

THE ZUNYI CONFERENCE AND THE RISE OF MAO ZEDONG

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1. INTRODUCTION

It has long been realized that the Zunyi Conference (1935) was a very important event in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and a crucial turning-point in the career of Mao Zedong. But details of the discussions and decisions of the conference have never been known outside China. Similarly there was never any reliable information about the positions Mao Zedong held in the decade following the Zunyi Conference. This article will solve these two problems. As the speeches and minutes of this conference have never been openly available, memoirs of several participants in the Long March are the main source for research.

a) The Zunyi Conference

Even though most historians emphasize the importance of the Long March for the communist movement and Mao Zedong, the accounts of this period of CCP history published in Hongkong, Taiwan and Western countries only offer a confusing picture full of inaccuracies and contradictions.

I will give two examples: J. Ch'en (1969:18-20) argues that Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, He Kequan and Otto Braun did not participate in the conference while Wang Jiaxiang did. However, Guo Hualun (1969:13), Wang Jianmin (1974:646) and J. P. Harrison (1973:245) argue that Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun, He Kequan and Otto Braun did participate while Wang Jiaxiang did not.

All of the above-mentioned authors and many others agree that at the Zunyi Conference Mao Zedong became chairman. But according to J. Chen (1969:36) and W. Bartke (1981:582) Mao became chairman of the Political Bureau. According to J. Guillermez (1972:255) Mao became chairman of the Central Committee. According to Wang Jianmin (1974:656), Guo Hualun (1969:18), J. P. Harrison (1973:246) and T. Scharping (1976:44) Mao became chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. One H. Meyer (1982:243) argues that

Mao became chairman of all three committees. But Chinese sources prove that the posts of chairman of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee did not exist before 1943, while the Military Affairs Committee was headed by Zhu De before and after the Zunyi Conference (Chronicle, 1981:70; Yan, 1983:54). Thus none of the assumptions of the abovementioned scholars can be correct. What actually happened to Mao Zedong at Zunyi will be described below.

b) The Rise of Mao Zedong

The rise of Mao Zedong in and after 1935 was not his first but his third rise to power. Mao had already participated in the founding congress of the CCP in July 1921 and by summer 1923 he had become one of the five leading cadres when he was elected into the Central Bureau (Zhongyangju), which also included Chen Duxiu, Luo Zhanlong, Cai Hesen and Tan Pingshan. In early 1924 he also became a candidate of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee (Materials, 1982:167-168; Chronicle, 1981:8). But in the autumn of 1923 - after being accused of rightist policies - Mao had left Shanghai and returned to Hunan. For the following half decade he did not hold any important post in the CCP hierarchy (Jiang, 1985:141-144).

Mao's second rise to power was the result of his success in creating and consolidating the Jiangxi Soviet after the CCP's near extinction in 1927. As communist influence in other areas diminished, Jiangxi became the centre of CCP activity and thus Mao's position improved. By 1930 he was the political and military leader of the Soviet (Jiang, 1985:131-132).

But the situation changed when the central CCP organization moved into Jiangxi. Mao lost his military power when - on 25 November 1931 - the Central Military Affairs Committee was formed and Zhu De became chairman and Peng Dehuai and Wang Jiaxiang vice-chairmen (Yan, 1983:54). In the following month Zhou Enlai arrived and later replaced Mao as political commissar of the First Front Army. Then, in 1933, the Central Bureau started a campaign against the so-called 'Luo-Ming-line' which was, in fact, directed against Mao Zedong and his supporters, including Deng Xiaoping (Luo, 1982:234 ff.). It is interesting that Deng at that time - as during the following three decades - already supported Mao, while their main opponent was Zhou Enlai, who led the campaign (Braun, 1982:34,56-69). In early 1934 Zhang Wentian replaced Mao as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Central Government and Mao had thus lost all his power (Wang, 1983:140). During that year Mao was for some time kept under house arrest, while several of his supporters were imprisoned. When the Long March started the CCP leaders first wanted to leave Mao in Jiangxi, which would have meant his certain death, but because of his popularity with the soldiers he finally managed to participate (Wu, 1982:I,176). In autumn 1934 Mao's position thus reached its lowest point since the founding of the CCP. In addition to that Mao was seriously ill with malaria

- during the first few weeks of the march he had to be carried on a stretcher (Wu, 1982:II, 170).

2. THE EARLY STAGES OF THE LONG MARCH

After the establishment of the Jiangxi Soviet the Guomindang organized five 'encirclement' campaigns to destroy the communist base. In 1930 and 1931 Mao Zedong successfully led the resistance against the first three campaigns; in 1932 and 1933 Zhou Enlai replaced Mao as military leader and succeeded in resisting the fourth campaign. But then the Comintern adviser Otto Braun took over and caused a disaster, which brought the end of the Soviet and necessitated a hurried westward flight of the Red Army - this was later called 'Long March'. At the beginning of the March the military leadership lay in the hands of the 'triumvirate' (San rentuan): Otto Braun, Qin Bangxian and Zhou Enlai. Simultaneously the Central Military Affairs Committee was headed by Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang (Yan, 1983:54). The Communist Party was led by the unofficial 'Standing Committee'¹ of the Political Bureau, which included 'general secretary' Qin Bangxian, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian and Chen Yun. The other two members of the Political Bureau - Mao Zedong² and Zhu De - did not have any real political influence (Central Party School, 1985:1).

But the disaster in Jiangxi and heavy losses during the early stages of the march, which after less than two months - mid-October to early December 1934 - had reduced the Red Army to one third of its original strength, caused a growing discontentment with the 'triumvirate' and particularly with the Comintern adviser Otto Braun, who was responsible for military strategy (Huang, 1985:35-36).

Two of the military leaders of the Red Army who are still alive - Nie Rongzhen and Li Weiha - recently published their memoirs and described the situation at this stage:

"While I was carried on a stretcher I had ample time for thought. (...) When we used Comrade Mao Zedong's strategies and tactics during the first four campaigns against 'encirclement', we achieved magnificent victories. But at the time of the fifth campaign against 'encirclement' it was different. Even though great changes in the enemy's situation took place, during the fight against the enemy the basic problems were the leadership and the line. In early 1933 the provisional Central Committee of the Party had moved to the Central Soviet and in September 1933 the military adviser Li De (Otto Braun) arrived too. The whole guiding ideology and tactical principles were completely changed and extreme 'leftist' and unrealistic policies adopted. Particularly after the fifth plenary session of the Sixth Central Committee in 1934 Wang Ming's

'leftist' line dominated the Central Soviet and Comrade Mao Zedong hardly had a right to speak. The 'leftist' adventurists even dared to claim that the "fight against the fifth 'encirclement' was the struggle for the final victory in the Chinese revolution". They made many mistakes and the Red Army suffered serious losses. After we had crossed the Xiang river, the Red Army had only 30 000 men. This made me feel very anxious. Lying on the stretcher I really thought long and hard why Comrade Mao Zedong was not asked to take over the leadership." (Nie, 1983:120-121)

"... Only afterwards did I learn that the 'leftist' opportunist leaders planned to join the Second and Sixth Army in the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou base. When the enemy realized this, he tried to encircle us with 400 000 troops in three lines, thus creating the fourth blockade and intending to annihilate our whole army at the Xiang river. Therefore the battle of the Xiang river became very difficult and the Red Army lost more than half of its troops. At the beginning of the Long March the Central Army included over 80 000 men, after the battle only 30 000 remained. This made people wonder why the campaigns against the first, second, third and fourth 'encirclement' succeeded and the fifth one was such a disastrous failure." (Li, 1985:32)

3. THE ZUNYI CONFERENCE

The decisions and changes in policy usually associated with the Zunyi Conference were, in fact, the result of five different meetings of Party and Army leaders. These were held between December 1934 and March 1935 in Tongdao, Liping, Zunyi, Jimingsansheng and Yaxi.

a) The Tongdao and Liping meetings

After the Red Army had crossed the Xiang river and was considerably weakened, it was confronted with strong Guomindang troops blocking the way to Western Hunan which was the original destination of the march. In this critical situation - on 11 December 1934 - some CCP and Army leaders including Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang, Mao Zedong and Otto Braun met in Tongdao - east of the Hunan-Guizhou border - to hold an urgent conference (Li, 1985:33). Mao Zedong proposed to move westwards into Guizhou to avoid a hopeless battle with the strong enemy; Otto Braun insisted on the original plan to move northwards (Nie, 1983:114-115).

Otto Braun wrote in his memoirs:

"Once again, Mao Tse-tung brusquely rejected my suggestion. He insisted that we continue westward into the interior of Kweichow. This time he was

supported not only by Lo Fu (Zhang Wentian) and Wang Chia-hsiang, but by Chou Enlai as well. This was the first indication of Chou's shifting of allegiance. . . . Mao thus forced through his countersuggestion." (Braun, 1982:92)

Supporting Mao's view Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang decided to move westwards and thus ended the military dominance of Otto Braun (and Qin Bangxian) (Lin, 1982:73-75).

On 18 December - after arriving in Liping on the Western side of the border - a full meeting of the Political Bureau decided to give up the original plan to move north to join forces with the Second and Sixth Army Corps. Instead the Red Army were to march to Zunyi, hold an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau to discuss further strategies and establish a base in Northern Guizhou (Li, 1985:33; Chen, 1935:1). This decision was an important victory for Mao Zedong as the conference in Zunyi would restore to him some of the power he had lost in the preceding years and would also limit Otto Braun's influence.

But who supported Mao Zedong and thus made a change in the leadership possible? Wu Xiuquan and Nie Rongzhen - two participants in the Long March - provide an answer:

"Since the beginning of the Long March the troops had suffered serious losses and morale was very low; there were discussions within the leadership and dissatisfaction with the errors of the military command. I remember that during the fight against the fifth 'encirclement' in the Soviet area Zhang Wentian told me that the command of Li De was unacceptable. How could a war be won in that way? This shows that he already had some objections and that his later support for Chairman Mao was no coincidence. But the main proponent of the Zunyi Conference was in fact Comrade Wang Jiaxiang. At that time he was vice-chairman of the Military Affairs Committee and chief of the General Political Department, but as he was badly wounded and in a serious condition, during the Long March he was carried on a stretcher; he often met Comrade Mao Zedong and when they rested or prepared for the night, they often discussed the current military line. After continuous talks Comrade Wang Jiaxiang supported Comrade Mao Zedong's views; later he exchanged his ideas with Comrade Zhang Wentian and both backed Chairman Mao's opinions." (Wu, 1982:II, 170)

"At that time Comrade Wang Jiaxiang (the chief of the General Political Department) also lay on a stretcher as he had been wounded during an air attack of the fifth 'encirclement' in the Central Soviet. Thus we often had opportunities to exchange our views. His opinion was: the facts had already proved that people like Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian) and Li De (Otto Braun) were useless and that a change in leadership was inevitable. Comrade Wang Jiaxiang proposed that Comrade Mao Zedong should be asked to take over the leadership and I replied that I completely agreed and already had the same idea. But this problem could only be solved at a high level confer-

ence." (Nie, 1983:121-122)

It is significant that Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian, who had both originally belonged to the so-called 'internationalist faction' and never before supported Mao Zedong, now began to promote him. But this only meant that they agreed with Mao's military strategies which had earlier been successful. On matters of general policy there was still as much disagreement as before, but these did not really count during the Long March, when everything depended on military success.

After the Liping meeting mobile warfare tactics - as used by Mao Zedong a few years earlier - were adopted again and Zunyi was quickly reached with minimal losses (Li, 1985:33).

b) The Zunyi Conference

The Red Army first entered and occupied Zunyi on 7 January 1935; the Central Committee and Military Affairs Committee arrived on 9 January and the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau lasted for three days - from 15 to 17 January. On 18 January the troops began to leave Zunyi (Li, 1983:17-19).

The Zunyi Conference was attended by 18 CCP leaders, one Comintern adviser and his interpreter (Li, 1983:20-21)³.

Members and candidates of the Political Bureau of the CCP:

Mao Zedong	Chairman of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic
Zhu De	Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee and commander-in-chief of the Red Army
Chen Yun	CCP and Youth League secretary in the National Federation of Trade Unions, political commissar of the column of the Military Affairs Committee
Zhou Enlai	Vice-chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, general political commissar of the Red Army, member of the 'triumvirate'
Zhang Wentian (Luo Fu)	Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic
Qin Bangxian (Bo Gu)	'General secretary' of the Central Committee, member of the 'triumvirate'
Wang Jiaxiang	Vice-chairman of the Military Affairs Committee and chief of the General Political Department of the Red Army ⁴
Deng Fa	Head of the National Political Security Bureau
Liu Shaoqi	Chief of the council of the National Federation of Trade Unions
He Kequan (Kai Feng)	Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League

Red Army leaders:

Liu Bocheng	Chief of Staff of the Red Army, commander of the column of the Military Affairs Committee
Li Fuchun	Candidate of the Central Committee, Deputy and acting chief of the General Political Department of the Red Army
Lin Biao	Commander of the First Army Corps
Nie Rongzhen	Political commissar of the First Army Corps
Peng Dehuai	Candidate of the Central Committee, commander of the Third Army Corps
Yang Shangkun	Candidate of the Central Committee, political commissar of the Third Army Corps
Li Zhuoran	Political commissar of the Fifth Army Corps
Deng Xiaoping	Chief scribe of the Central Committee ⁵
Otto Braun	Military adviser of the Comintern in China, member of the (Li De, Hua Fu) 'triumvirate'
Wu Xiuquan	Interpreter

The conference began with the main report of 'general secretary' Qin Bangxian, who also presided over the meeting. This was followed by Zhou Enlai's supplementary report. Then Mao Zedong gave a long speech in which he severely criticized the military leadership of Otto Braun and Qin Bangxian and the report given by Qin. When Mao finished, Wang Jiaxiang rose to make a statement in which he also criticized the military line and wholeheartedly supported Mao's views. Then most of the other participants voiced their opinions (Li, 1983:23-26).

As none of these speeches and statements have been published, two accounts of this conference will be quoted below. They not only describe the discussions but also give an impression of the atmosphere of the meeting:

"The conference was devoted to solving the question of military line, condemning the errors of the 'leftist' military line, summing up the lessons to be learned from the failure to resist the fifth 'encirclement' and exposing the dangers of military dogmatism. Bo Gu gave the main conference report: although he had realized the gravity of the situation and did examine the mistakes in the military line, he always stressed numerous objective reasons and tried to defend and explain mistakes. Zhou Enlai, who gave a supplementary report, was very modest and criticized himself in his report; he accepted responsibility, was strict with himself and lenient with others.

Shortly afterwards Chairman Mao gave an important speech. Normally he would always first listen to the comments of others and then when speaking himself his words would have the character of a conclusion. This time he went on for more than an hour, which was longer than all the other speakers. He concentrated on finding a solution to the problem of military line and condemned the mistakes of the 'leftist' military line and their manifestations as conservatism in defense, adventurism in

attacks and flightism during troop movements; the commanders had only discussed warfare in theory and forgotten that fighters had to walk, eat and sleep. They did not care if soldiers had to march through the mountains, walk on plains or cross rivers, but only looked at their maps and set a time for fighting. The result was naturally bad. He pointed to the victories in opposing the first four 'encirclement' campaigns and refuted the argument that objective reasons - such as the strength of the enemy and the weakness of our own troops - could be used as an excuse for failure. Chairman Mao's speech reflected everybody's opinions and correct points of view and was warmly welcomed by a large majority of the participants.

Comrade Wang Jiaxiang immediately followed with his own statement. He clearly supported Comrade Mao Zedong's view, harshly criticized Bo Gu's and Li De's mistakes in the military leadership and advocated that Comrade Mao should take command. Comrades Zhang Wentian and Zhu De also supported Comrade Mao Zedong. Comrade Zhou Enlai also completely agreed with Comrade Mao Zedong's criticism of the 'leftist' military line and also proposed that Comrade Mao Zedong should lead the future movements of our army. His proposal met with the enthusiastic support of the majority of the participants." (Wu, 1982:II, 171-173)

"Most participants supported Mao Zedong's promotion to the leadership, only Bo Gu and Kai Feng opposed it. Later Comrade Bo Gu made a self-criticism, but he did not thoroughly admit his mistakes. Kai Feng furiously shouted at Comrade Mao Zedong: "What do you know about Marxism-Leninism? You have not read more than 'Sun Zi's "Art of War"!." He was very critical of the conference. Li De also participated, he is the Comrade Hua Fu mentioned in the documents of the Zunyi Conference. He did not have a proper seat but just sat near the door and hardly said a word, continuously smoking and looking very depressed; he did not accept any responsibility for the mistakes criticized at the meeting and remained absolutely obstinate." (Nie, 1983:126-127)

On 17 January - the final day of the conference - the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau made the following decisions:

- to promote Mao Zedong to the 'Standing Committee'
- to ask Zhang Wentian to draft the resolution of the Zunyi Conference, which would then be approved by the 'Standing Committee'
- to dissolve the military leadership of the 'triumvirate' - Otto Braun, Qin Bangxian and Zhou Enlai - and entrust Zhou temporarily with the leadership
- to establish a Soviet base in Western Sichuan

(Li, 1983:25; Chen, 1935:8).

This meant that Mao Zedong was only elected into the 'Standing Committee' of the Political Bureau, which also included Zhang Wentian and Chen Yun (Chen, 1935:8). But Mao did not become chairman of any Party or Army committee. He was also dependent on the support of Zhang Wentian, Chen Yun and Wang Jiaxiang who were in senior positions. In addition, the Military Affairs

Committee headed by Zhu De, Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang remained unchanged.

c) The Jimingsansheng and Yaxi meetings

For a few weeks after the Zunyi Conference Qin Bangxian remained 'general secretary', but at a meeting of the 'Standing Committee' in Jimingsansheng (Western Guizhou) on 5 February 1935 Zhang Wentian finally replaced him (Li, 1983:26-28).

Otto Braun made the following interesting remark:

"Po Ku remained General Secretary for the time being. Not until a month later did he consent to surrender his post to Lo Fu (...) These facts indicate that Mao's 'victory' at Tsunyi was not so complete nor his pre-dominance in the Politburo so secure as they appeared to me at the time." (Braun, 1982:104)

During the following weeks the military situation quickly worsened and thus a reorganization of the military command became inevitable. Therefore around the 11 March 1935 a new military command (*junshi zhihui xiaozu*) including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Wang Jiaxiang was created near Yaxi (Guizhou). But the Military Affairs Committee was not affected (Li, 1983:28-30; Yan, 1983:54-55; Braun, 1982:111; Central Party School, 1985:2).

4. THE RISE OF MAO ZEDONG

In summer 1945 Mao Zedong held the following positions: Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party; Chairman of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee; Chairman of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Military Affairs Committee (Materials, 1982:187-188). But it has been shown that he was not elected to any of these posts at the Zunyi Conference, as was often claimed. When did Mao then receive these promotions?

During the Long March there was only one small change in the military leadership, which did not affect Mao Zedong directly. When - in June 1935 - the Central Army met Zhang Guotao's troops in Northern Sichuan, Zhang Guotao became the third vice-chairman of the Military Affairs Committee (Yan, 1983:55). It is significant that though the Committee was reorganized Mao was not elected vice-chairman or chairman. During the short period when the two armies were combined Zhang Guotao, who had been a leading CCP member since 1921, very much dominated the scene (Materials, 1982: 164 ff.).

After the main forces of the Red Army had reached Northern Shaanxi, the

Northwestern Military Affairs Committee was established (3 November 1935) Mao Zedong became its chairman (*xibei junwei zhuxi*) and Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai vice-chairmen (Yan, 1983:55; Song, 1981:64). In the following autumn Zhang Guotao's troops arrived in Northern Shaanxi and on 7 December 1936 a new Central Military Affairs Committee was formed. Mao Zedong became chairman (*zhongyang junwei zhuxi*), Zhou Enlai and Zhang Guotao vice-chairmen (Yan, 1983:55).

But Zhang Guotao could no longer challenge Mao Zedong's authority, he soon lost his influence and left the province.

On 22 August 1937 an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau at Luochuan (near Yan'an) decided to elect a new Military Affairs Committee with Mao Zedong as secretary and Zhu De and Zhou Enlai as deputies. Even though Mao's official title now became 'secretary', the earlier title 'chairman' continued to be used (Yan, 1983:56; Jiang, 1985:134-135).

There were no major changes in the CCP leadership when the sixth plenum of the Sixth Central Committee met in Yan'an between 29 September and 6 November 1938. At that time - and for the following five years - Mao was still only secretary of the Military Affairs Committee (Materials, 1982:184).

Then on 20 March 1943 the Political Bureau formally established a Secretariat, which included Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Ren Bishi. Mao now became chairman of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee (*Zhongyang zhengzhiju, shujichu zhuxi*) (Chronicle, 1981:70).

On 19 June 1945 the first plenum of the Seventh Central Committee elected a new Secretariat, which now included Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Ren Bishi. Mao Zedong remained chairman of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat and was also elected chairman of the Central Committee (*Zhongyang weiyuanhui zhuxi*). On 23 June Mao Zedong was elected chairman and Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Peng Dehuai vice-chairmen of the Military Affairs Committee (Chronicle, 1981:75; Materials, 1982:187-188).

More than ten years had passed since the Zunyi Conference and Mao Zedong had fought against different rivals and factions until he now finally emerged as the undisputed 'Chairman Mao'.

5. CONCLUSIONS

- 1) The decisions often associated with the Zunyi Conference were in fact made at five different meetings between December 1934 and March 1935.
- 2) The Zunyi Conference lasted from 15 to 17 January 1935. Wang Jiaxiang attended and was the main supporter of Mao Zedong. But discussions and decisions concentrated on military affairs and did not affect general policies.

- 3) At the Zunyi Conference Mao Zedong was only promoted to the 'Standing Committee' of the Political Bureau.
- 4) In 1935 Mao Zedong neither became official nor unofficial leader of the Chinese Communist Party. During the following decade he had to struggle against several powerful rivals and depended on cooperation with other CCP leaders, who not necessarily wholeheartedly supported him.
- 5) After 1935 Mao Zedong was only chairman of the Military Affairs Committee and did not have a leading position in the Party hierarchy. Only in 1943 did he become chairman of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

Notes:

- 1) At the time of the Long March the Communist Party did not have an official Standing Committee, Secretariat or general secretary, but the terms were informally used, as Chen Yun explained recently:
 "... (when) Wang Ming left for Moscow and (Zhou) Enlai went to the Central Soviet, Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian, Kang Sheng, Chen Yun, Liu Shaoqi and Lu Futan - the Central Committee leaders who remained in Shanghai - formed a provisional Central Committee with Bo Gu as the responsible leader. In early 1933 the provisional Central Committee moved to the Central Soviet (...). In early 1934 the provisional Central Committee convened the fifth plenary session of the Sixth Central Committee in Ruijin, Jiangxi. This session elected a new Political Bureau (...). But even at that session there was no Secretariat or Standing Committee, so why then are the terms Secretariat and Standing Committee sometimes mentioned in historical documents or memoirs of comrades? I think this is because even though the Central Committee did not have an official Secretariat or Standing Committee, there was still a core of leaders who did the day-to-day work; but this core did not have a fixed name. Therefore it is possible to say that Chairman Mao was promoted to secretary of the Secretariat or Standing Committee; it just means that at the Zunyi Conference Chairman Mao entered the core of the leaders of the Political Bureau of the Party's Central Committee, but it does not mean that the Central Committee had officially established a Secretariat or Standing Committee. (...) Even though Wang Ming and Bo Gu acted as leaders of the Party's Central Committee, they did not have the title 'general secretary'. Therefore when Zhang Wentian took over the work of Bo Gu after the Zunyi Conference, he could only assume the responsibilities of the leading cadre of the Central Committee but not the title 'general secretary' (...)." (Chen, 1983:13-15)
- 2) Mao Zedong had not been a member of the Fourth Central Committee of

1925. Mao became a candidate of the Fifth Central Committee (April-May 1927), a full member of the Sixth Central Committee (June-July 1928), a candidate of the Political Bureau (September 1930) and a full member of the Political Bureau of the Sixth Central Committee at its fifth plenary session in Ruijin (January 1934). (Materials, 1982:169-170, 173-174, 179, 182)
- 3) J. Ch'en (1969:20) adds Liang Botai, Wu Liangping and Zhu Shu, Guo Hualun (1969:13) adds Li Weihai and Wang Shoudao and Wang Jianmin (1974:646) adds Cai Shufan to the list of participants, but none of them did in fact take part.
 - 4) The six people above (Mao, Zhu, Chen, Zhou, Zhang, Qin) were full members of the Political Bureau, while the three below (Deng, Liu, He) were candidates. But it is not known whether Wang Jiaxiang's promotion to full member happened before, at or after the conference (Li, 1983:31-32, n.12). It is interesting to note that most authors outside China deny that Wang Jiaxiang participated in the conference (see: Introduction), while J. Ch'en argued that Wang participated and was criticized by Mao, because Wang was one of Mao's most serious enemies (1969:19-20, 36).
 - 5) "According to Deng Xiaoping himself and information provided by other comrades, Deng became chief scribe (mishuzhang) of the Central Committee in December 1934." (Central Party School, 1985:1) Deng Xiaoping was also editor of the CCP journal 'Red Star' (Hongxingbao) (Wu, 1982: II, 171). It seems that Deng's promotion (as Mao Zedong's promotion) was mainly due to Wang Jiaxiang's efforts (Tang, 1983:543-545).

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