

AFGHANISTAN'S STRUGGLE
FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION

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CIVILIZATION VOID AS THE RESULT OF A LACKING CENTRAL AUTHORITY?

Despite a fair amount of reporting on Afghanistan a one-sided picture has emerged in the Western media. There seems to exist a general consensus to the effect that the Russian invaders are confronted with a brave but unorganized resistance put up by barbarian tribesmen whose sole motivation is religious fanaticism. This talk about a feudal order that has not undergone any changes since the Middle Ages, where the clergy rules supreme and women are mere chattel, has greatly facilitated the Russian aggression. Many people in Europe and elsewhere tend to adopt a somewhat neutral attitude, finding it hard to be enthusiastic about the "Muslim rebels". Their prevarications are aptly summed up in the title of a newspaper article: "If Ayatollahs are villains, why should Afghans be heroes?"¹ It is widely suspected that a Russian withdrawal would lead, if at all to anything but chaos, to a Khumayni-style Islamist dictatorship. Socialist intellectuals openly speak of the "lack of a progressive alternative" to the Russian occupation. But this view is shared even by many who do not normally classify as leftists. Few would venture to openly acclaim the invasion, but it is often asserted that under the circumstances prevailing in Afghanistan, the Russian presence is a lesser evil. Some of those who purport to deplore the occupation call it, nonetheless, "a conceivable model of development". Thus, while hardly anyone seems to condone the Russian take-over of Afghanistan, many connive at it.

It is, therefore, small wonder that Communist party papers loyal to Moscow, such as *L'humanité*, constantly harp on the theme of Afghan backwardness. The emergence of a fairly broad educated class over the last fifty years is conveniently forgotten. No doubt, Afghanistan belongs to the twenty poorest nations and has a high rate of illiteracy. And yet, its élite is no quantité

négligeable. In view of the fact that the country has only little more than 17 million inhabitants, the proportion of highly qualified cadets is higher than in most of those other "poorest of the world"². Particularly over the last twenty years Afghan students were to be found at universities all over the world; especially in France and Germany but also in the United States and some Arab countries there was scarcely any university without Afghan students. Due to the succession of repressive regimes a large number of these academics did not return home, but their commitment to their country remained generally higher than that of many expatriates from the typical manpower-exporting nations. Besides, the educated class of Afghanistan did not spring up from complete virgin soil as in many developing countries. Afghanistan has a very proud tradition of learning. Looking at Islamic culture it strikes the eye of the historian that many of the greatest minds hailed from this part of the world. In view of the Afghan origin of such towering intellects as Al-Bayrûnî, Al-Fârâbî, Ibn Sînâ and Al-Rûmî, to name only a few, it is no exaggeration to say that Afghanistan made one of the highest contributions to Islamic civilization and, thereby, to the world at large. This argument could be expanded much further if reference were made to the intellectual life, both ancient and modern, of those Afghan territories swallowed by Russia at the turn of the century. In the present context it is important to realize that such a rich tradition of philosophy and science presupposes something more than mere savagery and tribal anarchy. The Communist regime installed in Kâbul is only too keen on portraying itself as a heir to the manifold cultural achievements of the nation. Thus, despite the undeniable backwardness of large sections of the population, the one-sided picture of a ferocious wilderness knowing nothing but the law of the jungle holds true neither for the past nor for the present.

Perhaps the Afghan situation can be understood better by drawing the parallel to a country with a somewhat similar social set-up: Morocco. Both states have a not dissimilar geography dominated by large mountain tracks of considerable height and vast deserts as well as fertile valleys and plains³. In both cases the ethnic and linguistic composition of the population is extremely diverse. In Morocco the major groups are Berbers (with their enormous variety of tribes and dialects), Arabs, Black Africans, White Andalusians, and Jews. In Afghanistan the Pashtûns appear almost like a carbon copy of the Moroccan Berbers, the Tâjiks are the more urbanized group dominating the educational sector just as the Arabs in Morocco. Nûristânîs, Balûchîs, Uzbeks, Hazâras and Kirghîz either proudly live apart or are minorities trampled upon and exploited. Both states stood out for the striking contrast between culturally highly refined urban centres containing many of Islam's architectural marvels and a largely tribalistic countryside where the authority of the central government was often only nominal and was many times challenged⁴. Both states, however, did also experience periods of a very strong central government

firmly in control of the entire realm⁵. Those periods were frequently characterized by imperialist expansion: in the case of Morocco into Black Africa or Spain, in the case of Afghanistan into India or Iran. Regionalism and linguistic as well as ethnic diversity were generally offset by an even stronger mystification of the central authority. If Moroccans of all political shades justify the monarchy as a necessary rallying point to keep the cauldron intact, they do thereby express a fervent nationalist sentiment transcending their other loyalties. The very existence of such a rationale might be the more essential consideration, making allowance for a possible transfer of their primary allegiance to a national rallying point other than the monarchy. The same applies to the Afghans. Their ardent particularism may be an obstacle to the unification of the resistance, but it did not lead to a regionalist split up, rather there is among all the rival groups complete identification with Afghanistan as a nation⁶. Indubitably, their inability to unite has enfeebled the resistance, but it is even more significant that none of them denies the necessity of a common front and that there is a growing tendency to gradually overcome the divisions.

One reality of the Afghan predicament is generally overlooked, this is the fact that the disunity of the resistance is by far not solely due to Afghan individualism but just as much to foreign influences. However, this outside interference takes place in a sense quite different from what the Russians say about it, it has weakened the resistance more than strengthened it.

"ISLAMISM" AS A FOREIGN ELEMENT ON THE RELIGIOUS SCENE

In order to fully appreciate this point it is necessary to examine the religious situation. Afghanistan, like most other Muslim countries, has moulded Islam in such a way as to suit its national genius. The Islam of the mystic fraternities, the sufi orders (*ṭarīqas*), prevails over the Islam of the doctors of the canonical law (*sharīʿa*). The majority of Afghans is, in one way or the other, connected with one or several of the sufi orders. And yet there is a great difference between the deeply mystical popular Islam of countries such as Egypt or Indonesia and the more austere faith of the Afghans, which is often indistinguishable from the "official" religion of the *ʿulamāʿ*, the pharisees of Islam. This is yet another of the numberless similarities between Morocco and Afghanistan, although sufism among the Afghans seems even closer to orthodoxy than among Moroccans. The two strongest orders in Afghanistan, the Naqshbandi and the Qādirī, count among the *ṭarīqas* most akin to orthodox legism. But it has been observed that even the more mystic orders, such as the Chishtī with its Indian origin, underwent a process of

reintegration with orthodoxy. Ecstatic movements such as the Qalandarî, which are still important in neighboring Pakistan, seem to have dwindled⁷.

All this notwithstanding, the popular faith of the masses in Afghanistan is rather remote from the fundamentalism of such movements as the "Muslim Brotherhood" (ikhwân) in the Arab countries or the "Islamic Party" (jamâ`at-e islâmî) in India and Pakistan. Both these movements, which are in fact but national branches of one and the same phenomenon, are highly unpopular in their countries of origin, being considered heretical by the vast majority of the believers. Libya and Saudi Arabia are the only countries where this brand of Islam has been the official state religion during most of this century. Accordingly, both states used to patronize these fundamentalist movements in other Muslim countries. Libya has recently somewhat distanced herself from their ideology whereas Saudi Arabia has undergone a social transformation that makes her fundamentalism look farcical. Nonetheless, Riyâdh still aspires to a Caliphal role through heavy financing of radical groups and parties especially in its vicinity⁸. Over the last ten years the kingdom used to pay special attention to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the latter case the Saudis succeeded in toppling the popular Zulfîqâr `Alî Bhutto whose "Islamic Social-democracy" they loathed. Since 1977 the country has been ruled by a military dictator closely affiliated to the "Islamic Party" (which obtained barely six percent of the votes)⁹.

In Afghanistan, too, the fundamentalist following is insignificant as far as numbers are concerned. Saudi Arabia, however, has constantly buttressed them financially and morally. Their spokesmen are treated as the sole representatives of Afghan Islam. The Saudis' "man in Kâbul" was killed in the wake of the April 1978 coup d'état. But they quickly found substitutes and their press incessantly fetes Afghan clergymen as delegates, although most of these were unheard of in their own country until very recently¹⁰. As in Pakistan, the Saudis make use of their religious prestige as custodians of the hallowed places in order to forge unity among Islamic groups and parties and always try to impose the supremacy of their fundamentalist fifth columns upon the other Muslim tendencies.

Just as there are hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis working in the kingdom, there are also tens of thousands of Afghans working there. But whereas many of those Pakistanis are employed as engineers architects, contractors, technicians, medical doctors, nurses and, especially, army instructors, the Afghans are overwhelmingly coolies. (As compared to the English trained Pakistanis, the Afghan élite, often educated in French or German, is sometimes handicapped). This gave rise to fears about possible repercussions of the change of system in Afghanistan on the exploited laborers in Arabia, at least during the period immediately after the Kâbul coup. Riyâdh had, in any case, pursued a policy of "purchasing" President Dâûd. Together with the Shah of Iran the Saudis

actually succeeded in detaching Dâûd from Moscow, although it had been he who initiated the tilt toward the Soviet Union when he was Prime Minister in the fifties. Partly it was this Saudi policy which impelled the Russians to give the green light to Ḥaffẓullâh Amîn to launch the coup. (Tarahkî was in prison at that time). It is erroneous to say, as many observers did, that the Russians were not in the know of things and were surprised by the overthrow of Dâûd. For them it was a question of forestalling developments similar to those in Egypt, and Dâûd was already very much on the way to follow the example of Sâdât. All along he had been the driving force behind Pashtûn irredentism, wishing to reincorporate Pakistan's North Western Frontier Province into Afghanistan. His reconciliation with President Ziâ ul-Ḥaqq, detested by the Afghans as a Punjabi general and Muslim fundamentalist of British training, was a complete turnabout. The Conference of the Foreign Ministers of Muslim Nations, that was to take place in Kâbul in the very same April of 1978, might have sealed Afghanistan's absorption into the orbit of Riyâdh. Significantly, one of the Saudi financed fundamentalist groups in Afghanistan had ceased its opposition to Dâûd and cooperated with him. This jam`iyat-e islâmî of Afghanistan had particularly close relations with Pakistan's jam`at-e islâmî¹¹, whence Ziâ ul-Ḥaqq draws many of his political advisors. (The party boss, Miân Ṭufayl Muḥammad, is his maternal uncle¹².)

The Iranian revolution brought another fundamentalist movement to power, more radical than Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The initial popularity of Khumaynî misled most observers into believing that this was the major current of Iranian Islam. In the meantime more and more Iranians start realising that Khumaynî, far from reconciling the two main confessions of Islam, is sectarian even within Shî'ism. It would not be surprising at all if religious antagonism to him succeeds where military and political opposition failed. The progressive interpretation of Islam as represented by the mujâhidîn-khalq is still a more effective rival to him than the Communist Tudeh, and Khumaynî knows it.

The all out support given by the Iranian regime to the Afghan hizb-e islâmî ("Islamic Party") of the Sunni fundamentalist Gulbuddîn Ḥikmatyâr is symptomatic of a world-wide trend. Ḥikmatyâr represents the more radical wing of the "Muslim Brotherhood" that has switched sides by abandoning the former patron Saudi Arabia and pledging allegiance to Iran. In Egypt, homeland of the "Muslim Brotherhood", the movement split into, on the one side, the old guard with its loyalty to Riyadh and, on the other side, the younger radicals with their disdain for the Arabian monarchy and admiration for Iran's Islamic Republic. Pakistan's jam`at-e islâmî split into a Lahore-group and a Karachi-group. Whereas the conservatives still support the axis Islâmâbâd-Riyâdh, the radicals incite Khumaynî against Ziâ ul-Ḥaqq, whom they consider a usurper and stooge of the Americans¹³.

Hikmatyâr's hizb-e islâmî, though still represented in Peshâwar, has long since shifted its headquarters to Iran, - a curious development in view of the fact that they were the first among the Afghan parties to establish themselves in Pakistan. Hikmatyâr rebelled against Saudi Arabia's rapprochement with Dâûd. This is what differentiated him from Rabbânî and his jam `iyat-e islâmî. The story was somewhat analogous to what happened earlier to the two factions of the People's Democratic Party. Karmal's parcham, always subservient to Moscow, cooperated with Dâûd whereas the khalq of headstrong Amîn kept aloof. Hikmatyâr took shelter in Pakistan where Bhutto cultivated him as a lever against Dâûd¹⁴. In other words, the Pashtûn Hikmatyâr served the interests of Pakistan against the Afghan demands for a plebiscite in Pashtûnistân (Pakistan's NWFP = North West Frontier Province). This made him appear as a traitor to many Afghans in the Eastern borderlands.

If the jam `iyat-e islâmî of Burhânuddîn Rabbânî and the hizb-e islâmî of Gulbuddîn Hikmatyâr are so ineffective in the interior of Afghanistan it is largely due to the "foreignness" of their ideology. As fundamentalists they believe that Islam is first and foremost a political system as expounded by the Pakistani ideologue Maudûdî, who died in 1979, and Egyptian writers before him. They reject Capitalism and Communism (Khumaynî's "neither East nor West") and call for Islamism. They are referred to as "Islamists" in contradistinction to the majority of "Muslims" for whom Islam is primarily a religious faith and a moral code¹⁵. To the Afghan masses the Islamist theorizing about an Islamic system of government, system of education, system of economy, etc. makes hardly any more sense than the indoctrination with abstract Marxist terminology that was attempted by the cadets of the khalq.

More successful, therefore, is another organization that is also called hizb-e islâmî but is led by Yûnus Khâlîs, a Pashtûn mullah who is less of a fundamentalist and more in tune with the popular faith of his tribesmen in the Eastern provinces bordering Pakistan. Yûnus Khâlîs is the only one among the leaders of the Islamparties who does not roam about abroad but personally directs the fighting in his territory where he has even succeeded in setting up something resembling a make-shift administration¹⁶.

To understand this difference between fundamentalism and orthodoxy better one might refer to the conflict between Khumaynî and his senior, the Ayatullâh Sharî`at-Madârfî. The latter is the real spiritual leader of Shî`ite Iran and would never have lost his position to the upstart Khumaynî if not for the political role played by the exile. As far as Islamic learning is concerned it is better not at all to compare Khumaynî with Sharî`at-Madârfî. As an orthodox clergyman, Sharî`at-Madârfî is deeply conservative, but benign and humane, an embodiment of Islamic ethics. His erudition has opened up many a new vista to him that make him seem almost progressive in some of his views. Khumaynî, on the other hand, personifies a totalitarianism the symptoms of which

make it indistinguishable from fascism¹⁷. "Extra ecclesiam nullam salus" is not a motto of the Qur`ān (Koran) but Khumaynī takes it for granted that the entire world of Islam is going to adhere to his Shī`ite version of the faith, otherwise there would be no difference between Palestinians and Zionists and the one would be as undeserving of Jerusalem as the others¹⁸.

THE RIGHTIST PARTIES IN EXILE AND THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES

Orthodoxy does at least leave some scope for an opening up to progressive views. This accounts for the phenomenon of the "red mullahs", such as Bhashānī in Bangladesh or Hazār wī in Pakistan. Ayatullāh Tāliqāni was in reality closer to Sharī`at-Madārī than to Khumaynī, not only because of his learning but because he was far from being a fundamentalist fanatic, rather he was a humanist in the best Islamic tradition.

On the Afghan scene there are some equivalents to this phenomenon among the people associated with Nabī Muḥammadī, who heads the "Movement of the Islamic Revolution", numerically the strongest among the Islam-parties with centers both in Iran and Pakistan and strong bases inside Afghanistan. The fundamentalists accuse this group of leftist leanings, which is in fact a common synonym for "intellectual". Surely the calumny has its origin in the greater appeal which Muḥammadī's group has for the educated class, for they count among their followers a few academics, which cannot be said of the fundamentalists. Those have to compensate for it by calling Rabbānī "professor", though it is hard to tell what his subject is.

The Saudis, in a rare joint venture with the new Iranians, succeeded in forcing the foreign based rightist parties into an "Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan". This includes also the "United Islamic Revolutionary Council" of a modernised pīr, a political figure combining feudalist authority with traditional religious leadership of the popular type, Sayyid Aḥmad Gaylanī. An accomplished gentleman (representative of Peugeot in Afghanistan), he makes a good show in the corridors of international politics, but the only section this monarchist represents are elderly Afghan businessmen abroad and a few ex-diplomats. Politically Gaylanī may not yet be a spent force but his "Council" is hardly worth the name.

Of minor importance is Šibghatullāh Mujaddidī with his "National Liberation Front". His only standing is his family background which could be characterized - depending on one's viewpoint - as prominent "kingsmakers" or as notorious intriguers. By playing the fundamentalist card, the Mujaddidīs have managed

to survive on Arabian financial support. `Ubaydullâh Mujaddidî, a medical doctor, settled in Germany after being expelled from Nasser's Egypt because of clandestine activities. Sibghatullâh Mujaddidî was put in charge of a fundamentalist mosque in Copenhagen. Posting him in Peshâwar after the Russian invasion did not benefit anyone, least of all himself. Without any substantial following he can do little more than act as a public relations officer for Saudi Arabia and enlarge the number of "parties" united in the "Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan" which comprises the groups of: 1) Muḥammadi; 2) Khâlîṣ; 3) Rabbânî; 4) Gaylânî; 5) Mujaddidî. In this sequence they are numbered according to their numerical strength Nominal head of the "Alliance" is the comparatively young and nondescript `Abd al-Rasûl Sayyâf, a religious scholar of fundamentalist leanings. Ḥikmatyâr's ḥizb-e islâmî did not join because he claims to be stronger and more representative than all the others together¹⁹. This sounds hilarious if looked at the number of followers and the extent of influence within Afghanistan, financially, however, this tall claim may well be true, because Ayatullâh Bihishtî's establishment in Iran is known to spend larger sums on its protégés than Saudi Arabia ever did²⁰.

Iran's then foreign minister, Qutbzadeh, proved himself an astute diplomat by not just including Ḥikmatyâr and two other Afghan Shî'îs in the Iranian delegation to the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference of June 1980 in Islâmâbâd, but representatives of the other five groups as well. In this way he succeeded at least in upgrading Ḥikmatyâr, despite the latter's obdurate refusal to be put at par with the others. The preceding Extraordinary Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers (January 1980 in Islâmâbâd) had put the condition that the resistance movements join into an alliance. By ostensibly taking up the cudgels on behalf of them all, Qutbzadeh did in fact prevent Riyâdh's faithful from monopolizing the right to represent Afghanistan at the expense of Iran's Afghan outpost, Ḥikmatyâr²¹.

This urge to put up a show and not be left out of the game became a conspicuous feature of Iran's Afghanistan policy. One such example was the sudden appearance of Ḥikmatyâr posters on Kâbul street walls in July 1980²². In the Afghan capital the ḥizb-e islâmî did not cut much ice. Here the field was dominated by the popular nationalist guerilla leader `Abd al-Majîd Kalakânî. His execution in June 1980 turned him posthumously into a national hero. This deeply worried Ḥikmatyâr and his Iranian backers, impelling them to resort to propaganda actions that seemed more than futile in view of the grave national situation.

Both, the "Islamic Alliance" and the ḥizb-e islâmî have again and again been criticized by the resistance fighters inside Afghanistan and by those temporarily in Peshâwar. Cowardice and corruption are the principle charges levelled against them²³. One practice of theirs that created deep resentment was the issuing of party membership cards to refugees as a precondition for

receiving shelter and food in the camps. The Pakistan government's claim of not being politically or militarily involved with the refugees is largely true. A government involvement is indeed scarcely necessary since a more effective means was devised of keeping the destitute Afghans under tight control. The refugees are more or less left to the mercy of the rightist party organizations which in turn are so closely affiliated with Pakistan's semi-governmental *jamâ'at-e islâmî* that the military regime in Islâmâbâd has little to worry about "unislamic" forces. In at least one instance the inmates of a camp refused to become party members but were subsequently starved into submission²⁴. Denunciations of nationalist refugees to the Pakistani police are frequent and quite a number of those lingering in Peshâwar's prisons as Communist suspects are nothing but democratic nationalists, some of them have socialist tendencies, others are simply liberals.

For these reasons international aid organizations such as the "Solidarity Committee for the Afghan People" with its headquarters in Hamburg have to operate with extreme discretion in Pakistan because the core of this committee consists of nationalist Afghans and their likeminded friends from all parts of the world, rejecting both Russian invasion and Islamist pretension. If not for a growing resistance among the refugees to political exploitation and the emergence of more broad based patriotic self-help initiatives the "Solidarity Committee"²⁵ and sister organizations such as the Paris-based "AFRANE"²⁶ would not be able to continue sending relief teams through Pakistan into Afghanistan where the lot of millions of displaced persons is still more precarious than in the Pakistani camps.

On the Iranian side of the border relief work used to be easier. None of the established aid organizations such as the International Red Cross is present here. The fact that the "Solidarity Committee for the Afghan People" was the first and probably only foreign institution allowed to operate in the refugee camps was obviously facilitated by its self-help character: a number of committee members are Iranians or Afghans having lived and studied in Iran. Afghan relief teams sent by the Committee to Iran succeeded in establishing a network of politically independent local branches ensuring a direct and just distribution of the medical supplies and clothes flown in from Germany. Mullahs without party affiliations were often of great help in organizing self-reliance as they hold authority in some of the camps.

On the whole the Islamist parties in Iran used to be, for a long time at least, less successful in establishing a hold over the refugees than in Pakistan. Things began to change when *Ĥikmatyâr* with his *ĥizb-e islâmî* became more firmly rooted in Teheran. His strongest rival was the Shî'ite leader of the *ĥarakat-e islâmî* ("Islamic Movement") *Shaykh Muĥsinî* of Qandahâr. This party is not to be confused with *Muĥammadî's ĥarakat-e inqilâb-e islâmî* ("Movement of the Islamic Revolution"). *Muĥsinî* showed

a particularly receptive and responsible attitude toward the problems of the refugees, manifestly as part of his humane outlook and rather enlightened view of religion. However, in August 1980 Muhsinî's movement was banned in Iran and he was alleged to be an American agent, a charge which he refuted during his sojourn in Kuwait²⁷. That the Iranian regime decided for Hikmatyâr - a fundamentalist Sunni - and against Muhsinî - a liberal Shî'î - is but typical of the policy pursued by Ayatullâh Bihishtî's clerical party, viz., to support hardliners against moderates. Like the hizb-e islâmî of Hikmatyâr, the harakat-e islâmî of Muhsinî is also not a member of the "Islamic Alliance".

In all fairness, it must be said, though, that Muhsinî's "Islamic Movement" is smaller in numbers than even Hikmatyâr's "Islamic Party" and, what might be still more decisive, the former is not so well organized as the latter. The orderly establishments of the hizb-e islâmî have not failed to impress visitors, among them a number of Western journalists²⁸. For Hikmatyâr this is a means of making good for the lack of numbers, a means he learned from his Pakistani counterpart. For decades the jamâ'at-e islâmî was the best organized political party in Pakistan and the same might still hold true today. It always used to be a cader party.

The despair of the refugees in Pakistan and the disgust of the tribes in Afghanistan with the Peshâwar based political leaders led to the attempt at reviving the age old Pashtûn institution of a "Great Assembly of the Tribal Elders" (loya jirga) as an alternative. The initiative showed that there is a fair amount of democratic spirit to be found among the tribes, cryptic as their tribal democracy may be. It also demonstrated how unrepresentative Islâmâbâd's brain child, the "Islamic Alliance" really is. Several of its components, especially the groups of Rabbânî and Mujaddidî, as well as Hikmatyâr's hizb-e islâmî, not only did not cooperate with the loya jirga but left no stone unturned to sabotage it; and they did it effectively²⁹. Unless the mass of the refugees openly revolts against the Islamists, a difficult proposition in view of Islâmâbâd's vigilance, there is little prospect for a loya jirga coming to fruition on Pakistani soil.

Whatever has been said here about Afghan rightist parties may have been more than they actually merit, especially if one takes into account that some of them are so minuscule that they hardly deserve to be mentioned at all. The foregoing analysis served, however, a double purpose:

First, to prove that the image of the Afghan resistance so tenaciously maintained by the Western media is not only one-sided but patently out of focus. The groups referred to as "Muslim rebels" or "Islamic Mujâhidîn" are neither the mainspring nor the main stream of Afghan national resistance to Russian occupation.

Second, that foreign interference by Islamist regimes in the affairs of Afghanistan actually does take place, but on a pattern quite different from that given

out by the media of the Soviet bloc. The little military assistance that did at all reach Afghanistan from Egypt via Pakistan accounts only for a very minor part of the freedom fighters' armament³⁰ which, for the major part, consists either of their outdated tribal weapons or else has fallen into their hands as a result of skirmishes with or defections from the Afghan army and lately from successes against the Russians too. The light weapons from Egypt went, moreover, mostly to the above described groups, which are militarily the least effective among the resistance.

THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE NORTH AMONG THE VARIOUS FRONTS OF RESISTANCE

Before discussing the "other" resistance to the Russians, the "real" nationalist liberation, it seems incumbent to present a view of the different "fronts" in Afghanistan. The one most mentioned in the Western media is the Eastern front along the Pakistani border, particularly the Kunar valley down to the city of Jalālâbâd and beyond to Gardêz. It is here that the popular Mullah Yûnus Khâlîş has his base. Ghaznî and, further to the South, the country's second largest city, Qandahâr, are a different front. North of Kunar is the Nûristân front whence the uprising against the Tarakî regime started. It is rather isolated from the rest, first geographically and, second, politically, because the Nûristânîs, who were conquered by Afghanistan only at the end of the nineteenth century, cherish separatist tendencies. After liberating most parts of their inaccessible mountain region from government troops they proclaimed themselves autonomous and started flying their own, red and white flag. They nourish considerable grudge against the Islamists to the South but do cooperate with the nationalist front in Badakhshân to the North³¹, which is the Afghan remainder of the Soviet Republic of Tâjikistân. The entire Northern third of Afghanistan, that is Afghanistan north of the Asian Highway, stretching from Badakhshân's Fayḍâbâd (Faizabad) to Herât in the West, is the "Northern Front" held by the "national democrats" to be discussed below. The Western North-South axis from Herât via Farah to Nimrûz is partly an extension of the nationalist Northern Front, partly it is territory of the Iran-based Islamists. The Hazârajât Front in the heart of the country is again a somewhat separate case. The downtrodden minority of Shī ʿī Mongols (Hazâras) inhabiting this region initially looked to Khumaynî's Iran for support. As Teheran proved little effective, the Hazârajât Front came more and more under the sway of the Northern Front³².

Most important in military as well as political terms is the Northern Front. It has come into the news only in the Summer of 1980, almost exclusively due to astounding government admissions of fierce fighting and heavy casualties³³.

The entire region north of the Asian Highway, which cuts through the country in an almost straight line from West to East, remained inaccessible to foreign correspondents, except for those who ventured into parts of the Kunar valley in the vicinity of the Pakistani border. All other Western journalists remained usually confined to the route from Peshāwar via Jalâlâbâd to Kâbul, from there via Ghaznî to Qandahâr and Herât, and back to Kâbul. Just a handful of "tourists" managed to pass along the Northern highway through the Salang tunnel to Mazâr-e Sharîf near the Soviet border³⁴.

The principal centers of resistance, however, have all along been the mountain ranges north of Kâbul, especially Panjshîr, Badakhshân around the provincial capital of Fayḍâbâd, the city of Kunduz with its industrial belt, and the Turkistani region of Fâryâb in the Northwest where in July 1980 even a stretch along the Amû Daryâ, the river constituting the border with the USSR, was for a few days under nationalist control³⁵. Nowhere else have the Kâbul government and the Russian forces been given such a hard time as in these regions, where large territories have several times been liberated. Thus, aside from the immediate Northern vicinity of the capital, the strongest fight was put up precisely in the area bordering the Soviet Union. Among the many reasons for this, two deserve to be mentioned beforehand. First, many inhabitants of this region belong to families that fled before the Russian advance from what is now the USSR into Afghanistan. Some did so during the nineteenth century, others at the beginning of the 20th century only. The memories of Russian atrocities are still fresh in their minds and they entertain no illusions as to the Kremlin's designs. For them there can be no question of believing the official propaganda according to which the Red Army is soon going to withdraw. They are firmly convinced that this is just another annexation and they are prepared to take up a last stance. The second reason is the pre-dominance of national minorities in this region, nationalities that have long felt discriminated against by the Pashtûn dominated central government. Particularly Badakhshân has a tradition of armed resistance to this overlordship. It found expression in such regionalist militancy as *sitam-e millî* ("Movement against the discrimination of minority nationalities")³⁶. Harrassment of successive central governments provided the training ground for the liberation struggle against the Russians.

The Tâjiks are the major nationality in the North, and they are the second nationality in the country as a whole, after the Pashtûns. According to the latest census, carried through under the Amîn regime, Tâdjiks and Pashtûns are in fact equal, each constituting 40 % of the roughly 17 million Afghans³⁷. The census must necessarily be highly questionable as it was undertaken at a time when about half of the country was lost to government control. On the other hand the Amîn regime had no reason to inflate the number of Tâjiks and lower that of the Pashtûns from whom almost the entire *khalq* fraction is

recruited³⁸. As the result was released after the 'Tâjik-inclined' Babrak Karmal came to power, there is some likelihood that the figures are due to a later interpolation. But there are in fact a number of factors indicating that the Tâjik population has really increased in proportion to the Pashtûns. This is significant inasmuch as the Tâjiks have generally been more receptive to modern trends than the Pashtûns. Not only that literacy and intellectual agility are generally higher among them, the Tâjiks have also never been completely cut off from the tradition of Muslim modernism that once flourished among their conationals north of the border until it was crushed there by the Russians. It is doubtful whether the Kremlin really sees Afghanistan solely through the eyes of its specialists on the Pashtûns, as some observers are inclined to think³⁹. As far as the Tâjiks are concerned the USSR has, after all, its own long standing experience. It is more likely that Moscow pursues two different policies with regard to the two "halves" of Afghanistan. The policy initiated in August 1980 obviously is a Pashtûn-policy. It aims at subduing the tribes through bribes rather than arms. The huge sum of money set aside for this purpose (2 billion rubels) mainly aims at buying over tribal chiefs and other influential personalities. In this the Kremlin merely reenacts an age old policy that proved fairly successful under successive empires, particularly the Moghul and the British. It is, of course, a well established colonial practice that contributed much to the success of the French among the Berbers of Morocco. Whether it will have the same success among the Pashtûns after their nationalist sentiments have been stirred as hardly ever before remains to be seen. Among the Tâjiks this policy is for a variety of reasons, far less applicable. In the Northern region that has been more successfully cordoned off, the Russians are bound, therefore, to resort to a military solution, and the intensified fighting in the Summer of 1980 indicates that this is already under way.

Yet another reason for the more effective resistance in the North is the comparatively greater proletarianization. Whatever little industry Afghanistan has is to be found in the regions close to the Soviet border, particularly in Baghlân, Shibirghân, Gulbahâr and Kunduz. Accordingly, there has been greater receptivity to progressive ideas, but this has traditionally benefitted China more than Russia.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONAL FRONT

This leads us on to an analysis of the political forces. Leftism in Afghanistan came into the open during the period of liberalization in the sixties. As elsewhere in Asia it soon split into a pro-Moscow and a pro-Peking wing, with the

latter being numerically stronger. Not unlike in Pakistan, many Afghan left-ists thought of China as an Asian power more akin to their national aspirations than the European Russians. China is also often regarded as being less anti-Islamic than Russia. This is not to be understood in religious terms, but with a view to the greater respect for local Asian cultures and the notion prevailing among many progressive Muslims that the Chinese are better Muslims than themselves, Muslims not nominally, but "Muslims in practice", an argument that became almost part of the ideology of the Pakistan People's Party in its initial phase⁴⁰.

Pro-Moscow leftism took an organized shape in the formation of the PDP (People's Democratic Party) that was founded in Kâbul in 1964/65. Although numerically inferior, it had the advantage of counting among its ranks many of the Soviet-trained cadets, especially in the army. Pro-Peking leftism - although this is a generalization - united in the larger body called *shu`la -e jâwîd* ("Eternal Flame"). In reality this was a very loose grouping of a whole variety of leftist groups. Soon the PDP split into two (*parçham* and *khalq*) while *shu`la -e jâwîd* decided to dissolve itself⁴¹.

After the coming to power of the PDP through the military coup of April 1978, the various components of *shu`la -e jâwîd* were forced to go underground as they were in fact hounded more mercilessly than the Islamists. But whereas the reunification of *parçham* and *khalq* in the reconstituted PDP was a shortlived affair, some groups of what was formerly *shu`la -e jâwîd* forged a new unity which now included even less left-committed nationalists who had never had any links with the defunct *shu`la -e jâwîd*. Early in 1979 emerged the first union of the independent left, the "Afghan People's Liberation Organization" or SAMA (*sâzmân -e âzâdîbakhsh -e mar-dom -e Afghânistân*). PLO and EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front) were the apparent godfathers of this namesgiving.

From its inception SAMA was both less onesidedly Tâjik dominated and less Peking oriented. The first aspect was an indication of the new Afghan nationalism. As a result of foreign aggression the different nationalities are finding together in an unprecedented manner. At the time of the attempted British occupations of the country resistance was primarily, though certainly not solely, a task of the Pashtûns whose territory was affected first. The Russian invasion has made many of the remaining barriers between Pashtûns and the other nationalities crumble. Besides, when SAMA was founded it came to fill a vacuum. Afghans of all nationalities were at that time in search of a nationalist movement other than the squabbling Islamists. One more factor was obviously the personality of the founder, Majîd Kalakânf, a Tâjik brought up among Pashtûns in Qandahâr. Equally fluent in both languages and at home in both cultural traditions, he was a truly national figure acceptable to all alike. The nickname *shimâlî* ("man from the North", or rather the strip called

Shimâlf in the North of Kâbul) merely increased his popularity, although he is mostly referred to as simply Majîd. He had been a founder member, if not the initiator, of shu`la-e jâwîd.

As for the Chinese connection, Afghan leftists just as most Maoists all over the world, went through an ideological crisis after the change of orientation in Peking. The label "Maoist" with which the Kremlin commonly refers to the entire independent left of Afghanistan is surely more appropriate than the equally much used term "pro-Chinese elements". SAMA does preserve some of the cherished Maoist rhetoric but it has no links with the present Chinese administration. It has time and again expressed its firm determination not to play the China card.

At the beginning SAMA was really little more than the "band of armed robbers" as which it has been described by the Kâbul media. But when it undertook its first military operations it already had some 2000 fighters. At the time of the great popular uprising of Kâbul in February 1980 SAMA counted well over 8000 members.

Chief organizer of the upheaval in Kâbul was Majîd Kalakânî who has rightly been credited with having introduced urban guerilla warfare in Afghanistan. Ever since, there has been a steady influx of deserters from the Afghan army, so much so that soon the bulk of SAMA fighters consisted of former soldiers of the Kâbul government. This is in fact one of the accusations of splinter groups to the left of SAMA. These can be found among Afghan students in the safe havens of Western Europe and the United States. Being "Maoists" in the derogatory sense this term has acquired on the Western student scene, these mini-groups of armchair revolutionaries call SAMA names by alleging that it is nothing but a bourgeois association of disgruntled former army officers.

Afghan army officers do in fact suffer most in the turmoil their country is passing through. Those few loyal to the regime can never be sure if they are not liquidated for being either khalqis or parchamis. The Russians do anyhow assign to them the dirtiest tasks of mass murder and dangerous forays into such "rebel strongholds" as the ancient city of Herât⁴², while at the same time keeping them mostly disarmed. Those who desert face the danger of being executed by the Islamists who accuse them of having remained too long on the government side or simply because they doubt their ideological (Islamist) purity⁴³. In this respect Hikmatyâr's hizb-e islâmî has a particularly sad record. In one case these mujâhidîn destroyed four helicopters because they distrusted the army personnel that had taken them to their side⁴⁴. Such officers and soldiers as left for the "liberated areas" or Iran and Pakistan without joining the Islamists were often desperately in search of a "sensible" and reliable nationalist front to take up the fight for liberation⁴⁵. They account for much of SAMA's military prowess as the most effective guerilla force in Afghanistan.

Immediately after the Russian invasion of December 1979, SAMA established a broader union with other nationalist groups. The outcome was the foundation of the "United National Front" (jābhā -e muttāhid -e millī) in January 1980, under the chairmanship of Majīd Kalakānī. The constituting components have not been disclosed, but it is known that the parties cooperating with SAMA in this union are millat ("nation"), which defines itself as social-democratic⁴⁶, remnants of sitā m -e millī and other regionalists as well as groupings of "progressive Muslims" patterned after Iran's mu jā h i d ī n -e khālq (whom the Shah once classified as "Islamist Marxists"). Other minor groups include local nationalist guerilla fighters who did previously not have sufficient trust in the newly emerged SAMA. The "United National Front" has of necessity lost much of the leftist tinge that Yugoslavia-inspired "national communists" and "independent socialists" gave to the Northern Front. In the case of some groups this new centrist orientation may be due to tactical reasons since all socialist terminology has become anathema to the Afghan masses who understandably fail to distinguish ideological niceties and curse anything reminding them of the Russian installed regime's propaganda⁴⁷. At the same time, however, Afghan leftists of almost all shades have started to reidentify with Islam as a national rallying point. Most of them never really dissociated themselves from the inherited faith, having always regarded Islam - in its liberal version though - as an inalienable ingredient of their national heritage, if not as a religion, so at least as a culture. Islam played the decisive role in their history, for many Afghans Islam is the very starting point of their national identity, both in an historical as well as in a cultural sense. Thus Islam is for Afghanistan what Catholicism is for Ireland or Poland. In this perspective the identification with Islam transcends the divisions of parties, regions, ideologies, sects, schools of thought and hermeneutics. Besides, this religion offers a much broader spectrum of manifestations than the Islamists would like to admit. There are manifold forms of expressing religiosity, giving practically everyone a chance to feel at home in Islam. The leaders of the "United National Front" realize this only too well, several of them do hold degrees in Islamic studies from Arab universities, from Iran and other Muslim countries. Moreover, the bulk of the fighters who swelled the ranks of the Front in 1980 are deeply religious soldiers, sons of peasants, for whom Islam is not a political ideology, but a faith that buttresses their ardent nationalism⁴⁸. As far as their political tendencies are concerned they are unanimous in their desire for democracy. They may not be in a position to define this democracy in precise terms - though it is amazing to note how many of them are able to do so - but in any case they distrust the Islamists and are wary of the preachers of an "Islamic System" of Iranian or Pakistani inspiration⁴⁹.

All in all it can be said that the "United National Front" is still left of the center, though more to the center than to the left. It may seem weird that

both, the PDP of Tarakf-Amn-Karmal, and the "United National Front" define themselves as "national democrats". Numerous declarations by various spokesmen of the Kâbul government do, however, leave little doubt that with them this appellation serves as a camouflage⁵⁰, whereas with the UNF it is the result of a gradually worked out consensus. If some miracle were to happen making the Russians withdraw and allowing Afghanistan to be free, the "United National Front" would, in all likelihood, emerge as the strongest force, with SAMA playing more or less the part of the Sandinistas. Such a government would be fiercely non-aligned and about as distrustful of the West as of the East. Firstly, this stance is an original ingredient of SAMA's political line, secondly, it has been reinforced by Western callousness with regard to Afghanistan. United States' preparedness to let Afghanistan be swallowed so that America may be able to relax and concentrate on the much more important game called presidential elections could not fail to create bitterness among the Afghan resistance. The same applies to the anxiety of the West German entrepreneurial class shivering in its pants lest the Afghan crisis upset its roaring business with the USSR and the rest of Eastern Europe⁵¹. Then there are those other circles in the West wishing to tease the Russians by "fighting till the last Afghan", and this without even arming the Afghans.

The "fight till the last Afghan" is not such a remote prospect at all. Khalq's President Amn is on record as having said that 'if need be we fight on till there is only one million Afghans left, that will be enough for us to build socialism on secure foundations'. With more than one million dead since the April 1978 coup⁵², with little less than two million as refugees abroad⁵³, with another three million threatened by famine and complete lack of medical care⁵⁴, Moscow socialism stands a fairly good chance to progress. On the other side is SAMA's motto "Freedom or Death", something not to be taken lightly in a region where martyrdom is extolled beyond measure - a tradition that is by no means confined to Shf'ite Islam.

ABD AL-MAJID KALAKANI AS THE SYMBOL OF NATIONAL RESISTANCE

The execution of Majid Kalakani on June 8, 1980, in Kâbul supplied the Afghan resistance with a national martyr symbolising their struggle, and providing an additional rallying point as well as a much required focus of hero-worship. Since Majid Kalakani was the first truly national figure to emerge out of the liberation struggle, it might not be out of place to present a glimpse of the man and his career. He hailed from the village of Kalakan some 35 km to the North of Kâbul. This is the same place where the "Son of the Watercarrier"

- Baccha-e Saqqâ - came from who ruled Afghanistan in 1923 for some nine turbulent months after the overthrow of King Amânullâh Khân. Baccha-e Saqqâ was not exactly an Afghan Pancho Villa, but he evidently was more than just the bandit as which he is sometimes described. Majîd Kalakânî's father and uncle were executed in 1945 by King Zâhir Shâh, whose father, Nâdir Shâh had Baccha-e Saqqâ murdered with the help of Mullah Mujaddidî, grandfather of Sibghatullâh Mujaddidî, imâm of the Kopenhagen mosque and self-styled party boss in Peshâwar. Majîd, born in 1939, was just about six years old when the remainder of the family was banned to Qandahâr in the South of the country. Later he and his elder brother Qayyûm were allowed to attend college in Kâbul, but were soon jailed for allegedly having murdered the Dean of the Faculty of Theology. After two years in solitary confinement during which they were kept in chains, they were released and offered an apology for the "misunderstanding". While Qayyûm subsequently went to Nasser's Cairo where he studied for almost a decade, Majîd became immensely popular in Kâbul as a teacher, poet and politician. In the late sixties, after the dissolution of shu`la-e jâwîd, he took to the mountains and started a small scale guerilla warfare against King Zâhir Shâh and President Dâ`ûd. Indian papers called him an "Afghan Robin Hood"⁵⁵ though he himself might rather have thought of Che Guevara. In 1958, when he was just 19, he already had to go underground for the first time, emerging only in 1963, at the time of "liberalization" when he founded shu`la-e jâwîd.

Majîd Kalakânî was captured more or less by chance on February 27, 1980, in Kâbul, that is shortly after the great popular uprising. Once his identity was discovered he was taken to the Soviet Embassy where he was kept in the basement and completely shielded off from his countrymen. The only Afghans allowed to see him there were Babrak Karmal and security chief Najîb. It was widely believed that Majîd Kalakânî would be taken to the Soviet Union in order to be "re-educated" so as to be returned to Afghanistan one day as a kind of Janosz Kadar⁵⁶. Significantly, the news of his capture was not at all released. Two governments - Dâ`ûd and Amîn - had tried in vain to get hold of a foto of Majîd Kalakânî, offering huge sums in reward. Now Majîd-posters appeared on Kâbul walls demanding his release, thus defeating the government's purpose of keeping the capture secret in order not to unleash new violent-demonstrations. SAMA guerillas staged some of their most spectacular actions and declared in their regular leaflets about the political situation that these attacks on Soviet installations were undertaken in retaliation for the imprisonment of Majîd Kalakânî.

The execution came as a surprise to most. Amnesty International had obtained assurances from the Kâbul authorities that Majîd would be given a fair trial (he was unarmed at the time he was captured). According to the government announcement he was executed along with the ten most hated henchmen of Amîn

just as if the regime wanted the public to view him in the same light⁵⁷. That, however, proved ineffective and there was large scale retaliation on the part of SAMA, this time not only in the form of increased military action that killed two Russian generals, but also to the liquidation of at least two dozens of *par chamîs* (in addition to the *par chamîs* that fell victims to *khalqî* revenge). Militarily the Russians did not gain much by executing Majîd Kalakânî, by the time of his death SAMA had been joined by enough defected army officers to keep it not only going but intensify its campaign more than ten times, extending its influence and field of action into Hazâradjât, Herât Nûristân and even up to Ghaznî. In August 1980 the Russians seemed to gain some ground against SAMA in the province of Fâryâb bordering the Soviet Union. This seemed important as the major gas fields of Shibirghân are in this area. It also served to relieve pressure from the highway connecting Tirmiz on the Soviet side of the border (staging point for the occupation of Afghanistan) with Mazâr-i Sharîf. And yet, in September SAMA still inflicted a heavy blow on the enemy near Surûbî at the highway connecting Kâbul with Jalâlâbâd. Not only that this temporary liberation of Surûbî was achieved with high casualties on the side of the occupant, but it had been facilitated by the defection of Asian Soviet soldiers⁵⁸. About a dozen of earlier Muslim defectors from the Red Army are fighting in the ranks of SAMA. Most important, perhaps, is that the resistance is still carried on with the gusto characteristic of Afghan warfare⁵⁹. Far from breaking the spirit of the nationalists, more suitable Russian weapons and a new military strategy have anything but lessened their determination to resist. In the Summer of 1980 some of the "liberated zones" under the sway of SAMA suffered from acute starvation due to Russian encirclement. And yet the overall mood was one of rather joyful confidence, at times almost elation. In anything concerning personal plans for the future there recurred the phrase "after the liberation" as if it were actually close at hand, though sometimes admission is made that the war may last for some two to three, or even five years.

The execution of Majîd Kalakânî, therefore, helped the Karmal government in a political sense only. As many observers have rightly pointed out time and again, the great handicap of Afghanistan's struggle for freedom is the dearth of a leadership with nation-wide acceptance. Afghanistan is not going to be Russia's Vietnam, it is commonly argued, because there is no Afghan Ho Chi Minh. Majîd Kalakânî was at least on his way to becoming such a national figure. As far as SAMA and the "United National Front" are concerned, the gap created by his death was quickly filled. But the apparently very effective leaders of the Northern Front are scarcely known to the rest of the country and, therefore, fail to attract people from other fronts and parties in a sweeping manner. The "United National Front" replies to such questions by referring to its policy of winning the masses over from other parties, instead of persuading party leaders to join, which would entail political compromises and a

dilution of the Front's basic principles. An instance in point is the Western Front. Here the "United National Front" has a firm hold in the North, especially in the city of Herât. The province of Farah, that occupies the central sector of the Western Front, is the base of Nabî Muḥammadî and his "Movement of the Islamic Revolution" (ḥarakat-e inqilâb-e islâmî), particularly its subsection, the "Association of Religious Scholars" (jam'iyat al-`ulamâ). At the Southern end of the Western Front, in the province of Nimrûz, another subsection of the "Movement" is in control, the "Society for the Armed Liberation of the Afghan Nation" (sharika-ye rahâ'î-bakhsh-e musallaḥ-e millat-e Afghânistân). The "United National Fronts" feels little inclination to absorb a conservative mullah such as Nabî Muḥammadî, even though they prefer him to Ḥikmatyâr and his fundamentalist ilk. But Muḥammadî's subsection, which controls the Nimrûz Front so well that the "Committee for Solidarity with the Afghan People" was able to set up a make-shift clinic over there⁶⁰, is "progressive" by comparison. This resulted in a de facto incorporation of the "Society for Armed Liberation" in the "United National Front", although nominally the Nimrûz Front still pledges allegiance to Muḥammadî's "Movement", for a variety of reasons. There are, however, reports of Yûnus Khâliṣ cooperating with the UNF, if he has not actually joined it while still professing to maintain links with the "Alliance" in Peshâwar. He is, in any case, known for being particularly contemptuous of his party's namesake, the ḥizb-e islâmî of Ḥikmatyâr⁶¹.

One can hardly go wrong in assuming that the emergence of a leader of national caliber would greatly enhance the attraction of the UNF and speed up the extension of its influence into all parts of the country. When Majîd Kalakânî died there was the first ever national mourning in the true sense of the word. Even the Islamists in Peshâwar observed a three day fast as a religious respect to the slain hero, excepting, of course, the groups of Ḥikmatyâr and Mujaddidî.

Although no one has ever spoken of Majîdists, the founder of SAMA was to his comrades-in-arms very much what Sandino was to the Sandinistas, if in no other sense than that the party line of SAMA can best be understood by comparing it to that of the Sandinistas (with allowance made for the different constellation regarding the superpowers). A core of leftists has developed a conception of their responsibility toward an interaction with the masses that allows it to pursue a policy of national consensus without deviating from its revolutionary principles. Such broadstream progressivism, based on genuine identification with the masses rather than on opportunism, enabled the Sandinistas to join hands with religious romantics and mystic visionaries such as the clerical poet Ernesto Cardenal. On a similar pattern Afghanistan's United National Front is attracting breakaway sections of "progressive mullahs"

from organizations such as Muḥammadī's "Movement for the Islamic Revolution". Just as the strikers in Poland generally expressed dislike for journalistic attempts at situating the new social order they aspire for between the Hungarian and the Yugoslav model, wishing to be just Polish and nothing else, similarly SAMA clamors for an independent Afghan version without reference to Albania or Rumania.

PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR OF LIBERATION

The UNF enjoys one major advantage over the Islamists just as it suffers from a pernicious handicap. Its great advantage is that it is inland-based, having its headquarters neither in Iran nor Pakistan (nor Geneva or London for that matter) but inside Afghanistan. This enables its fighters to discredit the parties in exile as merchants who trade in the news about the successes of a resistance they have no share in. The proclamation outlining the platform of the UNF is dressed in a poetic literary style full of religious allusions typical of Afghan tradition. It demands from the politicians abroad to prove their spirit of sacrifice and nationalism by becoming like Abraham and join them "in the abyss of Nimrod's fire" or else accept the role of auxiliaries without any claim to leadership⁶². Whereas the sympathizers of other parties flee the country in ever increasing numbers⁶³, the UNF with its greater credibility, has even been able to induce Afghan academics to give up cosy university posts in affluent societies and join the guerilla.

Its handicap is the supply with weapons and ammunition. As a result of so many defections from the Afghan army the armament was not all that bad by mid-1980. Besides, SAMA did not only take possession of some of the Afghan army's weapons depots, it also seized several ammunition transports from the Russians. A proud motto of SAMA says, "our weapons are manufactured for us exclusively in Russian factories"⁶⁴. It is a cardinal principle of theirs not to accept gifts from any side so as to eschew any outside interference or political influences. This must sound very appealing to many revolutionaries and liberation movements in the Third World, but is hardly realistic under the present circumstances. Kābul's army has more or less disintegrated, with about two thirds of its original strength (80 000) gone. Among the remaining third there are not too many potential deserters left and even those who should like to switch sides are going to find this increasingly difficult because of Russian supervision⁶⁵. Not much of arms, therefore, is likely to come from this source. For some time to come SAMA may still succeed in repleting its stock with weapons captured from Soviet conscripts who prove to be the same kind of "paper tigers"⁶⁶ as America's spoilt children in Vietnam. An increase

in Russian presence and the exchange of indisciplined, unmotivated and badly trained conscripts⁶⁷ with elite troupes armed with weapons suitable for Afghanistan⁶⁸ are bound to get the better of SAMA's idealistic fighters who are not only being cut off from supplies but do also refuse help except if it comes from Afghans abroad, who occasionally sent a telescope or a field radio.

Whatever the military prospects for the Afghan resistance may be, one thing is sure, the cliché of Russians encountering nothing but "Muslim rebels" of the medievalist tribal type in Afghanistan is a myth; so is the Soviet propaganda about foreign interference that necessitated the invasion. Much as the Western countries rejoice in the difficulties encountered by the Russians in Afghanistan, they are all extremely worried and go out of their way so as not to make the Kremlin feel provoked. As for interference from the Islamic countries, it certainly does take place, but very much to the advantage of Moscow, because the only effect such "fraternal assistance" has is to weaken the Afghan resistance. Rather than furnishing the movement for national liberation with arms and ammunitions, the Islamist states accentuate existing fragmentation among the Afghans and bog them down with ludicrous squabbling over aid money disguised as theological issues.

Afghanistan's liberation in the foreseeable future would be next to miraculous, and it would be just as much a miracle if this were not followed by a civil war. Even now one witnesses occasional shootouts between Islamist groupings; and SAMA has to exercise utmost restraint not fall into the traps of Hikmatyâr's *hizb-e islâmî* and allow itself to be provoked⁶⁹. The gruesome war, however, has had its positive aspects inasmuch as it has given rise to an Afghan national consciousness with hitherto unknown dimensions. Pashtûns, Tâjiks, Hazâras, Usbeks, Nûristânîs and other nationalities fraternalize on an unprecedented scale⁷⁰. The traditional society, which the PDP sought to revolutionize on a Moscowite pattern, is breaking asunder and reshaping itself in a manner suiting its national requirements. Women, whom Tarakî-Amîn-Karmal endeavored to press into emancipation are liberating themselves much more genuinely in the struggle for national independence. Afghanistan's future is going to hold many surprises and most observers will have to revise number of their opinions about this country.

Notes:

- 1) S. Jill Tweedie, "If Ayatollahs are villains, why should Afghans be heroes?", in *The Guardian (Weekly)*, Aug. 17, 1980. Cf. Giorgio Vercellin, "Afghanistan: guerriglia e trattive" in *Rinascita*; No. 25, Rome, June 20,

1980. The author invites the European left to ponder over the alternative to the Russian takeover in Afghanistan and concludes that in case of a Soviet withdrawal there is the danger that "the unpopular regime might be succeeded by an antipopular regime". For an outright defense of the Soviet position by the Trotskyist: s. J. Posadas, *Afghanistán, el imperialismo, la Unión Soviética y la construcción del socialismo*. Ediciones lucha comunista. Madrid 1980.

- 2) S. Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan under the Khalq", in *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1979. Cf. D. Khalid, "The interaction between political upheaval and structural changes in the educated class of Afghanistan" (forthcoming, autumn 1981). Cf. Daniela Bredi, "I protagonisti del cambio sociale", in *Politica Internazionale*; No. 6, Rome, June 1980.
- 3) Morocco's long sea coast belies this comparison only superficially because Afghanistan has not always been so landlocked as it is now. This, after all, is precisely Afghanistan's conflict with Pakistan: a restoration of the Afghan areas incorporated into British India (a Greater Pashtūnistān including Balūchistān) would give the country access to the sea. Many partisans of the Pashtūnistān idea do indeed claim as much as Karachi. The more chauvinist propagandists buttress this claim by pointing to the fact that Pakistan's largest port and commercial metropolis counts among its roughly four million inhabitants about one million Pashtūns, as such Karachi would be the biggest conglomeration of Pashtūns, having more Pashtūn population than Kabūl and Peshāwar.
- 4) The confinement of the authority of some Afghan kings to the urban centers more or less in conflict with the rebellious countryside during stretches of Afghan history strikingly resembles the Moroccan antagonism between bilād al-makhzan (government administrated area) and bilād al-sibā (tribal areas only temporarily under the monarch's control whenever he would muster a huge army to show his flag over there in order to remind the tribes of the tribute due to him).
- 5) The resemblance between the countries that fascinates Moroccan visitors of Afghanistan, could be carried on ad infinitum. In this particular context it is the history of the imperial cities that comes to mind: Fes, Meknes, Marrakesh and Rabat in Morocco; Balkh, Ghazni, Peshāwar and Kābul in Afghanistan.
- 6) The autonomy proclaimed by the Nūristāns after wresting control from Amīn's troupes seems to belie this, but recent information from Nūristān speaks of a particularly close cooperation with Afghan "national democrats" in the liberation front, who have all along advocated greater rights for the national minorities in a free Afghanistan. For the similar case of

- the Shī`ī Hazāras see Mike Barry, "L'Afghanistan crucifié" III, in *Le Monde*, May 25-26, 1980.
- 7) S. Klaus Jäkel, "Reform and Reaktion in Afghanistan", in *Mardom Nameh*; No. 3, Berlin, February 1977. Cf. Harald Einzmann, *Religiöses Volksbrauchtum in Afghanistan. Islamische Heiligenverehrung und Wallfahrtswesen im Raum Kabul*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977.
 - 8) Cf. D. Khalid, *Die politische Rolle des Islam im vorderen Orient*. Second and enlarged edition; Hamburg 1979.
 - 9) Cf. D. Khalid, "The Phenomenon of Reislamization", in *Außenpolitik Hamburg* 1978, No. 4, English edition. (I have to caution against the translation in the German edition, which is very faulty indeed).
 - 10) Cf. the weekly newspaper *Akhbār al-`ālam al-islāmī* published by the "Muslim World League" (*rābitat al-`ālam al-islāmī*) from Mecca.
 - 11) These two names are constantly being confused, including in such well-informed standard articles on Afghanistan as those by Mike Barry, "L'Afghanistan crucifié", in *Le Monde*, May 24, 1980. In Pakistan, the fundamentalist party is called *jamā`at-e islāmī*. It has two orthodox rivals, the *jam`iyat al-`ulamā` islām* of Muftī Mahmūd and the *jam`iyat al-`ulamā` pākistān* of Maulānā Nūrānī. In Afghanistan there is no party called *jamā`at*, but only *jam`iyat*. Thus, the counterpart to Pakistan's *jamā`at-e islāmī* in Afghanistan is called *jam`iyat-e islāmī* (led by Prof. Burhānuddīn Rabbānī). The counterpart to Pakistan's *jam`iyat al-`ulamā` islām*, which is particularly strong among Pakistani Pashtūns (Muftī Mahmūd) is also called *jam`iyat al-`ulamā`* in Afghanistan where it constitutes a subsection of Nabī Muhammad's *harakat-e inqilāb-e islāmī*. In Arabic *jam`iyat* means association or organization, whereas *jamā`at* stands for group or community, it also means party and as such it is used in Urdu where "political party" is nowadays mostly translated as *siyāsī jamā`at*. In Arabic "political party" is more commonly rendered as *hizb*; since the usage of Arabic words in Afghanistan is generally closer to the original than in Pakistan, Hikmatyār calls his "Islamic Party" *hizb-e islāmī*.
 - 12) S. D. Khalid, "The final replacement of parliamentary democracy by the 'Islamic System' in Pakistan", in: *Orient*; Vol. 20, No. 4, Hamburg, December 1979.
 - 13) *Ibid.*

- 14) S. Anthony Hyman, "Grass root resistance", in *The Middle East*, May 1980.
 Cf. Mike Barry, "L'Afghanistan crucifié" II, in *Le Monde*, May 24, 1980.
 This seems to be an irony of fate because it was precisely Hikmatyâr's Pakistani counterpart, the radical section within the *jamâ`at-e islâmi*, that was primarily responsible for the overthrow of Bhutto. It also shows how principled an "Islamic" politician Hikmatyâr is, entering into an alliance with one "infidel" (Bhutto) against another "infidel" (Dâ`ud).
- 15) S. D. Khalid, "Das Wiedererstarben des Islam als Faktor sozialer Umwälzung", in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte - Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament*; Vol. 10, Bonn, March 10, 1979, Cf. Mike Barry, "L'Afghanistan crucifié", in *Le Monde*, May 24, 1980.
 Martin Woollacott, "The Afghans find a national identity", in *The Guardian* (Weekly), Aug. 10, 1980, calls the *jam`iyat-e islâmî* and the *hizb-e islâmî* "minority sects in Afghanistan". This terminology may be disputable from the viewpoint of Islamicists, nonetheless it reflects what the majority of Afghans feels about these fundamentalist movements.
- 16) Cf. Mike Barry, "L'Afghanistan crucifié", in *Le Monde*, May 24, 1980. Cf. Peter Niese wand, "With the Afghan rebels", in *The Guardian*, June 22, 1980.
- 17) Cf. D. Khalid, "Ayatullâh Khumainî", in *Mitteilungen - Verbund Stiftung Deutsches Übersee-Institut*, Hamburg 1979, No. 4.
- 18) S. D. Khalid, "Der Bruchpunkt heißt Jerusalem", in *Vorwärts*. Bonn, Sept. 4, 1980.
- 19) S. *The Economist*, June 28, 1980, about the June 20th meeting of Afghan exile politicians at Mont Pélerin, near Lake Geneva in Switzerland.
- 20) S. "Press Review" in *Echo*, Tehran, May 19, 1980, p. 12, reproducing details published by the Central Bank of Iran's Employee Association. Six and a half million Franc were remitted, *inter alia*, to the Philippine Separatists Movement, Paris Office, on March 11, 1980. The Shf`î mosque in Hamburg received 22 240 000. - German Mark between Aug. 22, 1979 and April 7th, 1980.
 The *hizb-e islâmî* is the only party of the Afghan resistance that possesses a radio station operating from Iran. S. the interview with Hikmatyâr's second-in-command in Akhbâr Dubai, May 1980 (a monthly published in the United Arab Emirates).
- 21) S. D. Khalid, "Kämpfer und Märchenerzähler - der afghanische Widerstand ist kein einheitlicher Block", in *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt*; No. 28, July 13, 1980.

- 22) According to some sources, these posters were not in support of Hikmatyâr but rather government announcements (WANTED) calling for the arrest of the "traitor". Afghans, however, suspect that this was a clever propaganda trick of Hikmatyâr. S. Philippe Roger, "Les mille résistances afghanes", in *Le Monde*, Sept. 11, 1980.
- 23) S. *Le Monde*, July 22, 1980. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 19, 1980. Cf. Philippe Roger, "Les mille résistance afghane", in *Le Monde* Sept. 11, 1980. For a vindication of the hizb-e islâmî's line see the propagandistic feature by their partisan Asen Balikci, "L'idéologie et l'organisation de la résistance afghane", in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 1980.
- 24) Cf. Mike Barry, "L'Afghanistan crucifié", in *Le Monde*, May 25-26, 1980.
- 25) The Solidarity Committee has produced a number of pamphlets and leaflets explaining its humanitarian actions and presenting reports about relief missions. They are also offering a documentary film about the distribution of medical aid and clothes in the refugee camps in Iran. The information material provided by the Solidarity Committee makes a laughing stock of the erratic article by Asen Balikci, "L'idéologie et l'organisation de la résistance afghane", in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, September 1980. The author gives the figure of 736 000 refugees in Pakistan without mentioning that this figure has almost to be doubled because it includes only the till then officially registered refugees. His report becomes altogether outrageous when he goes on writing: "It appears that one could possibly add another 100 000 Persian speaking people of Afghan origin who took refuge in Iran and about whom scarcely anything is known at all." The Solidarity Committee does also provide information about the political developments and is well stocked with proclamations and statements issued by the liberation front, both in Persian as in translation. "Solidaritätskomitee für das afghanische Volk e. V.", P. O. B. 244, Maria-Anna Heinz, Susannenstraße 4, 2 000 Hamburg 6, West Germany. Account number: PschA Hamburg 2270-201.
- 26) S. *Les nouvelles d'Afghanistan*; No. 1, Paris, July 1980. The fate of Afghan relief organizations bears some resemblance to that of the political parties, which is obvious in view of the fact that most of those aid committees are sponsored by one party or the other. Besides, it frequently happened that groups or individuals founded a relief organization spontaneously, not knowing that in the same country or even in the same city others had done the same. After the first rather turbulent year of such activities head organizations of a more solid foundation emerged,

mostly centering around the committee that proved to be politically the most broad based, the one with the longest breath and best motivated workers. The Hamburg-based "Solidarity Committee for the Afghan People" is operating in Austria, Germany, Holland, England, Norway, Spain and the USA. "AFRANE (Amitié Franco-Afghane), 1, avenue Racine 78 600 - MAISONS LAFITTE, although independently founded in France as the result of the merger of several solidarity groups, is for all practical purposes a French version of the Solidaritätskomitee für das Afghanische Volk e. V. being indistinguishable in aims and objectives as well as organizational set-up and working modus. Cf. *Le Monde*, June 26, 80.

- 27) *S. weekly Inquilâb*, London, Aug. 14-21, 1980.
- 28) S. Philippe Roger, "Les milles résistances afghanes", in *Le Monde*, Sept. 11, 1980.
- 29) *S. International Herald Tribune*, May 30, 1980. *Nawâ-e Waqt*, Rawalpindi, May 31, 1980. *The Middle East*, Aug. 30, 1980. In a way this was more of a rivalry within the "Alliance" as the *loya jirga* was very much under the sway of Gaylânî. A success of this venture would have given Gaylânî, who so-to-say represents 'popular' Islam, the lead over the fundamentalists. Cf. Philippe Roger, "Les milles résistances afghanes", in *Le Monde*, Sept. 11, 1980.
- 30) S. Drew Middleton, "Reports conflict on arms supply to Afghan fighters", in *International Herald Tribune*, July 22, 1980. Cf. Arnold Hottinger, "Berichte afghanischer Freiheitskämpfer - Ruf nach Waffen", in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 20/21, 1980. Brian Crozier, "Afghan rebels armed with SAM-7 rockets", in *Now*, June 13, 1980.
- 31) Cf. Mike Barry, "L' Afghanistan crucifié" III, in *Le Monde*, May 25-26, 1980.
- 32) S. Mike Barry, "L' Afghanistan crucifié" III, in *Le Monde*, May 25-26, 1980. In this instalment of his highly perceptive and well informed series on the Afghan resistance the author vividly describes how disillusioned the Shî`î Hazâras became with Iran: "They have not given us a single grain of rice. Iran has let us down, they let us die. We do not mean anything to them. For us Khumainî has become a name by which we call our dogs. Whereas we are fighting for our survival they go on screaming in front of fifty poor hostages!"
- The author goes on explaining how, on account of the callousness of the Iranian establishment, the Shî`î Hazâras, after first having declared their autonomy, reintegrated in the liberation struggle of Afghanistan as a nation and eventually joined hands with the "United National Front". That this disappointment with Iran is shared by other resistance groups

outside the Khumaynist *ḥizb-e islâmî* is reported by Anthony Hyman, "Grass root resistance", in *The Middle East*, May 1980. The leader of one of the smallest guerilla groups, Walf Baig of *ittihâd-e mujâhidîn-e islâmî Afghânistân* ("Union of Afghan Islamic Freedom Fighters") was arrested by the Iranian authorities in August 1980 at Zâhidân (Balûchistân) for having entered Iran without a visa. *S.* weekly *Inqilâb* (London), 24-30, 1980.

- 33) *S.* "Verstärkter Widerstand afghanischer Rebellen", in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 17, 1980. *Le Monde*, Aug. 12, 1980. Arnold Hottinger, "Ein Vietnam der Russen?", in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Aug. 8, 1980. *Le Monde*, Aug. 20, 1980. *Al-Hawâdith*, July 4, 1980. *Le Monde*, Sept. 9, 1980. *International Herald Tribune*, Sept. 9. *Le Monde*, Sept. 9, 1980. Carol Honsa, "Soviet view: We're only rooting out Afghan bandits", in *Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 8, 1980.
- 34) S. Bernard Dupaigne, "La situation en Afghanistan - carnet de route", in *Le Monde*, Aug. 19 and 20, 1980. Cf. Carol Honsa, "Soviet view", in *The Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 8, 1980.
- 35) *S.* *Le Monde*, Aug. 12, 1980.
- 36) S. Daniela Bredi, "I protagonisti del cambio sociale", in *Politica Internazionale*; No. 6, Rome, June 1980. Cf. *Newsweek*, Feb. 26, 1979: "Death of an Envoy".
- 37) S. Mike Barry, "L' Afghanistan crucifié", in *Le Monde*, May 24, 1980.
- 38) S. Daniela Bredi, "I protagonisti del cambio sociale", in *Politica Internazionale*. No. 6, Rome, June 1980.
- 39) S. David Chaffetz, "Afghanistan in Turmoil", in *International Affairs*. January 1980. For a perceptive analysis of the martial capabilities of Pashtûn tribes s. Akbar S. Ahmed, "Afghanistan and Pakistan: The great game of the tribes", in: *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*; Vol. 3, No. 4, Summer 1980.
- 40) S. D. Khalid, "Die 'schleichende Isolation' - Pakistans außenpolitisches Dilemma", in *Orient*, Vol. 20, No. 2, Hamburg 1979. In the present article I have refrained from discussing Soviet motives for the invasion and the overall world context of Russian expansionism in Central and South Asia, as this forms the subject of a forthcoming paper (Summer 1981). Briefly, my main thesis is that the Kremlin's move in Afghanistan is primarily to be seen as a move to contain China, though the access to the Gulf's oilfields and the dismemberment of Iran certainly do play a role too. Cf. David Housego, "Tinder boxes all in a row in Central Asia", in *Financial Times*, Nov. 6, 1978. This is one of the few Asia correspon-

dents who affords due importance to the Chinese factor in the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Likewise *Al-siyâsa al-dawliya*, No. 57. Cairo, July 1979.

- 41) S. Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan under the Khalq", in *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1979.
- 42) S. Tyler Marshall, "Afghan city is dying amid constant war", in *International Herald Tribune*, Sept. 5, 1980.
- 43) S. the Urdu daily *Jang* (London edition), Aug. 21, 1979. Likewise daily *Millat* (published from London), Nov. 8, 1979. Cf. Philippe Roger, "Les mille résistance afghanes", in *Le Monde*, Sept. 11, 1980.
- 44) S. D. Khalid, "Afghanistan: Der Widerstand kommt aus den Bergen", in *Südkurier*, Aug. 16, 1980. Cf. Mike Barry, "L'Afghanistan crucifié" III, in *Le Monde*, May 25-26, 1980. Reporting a similar case of *hizb-e islâmî* partisans sparing their prestigious anti-tank weapons instead of using them in a crucial moment, thereby causing the catastrophe of Kunar Valley in which thousands lost their lives on March 2, 1980. Similarly Philippe Roger, "Les mille résistances afghanes", in *Le Monde*, Sept. 11, 1980.
- 45) S. Mike Barry in *Le Monde*, May 24, 1980, where he reports that the influence of the five-party alliance and the *hizb-e islâmî* extends no further than a few kilometers inside Afghan territory. Guerillas told him again and again: "These parties do not represent anyone. They only strut about in front of foreign delegations. Resistance can be found only with us, in the interior."
- 46) S. Anthony Hyman, "Grass root resistance", in *The Middle East*, May 1980.
- 47) S. Philippe Roger, "Les mille résistance afghanes", in *Le Monde*, Sept. 11, 1980.
- 48) The "Platform" of the United National Front warns of the Russian attempt to "completely annihilate our national identity by means of attacking Islam, our bulwark". For this reason, it says, we have to be wary of attempts at "misguiding our combatants by dint of reactionary and superstitious interpretations of Islam". Therefore, "we have to promote a concrete illustration of the humane and revolutionary Islam, under the present circumstances of our people's struggle this is all the more necessary in order to lead our ongoing great national uprising to fruition and put social justice on a sure footing." *S. Plattform der Nationalen Einheitsfront Afghanistans*, n.d., translated from Persian by Karîm 'Azîz Sâfi. Hannover, September 1980; available with "Solidaritäts-

- komitee für das afghanische Volk e. V.", P. O. B. 244, 2 000 Hamburg 6. For an interpretation of the events in Afghanistan from the viewpoint of democratic Muslim socialists s. Al-ikhwân aljumbûriyûn (Republican Brothers), "Ghazu Afghânistân - al nadhîr al-ûryân", Khartûm, March 1980.
- 49) S. Philippe Roger, "Les mille résistances afghanes", in *Le Monde*, Sept. 11, 1980.
- 50) S. Zalmay Khalilzad, "The superpowers and the Northern Tier", in *International Security*; Vol. 4, No. 3, Winter 1979/80. Cf. Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan under the Khalq", in *Problems of Communism*, July-August, 1979.
- 51) S. "Depuis l'affaire de Kaboul, on voit les pays européens, de l'Ouest et de l'Est, ébaucher un rapprochement", - un entretien avec Gunter Grass; in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, July 5, 1980. Cf. Jonathan Steel, "Soviet proposals not such a blind alley", in *The Guardian* (Weekly), May 25, 1980. Hella Pick, "Cool line over Afghan invasion", in *The Guardian* (Weekly), Aug. 17, 1980. Russen Warren Howe, "US backs Afghanistan neutrality plan", in *8 Days*, March 15, 1980. Likewise "A great game not worth the candle", in *The Guardian* (Weekly), May 18, 1980. Cf. Leslie H. Gelb and Richard H. Ullman, "Keeping Cool at the Khyber Pass", in *Foreign Policy*; No. 38, Spring 1980. For a dissenting voice s. Zalmay Khalilzâd, "Afghanistan and the crisis in American Foreign policy", in *Survival*, July/August 1980.
- 52) Cf. Mike Barry, "L'Afghanistan crucifié", in *Le Monde*, May 24, 1980; where this utterance is attributed to an Afghan minister who, however, might just have repeated what Amîn had said earlier in a public speech. Babrak Karmal accused Hafîzullâh Amîn of having murdered one and a half million people. Although Karmal, for his own justification, tends to paint Amîn as dark as possible, all indications are to the effect that this is a rather realistic figure. Amîn himself admitted to having well over 12 000 persons executed, - at a time before the worst repression had even started. Cf. Zalmay Khalilzâd, "Afghanistan and the crisis in American foreign policy", in *Survival*, July/August 1980.
- 53) There has been much confusion about the exact number of refugees. This is due to the fact that some papers give only the figure of those refugees who are officially registered with the Pakistani authorities. Other sources give the figure of both, the registered and the unregistered refugees together. The number of those registered with the Pakistani authorities attained the figure of one million by September 1980. Various estimates speak of at least half a million unregistered refugees in the remote mountainous regions in the North and the deserts of the South (Baluchistan). More

than a hundred thousand Afghans have crossed Pakistan into India. The number of those stranded in Iran, where there is no such registration as in Pakistan, can hardly be less than one million. Another hundred thousand Afghans proceeded from Pakistan, India, and Iran to other Middle East countries, Europe and the United States. Already in November 1979, Anselm Heyer, an expert on the region, warned on German TV that the number of refugees was bound to be ultimately more than two million; by autumn 1980 this figure appears almost conservative. Still larger, however, is the number of displaced persons within Afghanistan. The population of Kābul alone quadrupled from August 1978 till August 1980. Cf. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 17, 1980. *International Herald Tribune*, Sept. 8, 1980.

- 54) Patrick Laburthe of "médecins du monde" calls Afghanistan "a sanitation void" (*désert sanitaire*), s. "Afghanistan: l'hôpital enterré", in *L'Express*, Sept. 13, 1980.
- 55) S. "Saga of an Afghan Robin Hood", in *The Statesman*, New Delhi, June 10, 1980.
- 56) S. D. Khalid, "Afghanistan/Pakistan: Alarm am Khaiber-Pass", in *Kontinente*; Vol. 15, No. 3, Cologne, June 1980.
- 57) *S. International Herald Tribune*, June 9, 1980. *Le Matin*, June 10, 1980. *Libération*, June 10, 1980. *La Croix*, June 11, 1980. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 11, 1980. *L'Express*, Aug. 21-27, 1980. *L'étincelle*; No. 108, spécial été 80.
- 58) Eye-witness account of a participant in the battle whom the author was able to interview. The informant, a responsible officer of the Front, does not wish his name to be disclosed. Cf. *The Economist*, Aug. 30-Sept. 5, 1980.
- 59) S. "Afghanistan: Where War is like 'a Good Affair'", in *Time*, May 14, 1979. Cf. "URSS: le guêpier afghan", in *Le Point*, June 16, 1980. Jacques Buob, "Flames of hatred unite Afghanistan", in *Now*, June 27, 1980. Jesús González Green, "Guerra Santa contra los Rusos".
- 60) S. the documentary film on the refugee camps in Iran produced by Karīm 'Azīz Sāfi on behalf of the "Solidaritätskomitee für das Afghanische Volk e. V.".
- 61) S. Mike Barry in *Le Monde*, May 25-26, 1980.
- 62) *S. Plattform der Nationalen Einheitsfront Afghanistans*, n. d., translated from Persian by Karīm 'Azīz Sāfi. Hannover, September 1980.

- 63) S. International Herald Tribune, Sept. 8, 1980.
- 64) S. the leaflet "Springtime Thunderbolt in Shimâlî", published by United National Front on March 21, 1980. A German translation is available with "Sympathisanten der revolutionären Bewegung Afghanistans", Terhechte, F. Mardesugba, 4811 Leopoldshöhe.
- 65) S. Barry Shlachter, "Soviet Arms taken from Afghan Units", in International Herald Tribune, Sept. 13-14, 1980.
- 66) The Afghans do in fact have their own indigenous term for "paper tiger" by which they call the Russians. Dew sargini is the demon of cow dung. Dried sargini (cow dung) keeps on burning for a long time and generates much heat; in the end, however, it is reduced to ashes. S. the leaflets published by the UNF, originals as well as translations of which can be obtained from "Solidaritätskomitee für das Afghanische Volk e. V.", P. O. Box 244, 2000 Hamburg 6, West Germany.
- 67) S. Bernard Dupaigne, "La situation en Afghanistan - carnet de route" II, in Le Monde, Aug. 8, 1980. Cf. Anthony Hyman, "Grass root resistance", in The Middle East, May 1980. Stuart Auerbach, "Strategic inflexibility seen as eroding Russia's technical edge in Afghanistan", in International Herald Tribune, Aug. 13, 80.
- 68) S. The Middle East, Aug. 1980. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, July 7, 1980.
- 69) SAMA communiqués of September 1980 mention two major clashes with the hizb-e islâmî. One of these was an apparent attempt by Hikmatyâr's partisans to stem the tide of UNF influence in the largely Islamist controlled Paktia province bordering Pakistan. The hizb-e islâmî suffered about 60 casualties while SAMA lost ten of its fighters. Reports about recent arrests in Kabul mention that the arrested resistance fighters belonged, for the greater part, to SAMA and, to a lesser part, to the hizb-e islâmî, thus showing these two as the main contenders for the leadership of the Afghan guerilla. International Herald Tribune, Sept. 1980.
- 70) S. Martin Woollacott, "The Afghans find a national identity", in The Guardian (Weekly), Aug. 10, 1980. Likewise Jacques Buob, "Afghanistan: la résistance", in L'Express, Aug. 21-27, 1980.