part of the Report of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, vol. 1, p. 47.

48 The two statements are quoted in *Survey of International Affairs, 1947-1948*, p. 321

Elections in the usual communist style took place in North Korea in late August, leading to the establishment of a "Democratic Korean People's Republic." It too, like the government in the South, claimed jurisdiction over the whole of Korea.⁴⁹ And, as expected, the Soviets praised the outcome of these elections. Of the Supreme People's Assembly in North Korea convened after the August elections, *Pravda* wrote that it "demonstrated the unanimous will of the Korean people to continue the struggle for the reunification of northern and southern Korea into a single, independent, and democratic Korean state." Voicing the Soviet support for the unification of Korea under the Communists, the Soviet paper said, "The Soviet people and Soviet public opinion welcome the formation of the People's Democratic Government of Korea, discerning in it a significant and important step toward the unification of the entire Korean people."⁵⁰ Moscow followed this praise of the election result by according recognition to the new regime in early October and, before long, by appointing an ambassador to Pyongyang.⁵¹ Thus Korea was divided into two parts, one pro-U.S. and the other pro-Soviet, making the problem of the unification of the country more difficult than ever.

The U.N. General Assembly in December 1948 was faced with the question, which of the two Korean governments should be recognized. A Czechoslovak resolution proposed that delegates of the People's Democratic Republic should be invited to participate in the debates on Korea, while China proposed that this invitation should instead be extended to the representatives of the Republic of Korea.⁵² The committee rejected the Czechoslovak resolution and accepted the one proposed by China, India voting with the U.S. on both occasions.⁵³ A joint resolution now moved by the U.S., China and Australia proposed that the Republican Government in the South be recognized as the only legitimate government of all Korea and provided for the setting up of a new U.N. Commission to supervise the withdrawal of the occupation forces and to "lend its good office to bring about the

49 "An Important Historical Event in the Life of the Korean People", *Pravda*, 13 September 1948, p. 3; cited from *Soviet Press Translations* 3 (1 November 1948): 579-80. Hereafter cited as *SPT*.

50 *Ibid.*, p. 580.

51 "The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the Soviet Union and the Korean People's Democratic Republic", *Pravda*, 13 October 1948, p. 1; cited from *SPT* 3 (1 December 1948): 654-55.

52 U.N., General Assembly, *Official Records*, Third Session, Part I, First Committee, 229th meeting, 6 December 1948, pp. 936-38.

53 *Ibid.*, 230th meeting, 6 December 1948, p. 955.

unification of Korea ..."⁵⁴ Proposing that the old commission should be terminated and no successor appointed to it⁵⁵, the Soviet delegate told the Political Committee:

... Looking back on what had been done, it was clear that the Commission had helped the United States Government to achieve its aim of obtaining control of South Korea, so that it could become a springboard for military aggression in Asia and a field for exploitation by American monopolies ...⁵⁶

The committee, however, adopted the threepower joint resolution and rejected the one proposed by the Soviet Union.⁵⁷ In the Plenary Session of the General Assembly, the U.S.-supported resolution was passed (India voting for it) with an amendment from Canada. The Canadian amendment proposed that the new commission should consist of all members of the old commission, excepting Canada and the Ukraine.⁵⁸ India thus continued to be a member of the U.N. Commission.

The members of the commission arrived in Korea at the end of January 1949 and were soon denounced by the Pyongyang radio as a "collection of hirelings of American imperialism."⁵⁹ In an effort to contact the North, the commission made a direct appeal to Moscow, requesting it to intercede with the northern government, an appeal which Moscow completely ignored.⁶⁰ Thus it appeared that there was no

54 U.N., General Assembly, *Official Records*, Third Session, Part I, First Committee, Annexes to the Summary Records of Meetings, doc. A/C.1/426, 6 December 1948, pp. 91-93.

As in the case of holding separate elections in the South, India showed some reluctance to accept the U.S. view that the Rhee government in Seoul be accepted as the "national" government of all of Korea. Again, it led to intense discussions between the U.S. embassy in India and Indian foreign office, where Menon now served as Secretary for External Affairs. George Marshall spoke of a "substantial identity of views" on the Korean question between the U.S. and India, and hoped that the "present attitude of Menon and GOI [Government of India] can be altered in our favor ..." (The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India, 22 June 1948, *FRUS 1948*, Washington D.C., 1974, 6: 1224.) It is apparent that the U.S. again succeeded in persuading India to drop its opposition and support Washington's position at the U.N.

55 *Ibid.*, doc. A/C.1/427, Corr.1, 8 December 1948, p. 93.

56 U.N. General Assembly, *Official Records*, Third Session, Part I, First Committee, 234th meeting, 8 December 1948, p. 998.

57 *Ibid.*, 236th meeting, 8 December 1948, pp. 1025-26.

58 U.N., General Assembly, *Official Records*, Third Session, Plenary Meetings, 187th meeting, 12 December 1948, p. 1042.

59 Quoted in *Survey of International Affairs, 1947-1948*, p. 327.

60 Robert D. Warth, *Soviet Russia in World Politics* (New York, 1963), p. 393.

hope that the commission would be successful in achieving the unification of Korea. India, although hoping for the eventual unification of Korea, at the moment thought it best to support the U.S. policy (and thus oppose the Russian stand) directed toward setting up a non-communist and pro-U.S. government in the South.

Conclusions: India's Korean Policy and its Effect on Soviet Policy toward India

In the atmosphere of the intense Cold War that characterized Soviet-American relations at this time, both Washington and Moscow disapproved and ridiculed even the attitude of neutrality on the part of other powers.⁶¹ A country which supported the enemy's side was, therefore, bound to invite condemnation. India, which claimed that it was following an "independent" foreign policy, had, in fact, supported Washington on almost every aspect of the Korean problem. This, as has been argued earlier, was the result of India's own understanding of the issues involved. Even later, when U.S. Ambassador Loy Henderson was able to win New Delhi's support on such questions as the holding of elections only in the South, it was a case of persuasion, not dictation from Washington. In fact, Korea was not the only issue on which the interests of the two sides converged at this time. Both Washington and New Delhi were also able to cooperate with one another on the question of Indonesian independence.⁶²

As far as Russia was concerned, India did not just take a neutral position on the Korean question, it completely sided with the United States. Moscow expressed its displeasure directly to Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, leader of the Indian delegation,

61 Washington's position was well expressed by John Foster Dulles who served the Truman Administration on several occasions and later became the U.S. Secretary of State under Dwight Eisenhower. He condemned the idea of nonalignment or neutrality as "an immoral and short-sighted conception." (Cited in Richard L. Jackson, *The Non-Aligned, the U.N., and the Superpowers*, New York, 1983, p. 211.)

For Moscow's view, see the editorial, "For Unity of the Working Class", in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, 15 January 1948, p. 1. Ridiculing the idea that there could be a "third force" between capitalism and Communism, the Cominform paper noted that it was only "A thinly disguised political trick, disguised to facilitate the expansion of American imperialists. ..."

62 See Surendra K. Gupta, "Indonesian Crisis of 1948-1949; A Study in Great Power Diplomacy and India's Relations with Moscow and Washington", *Asian Profile* (Hong Kong) 12 (October 1984): 473-83.

in a meeting she had with Manuilsky during the U.N. General Assembly session in 1947. Manuilsky, it will be recalled, was one of the major participants in debates on the Korean question. K. M. Panikkar, a member of the Indian delegation, writes of the Ukrainian delegate's unhappiness with India:

... Mrs. Pandit had asked of him the reason for this less cordial attitude of the Soviet Union to the Indian delegation this year. Manuilsky was frank. "What is your interest in Korea and Greece? To us these are vital areas for our defence. Why should India interest herself against our interest in these matters? ..."

Panikkar adds, "It was clear that Russia had become uncertain of India's attitude and was generally suspicious of our approach to questions of vital interest to her."⁶³

As we have seen, during 1948 and 1949, India continued its Korean policy despite strong condemnation of its earlier stand by Moscow. It not only accepted the chairmanship of the U.N. Commission, which the Soviets had opposed, but fully supported the American plan of holding elections in South Korea and establishing a non-Communist regime in Seoul. An American observer correctly characterized Indian foreign policy in 1949 when he wrote, "In the shadow of two giants India declares independence from both power blocs, but leans toward the West on some important issues."⁶⁴ Even an Indian correspondent noted that despite India's claim that it was following a "middle course" in foreign relations, "there are signs that this middle path is deviating increasingly toward a point where it will be indistinguishable from the policies of the Western Powers ..."⁶⁵

Stalin's policy toward the Third World, including India, has often been characterized as rigid and dogmatic, and as a part of Russia's ideological thrust in Asia that did not allow for its acceptance of the newly-independent countries led by national-bourgeois parties. But, as we have seen, we have to look at the positions that many of these countries took in international affairs to find out the real reasons for Soviet attitude. In the case of Korea, when, after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, India opposed the U.S. on such crucial issues as the crossing of the 38th Parallel by General Douglas MacArthur's troops and declaring China as an aggressor after Beijing entered the war, there would be a parting of the ways between New Delhi and Washington. Russia, still under Stalin, would then be ready to applaud India's position and adjust her policy toward New Delhi accordingly.

63 K. M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas, Memoirs of a Diplomat* (London, 1955), pp.10-11.

64 Lawrence K. Rosinger, "India in World Politics", *Far Eastern Survey* 18 (5 October 1959): 5.

65 Cited in *The Modern Review* (Calcutta) 84 (December 1948): 427.