

GDR, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS+  
AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

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International politics is truly a global phenomenon today, thanks to the world-wide involvement of the Super Powers. The Sino-Soviet conflict took on new colour at the turn of the 1970's; America's detente with both Moscow and Beijing introduced fresh complexity into international politics. The impact of the Big Power Triangle has also been strong on the German political scene. A correlation between the Sino-Soviet armed clashes on the Ussuri in the Far East (March 2 and 15, 1969), the consequent rapid militarization of the 4 500-mile border between the two communist giants and the simultaneous Sino-American rapprochement on the one hand, and the sudden progress in the protracted Four-Power Berlin talks in May 1971 on the other has been shown elsewhere<sup>1</sup>. The Berlin Agreement had resulted inter alia in Moscow's resumption of the responsibility to control civilian traffic on West Berlin's access routes - at the GDR's psychological cost. The latter had to resign itself to a number of other distasteful phenomena like Letter on German Unity or the continued denial of its de jure recognition by Bonn despite the age of detente in Europe. In this context, the present article analyzes the further impact of Moscow's eastern flank on the most sensitive area of its Western flank, viz., the GDR, and relates the latter's policy and response to its most fundamental problem: the German Question governing its political relation with Bonn.

One of the initial blasts against China had emanated from East Berlin as early as January 1963<sup>2</sup>, at the inception of the Sino-Soviet dispute in public. China's intensified anti-Sovietism during the Cultural Revolution had led to a sharpening of the GDR's polemics against Beijing. Observers have noted that the aggravation of the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1969 drew the GDR's critical gunfire

+ ) This article is part of a larger study of the GDR's foreign policy, which the author is preparing at the Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Bonn. He wishes to express his gratitude to the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, Bonn, for supporting the project.

to a degree that seemed to surpass even Moscow's own volleys<sup>3</sup>. It has been observed subsequently that during the first half of the present decade, the GDR has shown an overall circumspection towards China, barring occasional criticisms. Critique has been exercised in GDR publications as a rule by re-printing articles from other sources<sup>4</sup>. If this was true in the earlier half of the 1970's, it has no longer been so over the past few years.

#### THE CHINESE POSTURE ON EUROPE IN THE 1970's

Along with the initiation of its "revolutionary diplomacy" that contained a series of favourable signals to the Nixon-Kissinger team in Washington, movement came in China's relations with West Europe. Criticism of the European Community, the idea of West European integration or even NATO had earlier undergone a volte face. With the Cultural Revolution subsiding, the Ussuri clashes and the explicitly anti-Soviet 9th. Party Congress of spring 1969 led to the new Chinese diplomatic line that quickly brought in its trail recognition of China by a number of European states and Japan between 1970-72. Soviet commentary noted carefully in this connection that a large number of NATO member states were involved in China's recognition<sup>5</sup>.

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has once observed that the Soviets think in long-term perspectives<sup>6</sup>. Already in early 1968 Ernst Henri, the noted Soviet journalist, had written about Moscow's suspicion of a Sino-Western rapprochement in the foreseeable future<sup>7</sup>. A year ago Franz-Josef Strauss, branded "revanchist" by the communists, had added to Soviet worries by suggesting careful Bonn-Beijing rapprochement, thereby reviving Starlinger's memory<sup>8</sup>. China's rehabilitation in international life was enabled by the USA, and Bonn's connections with Beijing have not been confined to impressive trade alone<sup>9</sup>. Besides the developing Chinese connections with West Europe, Beijing's cultivation of the "weakest links" in the socialist system of states like Rumania and Yugoslavia has not contributed to the euphoria of the more conservative Warsaw Pact (WP) member states.

The GDR fully shares Moscow's worries over Chinese-European ties. But the GDR has over and above them a more fundamental worry regarding China and its policy towards the West. China's deliberate pronouncements on the German Question have touched a raw nerve of the SED elite<sup>10</sup>. Beijing condemned the Moscow Treaty of 1970 as a sellout of the GDR's interests<sup>11</sup>, thereby trying to home in on the Soviet-GDR "contradictions" over Moscow's detente policy towards Bonn. With the Shanghai Communique of February 1972 behind it, which contained an anti-hegemony clause, China invited Gerhard Schröder,

known for his differences with Brandt's conciliatory Ostpolitik, to visit Beijing in July, to be followed the same year by Foreign Minister Walter Scheel (10-14 October). On the latter occasion, China again hurt the SED by expressing regret over the "anomalous situation" of divided Germany<sup>12</sup>. China's unsolicited outspokenness on the German scene, the latest example of which was Hua Guo-feng's utterances in October 1979, have been designed to encourage anti-Soviet sentiments on both sides of the Elbe<sup>13</sup>. Although the Chinese avoid attacking the GDR directly, the latter has little alternative to maintaining close identification and solidarity with Moscow, and hence it has viewed China's "Intermediate Zone" strategy as dangerous for bloc unity. Bonn has also at times allowed the political element in its relations with China to come through. Chinese attacks on detente moves like SALT, MBFR (dubbed by the Chinese as "More Battalions for Russia") or CSCE have not surprisingly met with strong criticism in the GDR. China's deliberate politicization of its growing relations with West Europe has produced expected results in Moscow and East Berlin<sup>14</sup>.

#### THE PERCEPTION OF CHINA'S GLOBAL STRATEGIC ROLE

While Europe got busy managing detente and putting its house in order, tension brewed in other parts of the world. Conceptualized as the "arc of instability" by Carter's National Security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, large chunks of Africa including the strategic Horn combined with adjoining and farflung Asian regions like Afghanistan, Iran and Indochina to throw into relief increasing tension and instability. Beside the USSR and Cuba, the GDR turned out to be a most enthusiastic actor in the African continent in influencing national liberation movements as well as a number of newly independent states. Taking advantage of the fact that the USA remained largely paralyzed after its Indochina and Watergate experiences, which also coincided with growing Soviet capabilities in the conventional arms area including the navy, the Soviet bloc increasingly got busy in that continent to rollback "imperialist" influence and presence. The standard Marxist-Leninist theory of "imperialism" holds that the "historic tendency" of the deterioration of capitalism is nudged along the right track by denying the latter colonies. The Soviet bloc's policy of encouraging national liberation or nonalignment are a testimony to that strategy. Besides this motivation, such assertive activities have helped the GDR project its state-personality beyond Europe. Although its cooperation with certain African national liberation movements began earlier, the GDR made diplomatic breakthroughs in that continent at the turn of this decade<sup>15</sup>. East German Army (NVA) and other experts (including police) have been present in at least 6 Arab and 9 black African states in the past decade<sup>16</sup>. Werner Lamberz's

African mission (followed by Honecker's in early 1979), which roughly coincided with Soviet and Cuban missions in mid-1977, underlines such Soviet projection of power overseas "for the first time in history"<sup>17</sup>.

However, if opportunities seemed to present themselves to the Soviet bloc in Africa and parts of Asia, they also contributed to the sharpening of the US-Soviet-Chinese triangular interaction. President Carter in a number of speeches and moves clearly signalled the Soviet bloc that the USA had no intention to let its power projection whether in Europe or elsewhere, go unchallenged<sup>18</sup>. Soviet expectations of possible reconciliation with post-Mao Chinese leaders received a setback when Hua Guo-feng brought out the 5th, volume of Mao's Selected Works containing early anti-Soviet remarks in mid-April 1977 and pressed home Beijing's reply to Moscow's hopes by touring China's sensitive north-eastern border preaching utmost vigilance<sup>19</sup>. In his own keynote speeches Hua blasted the USSR on May 1 and August 12, and reiterated the earlier Chinese standpoint that Moscow's "fascist dictatorship" represented by far greater threat than the USA<sup>20</sup>.

On February 2, 1978, shortly after Carter's NATO consultations in Brussels, US Defence Secretary Harold Brown announced a 3.5 % real increase in US defense budget (FY 1979) and touched a Soviet nerve by conforming that the USSR's China flank had been taken into account in strategic planning<sup>21</sup>. Although the Vance mission to China the previous year had suffered shipwreck on the question of Taiwan, Brown's statement and budget came at a time of growing Sino-Soviet tension over Indochina. This only added to the Soviet trauma of a convergence of interests between the NATO states and China. Moscow's offer of reconciliation to Beijing just two days before the 5th, National People's Congress session the same month must have been prompted by such consideration. China, however, not only brushed aside the Soviet offer of normalization but repeated its call to Tokyo to sign up the Peace Treaty which was expected to contain an anti-hegemony clause. The Congress ended with another constitution containing explicitly anti-Soviet observations<sup>22</sup>.

It was not only polemics, however, that bothered Moscow and its apostles. The increasing tension between a pro-Chinese Kampuchea and a united Vietnam started attracting the greater Sino-Soviet rivalry in Southeast Asia, which in turn gave new impulse to the interaction structure of the Big Power Triangle. The Soviet tilt towards Hanoi in the latter's dispute with Phnom Penh took place in fall 1977<sup>23</sup>. In the following January Hanoi sent out an SOS to the Soviet bloc for help to "restore friendship" between the two Indochinese neighbours. Next month a Soviet delegation under Politburo-member Grigory Romanov arrived in Hanoi and assured the latter of Soviet support for its stand against Phnom Penh<sup>24</sup>.

Besides China's support for Pol Pot's Kampuchea, the internal measures of Hanoi affecting the ethnic Chinese Hoa community of Vietnam turned out to be

another source of friction in its relations with Beijing. Tension increased on the latter issue from June 10, 1977, when a Chinese memorandum on the subject was submitted to Hanoi<sup>25</sup>. The situation further deteriorated when Beijing Radio threw down the gauntlet to Vietnam on May 1 the following year by publicizing en masse Hoa emigration<sup>26</sup>. China's subsequent steps like reinforcing troops on its border with Vietnam and stationing naval forces off Hainan Island, cutting off aid to Hanoi and recalling its Ambassador sharpened tension in the region, but did not stop Vietnam from going ahead with its intervention in Kampuchea. Hanoi, which had held an observer's status in the CMEA, entered that organization in June and signed a Friendship Treaty with Moscow on November 3 - clear political signals to China which were not lost on the latter. A Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty did not exist even at the height of US presence in Vietnam; Hanoi's decision to sign it at this juncture was indicative of the gravity of the situation not of Southeast Asia alone. It also raised China's determination to cut Vietnam down to its size and thereby rebuff Moscow.

The international political situation was evolving rapidly elsewhere too. The Franco-Belgian action in Zaire in May 1978, which was backed by the USA, aggravated East-West controversy. Despite his illness which had reportedly prevented Brezhnev from meeting Brandt the previous December and February, the Soviet chief undertook a much publicized inspection of the Soviet Far Eastern border forces during March 28 - April 9, 1978, accompanied by top military brass<sup>27</sup>. On April 7, he expressed the Soviet bloc's anxiety aboard the cruiser Admiral Senyavin:

It is no secret that both to the west and to the east of our borders there are forces that have an interest in the arms race, in whipping up an atmosphere of fear and hostility<sup>28</sup>.

As if confirming Brezhnev's apprehension, Brzezinski, considered a "hawk" by the Soviet bloc, showed up in Beijing next month<sup>29</sup>. It is not known whether Brezhnev's second Bonn-visit in early May, which featured security questions prominently, was hastened by Brzezinski's expected appearance (May 20-22) in China. The latest round of US-Chinese talks, this time successful, was followed on August 12 by Japan making up its mind on the signing of the long-awaited Peace Treaty with China, despite the antihegemony clause it contained. The year climaxed with the fall of Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea, the heightening of Sino-Vietnamese tension coinciding with Deng Xiao-ping's US-visit and the announcement of Sino-American diplomatic recognition. The expected border war between China and Vietnam followed, the instability in Indochina being matched by upheaval in Iran on the other flank of Asia. Regarding on-going Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Moscow has alleged that it is countering active Sino-US encouragement to anti-government forces in that country<sup>30</sup>. Hence, despite the diversity around the globe, the turmoil and con-

flict sketched above tended to become assimilated within the triangular interaction among the Super Powers and China.

#### THE GDR'S CRITICISM OF CHINA

Against such background which was fraught with opportunities for the Soviet bloc as well as the latter's growing conflict with the USA and China, the sudden upsurge in the GDR's criticism of the latter becomes comprehensible. The heightened critique was simultaneously an indicator of the Soviet bloc's, especially the GDR's, threat perception. Perception may not necessarily tally with reality, but much of international politics is nevertheless guided by how nations perceive or interpret that reality. The GDR's growing interest in the Far Eastern flank of the Soviet Union was also an indicator of the Warsaw Pact's greater involvement beyond the bounds of Europe. This was also carefully noted in Beijing<sup>31</sup>.

Paradoxically, both Moscow and Beijing have imputed "appeasement" to the Western world. Each capital is perceived by the other as posing a threat to the comity of nations, and the West is blamed for not opposing such "threat", or even encouraging it<sup>32</sup>. Such standard Soviet argumentation casting suspicion on Western-Chinese relations has, not surprisingly, been faithfully echoed in the GDR<sup>33</sup>. But the more fundamental reason behind the latter's energy in taking an anti-Chinese posture, as suggested earlier, revolves around the German Question. Notwithstanding its pragmatism in certain nonpolitical areas, the SED has tried to put an end to that Question in its relations with Bonn. It has further sought to represent the GDR as irreversibly a socialist state enjoying ever closer ties with the Soviet Union. Solidarity and unity of purpose are the minimum qualities that the GDR has expected of its WP partners. Beyond these, it has championed both in words and deeds the cause of stretching the influence of the Soviet bloc beyond Europe (such as in Africa and selected Third World states like India). In a zero-sum relationship, the extent of success in this direction is seen as reducing the influence of world capitalism. This in turn is taken to reinforce the image of a young, socialist German nation unencumbered with the political past, i. e., the GDR's own point of view as contraposed to Bonn's. In other words, it would seem that the GDR has made a virtue out of necessity in championing socialism. The SED's continued enthusiasm in closely identifying the GDR with Moscow's cause is best understood in the light of its fundamental Gesamtdeutschland neurosis. China in recent years aggravated that neurosis by challenging the rise of Soviet power, especially in Southeast Asia. Because of its special situation, the GDR felt seriously affected, not least because of China's continued irredentism against

the USSR as well as its Intermediate Zone strategy<sup>34</sup>. The deterioration of the international situation in recent years has thrown into relief for the GDR a rise of "reactionary" forces in both East and West, and this has hardly attenuated its fundamental dilemma.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1977 the GDR took energetic steps to sign a number of Friendship Treaties with "fraternal" states, taking pains in each of them to emphasize the importance of detente in Europe, sanctity of borders, need for close political consultations, and the like<sup>35</sup>. Documents such as these and others involving the GDR continued to stress solidarity with all the three Indochina states including Kampuchea until October that year when Kampuchea was dropped from the GDR-Czech Joint Communiqué (3 October). Contrasted against the Soviet message of greetings to Phnom Penh the same month, it reflected the GDR's keenness to outdo Moscow<sup>36</sup>. The explicit criticism of China's anti-detente policy, which was embodied in the GDR-Bulgarian Joint Communiqué the previous month (14 September)<sup>37</sup>, was repeated, signalling the GDR's interest in involving itself in the latest round of Sino-Soviet conflict over Vietnam and Kampuchea that would turn into greater Sino-US understanding. Although not explicit, the 25-year GDR-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 6 May, that had come on the heels of a meeting between Mongolia, Cuba and the WP states (5-7 April)<sup>38</sup>, had transparently an anti-Chinese streak. The fact that the GDR signed such a treaty involving "common efforts" against "every appearance of revanchism and militarism", consultations on "all important international and other questions of mutual interest", and the expectation of proceeding from "agreed positions", with a state in the Far East that owes its continued existence to Soviet protection against China, was itself significant<sup>39</sup>. This notwithstanding the long cultivation of relations between East Berlin and Ulan Bator. Seen against the background of reports of the NVA exercising near the Sino-Soviet border only two years ago and the GDR's treaty with Laos (also signed in May 1977), which reportedly harboured Soviet MRBMs, the documents assume even greater significance<sup>40</sup>. The Soviet-GDR Friendship Treaty of 7 October 1975 was also apparently designed to extend the East German state's commitments to the security of the Soviet Far Eastern flank<sup>41</sup>. The GDR-Mongolian Joint Declaration rejected all "revanchist" and "militaristic" attempts to challenge existing borders, a clear allusion to Bonn and Beijing.

During 28 March - 7 April 1977 Vietnam's Defence Minister Giap led a military delegation to East Berlin to belatedly thank the GDR for its support against the USA<sup>42</sup>. The Vietnamese veteran then reminded the hosts of the importance of "proletarian internationalism" and went ahead to acquaint himself with the NVA's training facilities. He also held consultations with Honecker. GDR sources reported quite openly that the visit helped "strengthen" the ties between the armed forces of the two countries and that Giap's counterpart, Heinz

Hoffmann, assured him that the GDR was a "brother-in-arms" and wished the "reliable military protection" of Vietnam much success. The latter country hardly needed such reassurance against a far weaker Kampuchea. Evidently the two sides had China on their mind, although both refrained from publicly saying so.

When during 11-16 May that year a Laotian delegation visited the GDR, both sides stressed that Vietnam was "a bastion of freedom and socialism in South-east Asia"<sup>43</sup>. It must have had an interesting reaction in Phnom Penh and its patron, Beijing. About a week after Hanoi signed a Friendship Treaty with Vientiane, Nguyen Duy Trinh was received by Willi Stoph on 26 July, and presumably their talk was not confined to recent floods in Indochina<sup>44</sup>. As the situation in that peninsula rapidly deteriorated, a GDR delegation hurried to Hanoi and stayed there during 1-6 December, 1977. The result was a 25-year GDR-Vietnam Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed on 4 December. It repeated the GDR's favourite principles of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity (Articles 1 and 5) along with the need for cohesion of the Soviet bloc and the world socialist system. While it was not apparently designed to be a mutual assistance pact, like the GDR's treaty with Mongolia it provided for consultation (Article 7). In the ensuing Joint Declaration the GDR fell in with the Vietnamese line on supporting the Hanoi-backed KUFNS against the Pol Pot regime<sup>45</sup>. China was still not explicitly mentioned, which reflected Hanoi's desire not to stir up the hornet's nest yet.

The following January Truong Chinh, Hanoi's ranking ideologue and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, and the Laotian President Souphanouvong, held consultations with Erich Mückenberger<sup>46</sup>. The connection between such consultations and other activities of the GDR on China's doorstep on the one hand and its own fundamental problem on the other was revealed by a Neues Deutschland commentary of 17 April 1978. It maintained that the GDR was paying "great attention" to the post-Mao Chinese leaders' statements and activities which, however, showed the continuation of the Chinese policy of "building a wide international united front of all reactionary, anti-Soviet forces". The commentary then concluded by observing that such policy damaged "socialism" and "anti-imperialist solidarity", and hence "the most fundamental interests of the GDR"<sup>47</sup>. Next month Honecker implied as much in his report to the 8th, Central Committee Meeting of the SED<sup>48</sup>. On 25 July, when Honecker held his "traditional" talks with Brezhnev in the Crimea, both leaders "pointed out the dangerous character of the ever spreading and far-reaching alliance of the Chinese leaders with aggressive imperialist circles"<sup>49</sup>. This was obviously referring to the US-Chinese talks of two months ago, and the theme was repeated in other GDR documents.

By mid-1978 Vietnam's relations with China had reached their lowest point yet, and Hanoi no longer had any hesitations in openly condemning China, a



line supported by the GDR to the hilt<sup>50</sup>. The latter also expressed its support for Vietnam's defence measures and extended its congratulations to Laos on its "internationalist" (pro-Soviet) attitude<sup>51</sup>. In September further political consultations were held by the GDR and Vietnamese representatives<sup>52</sup>. Next month the GDR signed a treaty with Hanoi to help out the latter with its "transport problems"<sup>53</sup>. Under the tense circumstances of the Indochina scene this was nothing short of semi-military logistical support for Vietnamese forces fighting in Kampuchea and also getting ready to resist a possible Chinese thrust.

A high-level analysis between the growing Sino-Vietnamese conflict and the GDR's "vital interests" came again in December. Politburo-member Joachim Hermann alleged that both the "revanchist" forces in the Federal Republic as well as the Beijing leaders were burdening international relations. "On the basis of the friendship treaty between the GDR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam we will go on doing everything in our power to help our Vietnamese comrades in this heavy struggle", Hermann promised. He then elaborated on the SED's Weltanschauung: China "obviously" wanted to forge an anti-Soviet bloc with "imperialist" states, and therefore extended its support to West German "revanchists". "This was directed against the sovereign rights of the GDR and simultaneously against detente in Europe ..."<sup>54</sup>. This theme was repeated in public forums on subsequent occasions<sup>55</sup>.

True to its promise of support, the GDR was quick to recognize the Hanoi-backed Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh in January 1979 and opened its Embassy in that capital by April 2. It also quickly reacted to the outbreak of the Sino-Vietnamese border war on February 17 by issuing a protest against China the same day. Its media played up anti-Chinese propaganda. A week after the outbreak of the war, Honecker assured Vietnam's Ambassador Hoang Tu of the GDR's "effective" help to Hanoi<sup>56</sup>. The GDR-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty was invoked again on this and subsequent occasions confirming its political nature<sup>57</sup>. Such high-level assurance was repeated in fall 1979, when Honecker received Giap again on 11 October<sup>58</sup>.

In conclusion it may be asserted that China represents more than just another state to the GDR. Beijing's conflict with Moscow in the 1970's, which has seen a Western-Chinese rapprochement, has generated a situation that is perceived as dangerous by the GDR, not least due to China's energetic propaganda. China represents for East Berlin a challenge to the set of values that the latter cherishes as fundamental to its security and identity, even though the Chinese have not gone out of their way to introduce polemics against the GDR. The latter's enthusiastic self-identification with Moscow, its repeated assertion of bloc solidarity and firmness of purpose, and its energetic involvement in the African and Southeast Asian turmoils point to its continued security psychosis vis-a-vis Bonn, despite examples of improved interaction

in nonpolitical spheres between the two German states. The GDR seems to be ideologically geared to bolster the cause of world socialism (the Soviet variety), to strengthen the Soviet hand against the capitalist world order, not merely out of duty towards Marx and Lenin. Only in a world of shrinking capitalism and rising socialism, so seems to be the SED's perspective, can the GDR's own state personality and identity be secured and projected while the Deutschland-frage buried beyond recall. China's anti-Soviet policy, hence, symbolized a major roadblock in the way of "history", more so since it claims a connection with "reactionary" forces in the West. Permanent sanctity of territorial status quo is considered so important by the GDR that it is repeated on every occasion including treaties<sup>59</sup>. Such frequent repetition may also have been designed to stress Moscow's anxiety vis-a-vis China so as to set a limit to the former's penchant for understanding with Bonn.

It should be added that its anti-Chinese posture has not prevented the GDR from maintaining its Embassy in Beijing or in going for increased trade relations with the latter<sup>60</sup>. The Soviet proposal of February 1978 for reconciliation with China was strongly commended by East Berlin, and the Sino-Soviet agreement to discuss inter-state coexistence in fall 1979 has been appreciated in the latter capital<sup>61</sup>. The GDR seems to be closely following the parameters of Moscow's China policy of offering resistance to Beijing's hostile political thrusts while simultaneously keeping a way open for reconciliation so as to nip in the bud the perceived international "united front" directed against the Soviet bloc. Hua Guo-feng's Bonn-visit in late October 1979 was kept on a low key by Neues Deutschland. However, the single ADN commentary on the visit, "Playing with Fire"<sup>62</sup>, reflected East Berlin's anxiety about a Bonn-Beijing rapprochement that would reinforce Bonn's position on the German Question.

#### Notes:

- 1) The present author's article, "The Asian Dimension of East German Foreign Policy", China Report, Delhi, vol. XV, No. 4, July-August 1979, pp. 31-39.
- 2) Uwe G. Fabritzek, "Die chinesische Deutschland-Politik heute", in: Erik von Groeling et al. (eds.), Die Außenpolitik Chinas, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Munich, 1975, p. 398.
- 3) Uwe G. Fabritzek, "Die außenpolitische Praxis gegenüber Ost- und West-europa", in Groeling, op. cit., p. 268.
- 4) Fabritzek, note 2, p. 399.

- 5) A. I. Stepanov, FRG i Kitai, Moscow, International Relations Publishers, 1974, p.166.
- 6) Interview with Die Welt, in Bulletin, Bundespresse- und Informationsamt, Bonn, 15 August 1974, 95/984. (henceforth B).
- 7) See Franz-Josef Strauss, Herausforderung und Antwort. Ein Programm für Europa, Seewald, Stuttgart, 1968, pp.96-97. Reference is to Ernst Henri's articles in the issues of 10 and 17 April, 1968, of Moskovskaya Literaturnaya Gazeta.
- 8) Strauss, op. cit., Chapter V, pp.84-103. Wilhelm Starlinger, Grenzen der Sowjetmacht, Holzner Verlag, Würzburg, 1955, pp.111-131.
- 9) Besides China's deliberate politicization of its relations with Bonn, the latter has also not completely avoided giving a political angle to such relations. For instance, Walter Scheel's speech in Beijing, B, 18 Sept. 1974, 106/1088; Helmut Schmidt's speech in Beijing (29 October 1975), B, 4 Nov. 1975, 127/1257-9; Genscher's ZDF interview (9 Oct. 1977), B, 12 Oct. 1977, 99/906; his speech in Beijing, B, 12 October 1977, 99/942-944, and at lunch for Gu Mu, 29 May 1978, Bonn, B, 31 May 1978, 57/547.
- 10) See, for instance, Außenpolitik der DDR - für Sozialismus und Frieden, Instt. for International Relations, Staatsverlag der DDR, East Berlin, 1974, pp.130-136.
- 11) Fabritzek, note 2, p.269.
- 12) The GDR's sensitivity to Bonn-Beijing ties seen in note 10, pp.134-135.
- 13) Hua Guo-feng reiterated in an interview China's sympathy for Germany's division and support for West European integration and added, "We are not against detente but against the hegemonists!", ARD TV, 7 October 1979, 8 p. m.
- 14) Among important ideological statements on the rise of international "reaction" are Honecker's speeches at the 25th. CPSU Congress, Außenpolitische Korrespondenz (henceforth AK), East Berlin, 4 March 1976, p. 66, and at the 8th. Meeting of the CC SED (24-25 May, 1978), AK, 22, 2 June 1978, p.172; Mikhail, A. Suslov's speech at the 9th. SED Congress (19 May 1976), Europa Archiv (henceforth EA), Bonn, 1976, Folge 20, D 558-559; Soviet Statement of 22 May 1976, EA, 1976, Folge 15, D 371-375.
- 15) See Bernard von Platte, "DDR-Außenpolitik Richtung Afrika und Araber", Außenpolitik, No.1, vol.29, 1973, p.73.
- 16) "Waffenhilfe für Nahost und Afrika", Der Spiegel, No.36, 30 August 1976, pp.60-65.

- 17) Henry Kissinger in early 1976, quoted in Viktor Zorza's "Building on Kennan's Containment", *The Statesman*, Calcutta, February 13, 1976, p.4.
- 18) Carter's addresses delivered at Notre Dame University (May 22, 1977), Charlestone (July 21, 1977), Wake Forest (March 17, 1978), and those of June 7 and 14, 1978. "American Foreign Policy in a New World", "President Carter on US-USSR Relations", USIS, New Delhi, and "No US Pull-back from Defense Responsibilities", ICA, New Delhi, US-Soviet relations at the time of writing (January 1980) remain complicated by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in an election year in the USA.
- 19) Robert C. Horn, "China and Russia in 1977: Maoism Without Mao", *Asian Survey*, California, 10, XVII, October 1977, pp. 919-930.
- 20) I. Alexeyev, G. Apalin, "Peking: Balancing on the Dangerous Brink", *International Affairs*, Moscow, 9, 1977, pp. 53-54. Hua's report of August 12, 1977 and the new Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party in *China Report*, Delhi, No. 6, Vol. XIII, Nov-Dec 1977, pp. 57-84 and 85-91, respectively.
- 21) "Secretary Brown's Department of Defense Report for Fiscal 1979", ICA, New Delhi, pp. 1, 3, 5-7. Soviet anxiety seen in Dmitry Volsky, "To Shackle Asia", *New Times*, Moscow, 12, March 1978, p. 15 (henceforth NT).
- 22) See *China Report* (documents), No. 2, Vol. XIV, March-April 1978, pp. 75-96 and 97-107. As a postscript, China blasted its 23rd. nuclear bomb the same month.
- 23) Le Duan conferred with Brezhnev on 4 November 1977 in Moscow.
- 24) "The Events on the Vietnamese-Kampuchean Border", NT, 3, January 1978, pp. 8-9, and I. Nikolayeva, "Ignoring Vietnam's Goodwill", NT, 9, February 1978, pp. 2, 6.
- 25) "Decision on Shifting Capitalist Traders to Production", p. 18, and Le Duan's speech at the 4th. Trade Union Congress, p. 9, in *Vietnam*, 2, XIX, June 1978, SRV Embassy, New Delhi.
- 26) Le Phuc, "Hoa Workers at the Mai Lam Foundry", *Vietnam Pictorial*. Hanoi, 235, No. 7, 1978 (pages not numbered).
- 27) Brezhnev's illness in Christian Meier, Fred Oldenburg, *Das deutsch-sowjetische Verhältnis nach dem zweiten Breshnew-Besuch*, Bundesinstt. für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Köln, 40-1978, p. 10. On his tour, *Far Eastern Affairs*, Moscow, observed that it had "wide repercussions in the international arena" (V. Alexandrov, "In the Interests of Communism", 4, 1978, pp. 18-19).

- 28) Speech quoted in NT, 16, April 1978, p.4.
- 29) Brzezinski's own view of China in "The Priorities of US Foreign Policy", The American Review, New Delhi, Autumn, 1, 23, 1978, p. 55. Soviet anxiety over his China visit inter alia in Pravda, May 14, 1978, Izvestiya, May 20, 1978; M. Chernousov, "Playing the 'Chinese Card': World Press Comment", NT, 23, June 1978, p.11; A. Zoin, "Peking Flirtation", NT, 24, June 1978, pp.26-27; A. Titov, "Peking and Its American Lobby", Far Eastern Affairs, op. cit., pp. 89-93.
- 30) Gennady Anatolyev, "Repulsing Imperialist Intervention", NT, 2, Jan. 1980, pp. 8-9; Andrei Stepanov, "The Undeclared War Continues", NT, 10, March 1980, pp. 8-9.
- 31) "Kremlin's Highhandedness", Peking Review, 49, December 8, 1978, p.25. The commentary observes that Moscow was trying to "extend the (Warsaw) treaty's commitments to areas well beyond Europe" by means of its Friendship Treaty with Vietnam.
- 32) On the Soviet side, note 29, and L. Bezymensky's serialized article, "The Munich Tragedy", NT, 29, 31, 34 and 36, July-Sept 1978, pp.18-21, 24-26, 20-23, and 23-26, respectively. On the Chinese side Hsu Hsiang-chien, "Heighten Our Vigilance and Get Prepared to Fight a War", Peking Review, August 11, 1978, p. 8; "Appeasement - Its Manifestations and Adverse Effects" (interview of Liu Shen), Peking Review, July 28, 1978, No. 30, pp. 35-37; "Moscow's Outcries Can Never Harm China", Peking Review, October 20, 1978, pp. 22-25.
- 33) GDR-Bulgarian Joint Communique, 14 Sept. 1977 (Sofia), AK, 37, 22 Sept. 1977, p. 295; GDR-Czech Joint Communique, 3 October 1977 (East Berlin), AK, 40, 13 Oct. 1977, pp. 319-320; GDR-Ethiopian "Declaration on Principles of Friendship and Cooperation", AK, 48, 8 Dec. 1978, p. 383; GDR-Czech Communique (1-2 Nov. 1978), AK, 44, 6 Nov. 1978, pp. 346-7; ND commentary (17 April 1978) in AK, 17, 28 April 1978, p. 134; Honecker's CC SED report (24-25 May 1978) in AK, 22, 2 June 1978, p. 172; report on Honecker-Brezhnev Crimea summit (25 July 1978) in AK, 31, 4 August 1978, p. 242; Joachim Hermann's PB report and Peter Florin's speech at the 9th. session of CC SED, AK, 50/51, 22 Dec. 1978, pp. 396-7 and p. 404, respectively; Kurt Hager's speech (29 Dec. 1978), AK, 2, 12 Jan. 1979, p. 12; GDR-Cuban Communique (23-25 Jan. 1979), AK, 5, 2 Feb. 1979, p. 38; Oskar Fischer's address to African Ambassadors, AK, 22, 1 June 1979, p. 171.
- 34) GDR publications registered in 1978 a quantum jump on China. Deutsche Außenpolitik featured 7 articles on the topic in that year, while Außenpolitische Korrespondenz also had numerous entries on China to offer.

- 35) On the significance of these "second generation" treaties, see Hans Heinrich Mahnke, "Die neuen Freundschafts- und Beistandsverträge der DDR", *Deutschland Archiv*, 11, 1977, pp.1160-1184.
- 36) GDR-Czech Communique (3 October 1977) in AK, 40, 13 Oct.1977, p.319. Soviet greetings message mentioned in Yuri Antoshin, "On the New Path", NT, 44, Oct.1977, pp.20-21.
- 37) Text in AK, 37, 22 Sept.1977, p.295.
- 38) AK, 15, 14 April 1977, p.119.
- 39) Text in AK, 19, 12 May 1977, pp.148-151.
- 40) On NVA exercises, Harold C.Hinton, *The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Implications for the Future*, Crane, Russak and Co., New York, 1975, p.35. On Soviet MRBM bases in Laos, Thanat Khoman, "The New Equation of World Power and its Impact on Southeast Asia", *Orbis*, Philadelphia, vol.20, No.3, Fall 1976, p.616.
- 41) *Weltgeschehen*, Munich, Oct-Dec.1975, IV, pp.486, 490.
- 42) AK, 15, 14 April 1977, p.115.
- 43) AK, 20, 19 May 1977, p.156.
- 44) AK, 30, 4 August 1977, p.234.
- 45) Texts in AK, 48, 8 Dec.1977, pp.378-9.
- 46) AK, 5, 2 Feb.1978, p.37.
- 47) Text in AK, 17, 28 April 1978, p.134.
- 48) AK, 22, 2 June 1978, pp.169, 172.
- 49) AK, 31, 4 Aug.1978, p.242. Emphasis provided.
- 50) Report on Hermann Axen's meeting with Nguyen Co Thach (Vietnam's Deputy Foreign Minister), AK, 32, 11 Aug.1978, p.252.
- 51) Ewaldt Moldt's talk with Thach, note 49; Honecker on Laos, AK, 34, 31 Aug.1978, p.267.
- 52) AK, 36, 15 Sept.1978, p.285.
- 53) On 16 October 1978, AK, 43, 3 Nov.1978, p.343.
- 54) AK, 50/51, 22 Dec.1978, pp.393-397.
- 55) Kurt Hager's East Berlin speech (29 Dec.1978), AK, 2, 12 Jan.1979, pp.11-12; GDR-Cuban Communique (Jan.1979), AK, 5, 2 Feb.1979, p.38; Oskar Fischer's statement at meeting with Gromyko (27 Feb.-3 March 1979), AK, 11, 16 March 1979, p.88.

- 56) AK, 3, 16 Jan. 1979, p. 22; 15, 13 April 1979, p. 120; 8, 23 Feb. 1979, pp. 57, 61; Honecker's statement, 9/10, 5 March 1979, p. 65.
- 57) Honecker, Note 55, and Oskar Fischer, Note 54.
- 58) ND, 12 Oct. 1979, p. 1. A day earlier, Kampuchean Defence Minister, Pen Sovan, was also received by Honecker, ND, 11 Oct. 1979, p. 1.
- 59) Even while supporting Vietnam against Kampuchea, the GDR's anxiety over the sanctity of the principle of "territorial integrity" is reflected in its incorporation in the GDR-Vietnamese Joint Declaration of Dec. 1977, AK, 48, 8 Dec. 1977, p. 379.
- 60) The GDR-PRC trade and payments agreement of 19 Jan. 1978 envisaged an increase, AK, 5, 2 Feb. 1978, p. 39.
- 61) ND, 17 April 1978, in AK, 17, 28 April 1978, p. 134; Honecker's speech, 8th. session of CC SED, AK, 22, 2 June 1978, p. 172; 5 May 1978 GDR message to China, AK, 19, 12 May 1978, p. 150; GDR-Rumanian Communiqué on Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei's GDR visit (28-30 June 1979), AK, 28, 13 July 1979, p. 221.
- 62) ND, 23 Oct., 1979, p. 5. On Oct. 26 there appeared a similar commentary reprinted from Soviet sources: W. Sacharov (Radio Moscow), "Im Spiel gegen Frieden und Entspannung", ND, p. 2.

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