

THOMAS KAMPEN, *Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership*. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2000. xiv, 144 pages, £ 15.99 / \$ 19.95. ISBN 87-87062-76-3 (Pb.). £ 30.00 / \$ 45.00, ISBN 87-87062-80-1 (Hb.)

The unprecedented expansion of research, and a flood of publications in the People's Republic of China that has emerged since the 1980s in consequence of the reappraisal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initiated at the end of the 1970s, has led to completely new insights into sources that were hitherto unknown or unedited.

Thomas Kampen's book analyses the question of how Mao Zedong (and Zhou Enlai) rose to power. He seeks to shed new light on the power struggles within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party between 1931 (when several party leaders left Shanghai and entered the Jiangxi Soviet) and 1945 (when Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai had emerged as senior CCP leaders). Based on the new publications from the People's Republic of China since the early 1980s such as memoirs, autobiographies and biographies, collections of CCP documents, descriptions of the organisational structure of the CCP, chronicles of the party and several politicians etc., Kampen presents a powerful critique of some myths which had been central to Western and Chinese scholarship for decades. The respective sources allow more exact conclusions concerning the approximate date of individual biographies and crucial events, which up to the time of Kampen's work had not been noticed or were simply not recorded.

Thomas Kampen challenges a myth which has been upheld within Western historiography for more than 40 years: the hitherto undisputed homogeneity of the "28 Bolsheviks" who returned from Moscow in 1930 in order to take over the CCP leadership. Until now, the "28 Bolsheviks" were considered representative of the enforcement of Soviet interests, while Mao Zedong was regarded as representative of the maintenance of Chinese interests. In Kampen's view, this pattern of a "struggle between two parties" reveals itself as "instrumentalized history", a view that seemed most convincing due to its simplicity. Especially after the outbreak of Sino-Soviet conflict in the 60s, this pattern guaranteed the establishment of a fundamental difference between Soviet and Chinese communism. But in fact the "28 Bolsheviks" did not constitute a homogeneous group; the truth is that as regards social and geographical descent, age, education and their function in the party they differed from each other quite considerably and therefore constituted a totally heterogeneous group. Moreover, the author shows that in order to strengthen its own policy, the Comintern removed Li Lisan (the head of the Communist Party) in 1930 without any participation of the "28 Bolsheviks" by merely calling him to Moscow.

The author focusses on the evolution of a new leadership within the Communist Party, especially at the 4th plenum in January 1931, during which the supposed *putsch* of the "28 Bolsheviks" was supposed to have taken place. In fact, such an "attempt to seize power" (!) never took place – the acceptance of the Comintern line at the plenum was mainly due to the participation of Pavel Mif, the Comintern's

China specialist. Zhou Enlai's role – that of a highly esteemed functionary – was important as well. Recent facts disprove the erroneous view that Mao Zedong was “dethroned” by the “28 Bolsheviks” after their move to Soviet territory. Moreover, Kampen shows that the “Bolsheviks” were not removed from power during the “Long March” as was maintained for over 40 years. His profound analysis also shows that Mao Zedong was *not* chairman of the Politburo, an office which did not exist at all in the 30s. That Mao Zedong gained influence over the military leadership was due to the failures of the New Leadership, which had to quit Soviet territory in 1934, as well as to the change of mind of Zhou Enlai who held the prime position together with Zhu De. The leading position of Mao in January 1935 was therefore still unestablished. Although he was a member of the Politburo, he was not the leader of the party, neither nominally nor practically. The outstanding result of the present study is the explanation of the Zhunyi Conference in January 1935.

Kampen disproves the view that Mao advanced to the position as a member of the top leadership in military affairs, a view held since the 70s by no less than six eminent historians, also that he was elected chairman of the Politburo at this conference, a view held since the 50s by eight other reputed historians. The same is true for the suggestion that Mao was elected member of the Secretariat of the Politburo, and that the dominating role of the Comintern had definitely come to an end in 1935. As a matter of fact, there were no relevant changes in party leadership in January 1935. As Kampen points out, Mao rose to his well-known position not earlier than 1943. It was *afterwards* that Mao Zedong was able to establish his position by promoting the “Mao-Zedong-ideas” (1943), by publishing his “complete works” (1944) and by his election to the CCP leadership (1943). These results are based mainly on the memoirs and biographies of persons who were either involved in the events mentioned or at least were able to witness them. Comparing this material with suggestions treated by international historiography as established facts, the latter can be shown to be purely imaginary. This leads to some new conclusions. Insight is derived into the very procedure by which historical knowledge was produced in the PRC of the 50s, characterized by the uncritical acceptance of untraced and rudimentary sources which were simply reproduced (utterly neglecting the newly discovered sources accessible since the 80s). Kampen is also able to show how the propagation of the simple pattern of the “struggle between two parties” was instrumentalized ever since the 50s as a tool of political propaganda. Shortening Mao's “time in office” by eight years would diminish the “glorification of Mao's ascent to power” and would therefore only create confusion.

Re-constructing this historical aspect therefore not only unmask a considerable amount of information about Mao as intentionally false, but also reflects the way Western (especially North American) historiography worked, and simultaneously reflects how China's historians treated their own past.

The book is the revised translation of *Die Führung der KP Chinas und der Aufstieg Mao Zedongs (1931–1945)* published in 1998 by Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz. Although the content is identical, the editorial improvements should be valued: The

English version gains by the insertion of a chronology, of a list of key protagonists, a well structured index of names and subjects, and last but not least by the insertion of 19 photographs. Hopefully, the paperback edition will make it easily accessible to all who wondered about unspoken contradictions and inconsistencies within modern Chinese history.

Angelika Messner

MARKUS TAUBE, *Ökonomische Integration zwischen Hongkong und der Provinz Guangdong, VR China. Der chinesische Transformationsprozeß als Triebkraft grenzüberschreitender Arbeitsteilung.* (ifo Studien zur Entwicklungsforschung, 31). München, Köln, London: Weltforum Verlag, 1997. XXV, 671 pages, DM 78,-. ISBN 3-8039-0467-6. Incl. a summary in English.

In 1997, Hong Kong became the first Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. A process of close economic co-operation and integration of the former Crown Colony with China's southern province of Guangdong entered a new phase. But while most spectators concentrated on the prospects of Hong Kong's further development as an international centre of finance, trade and commerce, the underlying institutional arrangements were largely ignored. It is one of the great achievements of Markus Taube, a young economic researcher at the ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich, to have cast light on this important topic.

Markus Taube's research focuses on three major questions: the transformation of the Chinese economy, the impact of institutional change on the relations between different economic systems and the development of the institutions of foreign economic relations in Guangdong. Relying explicitly and in great detail on economic institutional theory Markus Taube provides an accurate description of the economic exchange between Hong Kong and Guangdong from 1950 to 1995. The book offers profound insights into past economic developments and thus lays the foundation for a detailed analysis of recent changes within China as well as her relations with capitalist economies. Anyone interested in China's economic modernization and the role of institutions within this process will find this case-study most enlightening.

Using the tools of the institutional approach of modern economics, Markus Taube analyses the systemic differences between the two basic models of economic organisation, market economy and centrally planned economy. While economic interaction within these systems usually does not cause too many problems, transactions between market economies and centrally planned economies are not systematically regulated. Consequently, formal institutions such as property rights or accounting systems are unable to transmit the information necessary to achieve optimal outcomes. Where formal institutions fail, informal institutions are set up in order to erase intersystemic inefficiencies. But even in cases where informal institutions do work, they consume resources that could otherwise be used more efficiently. Hence the problems of intersystemic exchange affect economic outcomes and reduce the benefits of cross-border division of labour.

On this theoretical basis, Markus Taube analyses the major aspects of the economic relationship between Guangdong, part of a centrally planned socialist econ-