

THE NEW ORDER OF INDONESIA. TEN YEARS LATER

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I. The present military regime in Indonesia emerged from the womb of Guided Democracy (1959-66) which was generally associated with Sukarno, although it was in fact based on an unholy alliance between Sukarno and the army leadership. The political constellation of Guided Democracy began to disintegrate after the traumatic abortive coup of 1 October 1965 which led to the killing of six top army generals. In its aftermath General Suharto launched his own coup against Sukarno on 11 March 1966 which catapulted the former into power, although Sukarno was allowed to remain as a figure-head President up to March 1967. General Suharto banned the Communist Party (PKI) on 12 March 1966, the day after the coup. With the political demise of the PKI and the neutralization of Sukarno, two pillars of Guided Democracy had fallen away. Since then the military in Indonesia had been in the hegemonic position.

Suharto and his army colleagues call their regime 'The New Order' thus deliberately setting it off from the preceding regime of Guided Democracy, now also known under the name of 'Old Order'. It involuntarily reminds us of the New Order established by the infamous leaders of Fascism in Europe and Asia prior and during the Second World War. Perhaps this choice of name is not co-incident-al, because the regime in Indonesia shows features that were also inextricably linked with its ill-fated German, Italian and Japanese counterparts. One of these is, for example, its essentially military character that is ill-concealed in a shroud of seemingly democratic trappings as expressed in the existence of a parliament. A second

feature is the all-pervading physical terror let loose by leaders of the regime against their opponents, be they communists, Sukarnoists, dissatisfied officers in the armed forces, 'liberal' intellectuals or demonstrating students. This terror finds its concrete expression in a system of prisons, and concentration camps all over the country, including a kind of 'Devil's Island' (Buru) in the Moluccas, eastern part of the country, which is filled with tens of thousands of political prisoners in the wake of the abortive coup of 1 October 1965. Another feature of Orde Baru (Orba) or New Order in Indonesia conjuring up associations with fascist regimes of the past, is the existence of an all-embracing government-sponsored mass organization such as Golkar (Functional Groups), and of the 'trade union' SOKSI, in which managers and workers are regimented together, thus reminding us of Hitler's 'Deutsche Arbeitsfront', Mussolini's 'Corporations' and Franco's 'Syndicats'. The identification of the New Order in Indonesia with Fascism has also been made by a well-meaning critic of the regime, Mohammad Hatta, who was once Vice-President of Indonesia. In one of the big circulation dailies in Jakarta Hatta demanded: 'Have we got to head for Fascism first, in this period of transition?'.¹⁾

If the Indonesian New Order purports to be qualitatively different with regard to the preceding regime of Guided Democracy, then this is correct as may be inferred from the features stated above. On the other hand echoes of the past are still being heard in the new regime. This may be explained by the fact that the top leaders of Orba also played a vital role during the period of Guided Democracy. Thus President Suharto himself received his general's stars at the beginning of the 1960s and he reached a high

point in his career when Sukarno in 1962 appointed him as commander of the Mandala amphibian operation against the Dutch stronghold in West Irian. General Nasution, prominent leader of the New Order in the beginning period when he was Chairman of the Provisional People's Congress (MPRS) between 1966 and 1972, could even be considered the auctor intellectualis of Guided Democracy. For it was Nasution who convinced President Sukarno in 1959 of the necessity of repromulgating the Constitution of 1945 which later formed the basis of Guided Democracy and who assured him of the support of the army in this.²⁾ Also anticommunist leaders such as Foreign Minister Adam Malik and the Chairman of the People's Congress (MPR), Idham Chalid, were Cabinet Ministers under President Sukarno. Other echoes of the past are the Pancasila (Five Principles) philosophy comprising (1) Nationalism, (2) Humanitarianism, (3) Democracy, (4) Social Justice and (5) Belief in God, and the Constitution of 1945 which are still preserved under the New Order.

What is the structure of Orba and what are its aims? To answer this question we should look first at the official views expressed by the leaders of the regime. Within this context General Nasution as Chairman of the MPRS emerged as the ideologue of the New Order, at least in the initial period. In one of his speeches to instructors of the Military Academy at Magelang, Central Java, for example, he asserted that 'the goal (of the New Order) is to create a social, political, economic and cultural life that is inspired by the morals of the Pancasila, especially by the principle of the Almighty God... The New Order aspires to a structure that is more stable and institutionalised, and less influenced by individuals thus preventing a cult of the individual. But the New Order does

not reject strong leadership and a strong government. Far from it, it requires such characteristics in the period of construction'.³⁾ To obtain this strong leadership the New Order should therefore also be based on the 1945 Constitution with its presidential cabinet system. But now this constitution would be implemented in a 'pure' way and 'in agreement with the ideals of the 1945 Revolution', i.e. the armed struggle against Dutch colonialism (1945-49). For Nasution this revolution is only a nationalist one in which there is no place for a social revolution. Neither is there place for a united front with the PKI which is now considered to be the main enemy of the New Order. In other words, an idea such as Nasakom or united front between nationalists, religious elements and communists, is anathema. Nasution who during the heyday of Sukarno apparently remained silent 'in thousand languages' when the latter untiringly propagated the idea that anti-Nasakom meant anti-Pancasila, now with Sukarno out of power contends that Nasakom is an ideological deviation of the Pancasila.⁴⁾

After the gradual eclipse of Nasution from the political scene since the MPRS has been replaced by the MPR due to the elections of 1971, new ideologues have appeared. Foremost among them is President Suharto himself who in his speeches is now more and more talking about a 'Demokrasi Pancasila'. This seems to be considered equivalent to the New Order by the rulers of Indonesia.

II. In the following the salient features of the New Order will be scrutinised in a more detailed and systematic way. The best way to do this is to take the USDEK-pillars of the preceding regime as starting point and study how each of them has been eliminated changed or readjusted

since 1966. USDEK was the main core of the Manifesto Politik (Manipol), the ideology of Guided Democracy. It was the acronym of the five key concepts in Manipol, namely (1) Undang-undang Dasar 1945 (Constitution of 1945), (2) Sosialisme Indonesia, (3) Demokrasi Terpimpin (Guided Democracy), (4) Ekonomi Terpimpin (Guided Economy), and (5) Kepribadian Nasional (National Personality).⁵⁾

1. First of all, the U of USDEK, or the Constitution of 1945. Repromulgated by President Sukarno on 5 July 1959 to make an end to the deadlock in the Constituent Assembly, it has also become the mainstay of the New Order. What the army leadership rejects in Guided Democracy is not its Constitution but what it considers to be a Leftist interpretation of it. As stated earlier, it was General Nasution who had persuaded Sukarno to re-enact the 1945 Constitution which is based on the presidential cabinet system and thus guarantees the existence of a strong government. After coming to power, the Indonesian military rulers do not intend to embrace back the system of parliamentary democracy which prevailed in the period 1949-59, as this would endanger their paramount position in the country. In the implementation of the 1945 Constitution under the New Order, however, the 'excesses' committed by the preceding regime have purportedly been corrected.

As an example, the trias politica principle, inherent in the 1945 Constitution, was to be restored. For this purpose Law No 19/1964 which empowered the President to intervene in juridical matters 'for the sake of the Revolution, the honour of the State and Nation or the interests of Society' was revoked and replaced by Law No 14/1970 on the Basic Stipulations concerning the Power of the Judiciary. Article 3 of the new law states among

others that 'any intervention in judicial matters by forces outside of the Judiciary is prohibited, except in cases mentioned in the Constitution'. In addition, the position of Chairman of the Supreme Court who was simultaneously a Cabinet Minister under President Sukarno, was disconnected from its ties with the Executive. Likewise the concurrent ministerial status of the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the MPRS and DPR (Parliament) was abolished.

In implementing the 1945 Constitution in a 'pure' way, President Suharto, however, resorted to the same tactics as his predecessor. To strengthen his position he purged and changed the membership of the MPRS and DPR in such a way that the composition of both assemblies became very favourable for the implementation of his policies. In practice this meant the removal of members and sympathizers of the PKI and their replacement by Suharto's own supporters who, not in the least, originated from the armed forces. On 30 March 1966, nineteen days after Suharto's 'silent coup' which forced Sukarno to sign away his powers, the DPR-membership was reduced from 304 to 242. Among the expelled were 30 representatives of the PKI. To fill up the vacuum caused by this purge, Suharto increased the membership of Parliament with 108 appointees in 1967 on the basis of Decree No 7/1967. To this, 64 new nominees were added in 1968 (Decrees No 57 and 58/1968) making the total membership 414.⁶⁾ Similar 'redressings' took place with regard to the MPRS-membership. It was due to these tactics that Suharto was elected as President by the MPRS in 1968 without encountering serious opposition. In 1973 the MPR, the successor of the MPRS, appointed Suharto as President for a second tenure of five years. Sultan

Hamengku Buwono IX of Jogjakarta was elected as Vice-President of the Republic.

Inseparable from the 1945 Constitution are the five principles of the Pancasila, the state philosophy, as they are incorporated in the Preamble of this state document. These principles, enunciated by Sukarno for the first time in June 1945, have ironically also become the beacon light of the New Order which is thriving on anti-Sukarnoism. Now, however, the emphasis is placed on the principle of Belief in God as suggested by General Nasution earlier in this article. This seems to be a reaction to the neglect of this principle in the past due to the alleged machinations of the PKI. In line with this, the principle of Social Justice, associated with the PKI, is being neglected. With regard to the principle of Humanitarianism, there is a strong case to be made for arguing that the regime is guilty of transgressing the Declaration of Human Rights as published by the United Nations. There are still nearly 100,000 political prisoners in the prisons and concentration camps who have not much hope of a fair trial in which to prove their innocence. Many of them have become physical and mental wrecks with each passing day while their families outside live in utter destitution. By allowing such a situation to continue for ten years now, it is clear for the objective mind that the New Order is acting against the elementary human rights of mankind in general.⁷⁾

2. Socialism (the S of USDEK) as the end goal of the development of Indonesian society is receding more and more into oblivion under the New Order. The reasons for this are not hard to find. For the leaders of the regime the idea of Socialism is too much identified with the

notions of 'nationalist-democratic revolution' and 'socialist revolution' championed by the PKI. Although in 1966 and 1967 the term 'Indonesian Socialism' was still found in speeches and writings of the Orba-leaders as a form of belated echo of the Old Order, it is now gradually being discarded and people revert to the vague 'just and prosperous society' when referring to the future of the country. Symptomatic was the editorial of the Protestant daily, Sinar Harapan (Ray of Hope), in Jakarta on 23 July 1968. In it was written: 'People seldom talk about Socialism of late. This is understandable since the word was formerly misused, it was cleverly used to cover up Communism... The lack of attention for the word 'Socialism' in the aspirations of the Indonesian people -- it has even become a kind of phobia toward this word -- in reality is a deviation from one of the principles of our Pancasila'.

3. Strange as it may sound, the 'Guided Democracy' system (the D of USDEK) is still in existence under the New Order in the form of 'guided' political parties. What is more, compared to the preceding regime General Suharto and his army colleagues tend to intervene more drastically in the internal affairs of parties, as will be shown presently. After less than a decade of manipulation, intimidation and terrorization, the Indonesian political parties have been emasculated to such an extent that they have become a mere shadow of themselves.

In the heyday of Indonesian parliamentary democracy during the first decade of independence (1949-59), there were no less than 21 parties represented in the DPR after the elections in 1955. Among these the Big Four comprised the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), the reformist Muslim party, Masjumi, the orthodox Islamic Nahdatul Ulama (NU)

and, last but not least, the PKI. Under Guided Democracy the party system was simplified. Small parties were eliminated and bigger ones such as Masjumi and Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) were dissolved by Sukarno on account of their involvement in a rebellion in West Sumatra. As a result only 10 parties remained which had to swear allegiance to the Manipol, the ideology of the regime. Included in this number were the PNI, NU, PKI, Partindo (Partai Indonesia), a Left-wing party; Partai Murba (Trotskyist), IPKI (army veterans) and four religious parties. These consisted of two small Muslim parties, PSII and Perti, in addition to Partai Katolik and the Protestant Parkindo (Partai Keristen Indonesia). In August 1965 Partai Murba was banned by Sukarno as its leaders were accused of conspiracy against the regime. When General Suharto began his rise to power in 1966 there were then nine political parties in existence. This number was changed again by the subsequent dissolution of the PKI by Suharto who charged it with involvement in the abortive coup of 1 October 1965 leading to the assassination of six top generals of the Army Staff. The Left-wing Partindo also disappeared from the political scene as it had virtually abolished itself as the result of the terror launched against its leaders. As a kind of vindictive act toward the old regime, Suharto then restored Partai Murba as a legal party.

The leaders of the remaining political parties apparently saw the end of Guided Democracy as a chance to turn the clock back and restore parliamentary democracy. Thus when the Provisional People's Congress (MPRS) held its session in July 1966, they succeeded in pushing through the MPRS Edict No XI on the holding of general elections not later than 5 July 1968. As stated earlier, General

Suharto managed to place his appointees in the MPRS only in 1967 and 1968, so that during the July 1966 session he could not do otherwise than accept Edict No XI as a fait accompli. He was however not contemplating of giving back political power to the civilians. To gain time he procrastinated in the implementation of the MPRS Edict so that the elections were to be postponed until July 1971. He then succeeded in putting enough pressure on the members of the DPR, now almost half of them his nominees, in adopting two election laws in 1969 which ensured the continuation of army rule. According to these laws only 360 out of the 460 members of the new DPR would be contested in the elections. The remaining 100 would be appointed by the President. In addition large sections of the population were to be precluded from casting their votes at the polls and from becoming candidates. In this group belonged people who were considered of being involved in the abortive coup of 1 October 1965 and who were members of banned political parties such as the PKI, Masjumi and PSI.⁸⁾

Not satisfied with these precautions, the leaders of the New Order set out on a policy of weakening the political parties from within. Prior to the elections Suharto allowed the establishment of a new, reformist Muslim party in 1969 to neutralise somewhat the redoubtable NU. The new party was called Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi). Very soon it became an instrument of the Government as the post of General Chairman of Parmusi was entrusted to Mintaredja, Minister for Social Affairs in Suharto's Cabinet. Likewise in 1970 the PNI came under the control of the ruling clique of the New Order when during its party congress in Semarang (Central Java) the army candidate, Hadisubeno, was elected as General Chairman after much pressure and arm twisting from the side of the regime.

Moreover Suharto and his associates blew new life into the amorphous functional groups (workers, peasants, artisans, journalists etc.) and groomed it as their own mass organization to contest the elections in 1971. It became known as Golkar, the abbreviation of Golongan Karya or Functional Group. Due to massive material and logistic aid to Golkar combined with pressure and intimidation tactics vis-à-vis the political partisi, Golkar succeeded in winning 236 out of the contested 360 seats for the DPR. From the 100 appointed seats, Golkar received another 25 with the other 75 going to representatives of the Armed Forces. In other words, the Government forces in the new DPR control 336 votes from the total of 460. With this dictatorship of the majority they can pass any Bills they like. The relative strength of the parties is as follows: NU (58 seats), Parmusi (24), PNI (20), PSII (10), Parkindo (7), Partai Katolik (3) and Perti (2). IPKI and Partai Murba did not succeed in winning seats in the DPR.⁹⁾

Likewise in the MPR or People's Congress, Golkar (392 representatives) and the Armed Forces (230) together have more than the absolute majority. As a kind of consolation prize, President Suharto appointed one seat each in the MPR to IPKI and Partai Murba.

In the wake of the total defeat of the parties in the elections of 1971, President Suharto continued his policy of curbing the political influence of the civilians. After again putting the necessary pressure and perintah halus (subtle order) he succeeded in forcing the merger of the existing parties into two only. On 8 January 1973 all Muslim parties were merged into the Democratic Union Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) with Mintaredja, Minister of State, as General Chairman of the Party Central Execut-

ive. On 10 January the other parties (PNI, Partai Katolik, Parkindo, IPKI and Partai Murba) followed this example and were fused into the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia). The General Chairman of the new party was Mohammad Isnaeni of the PNI.

A Bill introduced by the Government in the DPR at the beginning of 1975 has the purpose of barring activities of the political parties in the villages below the kabupaten (provincial district) level. The population there is to be considered a 'floating mass'. Up to general elections only local government officials are to be entrusted with the guidance of this population. Needless to say that these officials belong to Golkar which will accordingly have the monopoly of political indoctrination in the rural areas.¹⁰⁾

From the data mentioned above we see then that the 'guidance' of political parties has gone a longer way in the New Order compared to the preceding regime. It might therefore perhaps be not unfitting to rename the New Order 'Guided Democracy II' and its predecessor 'Guided Democracy I'

4. Differing from the Constitution of 1945 and Guided Democracy which have been preserved under the New Order although reinterpreted according to the interests of the ruling clique and also differing from the idea of Socialism which has been allowed to fade away into disuse, Guided Economy (the E of USDEK) has been kept to the necessary minimum. Traces are still to be found as, for example, expressed in the existence of the First Five Year Plan (Repelita I) and the Second Five Year Plan (Repelita II). However under the New Order the national economy is subjected to forces of laissez-faire embodied by foreign investors, many of them multinational corporations, who

are more motivated by quick profits than by considerations of the welfare of the Indonesian people.¹¹⁾

The implementation of the economic policies of the regime of the New Order is totally dependent on foreign aid and capital. This differs dramatically from Sukarno's defiant spurning of Western help. In the New Order 58.7 per cent of the financial resources of Repelita I (1968-73) was furnished by foreign aid in the form of projects and general imports.¹²⁾ To implement Repelita II (1973-78) foreign aid is still to be considered essential, apart from capital investment by private foreign entrepreneurs.

The importance of foreign assistance is repeatedly stressed by the Orba-leaders, for example, in the State Address of President Suharto on 16 August 1972 in which he outlined a policy toward foreign capital based on the principle of 'more of the same'. According to Suharto, foreign loans are welcome if the following conditions are fulfilled: they must be without strings attached, in agreement with the needs of national development, and repayable in 25 years with a grace period of seven years and a maximum interest of 3 1/2 per cent annually. In the period 1967-75 the Government approved 778 investment projects by private foreign capital, amounting to US\$ 3,879.8 million. The bigger investors came from Japan (US\$ 1,003.4 million), the United States (US\$ 974 m.), whereas among West-European countries the investors from the Federal Republic of Germany came first with US\$ 166.4 million.¹³⁾ As a reflection of this situation the foreign policy of the New Order is pro-Western and anticommunist. This is in contradistinction to the 'anti-imperialist' stance of Guided Democracy.

For the economic rehabilitation of the country, the

leaders of the regime embark on a policy with regard to foreign aid and credits which is, first, based on the rescheduling of the old foreign debts; second, on the acquisition of new aid and credits; and third, on lenient conditions of repayment of the new debts. To coordinate the demands and requirements of the creditor-countries, the Intergovernmental Group of Indonesia (IGGI) was set up in September 1966. It comprises countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, Japan, France and the Netherlands. Since 1967 the IGGI has come together with representatives from Jakarta to fix the yearly amount of aid needed by Indonesia. For 1967 the IGGI provided US\$ 212 million. Since then the amount of aid had been increased annually. In 1973 it was already 760 million and in 1974 it reached the record amount of 913 million.¹⁴⁾

Criticism of the economic policies of the New Order is mounting. Accusations that the Suharto Government is selling out national resources as in the ijon system in which the seller receives in advance the money for crops that must still be harvested, are regularly voiced. Merdeka, an important daily in Jakarta, reqlently carries editorials urging a limitation to the dependence on foreign aid and private investment by restricting the flow of foreign capital into the country. In this connection it is pointed out, for example, that many domestic textile enterprises have been closed down because of competition from foreign (mainly Japanese) textile manufacturers who have more capital resources and technical skills.¹⁵⁾ A significant symptom of this feeling of dissatisfaction among the political public was the anti-Japanese demonstration in the capital on the occasion of the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister, Tanaka, on 15 January 1974. As a result a

number of demonstrators were killed and wounded by the police and army. To maintain his position Suharto himself was forced to sack his 'Inner Cabinet' consisting of four army generals called Aspri or Private Assistants.

To implement his economic policies, Suharto succeeds in enticing a number of civilian technocrats, many of whom have graduated from universities in the United States, for example, the University of California at Berkeley. Among them are Widjojo Nitisaastro, appointed as Minister for Development Planning in 1971 while retaining his post as Chairman of the National Development Board (Bappenas). He obtained a Ph.D. degree at Berkeley. His deputies in the Bappenas are Saleh Affif (M.A., University of California and Ph.D., Oregon State University), A.Mooy (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin) and Madjid Ibrahim (University of Columbia). ¹⁶⁾ Minister of Finance is Ali Wardhana (Ph.D., University of California). These technocrats do not, however, possess real power as this only emanates from the ruling clique of military leaders.

5. The search for a National Personality (the K of USDEK) has to all intents and purposes been given up in the New Order. As interpreted by Sukarno in the preceding regime, this search boiled down to the rejection of foreign cultural traits which were allegedly endangering the purity of the indigenous culture. Thus American, British and other Western motion pictures were banned as was the case with magazines such as the US Life, Time, Newsweek or the Dutch De Lach and Panorama. Also dances such as Rock-and-Roll and the Hully-Gully were considered 'decadent' and weakening 'the revolutionary stamina' of the Indonesian youth. They were considered anathema to the regime and prohibited. The music of the Beatles and Rolling Stones experienced the

same fate and Sukarno himself branded it as musik ngak-ngik-ngok, which could perhaps be freely translated as 'worthless music'.

In the New Order the Indonesian way of life, especially in the big cities, is again freely penetrated by Western cultural traits unhampered by Government banning. This is a reflection of the massive influx of Western foreign aid and capital into the country since 1966. After the cultural isolation experienced under Guided Democracy, this renewed contact with the expressions of Western society that in the meantime has become 'permissive' is not always beneficial to the Indonesian way of life. This is soon evident to such newly arrived visitors who knew Indonesia in the past. Nightclubs, gambling casinos and massage parlours have become familiar landmarks in the big cities. Hard-core pornography imported from Scandinavia is sold by young boys to passers-by in the shopping districts or amusement centres of Jakarta, Bandung or Surabaya. Copying their peers in the West, Indonesian youth have become addicted to drugs. They learn especially from American and European hippies who pass through the Indonesian bigger cities on their way to the island of Bali, considered a paradise on earth by these young foreigners. Perhaps this trend of ke-barat-baratan (exaggerated imitation of the West) may be symbolised by the racecourse in Jakarta that has been built with Australian capital. The jockeys and the horses are brought from Australia, and the clothes worn by the public have to conform with international (Western) standards. Only the sweltering heat of the capital which makes a mockery of these clothes designed for use in a temperate climate, is purely Indonesian.¹⁷⁾

III. The New Order in Indonesia may be placed in the category of military regimes which are characterised by 'direct: quasi-civilianised' rule. Among the salient features of such a regime is the lack of legitimacy and the attempts of the military to provide a semblance of legality by illegal means. As expressed by Professor Finer: 'The military leaders go through some fake or forced form of legitimization: by popular plebiscite, by the recognition of some captive assembly and so forth'.¹⁸⁾ The correctness of this analysis has been borne out by the Indonesian case. The fraudulent elections of 1971 may be considered as the fake or forced form of legitimization leading to the establishment of captive assemblies such as the DPR and MPR which have become instruments of the regime in furthering the interests of its leaders.

After ten years of rule, the New Order ruling clique seems to be still lacking in political legitimacy. As pointed out by Professor Blondel, 'legitimacy results from the convergence of the norms of the population as a whole with the norms of the Government'.¹⁹⁾ In Indonesia the mass demonstration in the streets of Jakarta on 15 January 1974 has shattered the myth of an existing convergence of norms. The demonstrators were right-wing elements, among whom most prominent were students and intellectuals, who protested against the oppressive policies of the Government.

The official target of the demonstrations, i.e. the rapacity of Japanese capital in Indonesia, was only the pretext. Studying the problem of the political legitimacy of the New Order, Dr. Kahane of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem comes to the following conclusion: 'If predictions can be made regarding the future of the present

Indonesian regime, it is expected that the Indonesian army will not be able to establish strong positive legitimacy and a chain reaction of coups d'etat could be the result. The July 1971 election and the pressures exerted by the Golkar party on the voters at this time may be indications of only the beginning of such a process'.²⁰⁾ The '15 January Affair' is a further indication. As an attempted coup (which is problematic) it has failed and its leaders, such as Siregar and Sjahrir, have been brought to trial and sentenced to long-term imprisonment. A change of regime will not happen from the Left as has been the case with the overthrow of the military regimes in Cambodia and South Vietnam in the spring of 1975. The communist movement in Indonesia is in disarray although a group of guerrillas is still fighting against Government troops in West Kalimantan. What can be expected in Indonesia is something similar to what has happened with the Thanom military clique in Thailand in 1973, i.e. the overthrow by student demonstrations which means in effect a more successful repeat of the '15 January Affair', or a coup by a Left-wing faction within the military such as happened in Portugal in 1974.

Footnotes

- 1) As quoted by Shaplen, R, Letter from Indonesia. In: The New Yorker, New York, April 1974, p. 82.
- 2) This was acknowledged by Nasution himself. In his book ABRI. Penegak Demokrasi UUD 45, Jakarta, Seruling Massa 1966, he stated that he 'menjarankan' (propositioned) to Sukarno to restore the 1945 Constitution (pp. 38-39)

- 3) Nasution, A.H., *Ketetapan-ketetapan MPRS. Tonggak Konstitusional Orde Baru*, Jakarta, Pantjuran Tudjuh, 1966, p. 30 .
- 4) Nasution, *ibid*, p. 35 .
- 5) For the ideology of Guided Democracy, see Oey Hong Lee, *Indonesian Government and Press during Guided Democracy*, Zug (Switzerland), Inter Documentation Company, 1971, pp. 83-90 .
- 6) Budiardjo, M., *Dasar-dasar Ilmu Politik*, Jakarta, Dian Rakjat, 1972, p. 171.
- 7) Concerning the political prisoners, see among others: Amnesty International, *Political Detention in Indonesia* London 1973. Also Veldkamp, A/van Dijk, P., *De Vergeten Gevangenen van Indonesie*. In: *De Volkskrant*, Amsterdam, 12 January 1974; and Budiardjo, C., *Political Imprisonment in Indonesia*. In: *Repression and Exploitation in Indonesia*, published by the British Indonesia Committee, Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1974.
- 8) For the in-fighting with regard to the election laws, see Crouch, H., *The Army, Parties and Elections in Indonesia*, Cornell University, No 11, April 1971 .
- 9) More about the elections, see Oey Hong Lee (Ed.), *Indonesia After the 1971 Elections*, London, Oxford University Press, 1974 .
- 10) Elucidating the Bill in the DPR, the Minister of Justice stated among others: 'Political organizations do not need to go into the villages so as to protect these villages from nefarious ideological dangers'. In: *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*, Jakarta, 16-28 February 1975, pp. 4-5 .
- 11) Among the multinational corporations now active in Indonesia are ITT, IBM, Singer, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Unilever, Siemens, AEG and Philips.
- 12) Iskandar, S., *Indonesia. Polarised Progress*. In: *Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)*, Hong Kong, 1 April 1972, p. 141 .
- 13) *Indonesian Embassy, Indonesian News*, London, March 1975, pp. 5-6 .

- 14) Indonesië. Feiten en Meningen, published by Komite Indonesië, Amsterdam, April 1975, p.4 . For the role of the IGGI, see also Payer, C., The Debt Trap, The IMF and the Third World, London, Penguin Books, 1974; and Mortimer, R. (Ed.), Showcase State: The Illusion of Indonesia's 'Accelerated Modernization', Sydney/London, Angus and Robertson, 1973.
- 15) In: FEER, see Note No 12 above.
- 16) For a background of these technocrats, see Ransom, D., The Berkeley Mafia and the Indonesian Massacre. In: Ramparts, Berkeley (California), October 1970 .
- 17) The example of the racetrack is provided by Castles, L., Economic Recovery under the New Order: Miracle or Illusion?. In: Oey Hong Lee (Ed.), op.cit. (Note no.9), pp. 97-111 .
- 18) Finer, S.E., Comparative Government, London, Penguin Books, 1974, p.552. This author differentiates three categories of military rule: (a) Direct, (b) Direct: Quasi-Civilianised, and (c) Indirect.
- 19) Blondel, J., Comparing Political Systems, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973, pp. 57-58 .
- 20) Kahane, R., The Problem of Political Legitimacy in an Antagonistic Society: The Indonesian Case, London, Sage Publications, 1973, p. 36 .