

SOVIET-INDIAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY, 1971-1984:
FROM EUPHORIA TO REALISM⁺

Surendra K. Gupta

In all their writings on India, the Soviet commentators continue to speak of the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation as an important landmark in the relations between the two countries¹. In August 1981, the tenth anniversary of the 1971 treaty was celebrated in various parts of the Soviet Union with a great deal of enthusiasm². Some prominent individuals from India also travelled to Moscow to participate in the celebrations. But Indira Gandhi, then India's Prime Minister and the most prominent Indian invited by the Soviets, chose to stay at home. As one Indian writer put it, "The Tsarina in New Delhi ... was not very enthusiastic"³. Earlier, at the founding of a new organization, 'Friends of the Soviet Union', both the Soviet ambassador in India and Vice President of the Moscow-based Soviet-Indian Friendship Society repeatedly referred to the treaty and talked of a special "relationship" between the two countries, but the late Prime Minister spoke only of "friendship" and did not mention the treaty even once⁴. For Indira Gandhi, now in quest of a more balanced relationship with both Moscow and Washington, the old treaty with the Soviets had lost the significance it once had.

ORIGINS OF THE TREATY

Even if one looks at the origins of the treaty, it was, at least from India's viewpoint, designed to solve the diplomatic isolation she faced in July 1971 after the announcement of the secret Henry Kissinger mission to Peking. Despite the fact that India was not a member of the U.S.-sponsored alliance

⁺ This is a revised and expanded version of a paper originally presented at a conference sponsored by the Section on Military Studies of the International Studies Association held in October 1982 at the United States Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

system, it was clearly understood in New Delhi that Washington would not permit Peking's intervention in any India-Pakistan conflict. When Kissinger went to New Delhi en route to Peking, he told the Indian officials that "we would take a grave view of an unprovoked Chinese attack on India"⁵. The U.S. assurance carried weight for New Delhi in view of China's open support of the military government in Pakistan⁶. On his return to the U.S., however, he told the Indian ambassador in Washington, L.K. Jha, that New Delhi could no longer count on U.S. help in case China intervened in an India-Pakistan war in support of Pakistan⁷. As Kissinger later noted, the "euphoria" of his earlier assurance to India "surely ended with the July 15 announcement of my trip to China"⁸.

In India, the reaction to this sharp turn in U.S.-China relations was one of grave concern, especially in view of the deteriorating situation in Pakistan and the large number of refugees that had already crossed into India. Commenting on the implications of this turn-around in Sino-U.S. relations, an Indian scholar, Sisir Gupta, argued that to counter the U.S. move India had no other choice but to turn to Moscow in pursuit of her goal of establishing an independent Bangladesh. As he asserted:

The whole business of international politics is about alignment and re-alignment, not about how to remain non-aligned. And the main criterion that a nation applies in determining with whom it should be aligned is not one of ideological affinity but the one of balance of power.

If such ideological adversaries as China and America can seek to build up an entente there is no reason why India ... should not veer towards Moscow⁹.

So Indira Gandhi, who had earlier given a cold reception to Leonid Brezhnev's plan of collective security in Asia¹⁰, now turned to the Soviets. Even the Western comments emphasized that it was America's new policy toward China that made India move closer to the Soviet Union. While the New York Times noted that the "motivating factor" behind India's move was her "desperate sense of isolation"¹¹, the Washington Post wrote, "Only the shock of seeing its traditional friend in Washington stand at the side of a regime condemned everywhere could have toppled India out of the ranks for formal nonalignment at this hour"¹².

The fact that, from New Delhi's viewpoint, the treaty was designed to serve a specific purpose was clear from its key paragraph that was added to the Soviet draft at India's insistence. It read, "Each high contracting party undertakes to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other party. In the event of either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and security of their countries"¹³. As a prominent Indian columnist, G.K.Reddy, has noted, the first sentence was designed "to preclude the Soviet Union from

placating Pakistan with offers of military aid as it did after the Tashkent conference in the hope of securing some leverage with it". And the second gave India "the right to invoke Soviet assistance in the event of Chinese intervention or U.S. pressure"¹⁴. The treaty, therefore, acted as a deterrent to any possible Chinese or American intervention and gave New Delhi a free hand in dealing with the explosive situation on its borders. When the war with Pakistan did break out in December, 1971, India was able to accomplish her objective of establishing an independent Bangladesh.

THE TREATY AND INDIRA GANDHI'S POLICY AFTER 1971

Many Indian writers, especially on the Left, saw in the treaty a long-range implication for Soviet and Indian policies, not only toward each other but toward Asia. At a seminar held in New Delhi on January 29-30, 1972, organized by the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, Professor Rasheuddin Khan raised the possibility of the Indo-Soviet Treaty becoming a model for inter-state cooperation¹⁵. A member of Parliament, Shashi Bhushan, whose writings often reflect pro-Soviet views, wrote: "Any country or power which wishes to frame its policies in respect of India or the Soviet Union will have to take into account this Treaty. ... The Treaty will in a sense change the pattern of world diplomacy"¹⁶.

In reality, however, Moscow's crucial assistance in 1971 resulted in less Indian dependence on Moscow, not more. One reason why the link with Moscow had been so important for New Delhi was the sad state of Indian-Pakistani relations. A complicating factor in this equation was the state of Sino-Indian relations and Peking's support for Pakistan. In a way, the emergence of Bangladesh, to some extent, solved India's Pakistan problem, which, despite India's protestations in the later years, could no longer pose a threat to India's security. As a well-known Indian journalist Sham Lal wrote at the time,

... for those who glibly assume that India is now firmly in the Soviet sphere of influence, it will not take them long to realize their mistake. The Indian people are greatly obliged to Russia for its support to the liberation struggle in Bangladesh. ... But this country has not borne the brunt of this struggle at grave risk to restrict its area of independence but to enlarge it and claim its due place in the region¹⁷.

For Mrs. Gandhi, therefore, India's victory in 1971 created the possibility that she might now be able to reduce her dependence on the Soviet Union and chart out a more independent course. She realized that India could never play a truly independent role as long as the Great Powers, including the Soviet Union, intervened in the affairs of the subcontinent. And the possibility of such intervention would remain as long as there were unresolved disputes

between India and Pakistan, including the Kashmir problem. Since 1953, the Soviets had urged a solution of Indo-Pakistani problems¹⁸, because they realized that only those problems made one of them turn to the West and, later, China. Moscow had the same objectives in mind at Tashkent in 1966, when Alexei Kosygin worked so hard to bring about reconciliation between the two countries. Therefore, while the Soviets, as a continuation of their Tashkent policy, offered to mediate between India and Pakistan after 1971, India, in light of her own objectives, declined the Soviet offer and preferred to deal directly with Pakistan on a bilateral basis¹⁹. On the Soviet offer, the late Prime Minister told the Indian Parliament on April 4, 1972, barely four months after valuable assistance rendered by the Soviet Union during the Bangladesh conflict, "The Soviet Union is the friend of India and we value their friendship. However, anyone who imagines that we shall allow ourselves to be dictated to by third parties in our negotiations with Pakistan, or in any other matter, foreign or domestic, is off the mark. Let me make that clear!"²⁰

Mrs. Gandhi acted in two ways to establish a new relationship with Pakistan. First, at Simla in 1972, she decided to return all Pakistani territory in West Pakistan under Indian occupation in return for a new "line of control" in Kashmir. Since the new line was negotiated between the two sides, it implied that the old cease-fire line was no longer valid and, in time, both would accept the new line as a permanent border. Within Kashmir, she was able to work out a settlement with Sheikh Abdullah, who, in the past, had been imprisoned several times by the Indian government. While working toward reconciliation on the subcontinent, Mrs. Gandhi continued to resist Soviet pressure to participate in Brezhnev's collective security plan. In 1973, during the Soviet leader's visit to India, most of the Western comments indicated that the primary objective of Brezhnev's visit to India was to seek India's approval for his collective security plan²¹. In his speech before the Indian Parliament, he spoke very strongly for the need of an Asian security pact²², but no such reference was found in the joint communiqué issued at the end of his visit²³.

While resisting Soviet pressure on the question of the Soviet-sponsored Asian security pact, Mrs. Gandhi also seemed determined to improve relations with the Chinese. In April, 1976, India decided to post an ambassador in Peking as a first step to normalize relations with China²⁴. The question of India's efforts to improve relations with Peking naturally came up during her visit to Moscow in June, 1976. That the Soviets must have showed some concern at the possibility of India-China rapprochement was evident from the reply she gave at a press conference. Asked if the Soviets expressed disapproval of India's decision to send an ambassador, she replied, "When we discuss the international situation we cannot leave out a country like China, and I think the Soviet leaders understand India's point of view"²⁵.

A MORE INDEPENDENT LINE DURING THE JANATA RULE

Indira Gandhi's defeat in the parliamentary elections in March 1977 and the formation of the Janata government under Morarji Desai raised the possibility that India might abrogate the treaty. Desai, a man known for his conservative and pro-Western views, had, on many occasions, been the target of bitter attacks in the Soviet media²⁶. Even on the eve of the elections, Moscow had condemned Desai and other leaders of the Janata party as "reactionaries"²⁷. Desai himself had been critical of the treaty at the time it was signed in August, 1971, calling it "an outcome of the fear psychosis" and a 'pact between the weak and the strong' that could only help the Soviet Union²⁸. And during the 1977 election campaign he had announced that the treaty might be scrapped if his party came into power²⁹.

But India's links with the Soviet Union, especially in the economic field, were too important to be affected by personal biases or ideological differences. For New Delhi, Moscow still remained an important source for arms which could not easily be obtained elsewhere.

It was, therefore, a recognition of India's need for a friendly relationship with Moscow that the new Foreign Minister, Atal Behari Vajapayee, and old critic of Mrs. Gandhi's Soviet policy, lost no time in inviting the Soviet Foreign Minister for talks in New Delhi. In an effort to assure the new leadership that Moscow would continue to deal with the new government in India, the Soviets responded warmly to the Indian invitation³⁰. At a luncheon in honor of Andrei Gromyko, Vajapayee said, "The bonds of friendship between the two countries are strong enough to survive the demands of divergent systems, the fate of an individual, or the fortunes of a political party"³¹. Quite aware of the desire of the new Janata government to improve relations with the United States, Gromyko, on his part, "utilized every opportunity to drive home the point that the (Indo-Soviet) treaty was not intended to harm the interests of any third country . . ."³². Before returning to Moscow, the Soviet Foreign Minister signed three agreements granting a 250 million ruble loan, as well as providing a supplementary trade plan and the troposcatter communications link³³.

Later, the Janata government entered into various economic agreements with the Soviet Union. These agreements provided for Moscow's assistance in such diverse fields as steel³⁴, heavy machine building, coal exploration, production and refining of oil, and the setting up of cement plants³⁵. Moscow even offered to supply crude oil to India beyond 1980 at the expiration of the agreement earlier signed by Mrs. Gandhi's government³⁶.

Despite Moscow's continuing importance as an arms supplier and a trading partner, the Desai government went a step further in taking a more independent line in foreign policy. The Soviet view of non-alignment was always that it should be sympathetic to Soviet foreign policy objectives in other parts of the world. According to this view, "a genuinely neutralist line" would be "a policy of resistance to imperialism and cooperation with the socialist countries"³⁷.

It is in this respect that the Desai government had made a decided shift in Indian foreign policy. For example, during Prime Minister Desai's visit to Moscow in October, 1977, the Indian leader did not agree to publicly support Soviet foreign policy in Africa and Europe. The Hindu correspondent, G.K.Reddy, reported from Moscow:

The Soviet side wanted India to subscribe, at least in principle, to Mr. Brezhnev's new ideas on European security for the consolidation of military detente in Europe. But India saw no point in committing itself to any set of proposals that did not concern it. Similarly, on the question of disarmament too, the Soviet officials wanted more detailed formulations, while India preferred to confine itself to its present position calling for a reduction of both conventional and nuclear arms under international supervision. In regard to Southern Africa also, India did not want to commit itself to support any particular group of patriotic forces in their struggle for racial equality and freedom³⁸.

There was also a decided shift in India's public reference to the treaty. During the discussions the Soviets worked hard to include the phrase, "on the basis of the treaty", in the joint communiqué. But the Indian side pointed out that only "in the spirit of the treaty" would suffice. Eventually, the Soviets agreed to accommodate New Delhi's position. At India's insistence, the communiqué also spoke of the different political and social systems of the two countries³⁹. Summarizing the results of Desai's visit for the Indo-Soviet relations, a writer in the *Statesman* noted, "For the first time in independent India's history, discussions between the two countries' representatives were held on the basis of something approaching equality"⁴⁰. This conclusion was no doubt an exaggerated one as Indira Gandhi had never dealt with the Soviets on a subservient basis, but it was clear that Desai wanted to emphasize India's independence in every respect.

There were other subtle but important changes in India's posture under the Janata. While in the past India routinely criticized the U.S. naval base at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Desai equated American bases with Soviet "spheres of influence" in the area⁴¹. And while in the past it had called for the elimination of all military bases, the new government accepted the Carter position of freezing the present situation, with the possibility of an eventual agreement between Moscow and Washington without requiring agreement by other Indian Ocean powers⁴². Pointing this shift in the Indian position, the influential *Economic and Political Weekly* criticized the Desai government for its silence on Diego Garcia⁴³.

These changes in Indian foreign policy inevitably drew some harsh criticism from pro-Soviet Communist and Leftist circles in India. In an article published shortly after President Carter's visit to India in January, 1978, Pratul Lahiri, a member of the Communist party, wrote in the party organ, *Party Life*, that "our present leaders are making our 'amoral' non-alignment 'moral' to the U.S. leadership. We have noticed that different foreign office desks dealing

with imperialist countries have become vigorously active in their efforts to build a new image for India". He continued, "Now let us see the desks which deal with national liberation struggles"⁴⁴. A writer in *New Wave*, a pro-Soviet weekly, criticized Vajapayee's view of the Cubans in Africa as a "sell-out to Americans"⁴⁵.

Indira Gandhi, as well as foreign policy experts close to her, were also critical of Desai's conduct of foreign affairs. Voicing that criticism, T.N. Kaul, who was India's Foreign Secretary at the time of the signing of the Indo-Soviet treaty, said that what Desai was attempting to do was "to dilute the basic concept of non-alignment into one of neutrality" and "to inject the theory of 'equidistance from the two super powers'"⁴⁶.

INDIRA GANDHI'S RETURN: SOME NEW ISSUES

It is very difficult to see how Indira Gandhi would have basically changed Desai's course in foreign affairs, except perhaps on such issues as the recognition of Vietnam-dominated Kampuchea, which Desai did not recognize and she did, but her accession to power in January 1980 also coincided with Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan. Besides the moral question it raised, it was the first Soviet intervention in the affairs of a non-aligned country. It was a development close on India's borders which no Indian government could ignore.

India's initial pro-Soviet response to Moscow's armed intervention, made by the Indian delegate at the U.N., drew criticism from all shades of non-Communist political and public life in India⁴⁷. But gradually Indira Gandhi took a more realistic stand as India's isolation on this issue in the nonaligned world became obvious, and as the implications for India's security, both of the Soviet intervention as well as the Western response to Moscow's move, became apparent. India's new position was best stated by President Sanjiva Reddy during Brezhnev's visit to India in December 1980. At a banquet in honor of the Soviet visitor, Reddy said that India was "opposed to any form of intervention, covert or overt, by outside forces in the internal affairs of the region". He further stated that peace in the region could be restored only "through negotiated political solution having full respect to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonaligned status of the countries of the region"⁴⁸.

A second problem faced by the Indira government was the modernization and growth of Indian economy. Gradually, she decided to liberalize imports, lift government controls on several items, encourage private investment, both Indian and foreign⁴⁹, and go for Western collaboration in such fields as oil exploration⁵⁰.

These two issues led her to make friendly overtures to the U.S., which, in

July 1982, culminated in her visit to Washington after an interval of eleven years. Describing her visit as one of "adventure in search of understanding and friendship", and praising the U.S. for standing "for opportunity and freedom"⁵¹, Mrs. Gandhi sought to improve India's ties with Washington. When asked at the National Press Club as to which way India "tilts" between Russia and America, she replied, "I think we stand upright"⁵². She also invited American business leaders to come to India to explore ways for more private investment⁵³.

Because of the Reagan Administration's decision to supply American F-16 jet fighters and other modern weapons to Pakistan, and because of continuing problems in the supply of American fuel to the atomic power plant in Tarapur, there have been serious limitations to the improvement of Indo-American relations. But if India could not balance her relations with Moscow - which continues to be a dependable supplier of much of modern weaponry for India's armed forces - with a fundamental change in her ties with Washington, she has sought to reduce her dependence on the Soviets by turning to other Western countries. In 1982, New Delhi signed a major deal with France for the supply of Mirage 2000 jet fighters. And she has turned to West Germany to buy submarines for the Indian navy⁵⁴.

Although the Soviet coverage of Gandhi's visit to the U.S. emphasized the unresolved differences between India and the U.S.⁵⁵, it was obvious that New Delhi's efforts to improve its ties with the West seriously worried the Kremlin. It voiced its criticism openly during Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union in September 1982⁵⁶. It was no wonder that it took the two sides thirty-six hours to agree on the draft of joint communiqué⁵⁷. Commenting on Moscow's view of the changes in India's foreign and economic policies, an Indian columnist wrote after his visit to the Soviet Union in 1982.

As long as India maintains its present economic, political and foreign policy postures, the Soviets do not mind if New Delhi seeks to normalize its relations with this or that power, or diversifies external sources of military procurement. However, Soviet scholars wonder with unconcealed misgiving what may be the political fall out of India's present openings to multi-nationals and Western monopoly houses⁵⁸.

CHINA AS A FACTOR IN INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Perhaps one of the most important issues that may fundamentally alter Indo-Soviet relationship in the future will be a mutually accepted settlement of Indo-Chinese border dispute, opening up possibilities for a more normalized relationship between the two countries. When, during the Janata rule, Indian Foreign Minister Vajapayee visited Moscow to brief the Soviet leaders about his projected trip to Peking, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko took the unusual

step of cautioning India publicly with regard to her dealings with Peking⁵⁹. It was obvious that Vajapayee was not able to satisfy the Soviets. Asked at a press conference if his assurances that India's relations with China would not affect Soviet-Indian relationship had satisfied the Soviet leaders, the Indian Foreign Minister said, "... he had given the assurance in all sincerity and whether the Soviet leaders were satisfied, it was for them to say"⁶⁰. Gro-myko's open advice to India was, however, resented by many in the country⁶¹.

When Mrs. Gandhi returned to power, she also took further steps to normalize relations with Peking. Her meetings with the Chinese Foreign Minister in April, 1980, in Salisbury, Zimbabwe⁶², and with the Chinese Prime Minister in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in May of the same year⁶³, were followed by intensive talks between the two sides to settle the border issue. So far, the two countries have held five rounds of discussions: Peking (December 1981), New Delhi (May 1982), Peking (February 1983), New Delhi (October 1983), and Peking (September 1984). While during the first three rounds the two sides discussed their differing approaches toward a settlement⁶⁴, some significant progress was made at the fourth round. An effort was now made to "marry" the two positions - the Chinese offer of a package deal providing for Peking's recognition of India's claims in the East in return for New Delhi's acceptance of China's control of Aksai Chin, and India's insistence on a sector-by-sector settlement. Satisfied with the outcome of the talks, P. V. Narasimha Rao, who was then India's Foreign Minister, stated in the Parliament, "We have come to grips with the problem now, and begun to involve common principles on the basis of which the problem can be solved"⁶⁵. At the fifth round in Peking last September, the two sides succeeded in "sufficiently narrowing down" their differences further, announcing that the progress made by them would enable the two countries to start "substantive" discussions at their next round in New Delhi⁶⁶. Although it is difficult to predict the time the two countries will take in working out the details of a settlement, both sides seem determined to end their long border dispute. When that happens, it will have a fundamental effect on India's security environment, further lessening her dependence on Moscow and increasing her maneuverability in her relations with the great powers.

CONCLUSIONS

In signing a friendship treaty with the largest non-Communist Asian power in 1971, Moscow no doubt sought to strengthen her position in South Asia, as well as enhance her influence in the Third World. India, however, entered into the pact only to deal with a particular situation she faced at that time. Once the occasion passed, the treaty was no longer as crucial and valuable as it once was. Ironically, by assisting India in solving her "Pakistan problem", the

Soviets inadvertently created a situation in which New Delhi no longer needed to depend too heavily on them. As we have seen, the Indian leadership since 1971 has sought to take maximum advantage of this opportunity by asserting India's independence in every possible way. Thus the Soviet efforts to institutionalize their relations with India on the basis of the treaty have achieved little success. Moscow's frustration was reflected in a conversation which a Soviet diplomat had on the occasion of the second anniversary of the treaty with Indian columnist Girilal Jain. The diplomat asked Jain as to why the Indians were so indifferent to the treaty. "Without waiting for a reply", writes Jain, "he said, 'Why should you be interested? After all, it is a Soviet-Soviet treaty' "67.

Moreover, in the world of the 1980s and beyond, India's need for more sophisticated technology, all of which cannot be supplied by Moscow, and her desire to seek wider markets for her products, is bound to put further strain on her relationship with the Soviet Union. Tied with this is India's perception of her own role in world affairs. As an Indian scholar recently pointed out, "India is now a middle power, gradually aspiring to the status of a big power. What it needs now is not Soviet help to defend and extend its freedom, but recognition by others of the fact that India is the center of power"68.

All this does not mean that India is about to end a relationship which is still one of the most important elements in her foreign policy. In the postwar period, it has proved, despite its many ups and downs, one of the most stable relationships between any two countries. India will, therefore, not abrogate the treaty, as was suggested by *The Hindu* in an angry editorial⁶⁹ soon after the Soviet army entered Afghanistan, but would prefer quietly to forget it. For India, the geopolitical and economic realities of the 1980s require neither a confrontational nor a special relationship with the Soviet Union but more balanced ties with both Washington and Moscow.

Notes:

- 1) See B. Chekhonin, "Soviet-Indian Friendship and Cooperation", *International Affairs*, no.5 (1982): 15, and Azim Sarvarov, "Time-Tested Friendship", *Asia and Africa Today*, no.4 (1982): 20.
- 2) For example, *Soviet Land*, a magazine published by the Soviet Embassy in India, organized a round table in New Delhi to mark the occasion ("Abiding Significance of Soviet-Indian Treaty: 'Soviet Land' Round Table to Mark Tenth Anniversary of the Treaty", *Soviet Land*, no.16, August 1981: 10-13). The same issue of the magazine (p.20) also reported that on this occasion "numerous rallies, conferences, round tables, symposiums and seminars were organized all over the USSR in which ministers, statesmen and public figures participated".

- 3) G.P.D., "Uses of the Treaty", Economic and Political Weekly 16 (22 August 1981): 1375.
- 4) "Relations With the USSR: With Such Friends ...", *ibid.* (20-27 June 1981): 1080.
- 5) Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, 1979), p.860. This is confirmed by T.N.Kaul, then India's Foreign Secretary, *Reminiscences: Discreet and Indiscreet* (New Delhi, 1982), p.234.
- 6) Several Chinese statements to this effect are cited by R.K.Jain, *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (New Delhi, 1974), pp.167-72.
- 7) Kaul, *Reminiscences: Discreet and Indiscreet*, p.234.
- 8) Kissinger, *White House Years*, p.860.
- 9) Sisir Gupta, "Changing Power Pattern: Grim Implications for India", *Times of India*, 19 July 1971, p.6.
- 10) Robert H.Donaldson, *Soviet Policy toward India: Ideology and Strategy* (Cambridge, 1974), pp.220-21.
- 11) "Soviet-Indian Pact", editorial in the *New York Times*, 10 August 1971, p.30.
- 12) Cited in N.M.Ghatate (ed.), *Indo-Soviet Treaty: Reactions and Reflections* (New Delhi, 1972), p.176. Time magazine called the treaty a "largely self-inflicted wound" on the part of Washington. Criticizing President Nixon's policy toward the South Asian crisis, it wrote, "In its overriding pre-occupation with India's greatest enemies, Pakistan and China, the U.S. simply left New Delhi nowhere to go but Moscow" ("The View From Washington: Self-Inflicted Wound", *Time*, 23 August 1971, p.15).
- 13) Pran Chopra, *Before and After the Indo-Soviet Treaty* (New Delhi, n.d.), p.165.
- 14) G.K.Reddy, "Decade-old Treaty in Perspective", *The Hindu*, 22 August 1981, p.8. All citations from the *Hindu* are from its international weekly edition.
- 15) Documents of the Seminar on Non-Alignment, Self-Reliance and Indo-Soviet Cooperation (Delhi, 29-30 January 1972) (New Delhi, n.d.), p.8.
- 16) *India's Foreign Policy and Indo-Soviet Treaty* (New Delhi, n.d.), pp.8-9.
- 17) Sham Lal, "The Liberation and After: Changes in Balance of Power", *Times of India*, 16 December 1971, p.8.
- 18) "First Steps", *New Times*, no.27 (1 July 1953): 16-17.
- 19) Leo E.Rose, "The Superpowers in South Asia", *Orbis* 22 (Summer 1978): 398.
- 20) Cited in M.S.Rajan, "The Indo-Soviet Treaty and India's Non-Alignment Policy", *Australian Outlook* 26 (August 1972): 212.
- 21) Hedrick Smith, "Brezhnev to Seek Backing in India", *New York Times*, 25 November 1973, p.8.
- 22) "Brezhnev Calls for Asian Talks", *ibid.*, 30 November 1973, p.5.
- 23) *Times of India*, 1 December 1973, p.7.
- 24) "India-China Relations, January-December, 1976", *China Report* 14 (May-June 1978): 78-79.

- 25) *Ibid.*, p. 86.
- 26) See, for example, Y. Etinger and O. Melikyan, *The Policy of Nonalignment* (Moscow, n.d.), p. 54.
- 27) V. Tretyakov, "The Election Manifestoes", *New Times*, no. 11 (March 1977), p. 5; and V. Skosyrev, "India on the Path to Parliamentary Elections", *Izvestia*, 5 February 1977; cited from *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 29 (2 March 1977): 19.
- 28) Cited in Ghatate (ed.), *Indo-Soviet Treaty: Reactions and Reflections*, p. 61.
- 29) *The Statesman Weekly*, 12 February 1977, p. 14.
- 30) "Moscow Eager to Sustain India", *The Hindu*, 20 April 1977, p. 2.
- 31) Cited in Bharat Wariawalla, "The Future of Indo-Soviet Ties", *China Report* 13 (March-April 1977): 9.
- 32) *The Hindu*, 27 April 1977, p. 1.
- 33) "Ruble Loan Pact", *The Hindu*, 4 May 1977, p. 1.
- 34) "Latest Know-how to Boost Bhilai Steel Output", *ibid.*, 17 September 1977, p. 1.
- 35) "Wider Economic Collaboration with Soviet Union", *ibid.*, 18 March 1978, p. 7.
- 36) "Russia Offers More Crude", *ibid.*, 23 September 1978, p. 1.
- 37) Etinger and Melikyan, *The Policy of Nonalignment*, p. 14.
- 38) *The Hindu*, 29 October 1977, p. 1.
- 39) *Ibid.*
- 40) S. Nihal Singh, "Foreign Policy - How to Win Friends and Neighbours", *The Statesman Weekly*, 19 November 1977, p. 4.
- 41) "'Soviet Influence' in Ocean", *The Hindu*, 23 July 1977, p. 2.
- 42) "Indian Ocean: Silence on Diego Garcia", *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay) 13 (28 January - 4 February 1978): 119-20.
- 43) *Ibid.*
- 44) Pratul Lahiri, "Whither Indian Foreign Policy?", *Party Life* (New Delhi) 14 (7 January 1978): 49.
- 45) "Vajapayee Comes Out in True Colors", *New Wave* 7 (2 May 1978): 5.
- 46) Kaul, *Reminiscences: Discreet and Indiscreet*, p. 231.
- 47) Even Bimal Prasad, a foremost South Asian expert and generally supportive of Soviet-Indian relationship, says that the speech of India's permanent representative at the U.N. showed "an undue lack of forthrightness" ("India and the Afghan Crisis", in K.P. Misra, ed., *Afghanistan in Crisis*, New Delhi, 1981, p. 82).
- 48) *India News* (Washington, D.C.), 15 December 1980, p. 4.
- 49) On recent changes in Indian economy, see Jay Dubashi, "New Wine in Old Bottles", *India Today* 7 (15 October 1982): 66-68; and "India Opens Up: Welcoming Foreign Investors", *Time*, 2 August 1982, p. 59. See also "World Business", *U.S. News and World Report*, 6 July 1981, p. 40. The magazine reported that "in India, joint ventures between local companies and foreign partners are increasing, with U.S. outfits taking the lead in

approvals from New Delhi".

Voicing a remarkably outspoken criticism of the Soviet economic system at a meeting of the National Development Council on February 14, 1981, Prime Minister Gandhi accused her Marxist critics of thinking in "archaic terms". Declaring that she did not believe in "doctrinaire theories", she referred to the Soviet Union as a "so-called ideal society (that) continues to import vast quantities of foodgrains from every available market, especially from the capitalist countries" ("Leftists Behind Times - PM", The Hindu, 21 February 1981, p.1).

- 50) See Kasturi Rangan, "India, Speeding Oil Hunt, Will Seek Foreign Help", New York Times, 8 August 1980, p. D 3.
- 51) Ibid., 30 July 1982, p.4.
- 52) Kansas City Times, 31 July 1982, p.C-8.
- 53) Ibid., 30 July 1982, p.C-5.
- 54) India Abroad (New York), 22 October 1982, p.1.
- 55) See "Talks in Washington", Pravda, 31 July 1982, p.5; from Current Digest of the Soviet Press 34 (1 September 1982): 16.
- 56) G.K.Reddy, "Russia Unhappy Over India's Balanced Stand", The Hindu, 25 September 1982, p.5.
- 57) "Striking a Balance", editorial in The Statesman Weekly, 2 October 1982, p.8.
- 58) Bhabani Sen Gupta, "The View from Moscow", India Today 7 (15 October 1982): 45.
- 59) The Hindu, 23 September 1978, p.2.
- 60) Ibid., p.1.
- 61) Attacking Gromyko for giving advice to India, The Hindu wrote, "It is to be hoped that the Government of India has already made it clear to the Soviet Union that there is enough experience and maturity in our country's foreign policy to cope with the delicate and sensitive task of normalizing relations with China, without needing tutoring from anyone else" ("A Moscow Visit of Mixed Results", editorial in *ibid.*, 23 September 1978, p.4).
- 62) "China Eager to Patch Up With India", India Tribune (Chicago), 1 June 1980, p.1.
- 63) "Indira Meets with Hua: Both Seek Closer Ties", India Abroad 16 May 1980, p.1.
- 64) For an analysis of Sino-Indian border talks during the first three rounds, see Satish Kumar, "Border Talks Limp, but the Dialogue Continues", *ibid.*, 18 February 1983, p.2.
- 65) Cited in D.K.Joshi, "Sunny Days Expected in Relations With China", *ibid.*, 9 December 1983, p.2.
- 66) "Sino-Indian Talks: Differences Narrowed Down", The Statesman Weekly, 29 September 1984, p.6.
- 67) Girilal Jain, "Limits to Indo-U.S.Ties", Times of India, 6 July 1983, p.6.

- 68) K.P. Karunakaran, "Soviet Union and South Asia", World Focus 4 (November-December 1983): 65.
- 69) "Impressive Verdict Against Soviet Invasion", The Hindu, 26 January 1980, p.4.