

lines of conflict (p. 109). Saeed Shafqat reveals the depth of extremist Islamist tendencies in the political process of Pakistan that make nation building a "daunting task" (p. 146). Therefore, Pakistan is at the centre of several lines of conflict. Transnational Islamism is, according to Olivier Roy, Sumit Ganguly and Gilles Dorronsoro only of recent origin. Jean-Luc Racine explains that Pakistani support for armed Kashmiri rebel groups plays an important role for the maintenance and development of the country's national ideology (p. 224), so that, according to Amélie Blom, the Kashmir issue even dominates the politics of Pakistan (p. 304). Pierre Lafrance, however, propounds a different thesis. He maintains that the geography of the country is such that "ethnic and religious forces at play are, (however), centrifugal with regard to (India)" (p. 338). Yet this thesis is not a novel one, nor is Lafrance able to provide conclusive evidence for it. What is more, Lafrance is strictly speaking alone with this thesis here. Ian Talbot's assumption, therefore, that "weak political institutionalization and an underdeveloped civil society" (p. 331–2) have proven to be the biggest burden in the nation-building process of Pakistan, seem to be taken more seriously.

The book is of value for all persons interested in the development of Pakistan. It provides a good insight into various issues involved and also gives a solid outline of Pakistan studies until 2001. However, the collapse of the World Trade Towers in New York brought the country back into the centre of world politics. Since then Pakistani politics seems to be re-arranging some of its coordinates. Naturally, the editor was not able to include these aspects in this book. A new publication covering recent developments would thus be welcome, though the issue of nation-building should not be restricted to Pakistan alone. A comparative study of the South Asian region could shed new light on the process of Pakistan's nation-building and indeed provide an innovative contribution to the subject.

Michael Schied

ILMAS FUTEHALLY / SEMU BHATT, *Cost of Conflict Between India and Pakistan*.
Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group, 2004. V, 105 pages, US\$ 40,-. ISBN
81-88262-04-8

The conflict between India and Pakistan is as old as the two states; in fact it is even older as the discussion about separate states for the followers of different religions in then British India dates back to the 1920s. At midnight on August 14, 1947 British India was partitioned. Where exactly the dividing line – drawn by the Radcliffe Award – would ultimately be, was not known until the celebrations were over, and the fact that colonial rule ended not only for British India, but also for hundreds of princely states, complicated affairs even more. Indo-Pakistan relations, thus, have been strained right from the beginning. The major bones of contention were the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir and the

waters of the Indus and its eastern tributaries. Wars over Kashmir were fought in 1947–49 and in 1965 and over East Pakistan in 1971. The water dispute was settled by the Indus Water Treaty in 1960; Bangladesh was recognized as an independent state in 1974. As for Kashmir, Pakistan had to accept the status quo in the Shimla Agreement of 1972. It was only after the end of the “Russian” war in Afghanistan, i.e. in 1989, that tension in Kashmir, or more precisely in the Indian held part of the state, turned into civil war between what India calls “Pakistani trained terrorists” on the one hand and Indian security forces on the other. After India and Pakistan demonstrated their capabilities with the help of a string of nuclear tests in May 1998, the world began to take notice of the dangers of a potential nuclear war in South Asia. The then US president Clinton famously called it “the most dangerous place on earth”. Since the Indo-Pakistan conflict was unrelated to the East-West conflict, there was no peace dividend from the break up of the Soviet empire. As early as 1999 it also turned out that there were no dividends to be expected from nuclear weapons, because nuclear deterrence did not suffice to prevent conventional warfare between India and Pakistan: for weeks fighting on the Siachen Glacier went on and heavy artillery fire was exchanged in the Kargil section of the “Line of Control” that divides Kashmir. An imminent war could be prevented after the Chinese and US leaders managed to convince the Pakistan prime minister to call back his “volunteers”.

The book under review deals with the cost of the conflict. It has been brought out by the International Centre for Peace Initiatives and is – according to the acknowledgements – “a result of a comprehensive exercise. The co-authors have gained significantly from input provided by in-house researchers, as well as by external experts from India and Pakistan”. The project was supported by the German Friedrich Naumann Stiftung and the Christian Michelsen Institute in Norway. The first draft of the report was discussed at a workshop in Colombo in late 2003, immediately before the SAARC summit in Islamabad in January 2004, which re-started the Indo-Pakistan dialogue that was taken up by the new government in India after prime minister Vajpayee, who had initiated this “last” attempt to come to an understanding with Pakistan, had surprisingly lost the elections.

The book is basically a collection of background material and information of the kind necessary for dealing with the topic and which is usually so difficult to gather from the diverse sources. Even the analysis comes mostly in the form of tables and graphs of the kind required for lectures and papers. It starts with a series of “Basic Statistical Data” on the two neighbours: heads of government, bilateral meetings, chronicle of Indo-Pakistan relations and a “Swing Model of India-Pakistan Relations” which shows graphically how the pendulum swung between peace (Lahore 1999, Agra 2001, Islamabad 2004) and conflict (nuclear tests 1998, Kargil 1999, attack on the Indian parliament 2001). Chapters 1 to 4 deal with the various costs of the conflict: military, social and political, economic, and diplomatic; chapter 5 shows the costs for Jammu and Kashmir; chapter 6 draws a “conflict escalation ladder”; chapter 7 shows the likely impact

of a "Nuclear Confrontation" and chapter 8 recommends climbing the "peace building ladder". The publication concludes with sources (arranged chapter-wise) and acknowledgements.

The book is rich in detail, most of which is otherwise not readily available. It is targeted at readers in India and Pakistan who know the basics of the conflict. The most shocking chapter deals with its escalation, from interference in internal problems, increased terrorist violence, breakdown of bilateral ties, and US intervention in the dispute to a disintegration of the Pakistan state, conventional war and – finally – nuclear war. The terrors of such a war are demonstrated by way of a (hypothetical) case study, i.e. the impact of nuclear attacks on Mumbai and Karachi. The likely impact is described in detail, zones of destruction are mapped, long-term effects on health, infrastructure, environment, the economy and the political system are listed.

The book ends on a more positive note: The "peace building ladder" starts by preparing the ground, initial official contacts and an official dialogue before the groundwork for political breakthrough is laid and a summit meeting can be held. The aim of this exercise, however, is only to defuse the conflict, not to advertise a particular solution to all bilateral problems: "Once adequate preparation is made [...] the Heads of Government of India and Pakistan should meet. They should specifically explore a political solution to all outstanding conflicts, in particular Jammu and Kashmir, and work out a compromise solution in the interest of the security of India and Pakistan and honour and justice for the Kashmiri people." (p. 104).

Wolfgang-Peter Zingel

AMIT DAS GUPTA, *Handel, Hilfe, Hallstein-Doktrin. Die deutsche Südasienspolitik unter Adenauer und Erhard 1949–1966*. (Historische Studien 479).

Husum: Matthiesen Verlag, 2004. 500 Seiten, € 69,--. ISBN 3-7868-1479-1

Es gilt als Allgemeinplatz, dass für Konrad Adenauer die Integration der Bundesrepublik in die westliche Staatengemeinschaft oberste Priorität hatte. Deshalb haben Historiker darauf ihr Hauptaugenmerk gelegt und andere Teile der Außenpolitik jener Jahre eher stiefmütterlich behandelt. Insbesondere zur deutschen Südasienspolitik dieser Zeit fehlte bisher eine Studie. Das umfangreiche Buch von Amit Das Gupta zur deutschen Südasienspolitik unter den Bundeskanzlern Adenauer (1949–63) und Erhard (1963–66) schließt nun diese Forschungslücke. Wie der Autor nachzeichnet, war Indien für die Bundesrepublik „das Schlüsselland zur Durchsetzung des Alleinvertretungsanspruchs“ (S. 13) und somit von besonderer Bedeutung für die gesamte Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Durch die ‚Hallstein-Doktrin‘ sah sich die Bundesrepublik als einzigen legitimen deutschen Staat an und brach diplomatische Beziehungen zu denjenigen Staaten ab, die die DDR als souveränen Staat anerkannten. Für den gesamten Untersuchungszeitraum der Studie Das Guptas kann die