

AFGHAN REFUGEES, AID AND ANTHROPOLOGISTS

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In this paper I shall be discussing and analyzing some of the practical problems that face nations as a result of mass exodus of populations from one country to another, the problems of dispersing aid efficiently and in time to them and how and where anthropologists and social scientists may be employed usefully in the exercise. I will discuss this paper within a broad conceptual framework that relates problems of displaced populations in different political and social environments as a result of political upheavals at home and with a specific situation in mind. The specific situation is provided in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan where some 600,000 refugees (another 100,000 are in Baluchistan) have crossed the border from Afghanistan and are temporarily living in 1980. I will be arguing that most aid-giving agencies would benefit if a social scientist were added to their teams assessing and distributing aid. An anthropologist with his specialized knowledge of tribal social structure and organization would be placed at an even greater advantage in adding this important dimension to the concept of international aid. A purpose of this paper is also to suggest practical means to improve the efficiency of distribution to the refugees. I will be discussing the problem as it pertains to the problems of the refugees and some practical steps that could be taken to alleviate their misery. I shall not touch on the political genesis of the problem or its continuing political ramifications. A comment with definite political implications is the prognosis that the refugees will be living on this side of the Durand line longer than most people expect. The urgency for planning, especially long-term planning, is therefore underlined.

THE THREE PARTIES TO THE PROBLEM

There are three parties to this problem and, for the purposes of this paper, we may conceptualize them as 'A' the aid-giving countries and institutions (UNO, notably the UNHCR, WFP, World Bank, etc.); 'B' the host country; and 'C' the refugees themselves. The three points in this triangle, 'A', 'B' and 'C' must at various stages work in some degree of harmony and balance if the purpose of the exercise, which is to distribute aid efficiently and fairly to 'C', the refugees, is to be met. A basic problem that faces the entire operation is inherent in the structural nature of 'A' and 'B'. Both are bureaucracies, the first on an international level and the second on a national or even provincial one. Both function within frameworks peculiar to them and within their own sets of specific political constraints. By definition both can be impersonal and cold, partly as a result of various types of red tape, in the matter of dealing with individuals and small groups.

Some of the personnel of 'A' and 'B' will, I am sure, declare that this brief disposition is unfair to them. Several members are dedicated and missionary in their zeal and do respond to the element of human drama in the situation, more than I have suggested. Many will argue that they are conscious of these problems but bound down by rules. This sighting of the problem is not enough if the ideas behind it are left untouched and a discussion will be more menaningful when it is made public. To my knowledge no such discussion or critique from within the fold has yet appeared or a debate along these lines been generated. Certain corns may be tread on in this paper. If this helps improve the flow and distribution of aid and understanding between 'A', 'B' and 'C' a purpose of the paper will have been served.

I was prompted to write this paper as a result of discussions and dealings with 'A', 'B' and 'C'. The problem was created by a political situation and political activities but it was to be dealt with sociologically, in as much as it concerned human groups in desperate need of basic facilities. Yet the social aspect is almost absent from the entire refugee scene. For instance in a discussion with United Nation's officials I discovered that some of them were in Pakistan for the first time in their lives, they knew nothing or little about the area or its history. As they were West European they could not appreciate the administrative situation in the Tribal Areas or the historical nuances of the Great Game. Some of them manifested little of the missionary spirit which one envisages is necessary for such a task. They appeared more concerned about hotel rates, taking precautions against malaria and other horrible local diseases. After staying in air-conditioned, four-star hotels, removed from the filth and chaos of the refugee camps for two or three weeks they were rushing off to Geneva to write a report on their activities with suggestions regarding the refugee camps. The depth, perception and

even validity of the conclusions to my mind were open to doubt. Some of my discussions centered on the suggestion that a social scientist be attached to 'A'. This argument was brushed aside for social scientists and anthropologists in particular are considered as either too academic or arcane for practical employment in such crises. I am arguing and hope to demonstrate that this is not so.

While personnel for 'A' may often be short-term visiting specialists the personnel from 'B' are invariably from the Civil Service of Pakistan (now the Tribal Area Group and the District Management Group) or services notorious for upholding status quo and responding to change in a static manner. District administration on the subcontinent is based on the philosophy of maintaining law and order not inducing forms of change. Yet the situation demands personnel prepared to and trained for dealing with situations of rapid change. The refugee by definition is a person who is living in changed social and cultural environments and some personnel in 'A' and 'B' must be trained to deal with his special problem.

Similarly anthropologists are often accused of a static approach to social analysis. They would like to see things as unchanging, as situations exhibiting permanent structure and organization. The refugee situation is so palpably a situation of change, often as a result of violent upheavels in their home areas. This must be recognized in methodological and theoretical considerations by anthropologists studying the problem.

To a degree both 'A' and 'B' are characterized by exclusiveness and an inordinate concern with questions of procedure marked by formality and impersonality. The personnel is largely conservative. Clearly I will raise questions about the relationship between 'A' and 'B' which have implications for other situations elsewhere in the world and which are rarely aired. But perhaps they are questions which need to be asked and answered. It seems that in the past activities of 'A' could to a large degree disguise differences with 'B'. This is increasingly difficult today.

The role of 'B' is as interesting as it is difficult. It is that of a broker between 'A' and 'C' and often of attempting to interpret one to another. It is also a role that requires considerable imagination and understanding for in dealing with 'A', 'B' is dealing with some of the more advanced aspects of the 20th century (computers, international organizations etc.) but while dealing with 'C' it is still handling problems familiar since the middle ages (seasonal migration, a camel and tent economy, a severe code of behaviour etc.). The need for understanding of local culture and structure is all the more apparent.

It is not uncommon that 'C' will complain and often play off 'A' and 'B' (in any case most of the elders, in one form or another have played their parts - indeed are still playing - to some degree in the Great Game over the decades).

It goes to the general credit of Pakistan that so far no major complaints have been lodged by 'C'. As a matter of fact most of the complaints by 'C' are against their own leaders who have formed political parties and tend to attract publicity to and assistance for their own groups based largely in Peshawar.

The problem is compounded for 'B'. How does an administrator explain to 'A' that the Tribal Areas are a part of Pakistan and yet a 'special' part and that for various historical and political reasons it is not advisable for foreigners to be roaming around in them? Without knowledge of the history of the region a proposition that there is a large area within a country not fully administered by it does not make sense. The distinction is a fundamental one and anyone dealing with the problem must be aware of it. As we know there are no criminal, civil or revenue laws applicable to the Tribal Areas. What crimes are committed are dealt with by tribal elders according to the light of custom and tradition. A man may commit murder, killing his wife or his cousin, and yet will not be condemned to death if the tribal group agree it was done according to tradition. In any case there are no courts or judges in the Tribal Areas.


HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Some understanding of the historical background that motivates the Afghan refugees would be useful. Afghans have crossed the mountains of the North-West Frontier Province on their way to India over the last thousand years repeatedly. But they have done so as conquerers. The Khiljis, the Surs and the Lodhis, tribal groups from Afghanistan, were rulers of Delhi. One of the last invaders was Babar, from Farghana, who established the Mughal Empire. These memories lend a fierce pride to the Afghan tribesmen. The memories underline their present plight and situation. They have not crossed the mountains as conquerers but have fled from their homes that have been invaded. For the first time in their history they are crossing into the sub-continent as a consequence of a major invasion of their land from the north. This creates a certain sullen pride and determination to return and restore the old order.


The problem of the Afghan refugees is to be understood on two different levels. Firstly, the refugee component is made up of those nomads who migrated annually from Afghanistan in winter across the international border to Pakistan (and back in summer) and were in a manner of speaking nationals of both countries. They spent their winters in Pakistan and made the long trek back on camels and on foot to summer pastures in Afghanistan. This was a tradition established over the centuries when modern international borders

USSR

Sketch map of the
NORTH WEST FRONTIER
PROVINCE OF PAKISTAN



AFGHANISTAN



did not prevent them from moving as they willed. These nomads were and are called *powindah* 'one who travels on foot' in Pakistan or *kochi* 'one who travels' in Afghanistan, words derived from Persian. The major and main refugee problem arises from the political changes in Kabul begun in the 1970s as a result of successive and increasingly pro-Soviet coups. The trickle of refugees crossing over soon became a flood and by the summer of 1979 there were some 500 000 in Pakistan. In December when Russian troops moved into Afghanistan a further impetus was given to refugees and in mid-1980 there are almost 700 000 of them in Pakistan. In addition to this, and I suspect a figure not fully assessed or enumerated by officials, are the large nomadic groups stranded on this side of the border with their summer pastures blocked to them in Afghanistan since 1979. The final total of refugees may be considerably more.

THE SITUATION IN WAZIRISTAN

The refugees have been treated generously by the Government of Pakistan. Generously in terms of the resources available to Pakistan, for Pakistan has had to pay for them from her own coffers and some charity donated by individuals and institutions all over the country. Refugees receive rupees 4 a day per adult (1 £ = 22 rupees) and subsidized essential rations such as wheat, sugar and vegetable oil. Recently the rates have come down to rupees 2 a day but a fixed amount of rations are provided free.

Although I discuss the problem in its more general aspects I will refer to my own present charge as Political Agent of the South Waziristan Agency where about 50 000 refugees are said to be living. Of these about 20 000 are officially registered and therefore entitled to the standard measurements of official aid. About half of these are *powindah* tribes, Sultan Khel, Sulaimanzai and Dottani and the other half *muqami* tribes, Kharoti and Tajak, from across the Afghan side of Birmal. About 30 000 live in the vast and inaccessible Birmal area of the Agency and one of the reasons they prefer to wait it out on the border is the hope that they would be returning soon to their villages a short distance from their present location. Although with my visit to Birmal in the summer of 1979, the first ever by any Political Agent or government official in the history of the area, Birmal is officially 'opened', the absence of a road and other facilities prevents a full scale penetration and therefore the area still remains partly inaccessible. As they are not registered the Birmal refugees do not receive any aid. The total number of refugees means that in South Waziristan Agency of a total population of 300 000 tribesmen some 50 000 are 'outsiders'. A proportion of 6:1 of such outsiders in any

total population is a high one to feed and support. The problem is more acute in North Waziristan Agency where the number of officially registered refugees is almost 120 000 (making the refugee - local ratio 1:2). One of the reasons that South Waziristan Agency does not face this problem so acutely is the fact that in November 1978, when I took charge, I anticipated events in the area and was sure that a mass exodus of refugees was in the offing. The local administration would be in danger of being swamped by them and eventually their presence would create tensions with the Agency tribesmen and result in a deterioration of law and order. This was the period when groups were crossing into Pakistan and requesting that they be allowed to camp or open up centres in the Agencies. Little thought was given to the problem in a long-range perspective and a rather haphazard attitude prevailed depending on the policies of the local administration. I was firm in my orders regarding refugee camps. I turned down requests to set up camps either at Wana, or beyond Wana towards the Durand line, because I was aware that such camps may sooner or later harbour military groups or guerillas and therefore create international complications. We fed the first groups and recommended that they move down to the settled district of Dera Ismail Khan where camps were organized for them. Most of my registered 20 000 refugees moved down to Dera Ismail Khan to escape the harsh winter of Wana. Apparently such precautions were not then taken in other Agencies and the result was vast unorganized, often highly politicized camps, some of them sitting right on the Durand line in for instance, North Waziristan and Kurram Agencies.

THE WORLD WIDE REFUGEE PROBLEM AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

The problem of the Afghan refugees is a problem that faces the 20th century in its most acute form involving mass human displacement. South and South East Asia have seen violent upheavals over the last few decades. In 1947 the subcontinent of India was partitioned and millions of people crossed the borders from and to the new country of Pakistan. Killing, rape and loot were common stories during the summer of 1947. In the 1970s Indo-China was a land of turbulence as a result of changing political fortunes and millions were displaced and killed. Today on the threshold of the 80s the world faces the problem of the Afghan refugee. The difference between the refugees who came to Pakistan in 1947 from India and the Afghan refugees 30 years later is that the latter are determined to return to their lands, however long and bitter the struggle; they have not come to stay.

Refugees have been treated with shocking callousness by the world at large and by neighbouring countries in particular. Stories of mass rape and murder off the Malaysian and Thai coasts by pirate ships are common. Bureaucracy is almost as brutal in shutting the doors to even temporary shelters for refugees. For example the classic situation in Cambodia where the host country, 'B' is deliberately blocking 'A', aid-giving agencies, from distributing aid to refugees for specific political purposes is almost inhuman. Yet we cannot ask or reply to the question "when will the refugees will go back?" or "how many will go back?" for the answers are based on political considerations across the border. The political situation has definite international political ramifications and is therefore outside the scope of this paper.

After the Russian invasion heads of government and heads of armies and other VIPs paraded about in Peshawar and the Khyber Pass. They visited the refugee camps and expressed sympathy. Suddenly the Afghan refugee was discovered and the VIPs descended on them. The camps had become like a tourist resort. The world leaders were photographed nodding their heads in sympathy and pointing portentously to the Khyber Pass. But this interest is, I fear, a temporary one for when the political dust has settled down and other areas of interest absorb the leaders of the world the Afghan refugee will be left largely to fend for himself. His problem of food, shelter and sanitation will remain as pressing as before the parade of tourist politicians. The attention of the world and its press is fickle.

Alas, the world and mass media respond to these great human tragedies with momentary interest and passing enthusiasm. Sometimes the interest is the sensation of viewing suffering on such a magnitude. The political climate also determines the length of interest. It was only when the Russians physically moved into Afghanistan with some strength in late 1979 that the world woke to the problem of the Afghan refugees. The fact that it woke only after the Russian invasion suggests that there was a political motivation in the response and not primarily a humanitarian one. Even after the Russians entered the scene it was a problem of degree and not of kind. Perhaps without sounding too cynical it may be predicted that with a fresh major disaster the attention of the world will divert from the problem of the Afghan refugees and focus on that part of the world. 'A' and 'B' will settle down to routine movement and 'C' will become another festering boil on the face of the earth. With no country, an uncertain future and increasing desperation, the classic ingredients of a Palestine-type situation in the region.

UNDERSTANDING AND MISUNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION AND NEEDS OF REFUGEES

Today there is considerable pressure to view all refugee activities including the most mundane in a global context. Such a demand is now a compelling element of the intellectual orientation of 'A' and yet it is inevitably unacceptable to social scientists working in and representing the Third World. 'A' the aid giving agencies, will insist, as they are insisting in the present situation, that aid should be 'meaningfully employed' and 'income generating activities' should be encouraged. Such activities concern growing more agriculture or are based on lands. An increase in cash crops or even planting seasonal crops rationally would generate some income, it is argued. The argument presupposes a blissful ignorance of the Tribal Areas where the majority of the Afghan refugees are placed. The refugees cannot by definition buy or own land in the Tribal Area according to the traditions and customs of the land. Therefore they cannot indulge in activities suggested by 'A'. No local tribesman will be allowed to sell land to any outsider which could permanently alienate it from the subsection or clan and therefore 'C' will not have access to land. In any case, the scarce water and the barren lands do not make this a feasible short-term project. Nonetheless I have heard official insistence and considerable petulance on the part of 'A' in wishing to impose such schemes on 'B'. In any case 'B' have a difficult time in explaining the local administrative situation in the Tribal Areas, which is one of the most peculiar in the world to 'A'. Those members of 'A' who have little knowledge or experience of South Asia, unlike some of the older British, find it difficult to rationalize the concept and situation of the Tribal Areas.

Another example of a similar misunderstanding of the local needs is the standard one of giving the wrong items of aid. For instance certain foods, such as tinned sardines and cheese have been brought in bulk for 'C'. Along with these blankets of excellent quality have also been given to 'B' for distribution. Both the food and the blankets are sold in the Peshawar markets and find their way to Islamabad and Lahore, and even as far as Karachi. 'A' is once again upset as the news trickles in and 'B' has little way of either controlling or explaining the situation to 'A'. The fact of the matter is that 'C' will not use either item. They will not eat foods such as sardines and cheese for their diet will be restricted under any conditions to wheat bread (*doda i* or *nan*) and they will use the quilt for sleeping in and never the blanket. To turn to blankets from quilts will be as repugnant as turning to trousers from the loose pyjama-type dress (*partog*) worn by the local population (on both sides of the border). 'A' will remain upset 'B' embarrassed and 'C' impassive in such a situation. What 'C' needs in this situation, living in their felt tents, are small and cheap tin oil stoves to cook food and a plentiful supply of kerosene oil. What they need are temporary income generating sources at hand

such as employment in manual work on roads or building sites which 'B' may easily provide through the local administration.

The point is borne out by my experience, some ten years ago, in 1970 when I was in charge of Manikganj Subdivision in East Pakistan as a Subdivisional Officer. I had to cope with the havoc caused by the fierce and terrible cyclones that hit the land from the Bay of Bengal in autumn. The cyclones displaced millions and killed an estimated half-a-million people in East Pakistan. The scale of the catastrophe and what they saw as the indifferent and insensitive attitude of the bureaucracy was one of the factors that convinced Bengalis to take their political destiny into their own hands and provided them with an argument. The irrelevance of certain commodities of aid that were given to East Pakistan that autumn aroused as much indignation as bewilderment. I was in charge of relief operations in a low-lying area almost flooded by swollen rivers and incessant rain. We were provided with tinned food which village Bengalis did not eat, with fine blankets which they did not use and western clothing. Such items invariably found their way to the town markets after distribution to the villagers. The international agencies were soon wondering whether aid items were being misused by the official machinery or even distributed at all in the first place. Had a social scientist been attached to the teams of 'B' they would have learned that Bengalis even when confronted with a disaster on such a scale do not know what use to make of tinned food, blankets and western clothes. In the villages such items are not traditionally acceptable even to numbed victims of disaster.

A certain flexibility, which implies imagination, is important in dealing with the problem, for the intentions are noble but larger regional problems may prevent their implementation. Examples are provided by the Tribal Areas where 'B' has little control beyond the main roads and government centers. Many of the camps are in areas where there is little direct government authority. Apart from this political aspect there is a cultural aspect too. For instance the refugees in South Waziristan and specially the *powindah* nomadic elements migrated from Wana to Dera Ismail Khan, some 150 miles away as they would in winter, to escape the severe winter of the Wana plain (at a height of 5 000 feet) in a journey that takes three to four days. Technically they were now moving from one refugee zone to another and therefore creating problems for those who keep books and accounts. Nonetheless, under no circumstances would these refugees have lived in their tents facing the harsh winter of Wana.

Similarly, they will once again migrate from the plains when it becomes uncomfortably hot in summer. Apart from imagination, compassion or feeling for people, which one imagines to be a major component of administering aid to refugees, is apparently missing or at best buried under bureaucratic procedure. Unfortunately they are reduced to numbers and anonymous names in

obscure registers in the offices of small officials. There is little or no apparent missionary zeal to serve and tend to the wounds both physical and moral of the refugees and yet the refugee is living in a state of social and psychological shock as a result of the dislocation of his life. It is for this reason that the work of someone like Doctor Dhal, at the Mission Hospital, in Tank has an immediate and wide impact. He provides free medicine to refugees and has seen up to 3 000 of them in the last three months. He is always accessible to the refugees who have come to Tank, to their women and their children. His female staff are of great help to the women in particular. A smile, some attention and some medicine go a long way in easing the problems that the patient might feel in such a situation.

I am arguing that some knowledge of social structure and organization, of the history and culture of a group and of its domestic economy are important in helping to administer aid effectively and efficiently. For instance the Cambodian household will be different to the Afghan one and therefore both have to be handled differently. This must be recognized by 'A' and this is where an anthropologist, trained to analyze specifically can be of help in providing blue-prints of local structure. It was therefore a pleasure to meet and discuss refugees with the Austrian aid relief team, the head of which is Dr. Alfred Janata a well-known anthropologist. The team had with them Dr. Bernt Glatzer, an anthropologist who had worked in Afghanistan, and within a few minutes the difference in approach was apparent. Relevant questions regarding the nuclear family, household economy, seasonal migrations etc. were being asked of me. The difference in perception and understanding with the other groups were clear.

WHAT CAN ANTHROPOLOGISTS/SOCIOLOGISTS DO ?

I will now attempt to answer specifically the question that members of 'A' would pose to me. What can anthropologists do in such situations to help practically? In short the answer is a great deal. They could identify and answer important questions. These questions would be important to both 'A' and 'B' and would presuppose a clear and deep understanding of 'C'. Let us briefly examine some areas where anthropologists can be of particular relevance and of specific assistance:

- 1) Most important, the social organization and structure of the groups could be identified. This identification is fundamental in trying to understand how many and what types of groups are being dealt with. For instance very few members of 'A' and 'B' recognize that in spite of surface and cultural similar-

ities the Afghan refugees can be demonstrably categorized into nomads and non-nomad groups with differentiated structural characteristics. This difference is recognized in the Tribal Areas and tribesmen refer to the first as *powindahs* and contrast them with the second as *muqami*, local, land-owning groups. The official Afghan refugee register does not recognize this difference and a column entitled 'name, parentage and tribe' glosses over it. *Powindahs* are transhumant and migratory and their economy is based on their animals and around their tent-homes. *Muqami* refugees dress, eat and live differently to *powindahs* and are mostly small land owners exhibiting characteristics of the peasant farmer. The needs of *powindahs* and *muqami* are different; as is their motivation for becoming refugees. Migration is escaping the situation for the *powindah* but a strategy for the *muqami*. The two categories explain and illustrate the problems arising out of distribution of tents. The *powindah* has lived in a tent all his life and adjusts his household around it. In the heat of summer he spread-eagles the tent and nails it in such a manner that it is a foot off the ground. This allows circulation of air and has a cooling effect. The *muqami* groups are being stifled in the heat. They have not only placed their tents on the grounds but also made mud walls around it. *Purdah* or modesty of women remains a key factor in their lives. The heat is oppressive in their tents and many of them live under adjoining bush and stick sheds. The tents are used as store-rooms. This categorization also demonstrates the 'span' of movement of the groups. All along the Durand line *powindahs* have moved in long-range spans (Waziristan to Dera Ismail Khan, for instance) while the *muqamis* have short-range spans, often of a few miles (as the Salarzai and Mamunds in Bajaur or the Zadran and Gurbaz in North Waziristan). Other questions the anthropologist can answer are what is the authority structure of the two categories? Which are their major senior lineages? What are the affiliated or occupational groups attached to the main groups? The clear distinction between the *powindah* groups and the other *muqami* groups in their organization, structure, economy, seasonal migrations and attitude to income generating activity would help 'A' and 'B' in understanding 'C'. *Powindah* and *Muqami* are tribal and both adhere to generally similar religious and cultural codes yet their society and economy are fundamentally different. Knowledge of these groups would help decide when setting up new camps, where to place, for instance, senior lineages. Nearer the main lanes or roads? Nearer the water supply? Where to place the occupational groups? Concepts of pollution and proximity are here involved. Where to place the *powindahs* for they would want to move with the seasons irrespective of any constraints and this has to be taken into consideration. The *muqami* groups, on the other hand, would not be moving in response to the seasons and therefore a different type of camp, perhaps a more permanent one would suit them better. Therefore planning should be prepared and implemented on different levels with different

objectives for both the groups. To the best of my knowledge no such analysis or breakup of local groups has been made.

2) Another problem among 'C' would be that of leadership. Who are the 'elders'? the men "who carry the gun"? Their relevance is immediately apparent in any council for they speak for the group. They will decide how and in what proportions to distribute aid among the group. They will decide where and when assistance is needed, for example, in the shape of veterinary assistance for their animals. They will decide whether the Mullah attached to certain groups would be best employed in teaching children at the primary schools that 'A' might be inclined to propose rather than inducting new staff. They could respond to the suggestion that in the absence of doctors their local Mullahs or medicine men could be provided medical kits to deal with minor medical cases.

3) Thirdly, the role and status of women particularly in the household and its economy can be identified by anthropologists. The household economy of the *powindahs* to a large extent is dependant on the activities of women. They look after the animals and can if given assistance weave carpets and rugs to create an extra income source. Similarly attention could be given to poultry raising in the tent household by women and selling of eggs etc. This is a traditional income generating activity and it could be emphasized instead of suggesting non-traditional methods. The problems of health, child-bearing and sanitation are tied with the problem of women in general. Fertility is yet another problem and, for instance, would the fact that men are more or less stationary in the camps with few social diversions increase fertility over a nine month period? I would guess so. In a survey of 1400 refugees conducted for himself at the Tank Mission Hospital, Doctor Dahl found significant differences in diseases that afflicted *powindah* and *muqami* refugees. These are partly explained by the very nature of the household structure and modes of living. For instance *powindah* women are changing from breast-feeding to bottle feeding fo infants. This is having disastrous consequences. The filth, flies and dirty hands ensure the nipple of the bottle is infected. The baby is therefore continuously ill with severe intestinal trouble, tuberculosis and diarrhoea. Either the mother must return to breast-feeding or keep the milk bottle impeccably clean. A regular systematic effort by lady medical staff has to be made to convey this point to the *powindah* women. For such analyses female social scientists would be essential. Given the Pathan tribal social structure male anthropologists would find it next to impossible to have access to women. To the best of my knowledge no such provisions have been made.

4) Knowledge of local norms and culture based on Pukhtunwali the code of the Pathans would be of immense assistance in understanding local culture¹.

Anthropologists could be of help in describing what local groups wear, what they eat and how they live. These answers to some key questions that 'A' wants to know will also include those items that would be locally rejected. For instance Muslims do not eat pork and Muslim tribal women do not generally wear mini-skirts etc. The categorization of refugees will tell us that many muqami groups, like Tajaks, speak Farsi and help plan for schools and interpreters. Most powindahs speak Pashto. The concept of purdah is highly developed and therefore would imply certain sensitive areas. For instance male doctors would not be allowed to attend to females. Under no condition will 'C' wear trousers. Trousers are associated specifically with colonizing western powers and have a long history of animosity. However coats, especially overcoats for winter, will always be welcome. I would recommend that certain standard books be required reading to personnel of 'A' when dealing with local groups. Some knowledge, for instance, of Pathan social structure and organization and their history is imperative to dealing with these groups. I would recommend for useful background information Granada Television's two films on the history and sociology of the region, Khyber and The Pathans, both by Dr. André Singer, and the forthcoming Time-Life book The Pathans. Certain writing from the colonial period is still valid and provides excellent material for tribal groups. Captain J. A. Robinson's Notes on Nomad Tribes of Eastern Afghanistan, written almost 50 years ago, is still an important and accurate, and I may add a fair, account of nomads including those that pass through South Waziristan like the Sulaiman Khel.

Cultural codes are also tied to larger religious ones. For instance

5) religious mores and tradition do not allow the drinking of beer or the eating of ham and sending these commodities as aid would be not only useless but counter-productive in creating ill-will among 'C'. There is the problem of the village or tent mosque. Almost every group has its own variety of mosque. Some knowledge of religion would also reveal that there is a tendency for differentiation in structure and organization among the major sects of Islam. The Shias seem to be more hierarchical and pyramidal in their social and religious structure whereas the Sunnis are less so. This would help in knowing who in authority to talk to among these sects. Kurram Agency has a chronic Shia-Sunni problem compounded by the fact that while the former occupy better lands and are more educated the latter are more numerous in population. The influx of Sunni Jajis among the Shia Turi alarmed the latter and local hostility was responsible for the refugees moving towards Peshawar. The Shias feared that the balance would tilt irrevocably in favour of the Sunnis.

Another consideration for 'A' is the possibility of associating or employing Muslim personnel to work among Muslim tribal groups. Although these may belong to different nationalities the common bond of Islam is of assistance in

establishing an immediate rapport which goes a long way in opening local doors and creating the right atmosphere for effective communications. One of the most successful members of 'A' that I have met was an official from a Muslim country. He could travel around not only among the camps but also in the Tribal Areas without any fear or cultural hang-up as a result of historical tensions between certain colonial powers in the region.

PROBLEMS WITH AND PROBLEMS FOR ANTHROPOLOGISTS/SOCIOLOGISTS

For some of the reasons enumerated above the association of sociologists/ anthropologists with the efforts of 'A' and 'B' must be recommended. In turn, and as argued by 'A' above anthropologists must be prepared to abandon their classroom "pure anthropology" attitude and to roll up their sleeves and plunge into the field-work situation. They must leave their notes and papers aside and be prepared to utilize their knowledge for less privileged groups. What are the implications of a social anthropologist with the aim of remaining a professional working among 'C'? He confronts and identifies boundaries. He himself must be conscious of passing from "pure anthropology" to "applied anthropology". There is a unique opportunity to illustrate how meaningful and important their usually specialized knowledge is in and to the modern world.

The resistance may be as fierce from within anthropology as from 'A' and 'B'. British academic anthropology in the main is orientated towards teaching and continues to show a reluctance to apply knowledge. The reluctance is rooted in the last two hundred years of British academic traditions and ideological framework. Knowledge must be practical if it is to be applied and utilized in Third World situations. It is of little relevance to know that a paper has been read in a small department in the West to a group of two dozen specialists and accepted as successful. What we are concerned with is how this knowledge can benefit large groups of people in situations where they need help and in whatever form it may be available. If local sociologists and anthropologists are available that would be of maximum benefit to 'A', 'B' and 'C'. There are problems of selecting social anthropologists. Who can be classified as a local expert when a village or a small group have been studied intensively over so many years? The problem is not as difficult as it appears for there are area specialists. An anthropologist who has worked in a Middle Eastern tribal society with generally similar religious, geographical and economic frameworks as the Pathans will have little difficulty in rapidly knowing and understanding Pathan structure.

I recommend that an anthropologist be attached to every major administrative unit of 'A', particularly in the field. We cannot expect 'B' to respond to this suggestion for anthropology as a discipline and the anthropologist as a

specialist have not yet arrived in the planning centers of the less developed countries. Anthropology is still a relatively new subject in these areas. For example, the Planning Commission of Pakistan, a highly prestigious and established division of government does not hire a single sociologist or anthropologist to help it formulate its national plans. One may expect a response from 'A' with its vastly superior resources and presumably superior attitudes to knowledge and development. The role of the anthropologist would be to bring some understanding, imagination and compassion to a problem that is essentially a human one. If he can bring 'A', 'B' and 'C' together at certain points, coordinate and interpret the latter to the former, at others, he will have partly achieved what his role suits him for so ideally.

Planning Commissions in less developed countries are invariably overstaffed with 'transport economists', 'regional economists', 'agricultural economists' and economists of other varieties. This plethora of economists in Pakistan is a result of the Planning Commissions in the 1960s when the Harvard Group and other such groups were influential in shaping the intellectual mould of the planning processes in Pakistan. It was heartening to note that a traditional stronghold of the economists, the World Bank, has finally been breached by the social scientists and a post of Senior Sociologist created. If it has taken the World Bank, with its sophisticated data, equipment and approach so long to recognize the importance of sociology then one can only conjecture how far behind other less sophisticated planning institutions are in recognizing and accepting this fact. In the meantime a great deal of time and effort will be lost which could have been salvaged to some extent by the inclusion of social scientists.

Note:

- 1) See A. S. Ahmed, *Pukthun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a Tribal Society*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.