

# Coping with Discourses on Minority Populations among the Rang of Far Western Nepal: Nation, Scheduled Tribe, *Janajāti* and Indigeneity

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## Abstract

The main inhabitants of Byans, Chaudans and Darma, three adjacent Himalayan valleys in the Mahakali (Kali) drainage system, call themselves “Rang” in their own languages. Their homeland, which has long constituted part of the extensive frontier between South Asia and Tibet, has been politically divided between Nepal and India for nearly two centuries. Even though the Rang have maintained their socio-cultural unity across the international border, the Rang in India and the Rang in Nepal have had to deal with different minority policies and discourses as citizens of one of the two states, coping with various “foreign” ethnonyms as well as meta-level categories such as “scheduled tribe”, *jan(a)jāti* and “indigenous people”. Primarily based on my ethnographic fieldwork in Darchula district in Far Western Nepal and elsewhere, this paper discusses how the Rang in Nepal have coped with changing institutional frameworks and discourses on minority populations on both sides of the Mahakali or Kali River.

**Keywords:** Nepal, India-Nepal border, Rang, Rung, Byansi, *janajāti*, minority politics, indigenous people

The main inhabitants of Byans, Chaudans and Darma, three adjacent Himalayan regions in the Mahakali (Kali) drainage system, call themselves “Rang” in their own languages. Their homeland, which has long constituted part of the extensive frontier between South Asia and Tibet, has been politically divided between Nepal and India for more than two centuries.<sup>1</sup> However, the

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Rang have maintained their socio-cultural unity across the international border, to the extent that the distribution of their internal sociocultural diversity does not coincide with the Nepal-India border. At the same time, the Rang in India and the Rang in Nepal have had to deal with different minority policies and discourses as citizens of one of the two states, coping with various “foreign” ethnonyms as well as meta-level categories such as “scheduled tribe”, *jan(a)jāti* and “indigenous people”. Primarily based on my ethnographic fieldwork in Darchula district in Far Western Nepal and elsewhere,<sup>2</sup> this paper discusses how the Rang in Nepal have coped with changing institutional frameworks and discourses on minority populations on both sides of the Mahakali or Kali River.

While the content and historical development of minority policies in both India and Nepal have been well-discussed among specialists, there have been relatively few anthropological studies that compare India and Nepal in terms of how a minority people have been treated by, and have dealt with, two different state systems for managing minority populations. The case of the Rang, who live across the Himalayan region of the Western border of Nepal with India, offers a unique vantage point from which to rethink the impact of those different policies and discourses on the peoples themselves.<sup>3</sup>

What this article chiefly discusses in terms of “knowledge on the move” are, thus, several ethnonyms and meta-level social categories in English, Nepali, Hindi and other languages, which are circulated and often creatively applied globally, regionally, nationally and/or locally across the Nepal-India border, as well as various ideas behind these concepts.

In the next section, I review the tangled and mutually intertwined histories of such meta-level social categories as “indigenous people”, “tribe”, *jan(a)jāti* and *ādivāsī* at the international and state levels. I stress that in Nepal, which has never been colonised and where English has never had formal status, the trajectory of some of these concepts has been significantly different from that in India, although this point seems to have been understood only superficially by many who are not themselves specialists on Nepal. After introducing the Rang and their ethno-ethnology, and briefly summarising the changing responses of Indian Rangs to the frontier and minority policies of colonial and independent India, I discuss the ways in which the people of the Nepali section of Byans have

1 The Nepal border in this region is currently under dispute, though I do not discuss this sensitive issue here.

2 I started my fieldwork in 1993, using Nepali and English. During the fieldwork I learned (and am still learning) Byansi, and the main language of my research shifted to Byansi from 1994 onwards. I do not speak local Pahari and Tibetan, and have very little Hindi conversation skills.

3 The case of the Limbu in eastern Nepal, Sikkim and West Bengal would be the most comparable (Caplan 1970; Sagant 1996; Subba 1999a, 1999b, 2006; Chemjong 2017; cf. Hangen 2010). The far greater number of non-Hindu populations and their internal diversity in Eastern Nepal and Sikkim, as well as the existence of Darjeeling, an important hill station with tea plantations into which many people from Nepal from various ethnic backgrounds have settled or temporarily migrated, make the situation of far eastern Nepal very different from the case of the Rang. Another comparable case would be the Thangmi discussed by Shneiderman (2009, 2014, 2015), but their residential areas in Nepal and in India are not contiguous.

responded to the shifting minority policies of Nepal in the twentieth and early twenty-first century.

## “Indigenous people”, South Asia and Nepal

I would like to start by discussing the widely circulated concept of “indigenous people”.<sup>4</sup> As van Schendel pointed out, the term was preceded by a highly entangled history of discourses and development of categories, some of which were legally defined and officially enforced in South Asia (van Schendel 2011). Furthermore, as Karlsson and Subba pointed out, the Indian Government has never applied the concept to “Scheduled Tribes” or to any other part of its population (2006), and some prominent Indian scholars, notably André Béteille (1998, 2006), question the simple application of the concept to the subcontinent. On the other hand, the introduction of the (redefined) concept of indigeneity has generated diverse new arguments by engaging with various existing claims upon categories. The terms *ādivāsī* and “tribals” have often been equated with “indigenous people(s)”, although ambiguously and problematically (Karlsson / Subba 2006: 2). “[I]n the case of India, the concept ‘indigenous people’ is already out there” (Karlsson / Subba 2006: 75), often constituting a vital part of the entangled socio-political processes, especially in the northeast.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, some Hindutva nationalists have argued that Aryans are the original inhabitants of Bhārat (India), forgoing the term *ādivāsī* for *vanvāsī* (“forest dwellers”), thus securing their glorious past and indigeneity in South Asia (Visweswaran et al. 2009, Karlsson / Subba 2006: 3). However, not all people have been equally involved in these debates and processes; for some of those who have already been acknowledged as a Scheduled Tribe, the crucial priority might be how to better deal with an existing scheme, rather than with a new concept.<sup>7</sup>

Nepal, once the world’s only Hindu kingdom and, after its long process of transition, a secular federal republic since 2015, has occupied a distinct position in South Asian minority politics, having never been directly colonised by the British.<sup>8</sup>

4 The ILO Convention 169 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have often been cited as international legal bases for this concept.

5 See Bates 1995 for a history of the concept of *ādivāsī* and *ādivāsī* movements in colonial and post-colonial India.

6 For instance, Karlsson 2013 shows that the category of “indigenous tribe”, a conflation of the national regime of “Scheduled Tribe” and the global framework of “indigenous peoples”, has become salient in the state of Meghalaya, where the vast majority of the population can claim Scheduled Tribe status. Also see Karlsson 2003, and Karlsson / Subba 2006.

7 Middleton’s ethnographic account of government anthropologists in Darjeeling, West Bengal (2013) contains no mention of “indigeneity” per se.

8 See Des Chene 2011 for her acute criticism of both South Asian Studies and “Western” anthropology of Nepal in terms of Nepal’s “non-postcoloniality”. I hope this paper escapes her criticism, even if only partially.

The categories, discourses and institutional frameworks regarding the various populations in modern Nepal have undergone several major transformations.

Until the middle of the twentieth century, the modern state of Nepal had a distinct socio-political system of its own: a strange amalgam of modern territorial state and “traditional” Hindu kingdom, developed most notably under the Rana rulers between 1846 and 1951. The first general legal code in modern Nepal, the Muluki Ain of 1854, treated each and every person within the territory of Nepal, including foreigners, as a member of a particular group known as a *jāt* or *jāti*. These *jāts* were hierarchically ordered according to various Hindu criteria, such as commensality and (un)touchability. Under this legal code, each person in Nepal, whether or not he or she was from a caste society, occupied a distinct place in the national caste system, which was different from any local caste system. On the other hand, the Muluki Ain also acknowledged regional (and *jāt*) sociocultural differences within the hierarchic order it prescribed, as long as these did not violate certain basic Hindu norms, notably the killing of cows and Brahmans.<sup>9</sup>

From the middle of the twentieth century, Nepal as a state experienced a series of fundamental transformations. From 1961 to 1990, the national integration policy under the Hindu king was strongly promulgated, together with the development of the state. Propagated through general education and mass media, both of which were first introduced after the end of the Rana regime, the scheme of “Panchayat democracy”<sup>10</sup> tried to create equal, modern and harmonious Nepali citizens, while prohibiting all political parties and organisations and largely ignoring ethnic, regional or caste differences.

To be sure, discrimination in terms of *varṇa*, *jāt*, and *jāti* was prohibited in both the 1959 and 1962 constitutions, with these words rendered respectively as race, caste and tribe in their official English translations.<sup>11</sup> The lack of any concrete policy toward any particular *varṇa*, *jāt* or *jāti*, however, marked a stark contrast to the legal frameworks of India and Pakistan. The national integration policy in the Panchayat era certainly accelerated the process of so-called Nepalisation in various respects, but ultimately failed to create a homogeneous body of Nepali citizens, imagined as Nepali-speaking modern Hindus.<sup>12</sup> Protests from sociocultural and linguistic “minorities” against the attempt at overly

9 The code was reprinted by the government of Nepal (Śrī 5 ko sarakāra 2022vs). On this code and the national and group imagination in the Rana period, see for instance Burghart 1996, Höfer 1979, Michaels 2005 and Sharma 1977. Khatiwoda et al. (2021) provide an annotated English translation of the entire code.

10 “Panchayat” originally refers to the “traditional” South Asian local council of five elders, but in Nepal during this period the term was used to refer to the distinctive “democracy” without political parties alleged to be suited to the climate of Nepal.

11 His Majesty’s Government of Nepal (1959, 1963); Śrī 5 ko sarakāra (2016vs., 2019vs.). Höfer (1979: 46–47, 135), among others, discussed this point. On the complicated effects of translation on the invisible exercise of power through language in the legal sphere in Nepal, see Nawa 2016, 2018.

12 On various aspects of the socio-political processes during the Panchayat era, see for instance Borgström 1980, Burghart 1996, L. Caplan 1970, P. Caplan 1972, Gellner et al. 1997 and Pigg 1992.

standardised national integration could already be heard in the late 1980s, especially among ethnic activists.

After the success of the (first) People's Movement demand for multiparty democracy, the 1990 Constitution redefined Nepal as a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual Hindu kingdom.<sup>13</sup> Many "ethnic" activists chose the term *janajāti* to refer to the individual "ethnic" groups in Nepali. Importantly, they adopted the word "nationalities", rather than "ethnic groups" or "tribes", as its English rendition. The Nepāl Janajāti Mahāsaṅgha (Nepal Federation of Nationalities), consisting of various individual organisations for each *janajāti*, was established in 1991 as their umbrella organisation.

One crucial point for understanding the internal diversity of the people of Nepal in general, and post-1990 minority politics in particular, is that this situation cannot be grasped as simple majority-versus-minority antagonism. Three major sets of long pre-existing oppositions, mutually overlapping and partly incompatible, became explicit after 1990: *janajātis* against Hindus; Dalits (once treated as untouchables) against higher castes; and people of the plains (*Madhesī*) against people of the mountains and hills (*Pahādī*; Gellner et al. 1997: 1–31). Not only has each group failed to form a numerical majority in Nepal, but boundaries between groups have been contested in many places, raising such questions as: Are non-caste populations in the inner-Tarai jungle and on the plains *Madhesīs* or *janajātis*? And are some *jāts* within the Newar, who were treated as untouchables, *janajātis* or Dalits? Furthermore, it has long been debated whether the relationship between Nepali-speaking higher-caste Hindu landlords and administrators and the *janajāti* population (many of whom are peasants and agricultural labourers) can best be grasped in terms of Hindu-tribal (or Hindu-ethnic, or Hindu-*janajāti*) relations, or in terms of politico-economic dominance.<sup>14</sup>

It was chiefly the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) who, during their "People's War" against the Royal Nepal Government from 1996 to 2006, tried to mobilise various minority peoples, notably the *janajātis* and Dalits, under the rhetoric of liberation (*mukta*). Though their baseline argument was always derived from the Marxist logic of class struggle, they also advocated liberation from all sorts of oppression, for example by gender, caste, ethnicity, region or religion.<sup>15</sup> During the war, they indeed established many Autonomous Regions named after the major *janajāti* living in a given region, though many of these were only nominal. In the same period, the Nepali Government organised first

13 See Śrī 5 ko Sarakāra (2047vs). Hutt (1994) points out that the popular rise of "ethnic" concerns was sidestepped in the drafting process of the 1990 Constitution.

14 Dilli Ram Dahal's criticism of Lionel Caplan (Dahal 1979; cf. Caplan 1970, Subba 1999b) was an early prominent example.

15 This was already clear in the 40 demands they sent to then-Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, in the name of Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, Chairman of the Central Committee, the United People's Front Nepal, the front organisation of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), just before they started the war.

the National Committee for the Development of Nationalities under the Ministry of Local Development in 1997, then the National Foundation for Development of Indigenous Nationalities (NFDIN) and the National Dalit Commission, both in 2002.<sup>16</sup> In 2008, Nepal ceased to be a Hindu kingdom, and Nepal's minority groups were now discussed as peoples with their own distinct cultures and identities who were to be "included"<sup>17</sup> in the new Nepal.<sup>18</sup> The new Constitution was promulgated in 2015, including many categories of people to be protected:

[...] socially or culturally backward women, *Dalit*, indigenous people, indigenous nationalities, *Madhesi*, *Tharu*, Muslim, oppressed class, *Pichhada* class, minorities, the marginalized, farmers, labours, youths, children, senior citizens, gender and sexual minorities, persons with disabilities, persons in pregnancy, incapacitated or helpless, backward region and indigent *Khas Arya*. (Article 18, Right to equality (3))<sup>19</sup>

The above brief summary of the history of the modern Nepali state in relation to its people(s) clearly shows that the treatment of people in Nepal by the state has changed dramatically. First, people were viewed as members of a particular *jāt* within the state caste hierarchy; then as citizens of a modern and developing Hindu kingdom, but with little serious consideration for non-mainstream populations; then as members of a certain group, each with its own culture and identity, to be "included" in a new Nepal. This is of course a highly simplified summary of the actual process. We must also take into account the diverse "caste", "ethnic", "social" and "religious" issues, which vary from place to place within Nepal. In addition, the people of Nepal have often considered their situation in comparison not only to Western but also to Indian experiences. Indeed, by the late 1960s, some "untouchable" villagers in West Nepal were already discussing what was taking place in terms of castes in India (P. Caplan 1972: 80–81).

Global concepts and ideas, propagated and circulated by various donor agencies and international NGOs, among others, have profoundly affected this whole process for more than thirty years. The concept "indigenous" has been one such case. It seems that, within a few years of the *janajāti* movement becoming very active, the discourse of indigeneity had widely entered Nepal. Activists quickly adopted the discourse, using the word *ādivāsī* for the Nepali equivalent

16 I consulted <http://nfdin.gov.np> and <http://www.ndc.gov.np> while writing the first draft in March 2014. Both websites still exist, though their contents have changed substantially.

17 The Nepali word *samāveś* ("inclusion") was widely used then.

18 There are literally dozens of books and papers on the post-1990 political and sociocultural transformations of Nepal in relation to group categories and group mobilisation. See for instance Gellner 2001, 2003; Gellner et al. 1997; Guneratne 2010; Hangen 2010; Lawoti / Guneratne 2010; Lecomte-Tilouine / Dollfus 2003; Onta 2006; Schneiderman 2013; Toffin 2013 and Whelpton et al. 2008, among others.

19 From the translation digitally distributed by the Nepal Law Commission (<https://www.lawcommission.gov.np>, accessed 22 September 2016). Interestingly, in the current version, last accessed on 11 April 2022, the original Nepali words in parentheses ("*Adivasi Janajati*") are added after "indigenous nationalities", though the original article in Nepali remains identical.



of “indigenous” and “indigenous people(s)”, though without giving up their claim as “nationalities”. *Janajātis* were thus recast as *ādivāsī janajātis*, and in 2003 the Nepāl Janajāti Mahāsaṅgha finally changed its name to the Nepāl Ādivāsī Janajāti Mahāsaṅgha (Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities; Lawoti 2005: 94). Note again that the term *ādivāsī*, literally meaning those who originally (*ādi*) live (*vāsī*) somewhere, was not itself new in Nepali or in Hindi. Rather, the newly introduced discourse of indigeneity changed its connotation substantially.

The discussion in this section also reveals the tangled nature of the history of how these meta-level social categories were received in Nepal, the other aspect of “the knowledge on the move” discussed in this article. Take the English term “tribe” as an example. During the Panchayat era, there had been no “tribal” policies per se in Nepal, even though, as we saw above, the word “tribe” appeared in the governmental English translation of its 1959 and 1962 Constitutions. The original Nepali word rendered as “tribe” is *jāti*. In other words, *janjāti*,<sup>20</sup> the Hindi word long used as the equivalent of “tribe” in the Indian Constitution, was not officially utilised as such throughout the Panchayat era Nepal. Furthermore, as I mentioned above, some Nepali anthropologists were highly critical about the application of the term “tribe” to the ethnography of Nepal even in the late 1970s, and *janajāti* activists have never relied on the English concept of “tribe”. These points are well known among those who have worked on Nepali history and society, but have often been ignored in debates in larger frameworks.

Van Schendel’s argument in his otherwise highly insightful article – that “[t]he anchoring of the term ‘tribe’ in the legal frameworks of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal has ossified it by turning a colonial term into a postcolonial identity marker for selected groups whose rights claims must be made in the idiom of ‘tribe’ versus rulers” (2011: 24) – is thus not applicable to Nepal.

## The Rang and their ethno-ethnology<sup>21</sup>

As I have already pointed out, the main inhabitants of Byans, Chaudans and Darma, the three adjacent Himalayan regions in the Mahakali (Kali) water system, constitute a largely endogamous “ethnic” group, together with inhabitants of several other villages. They also share the ethnonym “Rang” in their own non-Tibetan Tibeto-Burman language varieties. Many of the Rang in Byans and

20 Both Hindi and Nepali are written in the Devanagari script, and the spelling of the word *janjāti* / *janajāti* is identical in both languages. However, in Hindi the short vowel “a” after the consonant “n” is not pronounced, while it usually is in Nepali.

21 See Nawa 2000 for a more detailed analysis on the ethno-ethnology of the Rang in Nepal up to the mid-1990s, and Nawa 2004 for their language situation.

Darma have traditionally conducted seasonal migration. As trans-Himalayan traders, many of them visit Tibet in summer. In winter, the bulk of them move to Dharchula in India or Darchula in Nepal, the twin hill bazaars of Mahakali, or to one of several other places nearby, where they have their winter residences. The Rang in Chaudans have been more sedentary, as their fields can support two harvests a year. However, they are connected to this rhythm of seasonal migration, as it is through their territory that people of Byans and the higher Darma have moved.<sup>22</sup>

Largely coinciding with this geographic reality, the basic ethno-ethnology of the Rang in their own language, at least in Byans and Chaudans, is not a simple self–other dichotomy but a trichotomy of one endonym, “Rang”, and two exonyms, “Pang” and “Wolan”. Pang refers to the Tibetans who live further north, beyond several passes and on towards the Tibetan plateau. Wolan refers to all others, usually the people who live in the south, and to the prototypically Pahari-speaking hill Hindus of various different castes. The view that the Rang are neither Pang nor Wolan and have a distinct identity is widely shared. Coinciding with this distinction, several travellers and scholars have pointed out that the Rang have kept their own culture and tradition, while being influenced by both Tibetan Buddhism and Hinduism (Sherring 1906; Manzardo et al. 1976; Srivastava 1953, 1966).

The word “Rang”, their endonym in their own language, was rarely used in the outside world until recently. Moreover, there are several different exonyms for the Rang, reflecting the complicated intersection of geographical regions, international borders and ethnic stereotyping. In India, the Rang, together with inhabitants of several other Himalayan valleys in Uttarakhand (previously a part of Uttar Pradesh), have officially been recognised as the Scheduled Tribe “Bhotiya”. Note, however, that while all Rang in India are officially Bhotiyas, not all Bhotiyas in Uttarakhand are identified as Rang. In Nepal, the Rang have been most often referred to as the “Byansi” or “Byangshi”, which simply means “people of Byans”. The name “Byansi” has also been officially listed as an indigenous nationality in Nepal. Here again, although all Byansi are Rang, not all Rang are Byansi, as many of them are not from Byans. Their southern neighbours in the Mahakali Zone in Nepal and the Kumaun Region in India often call them “Shauka”, or sometimes Bhotiya, although, as we will see below, the Nepali Rang are highly antagonistic toward the latter word, finding it pejorative and derogatory.

22 See Bergmann 2016: 9 for a concise introduction of the Darma valley and the people who live there. Oko 2018 and 2019 provides detailed linguistic and sociolinguistic information of the people of Darma, while Martin 2013 suggests a historical relationship between the Zhang-Zhung and Darma.



## The Rang in India<sup>23</sup>

Before discussing the case of the Nepali Rang, a quick look at the effects of the changing socio-political situation on the Indian Rang from the early nineteenth century onward would be useful, partly because they have been documented much better than the Nepali Rang. As Christoph Bergmann has already analysed in detail the transformation of the relationship that Kumaun Bhotiyas have had with outside polities, mainly focusing on the Rang in the Darma valley from the perspective of borderland studies (2016), I concentrate here on an issue he does not emphasise: the changing situation of the Byans region, where the India-Nepal border has existed for more than two centuries.

Between 1815 and 1817, after the Anglo-Nepalese (Gurkha) War, the Rang Raju (Rang country) was divided between India (then the East India Company) and Nepal along the Mahakali River (Tolia 1994: 81–82). The British were quick to gather information on the northern part of “Kamaon” (Kumaun or Kumaon, the eastern part of the present state of Uttarakhand) bordering Tibet. The two “statistical” accounts written by the administrator George William Traill (1828, 1832) were among the earliest published materials to include substantial accounts of the Rang. Especially important is his 1832 work, in which Traill first identified the regions of Kumaun and Garhwar where “Bhotias” live, in terms of the mountain passes to the Tibetan plateau,<sup>24</sup> i.e. Mana, Nítí [Niti], Juwar [Johar], Darma / Dharma (he used the two spellings interchangeably) and Byanse [Byans], from west to east. Traill wrote a substantial amount of ethnographic information, including the following argument:

The *Bhotias* ought necessarily to have no distinctions of caste: the *Mána*, *Nítí*, and *Juwar* Bhotias, however, pretend to consider those of the *Darma* and *Byanse* Ghats as an inferior sect, and neither eat nor intermarry with them. (Traill 1832: 21, italics original)

The British refined their understanding of those they called the “Bhotiya” throughout their colonial rule. The best example of the colonial accumulation of information on “Bhotiya” in the nineteenth century can be found in Edwin T. Atkinson’s huge three-volume gazetteer. In the article titled “Bhotiya Maháls” (Atkinson 1996: 83–152), for instance, he gives us detailed accounts of the region, the location of each village, including Changru [Chhangru] and Tinkhar [Tinkar], the two villages in Nepali Byans,<sup>25</sup> ethnographic information on ma-

23 On the historical transformation of Kumaon “Bhotias” or “Bhotiyas” see Bergmann 2016; Bergmann et al. 2008, 2011, 2012; Brown 1984, 1987, 1992, 1994; Das / Raha 1981; Gerwin / Bergmann 2012; Hoon 1996 and Srivastava 1953, 1966. Note that Brown carried out his fieldwork mainly in the Johar valley. My focus in this paper is not on the “Bhotiya” in general but on the Rang defined in this paper. Also note that I have no fieldwork experience in India and this section is largely based on the literature quoted above.

24 This would explain why Traill did not mention the region of Chaudans, as it is the region south of the main Himalayan ridges.

25 Based on the account of H. Strachey, who went to Tibet through Byans (Strachey 1848).

terial culture, religion, customs and various rituals, and other data. Geographically, Atkinson divided the Bhotiyas in Kumaon into the Johár and Dárma, and subdivided the latter into the Dárma, Chaudáns and Byáns. This classification roughly coincides with the Rang's self-conceptualisation, though Atkinson always treated all of them as subgroups of the "Bhotiya".

How did the people react to this colonial gaze?<sup>26</sup> Charles Sherring, who visited Chaudans and Byans in 1905, left the following assessment of cultural trends among "Eastern Bhotias" (as the main inhabitants of Byans, Chaudans and Darma, they were effectively equivalent to the Rang):

They are daily becoming more and more Hinduised; they add "Sing" to their names; practise formal ablutions (which many of them require sadly); some follow the Hindu rites and customs as to birth, marriage, and death ceremonies, and all are seeking after a higher respectability. (Sherring 1906: 70–71)

One of the things that strikes the observer most about these eastern Bhotias, though it really holds good with the other Bhotias also, who have only lately issued from their seclusion and become Hinduised, is, that they have been so little affected by their surroundings to the north and south. (Sherring 1906: 74)

Sherring described "Eastern Bhotias" as people who had only recently started "Hinduising" their way of life. Certainly, it would be too naive to treat his words at face value, as Sherring had to rely on translators to collect information from villagers. It would certainly be true, however, that some Rang had at that time already started to "Hinduise" some of their socio-cultural practices. Sherring's key translator in Chaudans and Byans, Pundit Gobaria, was one of the richest and most successful traders from Garbyang, the largest village in all of Byans, a tax collector for both the Indian and Nepali Governments, who later obtained the title of Rai Sahib in Colonial India (Rāypā 1974: 272–273; Rimjinsyā n.d.: 393–397; Sherring 1906: 6, 97). It was through the agency of Gobaria and several other elite Rangs at that time that Sherring obtained his rich ethnographic material on the "Eastern Bhotias".

We also have to acknowledge that some Rang children had already been educated in Hindi.<sup>27</sup> These educated Rang most probably recognised themselves not only as Rang but as Indian, and it would be no surprise if some of them tried to modify their customs and socio-cultural lives, in consideration of the gazes of their fellow Indians. Indeed, Bergmann (2016: 76–84, 95–99) traced in detail the activities of the Kumaon Bhotiya Peoples' Federation, consisting of successful educated Kumaon "Bhotias" from various valleys, which sent a report to the Indian Minority Sub-Committee of the Constitution Assembly's Advisory Committee in 1947, about four months before India's independence.

26 See Bergmann 2016, which mainly focuses on the people of Darma, and Brown (1984, 1987, 1992), which focuses on the people of Johar.

27 Sherring (1906: 135) was surprised to find that one girl attended the Garbyang School with the boys.

Several scholars have reported the cultural progress among those whom they called “Bhotias” in the early years of Indian independence. They pointed out that some Kumaon “Bhotias” started social reform movements to get government support to acknowledge them as a Scheduled Tribe, although the most enthusiastic about this were the people of Johar, not the Rang (Srivastava 1966: 208–210, Das / Raha 1981: 260–261).<sup>28</sup>

In 1967, the Indian Rang, together with the main inhabitants of several other Himalayan valleys in then Uttar Pradesh, were officially listed as the Scheduled Tribe of “Bhotiya” (Das / Raha 1981: 261, Bergmann 2016, cf. Singh 1994).<sup>29</sup> Several anthropologists and sociologists have pointed out that the process of “Hinduisation” slowed down after this time (Das / Raha 1981, Prasad 1989, Bisht 1994), although the socio-cultural structure before 1967 was far more complex than the term implies (Srivastava 1953, 1966; Bergmann 2016). In his ethnography of the Rang in Hindi (Rāypā 1974), Ratan Singh Raypa, the first Rang native anthropologist, described in detail the socio-cultural traits of “Shaukā” (the exonym for the Rang by their southern neighbours) as being distinct from those of their northern and southern neighbours, and indeed unique in the Indian Subcontinent. On the other hand, Raypa also suggested that they were somehow connected with, and no doubt a part of, South Asian civilisation, while retaining their distinctiveness.

A photograph that shows Rang women in traditional dress with the then prime minister Indira Gandhi (Rāypā 1974: 128) might represent the state of the Rang at that time most eloquently. And, though complaints have been heard regarding the use of the label “Bhotiya” (which has been considered pejorative), the Rang in India have on the whole dealt with their status as a Scheduled Tribe, and its implications, affirmatively, even though from the 1990s their exclusive Scheduled Tribe designation has been challenged by arguments from some Caste Hindus that all people in the Bhot region should be treated equally as “Bhotiya” (Bergmann 2016: 107–116).<sup>30</sup>

Long before the concept of indigeneity was popularised, the Rang in India, and several other peoples generally categorised as “Bhotiya”, tried to develop their community in relation to the scheme of post-colonial Indian minority policy: first by campaigning to acquire Scheduled Tribe status, and then by efficiently utilising the accompanying possibilities. In April 1993 the Rang held a large meeting in Dharchula, India. Many Nepali Rang participants told me that the meeting was largely on “the issues of the other side of the river”, i.e. how to

28 Bergmann’s ethno-historical reconsideration of *rambang* (a controversial juvenile communal institution) critically elaborated upon this point (2016: 92–99).

29 The official criteria for Scheduled Tribe Status are “(a) indication of primitive traits, (b) distinctive culture, (c) geographical isolation, (d) shyness of contact with the community at large, and (e) backwardness” (Middleton 2013: 13).

30 Bergmann 2016: 116 summarises several reasons why the Bhotiyas in the Uttarakhand have never tried seriously to change their official ethnonym.

deal more effectively with the scheme of Scheduled Tribes and Indian policies and institutions. Of course, the meeting was not planned as an occasion for only the Indian Rang, and indeed, many Nepali Rang donated a substantial amount of money to support the occasion. There were numerous socio-cultural programmes in which Indian and Nepali Rang could participate equally. However, for the Nepali Rang, the bulk of the political and administrative issues discussed at the meeting were clearly not for them. This impression was confirmed by the contents of the first volume of the journal *Amṭīkar* (a Rang word meaning “the goat who leads the herd”) published for the occasion. It included several articles on methods to exploit the Indian minority-policy scheme more effectively (Amṭīkar Tīm 1993). The articles in the 2004 and 2008 issues of the same journal suggest that the basic trend had not changed in the period to 2008 (Raṃ Kalyāṇa Saṃsthā 2004, 2008). The 2008 issue in particular contains many chapters on government policies, in which the key term was clearly *janjāti*, not *ādivāsī*.<sup>31</sup> Of course, it is highly unlikely that none of the Indian Rang had touched upon the issue of indigeneity, but one can suppose that most of their discussion would have either related to, or complemented, the scheme of Scheduled Tribes.

## The Rang in Nepal

The way the Nepali government recognises the Nepali Rang has changed several times since the mid-twentieth century. Though I have found no documents showing how Nepali Rangs were categorised by the state before 1951, they were most probably classified and treated as a people within the general category of “*Matwālī*”, i.e. “alcohol drinkers”; lower than high caste Hindus but higher than people classified as “water-unacceptable” under the Muluki Ain of 1854<sup>32</sup> (Śrī 5 ko sarakāra 2022vs; Höfer 1979, Sharma 1977). In Nepal, unlike in many parts of India, many people outside the caste systems (in colonial and postcolonial Indian nomenclature: “tribes”) were not located at the bottom but in the middle of the socio-political hierarchy.

In the first half of the twentieth century, the Rang were exceptional among the peoples living in the Nepali hills and mountains, in at least one point. Though formal education for the general public was not introduced in the hill and mountain regions throughout Nepal until the middle of the twentieth century, some residents of Chhangru, one of the two villages in Nepali Byans, received modern schooling in Hindi well before that, through the school in

31 Also see Gerwin and Bergmann’s short argument on the leadership in *van* (“forest”) *panchayats* (2012: 100).

32 The Nepali original is *pāni nachalnyā*. This expression implies that if a “water-acceptable” person accepts water from a “water-unacceptable” one, the former would be polluted.

Garbyang, the neighbouring village in Indian Byans. They not only accumulated substantial educational capital, but also experienced the Indian independence movement directly or indirectly.<sup>33</sup>

In the early 1950s, several young Chhangru villagers who had been educated in India started a social reform movement.<sup>34</sup> As nationalists, and in recognition of the fact that they were not Indians but Nepalis and that there had been virtually no modern development in Nepali Byans, they promoted a wide range of activities: from building a school in Chhangru and introducing education in Nepali, to simplifying and “Hinduising” some of their rituals. The central figure in this movement was Bahadur Singh Aitwal, the first modern politician from Nepali Byans, who later became a Rastriya Panchayat member (roughly, a member of Parliament) and an Assistant Minister. Their activities can be approximately understood as consisting of three different but overlapping vectors, conventionally known as modernisation, Nepalisation and Hinduisation.<sup>35</sup>

The introduction of modern school education within the village was followed by attempts to popularise Nepali over Hindi. Other reforms included reducing the time and cost of funerary rites, which was accompanied by the prohibition of using a yak in these rituals and the introduction of the Hindu text *Garuḍa Purāṇa*.<sup>36</sup> The attempts by these villagers were highly compatible with, and in part reflected, the state policy of the partyless Panchayat regime from the 1960s to the 1980s, which was nationalistic, Hinduistic and modernistic. Moreover, the regime also aimed at national integration and development under the Hindu king (without political parties) and the use of Nepali as the national and official language.

Throughout this movement, Bahadur Singh and his allies strongly argued that the Rang were not “Bhote” (Tibetan) or Buddhists, but were Hindus and more precisely Matwali Chhetris (“alcohol-drinking Kshatriyas”), and stressed

33 The nature of the international border in this region before the middle of the twentieth century is crucially important for an understanding of the social and political situation. First, the border in this region was not tightly controlled until the middle of the twentieth century. For instance, taxation was not necessarily based on the logic of modern nation-states; there is evidence that many people of Indian and Nepali Byans paid their tax to three countries: British India, Nepal and Tibet (Brown 1984: 139, Nawa 2011). Bergmann (2016: 54–60) discusses British colonial officers’ attempts to claim territorial sovereignty with Tibet in the late nineteenth century, especially in terms of taxation. Second, despite this, the border certainly existed. After the Anglo-Nepal War, Byans, Chaudans and Darma became part of South Asia, not Tibet, and the Byans were divided between India and Nepal, with the international border between the modern states being imposed by the British (on the changing conception of the international border by the Nepali government in the 19th and early 20th century, see Burghart 1996: 226–260). Third, the existence of the border was most clearly evident in the degree and extent of infrastructure. Modern school education, for instance, was introduced in Indian Byans in the latter half of the nineteenth century (first in Nabi and Garbyang), and a junior high school was established in the village of Pangu in Chaudans, while there was no school in Nepali Byans until the middle of the twentieth century.

34 See Nawa 2011 and Manzardo et al. 1976 for more detail. The latter reported this movement as the activities of “Gram Sucharak Samiti”.

35 Note, however, that the Rang had already started to call themselves Hindu at the turn of the twentieth century. Sherring (1907: 64–65) also reported that all the “Bhotias” in Kumaon, including the people of Byans in the early twentieth century, called themselves Hindus.

36 See Nawa 2007 for more detail.

the fact that they did not eat beef or yak meat. At the same time they did not attempt any effort to assimilate the Nepali Rang into other Matwali Chhetris living within the local caste hierarchy in the Far Western hills. Indeed, they stressed that the Rang were distinct not only from the Pang or Tibetans, but also from the Wolan in general and their southern neighbours in particular. They strongly insisted that the Rang were not Tibetans, as they were Hindus of relatively high rank, though “racially” and culturally distinct, and should be treated properly, without prejudice or discrimination.<sup>37</sup>

Consequently, when I first visited Byans in 1993, three years after the Panchayat regime ended and Nepal became a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual Hindu kingdom, the Nepali Rang almost unanimously categorised themselves as Hindus and more specifically as Matwali Chhetris, sharply distinguishing themselves from those whom they called “Bhote”, i.e. Tibetans. Indeed, many of them were critical of the Indian Rang for still accepting the official name “Bhotiya”.

This is not simply a matter of ethnic classification, as it certainly had emotional and somatic aspects. During my fieldwork from 1993 to 1995, I saw some young Rangs become furious in a restaurant or teashop in Darchula bazaar because they were called “Bhote” and/or (they felt) treated as inferiors. On the other hand, whether or not the refusal to eat beef was merely one of their most important features in distinguishing themselves from Pang, to eat beef being clearly beyond their normative horizons, disdain for those who did eat beef seemed particularly strong among older females, as interjections of disgust “chhi” were often inserted in their conversations on beef eating. Indeed, in the early stage of my first fieldwork, I was seriously advised by several Rangs not to tell old ladies that Japanese eat beef. At the same time, the Nepali Rang also distinguished themselves from other Hindus living in the south, such as Pahari-speaking Hindus in Darchula and beyond, for whom they often used the quasi-scientific racial category “Mongolian” (they used this English term<sup>38</sup>). In this context, I was almost automatically included within this “Mongolian” category (Nawa 2000).

During my stay in Byans and Darchula from 1993 to 1995, I found that the *janajāti* movement had virtually no impact among the Nepali Rang. This was surprising,<sup>39</sup> as many Nepali Rang had been educated in universities in Kathmandu and elsewhere, where they should have had a great deal of contact with *janajāti* activists. One young Nepali Rang who was then a student at one of

37 See Nawa 2000 for more detail. Mohan Etwal, a brother of Bahadur Singh, even argues the superiority of Rangs vis-à-vis local hill Hindus (Etwāl: 2064vs).

38 Note that they used the word as a purely “racial” category, without any pejorative or discriminatory connotations.

39 The situation was quite different from that discussed in two representative and mutually contrastive ethnographies focusing on the (trans)formation of “ethnic identity” in Nepal based on fieldwork conducted from the 1980s to the 1990s: Fisher 2001 on the shifting and contested nature of Thakali identity, and Guneratne 2002 on the emergence of pan-Tharu identity.



the most prestigious universities in the United States explained this anomaly, saying, “there is a huge gap between the land of the Magars and our country,” thus pointing out the geographical isolation of the Rang from other *janajātis* in Nepal.<sup>40</sup> I suggest that it could equally be the case that the Nepali Rang had too fully adapted to and embodied the Hindu nationalist ideology of the Panchayat regime, and were thus reluctant to accept the new concept so soon.

This does not mean that these Nepali Rang were politically isolated or stagnant at that time, quite the contrary. Local politicians from all of the major parties, from the Royalists to the Communists, were already active, though unlike in many other regions of Nepal, as far as I could tell, the differences in their political affiliations were not clearly connected with local factional antagonisms. Moreover, in 1993 women’s organisations in Nepali Byans sent their delegates to Kathmandu to argue the predicament of remote areas (*durgam ksetra*). They met with several ministers and high-level officials, partly through the help of Kathmandu-based Rang bureaucrats and local Rang politicians (Nawa 2011). In this case, they utilised various agendas other than that of *janajāti* for political purposes.

Around 2000, ten years after the *janajāti* movement had gained popularity among many major *janajātis* in Nepal and under the influence of non-Rang *janajāti* activists, the Rang eventually joined the movement by establishing the organisation Byansī Śaukā Samāj.<sup>41</sup> The Samāj has been very active since the mid-2000s, organising numerous meetings and demonstrations that were sometimes attended by several top national leaders of the *janajāti* movement. They have also carried out training programmes in various “endangered” traditional skills, from handloom weaving of traditional clothing to reciting long oral texts at funerals. Byansī Śaukā Samāj was such an efficient and well-organised NGO that in 2010 it was contracted to work for several international NGOs in the Darchula district that were not directly connected to *janajāti* issues. Meanwhile, the *janajāti* discourse had been adopted by the Nepali Rang, for instance through their slogan “*janajāti ektā jindābād*” (“long live the unity of *janajātis*”).

Though in 2002 the Nepali Rang were officially listed as one of the 59 *Ādivāsī Janajātis* (indigenous nationalities) in Nepal as “Byansi”, the term “indigenous” seems to have become important for them more recently (after 2008), when Nepal became nominally a federal republic. Unlike several major *janajātis* in Nepal, however, their major concern did not seem to be the shape of federalism in the coming “New Nepal”. They knew that the vast majority of the population of the Far-Western hills and mountains were non-*janajāti*, and no matter how the lines were drawn, they would always be a tiny minority in the newly established states. During a visit to Darchula in 2008 and again in 2010, I found

40 The Magar is the largest group of *ādivāsī janajāti* in Nepal, many of whom traditionally live in Western and Mid-Western Nepal.

41 As pointed out above, *Śaukā* is their ethnonym in Pahari. *Samāj* means society.

that some of them were more concerned with the ILO Convention 169 (Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989) and the quota system. A rich trader from Chhangru, for instance, told me: “If ILO 169 became applicable to us, we would protect our resources against outsiders like caterpillar fungi (*Ophiocordyceps sinensis*).”

Nepali Byans is clearly separated from other parts of Nepal by the Himalayan ranges, and the Rang constitute an absolute majority there, though they are a tiny minority at the district level. They will also adapt quickly if a quota system is introduced fully under the new Constitution, as they already know of both the advantages and drawbacks associated with this type of system, through the experiences over decades of their counterparts in India.<sup>42</sup>

## Conclusion

In India, the Rang have officially been treated as a part of the “Bhotiya”. The British considered the Bhotiya a tribal population, while the Indian government officially listed them as a Scheduled Tribe, though twenty years after independence. It seems that the Indian Rang have tried to keep a balance between asserting their sociocultural distinctiveness and their belonging to Indian civilisation – with sufficient status, in the ever-changing discursive and socio-political fields (Bergmann 2016: 75–126). The Nepali Rang have experienced more dramatic discursive and institutional ruptures, deriving from: the Rana regime with its state hierarchy; the Panchayat regime, which aimed at national integration and development under the Hindu king; the multi-ethnic democratic Hindu kingdom; and then the federal republic with its social “inclusion”. The Rang in Nepal have dealt with these shifts, though sometimes with a substantial time lapse.

Some might ask: how has it been possible for the Rang in India and the Rang in Nepal, while sometimes changing their cultural practices, to maintain their overall common sociocultural realms while dealing with such different and changing discursive and institutional schemes on both sides of the Mahakali River? My partial answer is as follows: all Rang know that each region, each Rang village, and sometimes even each clan has its own distinct traditions. Every Rang knows to obey the rules and customs of the village they visit. Furthermore, villagers can modify the traditions in their own village. I would argue that this shared understanding of the diversity and plasticity of tradition has allowed them to pursue different discursive and sociocultural directions

42 As I have not been able to visit Darchula since the promulgation of the new constitution of 2015, I have to stop my story here, though I should point out that the fact that they have become a minority even at the “rural municipality” or *gāūpālikā* level, due to the fact that this new local-level political entity was created by merging several former village development committees or *gāū vikās samiti*, must certainly have affected their lives and strategies.

for many decades within the two states. We should also note that despite the fundamental shift of political discourses on minority populations in Nepal and India, the manner of imagining boundaries between Rang and non-Rang has not changed substantially.

For many Indian Rang, it seems, fully utilising the existing Indian schemes applicable to them notably that of Scheduled Tribes, has been of greater importance than dealing with the discourse of indigeneity. For Nepali Rang, on the other hand, the concept of “indigeneity” appeared in the recent past as one of many new concepts with a distinct aura of legitimacy and political correctness, and one which seemed of potential use to them in some contexts within the (then) emerging *Nayā* (“new”) *Nepāl*. In both cases, the discourse on indigeneity has constituted only a small part of their collective claims and practices at least until the recent past. It should thus be located within the historical development and current constellation of discourses on minority populations in South Asia and beyond, in which various concepts and ideas have always been on the move, across countries, across languages and across scales.

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