

chen Sprache) beigefügt ist. Er handelt von einer kaiserlichen Hochzeit der Östlichen Dynastie aus der Sicht der Familie der Braut. Obwohl der Text seit dem 17. Jh. als Fälschung stigmatisiert und nach wie vor umstritten ist, versucht die Textinterpretation, weitere Informationen über die „Hochzeit als Mittel zur Machtbegründung“ herauszufiltern.

Somit stehen sämtliche Beiträge unter der Frage nach weiblichen Persönlichkeiten im machtpolitischen Spiel. Das sorgt für die Kohärenz des Sammelbandes, bei aller Farbigkeit der Überlieferung sowie der Frauenfiguren, zumal auch eine einheitliche Epoche fokussiert ist. Eine weitere Stärke dieses Sammelbandes ist die bereits erwähnte Methodenvielfalt. Die „Wirklichkeit“ im Titel des Gesamtbuches würde ich aus den o. g. Gründen gerne streichen wollen, insbesondere dort, wo in den Einzelbeiträgen explizit wissenschaftsmethodisch argumentiert wird, sich die frühen Quellen eben als „Texte“, als „Erzählungen“ erweisen und kaum den Blick auf *wirkliche* Aufgaben, Räume und Rollen historischer Frauengestalten freigeben.

Gudula Linck

ROBERT L. SUETTINGER, *Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. XII, 556 pages, \$ 39.95. ISBN 0-8157-8206-3

This weighty volume is a first book by an author with 24 years' experience in US government service. It consists of a series of narratives about decision-making in various China-related policy fields. As participant-observer in both intelligence and policy processes, Suettinger rejects classified information, which he considers overrated. Writing from the US perspective, he offers less detail for the Chinese side, yet his depiction of relations is quite consistent. An overarching message are his repeated warnings that many disputes between the US and China were entirely unnecessary.

His major case is a detailed description of the Tiananmen events in 1989, conveyed to the US public through media dominated by countless US journalists with little prior knowledge of Chinese language and politics. These US media hardly mentioned that the student protesters could agree only on a negative agenda. The extremist attitudes of some of them revealed in the interview of the only female leader, Chai Ling, with an Australian paper, are still little known: "What we are actually hoping for is bloodshed. ... Only when the square is awash with blood will the people of China open their eyes." In contrast, Suettinger presents the Chinese leaders as amazingly patient with the demonstrators for weeks on end. He points to their readiness to negotiate with the students about how to improve the country, also to their lack of experience with modern techniques of crowd control (after the military crackdown China ordered water cannons in Germany). In the first chapters Suettinger relies repeatedly on *The Tiananmen Papers*, a publication the tenor of which is highly

critical of the Chinese government and supposedly compiled by a Chinese under pseudonym. Only in the last chapter does he explain more extensively how questionable the book is; yet it does not appear to negatively influence his analysis of the Chinese political leadership.

Suettinger sees policy decisions as outcomes of complex internal processes, not of grand strategic trends. He describes the backlash Deng Xiaoping suffered from Tiananmen, both in loss of public trust and in a severe setback to his economic reforms. After all, the economic reformers were the – subsequently dismissed – politicians blamed for the loss of control over the protests. The Chinese military also suffered from internal morale problems after turning against civilians. After June 4, 1989 members of Congress in the US lacked a sense of the complex internal divisions within China and became embroiled in a fight with the Bush administration, which was seeking to control damage in bilateral relations. It is instructive to read how much energy was wasted in the US alone in that process of infighting, due to mutual incomprehension and scape-goating. At that time President Bush insisted on a strategy of more contacts – somewhat resembling Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* – so as to create a climate for democratic change.

The enormous challenges of economic reform in China during the 1990s are vividly portrayed, undertaken by a courageous leadership in a process of trial and error, since there was no precedent for reforms on such a scale. The Chinese learning process extended to the surrounding Asian countries, reforms of state-owned enterprises were considered even more urgent after South Korea's problems with its *chaebol* conglomerates became obvious in the late 1990s. This contrasts with an absence of new thinking in the Clinton administration's approach to China, which nevertheless claimed to pursue an activist foreign policy. Where Bush had battled with Congress, Clinton's China policy suffered additionally from major internal divisions among government departments, as Suettinger describes in detail.

As a negative example he also focusses on the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Kosovo war in 1999. It was called an 'error' immediately afterwards by the heads of the CIA and Pentagon, and Clinton sent a letter of apology to Jiang Zemin. Yet Suettinger points out that the presumed target was the only one that the CIA had nominated in the whole war, which raised questions about whether it was a mistake. The bombing dealt a major blow to Chinese confidence in US values and led to widespread public demonstrations and lasting anti-American feelings. In the way it contradicted the US president's efforts to maintain good relations, the case is somewhat reminiscent of the killing of Italian secret service agent Nicola Calipari in Iraq by US soldiers in 2005, which could not have been in the interest of President Bush.

Another case of bureaucratic and congressional infighting was the alleged 'spy case' against Wen Ho Lee, a Taiwan-born scientist working in the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory. He was accused of betraying secrets to China. "Like many of



the issues that roiled U.S.-China ties since 1989, this one also had its origins in intelligence, espionage, and press leaks." The *New York Times* broke the story in March 1999. The accused was treated very harshly (nine months in solitary confinement), the case ended inconclusively and it later turned out that the FBI knew very early that the government's case was hopelessly inadequate. Media reports had so intensified the suspicions against Wen Ho Lee that the *Times* later found it appropriate to apologize for its role in the case. At any rate, widespread alienation of Asian Americans lasted for a long time.

Sabine Grund

KARL PILNY, *Das asiatische Jahrhundert. China und Japan auf dem Weg zur neuen Weltmacht*. Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2005. 340 Seiten, € 24,90. ISBN 3-593-37678-4.

Karl Pilny, ein Berliner Wirtschaftsanwalt, projiziert eine wohlwollende chinesische Hegemonie, der sich aber leider zu des Autors Zorn und Kummer das widerspenstige Japan nicht unterordnen will.

Die erste Hälfte des Buches, die von China handelt, ist durchaus interessant, zumal Pilny die Prognosen der künftigen Allmacht des Landes stets durch die Erwähnung aktueller Schwachstellen relativiert und so einer gewissen Realitätskontrolle unterwirft, bevor ihm in der zweiten Hälfte die Urteilskraft zu entgleiten droht. Seit 20 Jahren ist nach seinen Daten China um 9,4% jährlich gewachsen. Dank der Überinvestitionen gibt es 40 Mobiltelefonhersteller, 120 Autobauer, 400 Bierbrauer und 8000 Zementfabriken, von denen niemand, einschließlich der Ausländer, so recht rentabel arbeiten kann (S. 40). Pilny hält ausländische Großinvestoren nicht ganz zu Unrecht für „hypnotisiert“ von dem Potential der Einwohnerzahl (S. 34) und warnt vor mangelndem Rechtsschutz, dem Druck zum Technologietransfer und dem Zwang, chinesische Zulieferer zu begünstigen (S. 45). Angesichts der Vielzahl fauler Kredite, des intransparenten Aktienmarkts, dem Fehlen von Innovationen und dem „geborgten Aufschwung“ kommen ihm auch vorübergehende Zweifel an der Nachhaltigkeit des chinesischen Wachstums (S. 60). Diese halten jedoch nicht lange vor: Denn „in 10 bis 15 Jahren“ werden China und Indien die japanische Hochkostenwirtschaft überholt haben (S. 177), um „in 30 Jahren“ mit Indien zur größten Wirtschaftsmacht der Welt aufzusteigen (S. 152). Doch behauptet Pilny gleichzeitig, China und Japan würden „in wenigen Jahren“ möglicherweise 85% der weltweiten Wirtschaftskraft unter sich aufteilen (S. 286). Das lässt natürlich wenig Raum für die Inder, vom Rest der Welt ganz zu schweigen. Nach Angaben der Weltbank (2002) macht der aktuelle Anteil Japans 13,5% und der Chinas 3,8% am Bruttonationalprodukt der Welt aus. Da muss in jenen „wenigen Jahren“ schon sehr viel passieren.