

Convention of Speech (*rūlhi*) in Theriya Buddhism

The Law of Generalization

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For Būṭāvatte Saraṇaṅkara thera

1. *Nirukti* and convention

Semantic development of words—the development of secondary meanings of words in addition to and instead of their literal meanings—is a common phenomenon in many languages. Once a word's secondary meaning has developed, its literal meaning may either become redundant or disappear. As linguists point out, the word 'nice' originally meant 'ignorant' in Old English, but in Modern English it is used in the sense of 'polite'.¹ The original meaning of 'nice' has disappeared. Likewise, the Pali term *tela* literally means the 'essence of sesame seeds' (*tila*), i.e., sesame oil.² But when *tela* started to be used for 'oil' in general, the term *tilatela* had to be used to refer specifically to sesame oil. The literal meaning of *tela* faded away when its secondary meaning became dominant.³

As the Pāli commentaries show, the meaning of some terms in the Tīpiṭaka has evolved significantly from their original meaning. Because the secondary meanings of these terms became commonplace, their original meanings seem to have become unknown. Pāli exegetical literature is enormously helpful in figuring out the original meaning of these terms. Below I will explain some of these terms, with some examples.

1 Shukla and Connor-Linton 2006: 284.

2 DOP, s.v. *tela*: 'sesamum oil; oil in general'. See also pw, s.v. *taila*: 'Sesamöl, Oel überh.'; KEWA, s.v. *tailaṃ*: 'Sesamöl, Öl / sesamum oil, oil [...]. Später geht der Zusammenhang mit dem Sesam-Wort verloren (vgl. *sārṣapaṃ tailaṃ* ummustard oil' [Suśruta] u.a.) und die tautologische Bildung *tila-tailaṃ* "Sesam-Öl" (Pāṇ. u. a.; Suśruta) wird nötig.'

3 See Vin III 251.22–23 (= IV 88.30–31; 348.7–8; ≠ V 129.4–5): *telaṃ nāma tilatelaṃ sāsapatelaṃ madbukatelaṃ eraṇḍatelaṃ vasāṭelaṃ*. Tr. BD II 132: 'Oil means: sesamum oil, oil of mustard seeds, oil from the "honey-tree", oil of the castor-oil plant, oil from tallow.'

The phrase *rathakārakula* occurs in several discourses in the Tipiṭaka.⁴ It consists of three components, namely, *ratha* ('chariot'), *kāra* ('doer') and *kula* ('family'). Examining these components, one might assume that the phrase refers to 'a chariot-makers' family'.⁵ In fact, *rathakārakula* has nothing to do with a chariot-makers' family, but refers to one of the (so-called) lower castes (*nicakula*) in India who functioned as 'workers in leather' or 'shoemakers'.⁶

In other cases, the exact meaning of a term is hard to determine from its *nirukti* ('etymological explanation'). For instance, its *nirukti* suggests *gocara* means 'a place where cattle wander', i.e., the pasture-ground for cattle. Yet, as far as I know, it does not occur in this sense in the Tipiṭaka. Rather, it has the sense of 'an appropriate place to wander', for creatures,⁷ and especially monks; hence 'resort', and so forth.⁸

4 See S I 94.15; A I 107.22; II 85.15; III 385.8; Pp 51.23: *rathakārakule vā*. 'Or in a Rathakāras' family.'

5 See *rathakāra* = 'chariot makers' (Law 1924: 70–71); 'wheelwright' (Woodward 1932, 92, Woodward 1933: II 94; Hare 1934: III 274); 'cartwrights' (Bodhi 2000: 185); 'cart makers' (Bodhi 2012: 207, 467, 940). Edgerton translates *rathakāra* as 'cart-maker' and suggests that it occurs to mean a carpenter in Vedic texts. See Edgerton 1938: 707.

6 The Paribhāṣeṇḍusekhara (PrBṣIś 100.15) refers to 'the maxim of the chapter on *rathakāra*'; the commentary explains that *rathakāra* denotes a member of a particular mixed caste (*kaścit samkīrnajātivīṣeṣah*); see Kielhorn 1874, 470 n. 4. See also pw, s.v. *rathakāra*; Edgerton 1938: 707–709; Kunjunni-Raja 1963: 66. Buddhaghosa (Spk I 162.26) explains *rathakārakule* (S I 93.30) as 'in a leatherworkers' family' (*cammakārakule*); see also Mp II 175.23; III 111.16; Pp-a 227.23–24. But Dhammapāla attempts to establish a relationship between *rathakāras* and chariots: '*Rathakāras* are called leatherworkers because they cover [?] the chariots with leather.' (Spk-pt I 194.23–24: *rathesu cammena hananakaraṇato rathakārā cammakārā* [≠ Spk I 162.26] *vuttā*). C. A. F. Rhys Davids (1917: I 118) translates *rathakāra* as 'leather-worker'.

7 As a *bahuvrihi*, *vārigocara* occurs in the canon applied to (1) 'fish' (Sn 118.7, v. 605: *tato macche pi jānātha odake vārigocare*. 'Then, [you] should also know that fish [live] in water, and have water as their habitat.'; and (2) a frog (Vv 77.5: *maṇḍūko 'ham pure āsīṃ udake vārigocaro*. 'In the past, I was a frog [living] in water, having water as habitat.' In his commentaries Dhammapāla explains *vārigocaro*: 'Because the cattle roam here, [it] is [called] *gocara*. It is the place cattle search for food. But here, [it] is [called] *gocara*, because [it] resembles a pasture. Because *vāri* that is *udakaṃ* is the habitat of this [frog], [it] is [stated]: its habitat is water. For, some [creatures] residing in water, such as turtles, that can also have a non-water (i.e., land) habitat, [are still said] to have water as habitat.' (Vv-a 218.31–219.1 = Vism-mhṭ I 248.16–19 (to Vism 209.12–13): *gāvo caranti etthā ti gocaro, gunnaṃ ghās' esanaṭṭhānaṃ. idha pana gocaro viyā ti gocaro. vāri udakaṃ gocaro etassā ti vārigocaro. udakacāri pi hi koci kacchapādi avārigocaro pi hoti ti vārigocaro ti visesetvā vuttam*). See also Sp-ṭ I 294.14–16.

8 See M I 355.3: *ācāragocarasampanno* = '[H]e is perfect in conduct and resort' (Ñānamoli and Bodhi 1995: 461); see also CPD, s.v. *ācāra-gocara-sampanna*; BHSD, s.v. *gocara*; DOP, s.v. *gocara*. DOP, s.v. *gocara-gāma*: 'the village where bhikkhus or other ascetics

2. *rūl̥bis* in the Tipiṭaka

A *rūl̥bi* refers to the replacement of the original meaning of a term with a secondary one.⁹

This replacement typically occurs in dependence on some kind of relationship between the two meanings. As Pāli exegetical works show, many *rūl̥bis* have one of two opposed synecdochic functions in the Tipiṭaka, either expansion or contraction of the original meaning. The present article deals only with *rūl̥bis* belonging to the first category.¹⁰

Below I will discuss passages which illustrate how the Mahāvihāra school recognizes some canonical terms as *rūl̥bis* and offers scholastic exegeses of them. The school designates these words as *rūl̥bis*, even though their primary meanings could also serve the particular linguistic contexts well, thereby imputing new meanings to them in conformity with the scholastic tenets developed within the school. I first pay attention to the words of general linguistic usage and then examine some expressions in Buddhist thought in specific technical contexts.

beg for food; a village where bhikkhus can (properly) beg for food'. With reference to this meaning, Dhammapāla comments: 'Because "the cattle pasture here", [it] is [called] *gocara*. [It] is [called] *gocara* as [it] resembles a pasture in that it is the place monks search for alms.' (Sv-pt 1 28.5-6: *gāvo caranti etthā ti gocaro* (# Sv 1 5.18). *gocaro viya gocaro, bhikkhācaranaṭṭhānam*.)

9 See pw, s.v. *rūḍhi*: 'eine überlieferte, nicht unmittelbar aus der Etymologie sich ergebende Bedeutung eines Wortes'. Viśvanātha (17th century) defines the term *rūḍha* as follows: 'Where the meaning [of a term] is cognized simply through the expressive capacity of the whole utterly irrespective of the expressive capacity of [its] components, such a [term] is [called] convention.' (SidMuv 71.12-13: *yatrāvayavaśaktinairapeksyena samudāyaśaktimātreṅārtho budhyate, tad rūḍham*. See also Mādhavānanda 1940: 156.) As Mammāṭa (11th century) states, conventional meaning is implied when the primary meaning of a term is restricted (KvyP 48.3-4: *mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūḍbito 'tha prajyanāt | anyo 'rtho lakṣyate yat sālakṣaṇāropitā kriyā* ||. Tr. Jha 1925: 17-18: 'When the primary meaning is precluded (by incompatibility), another meaning, in affinity therewith, comes to be implied,—either on the basis of usage or for a special purpose,—this process of imposed implication is called "Indication", *Lakṣaṇā*.' The *nirukti* will offer a meaning based on the actual linguistic components of a word, whereas a conventional meaning derives from practical usage. Indian philosophers of language recognize such terms as *yogarūḍhis* ('etymologico-conventional'). Edgerton (1938: 709) explains *yogarūḍhi* as follows: '[S]ometimes the results of interpretation by *rūḍhi* and by *yoga* coincide.' See also Kunjunni-Raja 1963: 46: 59, 61-62; Dash 1993; Phillips 2012: 76.

10 For *rūl̥bis* involving contraction of the original meaning, see Gamage 2023, 118-147. With a wealth of examples, Bullinger (1898) discusses how synecdoche is used in the Bible in these two ways under 'synecdoche of the species' (623-635) and 'synecdoche of the genus' (614-623) respectively.

3. Kosala and other toponyms

The commentators identify a number of toponyms found in the Tīpīṭaka as *rūl̥bis* or ‘conventions of speech.’¹¹ For instance, the *Ambaṭṭhasutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* has:

*bbagavā Kosalesu cārikam caramāno*¹²

The Blessed One was wandering on tour in the Kosala country

Buddhaghosa glosses *Kosalesu* as follows:

*Kosalesū ti Kosalā nāma janapadino rājakumārā. tesam nivāso eko pi janapado rūl̥bisaddena kosalā ti vuccati. tasmim̐ Kosalesu janapade.*¹³

In the Kosala country: the princes belonging [to that] territory are called ‘the Kosalas’. Although the territory which is their residence is single, using a term due to the convention of speech, [it] is counted as ‘Kosalas’ (plural). In the Kosala territory.

As Buddhaghosa says, Kosala was originally used to denote the princes belonging to a particular territory. Later, this territory was also named Kosala after these princes. It was used in the plural despite referring to a single state. When the term Kosala is used to denote the territory rather than the princes who ruled it, it is called a *rūl̥bi*.¹⁴ In the subcommentary, Dhammapāla supports Buddhaghosa:

yadi eko janapado katham̐ bahuvacanan ti āba: rūl̥bisaddenā ti. akkharacintakā hi idisesu ṭhānesu yutte viya idisalīṅgavacanāni iccbanti. ayam ettha rūl̥bi, yathā aññattha pi Kurūsu vibarati (e.g., D II 55.), *Āngesu vibarati* (e.g., M I 271.6–7) *ti ca.*¹⁵

11 The term *rūl̥bi* is rendered in many ways; ‘*Sprachgebrauch*’ (Nyanaponika 1955: 292), ‘extension’ (Masfield 1994 I 468), ‘popular usage’ (Pruitt 1998: 37), ‘convention’ (Philips 2012: 76), ‘stipulation’ (Philips 2012: 93), ‘convention of speech’ (Bodhi 2017: 501). In this article, I use the last. For *rūl̥bisadda*, we find ‘figure of speech’ (Tin 1920: 84), ‘*Alltagssprache*’ (Nyanatiloka 2014: 354), ‘term of common usage’ (Ñāṇamoli 1956: 304; Horner 1978: 19), ‘*üblicher Wortgebrauch*’ (Nyānaponika 2005: 136), ‘conventional name’ (Bodhi 2017: 887).

12 D I 87.1–2.

13 Sv I 239.2–4.

14 See Pind 1989: 69–70; 2008: 47–48.

15 Sv-pt I 372.6–10. Cf. Ps-pt I 327.26; II 230.2; as the editors of the Chaṭṭhasāṅgīti edition note here, *yutte viya salīṅgavacanāni* must refer to Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī rule (1.2.51): *lupi yuktavad vyaktivacane*. Tr. Joshi and Roodbergen 1987: 88: ‘given *lup* (—deletion of a *taddhita*-suffix, then) the gender and number (of the derivative word) are like (those of) the original noun-base.’ The point seems to be that, if we view the place name ‘Kosala’ as a nominal derivative, it should continue to conform to the gender and number rules

If it is a single territory, why is it in the plural? [Buddhaghosa] says [it is plural] **due to being a term of convention of speech**. For, in such places, the grammarians desire [to apply the rule]: ‘such [and such] a gender and number [of a derivative noun] as in the original noun-base’. This is a convention of speech here, as also elsewhere: [the Blessed One] dwells in the Kuru country and [the Blessed One] dwells in the Aṅga country.

Glossing *Kurūsu*, in the *Mabānidānasutta*, Dhammapāla makes the following statement:

*avayavesu siddho viseso samudāyassa visesako hotī ti ekam pi raṭṭhaṃ babuvacanena voharīyati.*¹⁶

Although it is a single kingdom it is used in the plural by common linguistic usage since the specific meaning acquired for the parts becomes the attribute of the whole.

This explanation shows how, according to Dhammapāla, the original meaning of a term is expanded. The rulers of a given kingdom can be considered as its principal parts. Therefore, the princes residing there can be considered parts (*avayava*) of that kingdom. Kurus was originally used to qualify the princes of this kingdom. The same name was secondarily used to qualify the entire kingdom (*raṭṭhaṃ*) in which they lived, as *Kurūsu* in the plural. Here, a part (*avayava*) is substituted for the whole (*samudāya*), that is the whole is represented by a part.¹⁷

From the perspective of the commentators, toponyms such as Aṅga, Magadha, Vajji, Malla, and Pañcāla are also *rūlhis* which were primarily used to refer to the princes living in those regions.¹⁸ Perhaps after these

of the term it derives from. Thus, as the place name ‘Kosala’ derives from the name of a group of princes, it continues to be declined in the plural. See Pind 1989: 70–71; Katre 1987: 44; Cardona 2009: 7 n. 16; Candotti and Pontillo 2014: 111–112. Although he refers to Pāṇini’s rule, Dhammapāla implies that he does not agree with it by stressing at the end of his explanation that *Kosalā* here is a ‘convention of speech’ (*ayam ettha rūlhi*), adding two further canonical examples. For further glosses relating to *Kosala*, see Ps II 326.25–28; Pj II 400.19–21; Mp-nt II B^c 150.22–25. Commenting on *Kosalesu* at Ud 38.11, Dhammapāla offers the same gloss as Buddhaghosa, but omitting the term *rūlhi* (Ud-a 240.29–31: *Kosalā nāma janapadavāsīno rājakumārā. tesam nivāso eko pi janapado Kosalā tv’eva vuccati. tasmim Kosalajanapade*).

16 Sv-pt II 103.10–11 (to Sv II 481.3–5, to D II 55.2); Sv-pt II B^c 79.1–6 omits this sentence. On *Kurūsu*, see also Ps I 225.1–4; Ps-pt I 327.23–328.2; Spk II 85.16–17; Spk-pt II 98.10–12.

17 This is one of the characteristics of synecdoche. See Bullinger 1898: 613, 686; for examples from the Pāli canon, see Gamage 2021: 261–267.

18 See Sv I 279.3–6; Ps II 312.1–4; Ps-pt II 229.28–230.4 (Aṅga); Sv I 294.3–5; Pj II I 135.26–28; Th-a II 74.22–25, 264.25–27 (Magadha); Ud-a 182.12–14 (Vajji); Sv III 816.3–5; Ud-a 377.11–13 (Malla); Pv-a C^c 117.28–31 (Pañcāla).

names came to be commonly used to refer to these districts, their primary usage gradually disappeared.

4. The Cāpāla Shrine, etc.

In the *Dīghanikāya*, *Samyuttanikāya*, *Aṅguttaranikāya* and *Udāna*, we find the same passage where the Buddha proposes to the Elder Ānanda to join him in visiting the Cāpāla shrine (*ceṭiya*) to spend the day. After approaching this place, he states that six shrines are all delightful: the Udena, Gotamaka, Sattamba, Bahuputta, Sārandada, and Cāpāla.¹⁹ In the commentary on the *Udāna*, Dhammapāla glosses:

*Cāpālacetiyan ti pubbe Cāpālassa nāma yakkhassa vasitaṭṭhānaṃ Cāpālacetiyan ti paññāyittha. tattha bhagavato katavibhāro pi tāya rūlhiyā Cāpālacetiyan ti vuccati. Udenaṃ cetiyan ti evam ādisu pi es' eva nayo. Sattambaṃ ti Kikissa kira Kāsirañño dbitaro satta kumāriyo samvegajātā rājagebato nikkhamitvā yattha padhānaṃ padabimsu, taṃ ṭhānaṃ Sattambaṃ cetiyan ti vadanti. Bahuputtan ti bahupārobo eko nigrodharukkho. tasmim adhvattam devatam babū manussā putte pattenti. tad upādāya taṃ ṭhānaṃ Bahuputtam cetiyan ti paññāyittha. Sārandadan ti Sārandada-nāma yakkhassa vasitaṭṭhānaṃ. iti sabbān' eva tāni Buddhuppādato pubbe devatāpariggahitāni ti cetiyavohārena vohāritāni. Bhagavato vibhāre kate pi ca tath' eva paññātan ti.*²⁰

[To] the shrine Cāpāla: it was known as the Cāpāla shrine as it was the place where the demon named Cāpāla previously dwelt. Even the *vibhāra* built there for the Blessed One is counted as the shrine Cāpāla according to the convention of speech. This same method [applies] with respect to the shrine Udena, etc., as well. [The shrine] Sattamba: they call the shrine 'Sattamba' as [it] is the place where the seven princesses who were the daughters of Kiki, king of Kāsi, filled with a sense of urgency, went forth from the royal palace and focused on religious striving.²¹ The [shrine] Bahuputta: [there is] a banyan tree with many shoots [there and] many people pray for sons to the god who dwells in that [tree]. Owing to that [activity], that place was known as the shrine Bahuputta. The [shrine] Sārandada: the place where the demon named Sārandada dwelt. In this manner, all those entered common usage as the popular names for [these] shrines, since they had been occupied by the gods before the Buddha's emergence. And, although the

19 D II 102.5-19; S V 259.5-29; A IV 308.21-22-309.1-4; Ud 62.6-16.

20 Ud-a 322.20-323.13. (Ud-a 323.2 has *bāpālacetiyaṃ*, which is likely a typographical error.)

21 *sattamba* literally means seven women; the noun *ambā* is used either of a mother or a good woman. Dhammapāla here alludes to the past life story of the Therī Khemā (as Princess Samaṇī) and her seven sisters (Thi-a 122.9-14). (I am grateful to Alastair Gornall for pointing this out.)

vihāras [in these places] were built for the Blessed One, [they] were known by the same [former names].²²

Dhammapāla states that the term Cāpālacetiya, according to *rūlhi*, stands for the *vihāra* that was built for the Buddha. Although this phrase initially referred to the shrine of the demon Cāpāla, later on that usage was apparently merged with the name of the *vihāra*. Hence, Cāpālacetiya here is a substitution for *vihāra*. The statement that ‘this same method [applies] with respect to the shrine Udena, etc., as well’, shows that all the names of shrines mentioned here are *rūlhis*, and refer to the *vihāras* built for the Buddha. Although these *vihāras* are entirely different from those *cetiya*s, their primary designations continued to be used. The six shrines are, therefore, not shrines but *vihāras*.²³

5. *mārisa*

In the Pāli canon, the gods generally use the term *mārisa* to address the members of their community, the Buddha and eminent monks. In addition, kings also use the term to address one another. In the first discourse of the *Samyuttanikāya*, we see a certain god addressing the Buddha as *mārisa*:

kathaṃ nu tvaṃ mārisa ogham atari ti?

‘How, dear sir, did you cross the flood?’²⁴

Bodhi (presumably following PED) assumes that this term comes from Sanskrit *mādrś*, ‘like me, resembling me’.²⁵ Buddhaghosa’s exegesis on this term is as follows:

²² See also Masefield 1995: II 851–852.

²³ In the subcommentaries on the *Dīghanikāya* (Sv-pt II 190.28–30) and *Samyuttanikāya* (Spk-pt II 503.23–504.3), Dhammapāla explains the six shrines, but does not say they are *rūlhis*. Instead, he states that the previous common names for the shrines have come to be used for the *vihāras*. In his short glosses in the *Sumaṅgalavilāsini*, *Sāratthappakāsini* and *Manorathapāraṇi*, Buddhaghosa also does not designate these six shrines as *rūlhis*, but implies that in the present context they refer to *vihāras*: ‘The *vihāra* built at the place of the shrine of the demon Udena is called Udenacetiya. This same method [applies] with respect to the [shrine] Gotamaka, etc., as well.’ (Sv II 554.21–22: *Udenacetiyan ti Udenayakkhassa cetiyaṭṭhāne katavibhāro vuccati. Gotamakādīsu pi es’ eva nayo*) See also Mp II 373.12–17 (to A I 498.1); Mp IV 9.5–9 (to A IV 16.1–2).

²⁴ S I 1.8; Bodhi 2000: 89.

²⁵ Bodhi 2000: 341 fn. 1; PED, s.v. *mārisa*: ‘perhaps identical with *mādrś*.’ However, the term *mārśa* occurs in hybrid Sanskrit texts in the same sense as *mārisa* in the *Tiṭṭaka*; e.g. Abhidh-k-bh II 6.24–25: *mā bbaiṣṭa māṣṣāb* (‘don’t be afraid o respectable ones’). According to the dictionaries (PED, s.v. *mārisa*; BHSD, pw, SWTF, s.v. *mārśa*) *mārisa* and *mārśa* occur only in the vocative. Yet Śkd’s definition of *mārśa* as a noble person (*śreṣṭhabh*) suggests it can be declined in other cases. Dhammapāla mentions the nom-

mārisā ti devatānaṃ piyasamudācāravacanam etaṃ. niddukkā ti vuttaṃ hoti. yadi evaṃ, ‘yadā kḥo te mārisa saṅkunā saṅku hadaye samāgaccheyya, atḥa naṃ vvaṃ jāneyyāsi vassasabhaṃ me niraye paṇṇamānassā’ (M I 337.9–11) *ti idaṃ viruḷḷibati. na hi nerayikasatto niddukkḥo nāma hoti. kiñcā pi na niddukkḥo, rūḷḷhisaddena paṇa evaṃ vuccati. pubbe kira paṭḥamakappikānaṃ niddukkānaṃ sukhasamappitānaṃ esa vobāro. aḥarabbāge paṇa dukkḥaṃ hotu vā mā vā, rūḷḷhisaddena ayaṃ vobāro vuccat’ eva, nippadumā pi nirudakā pi vā poḅkḥaraṇī poḅkḥaraṇī viya.*²⁶

Mārisa: this is a term of cordial address among gods; [this] is to say, ‘O, one free from suffering.’ If this is the case, [it] contradicts this [statement]: ‘When, o friend, stake meets stake within [your] heart indeed, then you should know, “I have been boiling in the Niraya hell for a thousand years.”’ For, a living being who is suffering in the Niraya hell, is not called ‘one free from suffering’. Although [he] is not free from suffering, he is spoken of like this by virtue of convention of speech (*rūḷḷhi*). As is well known, this was formerly the common way of speaking of those belonging to the first aeon, who were free from suffering and endowed with happiness. But in a later time, this common way of speaking only used as a conventional term whether [it] invokes suffering or wards it off, it is, like how a ‘lotus pond’ [is called] *poḅkḥaraṇī* whether or not it has lotuses or water.²⁷

Buddhaghosa begins by stating that the term *mārisa* is a term of cordial address among gods. But it occurs in the present context in the sense of *niddukkā*—one free from suffering. He does not, however, explain how *mārisa* is a synonym of *niddukkā*. It is probable that *niddukkā* is a reflex of *mā riṣat*, a Vedic benediction.²⁸

The text Buddhaghosa quotes shows the guardians of Niraya hell addressing as *mārisa* a being who is being severely tortured.²⁹ Since the being

inative of *mārisa* as *māriṣo* in his subcommentaries. See Ps-pt II 214.20–21. According to Śkd, s.v. *māriṣaḥ*, *māriṣa* means ‘a person who is patient with people’ (*māriṣaḥ mriṣyati kṣamate janān iti [...] śreṣṭhaḥ*). As we shall see, Dharmapāla (Spk-pt I 44.16–18) also takes *mārisa* in the sense of enduring or patience.

26 Spk I 17.14–24.

27 See also Pj II 536.8–9: *mārisā ti piyavacanam etaṃ, niddukkā ti vuttaṃ hoti. ‘Mārisa*: this is a term of cordial address; [this] is to say, “o, one free from suffering.” See also Ps II 290.5–6.

28 See KEWA, s.v. *māriṣaḥ*: ‘(meist im Vok.) ein werter, verdienstvoller Mann, a worthy man.’ As Leumann proposes *mārisa*/*māriṣa* comes from an old Vedic benediction *mā riṣat* ‘mög’s nicht schlimm gehen’, meaning ‘may (somebody) not suffer harm’. Buddhaghosa’s gloss *niddukkā* could be a reflex of this. (Martin Straube, personal email communication, 6 June, 2023.)

29 Buddhaghosa apparently quotes the *Māraṭajjanīyasutta* (M I 337.9–11); neither the commentary (Ps II 421.22–422.6) nor the subcommentary (Ps-pt II 322.23–323.8) defines the term *mārisa* in this context.

is suffering severe torture, *niddukkha*, the proposed meaning of *mārisa*, obviously does not fit the context. Yet, the term *mārisa* occurs here as a *rūlhi*. Before concluding his gloss, Buddhaghosa further illustrates what *rūlhi* is, using an apt analogy of *pokkharanī*. Since the term *pokkbara* means both a ‘lotus-flower’ as well as ‘water’,³⁰ *pokkharanī* can literally mean a ‘pond with lotuses’ as well as a ‘pond with water’. But regardless of its literal meaning, as a *rūlhi*, we use the term *pokkharanī* even if the latter does not contain lotus flowers or water. In his subcommentary on the *Samyuttanikāya*, Dhammapāla explains Buddhaghosa’s words as follows:

marisanatt̃hena p̃pānaṃ rogādi-anatt̃hānaṃ abbhavanaṃt̃hena māriso, dukkharahito. tenāba: niddukkḥā ti vuttaṃ boti ti. nirayapakkhe piyālaṇavacanasena upacāravacanañ c’ etaṃ yathā ‘devānaṃ piyā’ ti.³¹

In the sense of enduring, [that is,] in the sense of overcoming evil [as well as] misfortunes such as illness [one is] *mārisa*, that is, [a person] who is without suffering. Therefore, [Buddhaghosa] says: [this] is to say, ‘o, one free of suffering’. But in the context of the Niraya hell, this is a metonymical expression by virtue of a term of address for someone who is dear, similar to [the expression] ‘O beloved of the gods’.

Here Dhammapāla explains that one who is capable of ‘enduring’ (*marisana*) or overcoming evil and misfortunes is called *mārisa*. Therefore, the term refers to ‘one who is without suffering’ (*dukkharahito*).³² Dhammapāla

30 DOP, s.v. *pokkbara*: ‘lotus, water’; PSED, s.v. *puṣkaram*: ‘water’; pw, s.v. *puṣkara*: ‘Wasser’. See also Hanneder 2002: 296.

31 Spk-pt̃ I 44.16–18.

32 In the *Mahā-Saccakasutta*, gods address the Buddha by the term *mārisa* (M I 245.9–10). Dhammapāla (Ps-pt̃ II 214.20–21) explains as follows: *dharmasārīrassa arogabhāvena sādḥū ti marisaniyo ti māriso* (≠ 245.9–10; Ps II 290.5–6). ‘[The Buddha is called] *mārisa* as he is enduring, as he is excellent, due to the healthiness of the body of Teaching.’ Here, Dhammapāla stresses the suitability of addressing the Buddha by the term *mārisa*. Dhammapāla further points out in his subcommentary on the *Diḅbanikāya* how appropriately this term applies to gods as well. In the *Sakkapañhasutta*, Sakka, the king of gods, makes the following statement addressing the other gods dwelling in the heaven of the Thirty-three gods (D II 263.14): *ayaṃ mārisā Bhagavā Magadhesu vībarati*. ‘This Blessed One, o friends, dwells in the Magadha country.’ Buddhaghosa (Sv III 698.27–28) explains: *mārisā ti piyavacanā etaṃ devatānaṃ, p̃piyeko vobāro. niddukkḥā ti pi vuttaṃ boti*. ‘*Mārisā*: this is a term of cordial address among gods, a distinct designation. [This] is also to say, “O ones free of suffering?”’ Dhammapāla (Sv-pt̃ II 311.5–10) glosses this: *p̃piyeko vobāro ti āveṇiko piyasamudābāro. marisanīyasampattikā ti mārisā. tesāṃ hi sampattim̃ sayāṃ mahānubbāvatāya sabanti ubbhanti, aññe anissāmanakatāya c’ eva appabūtāya ca sabanti yeva. sā pana nesāṃ marisanīyasampattikatā dukkḥavirābitatāya ti vuttaṃ niddukkḥā ti pi vuttaṃ boti ti*. ‘Distinct designation: a special cordial term of address. They have prosperity that is enduring, so [they] are *mārisā*. For they carry,

la identifies *mārisa* as a term of metonymical expression (*upacāravacanam*) when it is used to address beings who are being tortured in the Niraya hell, suggesting this usage is similar to the expression *devānaṃ piya* ('o beloved of the gods').³³ At the end of the gloss, Dhammapāla provides us with a clear definition of *rūlhi*, as follows:

*kiñci nimittaṃ upādāya kismiñci atthe pavattassa saddassa tannimittarabite pavatti rūlhi nāma, gamanakiriyārabite viśāṇādimati piñḍe yathā gosad-dassa.*³⁴

When a word used to refer to something by way of some feature is used to refer to something lacking that feature, it is called 'conventional usage', like [the use] of the word 'cow' (lit. 'goer') to refer to a body lacking the activity of going that has such features as horns.³⁵

In accordance with *nirukti*, a cow (*go*) is so named because it goes. This term is literally confined to a walking cow. However, as a *rūlhi*, the term refers to a cow regardless of what posture it is in.³⁶

6. *Kāsika*

The Aṭṭhakathās do not explicitly state that the term *kāsika* is a *rūlhi*. However, their interpretations of this term indicate that they did not follow its literal meaning in introducing it. In the Pāli canon, *Kāsi* is a city.³⁷

they bear, their prosperity, due to their having great dignity. Others even bear [it] due to their being without envy and without authority. But, as [the gods'] state of enduring prosperity is due to being separated from suffering, [Buddhaghosa] stated: [It] is also to say, "o, [dear ones] free of suffering?"

33 Cf. also Sv-pt I 161.6-8: *bhonto* (D I 5.28) *ti* (Sv I 81.2) *sādbūnaṃ piyasamudābhāro. sādbavo hi pare bhonto ti vā, devānaṃ piyā ti vā āyasmanto ti vā samālapanti*. '*Bhonto*: a cordial term of address [used] among good people. For good people properly address others either as *bhonto* ("sirs") or as *devānaṃ piyā* or as *āyasmanto* ("venerable ones").' See also Ps-pt II 101.9-11.

34 Spk-pt I 44.23-25; the reading *sāsanādimati paṭipīṇḍe* here is probably a contaminated reading; Vism-mhṭ II 11.13-14, in reading a similar context, reads *viśāṇādimati piñḍe*, which I have adopted as it appears to fit this context as well. See also Vism-mhṭ I 366.17-20; Vibh-anuṭ 7.10-13.

35 For *piñḍa* in the sense of 'body', see MW, s.v. *piñḍa*; pw, s.v. *piñḍa*: 'Körper, Leib; Person'.

36 Cf. Srds 348.7-8: *na ca vyutpatti balād eva sarvatra śabdah pravartate. tathābve gacchati ti gaur iti vyutpattes tiṣṭhan gaur na syāt, gacchan devadattaś ca gauh syāt*. 'And, in every case [of usage], a term does not function only due to the power of [its] etymology. If that were the case, due to the etymology, "because it walks [it] is a cow", a cow would not be [a cow] when standing, Devadatta would be a cow when walking.'

37 For example, see S I 82.24-32.

Hence, as a secondary derivative, the term *kāsika* literally means something or someone ‘belonging to the city of Kāsi.’³⁸ As an adjective, the term *kāsika* naturally appears in the suttas to denote garments; hence *kāsikavatttha*, meaning ‘clothing from Kāsi.’³⁹

Typically, the bare term *kāsika* in canonical verses means *kāsikavatttha*. For example, the expression *kāsikuttamadhbāriniṃ* in the Therīgāthā.⁴⁰ Although this expression literally means ‘she [who] is wearing [something] excellent belonging to Kāsi’, the context of the verse, as well as the contiguous context of the entire chapter on Cāpā, invites us to understand it thus: ‘she [who] is wearing excellent clothing coming from Kāsi.’⁴¹ No doubt the term *vatttha* was dropped for metrical reasons, but commentators stress ‘the need for the term *vatttha* to complete the meaning of this verse.’⁴²

Kāsika is sometimes combined with the term *candana* (‘sandalwood’) as *kāsikacandana*. For instance, the *Jaṭṭilasutta* of the Saṃyuttanikāya says that the king of Kosala enjoys *kāsikacandana*.⁴³ Does this mean the king enjoys

38 See DOP, s.v. *kāsika*: ‘coming from Kāsi’; pw, s.v. *kāṣṭka*: ‘aus Kāsi kommend’; MW, s.v. *kāsika*: ‘coming from Kāsi’. Some late canonical texts refer also to a city called Kāsika, e.g., Ap II 401.16; Bv 74.29, v. 14a: *Kāsikaṃ nāma nagaraṃ*.

39 e.g., *kāsikaṃ vattthaṃ* (D II 14.28; M III 123.3); *kāsikāni vattbhāni* (A III 50.3); Ja II 443.14 has *kāsiya* in the same sense (*kāsiyaṃ ca muduṃ vattthaṃ*, ‘and clothing from Kāsi that is soft’). In some cases, this term qualifies particular garments; e.g. *kāsikā kañcukā*, ‘jacket from Kāsi’ (A I 145.10). According to S v 45.1-2 ‘It is declared that, of all garments woven with threads, that of Kāsi is the best.’ (*yāni kānici tantāvutānaṃ vattbhānaṃ, kāsikavattthaṃ tesam aggama akkḃāyati*).

40 Thī 152.9-10, v. 298.

41 See also Rhys Davids 1997a: 111; Norman 1995: 32; Masset 2005: 74. It is clear that these translators understood the term *kāsika* in the sense of *kāsikavatttha*.

42 Thī-a 214.12: *kāsikuttamadhbāriniṃ ti uttama-kāsikavattthadhbāraṃ*. ‘[Me] wearing [something] excellent from Kāsi: [me] wearing excellent clothing from Kāsi’; cf. Pruitt 1998: 285. The expression *kāsikuttamadhbārini* occurs also at Pv 9.18, v. 8b, where again it seems we must understand *kāsikuttamavattthadhbārini*. Pv-a C^c 38.33-34 glosses: *kāsikuttamadhbāriniṃ ti kāsikavattthato pi uttamavattthadhbārini*. ‘[She] wearing [something] excellent from Kāsi: she wearing clothing superior to even that from Kāsi.’ At Thī 159.14, v. 374c, we have *kāsikasukbumehi*. ‘With fine [things] from Kāsi’. See also Norman 1995: 38; Rhys Davids 1997a: 128; Masset 2005: 84; cf. DOP, s.v. *kāsikasukbuma*: ‘fine garment of muslim from Kāsi’. Thī-a 235.32-33 glosses: *kāsikakusumehi ti Kāsiraṭṭhe uppannehi ativiya sukbumehi*. ‘With fine [things] from Kāsi: with exceedingly fine [things] originated from the district of Kāsi.’ See also Pruitt 1998: 318. As far as I know, this is the only place where the commentators indicate a connection between the city of Kāsi and *kāsika*.
43 S I 78.21-22: *tayā [...] kāsikacandanaṃ paṇanubhontena*. ‘By you enjoying the use of sandalwood from Kāsi.’ See also Bodhi 2000: 173. Here, Mrs. Rhys Davids (1917: 105) renders *kāsikacandana* as ‘Benares sandalwood’. See also DOP, s.v. *kāsikacandana*: ‘fine sandal from Kāsi’.

the sandalwood from Kāsi? According to Buddhaghosa's interpretation, *kāsikacandana* here means 'smooth sandalwood' (*kāsikacandanān ti saṅha-candanāṃ*).⁴⁴ However, Dhammapāla glosses *kāsika* with *ujjala* ('shiny'), but goes on to further justify why Buddhaghosa interpreted *kāsika* as *saṅha*:

*kāsikacandanān ti ujjalacandanāṃ. taṃ kira vaṇṇavasena samujjalaṃ hoti pabbassaraṃ. tad attham eva naṃ saṅhataraṃ karonti. ten āba: kāsikacandanān ti saṅhacandanān ti.*⁴⁵

Kāsikacandanāṃ: sandalwood that is shiny. As is well known, that [sandalwood] is fairly shiny [and] brilliant by virtue of colour. For the very same purpose (i.e., shine), [people] make it smoother. Therefore, [Buddhaghosa] says: *kāsikacandana* [means] smooth sandalwood.

The *Jaṭilasutta* is also found in the *Udāna*.⁴⁶ Interestingly, its commentary explains *kāsikacandana*, as follows:

*kāsikacandanān ti saṅhacandanāṃ, kāsikavattbañ ca candanañ cā ti vā attho.*⁴⁷

Kāsikacandanāṃ: smooth sandalwood, or clothing from Kāsi and sandalwood, is the meaning.⁴⁸

The first interpretation reiterates Buddhaghosa's, but the second takes *kāsika* as an ellipsis of *kāsikavattba* ('clothing from Kāsi').⁴⁹ In this manner the commentators usually go beyond the literal meaning of *kāsika* when it occurs as the first term in the compound *kāsikacandana*.

As a gloss in the commentary of the *Puggalapaññatti* shows, *kāsikavattba* does not have any connection with the city of Kāsi at all!

kāsikavattbaṃ (Pp 34.4) *nāma tayo kappāsamsū gabetvā kantitasuttēna vāyitaṃ sukbumavattbaṃ.*⁵⁰

What is called *kāsikavattba* is a delicate clothing woven with thread, which is spun taking three cotton fibres.

44 Spk I 149.12. See also A III 391.13–14; Mp III 400.25. At Ja V 302.14, v. 40b, the commentary glosses *kāsikacandanēna* with *sukbumacandanēna*, 'with sandalwood that is delicate'.

45 Spk-pṭ I 182.6–8.

46 Ud 65.25: *tayā* [...] *kāsikacandanāṃ paccanubhontena*. 'By you enjoying the use of sandalwood from Kāsi.'

47 Ud-a 332.5–6. Sāriputta reuses this gloss. See Mp-nṭ III B^c 132.27–133.1.

48 See also Masefield 1995: II 864.

49 Cf. Ja V 490.30–491.1: *kāsikacandanāñ cā ti kāsikavattbañ ca lohita-candanāñ ca*. '*Kāsikacandanāñ ca*: clothing from Kāsi and red sandalwood.'

50 Pp-a 216.31–32. Cf. DOP, s.v. *kāsikavattbi(n)*: 'covered with fine muslin from Kāsi.'

To summarize, according to the earlier commentators like Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla, *kāsika* in the compound *kāsikacandana*, usually means either *saṅha* ('smooth') or *sukhuma* ('delicate') or *ujjala* ('shiny'). They typically take the term *kāsika* as an adjective. Nevertheless, the second interpretation of the *Udāna*-commentary takes it as a noun, *kāsikavattha* ('clothing from Kāsi').

When the Buddha reveals his luxurious household life as a prince, he observes that 'it would not occur to him to use 'sandalwood that is not from Kāsi' (*akāsikaṃ candanaṃ*).⁵¹ Buddhaghosa explains *akāsikaṃ candanaṃ* by *asaṅhaṃ candanaṃ* ('sandal wood that is not smooth').⁵² In his twelfth century subcommentary, Sāriputta explains why the Buddha qualifies *candana* with the term *akāsika*, as follows:

*kāsikasaddo ativiya saṅhe sukhume mahagghavatthe nirulbo, aññasmim pi ta-thājātike rūlḥivasena pavattati ti daṭṭhabbaṃ. tenāha: akāsikaṃ candanan (A 1 145.9) ti.*⁵³

Understand that the term *kāsika*, which commonly refers to clothing of great value that is extremely soft and delicate, occurs also for other [things] having the same nature by virtue of convention of speech'. Therefore, [the Buddha] says: sandalwood that is not from Kāsi.

As this explanation shows, according to the commentators the term *kāsika* does not occur in its literal meaning (i.e., something or someone from Kāsi); its primary meaning is lost. It has, however, two referents. All the examples of *kāsika* we have seen confirm this idea. Sāriputta uses the word *nirulḥa* for the first referent and *rulḥi* for the second. The first referent of *kāsika* is extremely delicate clothing of great value, and the second is any other thing that is delicate and valuable. As a result, *kāsika* can occur as a qualifier of *candana*. In accordance with this interpretation, *kāsika* conveys the senses of 'delicate' and 'valuable'.

7. *nārī*

The term *nārī*, the feminine of *nara* ('man'), occurs in the *Vimānavatthu* to refer to a female deity.

51 A 1 145.8-9: *na kbo paṇ' assāhaṃ bhikkhave akāsikaṃ candanaṃ dbāremi*. See also Woodward 1932 1 128; Bodhi 2012: 240.

52 Mp 11 237.19.

53 Mp-nt 1 355.7-9. See also Mp-nt 11 B^c 119.7-9 (reads *kāsikacandanān ti*).

*suvaṇṇacchadanaṃ nāvaṃ nārī āruyha tiṭṭhasi |
ogābasi pokkharāṇiṃ paḍmaṃ chindasi pāṇinā ||*⁵⁴

On a boat with a golden canopy, lady, you rest; you dip into the lotus pool, with your hand you pick the lotus.⁵⁵

Nārī literally means ‘in relation to a man’.⁵⁶ As the commentary shows, this term was primarily used to refer to a female human but subsequently, as a *rūlhi*, it came to be used to denote other female beings as well:

*nārī ti tassā devadhītāya ālaṇaṇaṃ. narati netī ti naro, puriso. yathā hi paṭha-
mapakatibhūto satto itarāya pakatiyā seṭṭhattbena puri setī ti puriso ti vuccati,
evaṃ nayanatṭhena naro ti. puttābhātubbhūto pi hi puṅgalo mātujeṭṭhabhagi-
ninaṃ pituṭṭhāne tiṭṭhati, paḅ eva bhattubbhūto. narassa eṣā ti nārī. ayaṅ ca
samaññā manuss’ itthiṣu pavattā rūlhiवासena itarāsu pi tatthā vuccati.*⁵⁷

Nārī: a vocative addressing that divine daughter. Because [one] leads [and] guides, [one] is a man, that is *purisa*. For a living being born from the first material is counted as *purisa* because he stays above (*purī setī*), due to [having] a better nature than [those from] another material. In the same manner, [a man] is [called] *nara* in the sense of leading. For, a person, even if he is a son or a brother, stands in as a father for [his] mother and elder sister; even more so if he is a husband. Because the [female] belongs to a man, [she] is a *nārī*. And this designation that refers to human ladies, by virtue of convention of speech, is used similarly for other females as well.

As this definition indicates, *nārī* can mean any female—human, divine, and so on.⁵⁸

8. *kantāra*

The term *kantāra* (Skt. *kāntāra*) means a ‘desert’. In the Saṃyuttanikāya, a discourse entitled *Puttamamsa* (‘Son’s Flesh’) tells a parable about a cou-

54 Vv 6.16–17, v. 43.

55 Although the first *gāthā* refers to the female deity as *nārī*, the subsequent stanzas of this chapter use *devī* and *devatā* to designate her. See Vv 6.20, v. 45a, 6.24, v. 46a.

56 Hk, s.v. *narasyeyam*, defines *nārī* as: ‘This [female] relates to a man’.

57 Vv-a 42.17–24; I follow Vv-a C^e 33.20–21. In reading *nayanatṭhena naro ti* where E^c has *naratṭhena naro ti*. For a definition of *nārī*, see also Vism-mhṭ I 14.1–9.

58 We can note that in the expression *naradevānaṃ* (S I 5.25–26; 200.18–19), *nara* is taken by Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla in the sense of ‘male’ (rather than ‘man’) qualifying *devānaṃ*: ‘of god-men, of god-males in the meaning’ (Spk I 30.25–26: *devanarānaṃ, devapurisānaṃ ti attbo*) ‘of deities who are male’ (Spk-pt I 75.2–3: *purisabbhūta-devatānaṃ*); see also Spk I 293.12 and Spk-pt I 301.13. Neither takes *nara* here as a *rūlhi*.

ple travelling with their son through a desert where there is no food: 'A husband and wife having taken limited provisions might enter upon a path located in a desert.' (*dve jayampatikā parittam sambalam ādāya kantāramaggam paṭipajjeyyūṃ*).⁵⁹ Buddhaghosa explains *kantāramaggam* as follows:

*kantāramaggan ti kantārabhūtam maggam, kantāre vā maggam. kantāran bi corakantāram vālakantāram amanussakantāram nirudakakantāram appabbakkakantāran ti pañcavidham. tesu yattba corabhayaṃ attbi, tam corakantāram. yattba sibhabyagghādayo vāḷā attbi, tam vālakantāram. yattba balavāmu-khayakkhini-ādinam amanussānam vasena bhayaṃ attbi, tam amanussakantāram. yattba pātum vā nabāyitum vā udakam natthi, tam nirudakakantāram. yattba khādītabbam vā bhūñjitabbam vā antamaso kandamūlādīmattam pi natthi, tam appabbakkakantāram nāma. yattba pan' etaṃ pañcavidham pi bhayaṃ attbi, tam kantāram eva.*⁶⁰

A road across a desert: a road that has become like a desert, or, a road [located] in a desert. For a desert is fivefold: 1) a desert with thieves, 2) a desert with wild-beasts, 3) a desert with non-human beings, 4) a waterless desert, [and] 5) a desert with little food. Among these, where there is fear of thieves, that is a desert with thieves; where there are wild-beasts such as lions [and] tigers, that is a desert with beasts; where there is fear because of non-humans such as a female demon with a mare's mouth, that is a desert with non-human beings; where there is no water for drinking or bathing, that is a waterless desert; where there is nothing to be munched or to be eaten, not even a mere root, tuber etc., that is called a desert with little food. But, where all these five fears exist, that is a desert indeed.

After offering two interpretations for *kantāramaggam*, Buddhaghosa introduces the five *kantāras*. The term *kantāra* properly refers to a place threatened by thieves, wild animals, and non-human beings, and lack of water and food. However, if a place is at risk from only one of these five factors, that 'desert' is named after the factor causing the risk, e.g., 'a desert with thieves' (*corakantāra*). Dhammapāla initially interprets *kantāra* etymologically:

*dullabbatāya kam udakam tathā tāretī ti kantāram, nirudakam mahāvanam. ruḷhivasena itaram pi mahāvanam tathā vuccatī ti āha corakantāran ti ādi.*⁶¹

59 S II 98.9-10. See also Bodhi 2000: 597; Mrs. Rhys Davids 1922: II 68.

60 Spk II 103.27-104.3.

61 Spk-pt II 110.6-8.

Because, owing to [its] scarcity, one causes *kaṃ*, that is, water, to cross (*tārenti*) there, [it] is [called] a desert (*kantāra*), a great waterless forest. [Buddhaghosa] says: a desert with robbers, etc., because, by virtue of a convention of speech, other great forests are also likewise counted as [deserts].

Etymologically a desert is a place ‘one causes water to cross’, that is, where one must take water when crossing.⁶²

Hence, the term *kantāra* stands primarily for the great waterless forest (*nirudakaṃ mahāvānaṃ*). This is the fourth in Buddhaghosa’s list. Buddhaghosa uses *kantāra* as a *rūlhi* to qualify four other places.⁶³ Dhammapāla says nothing about the Buddhaghosa’s statement, ‘But where all these five fears are, it is indeed a desert’ (*yattha paṇ’etaṃ pañcavidham pi bhayaṃ atthi, taṃ kantāraṃ eva*).

62 Dhammapāla offers the same etymological explanation, deriving *kantāra* from *kaṃ* (water) and *tāra* (make cross), in other places: Vv-a 334.25–26: *kantāre* (Vv 126.10) *ti nirudake iriṇe. kaṃ tārenti nayanti etthā ti hi kantāro udakaṃ gabetvā taritabbaṭṭhānaṃ*. ‘In a desert: in a wilderness without water. For, as [people] make water (*kaṃ*) cross (*tārenti*), that is, lead [it] here, [it] is [called] *kantāra*, a place to be crossed taking water.’ Where Buddhaghosa glosses *kantāraddhānamaggam*, ‘a road across a desert’ (D I 73.4; M I 276.3) as *kantāraṃ addhānamaggam nirudakaṃ dighamaggam*. ‘A road which is a desert, a long road with no water’ (Sv I 213.4–5; Ps II 318.9–11). Dhammapāla elaborates (Sv-pt I 337.24–25): *anudakatāya kaṃ pāniyaṃ tārenti etthā ti kantāro ti āha nirudakaṃ dighamaggam ti*. ‘As, due to the absence of water, [people] make water (*kaṃ*), that is, drinking water, cross (*tārenti*) here, it is *kantāra*, [therefore, Buddhaghosa] says “a road with no water”’; at Ps-pt II B^c 235.4–5 Dhammapāla replaces *anudakatāya* with *dullabba-āpatāya* (‘owing to the scarcity of water’). The etymologies in Sanskrit lexicons differ markedly from those in Pāli exegetical literature. VcP, s.v. *kāntāra*: *kasya jalasyāntaṃ kāntaṃ manojñaṃ vā rasam ṛcchati*. ‘[*kāntāra* is what] moves to the end of *ka*, that is, of water; or to the pleasing (*kānta*), that is, an agreeable taste.’ The alternative *nirukti* seems to reflect the Skt use of *kāntāra* in the sense of ‘sugar cane’. See MW, s.v. *kāntāra*. ŚkD, s.v. *kāntāram*, takes *ka* as ‘happiness’: *kasya sukhasya antaṃ ṛcchati gacchati ti*, ‘[*kāntāra* is what] moves, goes, to the end of *ka*, that is, happiness’. ŚmhN, s.v. *kāntāram*, combines the previous explanations: *kasya jalasya sukhasya antaṃ taṃ, kāntaṃ manoharaṃ vā ṛcchati*. ‘[*kāntāra* is what] moves to the end of *ka*, that is, of happiness, of water; or [it moves] to the pleasing, that is, the agreeable.’

63 At Vism 208.16–18 where Buddhaghosa lists just four types of deserts, omitting *amanussa-kantāra*; Dhammapāla (Vism-mḥ I 247.4–6) gives essentially the same gloss: *kaṃ tārenti etthā ti kantāro, nirudako araṇṇappadeso. rūlhiवासena paṇa itaro pi araṇṇappadeso tatthā vuccati*. ‘Because [people] make water (*kaṃ*) cross (*tārenti*) here, it is counted as a desert (*kantāra*), a region of wilderness where there is no water. But, by virtue of a convention of speech, even other region[s] of wilderness are likewise called [deserts].’ See also Sp-ṭ I 293.2–4; Vmv I 57.7–8. Vism-sn (II 500.9–11) explains Vism-mḥ’s gloss: *kaṃ = jalaya* (water), *etthā = mehi* (here), *tārenti ti = gēṇa yēt nu y* (because [people] carry [it]).

9. *methuna*

The first grave offence in the monastic law code (Vinaya) prohibits sexual intercourse (*methuna*) for monks. If a monk engages in sexual intercourse either with a human female or a female animal, he commits the offence called *pārājika* ('expulsion from the order').⁶⁴ This also applies to the monk who engages in this activity, even with a female corpse, whether undecomposed (*matam akkhayitam*) or for the most part undecomposed (*matam yebbuyyena akkhayitam*).⁶⁵ Buddhadatta versifies these factors in his *Vinayavinicchaya*:

*mate akkhayite cāpi yebbuyyakkhayite pi ca |
methunam patisevanto hoti pārājiko naro ||*⁶⁶

Indulging in sexual intercourse with a [female] corpse undecomposed and with a [female] corpse for the most part undecomposed, a man commits an [offence of] *pārājikā*.

Buddhadatta does not use the term *bbikkhu*, but *naro* ('man') probably *metri causa* for one indulging in sexual intercourse. The term *methuna* (Skt. *maithuna*) is a secondary derivative from *mithuna* and stands for a pair consisting of a man and a woman; it literally means something belonging to the union of a man and woman, and refers to the sexual union.⁶⁷ This context speaks of a male inserting his penis into the vagina of a female corpse. There is no reaction from the female corpse, only the male engages in this act. The *Vinayavinicchayaṭīkā* explains how such an act of a male can be called *methunam* as follows:

*methunan ti rāgapariyuṭṭhānena sadisabbāvāpattiyā mithunānam idaṃ methunam. matitthi-ādīnam rāgapariyuṭṭhānena sadisattābhāve pi tattha vitikkamo rūlhiyā methunan ti vuccati.*⁶⁸

***Methunam*:** When pairs [of men and women] due to the outburst of passion reach a similar state, this is 'sexual union' (*methuna*). Even if this similarity due to outburst of passion is absent in a dead women, etc., the transgression there, according to the convention of speech, is counted as 'sexual union'.

64 Vin III 23.33–36. See also BD I 41–42. Von Hinüber (1985: 62) renders *pārājiko hoti* as 'zur Vertreibung (aus dem Orden) gehört', which I follow here.

65 Vin III 29.16–30.3 (BD I 49). Sp I 263.24–264.20 provides a detailed gloss relating to this theme with a view of the Elder Upatissa.

66 See Vin-vn 2.3–4.

67 Skt. *mithuna* can denote sexual intercourse; see pw, s.v. *mithuna*: 'Paarung, Begattung; auch Paarung im weitesten Sinne'. pw, s.v. *maithuna*: 'a) gepaart, ein Paar verschiedenen Geschlechts bildend. b) verschwägert'.

68 Vin-vn-ṭ 1 32.

In *methuna*, both male and female reach a similar state as a result of the outburst of their passion. Needless to say a female corpse does not have passion (*rāga*) thus does not reach such a position. Therefore, the necrophiliac act of a male indulging in sexual intercourse with a woman's corpse is literally not a *methuna*. But it is referred to as *methuna*, as a *rūlhi*.

10. *abbhuta*

The term *abbhutaṃ*, typically preceded by *acchariyaṃ*, is an expression of astonishment.⁶⁹ These two terms can be rendered as 'astounding' and 'amazing', respectively. The commentators understand both *acchariya* and *abbhuta* as terms expressing astonishment.⁷⁰ Kandaraka, a wandering ascetic, once approached the Buddha and was very struck by the complete stillness maintained by the disciples surrounding the Buddha. He expresses his astonishment:

*Kandarako paribhājako tuṅhibhūtaṃ tuṅhibhūtaṃ bhikkhusaṅghaṃ anuviloketvā Bhagavantaṃ etad avoca: acchariyaṃ bho Gotama abbhutaṃ bho Gotama yāvañ c' idam bhotā Gotamena sammā bhikkhusaṅgho paṭipādīto.*⁷¹

The wanderer Kandaraka, having looked around at the community of monks which was absolutely silent, spoke thus to the Blessed One: 'It is astounding, venerable Gotama, it is amazing, venerable Gotama, how the community of monks has been properly guided by the venerable Gotama.'⁷²

Buddhaghosa explains the term *abbhutaṃ* here as follows: 'Because [something] happened that didn't happen before, [it is] **amazing**' (*abbhūtapubbam*

69 D I 2.9-12; M I 83.21-23; S I 58.1-2; A IV 65.12-14; Ud 16.10-11. In verse too, *acchariya* precedes *abbhuta*; see Cp 9.15-18; Bv 3.19-20, v. 27a. But in the verses of Sundarī, only the term *abbhuta* occurs: Thi 154.1, v. 316a: *abbhutaṃ vata Vāseṭṭhi vācaṃ bhāsasi edisaṃ*. 'You, o Vāseṭṭhi, indeed speak an amazing utterance like this.' See also Rhys Davids 1997a: 116; Norman 1995: 33; Masset 2005: 76. Dhammapāla glosses here *abbhutaṃ* with *acchariyaṃ* (suggesting that the Mahāvihāra school treated these two terms as synonyms); see Thi-a 219.35: *abbhutaṃ vatā ti acchariyaṃ vata. taṃ hi abbhutaṃ pubbe abbhūtaṃ abbhutan ti vuccati*. '[It is] indeed amazing: [it is] indeed astounding. For, as what is amazing is that which has not happened (*abhūtaṃ*) previously, it is counted as **amazing** (*abbhuta*).' See also Pruitt 1999: 294. Pāli *abbhuta* corresponds to Skt. *adbhuta*, which Sanskrit lexicons take as an indeclinable in the sense of 'unforeseen' (*ākasmikārtha*): see Hk, s.v. *adbhuta*: '*ākasmikārtham avyayam*.' See also ŚmhN, s.v. *adbhuta*; ŚkD, s.v. *adbhutaṃ*; VcP, s.v. *adbhuta*. But NWS and pw list *adbhuta* as an adjective and noun.

70 Spk II 57.10-11: *acchariyaṃ abbhutan* (S II 36.24) *ti ubbayaṃ p' etaṃ vimhayaḍipānam eva*. '**Astounding, amazing**: both these simply convey astonishment.' See also Sv I 43.13-18; Ps II 53.35-54.1; Ps III 3.1-3; Bv-a 39.21-25.

71 M I 339.8-12.

72 My translation is based on Horner 1957: II 3; see also Ñānamoli and Bodhi 1995: 443.

bbūtan ti abbhutaṃ).⁷³ As Dhammapāla points out in the subcommentary, Buddhaghosa follows the etymological method, which is also in line with the convention of speech:

*abbūtapubbaṃ bbūtan ti ayaṃ niruttinayo, yebbuyyena upādāya rūḷhivasena vutto ti veditabbo.*⁷⁴

[Something] **happened that didn't happen before**: This is the etymological method [for interpreting the meaning of the word]. It is to be understood that, according to the majority of cases, [the word] is used by virtue of a convention of speech (*rūḷhi*).

What Dhammapāla means is that in the present context, as in most contexts, the term *abbhuta* stands for the mere expression of astonishment and does not refer to something that has happened for the first time.

II. *mūla*

The literal meaning of the term *mūla* is 'root'. But, as the commentators point out, when the term is preceded by a kind of tree such as *bodhi* and *sāla*,⁷⁵ it does not necessarily refer to the root of the bodhi or a sāla tree, respectively. In such cases, *mūla* means 'vicinity'. That is to say, the phrases like *rukkhamūla* ('root of a tree'), *bodhirukkhamūla* ('root of the bodhi tree') and *sālarājamūla* ('root of the royal sāla tree') found in the canon, have to be rendered as 'in the vicinity of a tree', 'in the vicinity of the Bodhi tree' and 'in the vicinity of the royal Sāla tree', respectively. Staying at the root (*mūla*) of a royal sāla tree, the Buddha preached the *Mūlapariyāyasutta*:

*Bhagavā Ukkatṭhāyaṃ viharati Subhagavane sālarājamūle.*⁷⁶

The Blessed One was staying in [the city] Ukkatṭhā, in the Subhaga grove, at the root of the royal sāla tree.⁷⁷

73 Ps III 3.2-3. For this definition, see also Sv I 43.17; Ps II 53.35-36; Spk II C^c 42.33-34. This part of the gloss is missing in the PTS (Spk II 57.12). Dhammapāla and Buddhadatta reuse this definition. See Ud-a 128.3; Masefield 1994: I 298, Cp-a 87.6-7; Bv-a 39.4; Horner 1978: 59, Th-a 219.35-36; Pruitt 1999: 294.

74 See Ps-pt III 2.1-2.

75 PED, s.v. *bodhi*: 'the tree of wisdom, the sacred Bo tree, the fig tree (*Assattha*, *Ficus religiosa*) under which Gotama Buddha arrived at perfect knowledge'; s.v. *sāla*: 'a Sal tree (*Shorea robusta*).'

76 M I 1.1-2.

77 See also Horner 1954 I 3, Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995: 83.

Commenting on the phrase *sālarājamūle*, Buddhaghosa offers the following explanation for the term *mūla*:

mūlan ti samīpaṃ. ayaṃ hi mūlasaddo: mūlāni uddhāreyya antamaso usira-nāḷamattāni pī (≠ S II 88.8; S II 93.9–10; A I 204.27–28; II 199.3) *ti ādisu mūla-mūle dissatī, lobbo akusalamūlan* (D III 214.19; M I 47.10; A I 201.19; Vin V 123.31; Dhs 79.13–14; Vibh 362.9) *ti ādisu asādhāraṇāhetumbi. yāva majjhantike kāle chāyā pharatī, nivāte paṇṇāni patanti, ettāvata rūkkhamūlan* (≠ Vin III 202.10–11) *ti ādisu samīpe. idha pana samīpe adhippeto. tasmā ‘Sālarājassa samīpe’ ti evam ettha attho daṭṭhabbo.*⁷⁸

Root: vicinity. For the term *mūla* (‘root’) appears in [the sense of] a root that is [literally] a root in [statements] such as: [one] would pull out the roots, even the mere fine rootlets and root fibre; [it appears] in [the sense of] a cause not shared [in statements] such as: greed is a root of unwholesome [phenomena]; [it appears] in the [sense of] ‘vicinity’ in [statements] such as: as far as the shadow [of a tree] spreads at the time of midday, [and its] leaves fall in the absence of wind, thus far is the root of a tree. But here, it is intended in [the sense of] vicinity. Therefore, [one] should know the meaning likewise in this context: ‘in the vicinity of the royal Sāla tree.’⁷⁹

The commentator begins his exegesis by stating that the term *mūla* in this context means vicinity (*samīpa*). He then illustrates how it differs according to context: it can mean either literally a ‘root’ of a tree (*mūlamūla*) or a cause that is not generally shared, i.e., a specific cause (*asādhāraṇāhetu*) or the vicinity of a tree (*samīpa*).⁸⁰ He quotes from the Canon to support each of these meanings. The first and the second quotations are attested in a number of discourses, while the third cannot be traced in the canon as it exists today.⁸¹ He concludes his exegesis by stressing that the expression *sālarājamūle* should be understood as ‘in the vicinity of the royal Sāla tree’.

78 Ps I 12.6–12.

79 See also Masefield 1994: 1 49.

80 This is the typical commentarial interpretation of *rūkkhamūla*. See (1) Ud-a 241.5–7: *rūkkhamūlan* (Ud 38.13) *ti [...] rūkkhassa samīpasāṅkhātāṃ mūlaṃ*. ‘The root of a tree: a root of a tree reckoned as [its] vicinity’; see also Masefield 1995: II 602); (2) Sv-pt I 333.14: *rūkkhamūlan* (D I 71.16; Sv I 209.20) *ti rūkkhasamīpaṃ*. ‘The root of a tree: the vicinity of a tree.’ See also It-a II 147.16. (3) Vibh-a 366.11–12: *rūkkhamūlan* (Vibh 251.19) *ti rūkkhassa heṭṭhā parikkhittāṃ vā aparikkhittāṃ vā*. ‘The root of a tree: underneath a tree either surrounded or not surrounded [by a fence].’ See also Nāṇamoli 1996 II 92). (4) Paṭis-a II 490.10: *rūkkhamūlagato* (Paṭis I 175.18) *ti rūkkhasamīpaṃ gato*. ‘[One] who went to the root of a tree: [one] who went to the vicinity of a tree.’

81 At Vin III 202.10–11 we find a partial correspondence: *ekakulassa rūkkhamūlaṃ hoti yaṃ majjhantike kāle samantā chāyā pharatī*. ‘A certain family has a root of a tree that spreads [its] shadow around at the time of midday.’

This explanation reveals that the term *mūla*, which was originally used literally of a ‘root’ of a tree, came to be used more generally and figuratively. It is significant that Buddhaghosa does not explicitly state here that the term *mūla* functions as a *rūlbi*. With respect to its extended meaning, Dhammapāla states:

*nippariyāyena sākhādīmato saṅghātassa suppatitṭhitabbāvasādbane avayavavise-
se pavattamāno mūlasaddo, yasmā taṃsadesu tannissaye padese ca rūlvivase-
na pariyaṃyato pavattati, tasmā mūlāni uddhareyyā* (S II 88.8; S II 93.9-16; A I
204.27; A II 199.3) *ti ettha nippariyāyamūlaṃ adhippetan ti ekena mūlasaddena
viseṣetvā āha: mūlamūle dissati* (Ps I 12.7-8.) *ti yathā dukkhadukkhāṃ* (Nid I
17.15), *rūparūpan* (Vism 451.25) *ti ca*.⁸²

In a non-figurative sense, the term *mūla* functions with respect to (i.e., is used to denote) the specific parts (of a tree) that produce the firm establishment of the assemblage possessing [features] such as branches. Since, figuratively, by virtue of a convention of speech, it is used to denote things that are [root]-like and the area shaded by that [tree], [Buddhaghosa] specifies that, by the single word ‘root’, a root in a non-figurative sense is intended [in a canonical statement such as] ‘one should pull out the roots’, and then says: [the term *mūla*] appears in [the sense of] a root that is a root, similar to [the expressions] ‘suffering that is [physical and mental] suffering’ and ‘matter that is [concrete] matter’.

This gloss shows that while the term *mūla* stands for the root of a tree in a literal sense (*nippariyāyena*), as a *rūlbi*, it occurs referring to things that resemble a root (*taṃsadesu*) as well as to the area shaded by a tree (*tannissaye*). Dhammapāla makes clear that Buddhaghosa reduplicated the term *mūla* (as *mūlamūla*) in order to distinguish the root of a tree in a literal sense (*nippariyāyamūla*) from the two secondary senses, namely, ‘specific cause’ and ‘vicinity’. This reduplication is quite common in Pāli canonical and commentarial works. Dhammapāla legitimizes his view by adducing two examples of similar reduplication: as *dukkhadukkhā*⁸³ and *rūparūpa*.⁸⁴ When glossing the phrases *Naḷerupucimandamūle* (‘at the root of the Nimba tree of Naḷeru’) in the Vinaya and *bodhirukkhāmūle* (‘at the root of the Bodhi

82 Ps-pt I B^c 45.19-24.

83 The discourses of the Pāli canon speak of three kinds of *dukkha*, namely, *dukkhadukkhā* (‘suffering of pain’), *vipariṇāmadukkhā* (‘suffering of change’) and *saṅkhāradukkhā* (‘suffering of formations’) (e.g., D III 216.22-23; S IV 259.11-13, V 56.26-27). Late canonical texts (e.g. Nidd I 17.1-18.4) as well as exegetical works (e.g., Vism 499.17-21) explain these in many ways. See also DOP, s.v. *dukkhadukkhā*: ‘the trouble that is physical or mental pain or distress’.

84 At Vism 451.25. Buddhaghosa uses the term *rūparūpa* to refer to ‘concrete matter’ (*nippbannarūpa*). See Ñānamoli 1957: 454, 511 fn. 9.

tree’) in the *Udāna*, the authors of the respective commentaries follow the same method of exposition that we saw in the *Papañcasūdanī*.⁸⁵

12. *akkamati* and *uppīleti*

The following sentence occurs in a discourse of the *Aṅguttaranikāya*:

*seyyathāpi bhikkhava sālīsūkaṃ vā yavasūkaṃ vā sammāpaṇibitaṃ hatthena vā pādena vā akkantaṃ batthaṃ vā pādaṃ vā bbecchati lobitaṃ vā uppādessati ti ṭhānam etaṃ vijjati.*⁸⁶

Bhikkhus, suppose that a well-directed spike of hill rice or barley were pressed by the hand or foot. It is possible that it would pierce the hand or the foot and draw blood.⁸⁷

This sentence qualifies both rice and barley spikes with the past participle *akkanta*. Furthermore, it uses the same participle distributively to describe one’s act with hand and foot. If we understand the literal meaning of *akkanta* as ‘stepped on’,⁸⁸ it seems that the participle is well-suited to describe the act of the foot, i.e., *pādena akkantaṃ* (‘stepped on with the foot’). However, one might find it odd in the case of *hatthena akkantaṃ*: ‘stepped on with the hand’! Buddhaghosa insists that *akkanta* is ideally applicable only to describe an act of pressing on something with one’s foot, and the appropriate collocating term in describing such an act done with the hand is to be read as *uppīlita*.⁸⁹ However, as a *rūlhi*, the term *akkanta* can be used even to refer to an act of pressing on something with one’s hand. Buddhaghosa glosses:

*akkantan ti ettha pāden’ eva akkantaṃ nāma hoti, hatthena uppīlitaṃ. rūlhi-saddavasena pana akkantaṃ t’ eva vuttaṃ. ayaṃ b’ ettha ariyavohāro.*⁹⁰

Stepped on: in this context it is only by the foot that [something] is said to be (*nāma*) ‘stepped on’; with the hand it is pressed (*uppīlita*). But, by

85 See Sp I 108.29–109.8 on Vin III 1.1–2; the author of the *tīkā* then heavily relies on Dhammapāla’s exegesis at Ps-pt I B^c 45.19–24 when explaining Sp’s gloss; see Sp-ṭ I B^c 205.12–17. Dhammapāla’s gloss on *bodhirukkhamūle* (Ud 2.1–2) at Ud-a 27.3–18 apparently borrows Buddhaghosa’s gloss from Ps.

86 A I 8.10–13.

87 Bodhi 2012: 95.

88 CPD, s.v. *akkamati*: 1. ‘to step or tread upon’; DOP, s.v. *akkamati*: ‘steps on, treads upon; presses upon’. See also MW, s.v. *ākram*: ‘to step or tread upon’.

89 CPD, s.v. *uppīleti*: ‘to press against, touch; to put on, rest upon, use something (loc.) as a support’; DOP, s.v. *uppīleti*: ‘presses on or against, squeezes’.

90 Mp I 55.24–56.1. The sentence here commented on (A I 8.10–13) is also found elsewhere (e.g., S V 10.29–32), but Buddhaghosa does comment on *akkanta* at Spk III 127.16–25.

virtue of the convention of speech (*rūlhi*), only ‘stepped on’ is said. For in this context, this is the common way of speaking of the nobles.

Akkanta collocates with *pādena* while *hatthena* collocates with *uppilīta*. Buddhaghosa states that the use of a participle with nouns, which do not typically collocate with them, is a common linguistic habit of noble people (*ariyavohāra*).⁹¹ In the subcommentary, Sāriputta justifies this explanation further, emphasizing that *akkanta* is used as a *rūlhi* in the present context.⁹² Within the gloss, Sāriputta employs the past participle *avamaddita* that can be commonly used to qualify an act of crushing something either with one’s hand or feet.⁹³

The *Kosambiyasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya* speaks of an infant pressing embers with his hand or foot.⁹⁴ Here, the sutta describes the act of the infant with *akkamitvā* (‘having stepped on’), the gerund of *akkanta*. According to the glosses on this term provided by Buddhaghosa⁹⁵ and Dhammapāla,⁹⁶ *akkamitvā* in this context has to be understood pragmatically: rather than ‘having stepped on’ it occurs here in the sense of ‘having touched’ (*phusitvā*). These commentators do not state that here *akkamitvā* plays the role of a *rūlhi*.

- 91 The subcommentary (Mp-nt 1 101.3) explains *ariyavohāra* as ‘the usage of common speech of the people dwelling in the noble country’ (*ariyadesavāsīnaṃ vohāro*). Apparently, by *ariyavohāra*, Buddhaghosa intends the usage of common speech of those who attained final enlightenment.
- 92 Mp-nt 1 101.1–3: *pādena avamaddite akkantan ti vuccamāne hatthena avamadditaṃ akkantaṃ viya akkantan ti rūlhi b’ esā ti āba: hatthena ... pa ... vuttan ti*. ‘When only that crushed with [one’s] foot is called *akkantaṃ*, that crushed with [one’s] hand is like *akkantaṃ*, for *akkantaṃ* is the convention of speech, [insofar Buddhaghosa] says: [what is crushed] with [one’s] hand [is also] stated [in the sutta as something that is pressed with one’s foot].’
- 93 See CPD, s.v. *avamaddana*: ‘crushing, striking, breaking off’; DOP, s.v. *avamaddati*: ‘crushes, breaks down.’ The verb *omaddati* also occurs in the canon in the same sense. See CPD, s.v. *omaddati*: ‘to squeeze, to press’; DOP, s.v. *omaddati*: ‘presses, crushes; tramples on; presses together; rubs into (+instr.); rubs, strokes.’
- 94 M 1 324.13–15: *daharo kumāro mando uttānaseyyako hatthena vā pādena vā aṅgāraṃ akkamitvā kbippam eva paṭisaṃharati*. ‘A tender little baby lying on its back, having stepped on a live ember with [its] hand or with [its] foot, draws [it] back quickly.’ See also Horner 1954: II 386; Nāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995: 422.
- 95 Ps II 402.10–11: *aṅgāraṃ akkamitvā* (M 1 324.14) *ti ito c’ ito ca pasārītena hatthena vā pādena vā phusitvā*. ‘Having stepped on a live ember: having touched either with [its] hand or with [its] foot, which is outstretched here and there.’
- 96 Ps-pt II 309.19–21: *yadi uttānaseyyako, kattham assa aṅgārakkamanan ti. yatbā tatbā aṅgārassa phusanaṃ idha akkamanan ti adhippetan ti āba ito c’ ito cā* (Ps II 402.10–11) *ti ādi*. ‘[If the little baby is] lying on its back, how would his stepping on ember [become possible]? Because the touching of an ember in whatsoever [manner] is intended here as [the meaning of] stepping on, [Buddhaghosa] says: here and there, etc.’

The examples discussed so far allow the following conclusion: the past participle, *avamaddita*, can mean an act of crushing something, either with the hand or the foot; *uppiḷita* refers to the act of crushing something with the hand, while *akkanta* means the act of crushing something with the foot. Yet, one is able to use the second two past participles interchangeably as a *rūḷhi*. The meaning of these terms must be interpreted in the light of their context.

It is worth noting here that Buddhaghosa employs these two terms in exactly opposite ways in his commentaries. He uses *uppiḷeti* to mean the act of stepping on something with one's foot, while choosing *akkamati* to refer to the act of pressing on something with one's hand. I cite two typical examples:

- 1 *usabho* [...] *catubi pādehi paṭhavim uppiḷetvā*.⁹⁷
The bull having pressed on the ground with [its] four legs.
- 2 *hattbena tulaṃ akkamati*.⁹⁸
[The crafty trader] will press on the scale with [his] hand.

These examples illustrate that the commentators of the Mahāvihāra school have employed the terms under discussion as *rūḷhis* even though they did not always label them accordingly.

These uses may vary from region to region and may also change over time. Therefore, it can be assumed that the commentators use them as *rūḷhis* as one of several options. Some canonical terms related to the Buddha and his teaching are also labelled as *rūḷhis* in the commentaries. When it comes to some keywords in the Buddha's teaching, especially terms having scholastic significance, the authors of the exegetical works provide the reader with comprehensive *rūḷhi*-explanations. In the following passages I will discuss some of them.

97 Ps II 26.35–27.1; Spk II 45.34–46.1; Mp III 8.6–7. The commentators collocate *uppiḷo* with diverse nouns. In some attestations, it is used to refer to pressing on the ground with a knee. See As 146.30: *so jannunā bhūmiṃ uppiḷetvā pi dburaṃ vabati*. 'He [i.e., the bull] carries the burden even having pressed on the ground with [his] knee.' See also Nidd-a II 409.17–18. At times, the same term is used to denote pressing on something with a stick. See Ps IV 74.5–6: *yaṭṭhikoṭṭiyā uppiḷento viya*. 'Just as the man who presses on [something] with a point of a staff.'

98 Sv I 79.6; Ps II 210.35; Spk III 305.18; Mp III 192.23. In the *Samantapāsādikā akkamitvā* occurs in the sense of 'sweeping'. See Sp II 465.1–2: *āsanam* [...] *manussā sayam hattbena akkamitvā 'idha bhante nisīdatthā' ti denti*. 'People offer [it to a monk], having swept a seat with [their] hands themselves, [saying]: "respected sir, pray sit here".'

13. *cārikā*

The Buddha and his disciples travelled through many cities of India on their tours with the aim of spreading the teachings. These tours are called *cārikā*.⁹⁹ The Pāli canon describes this practice of the Buddha as *cārikaṃ caramāno*. '[Whilst the Buddha] was wandering on [his] tour.'¹⁰⁰ Many of the Buddha's disciples who followed this practice are also referred to in the canon by the same phrase.¹⁰¹

In the *Rathavinītasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*, we see the Elder Puṇṇa wandering on his tour (*cārikaṃ caramāno*) in the Sāvatti country.¹⁰² The *Papañcasūdanī* says that the term *cārikā* is a *rūlhi* in this context:

*cārikaṃ caramāno ti ettha kiñcāpi ayaṃ cārikā nāma mahājanasaṅgabatthaṃ Buddhānaṃ yeva labbhati, Buddhē upādāya pana rūlhisaddena sāvakānaṃ pi vuccati, kilañjādīhi kataṃ vijānaṃ pi tālavaṇṇaṃ vīya.*¹⁰³

[While he] was wondering on [his] tour: in this instance, although this 'tour', as it is called, is proper only for Buddhas [going] for [the sake of] encouraging large [groups of] people. It is also used, however, alongside Buddhas, as a convention of speech for [their] disciples, just as a fan made of [various materials] such as a reed-matting [is referred to as] a fan made of the leaves of a fan-palm.

Although the term *cārikā* is ideally used for the tours of the Buddhas, as a *rūlhi*, it can also be used of the tours of the disciples (*sāvakānaṃ*).¹⁰⁴ To illustrate the function of a *rūlhi*, the commentator employs the analogy

99 DOP, s.v. *cārikā*: 'a going about; a journey, a tour.'

100 For example: see D I 87.1-2: *Bhagavā Kosalesu cārikaṃ caramāno*. '[While] the Blessed One was wandering on [his] tour in the Kosala country.' D I 111.1-2: *Bhagavā Aṅgesu cārikaṃ caramāno*. '[While] the Blessed One was wandering on [his] tour in the Aṅga country.' D I 127.1-2: *Bhagavā Magadhesu cārikaṃ caramāno*. '[While] the Blessed One was wandering on [his] tour in the Magadha country.' See also M I 285.1-2, 400.26-27; S IV 322.31-32, V 352.14-15; A I 180.14, III 30.5, V 122.1-9; Ud 41.17; Vin I 8.32, III 11.28-30, IV 16.14-16.

101 For example, see D II 316.2-3; M II 185.26-28, III 200.33-201.3, 269.19-24; S IV 62.32-63.5; Ud 58.29-59.1; Vin II 294.6-8.

102 M I 146.21-26: *āyasmā Puṇṇo Mantāniputto [...] anupubbena cārikaṃ caramāno yena Sāvatti tad avasari*. '[While] venerable Puṇṇa, the son of Mantāni was wandering on [his] tour in succession, he arrived at the Sāvatti country.'

103 Ps II 153.1-4. See also Sp-ṭ II 117.2-5.

104 The case of Sabhiya recorded in the *Suttanipāta* is different. He was a wandering ascetic (*paribbājako*) and was not a disciple of the Buddha at the moment that he was qualified with the phrase under discussion. See Sn 93.10-15: *Sabhiyo paribbājako [...] anupubbena cārikaṃ caramāno*. '[While] Sabhiya, the wandering ascetic was wandering on [his] gradual tour.'

with a *tālavaṇṭa*, that is, literally a ‘fan made of the leaves of the tala palm tree’. Yet, in addition to palm-leaves, a fan can be made of other materials, such as reed-matting (*kilañjādīhi*).¹⁰⁵ Irrespective of the material it is made of, a fan can be generally referred to as *tālavaṇṭa* as a *rūlhi*. As we shall see in the following passages, such analogy is very commonly employed the commentators of the Mahāvihāra school, including Buddhaghosa.

14.1 *sattā*, *pāṇā*, etc.

The ninth chapter of the *Visuddhimagga* is entitled Brahmavihāraniddesa (‘Instruction on Divine Abiding’).¹⁰⁶ In this chapter, referring to the *Paṭi-sambhidāmagga*, Buddhaghosa teaches the practitioner of meditation (*yogāvacara*) how to develop loving kindness (*mettā*) by following three methods. Of those methods, fivefold *anodhiso pharaṇā mettācetovimutti* (‘liberation of the mind by loving kindness pervading boundlessly’) relates to this theme. This method teaches how to pervade unreserved loving kindness to all living beings. The *Paṭisambhidāmagga* describes it as follows:

*sabbe sattā averā abyāpajjā anīghā sukhī attānaṃ paribarantu. sabbe pāṇā . . . pe . . . sabbe bhūtā, sabbe puggalā, sabbe attabhāvapariyāpannā averā abyāpajjā anīghā sukhī attānaṃ paribarantū ti. imehi pañcab’ ākārehi anodhiso pharaṇā mettācetovimutti.*¹⁰⁷

May all ‘beings’ being free from enmity, ill-will and affliction, live [their] lives happily. May all beings, [being] free from enmity, free from ill will free from affliction, happy, look after themselves. May all [creatures] who are breathing’, . . . ‘who have come into existence’, all ‘persons’, all ‘who have entered into ‘individuality’, being free from enmity, ill-will and affliction, live [their] lives happily’. [One should know] the liberation of the mind by loving kindness pervading boundlessly, in these five ways.¹⁰⁸

Buddhaghosa quotes this passage in his *Visuddhimagga*.¹⁰⁹ We can see that five generic terms appear as synonyms for living beings in this passage, namely, 1) *sattā* (‘beings’), 2) *pāṇā* (‘breathing creatures’), 3) *bhūtā* (‘those who have come into being’), 4) *puggalā* (‘persons’), and 5) *attabhāvapariyāpannā* (‘those who have entered into “individuality”’). He insists that the

105 Dhammapāla (Vv-a 147.26) defines *tālavaṇṭa* (Vv 45) as ‘a round fan made of the leaves of the fan-palm tree’ (*tālapattehi katamaṇḍalavijaniṃ*). See also Ps-pt II 14.9; DOP, s.v. *tālavaṇṭa*: ‘a palm-leaf used as a fan; a fan in general’.

106 Vism 295–325.

107 Paṭis II 130.23–131.2.

108 See also Nāṇamoli 1982: 317–318.

109 Vism 309.18–21. See also Pe Maung Tin 1930: II 356, Nāṇamoli 1957: 303–304.

meditator should consider these terms as *rūl̥hi*s and not be misled into concentrating on their literal meaning. If one takes these five terms literally, the loving kindness meditation does not work (*virujjhati*) for them. I quote the relevant passage in full:

sattā ti rūpādisu khandhesu chandarāgena sattā visattā ti sattā. vuttaṃ b' etaṃ Bhagavatā: rūpe kbo Rādha yo chando yo rāgo yā nandi yā taṇhā tatra satto tatra visatto tasmā satto ti vuccati. vedanāya, saññāya, saṅkhāresu, viññāne yo chando yo rāgo yā nandi yā taṇhā tatra satto tatra visatto tasmā satto ti vuccati (S III 190.3-7) *ti. rūl̥hisaddena pana vitarāgesu pi ayaṃ vohāro vattati yeva, vilivamaye pi vijānivisesa tālavaṇṭavohāro vīya. [...] pāṇanatāya pāṇā, assāsapaṣṣāyattavuttitāyā ti attho. bhūtattā bhūtā, sambhūtattā abhinibbatattā ti attho. 'pun' ti vuccati nirayo, tasmim galantī ti puggalā* (Paṭis II 130.25), *gacchantī ti attho. attabhāvo vuccati sariraṃ. khandhapañcakam eva vā, tam upādāya paññattimattasambhavato* (B^c; E^c; S^c °sambhā°). *tasmim attabhāve pariyaṇṇā ti attabhāvapariyaṇṇā. 'pariyaṇṇā' ti paricchinā, antogadhā ti attho. yathā ca 'sattā' ti vacanaṃ, evaṃ sesāni pi rūl̥hivasena āropetvā sabbān' etāni sabbasattavevacanāni ti veditabbāni. kāmāṇ ca aññāni pi 'sabbe jantū', 'sabbe jīvā' ti-ādini sabbasattavevacanāni atthi. pākāvasena pana imān' eva pañca gahetvā 'pañcab' ākārehi anodhisoparaṇā mettā cetovimutti' ti vuttaṃ. ye pana: 'sattā', 'pāṇā' ti-ādinaṃ na kevalaṃ vacanamatto 'va, attha kbo atthato pi nānattam eva iccheyyūṃ, tesam anodhisoparaṇā virujjhati. tasmā tathā atthaṃ agahetvā imesu pañcasu ākāresu aññataravaseṇa anodhiso mettā pharitabbā.*¹¹⁰

Beings: beings that are attached, firmly attached to the aggregates such as form due to passion accompanied by desire. For this was stated by the Blessed One: [Because one has], Rādha, that desire, that passion, that delight and that craving for form, one is attached therein, firmly attached therein, therefore one is counted as a 'being', ... for feeling ... for perception ... for volitional formations ... [because one has], that desire, that passion, that delight and that craving for consciousness, [and] because one is attached therein, firmly attached therein, one is counted as a 'being'. This common way of speaking indeed occurs as a term of conventional speech (*rūl̥hi*) even with reference to those freed from passion. It is similar to the common way of speaking of a *tālavanta* ('fan made of the leaves of the fan-palm tree') with reference to a special kind of fan even if it is made of split-bamboo. Because of [their state of] breathing (*pāṇanatā*), they are **breathing creatures** (*pāṇā*). It means [they are so-called] because [their] existence depends on inhalation and exhalation. On account of the fact that

110 Vism 310.13-311.9 (= B^c I 303.11-304.9; C^c 229.33-230.18; S^c II 112.13-113.16) ≠ Paṭis-a III 605.10-23.

[they] have come into being, they are *bbūtā*.¹¹¹ It means [they are so-called] on account of the fact that [they] are arisen [and] on account of the fact that [they] are reborn in another existence. The Niraya hell is counted as ‘*puṇ*’. Because they fall into that [*puṇ* hell], they are *puggalā*. It means [they are so-called] as [they] go to [that *puṇ* hell]. An individual is counted as the body,¹¹² or just the pentad of aggregates because of its (i.e., the individual’s) existence as a concept only with reference to that [pentad].¹¹³ [The lives of beings] who have entered into that individuality are *attabbāvapariyāpannā*. ‘[Those who] are included’ means ‘[those who] are delimited’, ‘[those who] have plunged into’, is the meaning. As with the term ‘*sattā*’,¹¹⁴ having attributed [a general meaning] to the remaining [terms] as well by virtue of convention of speech (*rūlhi*)¹¹⁵ in the same manner, one should understand that these are all synonyms for ‘all beings’. And, certainly there are also other synonyms for all beings such as ‘all *jantus*’ (lit. those who grow old)¹¹⁶ [and] ‘all *jivās*’ (lit. those who have the life faculty).¹¹⁷ But having taken only these five [terms] by virtue of [their] well-known nature, ‘the liberation of the mind by loving kindness pervading boundlessly’, in these five ways is stated. But there may be those who believe there is no unity among the [terms]

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- 111 Dhammapāla (Vism-mhṭ 1 366.25–26) glosses Buddhaghosa’s *bbūtattā* as ‘on account of the fact that [they] have been born because of the afflictions of [past] actions’ (*kammakilesehi jātattā*).
- 112 See CPD, s.v. *attabbāva*: ‘the existence as an individual, proper nature; but most frequently concrete: a living being, or its bodily form, person’; DOP, s.v. *attabbāva*: ‘a body’; pw, s.v. *ātmabhāva*: ‘m. 1) *das Dasein der Seele ŚVETĀŚVUP* 1,2. 2) *das eigene Sein, Persönlichkeit Spr.* 2306. Bei den Buddhisten *dass. und Körper*’; MW, s.v. *ātmabhāva*: ‘the body.’
- 113 Vism-mhṭ 1 367.3–4: *paññattimattasabbhāvato ti paramatthato asante pi sattasāññite paññattimattena sabbhāvato*. ‘Because of the arising of the mere concept of [“being”] means: because of the arising as a mere concept with respect to a so-called being, even though it does not exist in the ultimate sense.’
- 114 Commenting on *yathā ca sattā ti vacanaṃ*, Dhammapāla states that *sattā* is a *rūlhi*. See Vism-mhṭ 1 367.5–6: *yathā ca sattā ti vacanaṃ ti yathā sattasaddo yathāvuttentatthena nippariyāyato padesavutti pi rūlhiwasena anavasesapariyādayako*. ‘And, just as in the case of the term “beings” means: even though just as the term *satta* has a limited reference literally in accordance with the meaning as stated, it encompasses [all beings] without remainder by virtue of convention of speech.’
- 115 Vism-mhṭ 1 367.7: *sesāni pi ti pañādivacanāni*. ‘The remaining [terms] as well means: the terms such as those living creatures.’ Vism-mhṭ 1 367.9–11: *rūlhiwasena āropetvā ti yathāvuttāya rūlhiyā vasena kattbaci visaye avijjamānam pi paṇapuggalabbhāvaṃ āropetvā*. ‘Having attributed by virtue of convention of speech means: by virtue of the convention of speech as stated, having attributed the state of breathing creature and person, even though it does not exist, to any [of those beings] as the object [in meditation].’
- 116 Nidd-a 1 26.12: *jāyati* (B^c; S^c *jiyati*) *ti jantu* (Nidd 1 3.15). ‘It is born (grows old), hence it is a *jantu*.’
- 117 Nidd-a 1 26.11: *jīvitindriyaṃ dhāreti ti jivo* (Nidd 1 3.15). ‘It bears the life-faculty, hence it is a *jiva*.’

such as ‘*sattā*’ [and] ‘*pāṇā*’ just on account of their mere phonetic form and so (believe) that there is also variation in their meaning. For them, the unspecified pervasion is obstructed. Therefore, without taking the meaning [of these terms] in that way, one should pervade ‘the liberation of the mind by loving kindness boundlessly’, in these five ways.¹¹⁸

So, according to Buddhaghosa, those who desire a difference of [the words] *sattā*, *pāṇā*—not only on account of the mere verbal expressions, but also on account of the meaning—will find their loving kindness, will be obstructed from pervading universally.

In the following passages (14.2–14.6) I will discuss the five terms, beginning with *sattā*.

14.2 *sattā*

Buddhaghosa offers an alliterative explanation for the term *sattā*, quoting a canonical passage in support. This passage, presenting a fanciful but doctrinally significant *nirukti* for the term *satta*, is attested in the *Samyutta-nikāya*. It reads *satta* in the sense of ‘one who is attached’, which corresponds to the term *sakta* in Sanskrit.¹¹⁹ The Sanskrit term which corresponds strictly with *satta* is *sattva*, meaning an ‘existing entity’.¹²⁰ Irrespective of this original meaning, the semantic elucidation is made in relation to the term *sakta* in the canon as well as in the commentaries as a means of illustrating the negative influence of mental defilements that bind living beings to the cyclic process of existence. Although, according to this explanation, *sattā* literally means ‘those who are attached’, as a *rūḷhi*, it embraces those who are freed from passion (i.e., *arabants*) as well. Buddhaghosa further explains using the now-familiar analogy of the *tālavaṇṭa*. This analogy helps the meditator to understand the term *sattā* as a generic term that encompasses all living beings.¹²¹ Before concluding the passage,

118 In rendering this passage, I have relied on Pe Maung Tin (1930: II 357–358), Nyanatiloka (2014: 354) and Ñānamoli (1956: 304–305).

119 MW, s.v. *sakta*: ‘clinging or adhering to, sticking in, to stand as if nailed or as if rooted to the spot’

120 Deshpande 1992: 31. The term *sattva*, as Kunjunni Raja points out (1990: 107), ‘is derived from the root *√as*, meaning “to be”’. Sanskrit lexicons enumerate diverse meanings of *sattva*, among them, ‘being’ (*prāṇa*); see ŚkD, s.v. *sattva*, VcP, s.v. *sattvam*.

121 In two places, the author of the *Saddhammapakkāsīni* adaptively reuses Buddhaghosa’s explanation of *satta* (Paṭi-s-a I 57.14–20; III 604.35–605.16). (For ‘reuse’ and ‘adaptive reuse’, see Freschi 2014: 88–89; Kieffer-Pülz 2016: 9–45.) In the *Madhurattahavilāsīni*, Buddhaddatta expands the definition of *satta* more alliteratively (Bv-a 12.29–31): *sattā* (Bv 1.3) *tī rūpādīsū kbandbesu chandarāgena sattā visattā āsattā laggā lagitā pattā sampattā tī pāṇino*

Buddhaghosa teaches the meditator to take the remaining four terms (*pāṇā*, *bhūtā*, *puṅgalā* and *attabhāvapariyāpannā*) too as synonyms for all living beings (*sabbasattavevacanāni*).

14.3 *pāṇā*

The term *pāṇā* ('living creatures') denotes 'those who are breathing' (*pāṇa-natāya pāṇā*).¹²² Although one might think that all who are alive necessarily breathe, that is not always the case. In line with the canon and com-

vuccanti. rūlhisaddena pana vitarāgesu pi ayam vobāro vattati yeva. 'Living creatures are called beings because they are attached upon, firmly attached upon, fixed to, attached to, stuck to, attained, properly attained the aggregates such as form with passion accompanied by desire. But this usage of common speech indeed occurs also with respect to those who are freed from passion as a term of convention of speech.' See also Horner 1978: 19. In the exegesis of the *Sattasutta* (Spk II 336.6-12) Buddhaghosa does not identify *satta* as a *rūlhi*; likewise, Dhammapāla in his subcommentary. But the latter does make clear that one should not follow this etymological meaning of *satta* in the case of those whose influxes have perished; see Spk-pt II 262.10-11: *yadi rūpādisu sattatā satto khināsavā katham satta ti? sattabbūtāpubbā ti katvā.* ('If a "being" is [so-called] on account of being attached to form, and so forth, how can those who have destroyed their influxes [be called] "beings"? By considering that they have been previously attached'). This account differs from Buddhaghosa's, yet, also suggests *satta* can be taken as a *rūlhi*.

122. The term *pāṇa* (Skt. *prāṇa*), means 'the air lying in the heart and wafting toward the corner of nostrils' (See ŚmN, s.v. *prāṇa*: 'brdayasṭhe nāsāgrāvartini vāyau'. See also pw, s.v. *prāṇa*: '1) *Hauch, Athem*; im engsten Sinne *die eingeatmete Luft*. in (sic) weitesten *Lebenshauch* überh., *Lebensgeist*, *Lebensorgan*; MW, s.v. *prāṇa*: 'the breath of life, breath, respiration, spirit, vitality'. This etymological meaning of this term has influenced some scholarly translations. Although Pe Maung Tin once chose the phrase 'Living beings' to translate the term *pāṇā* (Pe Maung Tin 1930: II 357), he again rendered it as 'living things' (Pe Maung Tin 1930: II 356). Nāṇamoli constantly rendered it as '[b]reathing things' (Nāṇamoli 1957: 304, Nāṇamoli 1982: 317). Horner also used the same phrase to translate *pāṇino* (Horner 1978: 19). Nyānaponika took *pāṇā* as '*Lebewesen*' (Nyānaponika 2005: 188). Of these, the first translation seems more appropriate. Nonetheless, the other two look a bit absurd because they appear to be too literal. The term, *pāṇa*, as a *babuvrihi* term, obviously occurs in the canon for living creatures including human beings. Let me quote here two attestations: (1) M I 371.11-12: *pāṇo* [...] *domanassam paṭisaṃvedeti.* 'The living creature experiences grief.' See also Horner 1957: II 35, Nāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995: 476, (2) S v 78.1-2: *pāṇā cattāro iriyāpathe kappenti.* 'The living creatures assume four postures.' See also Rhys Davids 1930: v 65; Bodhi 2000: 1579. Many commentators, including Buddhaghosa rightly explain the meaning of the term *pāṇa*. See Sv I 69.21-22: *pāṇo* (≠ D I 4.1) *ti c' ettha vobārato satto, paramatthato jīvitindriyam.* 'Living creature: in this context, [the term refers to] the living being in the conventional sense [and] the faculty of vitality in the absolute sense.' See also Ps I 198.10-11; Spk II 144.19-20; As 97.14-15. Tr. Nyānaponika 2005: 188: »Lebewesen« (*pāṇa*) ist im konventionellen Sinn gleichbedeutend mit »Wesen« (*satta*), im eigentlichen (d. h. philosophischen) Sinn mit Lebenskraft (*jīvitindriya*). See also Thi-a 236.4: *pāṇo* (Thi 159.21) *ti satto.* 'Living creature means: living being.' See also Pruitt 1999: 319. On these grounds, I translate the term *pāṇā* as 'living creatures'.

mentaries, some living beings—the inhabitants in the ‘fine-material sphere’ (*rūpabhava*) and the ‘immaterial sphere’ (*arūpabhava*), those who are in the fourth meditative absorption (*catuttbajjhāna*) and those who are in the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling (*saññāvedayitanirodbasamāpatti*)—do not breathe.¹²³ The meditator who takes the term *pāṇā* as a *rūlhi*, should extend his loving kindness to all these individuals too.

14.4 *bbūtā*

As a generic term, *bbūtā* can mean living beings. However, strictly speaking, as the Mahāvihāra exegetical works teach, the term does not apply to all living beings. For instance, besides those who have attained final enlightenment (*nibbāna*), all the other living beings, namely, those who are in the first three spiritual attainments starting from stream-entry (*sekkhā*) as well as the average people who do not possess any spiritual progress (*puthujjanā*) do not qualify as *bbūtas* but are referred to as *sambhavesins* (lit. ‘those who seek existence’). Interestingly, both the egg-born (*aṇḍaja*) and uterus-born (*jalābujā*) living beings, as long as they stay in the eggs and uteruses respectively, are also not designated *bbūtas*. Yet, neither do they qualify as *sambhavesins* or *bhavyas* (lit. ‘those who will come to existence’). So, for example, the *Mettasutta* refers to two kinds of living beings: *bbūtā vā sambhavesi vā* (‘not only those who have come to existence but also those who seek existence’).¹²⁴ The commentary glosses:

bbūtā ti jātā abhinibbattā. ye bbūtā eva, na puna bhavissanti ti saṅkham gacchanti, tesam kbhīnāsavānaṃ etaṃ adbhivacanaṃ. sambhavam esanti ti ‘sambhavesino.’ appabhinabhavasamyojanattā āyatim pi sambhavam esantānaṃ sekkhaputhujjanānaṃ etaṃ adbhivacanaṃ. attha vā catusu yonisu aṇḍajajalābujā sattā yāva aṇḍakosaṃ vatthikosañ ca na bbindanti, tāva sambhavesi nāma. aṇḍakosaṃ vatthikosañ ca bhinditvā bahi nikkhantā bbūtā nāma. saṃsedajā opapātikā ca paṭhamacittakkhaṇe sambhavesi nāma, dutyacittakkhaṇato pabbuti bbūtā nāma. yena vā iriyāpatthena jāyanti, yāva tato aññaṃ na pāpuṇanti, tāva sambhavesi nāma, tato paraṃ bbūtā ti.¹²⁵

123 Vism I 283.25–30: *ime assāsapassāsā nāma [...] kassa vā natthi ti. [...] asaṇṇibbūtānaṃ matānaṃ catuttbajjhānasamāpannānaṃ rūpārūpabhavasamaṅginaṃ nirodbasamāpannānaṃ ti. ‘Who does not have these, inhalation and exhalation? Those who are non-percipient, dead, entered the fourth meditative absorption, endowed with the existences of the fine-material [sphere], the immaterial [sphere], and entered the “attainment of cessation” do not have inhalation and exhalation.’* See also Sp II 425.9–14; Paṭi-a II 498.15–20.

124 Khp 8.19; Sn 26.3 See also Bodhi 2017: 179.

125 Pj I 246.25–247.9.

Those who **have come to be**: those that have been born, generated. This is a designation for arahants, who are reckoned thus: ‘They have come to be but will not come to be again.’ Those who **will come to be**: those seeking existence. This is a designation for trainees and worldlings who, because they have not abandoned the fetters of existence, are seeking future existence. Or alternatively, among the four modes of generation, of those beings born from eggs and from the womb it is said ‘they will come to be’ so long as they have not broken out from the egg shell or the cawl. But when they have broken out from the egg shell or the cawl and have emerged, they are said to ‘have come to be’. Of those beings born from moisture and those spontaneously born it is said ‘they will come to be’ at the first mind-moment. From the second mind-moment on, it is said they ‘have come to be’. Or else, when they are born in a particular posture, so long as they have not adopted another posture, it is said ‘they will come to be’. But following this, it is said ‘they have come to be’.¹²⁶

Therefore, it seems that here Buddhaghosa conveys the following notion to his audience: ‘when developing loving kindness, irrespective of its literal meaning, one should apply the term *bhūta*, as a *rūlhi*, to *sambhavesins* and *bhavyas* as well.’

14.5 *puggalā*

Persons are said to be *puggalā* because they are liable to fall into hell called ‘*pum*’.¹²⁷ Nevertheless, all the persons are not liable to go to that hell. Those

126 Bodhi 2017: 579. See also Ñāṇamoli 1960: 286–287. With reference to *bbūtānaṃ vā sattānaṃ ṭhitiyā, sambhavesiṇaṃ vā anuggabāya*, ‘for the maintenance of living beings who have come to existence and for the support of those who seek existence’ at M I 48.3–4 and S II 11.22–23, Buddhaghosa glosses *bhūta* and *sambhavesi* remarkably similarly; see Ps I 207.10–26 and Spk II 22.26–23.14. Cf. also Sv I 112.3–9 (to D I 18.15–16), Ps II 406.12–18. In all these glosses, the commentators read ‘new’ doctrinal meanings into the term *sambhavesi*, probably because it is regarded as supporting the doctrine of an *antarābhava* (‘intermediate existence’) held by the Sarvāstivāda and some other schools. As we know, the *Kathāvatthu* rejects the *antarābhava* (Kv 361–366), as does Mahāvīhāra exegetical literature. Apparently, the purpose of this exegesis of *sambhavesi* is also to undermine the position of schools that advocated the *antarābhava*.

127 See under 14.1. See also Nidd-a I 26.9–10: ‘*pum*’ *vuccati nirayo, taṃ galati ti puggalo* (Nidd I 3.15). See DOP, s.v. *puggala*. See also Paṭis-a II 442.6–7; III 605.11–12. The word *pum* here corresponds to *put*, which in Hindu mythology can refer to a specific hell; according to the *Manusmṛti* (9: 138), the son protects his father from this hell; MW, s.v. *put*: ‘hell or a partic. hell (to which the childless are condemned)’. Buddhaghosa appears to take *pum* as hell in general. He takes the *nirukti* of *puggala* to be *pum+gala*. The verbal root *√gala* means to ‘drip’ or to ‘ooze’ (cf. DOP, s.v. *gala*: ‘dripping; oozing; dropping’); he apparently adds *gacchanti ti attho* to indicate that *gala* occurs here in the

who have attained a spiritual status, such as stream-entry do not go to any kind of hell.¹²⁸ Taking the term *puggalā* as a *rūlhi*, the practitioner should spread loving kindness to all living beings.

14.6 *attabhāvapariyāpannā*

Attabhāva can mean either *sarīra* or *khandhapañcaka*. *Sarīra* and *khandhapañcaka* are obviously not synonymous in this context, but they indicate two different meanings. Presumably, *sarīra* here refers only to the aggregate of form (*rūpakkhandha*).¹²⁹ Thus, *attabhāvapariyāpannā* ('those who have entered into individuality') can be understood as referring to:

- those who bear the aggregate of form
- those who bear all five aggregates

Non-percipient beings (*asañña-satta*) in the fine-material realm (*rūpabhava*) bear only one aggregate, *rūpa*, for the four immaterial aggregates, namely, feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*), conditional formations (*saṅkhāra*) and consciousness (*viññāṇa*) are not available in that realm. Therefore, non-percipient existence (*asaññabhava*) in *rūpabhava* is also called *ekavokārabhava* ('existence with a single aggregate'). Contrary to this, although

sense of 'go'. Dhammapāla interprets the term differently. See Vism-mhṭ 1 367.26–28: *pūraṇato, galanato ca puggalā* (Paṭis II 130.25) *ti neruttā sattā hi nibbantā tā tam satanikāyaṃ pūrentā viya bonti. sabbāvattbanipātīyā ca galanti cavanti ti attho*. 'In accordance with the etymological explanation, *puggalā* [are so-called] because [they are] filling and falling, for living beings who are being reborn appear as if [they] are filling the various orders of beings. And they are dripping, [that is,] disappearing owing to the collapsing on every occasion, is the meaning.' Both the Śabdakalpadruma and the Vācaspatya interpret *puḍgala* similarly. See ŚkD, s.v. *puḍgala*: '*pūraṇāt put galanāt galaḥ*.' '[In the case of *puḍgala*,] it is *put* because of filling and *gala* because of falling'. Cf. VcP, s.v. *puḍgala*: '*pūraṇāt put galatī ti galaḥ*.' Dhammapāla slightly touches on the *pum*-hell. See Vism-mhṭ 1 367.8–9.

128 Vism-mhṭ II C* 299.4–5 (≠) Mp II 349.9: *avinipādadhammānam pum ādigalanassa* (Vism-mhṭ 1 367.8–9 *pugalanassa*) *abbāvato*. 'Due to the absence of falling down [into the hells] such as "pum" for those who are not subject to downfall.' The term, *vinipāta*, according to Buddhaghosa, refers to falling into the four descents. See Sv I 313.2: *avinipādadhammo* (D I 156.9) *ti catusu apāyesu apatanadhammo*. 'One whose nature is not downfall: one whose nature is not to fall down into the four descents.' For a detailed explanation, see Sv II 544.7–9; Ps I 162.29–33; Ud-a 290.5–7.

129 The *Niddesa*-commentary confines *attabbāva* to form (*rūpa*); see Nidd-a I 149.2–3: *attabbāvo* (Nidd I 42.16) *ti rūpakkhandho*. Elsewhere Buddhaghosa equates *kalebara* with *attabbāva*; see Spk I 117.25; Mp III 88.21: *kalebare* (S I 62.20; A II 48.32) *ti attabbāve*. According to some glosses, *kalebara* stands for only the physical body, excluding the four immaterial aggregates beginning with feeling (*vedanā*); see Ps I 217.8: *rūpakāyasaṅkhātassa kalebarassa* ('of the body, reckoned as '[gross] material form'). See also Spk II 13.13–14; Paṭis-a I 153.25; Vibh-a 101.2.

the beings in the *arūpabbava* are endowed with the four immaterial aggregates, there is no *rūpa* at all in that realm. The *arūpabbava* is reckoned as *catuvokārabhava* ('existence with four aggregates'). The beings in the fine material sphere (other than non-percipient beings) and beings in the 'sense-sphere' (*kāmabbava*) have five aggregates. Therefore, these are designated as *pañcavokārabhava* ('existence with five aggregates').¹³⁰ Technically, the first interpretation of *attabhāva* excludes the beings in the *arūpabbava*, while the second excludes the beings in the *rūpabbava* who are non-percipient and all beings in the *arūpabbava*; it is confined to the beings in the *kāmabbava* and beings in the *rūpabbava* (other than non-percipient beings). Understanding *attabhāvapariyāpannā* as a *rūlhi*, denoting all living beings, the meditator can spread loving kindness without restriction.¹³¹

15. *paṇḍara*

The term *paṇḍaram* appears in several places of the Pāli canon. In the Mahāvihāra exegetical works, it typically stands for 'cognizance' (*citta*), while the plural *paṇḍarāni* refers to the six 'inner sense-bases' (*ajjhattikāni āyatanāni*). I would first like to consider an example in the second category. In the *Sabbhīyasutta* of the *Suttanipāta* there is the following verse:

dubbayāni viceyya paṇḍarāni ajjhattam babiddhā ca suddhipañño |
kaṇham sukkaṃ upātivatto paṇḍito tādi pavuccate tathattā ||¹³²

130 In the commentary on the *Niddesa*, we find a detailed explanation of the three realms. See *Nidd-a* I 44.31–45.5: *ekena rūpakbandhena vokiṇṇo bhavo, eko vā vokāro assa bhavassā ti ekavokārabhavo. so asaṇṇabbavo va. catūbi arūpakbandhebi vokiṇṇo bhavo, cattāro vā vokārā assa bhavassā ti catuvokārabhavo. so arūpabhavo eva. pañcabi khandhebi vokiṇṇo bhavo, pañca vā vokārā assa bhavassā ti pañcavokārabhavo. so kāmabhavo ca rūpabhavakadeso ca hoti. '[It is] one-constituent existence in the sense that "the existence is endowed with the single aggregate of form"; alternatively, in the sense that "its existence has a single constituent". It is just the existence of non-percipient [beings]. [It is] four-constituent existence in the sense that "the existence is endowed with the four immaterial aggregates"; alternatively, in the sense that "its existence has four constituents". It is just the existence of the immaterial [sphere]. [It is] five-constituent existence in the sense that "the existence is endowed with five aggregates"; alternatively, in the sense that "its existence has five constituents". It is the existence of the sensual sphere and part of the existence of the fine-material [sphere].'* See also *Paṭi-a* I 87.33–88.4. In the *Sāratthadīpanītikā* (Sp-ṭ I 232.17), Sāriputta states '*vokāra* is a synonym for the aggregates' (*vokāro ti vā kbandhānam etaṃ adbhivacanam*). In translating *vokāra* in the above passage, I follow his interpretation.

131 See also Gamage 2022: 36–66.

132 Sn 526 (97.12–13).

Having examined both lucidities (*pañḍarāṇi*), inside and outside, having pure wisdom, having transcended the black and white, one who is like that,¹³³ is truthfully called ‘wise’.

The language in this verse offering a definition for the term *pañḍita* plays on several metaphors and symbols; *pañḍarāṇi* is one such metaphors, and it has been rendered in many ways in this context.¹³⁴ The *Paramatthajotikā*’s exegesis here is:

*pañḍarāṇi ti āyatanāni. tāni hi pakatiparisuddhattā rūlhiyā ca evaṃ vuccanti.*¹³⁵

Lucidities (*pañḍarāṇi*): the sense-bases, because they are originally absolutely pure and because of the convention of speech (*rūlhi*) they are referred to in this manner.¹³⁶

The commentator says that the term *pañḍarāṇi*, as a *rūlhi*, occurs in this verse to mean the six inner sense-bases (*āyatanāni*)—*cakkhu* or eye, *sota* or ear, *ghāṇa* or nose, *jivhā* or tongue, *kāya* or skin, and *mano* or consciousness. He alludes to the fact that the six sense bases are metaphorically called *pañḍarāṇi* so long as they are not contaminated with various mental defilements that arise as a result of contact with their corresponding external objects, namely, forms (*rūpa*), sounds (*sadda*), odours (*gandha*), tastes (*rasa*), tactile things (*phoṭṭhabba*), and *dhammas* or phenomena. Whether or not the sense-bases are contaminated by defilements, they are called *pañḍarāṇi* because they are originally absolutely pure (*pakatiparisuddhattā*). The six inner sense-bases of humans whose defilements have yet to be eliminated are typically impure. In contrast, those who have attained ultimate

133 For the term *tādi*, see Roth 1968: 47. See also Gamage 2020: 98 fn. 118.

134 For example, ‘senses’ (Fausböhl 1881, 90); ‘senses’ range’ (Chalmers 1932: 127); ‘warring states’ (Hare 1945: 79); ‘(Taten-)Färbungen’ (Nyanaponika 1955: 124); ‘*la purezza*’ (Talamo 1961: 119); ‘sense-fields’ (Norman 1992: 66); ‘(sense-)spheres of clarity’ (Jayawickrama 2001: 205); ‘translucencies’ (Bodhi 2017: 245); Nyanaponika (1955: 292) points out that it can mean ‘hell, weiß, bleich, gelblich’, but that to his knowledge it does not mean color (‘Farbe’) in general. PED, s.v. *pañḍara*, gives ‘white, pale, yellowish’. Pe Maung Tin (1920 I 185) translates *pañḍara* as ‘clear’; Tiṭṭila (1969: 113) as ‘lucence’, Ñāṇamoli (1982: 193) as ‘lucidity’, Nyanaponika (2005: 249) as ‘das Helle’. Following Ñāṇamoli, I use ‘lucidity’.

135 Pj II II 430.2–3.

136 Tr. Nyanaponika 1955: 292: ‘Als *pañḍarāṇi*, “die Hellen”, sind die Sinnengrundlagen zu verstehen. Sie werden so genannt wegen ihrer natürlichen Reinheit und des Sprachgebrauchs wegen.’ Tr. Bodhi 2017: 922: ‘It is the sense bases that are called translucencies; for these are customarily spoken of in such a way because of their natural purity.’

enlightenment, like *arabants*, possess the six sense-bases, which are absolutely pure. The term *paṇḍarāṇi*, as a *rūlhi*, can be used to refer to the six inner sense-bases of ordinary people as well as those of *arabants*. The following passages show how the commentators of the Mahāvihāra interpret *paṇḍaram* in the Pāli canon as referring to any kind of cognizance.

Two texts from the Suttapiṭaka—the *Niddesa* and the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*—and two from the Abhidhammapiṭaka—the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* and the *Vibhaṅga*—give an almost identical passage that presents a string of synonymic designations for the mind.¹³⁷ The passage from the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* reads:

*katamaṃ tasmim̐ samaye cittaṃ hoti? yaṃ tasmim̐ samaye cittaṃ mano mānasaṃ hadayaṃ paṇḍaram̐ mano manāyatanam̐ manindriyam̐ viññāṇam̐ viññāṇakkhandho tajaṃ manoviññāṇadhātu. idaṃ tasmim̐ samaye cittaṃ hoti.*¹³⁸

What is cognizance on that occasion? Whatever on that occasion [is] cognizance, mind, mentation, heart, lucidity, mind, mind-sense-base, mind faculty, consciousness, consciousness aggregate, element of mind-consciousness related to that, this is cognizance on that occasion.¹³⁹

On the term *paṇḍara* in this list the *Atthasālinī* offers the following gloss:

*idha pana cittaṃ eva abbhantaratt̐hena hadayan ti vuttam̐. tam̐ eva parisud-dhat̐hena paṇḍaram̐ bhavaṅgam̐ sandhāy' etaṃ vuttam̐. yathāba: 'paḥhas-saram̐ idaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ, tañ ca kbo āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkili-ṭṭhan' (A 1 10.11–12) ti. tato nikkbantatt̐ pana akusalam̐ pi, gaṅgāya nikkbantā nadi gaṅgā viya, godbāvarito nikkbantā godbāvari viya ca, paṇḍaran t' eva vuttam̐.*¹⁴⁰

But here just the cognizance in the sense of [its being] internal is stated [by the term] *hadaya*. The very same [cognizance], in the sense of [its] absolute purity, is **lucidity** (*paṇḍara*). This is stated with reference to the *bhavaṅga*[-consciousness].¹⁴¹ As [the *Anguttaranikāya*] says: ‘This conscious-

137 Nidd I 3.4–7; 176.13–16; Paṭis I 189.37–190.2; 190.4–6; Dhs 10.11–15; 11.27–31; Vibh 87.23–26.

138 As 10.11–15.

139 See Ñāṇamoli 1982: 193; Rhys Davids 1997b: 8. See also Thiṭṭila 1969: 113.

140 As 140.22–29.

141 DOP, s.v. *bhavaṅga*: ‘a factor of existence, of becoming.’ DOP, s.v. *bhavaṅga*: ‘dormant mental continuity (in which no mental process occurs).’ Bodhi translates the term *bhavaṅga* as ‘factor of existence’. See Bodhi 2012: 1597, fn. 46. Both Nyanatiloka and Nyanaponika rendered the *bhavaṅgacitta* as ‘*Unterbewußtsein*’ (Nyanatiloka 2014: 528; Nyanaponika 2005: 249). Again, the former scholar translated the very same term as ‘[*U*]nterbewußte Zustände’ (1927: 880). Pe Maung Tin and Ñāṇamoli select the ‘life-continuum’ for it. See Pe Maung Tin 1920: 1 185, Pe Maung Tin 1931: III 537; Ñāṇamoli 1956, 466. For scholarly discussions of *bhavaṅga*-consciousness, see Gethin 1994: 11–35; Anālayo 2017: 10–51.

ness, monks, is luminous, but it is defiled by adventitious defilements.’ But even unwholesome [consciousness]¹⁴² is indeed called ‘lucid’, on account of the fact that it has emerged from that [*bhavaṅga*-consciousness], just as the tributary issued from the [river] Ganges [is also called] ‘Ganges’, and the [tributary] issued from the [river] Godhāvārī [is also called] ‘Godhāvārī’.¹⁴³

In this gloss, the commentator does not explicitly state that the term *pañḍara* is a *rūlhi*. However, the way he describes the term strongly suggests that he understands that it occurs as a *rūlhi* in the canon. Because of its absolute purity, the cognizance or *citta* is designated as *pañḍara*; but *pañḍara* was originally used to denote *bhavaṅga*-consciousness. *Pañḍara* (‘lucidity’) symbolically demonstrates its nature. As Bodhi points out, this *bhavaṅga*-consciousness ‘occurs in the absence of active cognition’ and is ‘responsible for maintaining continuous personal identity throughout a given life and from one life to the next’.¹⁴⁴ After suggesting that the *bhavaṅga*-consciousness was originally intended by the term *pañḍara*, the author of the *Atthasālinī* provides a scriptural example in support. According to the commentators, ‘this consciousness [that] is defiled by adventitious defilements’ describes the *bhavaṅga*-consciousness. The commentators typically insist on this.¹⁴⁵ Although, for the commentators, the term *pañḍara* originally refers specifically to the *bhavaṅga*-consciousness, it comes to be used as referring to consciousness in general: any consciousness—whether wholesome or unwholesome—has emerged from the *bhavaṅga*-consciousness (*tato nikkantattā*). The analogy drawn by the commentator illustrates this: while flowing into the ocean, the rivers Ganges and Godhāvārī give rise to distributaries which are also named after the main river. In short, the term *pañḍara* occurs in the Mahāvihāra sources as a

142 Dhs-mṭ 95.17–20: *akusalam pi paṇḍaran ti vuttaṃ, ko pana vādo kusalan ti adhippāyo. tañ hi paṇḍarato nikkhantaṃ sayañ ca paṇḍaran ti. attha vā sabbam pi cittaṃ sabbhāvato paṇḍaram eva, āgantukopakkilesavadānehi pana sāvajjānavajjānaṃ upakkilittbhavisuddhataratā bontī ti.* ‘Even [if it is] an unwholesome [consciousness] it is called lucidity, how much more [so if it is] wholesome, [that is] the intention. For, the [unwholesome consciousness] issued from the lucidity, even itself is lucid. Or, each consciousness by nature is verily lucid, but due to the adventitious defilements as well as purifications there is a more defiled or cleaner state of the blamable and blameless [consciousnesses].’

143 See also Pe Maung Tin 1920 I 185–186; Nyanaponika 2005: 249.

144 Bodhi 2012: 1597, fn. 46.

145 For instance, see Ps I 167.20–27; Mp I 60.9–15; Dh-p-a I 23.10–19; Nidd-a I 22.18–20; II 290.8–10; Paṭis-a I 242.2–4; II 520.29–521.3.

metonym for *bhavaṅga*-consciousness. Other commentators share the *Atthasālinī* gloss.¹⁴⁶

16. *vacisaṅkhāra*

According to the *Mahā-Cattārisakasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*, each of the first five factors of the Noble Eightfold Path—1. *sammādiṭṭhi* or right view, 2. *sammāsaṅkappa* or right conceptualization, 3. *sammāvācā* or right speech, 4. *sammākammanta* or right action, and 5. *sammā-ājīva* or right livelihood—can be divided into two aspects. The first aspect deals with the mundane level and is qualified with three adjectives as *sāsava* ('with influxes'), *puññabhāgiya* ('partaking of merit') and *upadhivepakka* ('ripening in the acquisitions').¹⁴⁷ The second aspect that involves the supramundane level is modified with four designations, namely, *ariya* ('noble'), *anāsava* ('influx-less'), *lokuttara* ('supramundane') and *maggāṅga* ('factor of the path'). The sutta describes right conceptualization dealing with the supramundane level as follows:

*katamo ca bhikkhave sammāsaṅkappo ariyo anāsavo lokuttaro maggaṅgo? yo kbo bhikkhave ariyacittassa anāsavacittassa ariyamaggasamaṅgino (E^c °maggassa sa^o) ariyamaggam bhāvayato takko vitakko saṅkappo appanā vyappanā cetaso abhiniropanā vacisaṅkhāro. ayaṃ bhikkhave sammāsaṅkappo ariyo anāsavo lokuttaro maggaṅgo.*¹⁴⁸

And what, monks, is the right conceptualization that is noble, influx-less, supramundane and a factor of the path? Whatever, monks, reasoning, proper reasoning,¹⁴⁹ fixing, proper fixing, mind's fixing [on objects] and ver-

146 Nidd-a I 22.16–23; II 290.6–13. Mahānāma adds an alternative interpretation; see Paṭi-a II 520.22–521.9.

147 Nānamoli and Bodhi 1995: 935.

148 M III 73.11–17 (= M III C^c 214.24–29. See also M III S^c 182.20–183.4).

149 In translating terms such as *takka*, I relied on the definitions in the commentary. For convenient understanding, let me quote the relevant passage here: Ps IV 132.25–133.10 (= Ps IV C^c 92.3–13; Ps IV S^c 94.9–17): *takko ti ādisu takkanavasena takko (M III 73.15). sv eva ca upasaggena paḍaṃ vadḍhettvā vitakko ti vutto. sv eva saṅkappanavasena saṅkappo. ekaggo butvā ārammaṇe appeti ti appanā. upasaggena pana paḍaṃ vadḍhettvā vyappanā ti vuttaṃ. cetaso abhiniropanā ti cittassa abhiniropanā. vitakkasmiṃ hi sati vitakko ārammaṇe cittam abhiniropeti, vitakke pana asati attano yeva dhammatāya cittam ārammaṇaṃ abbi-rūhati, jātisampanno abbiññātapuriso viya rājagehaṃ. anabbiññātassa (E^c abbiññātassa) bi paṭihārena vā dovārikena vā attbo hoti. abbiññātam jātisampannam sabb' eva rājarāma-mahāmattā jānantī ti attano 'va dhammatāya nikkhamati c' eva pavisati ca. evaṃsam-padam idaṃ veditabbaṃ. 'With regard to the [meaning of the terms] such as *takka*: it is [called] *takka* by virtue of reasoning. And, having developed the term with a prefix, the very same [*takka*] is called *vitakka* (i.e., "proper reasoning"); by virtue of conceptu-*

bal formation in one whose mind is noble, whose mind is influx-less, who possesses the noble path and is developing the noble path, this, o monks, is the right conceptualization that is noble, influx-less, supramundane and a factor of the path.¹⁵⁰

This discourse uses seven terms, beginning with *takka*, for right conceptualization. While these terms are synonymous, they also describe divergent functions of right conceptualization.¹⁵¹ For instance, *vitakka* (‘proper reasoning’) and *vacīsāṅkhāra* (‘verbal formation’) bear the same meaning in this context, and both express the attributes of *sammāsāṅkappa* belonging to the supramundane level. The *Papañcasūdanī* glosses *vacīsāṅkhāra* as follows:

*vācaṃ saṅkharoti ti vacīsāṅkhāro. ettha ca lokiyavitakko vācaṃ saṅkharoti, na lokuttaro. kiñcāpi na saṅkharoti, vacīsāṅkhāro t’ eva paṇ’ assa nāmaṃ boti.*¹⁵²

[It is called] **verbal formation** because [it] constructs speech. And in this context, proper reasoning [belonging to] the mundane [level] forms speech; not the supramundane [level]. Although [the supramundane] does not form [speech], it still has the designation of ‘verbal formation’.

In line with the *Mahā-Cattārisakasutta*, the right conceptualization occurring on the supramundane level comprises seven states relating to one’s ideation, including *vitakka* and *vacīsāṅkhāra*. But, as Buddhaghosa’s gloss shows, proper reasoning (*vitakka*) forms utterances only on the mundane level (*lokīyavitakko vācaṃ saṅkharoti*), not on the supramundane level (*na lokuttaro*). *Vacīsāṅkhāra* is said to consist of two components, namely, *vitakka* and *vicāra*.¹⁵³ Thus, *vacīsāṅkhāras* are nothing more than *vitakka* and

alizing, the very same [*takka*] (= *saṅkappa* (i.e., “conceptualization”). Because it fixes [one’s mind] on [objects], having become one pointed (= *appanā* (“fixing”). But, having developed the term with a prefix, [the very same *appanā*] (= *vyappanā* (i.e., “proper fixing”). *etaso abbinīropanā*: the mind’s fixing (on objects). For when the proper reasoning exists, it makes the mind fix one’s thought on objects. But, when the proper reasoning does not exist, one’s mind, by its own nature, fixes itself on an object, just like when a well-known person of high birth [entering] the royal palace. For a person who is not well-known is in need of a doorkeeper or a gatekeeper [when entering a royal palace]. Because all of the kings and royal chief ministers know of a well-known person of high birth, solely by his own nature he enters and leaves [the royal palace]. In the same manner, one should know this [presence and absence of proper reasoning] as having such a consequence.’

150 See also Horner 1959: III 116; Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995: 936.

151 Ps IV 132.25–27.

152 Ps IV 133.11–13.

153 See M I 301.21; S IV 293.15–16: *vitakkavicāra vacīsāṅkhāro*. Tr. Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995: 399: ‘applied thought and sustained thought are the verbal formation.’ See also Horner

vicāra. One first formulates a thought by the operation of *vacīsaṅkhāra*, and then produces utterances related to it.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, *vacīsaṅkhāra* typically precedes an intended utterance. When one is on the supramundane level, one's mind does not form any utterance. Although *vitakka* and *vicāra* do not function as *vacīsaṅkhāra* at all in one's mind on this level, *vitakka* is still referred to as *vacīsaṅkhāra*, merely as a conventional designation. Buddhaghosa does not make it explicit that *vacīsaṅkhāra* is a *rūlhi*. But, in his subcommentary,¹⁵⁵ Dhammapāla does make this explicit.

17. *nāṇaviṇṇayutta*

The *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*¹⁵⁶ introduces the first consciousness relating to the sphere of sensual experience (*kāmāvacara*) as follows:

katame dhammā kusalā? yasmim̐ samaye kāmāvacaram kusalam cittam uppannam hoti somanassasabagam̐ nāṇasampayuttam ...

Which are the states that are wholesome? When a wholesome consciousness belonging to the sphere of sensual experience has arisen, accompanied by joy [and] associated with knowledge ...¹⁵⁷

The author of the *Atthasālinī* explains:

kosalam vuccati paññā, kosallato sambhūtattā kosallasambhūtaṭṭhena kusalam. nāṇasampayuttam tāva evam hotu, nāṇaviṇṇayuttam katham ti. tam pi rūlhi-

1954: I 363. For the commentarial gloss, see Ps II 351.13-14; Paṭis-a I 316.7: *vacīsaṅkhāra* (Paṭis I 99.8-9) *ti vitakkavicārā*. 'Verbal formation: proper reasoning [and] sustained thought.' See also Moh 297.1-4.

154 S IV 293.23-25: *pubbe kho gahapati vitakketvā vicāretvā pacchā vācam bbindati. tasmā vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro*. 'First, householder, [one] makes proper reasoning [and] a sustained thought, and then afterwards [one] breaks into speech. Therefore, reasoning and proper reasoning are verbal formation.' See also Bodhi 2000: 1322. M I 301.26-28; Horner 1954: I 363-364; Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995: 399.

155 Ps-pt III 308.4-7: *vācam saṅkharoti* (Ps IV 133.11) *ti vācam uppādeti, vaciḡbosuppattiyā viśesapaccayo hoti ti attbo. lokiyavitakko* (Ps IV 133.11-12) *dvattiṃsacittasabagato vācam saṅkharoti* (Ps IV 133.13) *vacivīññattijananato. vacīsaṅkhāro tv eva paṇassa nāmaṃ hoti* (Ps IV 133.13) *rūlhi*. '[The mundane proper reasoning] forms utterances: [the mundane proper reasoning] generates utterances; [it] becomes a special condition for the generation of sounds of speech, is the meaning. Because it is included within the thirty-two consciousnesses, the proper reasoning [belonging to the] mundane [level] forms utterances, because it generates verbal intimation. But in accordance with convention of speech, its designation is "verbal formation", indeed.'

156 Dhs 9.1-3.

157 Here, I based myself on Rhys Davids 1997b.1.

saddena kusalam eva. yathā hi tālapaṇṇehi akatvā kilaññādīhi katam pi (E^c omits *pi*) *tamsarikkhattā rūlhisaddena tālavanṭan tv' eva vuccati, evaṃ nāṇa-
vip̄payuttam pi kusalan tv' eva vedittabbaṃ.*¹⁵⁸

Wholesomeness is counted as understanding. Because it is arisen from wholesomeness, in the sense of arisen from wholesomeness, it is wholesome. While the [consciousness] associated with knowledge may be like this, how may the [consciousness] dissociated from knowledge be [like this]? In accordance with the term [wholesome] as a convention of speech¹⁵⁹, that [consciousness] is also wholesome, indeed. For, just as even [a fan] made of reed-matting, etc., and not made with fan-palm leaves, on account of its similarity to a [fan-palm-leaf fan], is still counted as a fan-palm-leaf fan by a convention of speech; [one] should know that, in the same manner, even the [consciousness] dissociated from knowledge is still to be understood as wholesome.¹⁶⁰

The usual meaning of the adjective *kusala* is 'wholesome'. The commentator says that *citta* is to be described as 'wholesome' because it has arisen from 'understanding' (*paññā*). A *nāṇasampayutta-citta* is endowed with knowledge (*nāṇa*). However, *nāṇavip̄payuttacitta* is a kind of consciousness which is disassociated from knowledge. Since *paññā* and *nāṇa* are synonymous, how can such a *citta* be described as wholesome if wholesome means 'arisen from understanding'? The commentator finds a solution to solve this problem. Using the analogy of *tālavanṭa*, he stresses that *nāṇavip̄payutta-citta* can also be referred to as *kusala* as a *rūlhi*. Even though it has not strictly arisen from understanding.

Summary

The semantic development of words is a common phenomenon in many languages. Once the secondary meaning of a particular word is developed, its primary meaning may disappear. The authors of Pāli exegetical works

158 As 63.5-11 (= B^c 105.14-19; C^c 80.31-36; S^c 109.23-110.3).

159 Ānanda uses the term *rūlha* to qualify the *nāṇasampayutta*-consciousness as well as the *nāṇavip̄payutta*-consciousness. See Dhs-mṭ 64.12-14: *rulhisaddena* (As 63.9) *ti nāṇasampayuttesu rūlkena saddena, nāṇasampayuttesu vā pavattitvā anavajjasukkhavip̄kātāya tamsadesesu nāṇavip̄payuttesu rūlkena saddena*. 'By conventional use of the word means: By conventional use of the word [used] in the case of those (*cittas*) associated with knowledge; or having used [the word] in the case of those associated with knowledge, by conventional use of [that] word in the case of those dissociated from knowledge, which are similar to the former because of resulting in blameless happiness.'

160 See also Tin 1920: 83-84; Nyanaponika 2005: 136.

state that a number of terms and phrases in the canon are *rūlhis*. The exegeses of these *rūlhis* are philologically and philosophically important. As these exegeses show, by the time they appear in the canon, the original meaning of some words had already faded. Instead, such words appear in the canon in their secondary meaning. The exegetical works of the Mahāvihāra school are helpful in discerning the original meaning of some words like Cāpālacetiyā. Although the words like *mārisa* and *paṇḍara* were originally used in a limited sense, they later come to be used in a much broader sense. When interpreting verbs like *akkamati*, special attention must be paid to the context in which they appear in the canon. Although the term *vacīsankhāra* can be taken in its literal meaning when used to qualify the word formation of ordinary people, its literal meaning must be disregarded when it occurs to qualify the supramundane mind at the moment of enlightenment. Referring to the wholesome consciousness that occurs in the *kāmāvacara*-sphere, consciousness ‘dissociated from knowledge’, must be understood as ‘wholesome’ even when wholesome is taken to mean ‘arisen from understanding’, since ‘wholesome’ plays the role of a *rūlhi*. As the sub-commentary of the *Visuddhimagga* shows, there are shortcomings when the meditator focuses on the literal meaning of the five terms beginning with *sattā* while developing loving kindness. Therefore, if one concentrates on the *rūlhi* meaning of these terms, one achieves the very goal of one’s meditation.

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Abbreviations

A	<i>Āṅguttaranikāya</i>
Abhidh-k-bh	<i>Abhidharmakośabbāṣyam of Vasubandhu</i> , ed. by P. Pradhan, 2nd edn (Patna: Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975).
Ap	<i>Apadāna</i>
Ap-a	<i>Apadāna-Aṭṭhakathā</i>
As	<i>Attasālini</i>
BD	I. B. Horner, <i>The Book of the Discipline</i> , 6 vols (London: Pali Text Society, 1938–1966).
B ^c	Burmese Chaṭṭhasaṅgīti Tipiṭaka Edition
BHSD	Franklin Edgerton, <i>Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary</i> , 2 vols (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953).
BudSir	Buddhist scriptures information retrieval (Bangkok, Thailand: Mahidol University Computing Center [1994]).
Bv	<i>Buddhavaṃsa</i>
Bv-a	<i>Buddhavaṃsa-Aṭṭhakathā</i>
C ^c	Sinhalese Printed Version
Cp	<i>Cariyāpiṭaka</i>
Cp-a	<i>Cariyāpiṭaka-Aṭṭhakathā</i>
CPD	V. Trenckner and others, <i>A Critical Pāli Dictionary</i> , 3 vols (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Science and Letters, Bristol: Pali Text Society, 1924–2011).
D	<i>Dīghanikāya</i>
Dhs	<i>Dhammasaṅgaṇi</i>
Dhs-anuṭ	<i>Dhammasaṅgaṇi-anuṭikā</i>
Dhs-mṭ	<i>Dhammasaṅgaṇimūlaṭikā</i>
DOP	Margaret Cone, <i>A Dictionary of Pāli</i> . 3 vols (Oxford: Pali Text Society, 2001–2020).
E ^c	Pali Text Society's Edition
Hk	Jayaśānkara Joṣhi, <i>Halāyudhakośaḥ</i> (Lakhnau: Uttara Pradeśa Hindi Saṃsthāna, 1957).
It	<i>Itivuttaka</i>
It-a	<i>Itivuttaka-Aṭṭhakathā</i>
J	<i>Jātaka</i>
J-a	<i>Jātaka-Aṭṭhakathā</i>
KEWA	Manfred Mayrhofer, <i>Kurzgefasstes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen. A Concise Etymological Sanskrit Dictionary</i> , vol. 1, A–TH (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1956).
Khp	<i>Khuddakapāṭha</i>
KvyP	<i>Śri Mammaṭabhaṭṭapranītaḥ Kāvyaṇprakāśaḥ</i> ed. by R. Hariharasāstri (Trivandrum: Royal Printers, 1926).
M	<i>Majjhimanikāya</i>

- Manu *Manusmṛti: with the Sanskrit Commentary Mānavartha-muktāvali of Kullūka-Bhaṭṭa* ed. by J. L. Shastri (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2000).
- Moh *Mohavicchedani*
- Mp *Manorathapūraṇi*
- Mp-nt *Manorathapūraṇi-ṇaṭikā* of Śāriputta
- Mp-pt *[Manorathapūraṇi-purāṇaṭikā* of Dhammapāla] *Ṇṅuttaranikāya-purāṇaṭikā Catutthā Līnathappakāsini*, ed. by Primoz Pecenko (Bristol: Pali Text Society, 2012).
- MW Monier Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899).
- Nett *Nettippakaraṇa*
- Nett-a *Nettippakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā*
- Nidd *Niddesa*
- Nidd-a *Niddesa-aṭṭhakathā*
- NWS *Kumulatives Nachtragswörterbuch des Sanskrit*
- Paṭis *Paṭisambhidāmagga*
- Paṭis-a *Paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭhakathā*
- PED T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, *Pali-English Dictionary* (London: Pali Text Society, 1921–1925).
- Pj I *Paramatthajotikā I (Khuddakapāṭha-aṭṭhakathā)*
- Pj II *Paramatthajotikā II (Suttanipāta-Aṭṭhakathā)*
- Pp *Puggalapaññatti*
- Pp-a *Puggalapaññatti-aṭṭhakathā*
- PrBṣĪś *Paribbhāṣendūsekbara*, ed. by F. Kielhorn (Bombay: Indu-Prakash Press, 1868)
- Ps *Papañcasūdani*
- PSED Vaman Shivaram Apte, *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary* (Poona: Shiralkar, 1890).
- Ps-pt *Papañcasūdani-purāṇaṭikā* (B^c)
- Pv *Petavatthu*
- Pv-a *Petavatthu-aṭṭhakathā*
- pw [Petersburger Wörterbuch] Otto Böhtlingk, *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch in kürzerer Fassung*, 7 vols (Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften: St. Petersburg, 1879–1889).
- S *Samyuttanikāya*
- S^c Siamese BudSir Edition
- SidMuv *[Siddhāntamuktāvali] Bhāṣāparicchedaḥ (Kārikāvali) Siddhāntamuktāvalīyākyopetaḥ* of Nyāyapañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya (Bombay: Śrī Venkaṭeśvara Press, 1829).
- ŚkD *[Śabdakalpadruma]* Raja Radha Kanta Deva, *Śabdakalpadrumaḥ*, 5 vols (Varanasi: Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series, 1967).
- ŚmhN *[Śabdastomamahānidhi]* Sri Tārānātha Bhaṭṭācārya, *Śabdastomamahānidhi* (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1967).

Sn	<i>Suttanipāta</i>
Sp	<i>Samantapāsādikā</i>
Spk	<i>Sārattbappakāsini</i>
Spk-pt	<i>Sārattbappakāsini-purāṇaṭīkā</i> (B ^c)
Sp-ṭ	<i>Sārattbadīpanīṭīkā</i>
SrdS	[<i>Sarvadarśanasamgraha</i>] <i>Śrīmat Sāyaṇa-Mādhavācāryapranītaḥ Sarvadarśanasamgrahaḥ</i> , ed. by Abhyamkara Vāsudeva Śāstri (Mumbai: Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1924).
Sv	<i>Sumaṅgalavilāsini</i>
Sv-pt	<i>Sumaṅgalavilāsini-purāṇaṭīkā</i>
SWTF	<i>Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden</i> , vol. 1, ed. by Georg von Simson and others (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994).
Th	<i>Theragāthā</i>
Th-a	<i>Theragāthā-Aṭṭhakathā</i>
Thi	<i>Therīgāthā</i>
Thi-a	<i>Therīgāthā-Aṭṭhakathā</i>
Ud	<i>Udāna</i>
Ud-a	<i>Udāna-Aṭṭhakathā</i>
VcP	[<i>Vācaspatyam</i>] Tārānātha Tarkavācaspati Bhaṭṭācārya, <i>Vācaspatyam</i> , 6 vols (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1969–1970).
Vibh	<i>Vibhaṅga</i>
Vibh-a	<i>Vibhaṅga-Aṭṭhakathā</i> (<i>Sammohavinodanī</i>)
Vibh-nṭ	<i>Vibhaṅga-anuṭīkā</i>
Vibh-pt	<i>Vibhaṅgamūlaṭīkā</i>
Vin	<i>Vinaya-piṭaka</i>
Vin-vn	<i>Vinayavinicchaya</i>
Vin-vn-ṭ	<i>Vinayavinicchayaṭīkā</i>
Vism	<i>Visuddhimagga</i>
Vism-mhṭ	<i>Visuddhimaggamahāṭīkā</i> (<i>Paramatthamañjūsā</i>)
Vism-sn	<i>Visuddhimagga</i> [<i>Mahāsannaya</i>]: <i>kalikālasābhīya sarvajña paṇḍitā-bhidhāna dvitīya Parākramabāhu mahīpālayan visin liyū mahāsanya sabhīya</i> , ed. by Bentara Śraddhātiṣya (Kolutara, Sri Lanka: Vidyātīlaka Press, 1949–1955).
Vmv	<i>Vimativinodanīṭīkā</i>
Vv	<i>Vimānavatthu</i>
Vv-a	<i>Vimānavatthu-Aṭṭhakathā</i>
Yam	<i>Yamaka</i>

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