

THAILAND'S REFUGEE DILEMMA: ANOTHER LEBANON?

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Commenting recently on the 60 000 or so Vietnamese who fled to Thailand between 1945 and 1956 during and in the immediate aftermath of France's Indochina debacle, the deputy director of Thailand's "Internal Security Command" (ISC) raised the spectre of "Fifth Column" subversion. At a time when successive Bangkok governments have been ever more sorely tried by the influx of about 570 000 refugees (some estimates go as high as 700 000) from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, since 1975 and the Communist capture of Saigon, ISC's Major General Funchloi Anirutthewa charged that among the earlier wave of 60 000 Vietnamese refugees a "clandestine" Hanoi-controlled "administrative system" had been developed, which was giving assistance, including providing "political commissars", to the estimated 10 000 members of the guerilla "Liberation Army" of the proscribed Communist Party of Thailand. Seized equipment was said to demonstrate that some of the Vietnamese had been relaying radio messages to Hanoi¹.

Anirutthewa's charge was not the first of its kind, nor is it likely to be the last. A year earlier, police in Thailand's southern Songkhla province reportedly also discovered a "Fifth Column" among the 5 000 Vietnamese residents in the Hige refugee camp in the province, and a "spy ring" operating in the camp was said to have been unmasked². Shortly after the Hige incident, Bangkok's leading daily, editorialized that "We in Thailand have done our part", adding that it was not possible to keep on accommodating the Indochina refugees. "Third country" relocations for the refugees had to be found as Thais "do not wish to have a repetition" of the Vietnamese influx following the Dien Bien Phu battle³.

As international interest in the Vietnamese "boat people" and other Indochina refugees keeps waning and waxing, the unresolved diplomatic and military struggle over Kampuchea's future drags on, accentuating the Bangkok government's quandary. It seems unlikely that the Thais any time soon will be able to look back on having "done our part" in arriving at a durable settlement. For a solution to the refugee question is particularly likely to be slow, because concerns of Thai national security, the problem of the status and future of the constantly changing refugee flow, and the international dimensions

of the Kampuchean controversy, are all involved. To an analysis of these the following pages are addressed.

SECURITY PROBLEMS AND THE LEGAL STATUS OF REFUGEES

It has long been an axiom of Thai security polity, that new recruits and cadres of the Communist Party of Thailand, in recent decades, regularly were sent to camps near Hanoi for training subsequently to be infiltrated back⁴. And, in fact, already in April, 1981, General Anirutthewa charged that many of the original post-Dien Bien Phu Vietnamese refugees in Thailand had "gone underground", joined the CPT, and, instead of remaining in the nine Thai provinces originally assigned to them had swarmed out all over the kingdom in order to establish their subversive network⁵. The danger, whether real or imagined, that the Indochinese (including new Vietnamese) refugees now lingering in Thailand will eventually strengthen or expand this or similar networks, is producing a demand for more drastic policies in both military and civil political circles in Bangkok which fear Thailand may become "another Lebanon". Yet such policies undoubtedly would unbalance Bangkok's delicate relationship with Hanoi and with the Vietnamese-supported government of the "People's Republic of Kampuchea" (PRK) of President Heng Samrin, in Phnom Penh. The latter fears with considerable justification that Thailand, in turn, by attempting to repatriate the refugees, is forcing into PRK territory anti-Vietnamese Kampuchean ready to join any one of several groups now fighting in Western Kampuchea.

The Thai refugee problem is greatly aggravated by the uncertainty of the number and political-legal status of the refugees involved, and by the murky fluidity of the Thai-Kampuchean border world. But the question of the political-legal status of the Kampuchean refugees in particular has been complicated by periodic unauthorized border crossings as a result of military action. At first, in the course of 1979, in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, the Thai government had been relatively sympathetic of the tens of thousands of Kampuchean (as well as Laotians and South Vietnamese) who streamed into Thailand. Shortly, as the enormity of the logistical and political problem of the refugee mass became clear a much stiffer policy was announced. Bangkok also appeared to have become convinced that many Kampuchean were not really refugees but rather were motivated by economic considerations and the broader opportunities afforded by going to the Thai camps. In February, 1980, Bangkok formally closed its border with Kampuchea, and, henceforth, as a general policy, refused to grant official refugee status to any Kampuchean fleeing into Thailand. Kampuchean, in various camps already in Thailand, were officially permitted to stay on, until their "third country" acceptance as immigrants. The periodic influx of Kampuchean into Thailand since February,

1980, as a result of border fighting, has been tolerated reluctantly by Bangkok authority, and, again at least formally, always has occurred on the basis of temporary asylum accompanied by insistence on a speedy return back to Kampuchea.

Formally, there are several categories of refugees today, Kampucheans as well as other Indochinese. First there are the "legal" refugees living under the Thai Interior Ministry's control in special centers, including some run by international relief agencies, in half a dozen provinces. At the close of September, 1982, according to the Thai military Supreme Command, the number of those refugees was 87 194, including 79 355 Laotians, 846 Kampucheans and 6 983 Vietnamese. A year earlier, the Interior ministry has included a separate category of some 18 000 Hmong tribesmen, but these either have been absorbed in the Northern Thai tribal areas or are now classified among the Laotians. The "legal" refugees presumably also have established their claims to be processed for "third country" resettlement, since Thailand does not intend to absorb them in most cases within its own frontiers. Secondly, and in addition, according to the Supreme Command, there were at the close of September, 1982, also 46 940 "Kampuchean illegal immigrants under military detention", being held at three other camps. Presumably, these were not to be administratively processed for future resettlement. Because, according to the Thai Supreme Command, there is yet a third category consisting of "refugees and illegal immigrants awaiting departure for third countries" being held at two major "transit centers". This third category numbered 32 835 at the close of September, 1982. In addition, there were at this same time also an estimated 290 000 Kampucheans (estimates of the size of this group fluctuate) described as "living in Kampuchea opposite the Thai border" in camps and make-shift settlements in a zone across the Thai provinces of Ubon Ratchathai to Prachin Buri⁶.

How many of this last group, though outside Thailand, in fact should be considered "refugees" under some kind of informal Thai or UN aid agency supervision, and how many of these - as a result of a Vietnamese military offensive, or skirmishes, or as a result of camp life pressures - may yet become "illegal immigrants under military detention" on Thai territory itself is difficult to answer. Then, in separate facilities, there are according to the Supreme Command also 1 898 Vietnamese living "along the border areas".

The Thai government claims that over the past three years significant numbers of refugees in the first three categories have been sent on to other countries or repatriated. But for some categories of refugees that process appears to be a lot faster than for others. For example, the number of refugees under Thai Interior Ministry control in September, 1982, was, as indicated, slightly over 87 000, while a year earlier this category of refugees numbered 94 544. More significant was the drop of "illegal" Kampuchean refugees in military detention, which declined from "over 89 000" in September, 1981, to the above-mentioned 46 940 a year later⁷. Overall, according to the Thai Supreme Command's data at the close of September, 1982, between

1975, when the consolidation of Communist Vietnamese power throughout Vietnam occurred, and June of 1982, a "total of 399 521 were resettled in third countries". This figure is substantially higher, however, than the estimate of the US Committee for Refugees, which declared in an August, 1982, publication that 383 000 had "moved on to resettlement in third countries"⁸.

Still, a remarkable number were induced to leave Thailand, though authoritative estimates continue to differ somewhat. Judging by the data supplied by the Thai Supreme Command at the close of September, 1982, the total number of Kampuchean refugees of all categories living inside Thailand itself can at the most be about 80 000. But as late as September, 1981, a Thai Foreign Ministry publication on the problem of "displaced persons from Indochina" in Thailand said that more than 200 000 Kampuchean illegal immigrants alone still remained in Thailand⁹. Assuming both figures to be correct this would mean that in just one year some 120 000 Kampuchean would either have repatriated (likely to be the far greater majority) or found a haven in other countries. This is not wholly improbable, for the readiness by the rest of the world to accommodate the Indochinese refugees, initially particularly the Laotians and Vietnamese, has been noteworthy. The US alone by the end of 1980, and since 1975, received a total of about 450 000 refugees from all three Indochinese countries (initially primarily Vietnamese and Laotians, as of 1980 also 45 000 Cambodians). Between 1975 and mid-1980 almost 900 000 Indochinese refugees were resettled in "third" countries, many after having first spent time in camps in various Southeast Asian countries, among them Thailand. By August, 1982, at least 265 000 Indochinese had been settled in People's China, France had taken in 66 000, Canada 60 000, Australia about 40 000, and nearly two dozen other states, from Argentina to the United Kingdom, had absorbed additional tens of thousands. The preceding figures to a degree contrast with, and should be put in context of, still more recent official US data. According to an April, 1983, American State Department calculation, for example, "from 1975 through 1982 through 1982 the U.S. admitted 629 000 Indochinese refugees", while additional countries, e.g. People's China, France, Canada, Australia, and others accepted only a total of 618 000 in that same period¹⁰.

THE FIRST AND SECOND STAGES OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

This accommodating posture of many nations however does not touch the heart of Thailand's current refugee problem. That heart is the volatility of the Kampuchean political-military crisis itself, which perpetuates the influx of new refugees even as others "repatriate" or find permanent "third country" havens. The crisis is amplified as new groups of Kampuchean seek to leave

their homes in order to escape military conscription or forced resettlement in other "strategic" villages developed by the Vietnamese in Kampuchea.

In this connection it should be understood that there have been at least four stages in the more recent influx of Kampuchean (and in different degrees also Laotian and Vietnamese) refugees into Thailand¹¹. The first stage, following the overthrow of the government of Lon Nol and the capture of Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge (Communist Cambodian forces under Pol Pot) in mid-April, 1975, led to a massive flight of the Kampuchean elite, particularly professionals, top ranking government and military personnel, and their families. Some 33 000 of these entered and temporarily found refuge in Thailand. Relatively shortly thereafter most found permanent residences, primarily in Western countries, including the US and France.

It might be noted, however, that an additional 150 000 of this type of refugee preferred to settle in Vietnam, notwithstanding the avowedly anti-Communist character of the Lon Nol government. Some in this group subsequently returned to Phnom Penh with the invading Vietnamese forces three-and-a-half years later. Perhaps it says something of the volatility of Kampuchean political loyalties as well as, perhaps, a prescient appreciation of the character of the Pol Pot regime and its coming horrors in this time of stress, that about five times as many members of the Lon Nol regime's political and professional elite preferred sanctuary in a unified Communist Vietnam rather than in anti-Communist Thailand and the West. Yet, more than other, subsequent, Kampuchean refugee groups, the fleeing elite of the Lon Nol era probably would have found entry into the West relatively smooth.

The second stage of the Kampuchean refugee movement began with the accelerating Vietnamese invasion and overthrow of Pol Pot's "Democratic Kampuchea" government in the closing weeks of 1978. Among Thai Interior Ministry officials with whom the author discussed this post-Vietnamese invasion wave of Kampuchean refugees, there is uncertainty and skepticism regarding refugee motives for flight at this time. Already by the middle of 1979, at least 200 000 Kampucheans either had unlawfully crossed the Thai border, or being camped near it, periodically repeated their efforts to cross it despite repulsion by Thai security forces until they succeeded. Apart from those eventually given shelter in Thailand itself, as many as 300 000 additional Kampucheans, in the latter half of 1979 began hovering near, at, or thwart the border, sometimes crossing stealthily into Thailand, sometimes returning to the Kampuchean interior, but then coming back a gain in search of food as famine in Kampuchea spread. The memory of the much publicized, blood soaked, wrenching social revolution that had characterized Pol Pot's heyday in power, as well as fear of future fighting, may well have seemed reason enough to flee the country¹². But by early 1979, Kampucheans had good reason to assume that the conquering Vietnamese, and their puppet regime led by President Heng Samrin's "People's Republic of Kampuchea" (PRK), were unlikely to perpetuate Pol Pot's near genocidal policies. Moreover, the reception in Thailand, long historically at odds with Cambodia, was initially hardly very encouraging.

Clearly there were other refugee expectations. Among them, as some Thai sources have it, was the hope of eventual permanent emigration to the US. A popular belief that this was possible, particularly for those Laotians and Vietnamese who found their way to any camp in Asia under the jurisdiction of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), spurred flight into Thailand¹³. However, Kampuchean refugee motives at this time may well have been mixed. On the one hand, the invading Vietnamese and their puppet PRK regime sought to reassure the Kampuchean population that the nightmare of the Pol Pot era was over. On the other hand, Pol Pot's forces were not wholly destroyed, and 40 000 of them and their DK underground government headed by Khieu Sampan soon had solidified themselves in Western Battambang province and the Cardamom mountain range. With Chinese assurances and weapons supplies they continued the fighting. But whether Cambodians were actually all that fearful and were seeking to escape the prospect of an ongoing civil war, or were merely using such a prospect and the Vietnamese invasion as a pretext for permanent emigration elsewhere via Thailand, the Bangkok authorities quickly calculated that, in any case, the refugee influx posed an unacceptable hazard.

For apart from the logistical and economic problems posed for the Thais by the rapid influx during the early months of 1979 of tens of thousands of Kampuchean refugees, there was an overriding and dual threat to Thai national security. First of all, among the new refugee surge there were clearly those who had served Pol Pot's DK regime. Would Thailand's own Communist guerilla underground be strengthened not only by them, but also by the close proximity of the vestige of the DK government near the Thai border? And secondly, given the strength of the Vietnamese military forces and civilian support personnel (estimated at 200 000 and 35 000 respectively) for the new Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh, and the fact that behind Vietnam stood a watchful USSR unwilling to abandon easily the prize of its increased influence in Hanoi, what new danger would loom for Thailand if it proved hospitable to precisely those Kampuchians who now were abandoning the Heng Samrin "liberation" of their national soil?

And so, where possible, in the period from February to October, 1979, when the policy was at least partially reversed, Thai security forces, sometimes it is alleged acting with considerable brutality, drove refugees from make-shift border shelters back into Kampuchea. In one well-publicized incident alone in June, 1979, more than 40 000 Kampuchians were thus driven back. Thai Premier Kriangsak wrote President Jimmy Carter and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that the Cambodians had been "repatriated" because "they were not genuine refugees" but in fact had been "exported" from their own countries¹⁴.

THE THIRD STAGE OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

Such forceful countermeasures however produced, for both the Thais and the refugees, two sets of contradictory consequences, one which at least temporarily ameliorated the refugees' plight and moderated Thai fears. The other, unforeseen, tended to aggravate matters. By this time, it must be noted, faminelike conditions had come to prevail in much of war-ravaged Kampuchea. Strong UNHCR appeals, and, less covertly, deep concerns voiced to the Thais particularly by the US and France, led by October, 1979, to a gradually more forthcoming Thai posture. This new Thai policy inaugurates the third stage in Bangkok's attempts to deal with the refugee crisis. The UNHCR promised both economic assistance in the construction and supply of new refugee centers inside Thailand, and maximal efforts to help, not in finding a "third country" haven for the new refugee wave, but rather to induce the refugees voluntarily to "repatriate".

These developments, then, helped the refugee situation. The aggravating factor, on the other hand, was what can only be described as the "refugee nation" that developed along much of the Thai-Kampuchean border, its growth given new impetus as Thai forces at first had attempted to drive the Kampucheans back into their own country. Governed by self-proclaimed "national liberation" leaders and their well armed bands of bodyguards, the teeming, hunger driven, refugee mass along, if not virtually straddling, the ill defined border became a readily protective environment for smugglers (including weapons runners), black market operators with connections among corrupt officials in the Thai border communities nearby, "recruiters" for both Pol Pot's guerillas and their anti-Communist rivals, Vietnamese and Thai intelligence personnel, and so on. Ending this border chaos, however, was not only thwarted by understandable Thai fears of the political, security, and logistical costs of a more relaxed refugee entrance policy, but also by the influence of those who benefitted from the subterranean border economy of the "refugee nation". By early 1980, however, in order to alleviate the continuing miseries of starving Kampucheans, and with more regular infusions of international aid, Bangkok allowed "all who wished to enter official camps located a few kilometres inland from the border" in Thailand itself to enter¹⁵.

It is testimony to the political power structure that had emerged in the "refugee nation" by this time that this new Thai liberality only resulted in some 170 000 actually entering the new camps just inside Thailand. At the same time, as Funston has noted, "hundreds of thousands" remained "in encampments on the border", be it with provisions of food and medical services extended by United Nations agencies, the International Red Cross, and private US, Australian, and West European charitable organizations. The new inland camps were run by Thai military. But escape or "transfers" to Interior Ministry-run camps, with a corresponding greater assurance of emigration to Western countries, sometimes proved possible for those with

the financial means or political connections. Toward the close of 1980, as again, with the aid of hundreds of tons of rice shipped by UN and international relief agencies to the new Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea itself, conditions in Cambodia began to improve, the "refugee nation" along the border began to diminish slowly.

Meanwhile, "third country" relocation programs of Indochinese (primarily Laotians and Vietnamese) continued, under repeated Thai insistence, including threats that camps would be closed and refugees forceably "repatriated". Already in July, 1979, a UN-sponsored Geneva conference on the Indochinese refugees had resulted in 260 000 resettlements offers over the next 18 months¹⁶. The initial preference, however, clearly was for Laotians and Vietnamese. It was not until October, 1980, for example, that the Carter administration agreed to the entry of 30 000 Kampuchean, as other West European countries, as well as Australia and People's China, showed a readiness to absorb additional tens of thousands.

The Thai government's basic aim, in dealing with Kampuchean as distinct from most Laotian or Vietnamese refugees, was that "repatriation", not "third country" relocation, should occur as soon as conditions in Kampuchea itself permitted and as a relative stabilization of Thai-Heng Samrin political relations had occurred. Other nations, mindful of Thai security concerns and uncertain about the political attitudes or motives of Kampuchean who in the second or third stage of migration had flocked to the Thai border, seemed to concur in this Thai position. The more quickly, therefore, the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin government would be able to achieve a measure of economic stability the better. To this end an extensive, largely US-led, international relief program for Heng Samrin's PRK regime was undertaken. According to a US State Department press release in June, 1981, between late 1979 through 1980 alone, Western donor nations gave more than \$ 450 million in Cambodian relief, while private Western assistance from voluntary groups contributed an additional \$ 100 million (\$ 70 million from US organizations alone). Relief assistance provided by the USSR and Eastern bloc countries added an estimated \$ 200 million¹⁷.

THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

But by the middle of 1981, it was becoming clear that whatever the relative success in "third country" relocations of Laotians and Vietnamese refugees in Thailand, as well as the Vietnamese "boat people" in other Southeast Asian countries, the Kampuchean refugee crisis still was not ending. Indeed, it was now entering what should be termed its fourth stage. That stage was becoming apparent for Thailand as early as August, 1981. Not just Kampuchean refugee attempts to cross the border illegally into Thailand again seemed to

be increasing. But also the floating "refugee nation" population in the camps and makeshift settlements straddling the Thai-Kampuchean border and just inside Kampuchean territory once more began showing gradual, steady growth. Meanwhile, increased Thai-Vietnamese military conflict along the border, to be noted presently, was forcing new waves of refugees into Thailand.

By August, 1981, some 220 000 Kampuchean refugees were living in 15 of the largest of these border camps and settlements. A number of these camps, as in the past, were run either by Pol Pot's guerilla army, by elements of well-defined anti-Communist groups like the "Khmer People's National Liberation Front" (KPNLF) of former Cambodian Premier Son Sann, and yet others by local racketeers and gang leaders who occasionally, in the presence of Western journalists and visitors, claim hazy, usually anti-Communist ideological commitments. The character of the "refugee nation" settlements seemed to be changing also. One reporter noted the appearance of structures of a more "permanent appearance", including hospitals, meeting halls, and even postal facilities. The "fourth stage" newcomers were not the starving hordes of the past either, but many appeared intent on projecting a new power element of their own. "They are permanent, politicized and (their numbers are) growing", as one Western official described them¹⁸.

The appearance of the "fourth stage" Kampuchean border arrivals gave Thailand's refugee problem yet another, and politically dangerous, aspect. For one thing, the causes of the "fourth stage" refugee movement appear to have been and still are both political and economic. Gradually deepening disappointment in and resentment of Kampuchean of various strata with the disappointing economic performance of the Heng Samrin regime, was one factor. Another was nationalist resentment of the continuous and ubiquitous presence of Vietnamese military, Vietnamese Communist party cadres, civilian technicians and "resettled" Vietnamese farmers in Hanoi-adopted Cambodian "sister provinces". There are few reliable data on Kampuchean food production. But by end-1981, it had become apparent that the infusions of relief assistance noted above still had not been enough to stabilize the shattered agricultural economy, and that deteriorating living conditions were driving thousands to the border once again:

"At the beginning of 1981, foreign aid officials surveying Cambodia's agriculture concluded that the food emergency was over. What was needed, however, were a few years of convalescence. This verdict was premature: as the year drew to its close, alarm bells were ringing again. Because of drought, floods, and poor management of agriculture, the country again faced a shortfall of more than 200 000 tons of rice in 1982. . . . By the end of the year, malnutrition, if not famine, was a distinct possibility in 12 provinces."¹⁹

Shortages (especially of fuel and electric power), poor planning of resources for the textile and rubber processing industries, and a collapsing national currency, all added to the disenchantment, as did widespread popular belief

in outbursts of brutal misconduct by the Vietnamese military in the rural areas. In recent months dissatisfaction has deepened over conscription of Kampucheans by the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin governments, and over forced settlement of Kampucheans in new "strategic hamlet" complexes.

Then, too, for Thailand the "fourth stage" in its refugee problem has been characterized particularly by deepening security concerns resulting from the formation in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on June 21, 1982, of a "Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea" (CGDK). This is - an often uneasy - alliance between the three principal anti-Vietnamese and anti-Heng Samrin factions of Kampucheans. The factions are the 40 000 guerilla force of the erstwhile DK regime headed by Khieu Sampan and Pol Pot, the 2500-man Moulinaka (Mouvement de Libération Nationale du Kampouchea) founded in 1979 and headed by Cambodia's erstwhile ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and the 4 000-man force of the earlier named KPNLF headed by former Cambodian Premier Son Sann. This is not the place to evaluate the difficult birth of the CGDK or to assess its chances of success in its pronounced aim of liberating Kampuchea from the Vietnamese and give Kampucheans genuine self-determination²⁰. Suffice it to note that on July 8, 1982, Sihanouk crossed the Thai border into Kampuchea and in a KPNLF controlled camp at Sroch Srang, in the border zone of the "refugee nation", vowed before several hundred guerillas to lead the fight to drive the Vietnamese from his country²¹.

The Prince's various appeals had other effects. After his visit about the same time to the Khao I Dang refugee camp just inside Thailand, which then housed about 40 000 Kampuchean refugees, the latter began to move in their thousands across the border back into Cambodia into a small cluster of frontier settlements previously known collectively as O Smach, but now officially dubbed Sihanoukville (Sihanouk Bo Rai). As many as 14 000 former Kampuchean refugees from Khao I Dang had taken up residence in Sihanoukville by mid-October, 1982²². At Khao I Dang, Sihanouk had urged the Kampuchean refugees to return in order to help him in regaining control of Kampuchea from the Vietnamese.

But whether this was a mere rhetorical flourish by the Prince, or was actually intended, it soon became clear that the phenomenon of thousands of Thai-based Kampuchean refugees, in effect flocking to the CGDK's banner right in the Cambodian border zone, could be a development fraught with danger for the Thais and refugees alike. Periodic military sweeps by Vietnamese forces against DK guerillas already had occurred in the course of 1980-81, and they were soon to intensify. In some instances these sweeps had resulted in Vietnamese units crossing the Thai frontier and in brief skirmishes with Thai border forces. Fear that Sihanoukville shortly would become the target of a major Vietnamese border operation grew, as the settlement, already during the 1982 rainy season began to be hit by Vietnamese rockets.

THE REFUGEES, VIETNAM, AND THE KAMPUCHEAN CONFLICT

The danger undoubtedly was aggravated by the growing involvement of the refugees in the anti-Vietnamese resistance within Kampuchea, and by Hanoi's weariness with such involvement. Considerable controversy still surrounds the CGDK's original intended use of O Smach or Sihanoukville, and of such KPRLF run camps as Sroch Srang, or for that matter of the tactics of the Pol Pot commanded Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer) guerilla units. On June 26, 1982, in the immediate aftermath of the CGDK's formation, Sihanouk, in a Malaysian interview, proposed military "coordination" between the coalition forces and appealed for international aid²³. Yet, already on August 9, 1982, after his dramatic visits to Sroch Srang and Khao I Dang, Sihanouk, while in Beijing, in a telegram to Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila as well as to his own representative along the Thai-Kampuchean border, urged Cambodian refugees in Thailand not to leave Khao I Dang and go across the border, as they would lack food "and risk being attacked by the Vietnamese"²⁴.

Possibly because of this warning, after September, 1982, the refugee rush toward Sihanoukville at first seemed to slow down somewhat, as realization among the refugees of the danger of Vietnamese military intervention in the area sank in. At other border settlements, by the end of 1982 at least, there did not seem to be any significant increase in Kampuchean refugees coming from camps in Thailand²⁵. In part this may have been due to the increased frequency of armed clashes between the factions of the CGDK on the one hand and the Vietnamese forces on the other, and to the heightened political tensions in the "refugee nation" zone along the border. On August 22, 1982, the commander-in-chief of the Thai Army, General Athir Kamlang-Ek, said that Vietnamese forces were renewing and intensifying their attacks against Cambodian resistance organizations. He added that the fighting was resulting "in spillovers across the border into Thailand." Vietnamese units, he said, were now using artillery bombardments against resistance strongholds²⁶. In early October, 1982, according to Thai military sources, "fierce mortar and gun battles" were taking place between Pol Pot's guerrilla forces and PRK units of the Heng Samrin government²⁷. The clandestine DK radio said in early September, 1982, that its forces had killed or wounded nearly 500 Vietnamese military in what was reported as "an upsurge of guerrilla fighting" in previous weeks. DK "assassination squads" were said to be wreaking havoc among Heng Samrin's government officials. Already in late August, 1982, it was reported that the PRK deputy Agriculture Minister Nhem Heng, and two of his advisers were killed by such assassination squads²⁸. Shortly afterwards KPRLF units claimed to have begun operations against "Vietnamese positions" in Cambodia between the towns of Sisophon and Poipet, resulting in "heavy fighting."²⁹ Then during the first half of 1983 came further and similar CGDK assertions of ambushes and successful guerrilla raids.

The veracity of all such reports and claims cannot be wholly established. Still, it had become apparent by the end of 1982 that the Thai-Kampuchean

border zone, the "politicized" floating refugee mass in it, and the factions of the CGDK claiming control over parts of it, all were increasingly being drawn into a deepening vortex of violence.

Meanwhile, various sides accused each other of unlawful violations of territory. Thailand, in a protest note delivered in August, 1982, to UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar accused Vietnam of intruding into Thai territory with helicopters in order to supply Thai "communist saboteurs" in Thailand's Ubon Ratchathani province, adding that the incident was only one of a series of recent Vietnamese violations of Thai air space. The same note also said that in previous weeks Vietnamese forces had "more than 20 times crossed the Thai-Kampuchean border."³⁰ The Hanoi-backed Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh, in turn, kept charging the Thais with illegally overflying Kampuchean air space with their military aircraft, and of intruding into Thai territorial waters with various armed vessels³¹.

Early in 1983, the Vietnamese and their ally, the Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh, apparently had become persuaded that the growing danger of a CGDK military force, ensconced in and drawing recruits from the refugee border camps and its politically volatile floating population, no longer could be ignored. Thus on January 31, 1983, 4 000 Vietnamese troops, with the support of light artillery and tanks, attacked the refugee camp at Nong Chan, just inside the northwestern Kampuchean border, and located about eighteen miles northeast of the important Thai border center of Aranyaprathet. Before the attack, Nong Chan had housed about 24 000 Kampuchean refugees. But the camp was an important staging area as well for units of the KPNLF and the Vietnamese attack clearly was intended as a blow against the anti-Vietnamese guerrilla resistance. The camp was wholly destroyed and burned to the ground. Then on March 31, 1983, and in the early days of April, some one thousand Vietnamese military, augmented by several hundred troops of Heng Samrin's "People's Republic of Kampuchea" army, and preceded by a barrage of artillery, rocket and Soviet-built T-54 tank force fire, attacked Phnom Chat and Chamkar Kor. These clusters of refugee settlements, inhabited by about 30 000 refugees, are just inside Kampuchea and located about 30 miles northeast of Aranyaprathet. Phnom Chat at the time of this attack was, like Nong Chan had been, more than just a refugee center - it also was a regimental headquarters for a force of at least 3 500 military of the "National Army of Kampuchea", the fighting arm of the now underground government of "Democratic Kampuchea" (DK), one of the partners in the earlier named CGDK formed in Kuala Lumpur in June, 1982. Much of the Phnom Chat and Chamkar Kor camp area too was destroyed, though sharp fighting between Vietnamese and DK forces continued and, indeed, spilled over repeatedly into adjacent Thai territory³².

The immediate effect of both the attack on Nong Chan and Phnom Chat was to drive successive waves of some 40 000 new Kampuchean refugees across the border into Thailand, where reluctant authorities gave them temporary sanctuary in another border camp. Inter alia one notes that on May 25,

1983, Thai and United Nations relief officials in Bangkok reported that the "first batch" of some 20 000 of the recent new wave of refugees from the border camp fighting had returned to Kampuchea. Hanoi could not have taken much comfort from this news, however. For it was reported also that these returning refugees were going to a DK guerrilla stronghold and settlement just inside Kampuchea³³.

Then on April 4, 1983 came yet another Vietnamese assault, this time against the earlier named settlement of O Smach ("Sihanoukville"), the headquarters of CGDK head Prince Norodom Sihanouk's Moulinaka military force. The O Smach attack drove yet another 25 000 Kampuchean refugees into Thailand, as Vietnamese shells meanwhile rained once more inside Thai border territory.

The Bangkok government's response was sharp. After the O Smach attack was officially announced in Bangkok, Thai authorities revealed that earlier, during their pursuit of DK "National Army" units at Phnom Chat, some 150 Vietnamese soldiers not only had gone well into Thai territory, but also had attempted to take up an entrenched position in the Phnom Pra hill area of Thailand. Bangkok reported that the Vietnamese intruders had been driven off by Thai F-5 jets however. The Thai authorities claimed as well that there had been hand-to-hand combat between Thai and Vietnamese military during these border incursions, and that five Thais had been killed. The Thai government in formally charging Hanoi with repeated border provocations and violations strongly protested the Vietnamese military incursion also at the United Nations³⁴. The U.S., Thailand's military mainstay for more than a generation, was quick to express support again. Accompanied by a Reagan administration condemnation of the Vietnamese incursion, came the American gesture of an immediate airlift and other US shipments of long-range howitzers, anti-aircraft and other weapons to the Thais.

Though on April 6, 1983, Thai supreme military commander, General Saiyud Kherdpol, in an obvious attempt to calm Thai concerns, declared that Vietnamese forces had withdrawn completely from Thai border positions, speculation abounded that future clashes were likely. More and more came to be revealed in the Thai press of ongoing long-term Vietnamese logistical preparations along the border, including the construction of new access roads, bridges, and establishment of Vietnamese military posts. On May 19, 1983, Thai intelligence sources in fact reported that Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea were preparing for new attacks on border refugee camps in the future, and declared that though some Vietnamese border troops had been withdrawn, they had been replaced by fresh units³⁵.

Meanwhile powerful incentives continue to build up for the Vietnamese to launch a new, and perhaps more sustained, "border clean-up" campaign. The Vietnamese have had little success in their running clashes with various CGDK units. Except for their attacks on the refugee camps, the war against the CGDK "has not gone well for the Vietnamese", as one recent observer has put it, adding that the Vietnamese "have taken tens of thousands of casu-

alties and officials in Hanoi admit that troop morale has faded."³⁶ The Kampuchean resistance is reported to be stepping up "harassment raids on Vietnamese supply routes deep inside Kampuchea."³⁷ In turn, the Vietnamese in subsequent months continue to retaliate. Recent Vietnamese construction of a six metres wide, landmine and bamboo spike studded, 25 kilometre long trench in Kampuchea near the border, is designed to stem the flow of Kampuchians in Thailand from joining the CGDK³⁸.

Heating up the border war against the refugee camps, and, indeed, generally creating an atmosphere of wider conflict, may also serve a diplomatic purpose for the Vietnamese. This is not the place to review the tortuous course of various policy positions and negotiations, particularly between Vietnam and its ASEAN neighbors, to settle the Kampuchean question³⁹. Suffice it to say that thus far all this diplomacy has produced no agreement, ASEAN insisting on a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea, but Hanoi continuing to demand the elimination of a Chinese threat to Vietnam's security as the *sine qua non* for any compromise. Meanwhile, fresh Vietnamese troops, either in rotation of troops now in Kampuchea, or sent in order to augment existing units there, continue to pour into Kampuchea, according to Thai military intelligence sources⁴⁰.

THE REFUGEES AND THE "LEBANON SYNDROME"

Despite internal CGDK leadership squabbles⁴¹, the organization remains the only alternative rallying point for many Kampuchean refugees in or near Thailand. That rallying point, moreover, to Hanoi's deep chagrin, continues to find widespread support in the international community. Again and again the UN General Assembly, with large majorities, has voted for resolutions demanding Vietnam's withdrawal from Kampuchea. In turn, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has accused ASEAN of conducting, since 1975, "hostile activities" against Vietnam and other Indochinese states. He has also castigated the establishment of the CGDK, and declared that "We have warned ASEAN that if they can do such things we can do the same. We have the right to self-defense." Included in this self-defense, according to Thach, was the right to pursue Pol Pot's guerrillas, even if they were in Thai territory. Thach also intimated giving assistance to Communist parties in the ASEAN countries as a possible Vietnamese act of "self-defense" against a hostile ASEAN⁴².

Thach's warning was not lost on the Thais, whose press escalated the hostile tone of its customary anti-Vietnamese coverage. In one editorial *riposte*, however, a leading Bangkok daily also managed to lay bare the Thai's concern over the refugee problem and a widening conflict with Vietnam. Referring to Thach the editorial declared:

"He accused Thailand and ASEAN of interfering in Kampuchea's internal

affairs, but he never opened his eyes to the fact that it was Vietnam which invaded Kampuchea, introducing some 200 000 occupation troops into the country. Vietnam is the origin of all the problems, including the refugee problem, which will never be solved so long as Vietnam remains in Kampuchea.

"By threatening Thailand with hot pursuit into Thai territory in case of Vietnamese attacks against the Khmer Rouge forces along the Thai border, Nguyen Co Thach made a statement not worth that of a person holding the high post of minister."⁴³

It is in the context of all this that the "Lebanon syndrome" structures the apprehensions of some Thais over their refugee problem. There is the possibility that the ASEAN-supported CGDK, with a following among the "refugee nation" along the border, as well as in camps in Thailand itself, eventually will become a challenge that Hanoi no longer can afford to ignore. Particularly so, since the CGDK's factions - as they are now doing - not only receive weapons from People's China with the connivance or studied indifference of Thai military and border officials, but also might begin to receive even more sustained and long-term assistance (not necessarily military) from other powers than they already are receiving. To be sure, Thailand, like most other ASEAN members (with the exception of Singapore) formally disavow giving or contemplating the CGDK military aid. The fact is that they don't need to: by leading the CGDK's international diplomatic offensive against Vietnam and the Heng Samrin regime, and, in the case of Thailand, providing a de facto reservoir of potential CGDK recruits in the camps, the ASEAN powers already are extending as much assistance as practical exigencies demand or allow. Indeed, should the CGDK factions be able to weld themselves together in an ever more effective striking force than is now the case, and escalate operations beyond the present pattern of periodic, if "fierce", guerrilla clashes, then the point of no return for Hanoi would be even more quickly reached.

A thorough, "house cleaning", Vietnamese offensive against all CGDK strongholds would bring not just Vietnamese "hot pursuit" into Thailand, but involve a major border crossing strike. Hanoi just now is not eager for this, considering that in the past three years People's China has repeatedly assured Bangkok that it will come to the Thais' assistance in the event of a Vietnamese intervention. But as the remaining Kampuchean refugee problem and the international political problem of Kampuchea on which it feeds drag on unresolved, and as the human border flotsam continues to drift into and around the CGDK sphere of control in the camps, a Vietnam being "bled white" in Kampuchea may feel in the end that, like Israel confronting the PLO in Lebanon, it no longer has a choice. A sustained, extensive Vietnamese "clean up" strike could only result in more Kampuchean refugees being driven to the Thai border or across it into Thailand. Indeed, any intensified fighting inside Kampuchea itself, as the Thai ambassador at the UN, Phiraphong Kasemsi, already pointed out at the close of October, 1982, would only result in "another

massive influx of refugees" into Thailand, with its attendant displacement effect on Thais living near the border zone⁴⁴.

Certainly throughout the course of 1983 mutual Thai and Vietnamese accusations of border violations increased in sharpness of tone. In September, 1983, Hanoi radio charged Bangkok with numerous recent transgressions by Thai fighter planes into Kampuchean air space, and with Thai rocket attacks on Kampuchean territory; a month later, Thai military spokesmen accused "Vietnamese soldiers" of "frequent intrusions" of Thai territory, including the "plundering" of local Thai people near the border⁴⁵. A "white paper", published in mid-September, 1983 by Heng Samrin's PRK government in Phnom Penh, asserted that the Thais "have entered into collusion with Beijing and Pol Pot" to destroy Kampuchea, and it reviewed the allegedly centuries-long history during which "Thai feudalists" have been trying to seize "Kampuchean land."⁴⁶ In the meantime, the formidable problem faced by CGDK insurgents in wresting control from the Heng Samrin regime has been stressed by some observers, even as other reports speak of the significant strength of the anti-Vietnamese resistance in Kampuchea⁴⁷. Clearly, any discussion of Thailand's refugee problem these days increasingly has become caught in this barrage of contending claims and accusations.

At the same time, not just fighting along the border, but political conflict within Vietnamese controlled Kampuchea, may produce new waves of refugees. Beginning in early June, 1983, thousands of Kampucheans (estimated between 5 400 and 8 000 refugees) commenced streaming into KPNLF-controlled border camps. In an effort to consolidate their hold in critical areas the Vietnamese in previous weeks arrested hundreds of middle level party cadres and civil officials including commune leaders in Battambang, Siem Reap and Oddar Mancheay provinces. Some of the arrested were charged with being KPNLF agents or supporters, a charge that may perhaps reflect the increasing effectiveness of Son Sann's efforts in subverting the Vietnamese controlled border bureaucracy in Western Kampuchea. According to one Thai Army spokesman, Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea had disarmed an entire division of Heng Samrin's PRK troops and disarmed divisional commanders on suspicion of being supporters of the CGDK⁴⁸. Assertions of Kampuchean nationalism against further Vietnamese control, even among Heng Samrin supporters, will continue to make for internal conflict and refugee movement.

CONCLUSION: IS THERE A SOLUTION TO THE REFUGEE PROBLEM?

In line with its intermittent conciliatory gestures toward Vietnam, Bangkok has not overlooked the refugees. The Thai government has been making redoubled efforts in recent months to solve the question of its remaining Laotian and Vietnamese refugees, and to control the problem of the Kampuchean

refugee mass at its border. Sometimes the solution has been de facto absorption of the refugees, with semi-official acquiescence. For instance, in the past few years as many as 50 000 Laotian refugees in Thailand, including Hmong tribal people, are believed quietly to have resettled in Thailand in ethnically similar areas in Thailand's northern and northeastern provinces; the process clearly began illegally when thousands of Laotian refugees, upon being told that they did not qualify for "third country" resettlement, fled their camps and began living in the Thai northern highlands and in inaccessible "hill tribe" country⁴⁹. Then, too, Bangkok has at various international forums expressed growing impatience with the slowness of the rate of "third country" relocation of its estimated remaining 8 300 Vietnamese and nearly 84 000 Laotians who are still living in Thai camps designed to house such future resettlers. And as early as May, 1981, Bangkok attempted to induce Burma to accept its Kampuchean refugees for eventual resettlement elsewhere. By the end of July, 1981, Thai officials even announced that they would no longer accept any Vietnamese "boat people" refugees landing on Thai shores, as of August 15⁵⁰.

Through the International Red Cross, Bangkok and Hanoi also have been trying to come to an arrangement for the repatriation of as many Vietnamese as possible still staying in Thai camps. Already at the close of October, 1982, the US government announced it would double its staff of employees in Thailand in order to accelerate resettlement of Indochina refugees. The announcement came in the wake of sharp Thai protests shortly before that the rate of refugee "intake" by other countries had slowed to 40 000 for the year 1982 (most of them Kampucheans) as compared to more than 100 000 the year before⁵¹. Inter alia one may note that Thailand is not the only major ASEAN refugee haven which has been expressing impatience with the declining rate of "third country" acceptances of Indochinese refugees. In June, 1983 Malaysian authorities noted that the number of such refugees arriving on Malaysian shores again was increasing sharply ("from 50 boats in the first three months" of the year to "40 and 50 boats a month" since then). And although some 11 000 Vietnamese illegal immigrants were still waiting in Malaysian camps, the number of "third country" acceptances had dropped to "below a thousand a month", Malaysian authorities complained, as recipient countries were tightening refugee admission standards in favor of those with technical and special skills⁵².

The fear that remaining Vietnamese in Thailand today may yet prove to be fertile ground for subversive organization - a fear noted at the beginning of these pages - doubtlessly accentuates Thailand's impatience. Still, many obstacles to a resolution of the refugee problem persist. For one thing, it may be becoming increasingly difficult to find a "third country" home for the Cambodians now still in Thai camps, many presumably with "legal refugee" status. Early in September, 1982, Cambodian refugees in the 20 000-member Kamput Camp in Eastern Thailand started receiving what was known as "doom letters" - notices from the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

that their applications to go to the US had been rejected. Already 1800 refugees in the camp had been so rejected on the grounds that, in the opinion of the INS, they were not genuine refugees but merely "economic refugees", allegedly "scheming" to get into the US. They were advised to return to Kampuchea⁵³. More likely the rejected refugees would and will try to escape from the camps into surrounding Thai territory, or else become part of the volatile mixture of the border "refugee nation".

This "refugee nation" at the Thai-Kampuchean border now threatens to become a permanent fixture of Southeast Asia's political landscape. And, whether Thailand likes it, or so considers it, or not, the "refugee nation" remains part of the Bangkok government's own larger refugee problem. The waves - or trickles - of refugees from all parts of Indochina coming into Thailand always seem to leave some residue of those who manage to stay on legally or illegally, as others are "persuaded" to go back into Kampuchea or depart for "third" countries. The Kampuchean, indeed the Indochinese refugee problem, just isn't going away. Again, only a comprehensive settlement with Hanoi of the whole Kampuchean question, a settlement that inevitably must involve ASEAN, People's China and other major powers, could perhaps bring an end to Thailand's continuing refugee problem.

Notes:

- 1) Nation Review (Bangkok), May 24, 1982.
- 2) The Bangkok Post, May 15, 1981.
- 3) Editorial, "Refugees: No Deal, No Entry", The Bangkok Post, July 13, 1981.
- 4) Royal Thai Government, Communist Suppression Operations Command, Communist Insurgency in Thailand (Communist Suppression Operations Command, Bangkok, 1972, English edition), pp.16-19, 41-46.
- 5) Nation Review, April 6, 1981.
- 6) Radio Bangkok, "Voice of Free Asia", September 29, 1982 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports, hereafter FBIS, October 6, 1982).
- 7) 1981 Refugee data from Radio Bangkok, "Voice of Free Asia", September 9, 1981 (FBIS, September 11, 1981).
- 8) J. Patrick Hamilton Cambodian Refugees in Thailand: The Limits of Asylum (U.S. Committee for Refugees, New York, August, 1982), p.1.
- 9) Royal Thai Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Questions and Answers Concerning the Problem of Displaced Persons from Indochina (Bangkok, Royal Thai Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September, 1981), cited FBIS, September 4, 1981.
- 10) Kathleen Newland, Refugees: The New International Politics of Displacement (World Watch Institute, Washington, D.C., 1981), World Watch

Paper No.43, pp.19, 25-26; The New York Times, August 10, 1982. For the 1983 U.S.State Department data see the Department's Bureau of Public Affairs publication, "Indochinese Refugees", Gist (U.S.Department of State, Washington, D.C.), April, 1983, p.2.

- 11) The following discussion, including statistical data, derives in part from Hamilton, Cambodian Refugees in Thailand, op.cit., pp.2-6, as well as from discussions with Thai Interior Ministry and Internal Security Operations Command officials in Bangkok.
- 12) See e.g. François Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977), and John Barron and Anthony Paul, Murder of a Gentle Land (Pleasantville, N.Y., Reader's Digest Press, 1977).
- 13) Astri Suhrke, "Indochinese Refugees and American Policy", The World Today, February, 1981, pp.55-56. See also Astri Suhrke, "Indochinese Refugees: The Law and Politics of First Asylum", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, May, 1983, pp.102-116.
- 14) Frank Frost, "Vietnam, ASEAN, and the Indochina Refugee Crisis", p.365 in Southeast Asian Affairs 1980 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1980).
- 15) John Funston, "Indochina Refugees: The Malaysian and Thai Response", Asian Thought and Society, vol.5, 1980, p.224.
- 16) "Indochinese Refugees", Gist (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S.Department of State, Washington, D.C.), May, 1981, p.1.
- 17) "Khmer Relief", Gist (Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S.Department of State, Washington, D.C.), June, 1981, p.1.
- 18) Barry Wain, "Cambodian Refugee Surge Strains Aid", The Wall Street Journal, August 26, 1981.
- 19) Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook 1982 (Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, 1982), pp.129-130.
- 20) On the background of the CGDK's formation see Justus M.van der Kroef, "Kampuchea: The Diplomatic Labyrinth", Asian Survey, October, 1982, pp.1009-1033.
- 21) The Straits Times (Singapore), July 8, 1982.
- 22) The Bangkok Post, October 12, 1982, and The New York Times, October 21, 1982.
- 23) Agence France Press despatch, Beijing, June 26, 1982.
- 24) The Straits Times, August 10, 1982.
- 25) Nation Review (Bangkok), August 28, 1982.
- 26) Ibid., August 23, 1982.
- 27) The Bangkok Post, October 3, 1982.
- 28) The Times (London), August 30, 1982; The Straits Times, September 4, 1982.
- 29) The Bangkok Post, October 5, 1982; Far Eastern Economic Review, October 8, 1982, p.14.
- 30) Nation Review, August 19, 1982.

- 31) Radio Phnom Penh, SPK, August 18, 1982 (FBIS, August 20, 1982).
- 32) On the Nong Chan and Phnom Chat-Chamkar Kor attacks see The Bangkok Post, February 1 and 4, and April 1, 1983.
- 33) The Bangkok Post, May 25, 1983 and The New York Times, May 26, 1983.
- 34) Nation Review (Bangkok), April 5, 1983; The Bangkok Post, April 6, 1983.
- 35) OANA-TNA despatch, Bangkok, May 19, 1983 in FBIS, May 20, 1983.
- 36) Al Santoli, "The New Indochina War", The New Republic, May 30, 1983, p.20.
- 37) Nation Review, May 30, 1983.
- 38) Ibid., June 1, 1983. See also The Straits Times (Singapore), Feb. 24, 1983..
- 39) See Justus M. van der Kroef, "Kampuchea: The Diplomatic Labyrinth", op. cit.
- 40) The Bangkok Post, May 22, 1983.
- 41) See, e.g. "To Quit Or Not, That's The Question", Nation Review, June 18, 1983.
- 42) The Straits Times, July 20 and 21, 1982.
- 43) Matichon (Bangkok), July 23, 1982 (FBIS, July 23, 1982).
- 44) Radio Bangkok, October 30, 1982 (FBIS, November 2, 1982).
- 45) VNA despatch, Hanoi, September 24, 1983 (FBIS, September 27, 1983), and Radio Bangkok, "Voice of Free Asia", October 21, 1983 (FBIS, October 24, 1983).
- 46) PRK "White Book" entitled "Thai Policy Vis-à-Vis Kampuchea", Hanoi, VNA despatch, September 14, 1983 (FBIS, September 21, 1983).
- 47) Paul Quinn-Judge, "The Khmer Resistance: State of the Union", Indochina Issues (Washington, D.C.), no.40. September, 1983, pp.1-7; Jacques Bekaert in The Bangkok Post, September 17, 1983.
- 48) Nation Review, June 23, 1983; The Bangkok Post, June 17 and 27, 1983; The Straits Times, June 23, 1983.
- 49) U.S.Department of State, Country Reports on the World Refugee Situation. Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1983 (U.S.Department of State, Washington, D.C., August, 1982), p.57, and The Bangkok Post, November 6, 1982.
- 50) Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1, 1981, p.22, and Asiaweek, August 7, 1981, p.25.
- 51) Far Eastern Economic Review, October 22, 1982, p.48 and The Bangkok Post, October 30, 1982.
- 52) The New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur), June 22, 1983.
- 53) The Straits Times, September 6, 1982.