

## CHESTER BOWLES AS U.S. AMBASSADOR IN INDIA

1951-1953<sup>+</sup>

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Although in Europe the U.S. successfully met the challenge of security and stability through the Marshall Plan and NATO, representing a unique combination of economic and military means, its policies did not evoke such a positive response in Asia. A number of leaders of the newly independent countries chose to follow a nonaligned or independent foreign policy. They rejected Communism - in fact, many of them used force to suppress internal Communist rebellions<sup>1</sup> - and eagerly sought Western assistance for economic development<sup>2</sup>, but they were reluctant to ally themselves openly with the West. In an international environment dominated by the Cold War, the Americans, in general, found this position unacceptable. Even a moderate paper like the New York Times rejected the idea of an independent third force, sarcastically characterizing it as one "suspended in midair between the two decisive movements of our day - Communism that Russia heads, and the democracy of which the United States is the champion"<sup>3</sup>.

There were, of course, exceptions to this general approach. One, with whom this paper deals, was Chester Bowles, who became U.S. Ambassador to India in the fall of 1951. He had come to believe that the U.S., with its vast human and material resources, had a historic opportunity to help transform these newly-liberated Asian countries into free and democratic societies. In a speech at Freedom House in New York City in January 1947, he had argued that if the American people could invest only two percent of their annual income for twenty years for economic development in these countries, "we may change the tide of history"<sup>4</sup>. In another speech at Yale University on May 14, 1951, he did not minimize the importance of military defense, but said that its purpose should only be "to secure the elbow room in which to tackle the broad and fundamental problems with which the great bulk of the peoples of the world are confronted"<sup>5</sup>.

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## AMERICAN-INDIAN RELATIONS AND BOWLES' INTEREST IN INDIA

American-Indian relations had never been as strained as they were at the time of Bowles' appointment. Although India had adopted a democratic constitution, combining in it the liberal and humanistic values of the West with its own traditions of religious toleration, and although it had joined the Commonwealth (for which it was bitterly attacked in the Soviet press<sup>6</sup>) and supported Western defense efforts in Europe<sup>7</sup>, it did not always support U.S. policies in Asia. It did support President Truman's policy to repel the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950<sup>8</sup>, but opposed his decision to send American forces across the thirty-eight parallel<sup>9</sup>. And when Washington prepared a peace treaty with Japan, in the drafting of which Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had not been consulted<sup>10</sup>, India declined to attend the San Francisco Conference. Rarely has a non-Communist democratic country been criticized in the American press as India was for its refusal to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty.

In an editorial "The Lost Leader", the New York Times called the Indian Prime Minister as "one of the great disappointments of the post-war era"<sup>11</sup>. The Washington Evening Star characterized India's decision a "gift to the Kremlin"<sup>12</sup>. And for the Philadelphia Inquirer, Nehru's "neutrality" was a "one way neutrality" that only "help(ed) the Communists"<sup>13</sup>. Some Senators and Congressmen even called for the termination of all economic assistance to India. Representative Wesley D'Ewart, Republican from Montana, expressed the sentiments of many lawmakers when he said that Washington should stop all aid to India "while Nehru plays the Kremlin game" and "chooses to follow Stalin"<sup>14</sup>.

In India itself, Washington's approach to the Kashmir crisis had created grave apprehension. In early 1951, despite India's objections, the U.S. and Great Britain, pushed a resolution through the U.N. Security Council that, among others, provided for arbitration of the disputed questions. Criticizing the Anglo-American resolution, Prime Minister Nehru said that it would be "dishonorable" for India to accept the new resolution<sup>15</sup>. The New York Times reported from New Delhi that the Indian press had never been as "unanimous in its sentiment as it has been in objection to the new Kashmir resolution"<sup>16</sup>.

It is well to keep this sense of anger and frustration on both sides in mind in order to appreciate the enormity of the task that awaited Chester Bowles. At a reception given in his honor before his departure for India, J.J. Singh, President of the India League of America, rightly stated that the relations between the two countries had "never been at such a low ebb". Because of his known views on American approach to Asia, both he and Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, then India's ambassador in the U.S., welcomed his appointment as his country's envoy in New Delhi<sup>17</sup>.

Bowles' deep interest in India was evident from the fact that he himself had asked for this assignment. President Truman had offered to send him to some other country, but when Bowles suggested India, the President remarked, "Why in the world would you want to go to India"<sup>18</sup>. Answering this question,

Bowles later wrote, "I had come to see India as the political and economic key to a free and stable Asia" and "a testing ground for democratic government in a period of receding colonial dominance"<sup>19</sup>. He now had the opportunity to conduct American diplomacy in a major Asian country in accordance with his long-held convictions.

#### BOWLES' INITIAL REACTIONS

On his arrival in India in October 1951, Bowles found that both Nehru and other Indian officials were receptive to what he had to say. Even before presenting his credentials, he had talks with the officials of Indian Foreign Ministry and reported to the State Department on October 24, 1951, that he was "rather reassured by their viewpoint"<sup>20</sup>. Six weeks later, on December 6, in a detailed memorandum to the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, he spoke about the feeling of Indians toward Russia and America. About Russia he said, "Every top Indian official with whom I have talked has gone out of his way to condemn the Soviet Union and the Communist approach to economic, social and political problems. Nehru has been most emphatic in his statements to me on two occasions"<sup>21</sup>. And about India's view of the U.S., he told Acheson,

"The attitude of the average Indian toward the United States is much friendlier than one might assume from reading Indian or American newspapers. I have talked to scores of peasants and working people, and I have yet to see anyone whose face did not light up when he heard I was from America."<sup>22</sup>

Bowles also came to appreciate the fact that behind the policy of non-alignment was India's determination to remain independent. He told Acheson that since it was unlikely "that India will openly support free world in a manner that would place her against her great neighbor, China", "any aggressive effort to pressure India with a different position will be ineffective and eventually ... alienate a people and a government which are now basically sympathetic to our objectives ...". The U.S., he argued, "will make much faster progress if we let India know that much as we disagree with her we respect her desire to remain aloof for the present, and that our only wish is to help her to help herself and to maintain her independence". He felt confident that "such a policy towards India will create far better feeling towards America and it may enable us to draw her to our side"<sup>23</sup>. And when New Delhi "moves in our direction", he stated, "it will be in several stages - from her present cool neutralism, to benevolent neutralism, to the kind of association which we deeply desire"<sup>24</sup>. He concluded his long memo by telling the Secretary of State that although the views he was expressing were his own, they were

"broadly shared by most objective and thoughtful observers here in Delhi - American, European, and Asian"<sup>25</sup>.

Since any future economic assistance had to be proposed and approved back in Washington, he devoted a great deal of energy in trying to persuade the members of Congress, officials of the Truman Administration, and prominent newspapermen, to support U.S. economic assistance to India. As onetime owner of an advertising firm which had seen remarkable growth during the Depression years, he knew how to do a public relations job.

### BOWLES' NEW DIPLOMACY

Bowles also brought a new style and color to America's diplomacy in Asia. Attending an "October Day" reception at the Soviet embassy in New Delhi, he discovered that while only a small number of prominent Indians had been invited to the American embassy on such occasions, the Soviets had invited a group of three thousand that included school teachers and student and trade union leaders. As he later wrote, "Some of them were undoubtedly Communists, but the Soviet Union was reaching out its hand to a much broader group"<sup>26</sup>.

Bowles decided that the U.S. should also reach out its hand to Indians of every background. Since the month of July is one of the hottest in New Delhi, he decided to pass July 4 festivities and instead celebrate Washington's birthday in November when the Indian capital would be wrapped in a mild, pleasant winter weather. When the time came, he invited seven thousand guests, which included "every school teacher, college professor, welfare worker, trade union leader and businessman in the city of New Delhi"<sup>27</sup>. In place of alcoholic beverages - which are the inevitable part of diplomatic cocktail parties - simple fruit juices and colored drinks were offered to those who came. At the end of the party, everyone was presented with a scroll dedicated to Washington, the text of which called the American Revolution "the first successful revolution against colonization in the history of the world"<sup>28</sup>. On Lincoln's birthday, the Indian guests were presented with a pamphlet on Lincoln's life, emphasizing that this was the only occasion in world history when people of one race had died to make another race free<sup>29</sup>. Thus Bowles was using the themes of anti-colonization and equality, both of which had great appeal to the Third World.

Bowles also adopted a living style quite different than that of other diplomats in the past. Rather than sending his children to some famous and expensive private school, tucked away in the hills, he sent them to a public school in New Delhi. And they went to school, not in the Ambassador's fancy car, but on bicycles like other Indian schoolchildren. In the school they attended, they were the only whites in a total student population of 1300. His style was so

novel to the people of Delhi that a lot of stories began to circulate in the Indian capital. One was that after a diplomatic reception, while the Soviet Ambassador Novikov left in a bullet-proof limousine, Ambassador Bowles and his wife were seen leaving on their bicycles<sup>30</sup>.

Bowles also found that very few members of the Ambassador's staff ever ventured out to other parts of India. The reports they compiled about India for the State Department were based on information gathered from five Indian newspapers! So he decided that the embassy staff must see things for themselves before writing their reports. He himself gave lead in this direction. He crisscrossed the country several times, visiting large towns and small villages, even those located on the hills and in remote tribal areas, observing both the industrial projects as well as the rural community development work, and giving a score of speeches and press conferences. As he wrote to the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson: "I have drunk many cups of tea in the homes of peasants who have been eager for every snatch of information about our country"<sup>31</sup>.

#### BOWLES' IMPACT IN INDIA

To what extent did Bowles succeed in his mission of establishing what he had called a "living, breathing relationship" between the two countries?<sup>32</sup> Perhaps the best evidence of what he had been able to achieve in India and to what extent India had tilted towards the U.S. was Nehru's acceptance of the provisions of the U.S. Mutual Security Pact which provided that the recipient nations should cooperate with the United States in any way which they could mutually agree for maintaining peace. In a statement the Indian Prime Minister said, "... we have no difficulties with the United States and we are getting on very well indeed"<sup>33</sup>. It may be recalled that Burma had asked for modification in these terms and the Indonesian cabinet had been forced to resign for accepting U.S. assistance under these terms<sup>34</sup>. Not only this, India rebuffed Soviet offers of aid made at the International Industries Fair in Bombay in January 1952<sup>35</sup>. Nehru also appeared cool to the Soviet delegate Jacob Malik's speech at the U.N. in January, 1952, in which the Soviet position on the Kashmir question came very close to India's own stand on this vital issue<sup>36</sup>. Not only this, New Delhi even took the unusual step of informing Great Britain and the U.S. that it was in no way involved in Malik's support to India's position on Kashmir<sup>37</sup>.

As a result of Bowles' efforts, Washington succeeded in establishing a new economic relationship with New Delhi. The first technical cooperation agreement, providing for \$ 50 million for community development projects, was signed by him and Nehru on January 5, 1952<sup>38</sup>, a little more than a week before Malik's speech in the U.N. Back in the U.S., a few days later, Bowles proposed to the Congress a grant of \$ 1 billion over the next four years to

help complete India's first Five Year Plan<sup>39</sup>. Although Bowles was not able to get this money from the Congress, whose powerful members like Senator Tom Connally of Texas, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, continued to be critical of Nehru's foreign policy<sup>40</sup>, he was able to make a new beginning in this direction.

#### WASHINGTON'S MOVE TOWARD A MILITARY ALLIANCE IN ASIA

It soon appeared, however, that the Bowles era in Indo-American relations would prove only a brief episode of understanding and friendly cooperation in the otherwise continuing drama of misunderstandings and mutual recriminations. Washington's relations with Pakistan, which had acquired a state of extreme cordiality by September 1951<sup>41</sup>, reached their logical fruition toward the end of 1952. On the one hand, London and Washington submitted a resolution in the Security Council on November 5, 1952, which appeared to favor Pakistan<sup>42</sup> but which was bitterly criticized by Nehru<sup>43</sup>; on the other, there were soon reports in Pakistani as well as American papers that Pakistan might be included in a Middle East defense alliance<sup>44</sup>. In fact, in American military circles a discussion for constructing such an alliance had been going on for sometime. Only a month before Bowles' departure for India in Fall 1951 to take up his assignment, the ambassador-designate had been warned by General Hoyt Vandenberg, then Air Force Chief of Staff, that "... we are going to give you some trouble out there in India because we have our eyes on bases in Pakistan"<sup>45</sup>. One individual whose ideas were already pushing the U.S. in the direction of a U.S.-sponsored military alliance in the region was Sir Olaf Caroe, who had served as Foreign Secretary under two British administrations. He had come to believe that because of British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf region, it was necessary to fill the vacuum by a grouping of the countries in the region, and that the pacts bringing about this grouping must be underwritten by Western powers. Since India adhered to a policy of nonalignment, Sir Olaf concluded, it is Pakistan that must become a very important part of any such undertaking<sup>46</sup>.

While Bowles was working tirelessly in India to build a new structure of Indian-American relations, Sir Olaf, at the suggestion of British Foreign Office, undertook a tour of the United States in May-June 1952. He held discussions with important officials both in the Pentagon and the State Department<sup>47</sup>. For those - and their number was significant - who were already thinking along these lines, arguments of this retired British official settled the issue. It now became clear that in order to implement these ideas, the U.S. would have to reconsider her policies toward India and Pakistan.

At his New Delhi post, Bowles was aware of the rumors about a U.S.-sponsored military alliance in Asia coming out of Washington. In a letter to

Charles Murphy, President Truman's General Counsel, he wrote in December 1951 that a military alliance involving American bases in Pakistan would be disastrous for American-Indian relations. He wrote, "In fact, nothing could be better calculated to destroy the effort that we are now making to create a more solid basis of understanding and friendship"<sup>48</sup>. For the time being, his urgent letters and cables from New Delhi on this question proved quite effective. He was able to convince President Truman that "large-scale military assistance to Pakistan would be a serious mistake"<sup>49</sup>.

But the Truman Presidency soon came to an end. The new administration would be headed by Dwight D. Eisenhower, with John Foster Dulles as his Secretary of State. In fact, Bowles had written several letters to both, apprising them of his work in India in an effort to persuade them to his viewpoint regarding America's policy to India. In a letter to Eisenhower in March 1952, who was then the Commander of NATO forces in Europe, Bowles wrote how American aid was being effectively utilized in India. On Nehru's attitude to the U.S., he said, "Right now there is no question in our minds that the Indian Government from Nehru on down is emotionally quite close to us, and that this trend in our direction is increasing far more rapidly than we dared hope a few months ago"<sup>50</sup>. To Dulles he sent an analysis of Indian economy, arguing for American economic aid of \$ 250 million annually in the next four years, an amount which he characterized as "less than our average economic investment in Greece"<sup>51</sup>.

In their replies, while Eisenhower complimented Bowles for the way American assistance was being used and wished him success in his "important mission"<sup>52</sup>, Dulles expressed doubts if in view of "the great complexities of the problems in India" and "the difficulties of religion, language, etc." India could really use any massive assistance from the West in a useful manner. Not only this, he pointed to the serious differences between India and the U.S. on the Chinese issue<sup>53</sup>. His emphasis on the continuing political differences between India and the U.S. were to prove decisive in the future.

Eisenhower's victory in the presidential elections in November and the possibility that it might mean a new policy toward South Asia, one which could perhaps completely undo his work in India, prompted Bowles to make known his desire that he would be willing to stay on as America's envoy even under the new administration. He would do that so he could continue "the most important task I have ever tackled" and to build "on the foundations which have been laid in these first twelve months"<sup>54</sup>. But apprehensive that emphasis on military build-up might now be the main goal, he wrote,

"All of this is particularly important here in India where the military approach is doomed to failure. I am deeply convinced that if only India and America can work more closely together, we can build a bridge between East and West and we can become less dependent upon some of our tired colonial friends in Europe ..."<sup>55</sup>.

But the Eisenhower Administration decided to replace Bowles. It also soon

began to formulate a new American policy toward the region, a policy based on a U.S.-sponsored military alliance which India was bound to reject and Pakistan eager to join. As it worked to forge military ties with Pakistan, which would provide a U.S. base in Peshawar, not far from the Soviet borders, it also decided to withdraw Truman's recommendations in the 1953-54 budget for economic assistance to India to the extent of \$ 200 million a year for the completion of its First Five Year Plan<sup>56</sup>.

There was bafflement and frustration in India, especially on Washington's decision to replace Bowles. How could, the Indians asked, a country recall an ambassador who, for the first time, had transformed the Indian-American relations into a bond of friendship and understanding. In a moving letter to Bowles - a letter which the State Department's South Asian Division head Donald Kennedy said the Ambassador will "treasure" all his life<sup>57</sup> - Prime Minister Nehru paid rich tributes to Bowles. He observed that the Ambassador's stay in India had not only been "full of fresh developments in Indo-American relations", but the Indian people had increasingly begun to look upon him "as a friend of India and as one wishing well for India"<sup>58</sup>. Discussing his last meeting with Nehru, Bowles wrote to Kennedy that Nehru was "quite emotional and said over and over again that he had not really believed I would be pulled out". Nehru also said "that this made him doubly certain that drastic changes were in the wind in our foreign policy and that he was fearful of effects"<sup>59</sup>.

## CONCLUSIONS

The renunciation of the Bowles' approach to the problems of Asia and India and the adoption of a military-oriented policy - without the accompanying Marshall Plan as it had been the case in Europe - marked a turning point in America's Asia policy. The effects of this policy on America's future role in Asia and on developments in Pakistan is beyond the scope of this paper. Within the context of American-Indian relations, it appeared certain that an unusually successful regional policy had been sacrificed at the altar of larger geopolitical considerations. The most dramatic consequence of this change was, therefore, in changing India's relationship with the Soviet Union.

Most of the students of Soviet foreign policy have discussed the favorable turn in Indo-Soviet relations during 1953-54 in the context of changes in Soviet foreign policy in the post-Stalin period. It is, however, unlikely that India would have responded as warmly as it did to Soviet moves had the Bowles approach to India continued under Eisenhower. The changes in American policy created a grave crisis in Indian foreign policy, making it necessary to look for other sources for economic and technical assistance and for diplomatic support on the Kashmir question. The Soviet Union was willing to provide both without any conditions and on terms which India could easily accept.



## Notes:

- 1) For example, India suppressed a Communist rebellion in the Telengana region. Under Sukarno's leadership, Indonesia also suppressed the Madiun uprising of Indonesian Communists.
- 2) Shortly after India became independent, she sent Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, the highest official in Indian Foreign Ministry, to Washington for this purpose. He told the Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Robert A. Lovett, that "India can expect no effective assistance from the USSR in its primary objective of developing and strengthening itself economically ...". He then added, "In fact the U.S. is the only country which is in a position to aid India". Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State, 2 April 1948, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948 (Washington, D.C., 1975), 5: 507.
- 3) "The Lost Leader", editorial in the New York Times, 28 August 1951, p. 22.
- 4) Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969 (New York, 1971), pp. 245-46.
- 5) Papers of Chester Bowles, Box 61, Folder 876, Yale University Library in New Haven, Connecticut. Cited hereafter as Bowles Papers.
- 6) For example, an article in Pravda said that India's link with the Commonwealth "bears eloquent witness as to how transparent is India's 'independence' ". V. Maevskii, "The Results of the Conference of Prime Ministers of the British Dominions", Pravda, 8 May 1949; cited from Soviet Press Translations, 4 (1 June 1949): 324.
- 7) The Final Communiqué issued after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in October 1949 stated that the participants, which included Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, resolved "to work together and with other Governments to establish world peace on a democratic basis". Specifically, the communiqué welcomed British participation in the Brussels Treaty and said that "this association of the United Kingdom with her European neighbors was in accordance with the interests of the other members of the Commonwealth ...", Nicholas Mansergh (ed.), Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1931-1952 (London, 1953), 2: 1137-38.
- 8) See U.N., Security Council, Official Records, Fifth Year, S/PV.473, 25 June 1950, pp. 16-18, and Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950 (London, 1953), pp. 635-36.
- 9) See "Nehru Urges U.N. Go Slow in Korea", New York Times, 4 October 1950, p. 8.
- 10) The failure of John Foster Dulles, who had been appointed by President Truman to prepare the treaty, to travel to India and consult with Nehru is discussed by Frederick S. Dunn in Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton, 1963), pp. 132-33.
- 11) "The Lost Leader", editorial in the New York Times, 28 August 1951, p. 22.

- 12) "Nehru's Gift to the Kremlin", editorial in the Evening Star, 27 August 1951, p.A 8.
- 13) "Nehru Aids Red Drive to Block Peace", editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer, 28 August 1951, p.18.
- 14) Reported in the Washington Post, 30 August 1951, p.4.
- 15) The Statesman, 26 March 1951, p.1.
- 16) Robert Trumbull, "Both Sides Oppose New Kashmir Plan", New York Times, 25 February 1951, p.9.
- 17) New York Times, 3 October 1951, p.23.
- 18) Bowles, Promises, p.247.
- 19) Ibid.
- 20) Bowles to Donald D. Kennedy, 24 October 1951, Bowles Papers, Box 95, Folder 256.
- 21) "Early Observations on India", Bowles' memorandum to Dean Acheson, 6 December 1951, p.2. Bowles Papers, Box 94, Folder 233.
- 22) Ibid.
- 23) Ibid., p.9.
- 24) Ibid., p.13.
- 25) Ibid., p.15.
- 26) Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report (New York, 1954), p.21.
- 27) Ibid., p.22.
- 28) Ibid.
- 29) Ibid., pp.22-23.
- 30) Ibid., p.32.
- 31) Bowles' memo to Acheson, 6 December 1951, p.2, Bowles Papers, Box 94, Folder 233.
- 32) Bowles, Ambassador's Report, p.5.
- 33) "Nehru Endorses U.S.aid Motives; He Differs with Burma and Indonesia". New York Times, 29 February 1952, p.3.
- 34) Ibid.
- 35) For Moscow's offer see "Russia's Trade Offer to India", The Sunday Statesman, 13 January 1952, p.4; and "Soviet Offer of Equipment to India", The Statesman, 15 January 1952, p.10. Russia's hope for increased trade and economic relations with India was expressed in the Soviet press coverage of the International Industries Fair, one in which the Soviets had participated in a big way. See Mikhail Nesterov, "The Bombay International Industries Fair", News, no.3 (1 February 1952), pp.25-26; and "Uspekhi sovetskogo pavil' ona na Mezhdunarodnoi promyshlennoi vystavke v Bombee", Pravda, 22 January 1952, p.3.
- 36) U.N. Security Council, Official Records, Seventh Year, 570th meeting, 17 January 1952, pp.13-18.
- 37) Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol.2, 1947-1956 (Cambridge, 1979), p.116.
- 38) Statesman Overseas Edition, 12 January 1952, p.10.
- 39) "A Billion for India Sought by Bowles", New York Times, 17 January

- 1952, p. 12.
- 40) The Statesman, 18 January 1952, p.4.
  - 41) Unlike India, Pakistan chose to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty in September 1951. Not only this, her Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan made one of the most forceful speeches during the signing ceremonies in San Francisco. James Reston, the New York Times columnist, called it a "memorable defense" of the treaty, and said Zafrullah Khan defended it "not only against the arguments of the Soviet Union but against those of his neighbor, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India". "Four Asian Nations Support Draft of Japanese Treaty", New York Times, 7 September 1951, p.1.
  - 42) U.N., document S/2839, 5 November 1952.
  - 43) "U.N. Resolution on Kashmir; Nehru's Sharp Criticism", Statesman Overseas Edition, 3 January 1953, p.10.
  - 44) "Middle East and Pakistan; Pact Rumors", Statesman Overseas Edition, 17 January 1953, p.8. See also Bowles, Ambassador's Report, p.349.
  - 45) Quoted in Selig S. Harrison, The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy (New York, 1978), p.265.
  - 46) For a critical discussion of Sir Olaf Caroe's views see ibid., pp.263-64.
  - 47) Ibid., p.264.
  - 48) Bowles to Murphy, 11 December 1951, Bowles Papers, Box 96, Folder 275.
  - 49) Bowles, Promises to Keep, p.478.
  - 50) Bowles to Eisenhower, 24 March 1952, Bowles Papers, Box 94, Folder 246.
  - 51) Bowles to Dulles, 10 March 1952, Bowles Papers, Box 94, Folder 243.
  - 52) Eisenhower to Bowles, 4 April 1952, Bowles Papers, Box 94, Folder 246.
  - 53) Dulles to Bowles, 25 March 1952, Bowles Papers, Box 94, Folder 243.
  - 54) Bowles to Ethel B. Gilbert, 26 November 1952, Bowles Papers, Box 95, Folder 254.
  - 55) Ibid.
  - 56) Bowles, Promises to Keep, p.248.
  - 57) Kennedy to Bowles, 18 February 1953, Bowles Papers, Box 95, Folder 268.
  - 58) Nehru's letter to Bowles is cited in Bowles to Kennedy, 9 February 1953, Bowles Papers, Box 95, Folder 268.
  - 59) Bowles to Kennedy, 9 February 1953, Bowles Papers, Box 95, Folder 268. This was his second letter to the State Department on the same day.