

Community Development: Achievements and Deficiencies*

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I. Introduction

As a subject, community development has been more prone to false hopes and high flown phrases than most. At times, especially in the late fifties, it became, like the missionary gratuitousness which preceded it, something of a cult. Even today, the term, although a bit faded, is redolent of pious good works and conjures pictures of hardworking and devoted civil servants, khaki clad, talking earnestly with local chiefs in a durbar in Enugu or a barraza in Morogoro or the backwoods of Kenya. Or, in a different form, one recalls the shining morning faces of Peace Corps volunteers in the barriadas outside of Lima, anxious to transform society "from below."

Whatever the form, the common emphasis is on people to people, the pridefulness of self-help, and the voluntarism which men who teach confide to men who want to learn, and which is the basis of mutual hope and affirmation.

Brave hopes aside, United Nations officers may perhaps be more realistic. They have, in many instance, had to pick up where the cult left off. For them what makes community development attractive is its modesty of scale. It entails fewer risks than grandiose development schemes. It uses local resources, human and material. It can thus survive where the three, five, or seven year plans of central governments fail, their massive loans turning into external indebtedness, and leaving behind almost inevitably, broken hopes.

If we review the literature and experience of the more original programs and 'cover the distance to the contemporary, what is the pattern? Can we locate some major lines of experience? How has community development itself developed as a doctrine? Are there "models" of community development? The discussion which follows will take up some of these questions in turn.

2. Background and Origins

When I first became acquainted with community development, during the last stages of colonialism in Africa, it was a prominent feature of colonial policy. The emphasis was on and order, and to employ village officials as agents of rule. The

* Revised version of the keynote speech at the International Seminar on the Comparative Study of Community Development, 3-8 December 1973, Seoul, Korea.

nucleus of the community development idea was first embodied in rural reform in India. Building village prosperity was the key. In India the view was progressive. Against it was the fuller weight of orthodoxy. The more utilitarian reformers, far from favoring the community, opposed to it. Official opinion agreed with J. Fitz-james Stephen who articulated quite unequivocally the more common view:

"The condition of India for centuries past shows what the village communities are really worth. Nothing that deserves the name of a political institution at all can be ruder or less satisfactory in its results. They are, in fact, a crude form of socialism, paralysing the growth of individual energy and all its consequences. The continuation of such a state of society is radically inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our rule both in theory and practice."¹

Local communalism was the enemy of practical administration, and the obstacle to individual initiative. To favor the village community was therefore rather radical from the start. Identified with the people versus the bureaucracy, the simple versus the elite, its preference was the homespun as against the manufactured. The problem was how to reconcile the two views. Modern community development tries to combine individual initiative with collective goals. It has had to overcome the liberal critique. Its problem is to find a dual system of motivation, one in which private gain and community goals reinforce each other. Without such mutual reinforcement local reform will turn into local systems of corruption and plunder.

The issues were as fundamental as private enterprise versus socialism today. Community development remains subject to guesses about realism. Perhaps this opposition accounts for why it is that doctrines of community development retain something of a missionary flavor. In order to be right as doctrine, it must exhort people to behave in an appropriate manner. Since it can not coerce, it employs a motivating ideology. In its original and naive form it was the ideology of the reform minded district officer in India who rejecting the almost total emphasis on the Indian elite, wrote: "I start from bedrock/What do you cater for/The odd million literates/The three hundred million others/You must cater for the 300 million others."²

This is progressive Kipling. In Africa a generation later it became a kind of Fabianism.

Despite all the improvements in agriculture, education, and the more uncertain expansion of the franchise associated with the practice of community development doubts about the ideology as well as the cross pressures remain. Development from above implies shaking up the community. The local areas are pockets of resistance to change constituting a slow cycle of development. Those who emphasize community development regard change as ephemeral save as it fits into the community. Since results are part of a communal network the slowness of the cycle is a testimonial to its strength. Slow change mediates innovation rendering it compatible with people's lives and customs. When it works properly, the community remains capable of providing mutual help. It elicits mutual responsi-

¹ Quoted in Eric Stalkes, *The English Utilitarians and India*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 280.

² Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India*, *The Guardians*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953), p. 235.

lity. By this means local apathy, lawlessness, and growing vulnerability, the negative concomitants of development, can be minimized.

The idea of community development took hold as an articulated doctrine, especially after the second world war. It became bedrock for emergent democracy, itself the prerequisite for independence. During the last stage of British colonialism, experts such as T. R. Batten, the Labour Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, and senior colonial office officials, like Sir Andrew Cohen, threw their respective weights to community development as a major aspect of policy. Designed to take its place along side of the large programs of overseas investment under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, community development would provide local mediation and support in the form of rural credit, the establishment of growers and distributor cooperatives for cash crops, the building of feeder roads, construction of local schools, as well as a host of other projects. The major plans would thus be paralleled by the local ones. The combination would assist the articulation of central and local governments in a context of progressive constitutional and local government reform. These in time would establish the necessary conditions of democracy and political independence.

Such a combined emphasis, local and central, developmental and political was very English. We will call it the new "Fabian" model of community development³. The main idea was that community development was the way in which people, by their own efforts, could supplement what the government could do⁴.

This then is to give community development a proper pedigree. It could be said that it had its origins in Indian progressivism, became translated into the doctrine social change at the grass roots. Projects for social welfare were to cushion the shock of innovation and thereby make it more acceptable. These, in turn, would strengthen local governments by giving them important responsibilities. The combination would effect a local infrastructure, productive, self-reliant, an effective base for further change. Agents and district teams, cooperating with officers from other ministries, were the entrepreneurial and remedial instruments. As a means of instituting basic reform on the cheap, these were a good way of compensating for previous local neglect and backwardness. Rural reform would also stimulate local participation, taking some of the burdens off central government, and leading to a change in the behaviour of the people themselves. They would become less dependent on external innovators. Hence the basic object of good community development officers was to prime the pump by providing good leaders, loans, access to basic equipment and simple materials. Then the locals could take over. In short, the community development which I observed in Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda, and elsewhere, was essentially a variable set of practices and strategies based on local conditions united by a common doctrine of mutualism. "No community without development. No development without community!" This in essence was the idea.

Indeed, so breathtaking in its simplicity and so clearly a matter of good sense did

³ See Lionel Elvin, "Social Development" in Arthur Creech Jones, *New Fabian Colonial Essays*, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1959).

⁴ For a good description of the connection between local government and colonial development policy, see Ursula K. Hicks, *Development from Below*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961).

this doctrine appear, that few questioned its over-all design. There were some who, favoring the big economic push over the small incremental effort, regarded community development as negligible in the developmental scheme of things. But even they tended to ignore rather than oppose it. In addition to its simplicity and low costs were other virtues, intimacy, direct participation by the people, and the face to face development of human potentialities. All these the 'big project' tended to ignore. Such advantages could easily combine with the larger project emphasis. Cushioning the shock it could make up for more abrasive changes which were the unanticipated consequences of large schemes.

The debate over how best to develop will, of course, continue. Proponents of big change from the center will continue to be opposed by those who favor local incrementalism. How advocates and antagonists of community development deal with this is itself interesting. Tension between them was there from the start.

In India, where the idea began so were there skeptics and reformers. C. T. Metcalfe, the British Resident in Delhi (1811-19) was the first of a generation of reformers. He first took note of the importance of the Village Councils of Elders (panchayats). Many of his successors experimented with how best to use traditional village councils for the maintenance of law of Indirect Rule, and was taken over by the new Fabians, eventually to be made respectable by nationalist leaders during the last days of colonial tutelage. In this way community development survived its origins.

3. The Fabian Emphasis

Community development has never lost its "communal" emphasis. Providing a sense of appropriate work by the people themselves was the essence of the new Fabian spirit. Years later, it still seems a sensible way of getting things done without a great investment of time and money by central authorities. W. Arthur Lewis put the matter very well:

"The power of communalism is seen ideally in a modern dress in the progress in recent years of the movement for 'community development' in rural areas. In these schemes villagers are encouraged to give their labor freely for works of special benefit to the village, such as building roads, or schools, or wells, or community centers, or other public property. It takes some organization to get these schemes working; there must be government officials to plan them, and to work up enthusiasm for them; and public funds must also be provided to meet the cost of materials or of skills which the village cannot itself provide. Given such organization, experience shows that villagers will gladly turn out to work freely on local public works. The idea that they will do this seems strange to townsmen, especially in our own individualistic societies; but, in a small village, where everybody knows everybody else, a sense of communal effort for communal purposes may be a very effective incentive to the betterment of social conditions.

All the same, there are definite limits to what can be achieved in this way. In the first place, the works must be of local benefit; the villagers will build a minor road connecting their village to a main road, but they will not build a main road for all and sundry without payment; or they may dig drainage works for their village freely, but will not do so if the benefit is to be diffused widely outside their area. Secondly, the works must benefit the village as a whole, and must not be of obviously much greater advantage to some than to the rest."⁵

⁵ W. Arthur Lewis, *The Theory of Economic Growth*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955), p. 59.

Thus Lewis emphasizes the value of group loyalties as incentives as well as the importance of preserving the community as change occurs. But despite the logic of community development of the new Fabians and liberal-minded economists like Lewis, too often something goes wrong. Communalism, localism, and self-help are not enough.

4. Alternatives to the Model

One major effort to overcome its limitations has been made by President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. Ujamaa villages extend the idea of community development, transforming it into the new political ideology. From a totally different perspective, there is the powerful experience with communes as working communities, developmental as well as social units, which have been pioneered in China. The new Fabianism is the classic liberal model. Tanzania represents the mixed case. China is an example of quite different principles of community development, quite the opposite of those animating the Fabians and their friends. Theirs, the idea of revolutionary transformation, is also very different from the current United Nations orthodoxy which continues to follow the new Fabian tradition. Indeed, the Chinese example takes all the benign formulae of the Fabian model and turns them upside down. Members of the local community are plunged into the cold waters of total change. The survivors emerge gasping for air, with a renewed interest in survival. That is what it means to create new communal units which off-set the traditions of Confucianism, attack familism, and obliterate conventional deferences. The object is to liberate a generation from tradition not venerate it.

To create new land and service units, as well as new organizational forms means developing the community rather than fitting development to the community. This Chinese model is thus everything which the new Fabian model is not. It is abrasive, totalistic. It locks the locale into the center by means of programmed, and coordinated activities. This is the logic of community development carried all the way, to the extent that it changes some of its most essential values. It wants development and community, all right, but it confronts the inconsistencies which have been inherent in the neo-Fabian approach ever since its Indian inception.

5. Contradictions of Definition

Between the two extremes lie some fundamental contradictions. Consider the common definition offered by the United Nations:

"1. The term 'community development' has come into international usage to connote the processes by which the efforts of the people themselves are united with those of governmental authorities to improve the economic, social, and cultural conditions of communities, to integrate these communities into the life of the nation, and to enable them to contribute fully to national progress."

"2. This complex of processes is then made up of two essential elements: the participation of the people themselves in efforts to improve their level of living with as much reliance as possible on their own initiative; and the provision of technical and other services in ways which encourage initiative, self-help and mutual help and make these more effective. It is expressed in programs designed to achieve a wide variety of specific improvements."⁶

⁶ E/2931, Annex II, of 18 October 1956, Par. One, and quoted in "Community Development and Economic Development", Preliminary Progress Report, C/CN.14/144E/CN.14/SWCD 3.

The emphasis is on unity between people and government. The objects are improvement, integration, a national contribution, self-reliant participation and local initiative. The definition implicitly assumes that all these ingredients will fit together in a reasonable mix, with reasonable objectives. But it also raises some questions.

When does the emphasis on unity between the people and the government in fact lead to unity and when to conflict, or, if not outright conflict, severe parochialism. When does reliance on government assistance result in external support rather than local participation? When does improvement promote power cliques, petty bureaucracy, and local tyranny which not even the least sentimental version of the local community with its suasive social pressures can support? Under what circumstances does even modest improvement exacerbate cleavages and factions which turn people against each other so that old conflicts serve as the lightning rods for new disputes over land, property, wives, inheritance, theft? Indeed, how often has an emphasis on a national contribution resulted in precisely what W. Arthur Lewis warned against, i. e. the linkage of the local with a wider territory which would diminish the willingness of people to volunteer their time and energy?

We all know of situations where self-reliant participation fails, providing opportunities mainly for those noisy and arrogant dispositions, the self appointed and self appointed few who, parade their self importance, and make it virtually impossible to accomplish anything in a straightforward way. And, above all, does self-help include helping one's self to the proceeds, the problem of corruption.

It may be argued that of course each of the emphases in the common definition, like with Plato's ideal governments can take a debased form. The problem is to prevent such debasement. But if this is so difficult to do these problems must lie at the source. That is the theory of community development is bad. If the network of variables suggested in the definition are contradictory then community development as a method won't work as a program. It may rather succeed as an event, or by chance. The answer to this question is not clear. But I wish to take a heretical view. Otherwise failures may be explained as particular events while the practitioners of community development, those who make their living at it, will remain committed to the theory.

6. Some Community Development Experiences

Community development, in its various incarnations, is diverse. It is not programmatically embalmed as a coherent body of developmental practice. It takes many forms.

Falling far short of the neo-Fabian model, the U.S. fits the philosophy of the Agency for International Development, not to speak of the Peace Corps into a rough and ready pragmatism. The preferred way is the self-help management project which, with a suitable initial "input" from the U.S. (an appropriately cynical AID man or idealistic Peace Corpsman) builds the community.

The French at times more philosophical, are flavoring programs with humanism. The proto-type was Pere Lebret, the liberal Catholic philosopher priest, who, stealing a fig from the Marxist tree, emphasized investissements humaines, seasoned

with a dash of corporatism. Humanistic community development means that family, church, and larger society all can be reinforced strengthening the coherence between individual and social life. In the more militant days of Mali and Guinea, French style community development took on a more socialist look. It was ideological, militant, transforming. Official French support was available from FIDES (Fonds d'investissement pour le developpement economique et sociale) and other related bodies⁷.

Socialists preferred Chinese, Czech, and other local development teams to train local cadres in combination with party functionaries (P.D.G. Union Soudanaise, etc.), i. e. with support from the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries.

Whatever the specific ideology form, local initiative, self-help, mutual help, guidance, and government support require village level government workers, animateurs polyvalents, as well as volunteers, animateurs benevoles, not directly employed by government. One key is to avoid conflicts between local and central authorities. The second is reducing individual uncertainty.

Ending uncertainty for the local participants is the sensitive core of the problem. No matter what the organizations are for, cooperatives, societies de prevoyance, societies mutuelles de production rurale, health or social centers, a harmonization or coordination of efforts if it is to work, needs to increase the predictability of life in specific and particular ways. Otherwise development produces two extremes, a few gamblers and many conservatives. This is why new programs rarely last very long. Indeed one solution to the problem of predictability is increased income. If a program results in sufficient increases in real income, then individuals can fend for themselves⁸.

7. Risk-taking and Innovation

This puts the emphasis on those theories of community development which begin with a simple behavioral premise, namely that man is an optimizer and what he optimizes is measured in economic gains. But it ignores man as a risk-taker. Increase his risks and only the gambler can function. Moreover the poorer a man is the more likely he is to be cautious. Even though he has the most to gain, and least to lose, still the costs of losing are too high. Hence the role for the community development officer is to make it possible for gains to be made with minimal cost in uncertainty. He must manage innovation, mixing it with the appropriate institutional settings and through the animation of the people themselves, render it comfortable.

To "domesticate" such innovations is to project a future, the consequence of a change in land tenure, the use of cooperatives, the establishment of rural techno-

⁷ See Teresa Hayter, *French Aid*, (London: The Overseas. Development Institute, 1966). The French were less concerned with community development than the British since their original developmental philosophy was quite opposite to the latter's emphasis on localism. The French were anxious to promote a "harmonious development for the whole, and the interdependence of the parts" which resulted in a huge and expensive administrative structure, and politically inspired projects. See pp. 38-39.

⁸ For a discussion of "behavioral" factors, see John H. Kunkel, *Society and Economic Growth*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 249-282.

logies, the formation of rural credit associations, the organization of marketing. The stimulation of local demand, training for specialized skills, the organization of water, health, medical, and other facilities, mass literacy and education, all curtail costs, latent disfunctionalities. Local capital formation, a crucial object, is not a zero sum game but it comes out of the work of individuals. Everybody wants a fish pond, or a linkage road, or a football field. Everybody wants to know how to read. Everyone wants more cash in the pocket. But no one can predict his own share.

The solution to this problem is always very specific. It requires enabling guarantees. It requires local discretion. When the Indian government's Block Development Officers became the agents of the local government body it enhanced their ability to shift funds about for productive expenditures in agriculture or irrigation in the panchayat samiti system⁹, and to provide for contingencies. Phrased more generally the problem is similar to the one raised by Mancur Olson. Lack of predictability surrounding each project is individual. No one wants to pay too much for collective goods. If the motivation to maximize remains individual then the "animateur" must be an entrepreneur rather than planner, one who organizes people, and is exceptionally sensitive to the causes of failure. After all, is it not true that the most successful projects are the work of key individuals? The liberal and Fabian solution then is to enlarge the skill of the community development officer. His job consists precisely in reducing uncertainty, inducing individuals to take risks by reducing the margin of error. A good transition institutionalizes predictability. The trouble is this solution works only when it works.

Take for example, a combined AID-Peace Corps program established to help Indians in the Altoplano of Peru. Mainly Quechua and Aymara speaking peoples engaged mainly in a poverty agriculture, the object was to convert them to potters, weavers, brick and tile makers. Their products were to be marketed through a Peruvian cooperative, Artisanias del Peru, organized by a Peruvian in collaboration with a marketing expert brought in by AID on loan from the Sears and Roebuck Company. Programmatic ingredients were a teaching stimulus through Peace Corps artisans plus a marketing agency linked to the export outlets of the United States. Yet the experience was frustrating to all who participated, perhaps most of all to the artisans and craftsmen who went as Peace Corpsmen to the Altoplano villages. The Indians, some of the most expert weavers and potters in the world would modify the size of the cloths they wove so they would fit Mrs. America's double bed, or her dining room table. If they wove "for size", quality went down. Nor could they easily be induced to modify their pots to make into crafts implements for Madison Avenue gift shops or The Exotic Beads and Homespun Emporia of Kansas City. It was even difficult to induce them to use color fast dyes, or manufacture their own (so that the cost would be low). Their ponchos turned the pink necks of Berkely undergraduates green or blue, or red, (depending on the taste in Peruvian colors).

Efforts to synchronize pick ups of finished goods fared no better. Scheduled deliveries were rare. In the office of the trading cooperative in Lima it was feast or famine. The orders which came in from Sears Roebuck and other importing agencies could not be met. The Peace Corps man trying to communicate his frustration

⁹ See E/CN.14/144/-E/CN.14/SWCD/3, p. 19.

to the people with whom he worked in his clumsy crash-program Spanish got little response. Speaking in Spanish went hand in hand with centuries of exploitation. The Indians retreated further into their Quechua or Aymara shells increasingly mute, sullen, and unresponsive. To teach weavers to weave and potters to pot and establish cooperatives which would produce more money in their pockets turned out to be difficult. Even those financially successful cooperatives rarely lasted.

What were the explanations? Some were very complex. Community development can not create communities among a people whose history is smashed by time, brutalization, by the hardship of rural poverty. That, at any rate general. More specifically, to acquire appropriate skills is a cost. It reduces the ability to confront the known vicissitudes of life which the experience of generations has driven home. Old practices can not be thrown overboard until there is a genuine confidence that the alternative is enduring. Nor can such conservatism be dismissed as "traditionalism". Most people will throw their traditions away with alacrity if they can see clear gains. Tradition is, after all, a strategy of survival.

The point is that a context where many die, most people are willing to take fewer risks rather than more. It is hard to effect real and substantial change. What begins well may fail at the point of transition of leadership. What is rare is the self-sustaining program. Few have succeeded. Exceptions like the Chagga coffee cooperatives in Tanzania are notable, fortuitous. Reducing uncertainty depends on more than a confidence inspiring leader or even a local government technocrat. Success will depend on whether or not a network of mutually reinforcing roles can be established, institutionalized, and harmonized with the prevailing set. If the prevailing set in a local community involves extensive practical obligations, families and children, kinsmen generally (on whom one's welfare depends both in the first and last instances), there are problems of practical risk. If a farmer, even on a poor farm is to undertake weaving or potting for a market, the market must be guaranteed. If his skill varies with his other obligations and his product is not always marketable, his incentive to improve weaving will be less. At least on the farm he can eat.

Any existing institutional structure is designed to cushion failures. Hence, when new opportunities are opened up by means of new community development programs, they are often accepted with reserve, half-heartedly, and with small conviction. Similarly in local self-help projects to the poor. In the effort to induce greater participation, there is increased uncertainty (as well as opportunities for corruption and abuse). Programs from "on high" don't work. Programs from "below" don't either. The point is that the theories of community development which center about the liberal or "Fabian" model treat the uncertainty problem largely as a matter of leadership.

8. Reducing Uncertainty

This suggests that the problem of community development is that it is behavioral-ly simplistic, assuming that benefits of rewards, self-help and localism will make for sufficient institutional harmonies so that marginal or incremental change will accumulate and become permanent. The argument is not that this never happens.

Obviously it does. But that the theory is less good than the practice, and one rarely can anticipate what programs will succeed, or why.

How can uncertainty be dealt with more theoretically? First, there must be a clear cut set of values, norms, and priorities associated with a community development program. These, whether or not in harmony with the local institutional setting, are essential both if there is to be coherence, and if the purely local and individual is to be linked up with wider governmental purposes.

The second element is the need for a supporting network of roles in which mutual contingencies and obligations are functionally valid, i. e. where role follows function and function follows need. To specify need, articulate function, establish role, and organize reciprocities and exchanges means to surround the community with an identifiable organizational or institutional frame.

Third, there is the problem of appropriate behavior and motivation, or the extent to which roles, once established, will be properly fulfilled. Where there is too great a gap between task and performance, failure is ensured.


For each of these three key elements there are some important processes which become particularly relevant at the point of transition from the initiation and first phases of a program to its transition, i. e. the period when most programs fail. Effective transition really depends on the institutionalization of new roles. Indeed, institutionalization means the "setting in" of roles as a network of interactions based on needs and functions, and reinforced reciprocities. The business of forming the appropriate mutually dependent networks includes the development of new roles which, grafted on to the existing ensemble, modify the entire set.

The point is that when this occurs, new roles become integral parts of the entire society, not isolated, and therefore culturally autonomous and vulnerable. But institutionalization is only one aspect of the problem. If there is too great a discrepancy between behavior and role, institutionalization will fail. Needed is a second process, sufficient socialization, including in this the screening of appropriate candidates for roles, and providing them with the necessary and sufficient skills. Only then can needs, embodied in roles, be satisfied through proper performance.

However, none of these will endure unless a third process occurs, internalization. Values and norms embodied in the roles must not only become part of the motivational system of the individual but should be largely self-monitored. When self-monitoring occurs, and produces a high degree of voluntarism, it can be said that a total innovative sequence has been completed and has achieved functional validity. We can now apply these as elements of a theory designed to reduce uncertainty in the context of community development.

Three relationships determine balance and stability. The three processes which arise out of the relationships indicate the process of absorption of innovation. When there is a high degree of reinforcement between them, we predict that a project which survives its initial phase, with the transition taking the shape of effective institutionalization, socialization and internalization, then innovation will become a real increment in the social body. We can diagram these as follows:

Fig. 1: Relationship and Process in Role Innovation



9. Some Alternatives

The problem is how concretely to achieve the appropriate reinforcement of the network of variables. We have rejected the characteristic solution, i. e. by means of exceptionally devoted leadership at the local level because it is hardly a "theoretical" solution. Talent is, in any case, at such a premium, that those best qualified to induce the needed behavioral changes for continuing the success of new projects is very rare. A more important way is a continuous stream of network building inputs deriving from outside the community. This is a structural solution. But alone it lacks normative force. Normative inputs are also necessary.

If this analysis is correct, then the Fabian solution, incrementalism plus pay-offs, is alone a weak foundation on which to build programs of community development. Incrementalism maximizes uncertainty. Marginal risks are too great for individuals to indulge the luxury of change. If so, what about the possibilities opened up by "disjunctive" change, i. e. the simultaneous changing of norms, structural relationships, and behavior?

For such a condition to produce the appropriate radical transformation from present conditions to conditions as projected, an ideological blueprint is required. The blueprint needs to be precise enough to specify appropriate roles and delineate standards of performances according to ideological norms: Then, if institutionalization processes establish conditions for socialization in roles and socialization processes allow for internalization of norms, the pre-requisites of reinforcement will have been met and real change produced at a local level.

Such a transition from one total system to another is precisely what the Chinese model represents. Not only is every aspect of social organization defined ideologically. Roles are given functions. Performance standards make sense. Socialization is an educative process, through the group examination of normative, structural and behavioral contradictions, and, if this fails, supported by selective coercion. The result is a drastically altered behavior¹⁰). The rural communes through-

¹⁰ See James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

out the country are a far cry from the age old dependency and helplessness of the Chinese peasant¹¹.

The Chinese model is the opposite of the Fabian one. The main problem is that it requires total solutions. Community development is thus a derivative activity of total mobilization. It controls uncertainty. It produces disjunctive change, providing a totally new set of alternatives. But latent between structure and behavior is high coercion which conventional ideals of community development would preclude. The question is whether or not it is possible to have the advantages of disjunctive change and controlled uncertainty, without relying on coercion.

10. The Tanzanian Model

As indicated, an interesting mixed strategy of community development is the Tanzanian. It is not disjunctive but has proposed new village communities as productive and social units, i. e. the Ujamaa village, normatively a composite of socialism and tradition. It is too soon to tell exactly how effective the Ujamaa village program will be in changing behavior. As yet there is not a sufficient experience to see how ideology and technique will blend into a reinforcing network of roles.

Briefly, the Tanzanian program is based on the development of a national ideology, communal socialism, the program of which was laid down in the Arusha Declaration. It specifies certain norms of equality and obligation. It opposes acquisitiveness and personal gain. It tries to reconcile traditional forms of communalism with modern socialist organizational techniques. It stands between the Fabian and Chinese models¹².

How prescriptive is the ideology? Certain points are made very clear. First, the emphasis on development is away from money, gifts and loans, foreign investment and taxes, and toward self-help and community labor. A second emphasis is on agriculture rather than industry. Indeed agriculture is defined as the basis of development, with industry secondary, a later priority. Community development occurs through the society as a form of agricultural improvement based on the local initiative of the people in accordance with both local and national goals. Moreover, leaders must be peasants or workers, should not hold shares in companies, or directorships in private firms, or own rental housing. Education, ideological redefinition, and the blending of past with future are carried forward by TANU, the party, in a joint attack on institutionalization, socialization and internalization problems. The ideology has taken specific structural forms, basic reforms of the civil service, a reorganization of the national party system into a single party state, a five year plan which specifies patterns of investment for development, and, as well, genuine elections to a functioning parliament.

So far the development consequences are mixed. In the first five years after independence, farmer's purchasing power grew about five per cent, a low figure¹³.

¹¹ See William Hinton, *Fanshen*, (New York: Random House, 1968).

¹² See Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa — Essays on Socialism*, (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968).

¹³ See Knud Erik Svendsen and Merete Tsisen, *Self Reliant Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1969), p. 305.

The cooperative movement has grown substantially. Nevertheless, there are great variations in performance between different Ujamaa villages. In some areas Ujamaa village production is lower than freehold or other forms of agricultural holding particularly where in the past coffee and sisal plantations were commercially successful. Overall agricultural production from 1962–66 was up by 7.4 per cent a year, a general agricultural growth rate of 6.1 per cent¹⁴, but only a small proportion of this was based on the Ujamaa village.

It is difficult to assess the performance. Nor are the criteria very clear. What are the appropriate standards by which to measure benefits? Should they be primarily economic? A mixed strategy, between the Fabian and Chinese models, such as Tanzania has attempted, shows basic contradictions between the response of farmers in terms of individual achievement versus the goals of socialism. The problem is "how to reconcile efficiency in economic growth with equality, co-operation, and the other aims of Tanzanian socialism."¹⁵

Ujamaa socialism has laid down its objectives. Some reorganization of roles has occurred. A number of successful Ujamaa villages have been established. Massive education campaigns have been undertaken. Government funding has been provided in the form of loans. Local leadership has been trained. National and local goals have been identified. At stake is not simply a pay-off value measured in increased income, but a total pattern of life based on mutual self-help and co-operation. However, even if the Tanzanian model process successful in Tanzania, how much its experience is for export remains a moot question. And, in any case, within Tanzania itself the entire program depends too much on the special genius of President Julius Nyerere.

11. Towards a Redefinition of the Problem

We have said that the conventional definitions of community development stress localism plus incremental change brought about by the people themselves. If these produce genuine benefits quickly, they may be able to bring about desired effects. A durable base for further innovation reinforced by local democracy and participation is the heart of the Fabian model. The Tanzanian model accepts many of these but forms rural socialism and a national plan in which the Ujamaa village communities serve as the essential building blocks. However, if our discussion is correct, if the Fabian approach succeeds, it is less by design than chance. Because it maximizes uncertainty and minimizes genuine innovation, it works best when there is a good possibility of immediate economic gain.

The Tanzanian model depends on the society remaining agricultural. In a country at a low level of development there is little internal differentiation and a minimum development of urban life. The policy followed by the government has prevented a growing tendency to bifurcation between urban and commercial centers on the one hand and the faraway world of the peasant, the conventional consequences of modernization to more highly modernized countries. Moreover, Tanzania has a small population. It is thus a unique rather than a generalizable case.

¹⁴ Ibid, Table 2, p. 312.

¹⁵ David Feldman, "Rural Socialism in Tanzania", in: Colin Leys, ed., *Politics and Change in Developing Countries*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 87.

This brings us to the problems of more complex societies. Community development in poor countries emphasizes innovation and growth. In highly modern countries the need is to remedy the negative consequences of growth. For example, China was already sufficiently developed prior to the Chinese revolution to have the worst of all possible worlds, the combination of large urban centers and relatively backward traditional rural sectors dominated by landlords. The situation in many Latin American countries is not much better. But they too have major cities (Buenos Aires, Santiago) despite their attractiveness imposes on the marginals on the ruthlessness of urban life while growth has destroyed what had been until recently, at any rate, relatively traditional rural sectors. Patrons and clients, *latifundios*, *haciendas*, give way. The rural poor are a growing proportion and even more so the urban poor. The Chinese case differed in the extremes of poverty and wealth, and smaller proportion of population in the middle class¹⁶.

China was the classic case of the dual society which, as it developed, produced a predatory consumption-oriented middle class. The poorest become the marginals, i. e. excluded from all shares in the system. Latin Americans had passed through this. Now there is a more European class structure, workers and peasants, a growing bourgeoisie, and a powerful aristocracy¹⁷.

In effect then, the problem is two fold-innovation for countries at low level of development and a renewed social structure at higher levels. If community development is to work, it needs to link together, in terms of functional relations, the city and the countryside, while reducing the power of the bourgeoisie. To accomplish these purposes would require both a national policy to upgrade the rural areas while preventing uncontrolled urban growth and migration.

This is a point on which the Chinese have been first to recognize. By sending urbanites and students into the countryside, major efforts are made to prevent the gaps between city and country from becoming greater. This, combined with a carefully orchestrated set of structural relationships emerging with development, has helped prevent the expansion of a commercial middle class. By the same token, they have eliminated rural and urban marginality. They have favored decentralization of economic activity even at the expense of the industrial growth rate. But in order to work, a revolution is required. In Latin America the prospects for revolution are remote.

A normative, structural, and behavioral network of mutually reinforcing and supporting roles, the Chinese model turns our attention away from rural transformation as such, or away from localism, and towards more national planning. It is more useful for this reason than as a model to be emulated. Villagization schemes and local development may work better in tandem with larger networks, W. Arthur Lewis and the Fabians to the contrary. Clearly, however, no matter how specific or appropriate as an ideology, rural socialism can not be a durable basis for the

¹⁶ In 1969, CEPAL published figures showing that 20 per cent of the poorest population in Latin America received 3.1 per cent of the total revenue while the richest 20 per cent received 62.6 per cent of the total revenue. Cited in Ignacy Sachs, *La decouverte du tiers monde* (Paris: Flammarion, 1971).

¹⁷ In actuality the picture is much more complex. See Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies about Latin America", in: James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds. *Latin America: Reform or Revolution*, (Greenwich, Connecticut: Fawcett Books, 1968), pp. 13-31.

national life. Most countries are already too modernized. Urbanization has already occurred. A commercial bourgeoisie exists (nearly) everywhere. Can community development succeed only when the latter is reduced and the former is more effectively integrated with the countryside? That question is, it seems to me, the central problematique of community development.

12. Disjunction and Mediation

Let us consider these matters theoretically, i. e. the advantages of disjunctive and total change, mediated through those political instrumentalities which have the specific effect of reducing disjunctive changes which occur beyond anyone's power of control. The point is that development is disjunctive and local community development alone is too fragile to cope with the problem. There is perhaps nothing more ruthlessly disjunctive than the marginalization of a peasant population, with all the behavioral destructiveness that implies. One has only to look in on an Aymara village in Peru or a black slum in the United States to see how demoralization works. Moreover, a large and growing commercial middle class is not, if left to its own devices, likely to be willing to support community development on a large enough scale to make a difference. The experience of the Alliance for Progress is eloquent testimony to the failure of such hopes. All this reduces the possibilities of effective action by those who would favor the Fabian model.

The Chinese model requires a very high degree of political control and loses the political advantages of the Fabian and Tanzanian, namely, the high degree of voluntarism and democratic participation. The Tanzanian model, however, remains extremely tenuous and particular to Tanzania. For example, success or failure will to a great extent depend on the actualities of production. Tobacco farming differs sufficiently from coffee growing so that what might work as a solution in the one case will fail in the other¹⁸.

There are very few successful examples of a mixed-model strategy. Perhaps the Israeli Kibbutz comes closest. Certainly it holds something of a record for longevity, surviving not only leadership transition but also generational change. The ideological cement remains fairly powerful, although perhaps less so now than in the past. A pioneer ideology of socialism and nationalism embodied in egalitarian roles produced a mutually responsible communal behavior. Norms were highly internalized, socialization extremely successful, and new functions were grafted on to institutional roles. The pioneering spirit is perhaps gone today although it has been replaced by the need for national survival. Clearly, however, in terms of a total way of life, the Kibbutz has proved to be both economically productive and satisfying as a way of living for many. What is lacking is the national network of mutually reinforcing roles. Perhaps doomed if Israeli society becomes more strenuously capitalist, urban, and industrial.

¹⁸ Indeed, the mechanics of tobacco production have so far favored a normative, structural and behavioral mix which relies on an authoritarian pattern of family enterprise, private land tenure and ownership which stimulates local initiative. Experience shows that the more efficient the enterprise under such conditions, the smaller the number of cooperative farm members and the more fissiparous the organizational consequences. This works against socialization and confounds the normative ideal. See David Feldman, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-106.

13. Conclusion

We have tried to suggest some of the weaknesses of the conventional ideology of community development. We have proposed a simple scheme which helps to examine the kinds of contradictions the process is likely to arouse. We identified three models, (1) the neo-Fabian, which dominates UNESCO thinking and Western liberalism, (2) the Chinese, a more coercive strategy but more comprehensive, and (3) the Tanzanian, a mixed model which is less universal than the other two.

We have indicated that uncertainty is one of the principal difficulties of Fabian incrementalism which too often prejudices success. A more complete approach requires far greater planning and ideological clarity. But it is likely to rely on coercion. Coercive solutions may get results but are hardly a basis for building societies according to the more humanitarian norms of community development. The Israeli case is exceptional. But it poses the problem of whether local socialism can endure under developmental capitalism at the center.

Underlying this analysis then is a question. Is community development programmatically possible? Or, to put it differently, can there be an applied theory of community development? If we put ideals together with projects, the answer is not very clear. Too much depends on specific productive processes and situations. No clearly general answer can be found. Some forms of socialism have clearly proved useful in reducing uncertainty and giving people an ideological blueprint for a renovated structure and an improved standard for behavior. Where this has worked, community development has come to mean more privileged pay-offs.

It is possible that somewhere between the traditionalization of innovation (the Fabian ideal), and the transformation of man's behavior, root and branch (the Chinese ideal), lie the critical scientific questions whose answers will explain the intimate connections between a community and its appropriate development, and development and its potential communities.

Our real conclusion, insofar as we have one, is that the conventional emphasis upon localism inherent in current theories of community development and which seem so comfortable and right, are not so much wrong as inadequate. Development is too complex, disjunctive, and a total process. We want to know how to direct it as well as cushion its impact. If we accept the view that more comprehensive networks of rural/urban roles are required, we ought to pay less attention to the community as a locale and more to its relationship to society.