

ogy transfer from Western Europe to China. These aspects are of critical interest in the framework of applied China research.

Without doubt C.S. Kang has taken great pains to fulfil her undertaking. Unfortunately, she has not been successful in working out systematically the particular characteristics of technology transfer nor in analysing the key problems in the context of technology transfer to China. She could have pointed out problems specific to the cultural framework, and as a political scientist she should have concentrated on the political exigencies.

Research on "Technology Transfer" can not be accomplished by studying books. Without actually having seen China with one's own eyes it is not possible to convey clearly the process of technology transfer and to present a comprehensive picture of the problems concerned. Regrettably, diligent work can not compensate for research which is far removed from reality.

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**Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation: Agriculture in China. Prospects for Production and Trade.** Paris: OECD, 1985. 84 pages, FF 65/US \$ 13.

This study analyses the dramatic policy changes affecting China's agriculture since 1978 and takes stock of their immediate effects on production, consumption and trade. The study is thoroughly researched, and with 47 tables extremely well documented in its statistical analysis, often supplying useful time series from the late 1940s to the early 1980s, thus illustrating the effects of China's erratic agricultural and rural policy decisions.

China, which continues to be a predominantly agricultural nation – its rural population is estimated to have grown from 350 mio (1953) to 850 mio (1980) – subjected its farm sector in the last 40 years to a rapid succession of extreme policy measures from a land reform (1952) to collectivization, the Great Leap Forward's disastrous rural industrialization campaign (1958/60) and the set-up of the People's Communes, the subsequent policy corrections and economic recovery, the Cultural Revolution and "Gang of Four"'s rule with its Dazhai campaign involving compulsory labour for large irrigation projects and focussing on grain output as prime agricultural production target (1966-78), and the transition to effective private management in agriculture since 1979, following the introduction of the "responsibility system".

Since 1981 and more so since 1983, "the family farm commitment" does away

with all collectivist elements: similar to a tenant-farming system, the farming family which has a long-term leasehold on the Commune's production teams' subdivided land, has become fully responsible for its own profit and loss. The de-collectivized farm household remains obliged to supply certain (declining) production quotas to the state and to pay to the team quite significant rents which are supposed to cover local social and infrastructural expenditure (welfare, irrigation, administration, education, health, etc.). New voluntary cooperative enterprises (in food marketing, processing, transportation and specialized livestock production) are encouraged, permitting the farmers to use free markets for their surplus production.

The post 1978/79 Chinese statistics reproduced in the OECD study not only show a dramatic upturn in cereal production – favoured hitherto in the Maoist "Take Grain as the Foundation" tenet – but also an even greater increase in the output of cash crops – cotton, oil plants, hard fibres, teas, forage, sugar cane and beet, tobacco, herbs, fruits and vegetables – and in livestock production (particularly in the dominant pork sector – but strong relative growth is evident also in the poultry/egg, beef/dairy and mutton/wool sector), as well as in the number of draught animals.

As a result of these productivity gains and output growth, agricultural incomes and consumer nutrition have improved. Improvement of the rural diet (increasing the wheat and rice intake, addition of vegetable oil, meats, sugar, eggs) is particularly striking (p. 67), farmers having been in the past, through compulsory deliveries, reduced to bare vegetarian subsistence levels. The – hitherto more privileged – urban diet has also improved discernibly.

In 1980 China turned into an ever more significant net exporter of agricultural commodities, which later enabled her to safely ignore and let lapse her grain importing commitments under long-term agreements with the US, Canada, Australia, Argentina and France (p. 73). As regards grain, it appears that only the shortcomings of the domestic transport system make it currently still more feasible to export Manchurian corn to Japan, to use surplus rice – hardly suitable for this purpose – for fattening South Chinese pork and at the same time to import US wheat for metropolitan consumption in return.

While the success of China's market and incentive-oriented agricultural reform cannot be denied – and could serve as a textbook model for inept Soviet and some African agricultural policies still discouraging rural production and subsidizing import-based urban consumption – Chinese agricultural planners now probably need to turn to some more medium-term issues, having set up an essentially reprivatised structure of small family holdings. Public structures will need to remain strong enough to maintain irrigation/drainage facilities in regions with paddy cultures, efficient cooperatives and enterprises for processing and marketing will have to be developed, and the transportation and storage system modernized and expanded. As

smallholders are essentially inefficient and high-cost grain producers (as evident in Japan) – they are better in speciality crops/livestock production – a longer-term structural grain policy will also need to address the issue of landholding/leasehold transfer and accumulation.

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