

Indo-Soviet Relations Chances of Peace in South Asia

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1. Indo-Soviet Relations in Historical Perspective

Broadly speaking the relations between the Russia and India may be divided into three periods¹. The first of these periods covers the relations of the Czarist Russia with the Mogul India. The second period which began about the middle of the nineteenth century, deals with the relations with the British India, until 1947, and the third period, which may be further divided into sub-sections, deals with the Soviet policies in South Asia up to this day.

The relations during the first period were mainly of commercial and cultural nature. It was Babur, the first Mogul Emperor of India, who took initiative in 1532, to establish formal political and economic relations with the government of Moscovy and for which purpose he sent two envoys to Petersburg. The Russians, were then not interested in such relations with a country which lay so far away. Their interest in India, as a matter of fact began in the seventeenth century, as a result of which, Czar Alexis Michaelovich Romanov, sent four missions via Central Asia to India. These missions however did not succeed in establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. They though led to extensive exploration of the Central Asian territory. In 1664, Peter the Great also tried to set up formal political relations with India but Aurengzeb the Mogul Emperor declined to enter into such relations. Then in 1791 Czar Paul, the so called "mad Czar" proposed to Napoleon, a franco-russian invasion of India and when the latter refused to collaborate, Czar Paul decided to do "it yourself". He ordered the Cossak cavalry and two companies of horse artillery to undertake an invasion of India. This adventure however had to be half-way abandoned, because the Czar in meantime had been assassinated. The Cossaks marched back to Volga.

It was only after the Russian conquest of the native states of Central Asia² that the Russian dream of invading India seemed more realistic. During the Russo-Turkish war in 1878, when a conflict between Great Britain and Russia was imminent, Czar Alexander II is said to have given orders to his soldiers to be prepared to march to India. The Treaty of Berlin in June 1878 again prevented the Russians to undertake the invasion. With the consolidation of power in Central Asia between 1868 and 1895 and the connecting of European Russia with this region by railway track, the Russians constituted a real threat for Britain for the safety of their

¹ For conclusions regarding early relations see Druhe, N., *Soviet-Russia and Indian Communism*, New York, Bookman Association, 1959, pp. 9-13.

² Bukhara in 1868, Khiva in 1873 and Konad in 1875. *Ibid.*

Eastern Empire. It was only after the Russian defeat in a war with Japan in 1904–5 that the military weakness of Russia was revealed. Subsequently through an agreement in 1907, both countries recognised each others rights in India's northern and western borderlands (Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia). The cordial relations based on the principle of spheres of influence remained favourable to both countries³ until the Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917.

2. Relations after the Revolution

The Soviet concern for India immediately after the revolution was not merely ideological, it was also a practical concern, because of Britain's participation in the civil war in their country. In order to weaken British influence in general, Lenin gave much importance to the "Eastern problem". He said the Russian interest in East was not a matter of prestige for her, the Near East "concerns the most real and vital interests of Russia"⁴. The motivation therefore was both ideological and practical. On the whole Lenin conceived better opportunities in the underdeveloped countries or the colonies for the revolutionary expansion. He said that the path to revolution in the advanced capitalist countries lay in the East⁵.

Despite the fact that Stalin did not in substance alter the theoretical base which Lenin had founded for guiding the Soviet policy towards the colonies, the relations between India and the Soviet Union, during his leadership were not remarkable⁶. He as a matter of fact did not show enough interest in India. During thirty-six years of his leadership of the Soviet State, he made references to India only six times⁷. His interest in India was general in content and did not go further than declaring a necessity of creating a strong communist party in that country⁸.

A few month before India gained independence from Britain, the interim government of India and the Soviet government agreed to exchange diplomatic missions at ambassadorial level. It was Mr. Nehru's wish that India should build up equally good relations with the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union. It is interesting to note that the Russian attitude towards India continued to be that of indifference and even outright hostility. They considered India still to be a colony of Britain and therefore the claim of nonalignment by Nehru was not taken seriously⁹. After the Telengana revolt in 1950, the Indo-Soviet relations, were at their lowest level. The Indian government took strong measures to suppress the communist party and banned the sale and distribution of the Soviet propaganda material. The membership of CPI dropped from an estimated 89,200 in 1948 to 20,000 in 1950¹⁰.

³ Russia occupied a major place in British India's foreign trade. See Naik, J. A., *Soviet Policy Towards India from Stalin to Brezhnev*, Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1970, p. 164.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 6.

⁵ Cf. Gehlen, M. P., *The Politics of Co-existence*. Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1967, p. 36.

⁶ It may be due to Stalin's obsession with his "two camp" theory.

⁷ Naik, p. 11.

⁸ Stalin's statement, cf. Naik, p. 12.

⁹ Until Stalin died in 1953, Gandhi along with other Indian leaders, was called a bourgeois nationalist and India a British colony.

¹⁰ Müller, H. R., *Der Kommunismus in Indien*, Niedersächsische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1966, p. 11. Also see Druhe, p. 290.

3. The Shift in Soviet Policy

The Soviet attitude still indifferent and hostile underwent a positive change during and at the end of the Korean war in 1952. The role of India in bringing about a negotiated end of the conflict and by abstaining from voting on all resolutions in the U.N. condemning the Chinese intervention in Korea, improved India's image in the eyes of the Soviet leaders. For them India seemed to have supplied enough proof in support of her nonalignment policy. The other major areas where India and the Soviet Union began to cooperate and consult each other in the U.N. were questions relating to racialism and colonialism in Africa and Asia.

The shift in the Soviet policy in general took place with the change in the Soviet leadership. Stalin was gone and now his power was shared first by Malenkov¹¹ and then Bulganin as the Prime Minister and Khrushchev as the First Secretary of the party. There appeared a strong desire on part of the new leadership to reduce tension in their relations with the non-communist nations¹² and reproject the policy towards the neutral countries in order to meet the challenge of the United States' various regional security arrangements in Asia¹³. As far as India is concerned there was a radical change in the Russian outlook¹⁴. Specially after the U.S. military aid to Pakistan under a mutual defense assistance agreement in 1954

¹¹ He stayed in power only for three weeks.

¹² The new policy concerning relations with the West in general and with the U.S. in particular, culminating into the limited test-ban treaty in 1963, was characterised by vigorous pursuit of both confrontation and cooperation with the center of gravity shifting toward collaboration. See Vernon, V. A., *Foreign Policy Perspectives in the Sixties*, In: Dallin, A., ed., *Soviet politics since Khrushchev*, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968, 129-162 p. 129 and 137.

¹³ In 1954 the Soviet Union started a foreign aid programme, when it offered a loan of \$ 3.5 m to Afghanistan and a second one of \$ 2.7 m. in the same year. This was followed by a loan of \$ 136 m. to India for the construction of the Bhilai steel mill. See, Goldman, M. I., *Soviet Foreign Aid Since the death of Stalin: Progress and Problems*, In: Duncan, W. R., ed., *Soviet Policy in Developing Countries*, Waltham/Mass./London: Ginn-Blaisdell A Xerox Company, 1970, 29-41. p. 29-30.

Between 1954 to 1968 the Soviet Union extended or pledged about \$ 6 billion in economic assistance to developing countries, one-third of which was committed by Kosygin-Brezhnev regime. Though the commitments were made to 33 countries, two-third of the aid was concentrated in only half a dozen countries (India, the U.A.R., Afghanistan, Iran and Algeria). In the period (1954-1966) the following countries received (in million dollars):

Iran	330	U.A.R.	1,011	Afghanistan	565
India	1,593	Algeria	232	Pakistan	178

cf. Kovner, M., *Soviet Aid to Developing Countries*, In: Strong, W. J., ed., *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin*, New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971, p. 62-63.

The Soviet Union also began to supply arms to the developing countries. Indonesia, India and Afghanistan were the countries in South and Southeast Asia which received most of the Soviet military aid. In the period 1956 through 1967 they received: (in million of dollars)

India	600 to 700	Indonesia	200	Afghanistan	260
Pakistan	5 to 10				

cf. Joshua, W., and Gibert, P. S., *Arms for the Third World Soviet Military Aid Diplomacy*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1969, p. 72-3.

Also see my notes 61 and 62.

¹⁴ About 14 Indian delegations representing different sections of Indian life visited the Soviet Union within an year and half after Stalin's death. Naik, p. 70.

and latter's joining the Baghdad pact, India became the focal point of Soviet policy in South Asia¹⁵. This new importance assigned to India was well displayed in the welcome accorded to Mr. Nehru¹⁶ when he visited Moscow in 1955¹⁷. In the communiqué issued after the visit, the Soviet Union recognised the "Five Principles of Co-existence" in the conduct of mutual relations between the nations. Both Prime Ministers agreed that States with different social systems could exist side by side in peace and accord and work for common good¹⁸.

In the same year Khrushchev and Bulganin paid their much publicised visit to Afghanistan and India and it was after this visit that the Soviet Union favoured India's position on the Kashmir dispute¹⁹ and supported her on the question of Goa²⁰. This swift improvement in the relations was undoubtedly influenced by the requirements of the cold war situation in which India's position as a potential leader of the newly independent nations and her role as a non-aligned power in international affairs was of considerable importance in Soviet Union's forward strategy²¹. The new foreign policy was no longer based on the two-camp theory. It sought to support neutralism and denounce such countries as Pakistan, for joining western military pacts. It was contemplated to gain influence in the developing countries in order to win their support and allegiance against West in a war of ideas and threats of armed confrontation.

4. The Sino-Soviet Split and India

According to China the differences with Soviet Union arose largely over the policies of de-stalinisation and peaceful-coexistence, which were formally announced by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956. It is however safe to say that the origin of the differences goes far back to the early

In his first speech on foreign policy to the supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953, Malenkov said: The position of such a considerable state as India is of great importance for the strengthening of peace in the East. cf. Menon, K. P. S., *The Lamp and the Lampstand*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 41.

¹⁵ Molotov said in a speech at the end of the Geneva Conference: "Who can deny that a country like India with a population of more than 300 million people has entered into a new, historic arena? Not long ago India was a colonial country. But now no one can deny that India is occupying a very important place among the countries which are consolidating their national independence and striving to secure her weighty place in world affairs." cf. Naik, p. 75.

¹⁶ For the first time since the October Revolution that the head of a non-communist government was welcome officially by the Soviet government. See: Menon, K. P. S., *Flying Troika*, Delhi/London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 106.

¹⁷ Mr. Nehru was also the head of a non-communist government to visit China.

¹⁸ Naik, p. 86.

¹⁹ ... The Soviet government supports India's policy on the Kashmir issue, because it fully accords with the interests of peace in this part of Asia... Bulganin's Report to the Supreme Soviet on his return from India, Burma and Afghanistan. cf. Naik, p. 93.

²⁰ ... As you know, there is still small Portuguese colony in ancient Indian territory — Goa. The Indians are legitimately demanding that this intolerable state of affairs should be ended and Goa liberated... The Soviet Government supports this just demand... Bulganin's Report. cf. Naik, p. 92—93.

²¹ Duncan defines this policy as any measures which the Soviet Union takes at winning over the leaders or peoples in the Third World countries and turning them against the West (or Peking).

beginnings of Chinese Communism. Even 1949 the Chinese claimed that their form of communism was best suited to the underdeveloped countries²². Thus China set herself as a rival source of authority for the developing countries²³. At the Bandung Conference 1955 where the Soviet Union was denied the participation, the Chinese on the one hand demanded equality and on the other claimed leadership of Asia²⁴. They naturally disapproved Khrushchev's policy of cultivating close relations with India, which China conceived as a rival for the leadership of Asia. The de-stalinisation and the policy of peaceful-coexistence further widened the gulf. Peaceful co-existence which envisioned collaboration with the West, particularly the U.S., and thus bringing an end to the cold war²⁵ was contrary to what the Chinese ideologically believed²⁶. They began to call the Russians as "revisionists" and accused them for "betraying Marxism-Leninism"²⁷.

In 1959 when the Sino-Indian border clashes took place, the Tass statement showed clearly that while the Soviet Union avoided any clear impression of a split with China Moscow did not outright support her claims against India²⁸. On the contrary — it re-emphasised the improving relations with India. By 1960 the split had taken visible shape. The Soviet aid to China began to diminish. In 1960 the Soviet exports to China amounted to 735 million Roubles, in 1962, it went down to 210 Million Roubles²⁹. In 1955 China had been the biggest trading partner of the Soviet Union, in 1963 it occupied the 7th place. In comparison to this in the period between 1955 and 1959 the Soviet trade with India increased by eleven times. In 1960 when Khrushchev visited India again, he pledged extra assistance for India's Third Five Year Plan. The first Indo-Soviet arms agreement which covered some \$ 13.5 million in Soviet aid was also signed in 1960, at a time when the Soviet technicians were being withdrawn from China, which seriously influenced the Chinese economic development³⁰.

²² "The way of Mao-Tse-tung was the only possible way to be followed by the peoples of Asia and elsewhere in the underdeveloped world." Liu Shao-chi's Address to Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australian countries. cf. Gittings, J., Survey of Sino-Soviet Dispute, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 3.

²³ Ibid. p. 3.

²⁴ "China had assumed her place as a great power in the international arena. Together with the Soviet Union and People's Democracies, China has become a bulwark of world peace." Liu Shao-chi's Address to 1st National People's Council, 15 Sept. 1954. cf. Ibid. p. 20.

²⁵ "When we speak, we speak not only for ourselves, but for all of Asia." Mme. Sun Yat-sen, NCNA, 26 Oct. 1954. cf. Ibid. p. 19.

²⁶ "This is a policy of co-existence, a policy of consolidating peace, easing international tension and doing away with the cold war." From the Extracts from Khrushchev's speech to the Third Rumanian Communist Party Congress in Bucharest, 21 June, 1960. cf. Documents on International Affairs, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1959, p. 213.

²⁷ "We believe in the absolute correctness of Lenin's thinking: war is an inevitable outcome of system of exploitation and the source of war is the imperialist system . . . Marxist-Leninist absolutely must not sink into the mire of bourgeois pacifism." Extracts from "Long Live Leninism" an article in the Chinese journal Red Flag, Peking, 16 April, 1960 . . . cf. Ibid. p. 213.

²⁸ People's Daily editorial, 7 Nov. 1965. cf. Gittings, p. 3.

²⁹ Tass Statement regarding Sino-Indian relations, Sept. 9, 1959. cf. Ibid. p.

³⁰ Naik. p. 152-153.

³¹ Goldman. p. 29.

5. Relations during the Sino-Indian Border Conflict in 1962

The Soviet attitude towards the Indian position in this conflict was determined mainly by two factors: a) the existing split with China³¹ and b) the Cuba crisis. India's confrontation with China on one hand and the differences with Pakistan on the other, had created a clear pattern of international alliances in South Asia. It looked as if China and Pakistan stood on the same side while India and the Soviet Union on the other and the U.S. maintaining a more symmetrical relationship with India and Pakistan³². In fact the Sino-Indian border conflict and Pakistan's overtures towards China led to the United States' and the Soviet Union's interests in South Asia as overlapping rather than competitive³³.

While in 1959 the Soviet Union took a mixed stand, almost neutral, on Sino-Indian border conflict, this position changed in October 1962. The Chinese troops had occupied a large area in the disputed territories and then had proposed that the "line of actual control" on that day should serve as cease-fire line, and that both sides then should withdraw their troops twelve and a half miles. To the great surprise of the Indian government and the Press, the Soviet Union in a press statement³⁴ urged India to accept the Chinese proposals for ending the conflict. This was however not acceptable to India³⁵ and therefore, the disapproval was immediately conveyed to the Russians, with the hope that they may use their influence on China to halt the hostilities. At this point we must not forget to mention that the Soviet Union at this time was involved in a confrontation with the United States over Cuba because of which Khrushchev found himself in a weak position and therefore was compelled to support the Chinese proposal in order to maintain a sort of "united communist front" for bargaining purposes with the Americans. He though somehow managed to supply India with some military equipment for use in the conflict.

The Soviet support for the Chinese position however did not continue for long. At no time they had supported the charges of aggression made by China against India. The dramatic change in the Soviet posture towards India, which apparently

³¹ Löwenthal maintains that the Russians were under no illusion that the former close ties with Peking could be restored in any foreseeable circumstances. See: Löwenthal, R.: *The Soviet Union in the post-revolutionary Era*. In: Dallin, A., ed., *Soviet policies since Khrushchev*, N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968, 1-22, p. 13.

³² Harrison, S. S., *Troubled India and Her Neighbours*. In: *Foreign Affairs*, 1 (1965), 312 to 330, p. 323.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ "The proposal made by the Chinese Government are constructive in our opinion. Without demaging the prestige of either side they are an acceptable basis for the beginning of talks and a peaceful settlement of the disputed question. A peaceful solution of the conflict requires more active efforts on the part of the progressive forces in India. One must take into account that in the present atmosphere of strained relations even some progressively-minded people can yield to nationalistic influence and adopt a chauvinistic position... In questions involving war and peace and in solving controversial international problems, such a position serves no useful purpose... (what is needed is) not a kindling of hostilities and sharpening of the conflict, but settling it by peaceful methods and negotiations." *Pravda*, 25 Oct, 1962. cf. Stein, A., *India and the Soviet Union*, Chicago, University of Chicago press, 1969 p. 152.

³⁵ Nehru asserted that the Chinese forces must return to the pre-September 20, 1962, position before any negotiations could take place. cf. Stein, p. 154.

occurred because of the Cuban crisis, suddenly reverted to the old position of neutrality favouring India, as soon as the Soviet Union decided to remove the missiles from Cuba. The Chinese had until then been supporting the Russians on their Cuban stance³⁶, but the removal of the missiles touched off another series of polemics between the two countries³⁷. While defending the removal³⁸ the Soviet Union openly accused China of starting a border conflict with India³⁹. In a statement issued after China had declared unilateral cease-fire, it became clear that the Soviet Union wanted to move on a course of increased political and economic support⁴⁰ for India and to denounce China for creating disunity in the international communist movement⁴¹. Löwenthal maintains that the Soviet leaders were fully conscious of having moved into a triangular constellation of hostile forces in which they would have to ensure their long term security and to compete for influence against communist China as well as the United States⁴². The increasingly closer relations with India should be viewed in this perspective. Being aware of the fact that China would remain a potentially hostile power, there was a need of actions to secure a firm and influential position in the areas which were geopolitically and strategically sensitive for the security of the Soviet Union. The same is true for China. This is one of the reasons that it was easy for Pakistan to seek and get Chinese support. There is a 371 mile-long border between Chinese Sinkiang and Pakistani controlled Kashmir which both sides agreed to demarcate in 1963. President Ayub Khan considered its first step in the evolution of their relations with China⁴³.

6. Soviet Policy during the Indo-Pak Conflict

The situation as it then existed in general and in particular in the Indian Sub-continent induced some changes in the Soviet policy concerning their relations with Pakistan and China. The relations between India and China were still far from being normal though no major border incident took place. Yet Mr. Nehru began to pay serious attention to India's defense problems. India's relations with Pakistan had also gone from bad to worse as a result the latter began to receive

³⁶ In a statement of 25 October the Chinese Government had pledged support for the Soviet Union in the Cuba crisis. See Gittings, p. 176.

³⁷ For the Chinese statements see: Dallin, A., *Diversity in international communism*, A Documentary Record, 1961-1963, New York/London, Columbia University Press, 1963 p. 656-659.

³⁸ Khrushchev's Report to the Supreme Soviet on the International situation and the Soviet policy, reprinted in *Political Affairs*, 42 (January 1963). Also see Suslov on Chinese adventurism in Sino-Indian war, Gittings, p. 176-177.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ The increased economic and arms assistance was also intended to offset the American aid which India received during the 1962 conflict with China.

⁴¹ For the impact of Sino-Soviet conflict on the internal tensions and dissensions of the communist party of India see: Gupta, B. S., *Communism in Indian politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972. Also see: Müller, H. R., *Der Kommunismus in Indien*, *Supra*.

⁴² Dallin, A., *Soviet Politics since Khrushchev*, *Supra*, p. 13.

⁴³ Khan, M. A., *Friends not Masters*, London, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 164.

arms from China⁴⁴. On the other hand the Sino-Soviet relations in the period between 1962–64 had been further injured from their border dispute and all attempts at mediation had so far been fruitless.

In this situation after the ouster of Khrushchev⁴⁵ the Soviet Union under the leadership of Brezhnev-Kossygin set forth to improve the relations with China on the one hand and with Pakistan on the other. Since the differences with China were far more complicated than with Pakistan, it was easier to begin with the latter⁴⁶ and at the same time develop closer ties with Afghanistan bordering on China⁴⁷, and Pakistan⁴⁸. In essence the Soviet policy after Khrushchev sought to follow a course of neutrality concerning their relations with India and Pakistan. The Soviet policy under Stalin was just about the same except that it grew out of indifference than any strategical considerations. For several reasons the new policy aimed at creating conditions of peace between India and Pakistan. One of the reasons was that the Soviet Union has for many years wanted to expand their

⁴⁴ May 1963 signing of Sino-Pakistani border demarcation agreement

Oct 1963 Sino-Pakistani air-traffic agreement

Oct 1963 Sino-Pakistani cultural exchange agreement

July 1964 China offered an interest-free loan of \$ 60 m to Pakistan (Dawn, Karachi, 1. 8. 1964)

Same year another loan of \$ 67 m to buy arms (Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 31. 12. 1964)

A Chinese delegation arrived in Dacca to establish a \$ 66 m. paper plant. (Sharma, B. L., *The Pakistan—China Axis*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1968 p. 115.)

After the U.S. embargoed the supply of arms to Pakistan and India in 1965, the Chinese supply of arms to Pakistan increased. The Indian officials have estimated that Peking supplied Pakistan enough armor and weapons to equip three new divisions and six somewhat obsolescent (MIG-19 and IL-28) aircraft squadrons. See: Sheldon, W. S., *Some Aspects of China's Asian policy*. In: *Pacific Affairs*, Spring 1971, p. 26.

Recently it was reported that China will bolster Pakistan's air striking force by supplying TU 16 aircraft. The *Overseas Hindustan Times*, July 19, 1973.

⁴⁵ The ouster of Khrushchev may have been prompted at least in part by the conviction that he had become too closely identified with the policy of alienating Peking in order to woo Washington. See Vernon, V. A., in: Dallin, A., ed., *Soviet Policy since Khrushchev*, *Supra*, p. 130.

⁴⁶ Pakistans relations with the Soviet Union began to deteriorate in 1960 when the Russians supported India's position on Kashmir. After 1962 when China began to woo Pakistan the Russians realized the geopolitical importance of that part of the Sub-continent for their security.

"If Pakistan is for Russia the key to India, for China it is also a central position — for the reverse of the same reasons." Jackson, R., *The Great Powers and the Indian Sub-continent*. In: *International Affairs*, 1 (1973), p. 43.

⁴⁷ Afghanistan which has 1,200 mile-long border with the USSR, was the first recipient of the Soviet aid in 1954. The Soviet Union has tended to look upon it as a buffer state and has wanted to prevent its incorporation in the western alliance structure. In early 1956 Afghanistan signed formal arms aid agreement with the SU and Czechoslovakia. By the end of 1960 the cumulative total Soviet-block military aid ran well over \$ 100 m. See: Joshua, W., and Gibert, P. S., *Supra* p. 57.

Afghanistan's Wakhan corridor varying in width from 7 to 37 miles — divided the Soviet Union and Pakistan along 188 miles.

⁴⁸ The controversial Durand Line divides Afghanistan from Pakistan. "The original agreement was arrived at in 1893, was confirmed in 1905, reaffirmed in the Anglo-Afghan Treaty in 1919 and finally endorsed when the present ruling family in Afghanistan came to power." Khan, M. A., *Friends not Masters*, *Supra*, p. 176.

transit, which already exists from Samarkand to Kabul, to Delhi and Calcutta and to Dacca, through Pakistan. The Pakistani cooperation in the first place would not be forthcoming as long as their relations with India are hostile and no deeper understanding with the Russians on these matters is reached. Pakistan thus on grounds of her geopolitical location occupies an important place in the Soviet security and offensive and counter-offensive strategy.

Another reason for cultivating friendly relations with Pakistan was to counter the Chinese influence which had been growing since 1962. With these aims the Soviet Union set about to repair their bi-lateral relations with Pakistan through increased trade⁴⁹ and economic assistance⁵⁰ and by modifying their stance⁵¹ on the Kashmir dispute. President Ayub Khan visited Moscow in 1963 and received very warm welcome from the Russian leaders. It was agreed to "double or treble" the volume of trade between the two countries⁵² and the Soviet Union offered commercial loans. For the first time Pakistan was listed with Iran and Turkey in a May Day slogan issued in 1965 and a wish was expressed for the growth of "friendly relations" between the Soviet and Pakistani peoples⁵³. The same year Pravda declared that strengthening the ties with Pakistan must be regarded as a part of the general policy aimed at ensuring peace in Asia⁵⁴. The Russian leaders assured India that improvement in relations with Pakistan would not be at the cost of relations with them⁵⁵.

Though economically the Soviet support remained constant and even increased, politically however, India ceased to enjoy the most favoured treatment. Under Khrushchev India had been often invited to participate in the Summit conferences of the Big Powers, which were convened to discuss such crucial issues as the Middle East conflict and arms control etc. Now India would be simply ignored. Naik maintains that in the new Soviet review of the world situation, the Soviet political support shifted to countries like Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Burma, Guinea, Congo and Mali⁵⁶.

This was precisely the Soviet posture toward the Sub-continent when the hostilities between India and Pakistan broke out in 1965. The Soviet Union, as a result, maintained a neutral position in the conflict and later on played the role of the mediator at Tashkent.

7. Relations during the Bangladesh Crisis

When the Bangladesh crisis broke out in late 1971 and India was again involved in an international dispute concerning her relations with Pakistan, the Soviet policies in the Subcontinent though basically remained the same, i. e., non-partisan, became increasingly pro-Indian in the course of the conflict. The Soviet policies

⁴⁹ Naik, p. 136.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ The gradual Soviet switch on Kashmir has been analysed in Sheldon, W. S., *The Kashmir dispute in Sino-Soviet Perspective*. In: *Asian Survey*, 3 (1967), pp. 176—187.

⁵² Naik, p. 136.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 138.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 140.

went so far as to support the creation of an independent Bengali State. The support for the Indian intervention in what was then called East Pakistan was however largely influenced by the fact that the U.S. and China had thrown their weight on the side of Pakistan. Had Pakistan won the war there would have been a great increase in the Chinese influence in Pakistan and would have humiliated India which was a Soviet ally. The Friendship Treaty with India was intended to serve as deterrent against any Chinese or American intervention on behalf of Pakistan. As soon as the crisis was over the Soviet Union lost no time in coming to an understanding with Pakistan. In 1968 Kosygin visited Rawalpindi, the first visit by a Soviet Premier to Pakistan, and offered economic assistance for constructing a metallurgical plant.

8. A Review of Soviet-Indian Economic Ties

India began to receive the Soviet economic assistance in 1955 and has since then been getting almost one-fourth of total Soviet aid to the developing countries. With this aid India has been able to construct two giant steel plants, of which one at Bhilai alone produces more than 30 per cent of the total steel production in India⁵⁷; a heavy machine building plant at Hardwar; a coal-mining machine plant and a thermal power and several hydro-power stations, which produce about 20 per cent of total electrical energy in the country⁵⁸. In addition to this the Soviet assistance has also been used in exploring oil and gas⁵⁹ and in constructing oil refineries at Koyali (Gujerat) and Barauni (Bihar) and, in setting up industries for manufacturing surgical instruments and anti-biotics and other pharmaceutical products. A couple of large-scale state-owned farms have also been set up with the Soviet technical assistance. Under the Soviet technical training programme about 40,000 workers have received technical training and about 27,000 more are working in the Soviet sponsored plants and mills⁶⁰. Besides this the Soviet Union has supplied India (1961—71) \$ 1.87 billion worth of military equipment⁶¹. It is estimated that so far (1954—71) India has received about \$ 2.10 billion from the Soviet Union in economic assistance⁶². In comparison to the controversial western aid, mainly from the United States, which has been estimated at 10 billion dollars in past twenty years⁶³, the communists have provided aid on terms⁶⁴ favourable

⁵⁷ Moskau und der indische Subkontinent, Osteuropa-Archiv (1973) Nr. 5 p. A 140. Also see footnote 94.

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. A 359. It should also be mentioned here that 80% of the metallurgical equipment and 60% of the parts for building turbines are produced with the Soviet cooperation. Le Monde 27. 11. 1973.

⁵⁹ Ibid. p. A 359. About twenty wells have so far been discovered. It is estimated that about 50% of petrol (and petroleum products) is produced by Soviet sponsored projects. Also see footnotes 96 and 97.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ International Herald Tribune (I. H. T.), July 9, 1973. Compare: the U.S. has in the same period delivered to Pakistan arms worth \$ 300 m. Supra (44).

⁶² Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Jan. 6, 1973. Also see the footnote 94.

⁶³ I. H. T., July 25, 1973. This amount covers all kinds of aid.

⁶⁴ "Economic relations with the Soviet Union are easier for us since we repay them through export of our commodities. This mode of payment makes the Soviet credit self-liquidating. Gandhi, I., India and the World. In: Foreign Affairs, 3 (1972) p. 73.

to Indians and for the projects which have a direct bearing on India's economic development.

When the United States suspended aid in December 1971 to India and there was no indication if and when it would resume⁶⁵, the Russians in their drive for increased influence in India stepped in to get further involved in the Indian economy. According to an agreement signed in September 1972 India and the Soviet Union agreed to establish an intergovernmental joint commission to sponsor collaboration in Indian trade and economic ventures and in scientific and technical research⁶⁶. The help is to be extended for supporting and increasing state-owned projects and for exploring oil and manufacturing computers in India⁶⁷.

The increasingly close ties with the Russians have led some Indian industrialists to think that total dependence on the Soviet Union for the development of the Indian economy will gradually ease out the free enterprise in India⁶⁸.

The current Five-Year Plan in India which has an outlay of about \$ 68 billion and in which the Russian participation is sizeable and in which the bulk of investment will be in the state sector, India "will be swamped with Soviet advisers and experts"⁶⁹ and thus "drift" of which the present government of Mrs. Gandhi has often been accused. There is genuine apprehension among the Indians about the consequences arising out of increasing dependence on the Soviet Union for India's economic development and defense⁷⁰. It is estimated that by 1980 about half of India's foreign trade would be with the Eastern block countries⁷¹ and thus the Soviet Union would be in a commanding position of influence on Indian policies by manipulating the economic strings. Already the Indian export industry is increasingly redesigning their products to suit the needs of the East European and Russian markets⁷². Though the Soviet Union's own transactions with India are not probably more than 3 to 4 per cent of her global trade.

9. The Brezhnev visit

The recent visit by the Soviet communist party chief Leonid Brezhnev to India was given wide international publicity and importance⁷³. In the western press it has been described as presenting Mr. Brezhnev's new Asian Charter containing a new

⁶⁵ The U.S. is discussing a development aid programme for India of \$ 75 m. I. H. T. July 25, 1973.

⁶⁶ New York Times, 22. 9. 1972.

⁶⁷ Ibid. Also see the footnotes 96 and 97.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ China's sad experience with the Russian assistance programme and the fact that Moscow used its aid to try and dominate the Chinese policy — may not apply to Indo-Soviet relations but these are historical facts which cannot be easily ignored. See Sulzberger in I. H. T., 10. 12. 1973.

⁷¹ Naik, pp. 142—143.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Sixty five Soviet journalists accompanied Brezhnev to India and a communications satellite had been specially launched for beaming live coverage to the television viewers back at home.

Almost all international dailies gave full coverage to his talks in Delhi and variously described the motive behind the visit. The London Times (25. 11. 1973) took the view that

Soviet strategy for Asia in which India will be given the leading role⁷⁴. Symbolically, the visit which is first by Mr. Brezhnev to any Asian country in his capacity as the party leader, signified India as the Soviet Union's most important ally outside the Soviet communist block. India which is in need of genuine economic help has gracefully accepted this elevated status though Delhi has not made any definite political commitment to the Soviet policy in Asia. Knowing well that this status derives much of its importance from the Ups and Downs of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, it has demurred to endorse Brezhnev's concept for the Collective Security in Asia⁷⁵. However, as the "Times" commented, India has become a very substantial piece on the board in the great game of Sino-Soviet rivalry⁷⁶.

The visit and the importance attached to it may be seen in the light of eagerness on the part of India for a rapprochement with China. It was reported in the month of March 1973 that India was rethinking Soviet ties in view of the U.S.-China thaw⁷⁷. It was also said that some of Mrs. Gandhi's closest advisers, considered to be pro-Soviet, had been losing influence⁷⁸. In the same month the Foreign Minister Mr. Swaran Singh said that India's relations with China will normalize⁷⁹. He also told a group of reporters that there have been no border clashes with China since 1962 except of a minor nature⁸⁰. Two months later in May it was indicated that China too sought better ties with India⁸¹. A few months ago Mr. Surender Pal Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs, said that Peking's attitude towards India had become "more affable" and cited such positive indications as the halt of the Chinese propaganda against India along the Himalayan border; friendly response to India's Republic Day celebrations in Peking and posting of a senior Chinese diplomat to head the Chinese mission in Delhi⁸². In these circumstances it is very likely that as soon as the issue of the return of the Pakistani prisoners is effectively implemented that China may soon recognise Bangladesh in order to cut the Soviet Union's influence in the Sub-continent.

Brezhnev was wooing the Indians by making them most important Russian ally in the Third World. The American newspapers and the London Observer described it as a move for opening a new Soviet policy drive in Asia (I. H. T. 26. 11. 1973 and Observer, 25. 11. 1973). Whereas the German and the French papers viewed it as Brezhnev's attempt to get India interested in his Asian Security plans. ("Breschnev lobt sein Entspannungsmodell" Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26. 11. 1973. "M. Brejnev souhaite intéresser Mme Gandhi à un système de sécurité collective asiatique" — Le Monde, 27. 11. 1973.)

⁷⁴ The Observer, 25. 11. 1973.

⁷⁵ Mrs. Gandhi considered the plan as endangering India's non-alignment and its chances of improving relations with China. Ibid. 2. 12. 1973.

⁷⁶ Times, 26. 11. 1973.

⁷⁷ I. H. T. 6. 3. 1973.

⁷⁸ Prime Minister's Principal Secretary, Mr. P. N. Hasker, a powerful person sympathetic to Moscow was lately retired, when many thought he would receive the extension and remain in office. Ibid.

It seems however that Mr. Hasker is still in service. He is the person who has been handling the negotiations with Bangladesh and Pakistan concerning the repatriation and other issues.

⁷⁹ Japan Times, 26. 3. 1973.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid. 4. 5. 1973.

⁸² I. H. T. 4.—5. 8. 1973.

In the shade of the above probability Brezhnev's Asian Policy drive in India also reflects a strong desire on the part of the Soviet Union to project itself as a peace-maker and as an Asian power with broad and friendly ties with all Asian countries⁸³. Where else but in India could Mr. Brezhnev launch such a masterly and timely move? India which is proud of its friendship with the Soviet Union⁸⁴ is in need of economic assistance for its fifth plan and is also looking for the fresh supply of arms. Only the Russians may deliver them.

In a speech in Alma-Ata on August 15 1973, Brezhnev praised India as a peaceful country⁸⁵ while referred to China as a country pursuing "great power chauvinistic" plans⁸⁶. Referring also the United States indirectly he supported his Asian Collective Security plans as a means to eliminate "wars and armed conflicts and imperialist aggression" on the Asian continent⁸⁷. The imperialist aggression pointedly refers to China's border problems with India and the Soviet Union itself⁸⁸. China is therefore branded as an aggressive power posing threat to the security of its neighbours⁸⁹. The Soviet conception of peace or *détente* in Asia envisages a kind of "Collective Security System" which in the first place guarantees the safety of the Soviet frontiers on the Asian continent and secondly bars any (further) Chinese, Japanese and American imperialist expansion⁹⁰. When compared with the proposed Security system in Europe it seems that both have been intended to secure the status quo and increased influence for the Soviet Union. China has opposed the Russian plan on Asian security⁹¹ primarily because it is against the hegemony of the great powers⁹². The Chinese who would prefer several powerful sub-centers which can compete in economic and political terms with the United States and the Soviet Union⁹³, therefore genuinely consider the proposed Asian Security System as a device to further the Soviet influence in Asia.

⁸³ Observer 25. 11. 1973.

⁸⁴ Mrs. Gandhi has described India's relations with the Soviet Union as "many sided" and has said that the people all over world could learn a lesson from Indo-Soviet friendship-despite following two different social structures we can be good friends. I.H.T. 1.-2. 12. 1973.

⁸⁵ USSR and Third World, July-September 1973.

⁸⁶ "The Peking leadership has come out particularly strongly against the idea of collective security in Asia as it sees it as a threat to its great power chauvinistic plans." Ibid.

⁸⁷ "Why we are advocating collective security in Asia? Because we are striving to eliminate wars and armed conflicts, and imperialist aggression on the Asian continent as well." - Brezhnev in his speech at Alma-Ata. Ibid.

⁸⁸ About the nature of future Sino-Soviet conflict, Walter Lipmann in his annual television conversation said in 1963 that (the Soviet Union) the whole movement of its population is west to east, across Siberia to the Pacific Ocean. Where as the movement of Chinese, with their expanding population is northward, through Manchuria and Sinkiang ... which causes a collision between these two ... It is a fundamental conflict of interests between Russia and China. All that happens in Asia around the enormous mass of China, north from Korea around to India is out of Russian control.

⁸⁹ Sulzberger, I. H. T., 10. 12. 1973.

⁹⁰ Supra, 88.

⁹¹ Sulzberger, I. H. T., 10. 12. 1973.

The only country which has so far endorsed the plan is Iran.

⁹² Jenkins Roy, "How China sees the world". In: Observer, 9. 12. 1973.

⁹³ Ibid.

It was therefore natural that India should refrain from endorsing a Security plan which is not based upon a spirit of genuine cooperation and understanding among the Asian powers. Apart from that the endorsement would have created further barriers between India and China.

The most important outcome of this visit for India has been the signing of the 15-year Agreement for the expansion of the Soviet economic assistance to India. It has been considered the most significant turn in the relations of both countries since the 20-year Friendship Treaty in August 1971. The agreement if implemented well would deepen the Soviet role in the Indian economic development.

The 15-year agreement on the "future development of economic and trade co-operation" between the Soviet Union and India hopes to expand the production of the existing Soviet sponsored steel plants⁹⁴, the construction of the Calcutta underground railway and an oil refinery and development of a copper mining complex. In the field of the trade relations an increase of between 50 to 100 per cent is envisaged in the next seven years⁹⁵. It is also reported that the Soviet Union will help India in its current critical oil shortage⁹⁶. Besides from promising to provide 21 deep drilling rigs and technicians to step up the oil production, the Soviet Union will supply India 3 million tons of crude oil and 1.5 million tons of kerosine this year⁹⁷. Since no agreement has been reached regarding the amounts and the conditions of the new Soviet credits, it is difficult to give a precise figure as to how big the Soviet contribution would be towards the cost of the fifth Five-Year Plan⁹⁸. The 15-year agreement however has enlarged the scope of the Soviet collaboration and cooperation in the implementation of the Fifth Plan.

India might have also asked for the fresh supply of arms, specially SAM missiles and MIG-23 fighter interceptor aircraft. There is though no indication if these demands have met a favourable response. In the meantime France has however made it known that it might consider supplying arms to Pakistan to counterbalance those being supplied to India by the Soviet Union⁹⁹. A point on which she can rally the support of the United States and China.

10. Conclusions

The Soviet policies in the Indian Sub-continent since 1953 have been determined mainly by the following factors: — a) The change in the Soviet outlook toward the

⁹⁴ Bhilai which produces now 2.5 million tons annually will be expanded to produce 7 million tons and Bokaro (steel metalurgical) which has a capacity to produce 4 million tons will reach 10 million tons. See supra, 57.

⁹⁵ The Indo-Soviet trade turn over has amazingly increased from \$ 2 million in 1953 to \$ 505 million last year. I. H. T. 1.—2. 12. 1973. At present the Soviet Union is India's second largest trading partner (the U.S. is the first) occupying the first position in regard to India's exports, with 25% being non-traditional. Overseas Hindustan Times, 6. 12. 1973.

⁹⁶ India imports more than 2/3 of the 22 million tons it uses a year. Also see supra, 59.

⁹⁷ I. H. T. 29. 11. 1973.

⁹⁸ India plans to meet itself from its own resources 90% of the total outlay of about \$ 68 billion. The rest 10% will be met through foreign assistance. As far as the Soviet non-military assistance to India during the preceding twenty years is concerned it amounts cumulatively to about the same as Britain's and substantially less than West Germany's. Times, 25. 11. 1973. Also see supra, 61—65.

⁹⁹ Sulzberger, I. H. T. 10. 12. 1973.

non-communist countries¹⁰⁰, particularly the non-aligned countries¹⁰¹, — b) Increasing differences with China¹⁰² requiring a new and favourable reorientation in international arena, and — c) In a long term planning the strategic importance of the Indian sub-continent for the Soviet security.

To this list of factors we may add the functional elements such as economic and ideological¹⁰³ interests as playing a subsidiary role in the growth of Indo-Soviet relations.

Do the consultations and coordination of economic activity and growth patterns between the Soviet Union and India indicate a relationship of inter-dependence? Or does it indicate India's increasing dependence on the Soviet assistance? Will the increasingly strong ties with the Russians limit India's freedom of judgement and action in foreign policy? Will India be able to improve her relations with China? These are some of the questions which one must face in a final analysis of the Soviet-Indo relations.

Rothermund maintains that in view of the China-India-Soviet Union triangle, the relations with India will become so important that the Russians can not ignore them¹⁰⁴. The same could be said for India that as long as the relations with China remains strained¹⁰⁵ and the United States does not follow a more realistic policy in South Asia, she has little choice but follow a "narrow" but safe course in her foreign policy. In the context of the thaw in the United States' relations with the Soviet Union on the one hand and with China on the other, India might stand isolated if her relations with Pakistan and China do not improve. This would of course be a two-way transaction. There is no positive sign that China will take a concrete step towards improving the relations. Recently they accused India as an expansionist collaborator of Moscow¹⁰⁶. On the other hand it has bitterly attacked the Soviet Union for trying to build a worldempire which the old Czars had failed to realize¹⁰⁷. The mutual accusations and massing of troops along the borders¹⁰⁸ has only created more bitterness between them. A soviet article has indirectly also encouraged India to maintain a firm position against the Chinese claims relating to the disputed frontiers¹⁰⁹. In the past it had tended to support the Chinese claims. All this points out to the Soviet interest in maintaining a degree of tension between India and China. Now with the putsch in Afghanistan, though it is not yet definite if the Soviet Union played any part in it

¹⁰⁰ Manifested in the policy of peaceful-co-existence.

¹⁰¹ Aghanistan was one of the first countries to benefit from the post-Stalin policy of creating close ties with non-aligned countries. Also see supra, 13.

¹⁰² See supra, 22—27.

¹⁰³ There is a growing tendency to regard the communist movement as an internal political force. See Gupta, B. S., *Communism in Indian politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972.

¹⁰⁴ Rothermund, D., *Indien und die Sowjetunion*, Tübingen, 1968, p. 101.

¹⁰⁵ Lately during the debate on Foreign Affairs in the Indian parliament, Mr. Swaran Singh said that the relations with China have frozen . . . they are neither improving nor deteriorating. *Overseas Hindustan Times*, 6. 12. 1973. Also see infra, 106.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ *The Japan Times*, 28. 3. 1973.

¹⁰⁹ *New York Times*, 10. 1. 1973.

and depending on how far India will go with the Soviet Union and how they view the situation¹¹⁰, it may have an adverse effect on India's relations with Pakistan and China and for that matter with Iran¹¹¹ and its ally the U.S., specially if the new leadership sets out to solve the Pathan problem¹¹² by policies which may further dismantle what is left of Pakistan¹¹³. China has already accused Moscow of seeking further disintegration of Pakistan by establishing a great Baluchistan State and a Pushtunistan State¹¹⁴.

It is our belief and understanding that unless the ties with the Soviet Union are moderated (i. e. maintain the existing ties but make greater effort to improve the relations with the U.S. and China). India might be isolated and get involved in future in a serious Sino-Soviet armed conflict. The Soviet objective to maintain and strengthen its presence in the Sub-continent, in order not only to keep China out, but to use this presence at a later date, in its conflict with China or for that matter with the U.S., the Soviet Union will strongly discourage any substantial improvement in relations between India and China. This is precisely the point that if India wants to regain its non-aligned status and decrease dependence upon the Soviet Union for its economic development and for defense, she must improve the relations with China and Pakistan.

The best course of action open to India, which may in the first place restore to India its credibility as a non-aligned power and in the subsequent development, prevent any harmful change in the balance of power in South and Southeast Asia in the favour of either China or the Soviet Union, it must not under any pressure support dismantling of Pakistan. This problem should be left to the Baluchistan the Pashtūs. Secondly, India should take initiative in creating a non-military Asian organisation for dealing with security questions.

Or it could be a Standing Commission composed of the representatives of China, Japan, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. It can be set up even if any two countries agree to join it. Other countries may later on send the representatives. The members of the Commission should meet regularly on the basis of equality and mutual

¹¹⁰ "Soviet Union and India back New Regime in Afghanistan" — I. H. T. 21.—22. 7. 1973.

¹¹¹ Because of its Baluchi minority and strong opposition to an independent Baluchistan State, Iran has deep interest in the stability of Pakistan and would do everything to prevent any further dismantling. The Shah announced that Iran will render military assistance to Pakistan. N. Y. T. 5. 7. 1973.

¹¹² Daud Khan is a known supporter of the demand (Pashtunistan) and has listed the problem as one of top priority for an early action. Overseas Hindustan Times, 26. 7. 1973. There are 4 million Pashtūn tribesmen, the dominant ethnic group of Afghanistan. A greater Afghanistan, reaching through ethnically Afghan—Pakistan territory is Gen. Daud's avowed dream. — I. H. T. 23. 7. 1973.

¹¹³ The present Pakistan is made up of four provinces: Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and the North-west frontier province. Baluchistan (126,000 sq. miles) having one-third of the countries total area, is biggest of Pakistan's four provinces. Rich in natural oil and gas the province has only 1.5 million Baluchi population. There are Baluchi tribesmen in southern Iran and Irak also. A Russian backed Independent Baluchistan movement with the headquarters in Baghdad, has demanded a new State comprising the Iranian Baluchistan and the Baluchistan in Pakistan. Another province which may cause difficulties for Pakistan is the North-west frontier province inhabited by Pashtūn tribesmen (see supra 112). See for a report on these problems: Far Eastern Economic Review, Jan 8 (1973).

¹¹⁴ Overseas Hindustan Times, 6. 12. 1973.

respect. The Commission should be charged with the prime objective of exchanging information concerning the economic, political and social problems facing each country and the solutions which they are seeking to solve them. There is too much of bitterness and resentment in India against China since the 1962 conflict. An appreciation of the Chinese experience and its problems would certainly create a more relaxed atmosphere for improving the relations and for negotiating a number of outstanding conflicts. The Indo-Soviet relations and their durability will depend on the future outcome of the mutual appreciation of problems and achievement between all three powers — now engaged in a triangular relationship of mutual suspicion and aggression.

Wirtschaftliche Integrationsprobleme der 3. Welt

In den Diskussionen der DSE mit Fach- und Führungskräften aus Entwicklungsländern spielen immer mehr Integrationsprobleme eine Rolle. Es wird zunehmend auf das Beispiel der Europäischen Gemeinschaft verwiesen. Es wird auch die Frage gestellt, welche Vor- und Nachteile regionale Integrationen bringen. Aus diesem Grund ist das Erscheinen dieses Buches zu begrüßen, weil es an einigen Beispielen die Schwierigkeiten aller Integrationsbestrebungen deutlich macht.

Die Arbeit versucht, einen kritischen Überblick über die zahlreichen Integrationsbestrebungen zu geben, die in Lateinamerika, in Afrika, im Vorderen Orient, in Südostasien und anderswo entstanden oder in der Bildung begriffen sind. Grundsätzliche Fragen zur Integrationspolitik sind soweit behandelt worden, als sie zur Aufhellung und zum besseren Verständnis der tatsächlichen Entwicklungen erforderlich erscheinen. Die Untersuchungen, die auf deutschen und ausländischen Quellen basiert, ist unter dem Gesichtspunkt einer praxisbezogenen Darstellung verfaßt worden. Sie mündet in die Feststellung, daß die zahlreichen Versuche einer regionalen Zusammenarbeit unter den Entwicklungsländern zu gewissen positiven Resultaten geführt haben, ergibt aber auch, daß der Entstehung und Aufrechterhaltung von Integrationsbildungen zwischen Ländern mit einem niedrigen Entwicklungsstandard noch große Schwierigkeiten entgegenstehen.

Hermann und Ilse Johann: Die wirtschaftlichen Integrationsbestrebungen der Entwicklungsländer. Reihe „Probleme der Weltwirtschaft“ des Deutschen Übersee-Instituts Hamburg. Weltforum Verlag München, 309 Seiten, DM 38,—.

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