

bereitungen abzuleiten. Die bereits erwähnte Auftrennung des Themas nach materieller und geistiger Kultur oder nach reinen und angewandten Wissenschaftsgebieten ist ungünstig, weil dadurch das interdisziplinäre Gespräch verhindert wird. Die bereits im Seminartitel vorgeprägte Zusammenstellung von zwei Konzeptionen für die praktische Durchführung erwies sich kaum als förderlich. So konnten Forscher der indischen Zeitgeschichte teilnehmen und dann ihr Desinteresse an Fragen der deutsch-indischen Beziehungen bekunden.

Den Referenten war die deutsche und die englische Sprache zur freien Wahl gestellt. Übersetzer standen aber nicht zur Verfügung, so daß indische Teilnehmer die Leitlinien deutschsprachiger Referate nur über spontane englische Zusammenfassungen erfahren konnten. Die Manuskripte lagen in recht zufälliger Auswahl teils in vollem Text, teils in Summaries, teils gar nicht vervielfältigt, auf jeden Fall niemals in Übersetzungen vor. Im übrigen gab es keine Arbeitspapiere mit gründlichen Vor-Informationen. So wäre eine Liste der deutschen Übersetzungen indischer Bücher aus den letzten zehn Jahren für die kulturkundliche Arbeitsgruppe nützlich gewesen (beschaffbar über Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen oder Deutsche Bibliothek). Man hätte gesehen, daß kaum eine wissenschaftliche Publikation oder ein bedeutender neuer Roman ins Deutsche übertragen wurde. Auch ein Verzeichnis der deutschen Entwicklungsprojekte hätte exaktere Vorstellungen vermittelt (beschaffbar über Dokumentationsabteilung der Deutschen Stiftung für internationale Entwicklung).

Die Arbeitsgruppen konnten in zwei Tagen nicht zu anwendbaren Ergebnissen kommen. Nur die kulturelle Arbeitsgruppe gab drei Empfehlungen. Im ganzen wurde die Frage nach den indischen Leistungen zu deutschen Gunsten gar nicht gestellt. Das mochte daran liegen, daß die Inder selbst, abgesehen von der innenpolitischen Entwicklung ihrer Verhältnisse, vor allem an einem Beitrag zur Weltwirtschaft durch Exporte und zur Weltkultur über eigenständige wissenschaftliche Leistungen interessiert schienen – und daß im Zuge der Vorbereitungen dieses Seminars exakte Fragestellungen (nicht zu verwechseln mit einer Themenliste) nicht ausgefeilt worden waren. Um so mehr hat sich dieses Experiment gelohnt, weil es zur Klärung vieler Notwendigkeiten und unabdingbarer Voraussetzungen einer solchen Veranstaltung beitragen konnte.

Oskar Splett

Political Development in South Asia

Reflections on an International Seminar at Jaipur
(February 5th to 9th, 1973)

Outline

The emergence of a large number of new states in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the wake of the second World War gave fresh impetus to the discipline of political science. When several of these old societies began to take the shape of new states it was inevitable that the attention of political scientists should have been drawn towards them.

The quest of these free countries for freedom characterizes them as "transitional" societies. Nobody denies the new countries their essential need for economic development. The difference of opinion is over the nature of the political order concomitant with the transition. This problem is the source of sharp ideological and political conflicts in the contemporary world, while, at the same time, it is the *raison d'être* of political development studies. The result has been a focusing of political development interests on ideology.

In the meantime, literature on the subject has been emerging in profusion. The Committee on Comparative Politics, under the Chairmanship of Gabriel Almond, entered into a terrific publication programme on developing countries, trying to bring together writers who had been working in the field of political development and trying to relate political development to communications, bureaucracy, political modernisation, education, political culture, political parties etc. Between 1963 and 1966, the Committee on Comparative Politics brought out six volumes at the Princeton University Press on various aspects of political development, to which scientists like Lucian Pye, Joseph La Palombara, Robert E. Ward, James S. Coleman, Edward A. Shils, Sidney Verba, and Myron Weiner contributed¹. But it would be wrong to

¹ See, for example: Almond, Gabriel A. and Coleman, James S., eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. Princeton, 1960.

believe that this effort led to any success in the evolution of a theory of political development.

In the late sixties, political scientists began to realise that there had been too much dependence on sociology, especially on the structural-functional model as formulated by Talcott Parsons and made familiar in political science by Gabriel Almond and his followers. Under the impact of Talcott Parsons², political scientists had developed a tendency to regard the governmental system as a dependable variable the contours of which were determined by social, economic, psychological and cultural factors. Politics was treated as the mere instrument of social forces.

The most important writer among those who shifted from the infra-structural approach to the concept of political institutionalisation was Samuel Huntington³. His criterion for political development was the institutionalisation of political organisations and procedures. Huntington's identification of political development with institution-building was based on the approach that a well institutionalised polity would be marked by high levels of adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence.

This brief outline may suffice to indicate the main currents of political thinking on the concept of political development. The organisers of the International Seminar at Jaipur intended carrying on the discussions on that concept, more particularly on a regional basis, and hoped to understand in greater depth the problems that the South Asia region is facing today. It was felt that the era which had started in 1947-48 with the liberation of the countries, and which saw these countries involved in various problems of domestic reconstruction and international re-adjustments, sometimes leading to intraregional, inter-regional and global conflicts, was coming to an end⁴.

With the exception of Pakistan, the other countries in the region were well represented, and scholars from these countries joined hands with scholars from other countries of the world⁵ in discussing the following subjects: (1) Political Development: Concept, Theory and Methodology — A Critical Review; (2) Nation-Building and Political Development in South Asia; (3) Political Systems and Political Development in South Asia; (4) Foreign Policy, International Politics and Political Development in South Asia; (5) Foreign Policy, International Politics and Political Development in South Asia.

The Indian "Model"

The organisers of the International Seminar on Political Development had of course no intention of endorsing or refuting the Indian "Model"⁶. It was commonly felt, however, that the developing countries would best learn their lessons from the performance of the Indian development model "characterized by politicization of a fragmented social structure through a penetration of political forms, values, and ideologies"⁷. The analysis was given depth by exploring India's peculiar mix of tradition and modernity in terms of historical confrontations, political culture and the politicization of traditional social structures.

National consolidation, the development of the institutional framework and the growth of the party system have affected India's capacity to cope with the problems of political integration, economic development and foreign policy. It was argued that the achievements and lapses of the past may provide important clues to the political development of other countries.

R. Jahan underlined that point in her paper on "The Emerging Political System of Bangladesh"⁸. She explained that during the twenty four years of the Pakistani period one of the major conflicts between the ruling elite of Pakistan and the Bengali elite centered on the strategies of political development. While the Pakistani ruling elite emphasized the goal of state

² See: Parsons, Talcott, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*. Glencoe, 1960.

³ Huntington, Samuel, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, 1968.

⁴ S. P. Varma in his key-note address to the participants.

⁵ There were scholars from Canada, U. K., West Germany (the present author), Czechoslovakia, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka (Ceylon) und Nepal, as well from several universities and research centres in India.

⁶ Kothari, Rajni, *Politics in India*. New Delhi, 1970, p. 8 sq.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 11.

⁸ For details see fotostyled paper.

building by forming a centralized political structure with the accent on output functions and limited political participation, the Bengali elite preferred a pluralistic political structure with the emphasis on input functions, political participation and legitimacy. The admiration of the Bengali elite for the Indian "Model" was all too obvious. The Awami League, the major spokesman for the Bengali nationalists, stood for a polity similar to the Indian political system. There were groups — the far left and the far right — who were opposed to the Indian "Model", but they were small in number, and in the 1970 election they all lost to the Awami League⁹.

The emerging political system in Bangladesh — a parliamentary democracy with a single dominant party — faces, however, a number of problems. First, the political parties are weak. Organisationally, the Awami League is in no way comparable to the Indian Congress. While in 1947 the Congress was more than fifty years old, in 1971 the Awami League was still a relatively new party with only twenty two years.

Second, the Indian "Model" of development presupposes gradualism and a certain amount of elitism. In Bangladesh, however, where the masses were highly politicized by the war of liberation, expectations have skyrocketed. It is not hard to mount a generalized challenge to the political system, as there seems to be no powerful built-in resistance to a final "crisis".

The system's greatest strength lies in the charisma of the leader, Sheikh Mujibar Rahman. He is still the unchallenged leader and uses his charisma to strengthen the political structure. But like Ayub before him, he is faced with the danger of equating building support for the regime with party support. The political system cannot be properly stabilized until political institution building gets priority.

This line of thinking carried the day. The participants expressed the common conviction that the Indian "Model" is a case in point. Deeper insight into the circumstances under which the political development in India took place in the past may provide guidelines for political development planning in other regional countries. Thus, it may be possible to minimize destabilizing influences. On the other hand, the issue was raised that "models" cannot just be transplanted, not even on a regional basis. Every society starts with a certain traditional culture and responds to the impact of politicization (modernization) in its own way. Wider knowledge of these consequences may have a sobering influence on those who entertain exaggerated hopes and expectations regarding the returns on political investments.

The political systems in South Asia are of varied nature — there is the parliamentary democracy of India, the authoritarian regime of Pakistan, the constitutional (?) monarchy of Nepal, the newly emergent parliamentary democracy of Bangladesh and the Buddhist parliamentary government of Sri Lanka. Amongst all these, India undoubtedly stands out: the three peaceful and orderly successions, the five general elections, the three wars, the 1971 refugee problem, the radical CMP governments, 1967 coalitions, all this evidence proves that the Indian political system is an on-going concern. It was, however, everyone's right to feel at the Conference that such an evaluation was not at all complete. Hence it was said: We have heard so far an analysis of the political development in recent and contemporary India, and the social and cultural variables which affect them. But we would like to know how the Indian political system is measuring up to the task and problems that it faces. How well has it succeeded in carrying out its economic measures and social objectives? What have its principal short comings been?

We should pause here to demonstrate that such questions are indeed called for. Let us take stock of the erosion of one of the most vital links in the country's development process — education. The educational system is perhaps the weakest constituent of India's institutional structure¹⁰. Archaic courses, uneducated teachers, overcrowded classes, chaotic administration, large scale graduate unemployment, and short-range policies have reduced this vital link in the nation's growth to a political incrimination. Here, as in many other areas of

⁹ In the 1970 election the Awami League won 167 seats out of 169 allotted to East Pakistan.

¹⁰ Naik, for instance, declares that in India "the supreme intellectual effort that is needed to visualise a new educational system fully geared to the new national objectives has not yet been made". See: Naik, J. P., *Educational Planning in India*. Bombay, 1965, p. 13.

India's public policy, the corrective measures are largely known: the Report of the Education Commission¹¹ contains a number of recommendations. What is lacking is an effective instrument for carrying out these recommendations. The worst link here is the Education Ministry at the Centre, in many cases even surpassed by State Education Ministries — all places of inefficiency and bureaucracy. The other bottleneck is the university system, presided over by a titanic bureaucracy in the University Grants Commission. Even the 'Centers of Advanced Study' — which are supposed to implement the recommendation of creating "centers of excellence"¹² — continue to be conducted as outmoded departments. Of the school system, of course, the less said the better. In short: the performance in the educational sector is deplorable though "the educational planners . . . could work against a background of political stability"¹³.

The Conference recognized that there are a number of shortcomings in economic, social and educational development in India which cast doubts on the vitality and validity of the Indian "Model". It was, however, agreed that the Indian system's "capacity to cope" with the problems does not arise from the political system itself as Kothari¹⁴ would imply. This is generated by the environment, the resources, the organisations, the nature of the conflict situations, the leadership's composition, the party-structure etc. The differences of opinion stemmed largely from assumptions about the place of politics in economic development.

Anti-colonial Struggle in Social Sciences

In this context a group of Indian social scientists referred to what they called "the anti-colonial academic struggle"¹⁵. It was argued that the concept of "modernization" of underdeveloped societies was a product of Western social science and meant essentially for export to, and use in, the Third World. The prescription of economic growth models by the Western countries for growth in poor countries was accompanied by the prescription of the modernization model as the focal point of the social sciences in these countries. It was further contended at the Jaipur Conference that Western social science could not avoid being a product of the social structure which it rationalizes through value-free sociological theories. Hence it was concluded that the concepts and theories which Western social scientists have evolved for the analysis of the problems of development in the Third World countries serve essentially to influence the course of socio-economic change in these countries in such a manner as to buttress the economic and political interests of the advanced countries. Ramasubhan¹⁶ quoted the innumerable U.S. government-financed educational projects in India to underscore the point.

No doubt, the concepts of political development, whether rooted in Western Sociology or Marxism, were both ideological offensives against the Third World. It is no longer being denied that what was known as Academic Sociology was used as an instrument of State policy by the West as much as communism by the Soviet Union — with a view to influencing domestic politics and increasing international leverage, influence and prestige. The United States has used the social sciences and social scientists extensively to check the spread of political and intellectual movements friendly towards Marxism and Communism. We should, however, remember that this was possible mainly because the training in social sciences in India and other developing countries was very poor and irrelevant to the environment when Independence was reached. As a result, scholars from the U.S. monopolized the study of development while the Soviet Union possessed a ready-made intellectual weapon.

We believe that the anti-colonial perspective of social science analysis should not be considered as a negative exercise nor as a rejection of foreign ideas and approaches. It is an attempt to stress the need for creative ability in the intellectual arena in the former

¹¹ Government of India, Ministry of Education. Report of the Education Commission 1964–1966. New Delhi, 1966, p. 613 sq.

¹² Ibid, p. 283 sq.

¹³ Naik, J. P., Education in the Fourth Plan. Bombay, 1968, p. 9.

¹⁴ Kothari, Rajni, State Building in the Third World-Alternative Strategies. In: The Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, 1972, No. 5–7.

¹⁵ Manoranjan Mohanty in his paper.

¹⁶ In her paper on "The Political Essence of Progress".

colonies. Colonial and neocolonial rule prevents the growth of creative ability in all spheres – political, economic and cultural. It sustains a dependence complex, praises foreign ideas and approaches uncritically, and pre-occupies the colonial subjects with second or third order activity in all spheres.

The recent upheavals in social science analysis arising from contradictions among colonial academics have found many responses. In the context of development theory Samuel Huntington's writings represent one set of responses in the West and Rajni Kothari's writings symbolize another set of responses in the South East. After the Western literature on modernization and economic development was over-whelmed by unexpected developments in the Afro-Asian countries, people like Huntington made a clear choice for their liberal political values over economic development¹⁷.

Kothari on the other hand pleaded for independent ways of attaining simultaneous development. He saw in the Indian "Model" the emergence of a distinct model of development which he recommended for the Third World. His Centre-Periphery Linkage model clearly belongs to the initial stage of anti-colonial struggle in the social sciences though he found himself confronted by participants belonging to the Marxist school of thinking who alleged that his writings still have their roots in Western Social Science.

The discussion which followed Kothari's presentation of his theoretical thinking produced much heat, but very little light. It was viewed as an open invitation to the 'radical' sociologists to initiate a dialogue with their 'conservative' counterparts. A young 'revolutionary' sociologist tried to develop a tentative model of socialist revolution for immediate adoption by the Indian Government. He reiterated the charges against the CIA and tried to make it clear that there were contacts between the 'conservative' elements at home and the Americans.

Theory-Building

There was general agreement that the entire concept of political development seems to be falling apart today. The concept of the existence of a preordained law of development – whether lineal, multilineal or spiralist – is now breaking down. It is also becoming clear that there is neither a perfect society towards which all societies should move, nor any inevitability of such a movement.

The breaking up into several worlds of the western world on the one side and the communist world on the other, and the developing countries following as many patterns of development as there are countries, has all made the conceptual distinction between developed and developing meaningless. Various countries have followed their own "road", depending on their social structure, cultural traditions and historical background.

We are thus back where we started from in the early 60' in search of a theory of political development. Whatever theories of political development have been developed in the West or in the East, lie in a shambles today¹⁸.

Though the participants were unanimous about the role of politics in development they noted that it is always useful to carry on studies within the context of comparative politics. The following were proposed as fields for study in depth: (1) the political systems, structures or institutions, which the countries in South Asia have developed, (2) the political processes which have, on the one hand, influenced the organisation and working of these political structures, and, on the other, been influenced by it, and (3) the problems which the various states are facing at the domestic and international levels.

Horst Hartmann

¹⁷ In his famous essay "Political development and Political Decay" Samuel Huntington pointed out in 1965 that modernization in the sense of economic development did not necessarily lead to political decay. See: Huntington, Samuel, Political Development and Political Decay. In: World Politics, April 1965.

¹⁸ To characterize the situation it may be mentioned that the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research started a new series in 1971 called "Crises and Sequences in Political Development". In order to link up political development with the sequences in which crises have taken place, they have gone back to European, American and even Soviet history, which hardly throws much light on the problems of the Third World.