

Portrait of a Young Indonesian Looking at his Surrounding

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Summary

As a mark of Soeharto's gratitude to the student leaders of 1965/66, almost all of them were appointed members of Parliament. One group of student leaders accepted, a second group remained firmly opposed to such policy, contending that their role was moral, not political and that their place was in the university. It was this second group that demonstrated again in 1970, this time against corruption which they claimed has emerged under the Soeharto regime. Members of the first group, now in Parliament, remained silent. Arief Budiman, the author of this article, belonged to the second group. His opinion and feelings represent the young Indonesians who decided to remain independent of the political powers.

When on the 30th of September 1965 what is now known as the attempted Communist Coup d'Etat failed, a 25year old young man who was aware of the social and political implications involved, followed the events closely. He heard on the one hand that a number of generals had been kidnapped, some of them even murdered, and that on the other hand a group of military officers were confronting the kidnapers who, in the meantime, had issued a statement saying that the nation was temporarily being governed by a "Revolutionary Council". He watched the political parties adopt a wait and see attitude, reluctant to interpret the situation at this critical time. At that moment, he joined a group of youth who had decided to support the officers who were moving against the "Revolutionary Council".

There are moments in a crisis when one becomes reminiscent about past experiences, drawing up a balance sheet, perhaps in the hope of anchoring oneself to face the turbulence ahead or to find a continuity which might help direct future actions. In this vein, the young man remembered that his ambition was to become a philosopher and a good writer. He had written several short stories and essays. He was encouraged when at the age of 15, one of his short stories was published by a literary magazine whose editor was J. B. Jassin, a leading literary critic. His enthusiasm grew when at the age of 21 he won a prize for an essay on the philosophy of art sponsored by a reknown literary magazine.

In 1962, while he was fervently searching for his identity and trying to develop his creativity, the communists were trying to develop their concept of thorough politization of all aspects of life, including the arts. While the young man was trying to relate concepts into a complex of basic principles to guide him, he felt himself intimidated by a force which preferred that he submit himself to this political doctrine. That he rebelled was inevitable. He helped formulate and also signed what was

called the "Cultural Manifesto"¹ which in essence stated the absolute necessity of freedom for the arts. This Manifesto was written in the middle of 1963 and had far-reaching repercussions.

In the beginning of May 1964, the Cultural Manifesto was banned by the Sukarno Government. The signatories lived under a political quarantine — though not imprisoned they were excommunicated from the community. Those who had government jobs were dismissed. The writings of the young man, which had regularly appeared in several periodicals, were no longer published. Fortunately, he was still allowed to attend lectures at the Faculty of Psychology at the University of Indonesia.

He considered the restrictive steps taken against himself and his friends as being tyrannical in nature. What is wrong with a man who has a different opinion, one who believes that art must be free while the Government recognizes art only in as much as it is "useful" for the revolution and politics? Why must they, who only understand art in an independent context, be excommunicated from the community? Although he respected Sukarno as a hero in the fight for independence, he now began to question the latter's good intentions. This was the young man's first encounter with politics, unfortunately at a time when he was helpless. He began to perceive power as having a strong tendency to oppress. Therefore, power must guard itself from falling into this trap.

In this extremely frustrating situation, he came to the conclusion that an intellectual is a man who will not complain when oppressed and who will not tyrannize when in power. He felt it his duty to carry out this mission.

The 30th of September 1965 incident was considered as a clear indication for a change in his fate. Therefore, he was prepared to face the situation, able to decide quickly on which side he would be, hoping, of course, that the change would bring freedom. The question was considered whether the group of officers fighting against the Revolutionary Council under the leadership of General Suharto could fulfill the hope for freedom. Was it possible for a military man to be more democratic than a man like Sukarno, who had thought about freedom and its problems for a long time while fighting to free the nation from colonialism? The question disturbed the young man, and in the end it was answered by an uncertain certainty: Whatever form the future should take, the most important thing was that he must be freed from the present situation. At least in the transition period a little hope

¹ The complete text of the Cultural Manifesto is as follows: "We, the artists and intellectuals of Indonesia, herewith proclaim a Cultural Manifesto, which states our principles, ideals and national cultural policy.

For us, culture is the struggle to perfect the condition of human lives. We do not give particular emphasis to one aspect of culture over the other aspects. Every sector needs to strive together in accordance with its nature.

In furthering the national culture, we endeavor to create with honest truth the struggle to defend and to put forward the values of the Indonesian people among the community of world nations. Pantjasila is our cultural philosophy.

Djakarta, August 17, 1963."

For further details regarding the problems around the Cultural Manifesto see "**Kekuatan Politik dalam Kesusasteraan Indonesia**" (Political strength in Indonesian literature) by Arief Budiman, in the book **Kejakinan dan Perjuangan**; buku kenangan untuk Letnan Djendral Dr. T. B. Simatupang, BPK Gunung Mulia, Djakarta 1972, pp. 158—172.

appeared like the flash of light from a passing comet in the sky. Moments like this had long been yearned for.

Thus, two days after the unsuccessful coup d'etat, when most people were still hesitant in taking a stand, he had joined other youth who were of a similar mind, and together they began to print pamphlets, using simple equipment. They worked at midnight in a garage which was transformed into a bedroom. When one of his friends, a poet, wrote some poems about the students' demonstrations, he at once published those poems stencilled booklet which was circulated among the demonstrators and became very popular². At night, he and a group of youth conducted an underground radio broadcast after a day of demonstrating and writing editorials for the radio³. Late at night, the young man cycled home alone after the broadcast, while the cold night wind aggravated the tuberculosis he was suffering from. At least the dry cough which sometimes had spots of blood in the saliva could be prevented from getting worse by a streptomycin injection three times a week. In spite of this handicap he worked with zest, for he saw a glimmer of hope flash against the dark night and he wanted to hold that light forever in his hands.

The efforts of this young man and his friends were rewarded when on March 12th, 1967, General Suharto was appointed Acting President. The hope grew when from the start Suharto intended to work in close cooperation with the intellectuals, primarily the economists. The best economists in the country were asked by Suharto to join forces to find a remedy for the ailing economic condition which then had reached an inflation rate of several hundred per cent. When in June 1968 Suharto included Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, an economist who had lived in exile during the Sukarno Government, into his cabinet, the image of Suharto as a leader who was earnestly striving to improve the nation's development efforts seemed almost perfect. When the young man heard the radio broadcast announcing Suharto's cabinet at a friend's house, he shouted: "For the first time since I am aware of politics I feel I have a Government I can support."

From that moment on, his doubts vanished. He was sure that Suharto intended to achieve the best for the country. There will be many difficulties to be faced by Suharto, he considered, for he is a leader who was created by the situation rather than one who had prepared himself for the job, which convinced the young man to do everything he could to help Suharto reach his aims. A feeling of happiness quietly began to grow inside him like a flower blossoming at night.

With this attitude, he observed the developments which followed. The leaders began engaging in corruptive activities as a means to personal wealth. He saw how the

² Collection of Taufiq Ismail's poems entitled "**Tirani**". This collection of poems was first published in stencilled form in 200 copies. Due to great demands for the book by the students, it was again reprinted in stencilled form. After the students' demonstrations were over, it was printed in book form by Birpen KAMI, Djakarta 1966. The poems of Taufiq Ismail were at that time very moving and added to the spirit of the students to strive for what they had begun.

³ The first underground radio was established by the Bandung Technical Institute students, who came to Djakarta. Headquarters were at first in the University of Indonesia and later were moved to the house of General Suharto's close friend, Mashuri SH, who is now the Minister of Education and Culture. The radio was named Radio Ampera (an abbreviation for "Message of the People's Suffering"). The broadcast very strongly attacked Sukarno. The editorials were later published in two volumes in stencilled book form.

civilian political leaders who had fawned on Sukarno began to approach Suharto in the same manner. He also saw his friends, who had once fought with him to bring about Sukarno's fall, begin to gain important positions because of their ability to talk sweetly, whereas other friends who did not employ such tactics were thrown out one by one. Faced with these developments which indicated a change in the Government's course from its original promises, the young man wrote newspaper articles attempting to point out these discrepancies. He was disappointed to see that the group who served Suharto obediently became stronger, while those who supported Suharto critically were slowly thrown out of the circle.

The young man began to think that maybe Suharto was too busy with his daily work; maybe he was buried under the routine of duties so that communication through the newspapers was too weak to attract his attention. Perhaps a more dramatic method could bring about the desired communication. When in January 1970 a group of his friends invited him to join them in an anti-corruption demonstration, he at once accepted. The demonstrators were about 50 youths, who were later joined by thousands of students from Djakarta. They asked Suharto to move against the corruption practised by his assistants rather than to raise the price of gasoline to increase state earnings, which had been planned.

What followed raised the young man's hope. At the end of January, as a reaction to the demonstration, Suharto formed a commission under the leadership of old political leaders, who had the reputation of being honest, to investigate the problem of corruption. The commission was enforced by Dr. Moh. Hatta, the former vice-president, who was known for his honesty and strong principles, as advisor to the commission⁴. As a response to Suharto's action, the demonstrators, at the suggestion of the young man, disbanded themselves. Calling themselves "The Students' Demand", they stated that they were not a political group trying to gain power but a moral group who wanted to see this nation safely achieve its ideals.

The Commission-4 continued its investigation, yet the Government did not seem to change its policy. The price of gasoline was nevertheless raised, and the officials who had been accused by the demonstrators the previous January were still holding their positions. Perhaps it was due to this fact that the demonstrators once again marched on the streets — to request the Government to take firm action against the corruptors. This time, President Suharto invited the students to meet with him personally. In the meeting, Suharto challenged the students, saying that if they had any proof pertaining to the corruption of his assistants, the students were to report to him directly.

The young man together with some of his friends immediately started the search for evidence to convince Suharto of the truth in the accusations which had been made. The meeting took place — with three of his friends he met Suharto in his study. The students gave Suharto evidence regarding the corruptive practices of his

⁴ The Commission-4 was formed by President Suharto on January 31, 1970. Its members are Wilopo SH as chairman, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, I. J. Kasimo and Dr. Tambunan, with Dr. Mohamad Hatta, the former vice-president, as advisor. In general, they are old political leaders who are no longer active. They are regarded as reliable and honest personalities who can be trusted. But a foreign correspondent once called them "a toothless tiger" — a tiger because of their reliable courage but toothless, because they do not have the means to take action.

personal assistant, Maj. Gen. Surjo. Suharto was friendly and sympathetic during the meeting with the four young men. In writing his impressions in one of the newspapers, the young man wrote "... pak Harto is a man of strong conviction who knows what he is doing and where he wants to go ..."⁵.

But further meetings with Suharto failed to give the same impression. In the second meeting two weeks later, speaking to about 20 students' representatives, Suharto told them that they were being used as tools by the politicians⁶. In the meantime, the Commission-4 had completed its investigation and gave quite a good report. The report pointed out that there were indications of corruption in some sectors of the economy. This was officially read by Suharto before the session of parliament on Indonesian Independence Day, August 17th, 1970.

There was no further action. Everything was calm again — a typical example of the Javanese custom to settle a difference of opinion with a feast called "slametan"⁷. Everything returned to normal after that, though the source of conflict was never touched. At this point, the young man gained a new understanding of the Suharto Government, though this new insight created a rather awkward feeling in him.

The issue of corruption was pushed aside by the approaching general election to be held in July 1971. The Government, which was dominated by the military — if not an outright disguised military government — experienced difficulties with the political parties. Though the political parties were not popular in the intellectual circles, they did have traditional bonds with the common people in the form of religious, cultural and tribal ties, which gave them a good chance for winning the election. For this reason, the Suharto Government was reluctant to conduct the general election at first. However, if the general election were not held, it was contended, the implications arising would make the Suharto Government appear to be a dictatorial military regime, and this would mean becoming easy bait for nations, groups or individuals who were not sympathetic towards the Suharto Government. Finally, Suharto chose to hold the general election, but with a strategy that he would win at all costs.

In the beginning it seemed that the Suharto Government wanted to coalesce with one of the big political parties: **Partai Nasional Indonesia** (Indonesian Nationalist Party). This party was the largest political party of the Sukarno period and its existence at present depended on Suharto, for it was the political party founded by Ex-President Sukarno. It was at the time of Sukarno's fall almost dissolved, and it was only through the interference of Suharto that it continued to live. The PNI had been prepared for this purpose. In 1970, when the party held its congress to elect the executive board, the Suharto Government conspicuously manipulated the election in

⁵ See "Pertjakapan dengan pak Harto" (Conversation with pak Harto), by Arief Budiman, **Kompas** daily, Djakarta, July 20, 1970.

⁶ See "Sesudah dua kali bertemu pak Harto" (After meeting pak Harto twice), by Arief Budiman, **Kompas** daily, Djakarta, August 8, 1970.

⁷ "Slametan" is a small Javanese party with the purpose, among others, of solving conflicts. Those in conflict are invited to the party together, and without discussing the conflict any further, everybody is supposed to be peaceful again. If anybody tallies again about the subject, he will be considered the troublemaker, because he does not know his role and function in the society.

For further details on the subject of "slametan", see Clifford Geertz **The Religion of Java**, The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, 1964.

order that Hadisubeno, a party figure who gave total support to the military, would be elected rather than Hardi, who supported the Suharto Government with reservations. But when the PNI was ready to become a partner in Suharto's Government, there was a change of tactics: Suharto developed a group which formerly had had no power at all — **Golongan Karya** (Functional Group). This group was then given all sorts of facilities. It persuaded all leaders outside the political parties to become members. Thus, when the candidates of the **Golongan Karya** for the general election were announced, names like Widjojo Nitisastro, Mashuri, Adam Malik, Sultan Hamengkubuwono and other well-known civilian leaders in the Government appeared under the banner of **Golongan Karya**. However, the leadership of the party remained in the hands of the military. (The military could not compete in the general election because they as a group had automatically been given one fifth of the number of chairs in parliament.) It was a public secret that many of the well-known leaders consented to be **Golkar** candidates only because they were reluctant to refuse and not because they really wanted to. As a group, they are in principle technocrats and avoided meddling in politics when they could.

Using tactics like these, **Golkar's** strength grew. But this did not give assurance that **Golkar** would win the election — at least that was the feeling among several persons in the Suharto Government. Therefore, in the pre-election period, coercive methods were used to persuade the people, especially in the villages, to join **Golkar**. Government employees were instructed to become **Golkar** members or face the risk of being dismissed⁸. The Armed Forces were used to "convince" the rural population. Cases of villagers being beaten, their houses set on fire, dismissed from their position in government offices and the like, were constantly being reported during the pre-election period.

Facing a situation like this, the young man could not remain silent. With a few of his friends, he organized a group named the **Golongan Putih** (the white group)⁹.

⁸ The Government, through the Minister of Domestic Affairs, organized what was called **Korps Karjawan Departemen Dalam Negeri** (Dept. of Domestic Affairs Employees Corps). All the employees of that Department had to be a member of the **Kokarwendagri** which is one of the **Golkar** groups. Those who refused would be fired, and there were cases of dismissal. During the election, the employees, especially the government employees, were obligated to vote in their respective offices, thus lessening the secrecy of the election. The political parties objected to this regulation, but the protest was held in a soft tone and no result was achieved.

⁹ The general election of 1971 was followed by 10 political parties, including the **Golongan Karya**. The existing political parties, especially the stronger ones such as PNI and **Parmusi**, experienced government interference in the executive board. In the case of **Parmusi**, the chairman of the party was appointed by President Suharto. The younger generation in general dislikes the political parties, for they have kept their old leadership consisting of personalities who worked very closely with Sukarno formerly. There were two alternatives for the younger generation. Those who believed that **Golkar** could be used as a tool to renew the political life in Indonesia (primarily the **Golkar** candidates of many scientists and intellectuals) chose **Golkar**. But another group of young people considered **Golkar** only as a military tool, with the intellectuals and scientists as mere ornaments. In view of the use of force employed in the rural areas to induce the election of **Golkar**, this group preferred not to join the election as a protest — a dishonest election to them was worse than no election at all. They then advised those who did not want to vote but were afraid not to go to the ballot boxes, to make a hole in the white part of the election form. The group of youth called themselves **Golongan Putih** (The White Group). The

People who joined this group stated that they were not going to vote and explained that if a person does not want to vote it is his right to refrain. They conducted their campaign by staging small demonstrations. A few of them were then called by the police for interrogation — the young man was one of them. They were accused of breaking the regulations prohibiting demonstrations of any kind. In Jogjakarta, a group of young men staging the same action was arrested by the military and detained for more than a week.

Finally, the general election was held in peace guaranteed by the force that had continuously been used in the pre-election period. The result of the election was — as expected — a total victory for **Golkar**.

The young man contemplated all this, and in debates with intellectuals who had joined **Golkar** he consistently maintained that it was better to have no election at all than to have a fraud like this. He also pointed out that “the nucleus of democracy does not consist of having a general election but lies in the protection of human values against oppression by the Government. When in 1966 we rebelled against the Sukarno Government, we were really rebelling against the arbitrary oppression exerted by those in power. Why is the New Order also resorting to oppression?”

The intellectuals in Golkar answered that they used force because there was no other alternative, declaring it as only a tactic to achieve a worthy aim. Indonesia's economic life had been greatly damaged. This had to be restored and the way to do it was to create a strong government that would allow the economists to work in peace. That government was the Suharto Government, and therefore the Suharto Government must win. If the general election were to be held following normal procedures, there was a great possibility that the political parties, whose leaders were only opportunists, would win. The majority of ignorant people tied to the traditional way of life would choose the political parties. Therefore, force was used in order that the Suharto Government might win the election, so that the economists could work in peace and the Indonesian economic progress would thus be assured.

Although the young man still adhered to his conviction that forceful ways in general elections must be opposed, he was also able to understand his opponents' point of view. He continued to protest, for it was his opinion that the happiness of man

results of the general election were as follows (not including members who were appointed by the President):

Political Parties	No. of chairs	Representing
1. Golkar	236	Government party
2. Nahdatuh Ulama	50	Islamic party
3. Parmusi	24	Islamic party
4. PNI	20	National party
5. PSII	10	Islamic party
6. Parkindo	7	Protestant party
7. Katholik	3	Catholic party
8. Perti	2	Islamic party
9. IPKI	0	Secular party formerly supported by the Armed Forces
10. Murba	0	A now meek leftist party.

cannot be sacrificed for an uncertain future. If the Suharto Government really had good intentions and was forced to do all this, he felt that at least his protests would be a constant reminder to those in power that the mission of humanity must never be put aside, in spite of the considerations for the aspired economic development.

Generally, people thought that after the election, the situation in Indonesia would improve. Did not Suharto now have everything? He had a tangible power to support him: the Armed Forces. After the election with the victory of Golkar, he now had his constitutional position affirmed. With this support, perhaps he could now peacefully perform his duties in creating a strong government oriented to development in all fields.

There were signs leading in this direction. Suharto, later followed by other high officials, began to talk about austerity, about a simpler way of life. Confronted with this reality, the young man again remembered the words of the intellectuals in Golkar. Maybe they were correct in insisting that all the force and deceit before the elections had really been a necessity to gain a bigger and better end. He suddenly thought that maybe his protests against corruption had been a bit premature. Perhaps after the election, Suharto would have a better opportunity to take stronger measures to prevent corruption. He once more began to hope, and he felt happy when he had hope.

Then, in December 1971, Madame Tien Suharto, the First Lady, announced that she was going to sponsor a big project that would exhibit the whole of the country's culture in miniature. This project called "Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature" is to be built in Djakarta at an estimated cost of ten and a half milliard Rupiah (there are other estimates at 20 milliard Rupiah).

The Indonesian intellectuals reacted. "Is a project such as this necessary, or at least has the appropriate moment arrived to build a project like this? Every year we have to beg for additional loans from other countries to finance our development." The First Lady answered that the money would not be taken from the state budget but would be collected from donations. However, would this not create the impression among donor countries that domestic funds could be mobilized to finance development, if ten and a half milliard can be collected to finance such a project? Why couldn't the donations be invested in a more productive venture such as the building of factories? Madame Tien answered that the project would attract tourists and thus would be productive. The economists, of course, started to calculate and came to the conclusion that the project would not be profitable. It would be more profitable, they contended, to build roads leading to places of tourist attractions or to repair existing roads. Roads, besides bringing tourist spots back to life, would also be useful for trade. Madame Tien again said that this was also a cultural project and should not be viewed from the economic point of view only, for the profit from a cultural project was not materialistic. The artists responded this time and said that it would be better for the money to be used to repair museums and libraries, both of which were now in a deplorable condition. In the end, Mrs. Tien said that she would go on with the project for it was her own idea and she wanted to realize her ideas during her lifetime.

One day after Madame Tien had stated that the project would at all costs be

executed, a group of youth calling themselves "The Austerity Movement"¹⁰ marched to the BAPPENAS (National Development Planning Council). As this is the highest institution for economic development planning in the nation, the youth wanted to hear its opinion on the subject. The movement attracted the attention of the press and the community and was then followed by other groups of youth not only in Jakarta but also in Bandung and Jogjakarta. Discussions were held at university campuses such as the University of Indonesia and the Bandung Technological Institute. Both campuses had once been the students' stronghold when they overthrew Sukarno in 1966. They took an active part in rejecting the "Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature" project. There was an incident when a group of youth who called themselves "Movement to Safeguard Public Funds" came to the office of the **MII** secretariat. They were attacked by another group using knives and guns; several persons were wounded in the skirmish. The situation grew tense until President Suharto, who had remained silent, made a speech in early January 1972. In his speech, Suharto said that the anti-"Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature" movement was being used for political interests which were directed to overthrow him. He continued that if he were no longer wanted as a president, parliamentary channels should be used. If extra-parliamentary means continued to be used, he would set the whole Armed Forces against the group on the basis of the "SP-March 11" (a presidential decision that gives Suharto extra-constitutional power). He also reminded the public of his wife's contribution to the nation in 1965, when he was facing critical moments¹¹.

The speech was surprising, for Suharto, well-known for his friendliness and smile, suddenly became vehement. Almost everybody thought that there was no need for Suharto to make such a strong speech and that the accusations were out of proportion for a group of youth who only had the simple aspiration of working together for the development of the nation. The youths responded to Suharto with a statement entitled "Grey January"¹². The content emphasized that the intention of the young people who demonstrated was only to put forward an honest criticism for something which in their opinion was not good. They had entertained no ulterior motives. However, if the criticism was to be confronted with the whole Armed Forces, they would surrender. They could not do otherwise, for they were helpless. With remembrance of their friendship in 1966 with Suharto, they could only wave their hands now, with tears in their eyes, and hope that Suharto could continue to lead the nation safely.

As a follow-up of Suharto's speech, several arrests were made. Among those arrested was the young man, who had been active in the demonstrations against the "Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature" project, in the discussions against the project and who was also one of the signatories of the "Grey January" statement. He was arrested with three of his friends¹³. While these three were being detained,

¹⁰ See Appendix I.

¹¹ Speech by President Suharto on January 5, 1972 during the opening of the Pertamina Hospital in Kebajoran Baru.

¹² See Appendix II.

¹³ Those arrested are **HJC Princen**, chairman of the Human rights Foundation who actively accompanied the youth (among others because of his duty as a Dutch newspaper correspondent) especially when facing the police. Then **Arief Budiman**, **Jusuf A. R.** a leader of the Secondary School Students Action who was very active in 1966, **Fairus Basar**, also

other young people began a solidarity action by writing in newspapers, by sit-in demonstrations in front of the police headquarters in Djakarta. These actions received enthusiastic support from the community, donations in the form of food and other things began to flow.

While in detention, the young man was completely cut off from the outside world. For the first ten days he was not allowed visits by his family, was forbidden to read newspapers and was continuously interrogated in connection with accusations of subversive action. The confinement induced him to contemplate deeply about many things. He began to ask himself what really had happened. Was it true that he tried to sabotage development efforts by opposing the "Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature" project, which he felt was a waste of money? Was it true that he tried to subvert the government which he formerly helped to establish, though his contribution was very small? He saw that if he were willing, he could follow his other friends who had joined Golkar. They now owned houses and private cars, and some had become directors of several business companies. He thought of his present attitude, which not only gave him no house or car but had carried him to a detainment cell as well; was this not the attitude of a person who does not understand the art of living? He remembered his own living quarters consisting of a small pavilion belonging to his in-laws, where he lived with his wife and two small children, on a salary which was just enough for a simple life. He remembered his only means of transportation, a Vespa scooter, for which he was still paying installments.

When he was released twenty-six days later, he was still asking himself if all that he had done so far were indeed the appropriate actions. He could not find the answer. But there was one thing he could answer: If he should have been asked whether he was happy, he would have said yes. He could even have added that he was a bit proud of all he had done. With the poverty, fear and the restlessness he had experienced from time to time, he could be at peace with himself, for he had never betrayed his conscience.

Appendix

I. The Austerity Movement and Indonesia in Miniature

When the Austerity Movement appeared, they distributed pamphlets, from which their purpose could be discerned. It is most interesting to note that their movement is based on exactly those economic principles which were emphasized by the intellectuals in Golkar. Their argument for using force and deceit during the election was "Economic development at all cost". Therefore, the Austerity Movement directly put their economic principles to test in order to see whether they are still faithful to their economic development policy. To obtain a complete picture, the pamphlet is quoted below:

The Austerity Movement and Indonesia in Miniature

1. It was none less than Suharto, the President of the Republic of Indonesia, who suggested that at the present stage of development we must live frugally. It was

a leader of the Secondary School Students Action. Princen was detained by the military (KOPKAMTIB) and the others were detained by the police except Arief Budiman who was borrowed from the police by the military for a week.

also Widjojo Nitisastro, Chairman of the **Economic Development Planning Council** (BAPPENAS), a famous economist in Indonesia as well as in the international world, who continuously campaigned for the Indonesian people to live economically. For this reason, we who are grouped in the **Austerity Movement**, are no less than an extension of the appeal for austerity.

2. **Why austerity is necessary.** In the present stage of development, where capital is very much needed for productive projects, the use of money unproductively is an indirect sabotage to the development itself. Every year we try to find loans to be used as capital. If the money is not invested in productive projects it means that in the future we do not get productive factories but a debt that grows larger with the years due to its interests. What we are doing today will determine our future fate, especially the fate of the younger generation who will inherit the nation.

3. In Indonesia at present we see two opposing movements on the subject of austerity. On one side, the economists and statesmen who want this nation to progress are trying to conduct a campaign of austerity. The effort to obtain capital is made intensively from foreign sources (loans from IGGI countries) and domestic sources (through Tabanas and Taska [domestic saving plan]). Naturally, after the capital has been collected we have to think seriously about investing it in good projects. The wrong choice will mean a waste of the money which has been collected with great difficulties. On the other hand, we see the money used unproductively by high officials, civilian and military alike. Luxurious houses, big cars, consumption of imported goods while domestic goods of almost the same quality are available. President Suharto himself seriously suggests that Indonesian high officials should not exhibit their wealth conspicuously and that the Indonesian people use goods "Made In Indonesia".

4. What is called Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Project is a wasteful project. The cost of Rp 10,500,000,000,— (about 26.5 Mill. \$) would build seven modern university campuses as big as Gadjah Mada University, or would pay the salary of a university lecturer for 87,500 years if the salary were Rp 10,000,— a month. (Remember, our world is only 2,000 years old since the birth of Christ.)

5. It is said that the money will be obtained from non-budgetary sources which means that it will not disturb the state budget. The data from "Nusa" consultation bureau stated that amount of Rp 1,768,000,000 will be obtained from the provinces. Every province is expected to contribute Rp 50,000,000. The money will certainly be obtained from additional taxes (adding to the people's burden) or from the businessmen who in turn will raise the price of their merchandise (again a burden for the people). It seems that whatever the source is, in the end it is the people who must pay. Other institutions will be asked to donate the sum of Rp 1,497,000,000. It is reported that several departments will be asked to make money available for this project on the basis that it is a national project and must be assisted by all government apparatus. The question is, what in reality is a national project and who determines its status as a national project.

"Harapan Kita" foundation, a private foundation which sponsored this project would contribute the sum of Rp 2,068,000,000 in a period of three years. If the plan is successfully carried out, then the Harapan Kita foundation (chaired by Madame Suharto) is the best in Indonesia, if it could in a relatively short time collect such a big amount of money from the non-government community of Indonesia. If there

are foundations such as this in Indonesia, IGGI is no longer needed. We do not have to humble ourselves in front of rich nations just to get a loan.

Finally, a sum of Rp 4,267,000,000 will be obtained from domestic and foreign investors. From the businessmen it was learned that they are not interested in investing their capital in the project, for according to calculations the project can not be hoped to give profit to the investors. The inclusion of their names in the "who's who" or on the marble wall in the project is not attractive, for the project does not give a good impression to the people of Indonesia who live in extreme poverty.

6. We, in the Austerity Movement, would not be active if we are not moved by the plea from the people as well as from the elite group including our economists regarding this project. An honest research will show how unpopular this project is in the eyes of people, domestic as well as abroad. It is true that not everybody dares to voice his objection openly, just as in the period of Sukarno only a few people stated their objection when Sukarno wanted to build a "Bung Karno" tower where people could see the beauty of Indonesia while dining in a luxurious restaurant.

Our movement is thus not a movement of a few people but supported by the majority of the Indonesian people, though they do not dare to voice their objection openly. We are ready to prove this fact by honest research. On the other hand, our movement is also intended to preserve the image of our state leader as a man who earnestly wants to develop the nation. As citizens, we feel responsible to participate actively and voice our objection openly on things that we consider wrong. It is absurd and oldfashioned to relate us to a political background whatsoever.

Djakarta, December 16, 1971

II. The Grey January Statement

The "Grey January" statement is considered as something very touching by many people and also a strong blow in the Javanese tradition for Suharto. The content is as follows:

The Grey January

The attitude of President Suharto regarding the Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature is now clear as stated in his speech yesterday during the opening of the Pertamina Hospital. How Pak Harto judges us, what action he would take against us if we continue our demonstration and the like, is now clear.

We still think that the Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature project to be implemented by Harapan Kita Foundation, whether declared as private or not, will in the present condition hinder development efforts. Thus we still oppose it. Our opinion is not based on any kind of prejudice whatsoever but based on a logical opinion that can be put to test. We are ready to discuss with anyone who questions our argumentation. However if we are threatened by physical force, if all the armed forces is against us, if we are confronted by the armed forces like the Indonesian communist party formerly, as stated by Pak Harto yesterday, we can only say from the beginning that we surrender. We are helpless if we are threatened by a physical confrontation. We are nothing if faced by a fully-armed and compact armed forces. No matter what,

we are only a group of youth who in 1966 had a meaningless share which is nothing compared to pak Harto's share in establishing this new order government.

We will retreat for we are certainly helpless. We shall remain silent if we are confronted with the fully-armed Armed Forces for we cannot endure sharp bayonets and hot bullets. We are only made of soft flesh with hopeful eyes for the future. Our future.

Finally, to all the Indonesian people who are great in number and who sympathize with our actions whether openly stated or silently in their hearts, we thank you most sincerely and honestly. To pak Harto, in remembrance of our friendship formerly in 1966, we want to convey the message in order to distinguish who are friends, and who are enemies; who truly loves pak Harto and who wants to cause him to trip and fall? We hope pak Harto still remembers our old friendship and still wishes to hear what we are saying. With tears in our eyes we wave our hands to you pak Harto: Good-luck . . .!

Djakarta, January 6, 1972

We, Indonesian youth, are: Arief Budiman, Asmara Nawaban, Louis Wangge, Jusril, Jessy Monintja, Toto Surowijono, Haposan Sihombing, Butje Rumamory, Imam Waluju.