

THE TAMIL 'TIGERS' IN NORTHERN SRI LANKA:
ORIGINS, FACTIONS, PROGRAMMES

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THE BACKGROUND TO THE GUERILLA MOVEMENT

The anti-Tamil riots in Sri Lanka in 1983 made it known to the international public that a 'Tamil problem' exists in the country¹. This 'Tamil problem' has deep roots in the past, and the preliminary history of the guerilla groups, too, can be traced back to the time before independence. In the 30s and 40s, some more or less leftist-oriented, communal Tamil organizations originated, viz. the Jaffna Association and the Jaffna Youth League. Tamil politics, if not communal, have always tended more to the established left, notably the LSSP and CPC² than to the CNC and UNP, after Arunachalam left the Congress in anger in 1921.

While the history of the pre-independence Tamil organizations is reasonably well documented, it is perhaps opportune to say some words on the sources on which tensions between Tamils and Sinhalese fed during this period. The Manning Reforms of 1921 had given the vote to a far greater number of people than before, and this proved to be disadvantageous for the Tamils who could only gain three seats in the Legislative Council as against 13 seats before the reforms³. Arunachalam, one of the founders of the CNC in 1919, had agreed to these reforms under the impression that the CNC would grant the Tamils an additional seat in Colombo to make up for the loss. This was not the case, and Arunachalam left the CNC to join the Jaffna Association, an organization based on communal considerations. These and following frictions were confined to the sphere of political leverage and had not yet acquired the consciously ethnic slant and acerbity of later years. Developments in the cultural sphere had, however, already intensified the ethnic awareness of both the Sinhalese and the Tamils. It was the heyday of religious revival and the rediscovery and renaissance of the classical Tamil resp. Sinhalese culture and literature in India and Ceylon. These two traditions came to be considered as mutually antagonistic and hostile especially on the part of the Sinhalese. On the Tamil side this was less so, for here the problem was mainly one of asserting an independent Tamil identity both against India and

the Sinhalese tradition. The recovery from oblivion and translation of the *Yālpāṇa Vaipava Malai* (YVM) by C. Brito in 1979⁴ and S. Rasanayagam's famous, but controversial book 'Ancient Jaffna'⁵ for the first time made the Tamils aware that they had a history and tradition of their own, distinct both from that of the Sinhalese and the Indian Tamils. This filled them with a pride which helped to boost the demand for a fair share of power in the politics of contemporary Ceylon. The fact that the YVM can by no means claim the same historical authority as the Sinhalese chronicles *Mahāvamsa* and *Cūlavamsa*, did not count for much with the Tamils.

It is important to remember that communal talking and acting at this stage never envisaged a separation of Jaffna from Ceylon. The Tamils had always felt themselves an integral part of the island's life and politics, and this held true till after independence. Their demands never went beyond a fair share of power in, possibly, a federal structure. This also applies to the Tamil Congress, founded by G.G. Ponnambalam in 1944 in protest against the Soulbury constitution. The TC was less a party out to oppose or destroy this constitution than a forum to assure the implementation of article 29 (3) which forbade discrimination against minorities. A proof of the strongly Ceylon-oriented politics of the TC is the fact that it supported, in 1948, the law which deprived the Indian Tamils of their citizens' rights and Ceylonese nationality because it also felt that these Tamils did not really belong to the country. Only a splinter group, the later Federal Party (FP) under S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, stood out against this law.

In the 50s a leftist politico-literary movement of young Tamil writers and journalists even set out to postulate and define a Ceylon Tamil Nationalism and identity as against the Indian Tamil identity: Ceylon Tamils had always considered themselves to be something special⁶. This Ceylon Tamil nationalism did, however, not stand any chance against the growing and virulent communalism on the Sinhalese side, and finally the leftist inclinations ended up in ethnic-based, leftist-oriented, violent guerilla groups in the 70s.

In the meantime, Tamil interests were represented more or less successfully by the Tamil Congress, after 1952 by the Federal Party and finally the TU(L)F⁷. This was founded in 1972 as a union of all Tamil organizations in Sri Lanka including the CWC (Ceylon Workers Congress), the organization of the Indian Tamils. It changed its name from TUF into TULF for the elections in 1977. The FP has always been the senior partner of the union, and its programme has been dominant. The members of this group tried to get the best possible deal for the Tamils by constitutional and non-violent means with, on the whole, remarkably little success in view of the growing ethno-centrism on the part of the Sinhalese, which sometimes erupted into riots and violence, like in 1958.

THE COMING OF THE TIGERS

Since 1979 and more so since 1983 the guerilla groups suddenly started to attract the attention of the public. Yet their roots go back at least to the FP (ITAK) and its youth wing Tamil Iḷaiṅar Iyakkam (Tamil Youth Movement) as well as to another youth organization: Tamil Māṇavar Pēravai (Tamil Students' Union). In a remote way, they have been influenced by the insurgency of the JVP in 1971 and also by the communal groups of the 30s and 40s. In these guerilla groups, called 'Tigers' by themselves and 'Boys' by the Tamils, all these strands have come together in a highly dynamic and explosive mixture, namely a Marxist-Leninist ideology on top of a strong ethnic consciousness.

It was only in 1972 when a younger generation with an outlook on life different from that of the TULF felt really threatened by the new rules and regulations of university entrance, known under the name of 'standardization'⁸ that the dissatisfaction organized itself in a recognizable group: The Tamil New Tigers (TNT). A university education and a position in the civil service had come to be regarded by these young men as their traditional fief. This was threatened by the new regulations. In addition, there was the even greater danger felt by the implementation of the new republican constitution of 1972 which removed article 29 (3) of the Soulbury Constitution and substituted a simple declaration of human rights in its place⁹. The TNT, founded by V. Prabhakaran, grew out of the TMP and were no doubt influenced by the JVP ideology of a violent revolution to create a classless society¹⁰. The LTTE, the successor of the TNT, rejects, however, the style, programme and methods of the JVP's insurgency as diffuse, vague and completely ineffective¹¹.

Until 1975, the Tigers had not been noticed very much. Then they struck for the first time conspicuously, and the LTTE-literature rings in the second stage of armed urban combat that year: from building up an organization and acts of 'individual terrorism' they now went on to well selected targets symbolizing state and police suppression¹²: They shot Alfred Duraiyappah, the SLFP-mayor of Jaffna, for allegedly betraying the Tamil cause in not granting the use of the Town Hall for the Final Function of the World Tamil Conference, held in Jaffna in January 1974. The conference had been held in Jaffna much against the wishes of the government in Colombo, who had wanted it to take place in Colombo because of the better facilities and more impartial atmosphere there¹³. This the Tamils considered a form of cultural oppression and humiliation of their ancient tradition, and from then on the trenches were drawn on both sides: The conference was held in Jaffna without the consent of the government and without financial help. The government, on the other hand, refused visas to famous dravidologists from India. Quite a few non-Indian dravidologists did not take part at all in the conference because of these bickerings¹⁴. The climax of all this was the refusal of Duraiyappah to grant the use of the Town Hall for a non-government sponsored function, so that people gathered in front of the building in great numbers for the final meeting.

Duraiyappah declared this to be an unauthorized and unlawful assembly and ordered police to disperse it. In the ensuing scuffles, tear gas was used and shots fired which killed eight people and wounded many more¹⁵. The upshot of all this was the assassination of Duraiyappah by the TNT on 27th July 1975. From then on, their actions have become increasingly more frequent and more violent.

On 5th May 1976, the TNT changed its name into LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam) in the face of the coming elections. They still kept comparatively quiet to wait and see what the TULF would achieve. The riots immediately after the election in 1977, however, let them abandon any hope of a peaceful solution for the Tamils.

The name Ealam (Īlam) appears for the first time in this new name for the Tigers. The name is grammatical. It documents the demand of the right of self-determination of a Tamil nation with a culture, tradition and language and domiciled in their ancient homeland called Ealam. The demand for secession was also voiced in the TULF election manifesto¹⁶. Īlam was originally the ancient Tamil word for the whole island, like the slightly more recent Īlaṅkai. It means gold, or land of gold. The etymology of the term is uncertain. More importantly, however, it was the name the Imperial Colas used for the island when they ruled it as part of their empire: Īlamaṅṅalam. The guerillas claim it to be the old name only of the Tamil-inhabited areas of Sri Lanka and to denote that two different peoples lived there independently, a fact which is true only from the 13th century onwards in the Kingdom of Jaffna. Tamil Īlam today, as described by the guerillas, comprises nearly a quarter of the island's territory (see map).

The years 1977/78 proved decisive for the Tigers in more than one way. Shortly before the elections, the two great elder statesmen of Jaffna had died: S. J. V. Chelvanayagam, the founder-leader of the Federal Party, and G. G. Ponambalam, founder of the Tamil Congress. Chelvanayagam, even more than Ponnambalam, had served as a sort of integrative figure for all Tamils, and that had even kept the Tigers in check to some extent. Today he is still called Tantai Celva (Father Selva) even by the guerillas. After his death in early 1977, there was no other charismatic figure to keep the factions and generations together, and the Tigers got off the leash immediately after it was known that a new constitution was impending. The murder of four policeman in Valvettiturai in April 1978 was the real beginning of an ever worsening confrontation. This incident brought in its wake the proscription of the Tigers and similar groups in May 1978, which was changed into the notorious Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in early 1979¹⁷. Emergency was declared in Jaffna from January to May 1979 and August 1979 to January 1980. A special unit of the army was despatched to Jaffna to get rid of the terrorists within three months, i.e. by December 1979. These measures, however, created just what they were intended to prevent: The brutal and indiscriminate procedure of the police and army who detained and sometimes tortured innocent young people on mere suspicion, radicalised the Tigers and boosted their

popularity all over the country. Sympathy for them soared suddenly and tremendously. This was when the TULF began to lose its grip on the population and politics more and more as it was felt that it could not adequately protect its people. The LTTE was especially scathing in its criticism of the TULF as 'Tamil United Lawyers' Front'. The epithet is clear: the TULF consists to a great extent of British-trained lawyers and solicitors and fights with legal and political means. This cannot satisfy the guerillas who have seen the futility of these methods. They belong, moreover, to a generation no longer educated in English and the British tradition of 'fair play', having received their training under the regulations of 'Sinhala only' with special regulations for Tamils and the Tamil language. Consequently, their outlook is Tamil and not multiethnic, and they have little or no contact and empathy for their Sinhalese contemporaries who were educated in Sinhalese.

FACTIONS AND COALITIONS

The LTTE has remained the strongest and most determined of all guerilla groups still today. It has a clear-cut programme which is being followed determinedly, even ruthlessly. Besides, nearly all other groups in existence derive from it either through fissure or imitation. In 1980, LTTE entered a coalition with the newly-formed TELO (Tamil Ealam Liberation Organisation) and, together with this group, committed the big Neerveli Bank robbery in March 1981. The union broke up in late 1982 when the leaders of the TELO, Kuttimani and Thangaturai, were arrested¹⁸. On the whole, most of these groups are rather small and insignificant. The only one which can measure up to LTTE is the PLOT (People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Ealam), itself an offspring of the LTTE. It was founded in 1981 by Uma Maheswaran, the former chairman of the LTTE's Centre Committee. He had been demoted to a simple member of the Committee in 1979 for actions allegedly not in accordance with the ideology of the LTTE, and left the group in anger¹⁹. The reasons for the split are rather obscure: while Prabhakaran (who was responsible for Uma being elected as chairman) names personal antipathy, indiscipline and thirst for power as the reasons, Uma Maheswaran accuses Prabhakaran of the same and of violating the basic rules of the group and leaving the straight and narrow path of Marxist ideology. What exactly happened, cannot really be ascertained especially as both LTTE and PLOT do not at all differ in their avowed aim of an independent Tamil Iḷam. The PLOT is obviously not as well equipped with funds and weapons, both military and propagandist, as the LTTE which can afford to shop for armaments and to use glossy prints and good paper for its publications. PLOT therefore has to find its friends where it can get them.

Before we go on to discuss the programme, ideology and methods of these

two groups in detail, I want to briefly enumerate the other guerilla groups which have any importance at all. This description is by no means exhaustive, as new groups are constantly mushrooming.

TELO: Its leader today is Sri Sabaratnam (Tall Sri), after the former leaders Kuttimani and Thangaturai were convicted of the murder of the four policemen in Valvettiturai and of the bank robbery in Neerveli and murdered in 1983 during the prison massacre in Colombo.

TELA: Tamil Ealam Liberation Army. It was founded in January 1981 and also considered Kuttimani and Thangaturai as its leaders in a loose way. Its general secretary, (Oberoi) Tevan, was shot in September 1983, allegedly by LTTE members. Since January 1985 its new leader is Centil.

EPRLF: (Ealam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front). Its leader is Padmanabha; it became famous by the kidnapping of the American couple Allen at the beginning of 1984. They are known for other rash and - in their own words - 'James-Bond-like' actions, like the Batticaloa jailbreak in September 1983 in which they participated. They are also cited as possibly responsible for the Anuradhapura killings, together with the LTTE. Both PLOT and LTTE are wary of the EPRLF; PLOT accuses it of being CIA-sponsored²⁰.

EROS: (Ealam Revolutionary Organisation of Students). Its speaker is Balakumar; it has links to the former TMP and GUES (see below).

Apart from these there exist a few free-wheeling groups which are rather tiny and, from all information available, not involved in military actions though they give moral support to the guerillas. To this group belong mainly the TELF (Tamil Ealam Liberation Front) under Ealaventhana, which split from the TULF in 1981, the GUES (General Union of Ealam Students), the former TMP close to the Tigers, the TELE (Tamil Ealam Liberation Extremists) and the TEA (Tamil Ealam Army).

In September 1983, TELO, ERPLF, EROS and TELA united together with PLOT, which has always clamoured for more cooperation, in the ENLF (Ealam National Liberation Front) with a common programme of joint actions, cooperation in the field of PR and propoganda and mutual exchange of plans and information²¹. The ties between PLOT and TELA were particularly close²². PLOT even published some TELA pamphlets and papers in its bulletins concerning the murder of Tevan²³. As late as January 1985 PLOT republished TELA papers and statements and reaffirmed the close links between the two groups, inspite of TELA following a different path militarily²⁴.

This unity was dealt a severe blow in May 1984 when six LTTE-members were murdered in a particularly gruesome fashion in the village of Culpuram where they had gone to paste posters in memory of Sivakumaran, a member of the TMP shot by the police in 1972 during agitations against the new constitution. Inhabitants of the village gave evidence that the murders were not committed by the Sinhalese army but by PLOT members who had, in the dis-

guise of soldiers, killed the six in a kind of vendetta²⁵. Though the PLOT fiercely denied having anything to do with these murders and blamed alternately the EPRLF and the Sinhalese soldiers²⁶, credibility was on the side of the LTTE, and TELO, EPRLF and EROS practically expelled PLOT from the ENLF. Only TELA stuck to its union with PLOT as it still had some bones to pick with LTTE. In March 1985, talks were resumed between ENLF, PLOT and the TULF over a revival of the union. Rather surprisingly for the naive observer, the subsequent new alignments followed rather different lines: LTTE (which had hitherto been accused of not wanting cooperation and undermining it) joined the ENLF as senior partner in late May. It made it abundantly clear that this union was to be realized on its own terms and secondly laid down some severe conditions under which it would be willing to accept the TULF into the partnership²⁷. As the TULF was not willing to comply, it teamed up with PLOT which had shown unmistakable signs of willingness to come to an agreement²⁸. TELA withdrew from everything in disgust and at the moment pursues its own plans in Jaffna. The union has, no doubt, been brought about with a considerable amount of Indian pressure in view of the coming talks in Thimpu, but it cannot only be termed a result of these. PLOT which was more interested in a union of this kind, has been left high and dry to seek a rather unlikely ally, while LTTE, which hitherto preferred to go it alone, joined the ENLF without the other groups voicing objections. This, more than anything else, shows the relative power and influence of PLOT and LTTE: LTTE can get away with a union in which its voice is the most audible one, PLOT cannot.

IDEOLOGY AND PROGRAMME

These remarks show one feature of the relations between the different guerilla groups quite clearly: they are far from amicable. Especially the LTTE and its renegade PLOT indulge in hostile propaganda, reproaches, derision of the other's strategies and methods as 'childish', 'counterproductive', 'harmful for the population' or simply 'treacherous'²⁹. The PLOT is particularly outspoken in this, while the LTTE only occasionally indulges in this sort of mud-slinging, for instance after the jail-break in Batticaloa: LTTE accused the PLOT of mishandling the affair completely in not getting out Nirmala Nithiananthan, one of the known supporters of the guerillas, but freeing known collaborators of the Sinhalese, like S. A. David, formerly linked to the organization Gandhiam³⁰. LTTE got Nirmala out in a second attempt in July 1984.

On the whole, however, the LTTE clearly believes in other means of dealing with its adversaries. This became obvious in 1982 when in a shoot-out in Poondy Bazaar in Madras both Prabhakaran and Maheswaran were arrested but later released on bail. There are rumours of another more recent armed

clash between both groups in Madurai³¹. In Jaffna, the LTTE has blamed these feuds on counterinsurgents and Sinhalese soldiers disguised as Tigers to confuse the population, or claimed that guerillas it has captured and 'executed' were traitors³².

a) The military option

The ideological differences between both groups basically boil down to those of strategy and tactics. The PLOT believes that the LTTE is following the wrong military path and gives this as the reason for leaving the organization. It cannot at this stage be determined how far this decision was influenced by the assassination of the four policemen in Valvettiturai in 1978. So far, PLOT and LTTE follow identical lines with varying rhetoric. But they are still sharply divided over the question of how to pursue the armed fight: PLOT maintains that a guerilla war in the style of the LTTE is not only useless, but counter-productive, and harms the civilian population, because after each attack, reprisals by the army are to be expected³³. It argues instead for an all-out fight of the masses at a later date, i.e. it wants to plunge into full-fledged battle only after the whole population has been brought into line³⁴. Bank robberies, individual assassinations of symbols of suppression like policemen etc., the PLOT does not only reject, but considers as actions of personal revenge and hatred which have no place in the progress of the fight for liberation. This applies particularly to the murder of 13 Sinhalese soldiers which was allegedly the trigger-off for the riots in 1983³⁵. It has not been denied by the LTTE that this action was in retaliation for the killing of Charles Anthony, Prabhakaran's second-in-command on 15th July. But it also claims that it was equally the punishment for the rape of some Tamil school-girls by the soldiers, and that it could not be construed as a cause for the riots which had been planned long before³⁶.

The argument of the PLOT sounds, it is true, a bit farfetched, because even on a mass basis, the population will suffer in a fight. In an all-out civil war, the population cannot be protected adequately. What the PLOT, however, means by this mass basis, it has made clear in a recent article. Extending the mass basis means creating grassroots party branches in villages, towns and districts and strengthening the alliance with important population groups and classes like landless peasants, students, artisans, etc.³⁷. An organization like this, the LTTE has, however, already built up: below its Centre Committee which determines the political line, grassroot organizations and party branches exist in many villages and towns alongside training camps in the jungles³⁸.

While the PLOT claims a will to cooperate with the 'rural masses', the LTTE avowedly follows the strategy of urban guerilla warfare radically till today. It now claims to have reached the third stage of armed fight after the first one of individual terror and the second one of confrontation with the

police, state symbols of suppression and Tamil collaborators, etc.³⁹. This third stage is the armed fight against the occupation forces. The tactics of this fight are taken from Che Guevara and Mao: confuse the enemy, weaken the enemy, hit and destroy the enemy⁴⁰. This cannot yet be a fight on a mass basis, but it has gone beyond the tactics of 'hit-and-run'. The PLOT which accuses LTTE of 'hit-and-run' tactics, that are bad for the cause, instead follows a path of 'don't hit-and-run' or 'hide-and-run' (the pun cannot be reproduced in English as it appears in the Tamil original)⁴¹. The LTTE does not flinch at reckless and ruthless actions like exploding army trucks, planes and convoys, bridges and railway lines. It has, however, so far stuck to primarily military targets; civilians other than alleged collaborators have rarely been attacked. The killing of 200 Sinhalese new settlers in Dollar and Kent in the district Mullaitivu in late 1984 was justified with the allegation that these were released prisoners known for their atrocities on Tamils while in the police or army or during riots⁴². It is, therefore, difficult to see them as the group which committed the senseless killing in Anuradhapura, an action more in style with the EPRLF or TELA on whom it has also been blamed. The exact timing and operation, however, make one think, because military precision is the hall-mark of the LTTE. The discipline is high, and a sort of military-situation-and-actions-performed-report day by day is given in every issue of the LTTE's paper⁴³. So far it is not clear if the recent murders and kidnappings of TULF members in Jaffna can be blamed on the LTTE as well, as it is known that the two men murdered, Alalasundaram and Dharmalingam had already been subject to armed LTTE attacks in February 1983 for alleged embezzlement of the funds of the Jaffna cooperative stores⁴⁵. These attacks rang in a climax of guerilla activity in 1983, of which more below, and in May the LTTE called for a hugely successful boycott of the local elections in Jaffna, although this success has, however, also to be credited to the murder of three UNP candidates by the LTTE shortly before the voting day.

b) Justification of an Independent Tamil Ilam: Sinhalese Suppression and Socialist Revolution

The justification of the demand for independence is nearly the same for all groups: They want to free Tamil Ilam from Sinhalese suppression by reason of its having all characteristics of a nation: homeland, language, tradition and culture of its own, all of which are threatened by the racist Sinhalese government in Sri Lanka. This racist suppression is highlighted by discriminative regulations and policies in the spheres of politics, language, culture, economy, education, land control and government service and by the disenfranchisement of the Indian Tamils in 1948. In the eyes of the guerillas, all these are preparations for planned, large-scale genocide⁴⁶. Against this, the guerillas fight a war of liberation in the Marxist-Leninist

style with some Guevarist and Maoist features thrown in: their fight is not only for the liberation of Īlam from the Sinhalese; this is only the first step. A socialist revolution is to follow which will liberate the suppressed, landless, lowcaste rural masses of Īlam from their bourgeois exploiters who collaborate with the Sinhalese capitalists⁴⁷. This liberation can only be brought about by violent and military means because all non-violent and parliamentary means have been exhausted and not led to any solution⁴⁸.

An important point in this programme is the question of cooperation with Sinhalese 'progressive forces'. Because PLOT considers these as just as oppressed as the Tamils themselves, it wants to cooperate with left and socialist groups among the Sinhalese and free these as well. The oppressors are the high-class Sinhalese, not the poor⁴⁹. PLOT conjures up ever greater cooperation from Sinhalese leftist and socialist parties, trade unions and other organizations⁵⁰!

The LTTE has a less idealistic point of view. Though it also considers the Sinhalese masses suppressed, it maintains that the propaganda of the government is extraordinarily successful among them, and that hatred against Tamils is blinding them to their real enemies. Any attempt at cooperation must therefore fail at this stage, when even the leftist parties adhere to a programme of enmity towards the Tamils⁵¹. The LTTE, no doubt, remembers the programme of the unsuccessful insurgence of 1971 where one of the main points of action of the JVP was to expel the Tamils from the country⁵².

These differences of opinion over programme and strategy, however, hide another, more basic difference between PLOT and LTTE stemming from the social structure in Jaffna and the Eastern province which has been maintained right into the membership of the guerilla groups. Like the TULF the PLOT is made up mostly of high-caste Vellalars, a farming and land-owning caste⁵³. This fact probably goes a long way to explaining why it has edged nearer to the TULF recently, even to the extent of forming a common block with it in Thimpu. The Vellalars form the top stratum of society in Jaffna and have, therefore, the most to lose from the detrimental measures introduced by the government. The LTTE seems to have a rather more mixed membership: in contrast to the Vellalar Uma Maheswaran, Prabhakaran, a member of the Karaiyar fishing caste and hailing from Valvettiturai (a famous smuggling centre), attracts not only members of this caste, but also fishermen from Mannar and the Eastern Province as well as quite a number of Christians and even some Muslims⁵⁴. The support for the LTTE from the disputed Eastern Province is stronger than for the PLOT (its Muslim representative in Thimpu notwithstanding). Caste differences obviously run deep in the guerilla groups, and it is possible that the LTTE constitutes a forum for all those castes below the Vellalars who claim, but are not given, equal status and are trying to assert themselves. That would account for their determination and acerbity coupled with the fact that the fishing castes of Jaffna have always had the reputation of being more adventurous and violent than the land-owning Vellalars⁵⁵. Support from the Eastern Province probably

comes from discontented groups in Batticaloa and Trincomalee where quarrels with newly settled Sinhalese in allegedly Tamil areas are most bitter. Both by choice and necessity the PLOT seems to have become mainly a propagandist group, but the determination and will of the LTTE to continue the armed fight still holds. In addition, its propaganda language is much more vivid, powerful and appealing compared with the rather dry repetition of chapters from the socialist primer by the PLOT:

LTTE: "In this situation we have to get rid of egoism among us, we have to grow a consciousness of society and race. We must not hoard our money, keep our pots filled, thinking if we live well that is enough, but we must help those who have no opportunities, against whom are the odds. To those without money and to those who are hungry we must give help. This is a national crisis, the hardships born from this crisis the national race has to overcome as a whole. If we let this burden be borne only by the poorest at the bottom of society, then we have to be called traitors to the nation."⁵⁶

PLOT: "(Our) propaganda is not only intended to prepare people for armed combat, but also to let the Sinhalese people know that we are not its enemies, that our fight is one against imperialism, and that for this fight we want to help the Sinhalese."⁵⁷

It was, however, the LTTE which in February 1983, after the attack on the managers of the Jaffna cooperative, demanded in posters all over Jaffna that doctors, landowners, capitalists etc. lower their fees, raise wages and share their possessions. They claim, moreover, to have interfered in caste and religious quarrels on behalf of the lower caste to achieve amicable settlements⁵⁸. These claims are, however, in contrast to reports in 1984 that guerillas attacked and killed some low-caste Tamils for allegedly not supporting the cause of an independent Tamil Īlam⁵⁹.

c) Harking back to the glorious past and the ancient borders of Tamil Īlam

Apart from the differences about the right way to liberation the aims and programmes of the guerilla groups are practically identical. This also derives from the social and cultural make-up of Tamil society: shorn of the Marxist rhetoric, the justification for the demand for independence lies in the claim to constitute a community of language, culture, religion, tradition and contiguous territory, in other words, the Tamil nation which has the right of self-determination and independence⁶⁰. It is not always easy to reconcile this with the Marxist ideology, for traditional Jaffna culture is based on the concept of an unequal society, of the dominance of one caste, the Vellalars, over all others in order to maintain cosmic order and on the importance of fulfilling one's prescribed function in this order⁶¹. When it is claimed that caste

and class should be done away with, but the Tamil traditional way of life, the Tamil language and traditional culture should be maintained, a contradiction therefore arises. What, then, is this traditional culture? In the words of the LTTE, it is the following:

"The soil where we were born, the soil where our ancestors were born, the soil where we have lived through generations from ancient times, our own soil; how can we tolerate the robbing of this soil from us, doing nothing? Ours is a language of antiquity and magnificence, ours is a superior culture and a true and good tradition. We are a people excelling in education, excelling in the arts, and who have seen hard work and hard-ship. A true national race like ours, who have a firm historical existence should live in submission to another national race? Why?"⁶²

For the LTTE, however, this does not at all contradict the socialist ideal: a real, progressive nationalist shows reverence to his country and its traditions, unlike a cosmopolitan bourgeois out for personal gain:

"If a national race loves its history filled with greatness and its language and culture, its tradition and ancient customs, that we call patriotism. One who discards this progressive patriotism, this love of the nation and calls for cosmopolitanism, is not a true socialist. People like these are bourgeois cosmopolitans."⁶³

The attempt is thus made to weave the Tamil tradition into a Marxist concept. At the same time the efforts to foster friendship between the ethnic groups in Sri Lanka by the English-educated elite, are repudiated with this argument. The PLOT, while arguing in a similar way, also repudiates and exposes the economic basis on which this culture rests in order to be able to find some common ground with the Sinhalese lower classes. Yet it cannot get away from the ethnic angle either. It blames the TULF especially (and that also means to a large extent Tamils living in Colombo) for not having achieved anything for the Tamils because its members are puppets of the British and the capitalists, educated in an English, i.e. foreign and decadent ideology and brainwashed to eschew violence and use 'fair means' to attain their rights. To counter this, PLOT wants to return to the indigenous Tamil culture and tradition mainly found in the rural areas⁶⁴. There is a bias to be seen here against towns people, and that means the antagonism of Vellalar farmers towards artisan and labourer castes in the towns (as represented by the LTTE). The picture of suppressed farmers painted by the PLOT seems, therefore, somehow not to tally with reality, though on the whole, the evaluation of the social and political situation is quite accurate. The PLOT especially warns of the dangers of applying the conditions of a revolutionary situation in one country to another, much smaller, country with totally different conditions⁶⁵. It becomes, however, clear that in spite of this, the PLOT does not delve too deeply into the analysis of the social and economic fabric when we consider what it has to say about the position of women in society. It simply

rehashes the description of the situation of women in other third world countries: they are suppressed socially, sexually and economically by bourgeois society and can only be liberated by the socialist revolution⁶⁶. They must, therefore, cooperate with the men in this task. Liberation, however, does not mean the decadent freedom of Western women, but something different: working for the revolution together with the men⁶⁷. Apart from the fact that such a sweeping evaluation is most probably wrong for other countries as well, it is certainly wrong for women in Jaffna who, both socially and economically, occupy a remarkable position in society and can in no case be related to the dumb, superstitious, weak creatures described by the PLOT. This does not mean that everything is well for women in Jaffna, but the disadvantages manifest themselves on other levels not penetrated by the PLOT rhetoric. LTTE here sees more clearly (and is maybe nearer to the population): it localizes economic suppression mainly in the plantations where the situation of women is so bad that it would really be an effort not to recognize it. In Jaffna it is not so much exploitation and suppression that plagues society, but hypocrisy due to the traditional and caste structure⁶⁸. Another sore spot is the dowry system. Here, however, the problem is skirted when the LTTE attacks the dowry system as detrimental principally to women's interests. Originally, just the opposite was the case, i.e. dowry constituted a sort of financial security for women in the event of their husband being unable or unwilling to support them⁶⁹.

The LTTE does not criticize the abuses of this system, but voices resentment against the fact that the dowry has to be acquired by the whole family, i.e. the brothers are requested to work for it and do not get anything in return. There is a lurking suspicion that it is not so much the humiliation the dowry imposes on the women that is chastised but the demand on the brothers to acquire it. The LTTE, moreover, indulges in the double standards it criticizes when talking about rape as another severe form of suppression. It is, however, not rape as such that is condemned but the fact that rape is committed on Tamil women by Sinhalese soldiers who thereby destroy the chastity of these women and render them unfit for marriage to Tamil men⁷⁰!

The guerillas tread on surer ground when they call the people to fight in terms of the heroic classical Tamil tradition: a fight for the motherland, language, chastity. The deeds of the ancient kings whose 'national' symbol was the tiger from which the guerillas derive their name, are extolled in the *Puranānūru*, and the guerillas have been exhorted to fight with its stanzas in mind, for example those which tell of the heroic mother who sends her little son to the battlefield after both her husband and her brother have been killed in cattle raids⁷¹.

The glorious past justifies the present fight. This applies not only to the *Puranānūru* tradition, but also to that of the Kingdom of Jaffna and the earlier one of Imperial Cola rule in Sri Lanka, which are claimed as specifically Jaffna Tamil history on the basis of the *Yalppāna Vaipava Mālai* (YVM)⁷². In factual content, the YVM cannot be compared with the Sinhalese chronicles, but it is important for the slant it gives to certain undisputed events in Sri

Lankan history, e.g. the story of Vijaya. In the YVM he is portrayed as a Śaivite Indian prince married to a Tamil wife emigrating to Sri Lanka and building some of the oldest Śaivite temples there. According to the YVM, it was he who called Buddhist settlers from Siam to the country⁷³. Both the rule of the Colas and the time of the kingdom of Jaffna figure prominently in the YVM, and the guerillas rely on this tradition, if not explicitly, then implicitly. What happened to the Sinhala traditions and sources earlier, now also happens to the Tamil sources and historiography: they acquire an anti-Sinhalese slant, and the Sinhalese are portrayed as the eternal enemy. The last king of Jaffna, Caṅkili who made a last stand against the Portuguese in 1619-20, is made into a national hero by the guerillas. Caṅkili, however, was also the name of the ruthless king who slaughtered 600 Christians in Mannar in 1540 and killed or expelled the last Buddhist Sinhalese from Jaffna. In the tradition, both kings are sometimes considered as one because of the identical name⁷⁴.

For the Tamil guerillas, therefore, the suppression of the Tamils does not only begin in 1948 or even 1921, but much earlier with the Colebrooke-Cameron reforms of 1833:

"... till 1833, there existed separate states in Lanka. After 1833, the three separate states were brought under one central administrative organization for reasons of administrative convenience and disregarding the opposition of the Tamils and Sinhalese."⁷⁵

From then on, measures disadvantageous to the Tamils are adopted in fast succession: the rejection of communal seats, the colonization plans of the 30s and so on. Constitutional reforms have proved particularly detrimental to Tamil interests:

"Subsequently, new constitutional regulations were made in Lanka in the years 1920, 1924, 1931, 1946, 1972, 1978. All these constitutional amendments gradually came to be used to undermine the rights of the Tamil people."⁷⁶

After independence, it is no longer a question of suppression, but of planned genocide by the Sinhalese government from as early as 1948 onwards. 1956, 1958, 1961, 1964, 1965, 1972, 1974, 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1983 are only the hallmarks of this development⁷⁷. History is being streamlined to fit the requirements of the guerillas, and in this play the TULF has the rather sinister role of the cunning bourgeois out to get what it can from the spoils. Chelvanayagam, the father of the Tamil nation, is portrayed as a naive 'do-gooder' outwitted by the Sinhalese at every turn⁷⁸.

The reference to the Kingdom of Jaffna as justification for independence, is, however, fraught with internal dangers. This kingdom definitely did not include the Eastern Province, particularly Batticaloa which are nowadays claimed as Tamil areas. There has even existed a mutual antagonism between Jaffna Vellalars and Batticaloa Mukkuvars, to which the chronicles also testify⁷⁹. While Jaffna kings derived their legitimacy from a Pandyan dynasty,


the Mukkuvars of Batticaloa traditionally consider themselves as a fief of a Cola king, and against the attempts of the Kingdom of Jaffna to rule them, they claimed the king in Kandy as their overlord⁸⁰. To demand Tamil Īlam in the name of the Kingdom of Jaffna is therefore not the best way to draw the east coast Tamils in. This is, however, where the LTTE has an advantage over all other groups simply because of its name: The tiger was the symbol of rule and power of the Colas, though chosen also as a counterweight against the Sinhala conception of themselves as the 'lion race'. But the reference to Cola power is surely no accident on the part of the Tigers. They are, moreover, the only group which wants to make Trincomalee and not Jaffna the capital of the planned Īlam for reasons both historical and political⁸¹. They would thus stand more chances of support in the East, this also in view of the fact that they too are mainly fisher castes like the Mukkuvars and not Vellalars, like the PLOT members.

The extension of the Kingdom of Jaffna and of Cola rule define the borders of the demanded Tamil Īlam. The attached map shows that it is not only the Northern peninsula, which would not be a viable economic unit, nor even Trincomalee and Batticaloa on the east coast, but it is nearly a quarter of the island's territory, including long strips of the west and east coast: Chilaw and Puttalam in the West and Pottuvil south of Batticaloa in the East. These are called traditional Tamil homelands, not least because the power of the Kingdom of Jaffna once extended as far as Puttalam.

GROUPS TO SUPPORT AND COOPERATE WITH

All guerilla groups explicitly declare their sympathy and support not only for the east coast Tamils, but also for the Tamil-speaking Muslims whose assent to an independent Īlam they are seeking. Yet, it was mainly the LTTE who could gain a measure of support from these, while the PLOT has been less successful. The Muslims, though Tamil-speaking, do not consider themselves Tamils and have always been wary of the demands of the TULF (although a Muslim United Front = MUF allied itself with the TULF for the elections in 1977) and the guerillas but did not give their whole-hearted support to the Sinhalese government either. Both ethnic groups have tried and still try to win them over to their side. In its tales of horror against Tamil-speaking people by the Sinhalese, the LTTE also lists the Sinhalese-Muslim riots in Puttalam in 1976⁸² and a further reason why it wants to include Puttalam in Īlam is the fact of a sizeable Muslim population there.

In the East, the guerillas have a strong argument to ask for the support of both the Tamils and the Muslims against the Sinhalese: the colonization problem, which has been the cause of bitter dispute between Tamils and Sinhalese since the 1950s. This colonization was started in the 1930s with the aim of



Source: TULF Election Manifesto 1977, Kopay 1977

settling landless Ceylonese (which meant citizens of Ceylon of all ethnic groups) in the jungle areas of the North-central and Eastern provinces. Over time, the Sinhalese began to consider this scheme as their privilege as the majority community and as a return to the old heartland of the Sinhalese kings of old, the rajarata⁸³. The Tamils regarded this consequently as a plot to rob them of their traditional homeland and settlement areas. This colonization concentrated on the border region to the Jaffna peninsula and on areas around Trincomalee and Batticaloa in the East, and it led to bitter feuds between the new settlers and the old inhabitants. The eastern Muslim-majority district of Amparai comes to mind as a particularly troubled area because it is surrounded by a Sinhalese-majority district. Though only carved out as a Muslim district in the early 60s, there are now rumours of plans to merge it with the Sinhalese-majority district, Moneragala, thus depriving the Muslims of their majority⁸⁴. The dubious status of the East has led troublesome elements to instigate frictions between Muslims and Tamils there. The most recent of these were the Tamil-Muslim riots in Batticaloa in April 1985 which were, however, according to unanimous statements by all witnesses, externally rather than internally initiated⁸⁵. All guerilla groups firmly denied any involvement in these.

Plans published by the government in late 1984 to settle Sinhalese in Jaffna proper and arm them for self-defence have led to an unprecedented outcry by the guerillas and will certainly not help to solve the problem of colonisation⁸⁶.

Another group which needs, according to the guerillas, their support and liberation, are the Indian Tamils in the plantations about whose problems much has been written. But while the concern for the Tamils from the east coast and the Muslims leads to positive actions, tangible support for the Indian Tamils has yet to be forthcoming. This is not only a question of geographical, but also of social distance, as the Indian Tamils are low-class and low-caste. The concern for the low castes even in Jaffna is, as we have seen, more talked about than acted upon, for the simple reason that most of the guerillas stem from other than the lowest castes and landless labourers and want to maintain a traditional culture in which these castes are assigned a very lowly place.

LOOK OVER THE BORDERS: INDIA AND THE WORLD

Relations between India and the guerilla groups are rather ambivalent. While the TULF was hitherto accorded the status of legitimate representative of the Tamils, the guerillas had rather a free run in Tamilnadu and there were even rumours of training camps there. Lately, the attitude of the Indian government has hardened, and guerilla actions have been checked and supervised rather more closely. This, however, went hand in hand with their official recognition as partners at the talks in Thimpu, which was a major victory for them. PLOT

as well as ENLF made it clear that for them these talks were not so much a search for a solution but a forum where they could expose the Sinhalese atrocities to a global audience⁸⁷. It furnished them also with an opportunity to make known their four-point-programme of basic rights without the acknowledgement of which no progress in the talks will be likely⁸⁸. The guerillas seem to recognize India's difficult position towards them better than the TULF in spite of recent recriminations. They explicitly refuse Indian military help to attain independence (as the TULF has allegedly demanded) and merely demand recognition along the lines of the PLO and Namibia while maintaining that they want to fight their own battles themselves⁸⁹ - or emphasizing the importance of positive propaganda world-wide in preference to military help⁹⁰. An old antagonism against Indian overbearing attitudes and possible overlordship seems to be reasserting itself in view of the less than sympathetic attitude of the Indian government. In their demand for Indian assistance, the guerilla shrewdly omit the human rights issue already worked to death by the TULF but point to the geostrategical situation. A Tamil Īlam sympathetic towards India and in possession of Trincomalee harbour would be far more advantageous than a Sri Lanka whose attitude is ambivalent at best and positively pro-American at worst, thus endangering the plan for the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. It is, therefore, in India's own interest to support the guerillas⁹¹. It is here that the guerilla groups' rhetoric against US and world imperialism and capitalism comes in most useful, while in other contexts it seems to be more of a ritual than a programme.

In Tamilnadu itself, the guerillas need not beg for sympathy, for it runs deep and strong, a fact brought home forcefully to Rajiv Gandhi recently when in the wake of the deportation of three Tamil leaders all hell broke loose in Tamilnadu, including blockage of rail and road links, exploding of railway lines and huge black-flag-demonstrations in Madras⁹². Even if the support for the Tamils should wane somewhat over time in the light of about 100 000 refugees competing for jobs with the Tamils, this sympathy has strong roots and will not easily evaporate. Tamilnadu will remain a convenient vanishing point for the guerillas. Support organizations for the Tamil cause are mushrooming all over Tamilnadu, and now there is even a rumour of plans to train young Indian Tamils to swell the ranks of the guerillas in Jaffna⁹³.

The future of the guerillas is, at the moment, not easy to predict. But it is quite certain that their influence among the population has now outstripped that of the TULF and that support is mounting the more atrocities the army commits; blood, sweat and tears which such a support might entail⁹⁴ notwithstanding. With ENLF and PLOT, a solution will be difficult, without them, impossible. They are the ones who call the shots in Jaffna. But even they are in danger of losing initiative to their even more reckless extremist successors, a new generation of guerillas, and that harbours even graver dangers if a solution is not found soon.

Abbreviations:

CNC	Ceylon National Congress
CPC	Communist Party of Ceylon
ENLF	Ealam National Liberation Front
EPRLF	Ealam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front
EROS	Ealam Revolutionary Organization of Students
GUES	General Union of Ealam Students
ITAK	Ilaḥkai Tamiḷ Aracuk Kaṭci = Federal Party (FP)
JVP	Janatha Vimukti Peramuna
LSSP	Lanka Sama Samaj Party
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam
MUF	Muslim United Front
PLOT	People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Ealam
SLFP	Sri Lanka Freedom Party
TC	Tamil Congress
TEA	Tamil Ealam Army
TELA	Tamil Ealam Liberation Army
TELE	Tamil Ealam Liberation Extremists
TELF	Tamil Ealam Liberation Front
TELO	Tamil Ealam Liberation Organization
TII	Tamiḷ Iḷaiṅṅar Iyakkam
TMP	Tamiḷ Māṅavar Pēravai
TNT	Tamil New Tigers
TUF	Tamil United Front
TULF	Tamil United Liberation Front
UNP	United National Party
YVM	Yāḷppāṅa Vaipava Mālai

Note on Transliteration:

All names and expressions in Tamil and Sinhala have been given in their Anglicized form except for the names of texts and quotes from these. Tamiḷ Iḷam has been transliterated throughout except in quotes where the Anglicized form applies.

Notes:

- 1) Gananath Obeyesekere, Political Violence and the Future of Democracy in Sri Lanka. In: Internationales Asienforum 15 (1984), 39-60.
- 2) Michael Roberts, Elites, Nationalisms and the Nationalist Movement in Ceylon. In: Documents of the Ceylon National Congress 1929-1950, ed. M. Roberts, vol. I, Colombo 1977, p. ccvi fn.

- 3) K.M.De Silva, A History of Sri Lanka, London 1981, p.383/4.
- 4) The Yalppana Vaibhava Malai or the history of the Kingdom of Jaffna. Translated from the Tamil by C.Brito, Colombo 1879.
- 5) S.Rasanayagam, Ancient Jaffna, Madras 1926.
- 6) K.Civatampi, *Īlattiil Tamil Īlakkiyam* (Tamil Literature in Sri Lanka), Madras 1978, p.53 ff.
- 7) see D.Hellmann-Rajanayagam, *Tamil - Sprache als politisches Symbol*, Wiesbaden 1984, p.162.
- 8) For the problem of standardization see C.R.de Silva, *Sinhala-Tamil Relations and Educations in Sri Lanka: The University Admissions Issue - The First Phase, 1971-7*, and K.M.de Silva, *University Admissions and Ethnic Tension in Sri Lanka: 1977-82*, both in: *From Independence to Statehood. Managing Ethnic Conflict in Five African and Asian States*; eds. R.B.Goldmann and A.J.Wilson, London 1984, pp.125-146 and 97-110.
- 9) A.Jeyaratnam Wilson, *The Gaullist System in Asia. The Constitution of Sri Lanka* (1978), London 1980, p.25.
- 10) *Cōciyalicat Tamil Īlattai nōkki* (Towards a socialist Tamil Īlam), n.p. LTTE publication 1980, p.8 f.
- 11) A.S.Balasingham, *Liberation Tigers and Tamil Ealam Freedom Struggle*, in: *Towards Liberation. Selected political documents of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam*. npp., 1984, p.38.
- 12) *Viṭutalaip Pulikaḷ* (Liberation Tigers, the LTTE monthly), Madras, Dec. 1984.
- 13) Wilson, *Politics in Sri Lanka 1948-1979*, London 1980, p.154 f. See also: *Īnaverippiṭikkuḷ Īlattamiḷinam* (The Tamil Race in the Grip of Racism), LTTE Publication, n.p., 1981, p.2.
- 14) *ibid.* p.3 f.
- 15) *ibid.*
- 16) TULF election manifesto 1977, Kopay 1977.
- 17) *Proscribing of Liberation Tigers and other similar Organizations. Law Nr. 16 of 1978.*
- 18) *Diary of Combat*, LTTE Publication 10, n.p., 1984, p.28/29.
- 19) *Personal Communication.*
- 20) *Puṭiya Pātai* (The New Path, Monthly of the PLOT), Madras(?), Jan.-Feb. 1985, p.2.
- 21) *Tamiḷ Īla Makkaḷ Viṭutalaik Kaḷakam* (PLOT journal from 1983 on the occasion of the foundation of the ENLF) *General Understanding*, n.p., p.1.
- 22) *ibid.*, p.1/2
- 23) *ibid.*, *Tēvaṇukku ematu aṅcali* (Our homage to Tēvaṇ).
- 24) *Makkaḷ Pātai* (People's Path), Madras, Feb.-March 1985 p.4 f.
- 25) *Viṭutalaip Pulikaḷ*, April 1985, p.9.
- 26) In a pamphlet issued by the PLOT News Coordination Bureau in 1984, n.p., n.d.: *Cuḷipuram Īlaiṅarkaḷ kolai oru tiṭṭamiṭṭa cati?* (Was the murder of the youngsters in *Ḥulipuram* a planned trick?)
- 27) *Viṭutalaip Pulikaḷ*, April 1985, p.4. The agreement is published in the

- issue of May 1985, p.2.
- 28) cf. Putiya Pātai March 1985, p.2 and 4; cf. also issue of July 1985.
- 29) *ibid.*
- 30) Viṭṭalaip Pulikaḷ, 15.3.1984, p.11.
- 31) The Hindu, 5.2.1982.
- 32) Viṭṭalaip Pulikaḷ, May 1985, p.2 and Diary of Combat, *loc.cit.*, p.43/44.
- 33) Putiya Pātai, September 1984, p.10. See also Tamil Ḫattin Kural (The Voice of Tamil Ealam), n.p., 1984, p.4.
- 34) Makkalaḻ Viṭṭalaiyai venṛeṭṭuppōm (We will obtain people's liberation), PLOT News Coordination Bureau, n.p. 1985, p.18.
- 35) Viṭṭalaik Kural (Voice of Liberation) PLOT European Branch, n.p., Dec. 1984, p.4.
- 36) Interview with Prabhakaran in Sunday, 11-17 March 1984, repr. in Towards Liberation, *loc.cit.*, p.83/84.
- 37) Putiya Pātai, March 1985, p.4/5.
- 38) Viṭṭalaip Pulikaḷ, Aug.1984.
- 39) see n.11.
- 40) Diary of Combat, *loc.cit.*, p.11/13.
- 41) Viṭṭalaip Pulikaḷ, 15.3.1984, p.6/7.
- 42) Tamil Ḫattin Kural, *loc.cit.*, p.4/5.
- 43) see for example Viṭṭalaip Pulikaḷ, May 1985 and Diary of Combat, *loc.cit.*
- 44) In an interview with 'Sunday' (29th Oct.1985), Prabhakaran denied the involvement of the LTTE in the murders.
- 45) Diary of Combat, *loc.cit.*, p.33/34, cf. also Saturday Review, Jaffna, 23.2.1983.
- 46) cf. Putiya Pātai December 1984, p.1.
- 47) Cōciyalicat Tamil Ḫattai nōkki, *loc.cit.*, see esp. p.7 f., p.25 f.
- 48) *ibid.*, p.37. The PLOT justifies its armed fight sometimes with the strangest allies: In Putiya Pātai September 1984, p.4, it states that armed fight is justified because von Clausewitz already said that war is the continuation of politics with other means!
- 49) Viṭṭalaik Kural, July-Aug. 1985, p.17.
- 50) Makkalaḻ Viṭṭalaiyai venṛeṭṭuppōm, *loc.cit.*, p.11.
- 51) Cōciyalicat Tamil Ḫattai nōkki, *loc.cit.*, p.35. On p.33 it is stated that only one left party, the CPC, has conceded the Tamils the right to secession on principle.
- 52) *ibid.*, p.2 f. cf. also Oskar Weggel, Sri Lanka - Konfliktpotential und Außenpolitik, Hamburg 1978.
- 53) Bryan Pfaffenberger, Fourth World Colonialism, Indigenous Minorities and Tamil Separatism in Sri Lanka. In: Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol.16, 1984, p.21.
- 54) It is, naturally, nearly impossible to get access to membership lists of the guerilla groups and find out about their constitution castewise. The conclusions about the membership according to caste and religion I have drawn, somewhat macabrely, from the lists of 'fallen heroes' and

- necrologues regularly published in both the papers of the LTTE and the PLOT. These conclusions are, therefore, highly tentative.
- 55) Pfaffenberger, loc.cit., p.21.
 - 56) Viṭutalaip Pulikaḷ, April 1985, p.2 (from a speech by Prabhakaran).
 - 57) Putiya Pātai, June-July 1985, p.2.
 - 58) Diary of Combat, loc.cit., p.44.
 - 59) Asia Yearbook 1985, Hongkong 1985, pp.286.
 - 60) Cōciyalicat Tamil ḷḷattai nōkki, loc.cit., p.27.
 - 61) Pfaffenberger, Caste in Tamil Culture. The Foundations of Sudra Domination in Tamil Sri Lanka. Bombay 1982.
 - 62) Cōciyalicat Tamil ḷḷattai nōkki, loc.cit., p.32.
 - 63) ibid., p.37.
 - 64) Spark, Vol.1, 1984 (the Plot English Language Magazine), London(?), p.33.
 - 65) Putiya Pātai, June-July 1985, p.6.
 - 66) PLOT Bulletin, vol.1, no.4, London, 1984, p.3 f.
 - 67) Putiya Pātai, August 1985, p.5.
 - 68) Atēl Pālaciṅkam, Peṅkaḷum Puraṭciyum (Women and Revolution) n.p. LTTE Publication 1984, p.35.
 - 69) cf. Mohan H.Kantawala, A Thesis on the Thesawalamai, Jaffna 1930.
 - 70) Pālaciṅkam, loc.cit., p.34.
 - 71) Puranānūru 279. The stanza in translation reads: Breathtaking is the courage of this woman, she belongs in the line of our heroines. Only the day before yesterday her brother was killed on the battlefield, when he attacked an elephant with his spear; yesterday her husband was killed while trying to prevent the theft of his cattle; today she hears the drum calling to battle again; confused is she, she only has her little son; she oils his hair, ties it in a knot, dresses him in white robes, gives him the spear in his hand and sends him to battle. This is quoted by M.C.Cēnātirācar, Tamil ḷḷam Malara (May Tamil ḷḷam Flourish), in: ITAK Veḷḷi Viḷā Malar (Souvenir for the Silver Jubilee of the ITAK), Jaffna 1974, p.50.
 - 72) For this article, I am referring to the edition of the YVM of 1953: Mātakal Mayilvākanap Pulavar eḷutiya Yāḷppāṇa Vaipava Mālai, Colombo 1953; ed. Mutaliyar Kula Capanātan.
 - 73) YVM, loc.cit., p.3/4. On the sources of the YVM cf. S.Pathmanathan, The Kingdom of Jaffna. Part I. (ca.1250-1450), Colombo 1978, and S.Gnana Prakasar, Sources of the Yalppana-Vaipava-Malai, in: The Ceylon Antiquary and Literary Register, vol.VI, 1920-21, p.135-141.
 - 74) YVM, loc.cit., p.59 f. and 70-80, cf. fn. p.70.
 - 75) Makkaḷiṅ Viṭutalaiyai venreṭuppōm, loc.cit., p.2.
 - 76) ibid., p.4.
 - 77) cf. Balasingham, loc.cit., p.34 ff.
 - 78) Makkaḷiṅ Viṭutalaiyai venreṭuppōm, loc.cit., p.3.
 - 79) YVM, loc.cit., p.9/10.
 - 80) ibid., p.8, 10. See also Pathmanathan, loc.cit., p.132 and 136.

- 81) A.S. Balasingham to Anita Pratap in Sunday, Aug. 1984, pp.31. Since this manuscript was written, the importance of the Northeastern Province as a pawn for both the Sinhalese and the Tamils has risen enormously. It is felt that the possession of the Northeast will decide the outcome of the fight and the chances for survival of an independent Tamil State. Consequently, the battle in the Northeast has become increasingly fierce and bitter over the last few months.
- 82) Inaverip̄iṭikkul̄ Īlat Tamil̄inam, loc.cit., p.9-12.
- 83) de Silva, loc.cit., p.404.
- 84) Putiya Pātai, August 1985, p.4.
- 85) cf. Far Eastern Economic Review, 2nd May 1984, p.23.
- 86) Putiya Pātai, March 1985, p.1 and 11.
- 87) ibid., June-July 1985, p.1 and 11.
- 88) These four points were submitted by the PLOT, but agreed upon by both ENLF and PLOT. They comprised 1) the right of self-determination of the Tamils, 2) integrity of Tamil traditional territory, 3) citizenship for the Indian Tamils, 4) right of autonomy for the Tamils. In: Putiya Pātai, June-July 1985, p.12.
- 89) Viṭutalaip Pulikaḷ, April 1985, p.2 and Tiṇac Cuṭar (Daily Lamp), Madras, 16.5.85.
- 90) Putiya Pātai, June-July 1985, p.2. The PLOT operates a radio station called VOTE (Voice of Tamil Ealam) from Madras.
- 91) Viṭutalaip Pulikaḷ, August 1984.
- 92) Times of India 31st August 1985.
- 93) ibid.
- 94) Viṭutalaip Pulikaḷ, April 1985, p.2.