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CONTENTS

The Law of Theft:
Regulations in the Theravāda Vinaya
and the Law Commentaries[1]

All Buddhist canons were transmitted orally for several centuries, and — as we have them today — consist of older and younger text layers. In the present contribution the composition of the law of theft (Pārājika 2) of the Theravādins as handed down in their monastic code (*vinaya*) will be explored, focusing on the various chronological layers (part 2). Subsequently the classification of the various types of theft presented in the commentarial literature — Samantapāsādikā and Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī — for which also information from the old commentaries (*sīhaḷaṭṭhakathā*) had been taken into account by the authors is investigated (part 3). Finally, the method for the absorption of offences developed by the early Aṭṭhakathās in line with the law of theft will be looked at (part 4).

1. Introduction

The law of theft is part of the Pātimokkha, the list of rules which regulate the daily life of the fully ordained. It is included among the gravest rules, namely in the Pārājika class, the first of the seven sections of rules constituting the Pātimokkha. Their transgression leads to the expulsion from the community, although this, contrary to what had been thought for a long time, may not be irreversible.[2]

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[1]Andrew Huxley sent me a draft of his article on "Max Weber and the Classical Pali Law of Theft" (first draft, 7 February 2006, for the Law & Buddhism conference in Bellagio, March 2006), which — he told me — he is not going to publish. There he dealt with several of the questions I present here.

My thanks go to Shayne Clarke, who made corrections to a previous version of this article, to Peter Jackson and William Pruitt for their valuable suggestions and corrections, and to the latter for his unfailing efforts regarding the editorial work and for polishing the English.

[2]For other traditions than the Theravādin, see Clarke 2000, 2009; for the Theravādin, see Kieffer-Pülz 2007, 294.

The Pātimokkha is handed down as a separate text and as part of the Buddhist law code, where it is embedded in the Suttavibhaṅga. Since in the Vinaya older versions of a rule were not erased, but simply complemented by new ones, the Vinaya contains much more information than the mere Pātimokkha can give.

Two commentaries of about the fifth century A.D. have been transmitted, namely the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī on the Pātimokkha, and the Samantapāsādikā on the Vinayapiṭaka. Tradition ascribes both texts to the well-known scholar monk Buddhaghosa. It is, however, certain that the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī and Samantapāsādikā were not written by the same author and that the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī represents a more recent and developed stage.[3] The Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī comments on theft in seven and a half pages (Kkh 41,1–48,11),[4] the Samantapāsādikā in one hundred and seven (Sp 285,1–392,6).

2. Theft in the Suttavibhaṅga of the Vinayapiṭaka
2.1. The Law of Theft
The law of theft for monks and nuns[5] runs as follows:[6]

> *Whatever bhikkhu/bhikkhunī should seize from a village or from a wilderness what is not given in a way which is counted as theft, in such manner of taking what is not given that kings, having arrested a robber, would beat or would bind or would expel him/her,* [*saying*]*, "You are a robber, you are a fool, you are stupid, you are a thief," the bhikkhu/ bhikkhunī, seizing anything of such a nature that is not given, also is expelled* [*from the community, incurs*] *the loss of communal life.*[7]

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[3]von Hinüber 1996: § 224. The translation of this text into Chinese by Saṅghabhadra (489 A.D.) is a heavily abbreviated version of the Pāli Samantapāsādikā. But in the section on theft it is very close to the Pāli text. (See the English translation, Saṅghabhadra 1970, 219–85.)

[4]An English translation of this part of the Kkh is given in Appendix II.

[5]Corresponding rules for novices and laymen are handed down in the lists of five or ten sīlas.

[6]Pāt 8,9–14 = Vin III 46,16–20.

[7]For remarks regarding the translation of some terms, see Appendix II.

As is obvious from this rule the Buddha or the redactors of the Vinaya based themselves on secular law in defining the amount of stolen goods in such manner that kings would treat a person stealing it as a thief. An absolute measure for this amount is given not in the Pārājika rule itself, but in its predecessor, the *akaraṇīya*, "[that] which should not be done".[8] According to this the amount is one *pāda* or more.[9] In the Word Analysis of the second Pārājika, which is more recent than the Pātimokkha rule (see below, §2.2), two different amounts are named, five *māsaka* in the definition of a "robber" (*cora*), and one *pāda* in the definition of the stolen goods.[10] Finally in the first Introductory Story of the second Pārājika the *pāda* is described as an old currency equal to five *māsaka* at the time of this Introductory Story.[11] This shows that

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[8]For an analysis of *akaraṇīya* and *pārājika*, see von Hinüber 1999 : 41*ff.*

[9]Vin I 96,30–34 : *upasampannena bhikkhunā adinnaṃ theyyasaṃkhātaṃ na ādātabbaṃ antamaso tiṇasalākaṃ upādāya. yo bhikkhu pādaṃ vā pādārahaṃ vā atirekapādaṃ vā adinnaṃ theyyasaṃkhātaṃ ādiyati, assamaṇo hoti asakyaputtiyo*. "When a monk is ordained he should not take by theft what has not been given, even if it is only a blade of grass. Whatever monk takes by theft *pāda* or the worth of a *pāda* or more than a *pāda* that has not been given, he becomes not a [true] recluse, not a son of the Sakyans." (*BD* IV 124*f.*).

[10]Vin III 47,3–5 : **coro** *nāma yo pañcamāsakaṃ vā atirekapañcamāsakaṃ vā agghanakaṃ adinnaṃ theyyasaṃkhātaṃ ādiyati, eso coro nāma*. "**Thief** means that one is called a thief who takes in a way which is counted as theft anything not given having the value of five *māsaka* or more than five *māsaka*." Vin III 47,14–15 : **tathārūpaṃ** *nāma pādaṃ vā pādārahaṃ vā atirekapādaṃ vā*. "**Anything of such a nature** means a *pāda* or the worth of a *pāda* or more than a *pāda*."

[11]Vin III 45,5*ff.* *tena kho pana samayena aññataro purāṇavohāriko mahāmatto bhikkhūsu pabbajito bhagavato avidūre nisinno hoti. atha kho bhagavā taṃ bhikkhuṃ etad avoca : "kittakena kho bhikkhu rājā Māgadho Seniyo Bimbisāro coraṃ gahetvā hanti vā bandhati vā pabbājeti vā?" ti. "pādena vā bhagavā pādārahena vā" ti. tena kho pana samayena Rājagahe pañcamāsako pādo hoti. BD* I 71*f.*: "Now at that time a certain former minister of justice, who had gone forth among the monks, was sitting near the lord. And the lord

even before the Vinaya was redactionally closed it became necessary to replace one amount by another one.[12]

2.2. Structure of the Rules in the Suttavibhaṅga

In the Suttavibhaṅga section of the Vinaya each Pātimokkha rule is presented in a specific way: It starts with (1) an Introductory Story, followed by (2) the prescription itself (*paññatti*). Sometimes further Introductory Stories introduce supplementary prescriptions (*anupaññatti*). Thereafter (3) a Word Analysis (*padabhājanīya*), (4) a Casuistry, and finally (5) a section with defences leading to guiltlessness, the *anāpatti*-formula, follow. In the case of the four *pārājika* and the first five *saṅghādisesa* rules (6) a section called *vinītavatthu* is added after the *anāpatti*-formulas (*anāpattivāra*), that means at the end of the rules. These are collections of exemplary cases meant to give guidance to later law specialists.[13] In my impression these sections comprise all cases collected up to the date of the redactional closing of the Vinayapiṭaka.[14] Regarding the chronological succession the rule itself is supposed to be the oldest part. The Introductory Stories have been added later and sometimes do not fit in with the rule.[15] The Word Analysis and the Casuistry are thought of as originating from around the same time as the Introductory Stories, whereas the *anāpatti*-formulas are considered the youngest part.[16]

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spoke thus to this monk: 'For what amount [of theft] does King Seniya Bimbisāra of Magadha, having caught a robber, flog or imprison or banish him?' 'For a *pāda*, lord, or for the worth of a *pāda*, or for more than a *pāda*,' he said. Now at that time in Rājagaha the *pāda* was [worth] five *māsakas*."

[12] For this passages, see also von Hinüber 1999: 47*f*.

[13] See von Hinüber 1996: §22.

[14] The Vinītavatthu of the second Pārājika has been dealt with in some detail by Huxley 1999: 313–30.

[15] Schlingloff 1964; von Hinüber 1996: §23.

[16] For the different layers of the Vinaya and their relative chronology, see von Hinüber 1996: §§22*ff*.

The law of theft starts with an Introductory Story followed by a pre-scription (*paññatti*, Vin III 45,15–19). A second Introductory Story leads to the supplementary prescription (*anupaññatti*, Vin III 46,16–20) which further specifies the original rule in prohibiting theft whether from a village (*gāma*) or from the wilderness (*arañña*).

Deviating from the usual structure of the rules in the Suttavibhaṅga the law of theft has two supplementary sections, not belonging to any of the listed categories. They follow after the Word Analysis (Vin III 46,21–47,26) and before the Casuistry (Vin III 54,14–55,20). (See Table 2.)

2.3 The First Supplementary Section (Vin III 47,27–53,18)

The First Supplementary Section is composed of three parts:[17] (1) a list of stolen goods defined by their location, (2) a list of stolen goods specified by nature, and (3) a list of special types of theft. (See Table 3.) Probably all aspects of theft relevant to the practice at a certain time were collected here. This at least would explain the heterogenous structure of that section.

In my opinion this passage is not so much an example of "Virtuoso Patterns" as Andrew Huxley suggested for this First Supplementary Section,[18] but rather it was important for practical usage. Since the *pārājika* offence of theft was accomplished only if the act of taking was carried out with the intention to steal an object (*mens rea*) and after the

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[17]This is a simplification since in many of the cases not only items deposited in some location but also the locations themselves are dealt with.

[18]Huxley 2006a, 7: "For comparative purposes, I shall borrow Calder's description as a label for legal reasoning which looks pretty but which is analytically useless."

(1) Introductory Story
(2) Prescription (*paññatti*) = Pātimokkha rule

Possible
  – Further Introductory Stories
  – Supplementary prescriptions (*anupaññatti*)

(3) Word Analysis (Commentary on each word of the Pātimokkha rule; *padabhājanīya*)
(4) Casuistry or hypotheticals
(5) *Anāpatti* formula / defences (exceptions to the rule; *anāpattivāra*)
(6) *Vinītavatthu* section (only in *pārājika* and part of the *saṅghādisesa* rules)

Table 1. General structure of the *pārājika* rules in the Suttavibhaṅga

First Introductory Story (Vin III 41,1–45,14)
Pātimokkha rule: prescription (*paññatti*; Vin III 45,15–19)
Second Introductory Story (Vin III 45,22–46,15)
Pātimokkha rule: supplementary prescription (*anupaññatti*; Vin III 46,16–20)
Word Analysis (*padabhājanīya*; Vin III 46,21–47,26)
First Supplementary Section: list and definition of types of stolen goods and theft (Vin III 47,27–53,18).
Second Supplementary Section: theft by incitement (Vin III 53,19–54,13)
Casuistry (Vin III 54,14–55,20) containing a probably **more recent passage** (Vin III 54,31–55,5)
Anāpatti-formula (Vin III 55,21–23)
***Vinītavatthu* section (Vin III 55,25–67,38)**

Table 2. Structure of the second Pārājika rule in the Suttavibhaṅga

object to be stolen had been moved from its place,[19] it was necessary to know at which point the act of moving (the *actus reus*) was in fact accomplished.[20] Thus one had to know with respect to every object when the movement had been completed. To move, for example, standing four-footed creatures from their place was completed only when all four legs were moved. But if the animal was pegged, five points had to be taken into consideration, i.e. the four legs and the connection to the peg (Sp 364,18*ff*.). If, however, the animal lay on the ground, then only one point had to be examined; if it was pegged, two points had to be considered (Sp 365,4). This was different with respect to birds and even more complicated if birds as "objects being in the air" (*ākāsaṭṭha*) changed into "objects above ground" (*vehāsaṭṭha*) by sitting down on a tree or something else.[21] Thus the law specialists had to know how to define the exact status and range of an object depending on its location, and, in the case of living beings, on its posture.

The second part of the list, dealing with eleven special goods, had the same purpose; in the case of stealing water, for example, accomplishment of shifting the water from its location (case 16; Vin III 51,9–20) could not be judged as easily as in the case of goods placed on firm ground. In the case of goods in transit, no fixed location existed from which to move the goods (case 19; Vin III 51,29–35), etc.

The last group comprises five special types of theft. The first of these is a type of theft by incitement through a person who spies out goods and circumstances (case 27; Vin III 52,36–38). It is the only instance where theft by incitement is mentioned in the second Pārājika, if we ignore the Second Supplementary Section (Vin III 53,19–54,13). Even

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[19]Exceptions to this are mentioned in the Vinītavatthu section.

[20]If one of the two, *mens rea* (intention) or *actus reus* (actual completion of theft), is incomplete, a lesser offence is committed. I take over these two terms from Huxley 2006a.

[21]Vjb 129,9–12, see also Kieffer-Pülz (forthcoming), B [Z 42].

(1) Stolen goods defined by their location	(2) Stolen goods specified by their nature	(3) Specific kinds of theft
(a) being in the earth (2)*	(a) water (16)	(a) theft by incitement through a spy (case 27)
(b) being on firm ground (3)	(b) tooth-cleaners (17)	(b) theft by a keeper of the entrusted goods (case 28)
(c) being in the air (*ākāsa* ; 4)	(c) forest trees (18)	(c) theft arranged by a group of bhikkhus (case 29)
(d) being above ground (*vehāsa* ; 5)	(d) goods in transit (19)	(d) theft for which an appointment in time was made (case 30)
(e) being in the water (6)	(e) deposits (20)	(e) theft by giving a sign (31)
(f) a boat, being in a boat (7)	(f) toll taxes (customs frontier ; 21)	
(g) a vehicle, being in a vehicle (8)	(g) creatures (*pāṇa* ; 22)	
(h) carried as a burden (9)	(h) apodal creatures (23)	
(i) an *ārāma*, being in a garden or monastery (*ārāma* ; 10)	(i) two-footed creatures (24)	
(j) being in a monastic building (*vihāra* ; 11)	(j) four-footed creatures (25)	
(k) field, being in a field (12)	(k) many-footed creatures (26)	
(l) property, being on a property (*vatthu* ; 13)		
(m) being in a village (14)		
(n) wilderness, being in the wilderness (*arañña* ; 15)		

*Paragraph numbers

Table 3. Contents of the First Supplementary Section (Vin III 47,27–53,18)

the Vinītavatthu with its forty-nine cases does not give one example for this type of theft. In the second case, theft by a keeper of the entrusted goods (case 28; Vin III 53,1–3), the keeper himself steals goods entrusted to him. This slighty deviates from case 39 of the Vinītavatthu, where it is explicitly allowed that keepers give fruits from gardens they watch over to monks (Vin III 65,12–18). The third type of theft, theft by arrangement, planned by a group of bhikkhus and executed by at least one of them (case 29; Vin III 53,4–5) is not mentioned elsewhere in the Vinaya. This also holds true for theft by appointing a time (case 30; Vin III 53,6–11), and theft by making a sign (case 31; Vin III 53,12–18) which form the fourth and fifth types of theft.

2.4 The Second Supplementary Section (Vin III 53,19–54,13)

The Second Supplementary Section is a homogenous text dealing exclusively with theft by incitement. Differentiated are simple incitement of a monk by a monk; Vin III 53,19–27, and incitement in a chain (German: *Kettenanstiftung*), i.e. a monk incites another monk to incite a third monk to steal; Vin III 53,27–32.[22] Thus the Second Supplementary Section seems to supplement the First.

2.5 The Vinītavatthu (Vin III 55,25–67,38)

The Vinītavatthu section is still more heterogenous than the First Supplementary Section. I do not want to go into detail here, since that subject has been investigated at some length by Andrew Huxley (1999), but I want to review some of the facts. Out of the forty-nine cases listed in the Vinītavatthu, twenty describe situations where no theft takes place.[23] Some of them lead to the establishment of new rules.[24] Other

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[22]Further cases are dealt with in which a monk enjoined another monk to steal, and even when that one returned and said that he was not able to steal, insisted on the theft (Vin III 53,32–54,5), or the instigator enjoined another monk to steal, but felt regret thereafter.

For a fuller investigation of the position of this section, the third Pārājika should be compared since it contains an almost identical section.

[23]Cases 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 45; 19 and 20; 25, 33, 38, 39, 40, 41b, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, and 49.

cases deal with the missing intention to steal.[25] Twenty-nine cases of theft show that the questions of (1) ownership,[26] of (2) who kept the object at the time of theft,[27] of (3) whether the owner, keeper or thieves lost the object before it was stolen,[28] or (4) whether the objects were

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[24]It is forbidden to take clothes from a body not yet decomposed, *dukkaṭa* (case 8; Vin III 58,11–21); it is allowed to take something away from animals (case 11; Vin III 58,31*ff.*); it is forbidden to creep into a family's favour by referring to a bhikkhu who is respected by this family, *dukkaṭa* (case 25; Vin 61,23*ff.*); it is forbidden to eat something destined for another vihāra, *dukkaṭa* (case 43; Vin III 65,37*ff.*); it is allowed to accept what is given by a watchman (case 39; Vin III 65,12*ff.*); the temporary use of objects belonging to the saṅgha is allowed (cases 40, 44; Vin III 65,19*ff.*; 66,7*ff.*); it is allowed that *āgantuka* monks distribute fruits belonging to the saṅgha among themselves as food (case 38; Vin III 65,1*ff.*); it is forbidden to burn grass belonging to the saṅgha, *dukkaṭa* (case 41; Vin III 65,25*ff.*); it is forbidden to eat a pot of ghee little by little, *dukkaṭa* (case 33; Vin III 64,4*ff.*).

[25]If a monk mistakes something as his own (cases 10, 20; Vin III 58,25*ff.*; 60,15*ff.*); if a monk takes something in trust thinking that he may use it (case 19; Vin III 60,7*ff.*); see Norman 1989: 222*ff.* for this case); if a monk takes something to return it to its owner, but in being accused of having stolen it, he seems to confirm the accusation that he stole (case 6; Vin III 57,16*ff.*); if one takes some extra portion for a person — whether existing or not — and eats it himself. In that case, however, we are referred to the *pācittiya* rules, since this is a deliberate lie (cases 12, 45; Vin III 59,1*ff.*; 66,11*ff.*).

[26]Theft of objects belonging to the saṅgha (cases 16, 23, 41a, 42; Vin III 59,35–37; 61,12–16; 65,25*ff.*, 32*ff.*), of objects the owner of which is unknown (cases 3, 17; Vin III 56,27–32; 59,38*ff.*).

[27]Theft of an object from one who bleaches robes, etc. (cases 1, 2; Vin III 56,10–27); theft of an object owned by someone else, which the monk carries at that moment (case 5; Vin III 57,6–15).

[28]Theft of an object lost by the owner (case 7; Vin III 58,1–10) or by the one who bleaches robes (case 32; Vin III 63,32*ff.*), or objects lost or left by thieves (21, 22, 36; Vin III 60,28–61,11; 64,25–32) or someone else (30, 31; Vin III 63,16–31).

stolen from thieves who stole them from the owner before,[29] are irrelevant. Some cases illustrate that special situations, as for instance a famine, are not counted as alleviating circumstances if a monk steals something eatable (cases 13, 35; Vin III 59,11–20; 64,18–24). Three cases indicate that theft may be accomplished even if one does not move the object to be stolen from its place,[30] but only the object on which the object to be stolen is located (cases 15, 28; Vin III 59,31–34; 63,4–7). A few cases show specific types of theft, as (1) theft by exchanging a lot marker (case 9; Vin III 58,22–24), (2) arranged theft (case 34; Vin III 64,8–17), and (3) smuggling objects over some boundary (case 26; Vin III 62,9–29).

The Vinītavatthu section gives the impression of having been compiled out of various lists, since the same topic with only slight differences is dealt with in various places (i.e. cases 4 and 14; 7 and 32; 13 and 35; 12 and 45; 15 and 28; 16 and 23; and 41a and 42; etc.). This corresponds to Huxley's (1999: 315) opinion, that the Vinītavatthus were compiled from several collections of various monasteries.

2.6 Comparison of the Three Sections

Comparing the three sections we can see that "arranged theft" is described in the First Supplementary Section (case 29; Vin III 53,4–5) as well as in the Vinītavatthu (case 34; Vin III 64,8–17). Though the two cases agree with each other, the version in the Vinītavatthu is more detailed and contains an additional case, thus giving the impression of being more recent.

Passing an object over a boundary is described in the First Supplementary Section (case 21; Vin III 52,5–13) and in the Vinītavatthu (case 26; Vin III 62,9–29). But whereas the First Supplementary Section deals with a monk who himself intends to pass an object over a boundary, the Vinītavatthu has only cases where monks smuggle objects for other

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[29]Theft of something taken away from the owner by someone else (case 29; Vin III 63,8–15).

[30]Thus not accomplishing a *pārājika* offence according to the general rules.

people. Thus the Vinītavatthu case complements that in the First Supplementary Section.

As mentioned before, the Vinītavatthu does not contain any case of theft by incitement, whereas the two supplementary sections do. In the light of the facts mentioned before this may be taken as a further indication that the Vinītavatthu was compiled later than these two supplementary sections, because there was no necessity to deal with that settled subject any longer.

Thus we may assume that these three sections were handed down independently, and that probably the First Supplementary Section is the oldest of them, being complemented by the Second Supplementary Section and finally by the Vinītavatthu.

2.7 The Casuistry (Vin III 54,14–55,20)

The only systematic list of conditional clauses for theft is the list of the five constituent factors (*aṅga*)[31] of theft which lead to a *pārājika* offence. Only if all five constituent factors are given and if the *actus reus* is accomplished is a *pārājika* offence committed (Table 4).[32]

In addition to this list we have a list of six, and a second list of five (Vin III 54,14–55,20). In the second list of five (Vin III 55,6–20) the first of the five constituent factors ("the object belongs to another") has been replaced by "the object does not belong to another." In that case only *dukkaṭa* offences arise, irrespective of the value of the object and irrespective of the proceeding of the *actus reus*.

Now, the list of six constituent factors (Vin III 54,31–55,5) has the same purpose as the first list of five (see Table 5). This is proven by the identical distribution of offences in all cases, the worst being a *pārājika*.

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[31]This is how the commentaries name these five points.

[32]The list of five is applied to three items in accordance with the three types of possible objects: (1) a valuable object worth more than five *māsaka*, (2) a non-valuable object worth one to five *māsaka*, and (3) a non-valuable object worth less than one *māsaka*; and it gives the three possible offences for each item depending on how far the *actus reus* has proceeded: (1) touching, (2) shaking, and (3) moving from its place.

(1) The object belongs to another (*parapariggahitaṃ*)
(2) One thinks that the object belongs to another (*parapariggahitasaññī*)
(3) The object is valuable[33] (*garuko parikkhāro*)
(4) The object is worth more than five *māsaka* (*pañcamāsako vā atireka-pañcamāsako*)
(5) The intention to steal is present (*theyyacittaṃ paccupaṭṭhitaṃ*).

Table 4. The list of five constituent factors for theft from the Vinaya

Therefore the list of six seems to be a variant on the first list of five. If we examine the list of six, it becomes obvious that the first two constituent factors of the first list of five — (1) "the object belongs to another," and (2) "one thinks that the object belongs to another" — are missing here. Though the first constituent factor is not listed, we can safely say that it must be presupposed in the list of six. This is proven by the fact that a *pārājika* offence arises when all six factors are given and the *actus reus* is accomplished. That, however, presupposes that the object belongs to another. For, if it did not belong to another, only *dukkaṭa* offences would be possible, as is clearly shown by the second list of five (Vin III 55,6–20). Therefore the difference between the list of five and the list of six from the view of content is reduced to the second constituent factor of the list of five ("one thinks that an object belongs to another"). The list of six has three constituent factors instead: (1) "one does not think that the object is one's own"; (2) "one does not take the object on a mutual agreement"; (3) "one does not take the object temporarily". The first of these, "one does not think that the object is one's own", clearly says the same as the constituent factor 2 of the list of five ("one thinks that the object belongs to another") only formulated in the negative. Constituent factors 2 to 3 of the list of six clearly presuppose that a monk knows that the object belongs to someone else.

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[33]The splitting up of (3) and (4) would not be necessary in the case of a valuable object. In the case of non-valuable objects, however, there are two categories depending on the value. Thus the division results from those categories.

All three situations if turned into the positive exempted a monk from the accusation of theft. This is illustrated by cases 10 and 20 of the Vinīta-vatthu, where a monk mistakes something as his own, by cases 40 (Vin III 65,19–24) and 42 (Vin III 65,32–37) of the Vinītavatthu which allow the temporary use of material of the community, and by case 19 (Vin III 60,8–14) of the Vinītavatthu, where taking under the wrong impression of a mutual agreement frees one from theft. Besides, these exceptions are mentioned in the *anāpatti*-formula (Vin III 55,21). In giving the negatives of these defences the list of six expresses the same as the constituent factor 2 of the first list of five, but it specifies this constituent factor in excluding the possible exceptions.

The list of five constituent factors	The list of six constituent factors
(1) The object belongs to another (*parapariggahitaṃ*)	__34
(2) One thinks that the object belongs to another (*parapariggahitasaññī*)	(1) One does not think that the object is one's own (*na sakasaññī*) (2) One does not take the object on a mutual agreement (*na vissāsagāhī*) (3) One does not take the object temporarily (*na tāvakālikaṃ*
(3) The object is valuable (*garuko parikkhāro*)	(4) The object is valuable (*garuko parikkhāro*)
(4) The object is worth more than five *māsaka* (*pañcamāsako vā atireka-pañcamāsako*)	(5) The object is worth more than five *māsaka* (*pañcamāsako vā atireka-pañcamāsako*)
(5) The intention to steal is present (*theyyacittaṃ paccupaṭṭhitaṃ*)	(6) The intention to steal is present (*theyyacittaṃ paccupaṭṭhitaṃ*)

Table 5. The first list of five and the list of six constituent factors from the Casuistry of the second Pārājika

Thus the list of six seems to be an attempt to specify the second constituent factor of the first list of five in the light of exceptions, which probably occurred only after the first list of five had been compiled. Since the exceptions listed in that part of the Casuistry are mentioned only in the *anāpatti*-formula and in the Vinītavatthu, it may well be that

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[34]Implicitly presupposed, but not explicitly stated.

the list of six was inserted into the Casuistry around the time of the formation of the *anāpatti*-formula and the Vinītavatthu section. Nevertheless such a specification was superfluous since the fifth constituent factor of the first list of five and the sixth constituent factor of the list of six require the presence of the intention to steal. Therefore, "taking erroneously", "taking temporarily", and "taking on a supposed mutual agreement" are already excluded by this constituent factor. Since furthermore the list of six presupposes the constituent factor 1 of the list of five without mentioning it, the attempt at a more specified list of six constituent factors resulted in a rather weak product. The position of the commentaries regarding this Casuistry will be discussed below (§ 3.3).

3. The Commentaries of the Fifth Century
3.1. The Twenty-five Types of Theft

As the canonical material discussed so far shows, the Vinaya's statements on theft are not arranged according to some visible system, but rather consist in various lists, each systematized to a different degree, put side by side. Obviously the old commentaries lost today — setting aside the quotations in the commentaries from the fifth century onwards — also had problems in classifying this material; at least the Samanta-pāsādikā says that the statements in the old Aṭṭhakathās were confused, and hard to understand.[35] Thus the commentators of the fifth century and later had little help from the Vinaya and the old commentaries.

Nevertheless they present a system of twenty-five types of theft classified in five groups with five items in each.

These five groups are:

(1) The group of five concerning various objects (*nānābhaṇḍa-pañcaka*)
(1.1) Should seize (*ādiyeyya*)
(1.2) Should take (*hareyya*)
(1.3) Should take away (*avahareyya*)

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[35]The regulation presented by all old commentaries was confused, disturbed, and could hardly be understood (Sp 303,18–19).

(1.4) Should cause [someone] to deviate from the path he is moving along (*iriyāpathaṃ vikopeyya*)

(1.5) Should move from its place (*ṭhānā cāveyya*)

(2) The group of five concerning a single object (*ekabhaṇḍapañcaka*)

(2.1) As in (1.1)

(2.2) As in (1.2)

(2.3) As in (1.3)

(2.4) As in (1.4)

(2.5) As in (1.5)

(3) The group of five [beginning] "with one's own hand" (*sāhatthikapañcaka*)

(3.1) "With one's own hand" (*sāhatthika*)

(3.2) "Done by commanding someone else" (*āṇattika*)

(3.3) "Throwing out" (*nissaggiya*)

(3.4) "Accomplishing a legal case" (*atthasādhaka*)

(3.5) "Giving up the legal claim" (*dhuranikkhepa*)

(4) The group of five [beginning with] "acts preparatory to the main act" (*pubbapayogapañcaka*)

(4.1) "Act preparative to the main act" (*pubbapayoga*)

(4.2) "Act simultaneous with the main act" (*sahapayoga*)

(4.3) "Taking away by an arrangement" (*saṃvidhāvahāra*)

(4.4) "Act of appointing the time" (*saṅketakamma*)

(4.5) "Act consisting in making a sign" (*nimittakamma*)

(5) The group of five [beginning with] "taking away by theft" (*theyyāvahārapañcaka*)

(5.1) "Taking away by [simple] theft" (*theyyāvahāra*)

(5.2) "Taking away by force" (*pasayhāvahāra*)

(5.3) "Taking away by determination" (*parikappāvahāra*)

(5.4) "Taking away by concealment" (*paṭichannāvahāra*)

(5.5) "Taking away by changing lot markers" (*kusāvahāra*)

The names of these five groups and their items reveal that groups 3 to 5 received their names from their respective first item, while in the case of

the first two groups no connection between the names of the groups and their items exists. Thus the system is composed of two units: unit one consisting of the first two groups, and unit two of groups 3 to 5.

As an examination of the definitions of all twenty-five types of theft indicates, there was no absolute necessity to construct five groups of five. The first and second groups describe exactly identical types of theft with the only difference that group one refers to "various [types] of objects" (*nānābhaṇḍaka*) while group two refers to "one [type of] object" (*ekabhaṇḍaka*). As Samantapāsādikā and Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī explain, the group of "various [types] of objects" comprises animate and inanimate objects, whereas "one [type of] object" refers to animate beings only. Later, these are defined as slaves and animals which have an owner. Since the first group also includes animate beings, no necessity can be detected for the formation of the second group, except the wish to systematically cover *nānā-* and *eka-bhaṇḍaka*. Therefore one might suppose that these two groups — instead of one — were formed in order to have a smoothly constructed system of five by five.

Looking at the five items of the first two groups (for the following, see the table in Appendix I) it becomes obvious that the commentaries took the first five (out of six) synonyms given in the Word Analysis of the Vinaya for the word "should seize" (*ādiyeyya*; Vin III 46,35–36) as names of these items. For each of them they defined a certain type of action subsumed under the fact of theft. Thus "should seize" (*ādiyeyya*) was understood as laying legal claim to someone else's property; "should take" (*hareyya*) as stealing another's goods which one carried as a load already; "should take away" (*avahareyya*) as rejection of giving back some property deposited before; "should cause someone to deviate from the path he is moving along" (*iriyāpathaṃ vikopeyya*) as stealing the goods together with the carrier; and finally, "should move from its place" (*ṭhānā cāveyya*) as stealing property which stands on firm ground. If we examine which of these types of acts are described in the Vinaya, we realize that eight cases described in the First Supple-

mentary Section do agree with those five items of the first group, and six
with those of the second group.

The third group, "the group of five [beginning] with one's own
hand" (*sāhatthikapañcaka*), comprises five types of means of theft:

(3.1) stealing something with one's own hand,

(3.2) inciting someone else to steal,

(3.3) throwing something out of a certain location,

(3.4) settling a legal case, i.e. inciting someone else to steal at some
     time (variant to 3.2), and

(3.5) the owner's giving up his legal claim on his property.

Most types of theft are committed by the first two means, i.e. with
one's own hand (3.1) or by inciting someone (3.2). Giving up the legal
claim (3.5) is an additional original means.[36] But the two remaining
groups (3.3 and 3.4) are only special forms of stealing with one's own
hand (3.1) and incitement (3.2). Thus they may have been listed in order
to attain five items and because appropriate cases were described in the
Vinaya.[37]

Some of the Vinaya cases are conformable to the items of group
one/two and of three respectively. From them we can deduce from
which viewpoint theft is considered in the respective groups. "Laying
legal claim to someone else's property" is the first item of group
one/two (1.1). In group three we have as fifth item "giving up the legal
claim" (*dhuranikkhepa*) (3.5). From the way it is expressed it becomes

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[36]Within this item a development can be observed, when the Samantapāsādikā
  refers this case solely to giving up the legal claim to goods deposited before
  (Sp 304,20–21; Kkh 44,4–5), whereas the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī also refers it to real
  estates and to cases where temporary goods were not returned and no com-
  pensation was given for them (Kkh 44,4–6). Interestingly the sub-commen-
  taries try to explain that discrepancy between Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī and Samanta-
  pāsādikā by declaring that the Sp only gave an example, and that the other
  things are to be included.

[37]The Samantapāsādikā relates the third case (3.3) to the sixth synonym for
  ādiyeyya given in the Vinaya (Vin III 46,36; Sp 303,8–10; 304,5–9).

clear that group one/two describes the execution of theft from the viewpoint of the culprit (the monk lays claim to someone's property) whereas group three describes the means of theft by which theft is accomplished — the owner gives up his rightful claim to his own property.

The meaning of the fourth and fifth groups is self-evident. Group four, "the group of five [beginning with] acts preparative to the main act" (*pubbapayogapañcaka*), comprises types of acts preparative to theft, which nevertheless constitute the fact of theft. These can precede the main act, but may also be nearly simultaneous. The five items are:

(4.1) acts preparative to the main act, represented by incitement;
(4.2) acts simultaneous with the main act, represented by moving an object from its place or by shifting boundary pegs in the case of fields, etc.;[38]
(4.3) taking away by an arrangement;
(4.4) act of appointing the time for theft; and
(4.5) making signs for stealing.

Here again the first two items cover all cases, because each preparative act will precede the act or will be nearly simultaneous. Items three to five could have been subsumed also under the first item. But here too adequate cases were listed in the First Supplementary Section.

The last group (5), "the group of five [beginning with] taking away by [simple] theft" (*theyyāvahārapañcaka*), lists the methods by which theft is executed:

(5.1) simple theft,
(5.2) theft by force,
(5.3) theft in determining the objects or the place,
(5.4) in hiding something, or

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[38]This seems a bit strange, because moving something from its place generally represents the main act, not a preparative act. Perhaps this was listed because in some cases, preparative acts like shifting pegs resulted in the accomplishment of the main act with the shifting of the last peg.

(5.5) in changing lot markers to get another share than the one determined for oneself.

Each type of theft falls under one of these methods of theft. The Vinaya itself does not contain examples for most of them. In fact, nearly all the Vinaya cases fall under the first item. Only one case from the Vinītavatthu conforms to the fifth, i.e. changing the lot marker (Vin III 58,22–24 [Pār 2.7.9]). The Samantapāsādikā relates the third item to the sixth synonym given by the Vinaya for *ādiyeyya* (Vin III 46,36; Sp 303,6–8; 304,5–9).

Summarizing, we can say that in the system of twenty-five types of theft (five by five) theft is looked at from four angles:

1. Types of [main] acts constituting the fact of theft (groups 1 to 2). These are all possible main acts by which a person might steal some object.
2. Types of means of theft by which theft is accomplished (group 3).
3. Types of preparative acts constituting the fact of theft (4). These are all possible preparative acts by which a person might steal some object.
4. Methods of executing the acts which constitute the fact of theft (5). This refers to the mode in which theft is executed.

Each type of theft that might occur within the Buddhist community thus has to be examined from these four viewpoints.

This list of twenty-five types, though ignored by most of the secular Burmese law books (*dhammathats*), came up in the Manugye *dhammathat* (eighteenth century) and was later on used to lend some authority to two non-classical lists. Thus, the twenty-five types of theft of the commentarial tradition of monastic law crept into Burmese secular law.[39]

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[39]For their usage there, see Huxley 2006b: § 2b; Okudaira 2006: § III.1.(2).

3.2 The Five Points (*pañca ṭhānāni*)

The Samantapāsādikā gives a further set of five points — handed down already in the early sources, i.e. some old commentaries — which have to be taken into consideration in examining theft (see Table 6). These are:

- (1) Object (*vatthu*): determining the object as such;[40]
- (2) Time (*kāla*): determining the value of the stolen object at the time of theft (Sp 306,20–23).
- (3) Place (*desa*): determining the value of the stolen object in the region where it was stolen (Sp 306,23*ff.*).
- (4) Value (*aggha*): determining the value of the object as such (Sp 307,23–27);
- (5) Use (*paribhoga*): determining the value of the stolen object diminished by usage.

The Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī reduces this list to three points, (1) time, (2) place and (3) increasing as well as decreasing value by use (Kkh 47,26–48,2).

Samantapāsādikā based on old sources	Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī
(1) object (*vatthu*)	—[41]
(2) time (*kāla*)	(1) time
(3) place (*desa*)	(2) place
(4) value (*aggha*)	(3) increasing as well as decreasing value by use
(5) use (*paribhoga*)	

Table 6. The five points (*pañca ṭhānāni*) in
Samantapāsādikā and Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī

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[40]If no charge is brought against the thief, though he declares that he has stolen it, one has to examine whether the object is owned or not. If it is owned, one has to examine whether the owner wants to keep it or not. If the owner does not want to keep it, the thief is not dealt with according to the *pārājika* offence (Sp 305,6–12).

[41]Implicitly presupposed, but not explicitly stated.

In the version of the Kkh point one does not appear, but is implicitly presupposed, whereas points four and five are united. The sub-commentaries on the Samantapāsādikā do not touch on this passage except for one or other word explanation. This is an indication that the system of five additional points was outdated, or better, transformed as early as the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī and that its application did not lead to any problems which the commentaries thought worth discussing. These five points reduced to three in the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī appear in Burmese secular law as the four *mahāpadesas*, points four and five being united there.[42]

3.3 The Five Constituent Parts (*aṅga*)

As mentioned in connection with the Casuistry of the second Pārājika, the Vinaya hands down two lists, one with five, and one with six constituent factors. As a statement of the Samantapāsādikā shows, this Casuistry was not very well understood by the early commentaries. The Samantapāsādikā, after having explained the difficulties which the early commentaries had regarding the system of the twenty-five types of theft, proceeds with respect to the Casuistry (Sp 303,20–29) in the following way:

> For likewise the constituent parts (*aṅga*) of theft named [in the Vinaya] — in the manner "**one who takes what is not given in five ways has [committed] a *pārājika*[-offence]: (1) [the object] is owned by another**" (Vin III 54,14), etc., — which have been approved [by the early commentaries], are indicated as one group of five in some places [of the early Aṭṭhakathās,[43] and] as two groups of five in some [other] places [of the early Aṭṭhakathās, where the first list of five is considered] together with the [constituent parts] handed down by "**in six ways**" (i.e. the list of six; Vin III 54,31).[44] But these are not groups of five. For that is called a group of five where a theft is proven by each single word. But here, only one

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[42]See for this Huxley 2006b : §2c ; Okudaira 2006 : §II.4.(1).

[43]Explanation of the Ṭīkās.

[44]i.e. some early Aṭṭhakathās obviously did only refer to the first list of five, whereas others took the first list of five and the list of six into account and regarded each of them as a group of five.

theft [is indicated] by all the words, and the meaning of all these groups of five, which are indicated as in fact being received there (i.e. in the Vinaya), is not explained. Thus, in this point all [early] Aṭṭhakathās have regulations which are confused, disturbed, and could hardly be understood.

The explanation of the Casuistry by the Samantapāsādikā (Sp 370,24–371,16) does not add anything regarding the development or the usage of the two lists in the Casuistry. But a further development of the list of five can be detected in the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī, where the constituent facts (*aṅga*) for each rule are part of the classification of the rule given at the end.[45] The Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī lists five *aṅgas* for theft:

(1) The object belongs to another human being. This formulation shows that the rules resulting from some stories in the Vinīta-vatthu, i.e. the allowance to take things from animals (case 11) and from corpses (case 8), now have been taken into consideration.

(2) One knows that the object belongs to another [human being],

(3) it is a valuable object,

(4) the intention to steal is present,

(5) it is taken away by theft of one among the [twenty-five types] described (Kkh 48,6–8).

The Kaṅkhāvitaraṇi clearly has developed the list of five constituent factors given in the Casuistry in the Vinaya by (a) specifying the first constituent factor, (b) uniting clauses three and four and (c) adding as the fifth the theft according to the twenty-five types described in Sp (see Table 7).

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[45]The classification in Sp does not contain the *aṅgas*, at least not as systematically as Kkh.

List of five from the Casuistry of the Vinaya	List of five constituent parts (*aṅga*) from the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī
(1) The object belongs to another (*parapariggahitaṃ*)	(1) The object belongs to another human being (*aññassa manussajātikassa vasena parapariggahitaṃ*)
(2) One thinks that the object belongs to another (*parapariggahitasaññī*)	(2) One thinks that the object belongs to another [human being] (*parapariggahitasaññitā*)
(3) The object is valuable (*garuko parikkhāro*)	(3) The object is valuable (*garuparikkhāro*)
(4) The object is worth more than five *māsaka* (*pañcamāsako vā atirekapañcamāsako*)	—
(5) The intention to steal is present (*theyyacittaṃ paccupaṭṭhitaṃ*)	(4) The intention to steal [is present] (*theyyacittaṃ*)
	(5) It is taken away by theft of one among the [twenty-five types] described (*vuttappakārānaṃ avahārānam vasena avaharaṇaṃ*)

Table 7. List of five from the Vinaya and the list
of five constituent parts from the Kkh

4. Absorption of Offences

As the Vinaya's statements on theft of an object deposited in the earth (*bhummaṭṭha*), etc., indicate, there might be a number of activities preceding the actual theft. A monk who plans to steal some goods deposited in the earth might, for instance, badly need assistants, and/or tools to unearth the goods as, for example, some tool to cut the grass, the creepers, etc., or others to dig the soil. Furthermore he is forced to first dig the soil, pile it up, or throw it out of the hole in the earth. All such activities may accompany theft. The Vinaya clearly prescribes *dukkaṭa* offences in each and every case (Vin III 48,35–48,3).

Now the Samantapāsādikā describes these "preceding" or more precisely "accompanying actions" and the resulting offences in great detail, and thus makes plain that in preparing theft one could commit hundreds of smaller offences, mainly of the *dukkaṭa* type. I will illustrate this by the translation of a short excerpt from a passage of the Samantapāsādikā which extends over several pages (Sp 310,8*ff.*):

> A monk who, having learned [about some object to be stolen] ... develops the intention to steal ... gets up during the night [and] walks [to the place of theft] commits *dukkaṭa* [offences] with every movement of body and speech, even if he does not reach [the place of theft].... If he gets up in order to take away [the goods], he moves limb by limb; in every single case [this] is in fact a *dukkaṭa* [offence. If] he puts the under and upper garments into order, a *dukkaṭa* [offence arises] with every movement of the hand. [If he thinks] that the treasure is large, that one person might not be able to take it away, and wishes to go to a friend, desiring [to win] him as an assistant, a *dukkaṭa* [offence arises] with every gesture of the feet and the hands....

What results from this enumeration of examples is that a monk, even if he gives up theft during the "accompanying actions," has already committed many *dukkaṭa* and *pācittiya* offences. Now, if he wants to be of good standing (*pakatatta*) — which means that he is free from offences, and thus able to participate in legal proceedings of the community — he has to confess all offences committed by him. As one can easily imagine after what has been said before, the number of offences in the case of a more complex type of theft could amply accumulate. How could a monk be sure that he did not forget to confess one of his many offences?

In fact, the early commentaries had already started to develop methods for solving this problem which are at least partly preserved in the Samantapāsādikā.

The Samantapāsādikā divides accompanying actions into actions which precede [theft], i.e. "earlier actions" (*pubbapayoga*), and "simultaneous actions", i.e. actions simultaneous [with theft] (*sahapayoga*), see Table 8. Searching for assistants, searching for tools or preparing

them belong to the "earlier actions"; digging the soil, piling it up, etc.,[46] to the "simultaneous actions". All offences resulting from "earlier actions" are valued as *dukkaṭa* or *pācittiya* offences depending on the transgressed Vinaya rule. In the case of "simultaneous actions", however, *dukkaṭa* and *pācittiya* offences are valued as *dukkaṭa* offences only.[47] For example, when a monk who wants to steal an animal kills that animal before he moves it from its place, then the act of killing — regularly a transgression of a *pācittiya* rule — is counted as a *dukkaṭa* offence only, because this act of killing is an accompanying action to theft.[48] All offences resulting from "earlier actions" accumulate, i.e. they are not absorbed. If a bhikkhu stops while still being involved in these "earlier actions" he therefore has to confess all offences.[49] The

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[46]In the case of the object in the earth (*bhummaṭṭha*) there are five "simultaneous actions" which lead to *dukkaṭa* offences: (1) cutting [plants at the place of theft] (*chedana*), (2) digging [the soil] (*khaṇana*), (3) piling up [the soil] (*vyūhana*), (4) throwing the soil out [of the hole in the earth] (*uddharaṇa*), and (5) touching [the goods to be stolen] (*āmasana*). Moving (*phandana*) the object also belongs to the simultaneous actions, but it results in a *thullaccaya* offence as stated in the Vinaya.

[47]This results from all explications of the Sp and of the *ṭīkās*. See Sp 312,17–20: *idaṃ sahapayogadukkaṭaṃ nāma. ettha pana pācittiyavatthu ca dukkaṭa-vatthu ca dukkaṭaṭṭhāne yeva tiṭṭhati. kasmā? avahārassa sahapayogattā ti.* "This is called a *dukkaṭa* offence on account of the simultaneous action. But here the object of a *pācittiya* [offence] as well as the object of a *dukkaṭa* [offence] remain in the class of a *dukkaṭa* [offence] only. Why? Because these are simultaneous with theft." Cf. Vin-vn-pṭ I 62,8–10: *idha, adinnādāna-sahitapayogattā pācittiyavatthumhi, itaratra ca dukkaṭam evā ti ayam ettha viseso.* "Here, in the case of a *pācittiya* [offence resulting] from an [accompanying] act being simultaneous with taking what is not given (theft) and elsewhere [i.e. in other similar cases] only a *dukkaṭa* [offence arises]. This is the difference here [to the preceding action]."

[48]Sp 365,5–6 with Vjb 134,5–8, Sp-ṭ II 155,3–5.

[49]Sp 314,12–14: *sahapayogaṃ pana akatvā lajjidhammaṃ okkantena yā pubba-payoge dukkaṭapācittiyā āpannā, sabbā tā desetabbā.* "But not having com-

Accompanying actions to theft	
Actions earlier [than theft] (*pubbapayoga*)	**Actions simultaneous [with theft] (*sahapayoga*)**
dukkaṭa and *pācittiya* offences are counted as such	*dukkaṭa* and *pācittiya* offences both are valued as *dukkaṭa* offences
All offences accumulate, i.e. are not absorbed as long as "earlier actions" are executed.	All offences of one and the same simultaneous action accumulate.
All offences are absorbed as soon as one starts with simultaneous actions	All offences of one simultaneous action are absorbed as soon as one starts with another type of simultaneous action

Table 8. The absorption of offences

offences resulting from "earlier actions" are only absorbed as soon as
the monk starts with a "simultaneous action".[50] Within the category of
"simultaneous actions" the offences resulting from one and the same
activity accumulate, and are only absorbed when one changes the type
of "simultaneous action". That means, when one finishes digging the
soil and starts to pile it up, then all offences resulting from digging are
absorbed,[51] if, on the other hand, one digs the soil, and in a next step

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mitted a simultaneous action [a monk] filled with shame (and thus stopping
his theft) has to confess all *dukkaṭa* and *pācittiya* [offences] which he
committed with respect to earlier actions."

[50]Sp 314,10–12: *sahapayogato paṭṭhāy' eva c' ettha purimā purimā āpatti paṭi-
ppassambhati.* "And only from the simultaneous action onward is each earlier
offence absorbed."

[51]Sp 314,16–19: *khaṇane bahukāni pi viyūhanaṃ, viyūhane bahukāni pi
uddharaṇaṃ, uddharaṇe bahukāni pi āmasanaṃ, āmasane bahukāni pi
phandāpanaṃ patvā paṭippassambhanti.* "Many [offences committed] in
digging [the earth] lapse when one arrives at the amassing [of the earth]; all
[offences committed in] amassing [the earth] lapse when one arrives at the
throwing out [of earth]; all [offences committed in] throwing out [of earth]
lapse when one arrives at touching [the goods to be stolen]; all [the offences
committed in] touching [the goods to be stolen] lapse when one arrives at
moving [the goods to be stolen]."

piles it up, then the offence arising from digging is immediately
absorbed by the action of piling up.

The system of absorption described here seems to have originated in
one of the early commentaries, i.e. in the Mahā-Aṭṭhakathā.[52] Another
system of absorption is described in the Vinaya within the *yāvatatiyaka*-
rules,[53] where the culprit has to be admonished three times before he
becomes guilty with the third ineffective admonition. This type of
absorption is different from the one described in the case of theft insofar
as the offences arising from the first and second ineffective admonitions
are only absorbed when the final offence arises with the last ineffective
admonition. But the regulation in the *yāvatatiyaka*-rules seems to have
served as a model for the absorption invented with respect to theft. At
least it is mentioned as a pattern for the development of this method by
the Ṭīkās.

<div align="right">Petra Kieffer-Pülz</div>

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[52]Sp-ṭ II 135,8–9; Vin-vn-pṭ I 65,2–5.

[53]They are enumerated in the Parivāra (Vin V 146,19–21): from the Bhikkhu-
pātimokkha it is Suddhapācittiya 68 and Saṅghādisesa 10–13, from the
Bhikkhunīpātimokkha Suddhapācittiya 36, Saṅghādisesa 7–10 and Pārājika 3.

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CPD   *A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, begun by V. Trenckner, ed. D. Andersen, H. Smith, H. Hendriksen, vols. 1–3, Copenhagen, 1924–2011.

CSCD   CD-ROM of B[e], Version 3, Vipassana Research Institute, Dhamma-giri, Igatpuri, India.

DOP   Margaret Cone : *A Dictionary of Pāli*, Vol. I : *a–kh.* Oxford : Pali Text Society 2001.

E[e]   European edition

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Kkh   K.R. Norman and William Pruitt (eds.), *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī by
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Kkh-pṭ   *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇīpurāṇaṭīkā.* Rangoon, 1961 (Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana
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M   Monk

N   Nun

Niss   Nissaggiya

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          Italy, March 2006.

Pāc   Pācittiya

Pār   Pārājika

Pāṭ   Pātidesanīya

Pāt   Pātimokkha

PED   *The Pali Text Society's Pali–English Dictionary*, ed. T.W. Rhys
          Davids, W. Stede, London, 1921–1925.

Ps   Papañcasūdanī (see *CPD*, Epilegomena)

Saṅghabhadra 1970, *Shan-Chien-P'i-P'o-Sha*, English translation by P.V. Bapat
          and Akira Hirakawa, Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

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Sgh   Saṅghādisesa

Sn   Suttanipāta (see *CPD*, Epilegomena)

Sp   J. Takakusu, M. Nagai, K. Mizuno (eds.), *Samantapāsādikā, Vinayaṭṭhakathā*, 7 vols. London : Pali Text Society, 1924–1947.

Sp-ṭ   Sāriputta [from Poḷonnaruva], *Sāratthadīpanī*, 3 vols. Rangoon, 1960 (Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition).

Utt-vn Uttaravinicchaya (CSCD)

Vin   Hermann Oldenberg, (ed.), *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, 5 vols. London, 1879–1883.

VinTexts T. W. Rhys Davids, Hermann Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts*, 3 vols. Oxford, 1881, 1882, 1885 (Sacred Books of the East, 13, 17, 20).

Vin-vn-pṭ *Vinayatthasārasandīpanī*. 2 vols. Rangoon, 1977 (Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition).

Vism   Buddhaghosa, *Visuddhimagga*, ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, 2 vols. London, 1920–1921 (Pali Text Society).

Vjb   Vajirabuddhi, *Vajirabuddhiṭīkā*, Rangoon, 1960 (Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition).

Vmv   Coḷiya Kassapa, *Vimativinodanīṭīkā*, 2 vols. Rangoon, 1960 (Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition).

Appendix I: The explanation of the twenty-five types of theft and the corresponding cases of the Vinaya

Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī, Samantapāsādikā	Vinaya
(1) The group of five concerning various objects (*nānābhaṇḍapañcaka*)	
(1.1) should seize (*ādiyeyya*) : to lay legal claim to something belonging to someone else (Kkh 43,1–3 = Sp 302,22–25).	Vin III 50,5–7.14.22.30 (Pār 2.4.10, 11, 12, 13).
(1.2) should take (*hareyya*) : stealing the goods of another which one carries as a load on the head (Kkh 43,4–6 = Sp 302,25–28)	Vin III 49,26–35 (Pār 2.4.9).
(1.3) should take away (*avahareyya*) refers to cases where someone who deposited his goods and now asks to get them back is rejected by a bhikkhu with the words "I do not fetch them" (Kkh 43,7–10 = Sp 302,28–303,1).	Vin III 51,36–52,4 (Pār 2.4.20).
(1.4) should cause [someone] to deviate from the path he is moving along (*iriyāpathaṃ vikopeyya*) refers to cases where a person who carries some goods with him is caused to leave its original path (Kkh 43,11–13 = Sp 303,1–3).	Vin III 51,30–32 (Pār 2.4.19).
(1.5) should move from its place (*ṭhānā cāveyya*) refers to stealing property standing on firm ground (*thalaṭṭhaṃ bhaṇḍaṃ*, Kkh 43,14–15 = Sp 303,3–6).	Vin III 48,20–24 (Pār 2.4.3).

(2) The group of five concerning a single object (*ekabhaṇḍapañcaka*)	
(2.1) seizing (*ādiyana*, as in 1.1)	Every theft of creatures may belong to this section (Vin III 52,14–35 [Pār 2.4.22–26]).
(2.2) taking (*haraṇa*, as in 1.2)	”
(2.3) taking away (*avaharaṇa*, as in 1.3)	”
(2.4) should cause someone to deviate from the path he is moving along (*iriyāpathavikopana*, as in 1.4)	”
(2.5) moving from its place (*ṭhāna-cāvana*, as in 1.5)	”
(3) The group of five [beginning] with one's own hand (*sāhatthikapañcaka*)	
(3.1) "with one's own hand" (*sāhatthika*) means with one's own hand one takes away the goods of another (Kkh 43,21–22 = Sp 304,12)	All cases in the Vinaya — except incitement — are cases in which theft is committed with one's own hand.
(3.2) "done by commanding someone else" (*āṇattika*, Kkh 43,22–23 = Sp 304,12–13)	Vin III 52,36–38 (Pār 2.4.27) ; 53,19–54,13 (Pār 2.5.1–4).
(3.3) "throwing out" (*nissaggiya*) means throwing outside, while standing inside of the customs frontier (Kkh 43,23–24 Sp 304,14–16)	Vin III 46,36 ; 52,5–13 (Pār 2.4.21).
(3.4) "accomplishing a legal case" (*atthasādhaka*) means that one commands another to steal goods when he is able (the difference to 3.2 is that the command and theft are not simultaneous ; Kkh 43,24–44,4 Sp 304,16–20).	Vin III 54,3–5 (Pār 2.5.3)

(3.5) "giving up the legal claim" (*dhuranikkhepa*) refers (a) to an owner who gives up his legal claim to his deposited goods as a consequence of a bhikkhu's claim to the respective object (Sp 304,20–21 ; Kkh 44,4–5), or to his property (Kkh 44,4) ; (b) to one who does not give compensations for temporary goods (Kkh 44,5–6).	Vin III 50,5–7.14.22.30 ; 52,2 (Pār 2.4.10, 11, 12, 13, 20).

(4) "The group of five [beginning with] acts preparative to the main act" (*pubbapayogapañcaka*)	
(4.1) "act preparative to the main act" (*pubbapayoga*) refers to a command preceding the theft (Kkh 44,8–9 = Sp 304,24–25).	Vin III 52,36–38 (Pār 2.4.27) ; 53,19–54,13 (Pār 2.5.1–4).
(4.2) "act together with the main act" (*sahapayoga*) refers to (a) moving the object from its place (Kkh 44,9 = Sp 304,25), (b) taking fields, etc., in shifting the boundary pegs (Kkh 44,9–10).	(a) nearly all types of theft ; (b) no example for this type of theft is to be found in the Vinaya.
(4.3) "taking away by an arrangement" (*saṃvidhāvahāra*) refers to cases, where several bhikkhus planned together to take away such-and-such goods. When these goods are moved from their place by even one of them, it is theft for all of them (Kkh 44,10–13 ; Sp 304,26 only refers to the Vinaya).	Vin III 53,4–5 (Pār 2.4.29).
(4.4) "act of appointing the time" (*saṅketakamma*) means having fixed a time for theft (Kkh 44,13–17 ; Sp 304,26 only refers to the Vinaya).	Vin III 53,6–11 (Pār 2.4.30).

(4.5) "act consisting in making a sign" (*nimittakamma*) refers to making a sign such as blinking with the eyes, etc. (Kkh 44,17–20 ; Sp 304,26 only refers to the Vinaya).	Vin III 53,12–18 (Pār 2.4.31).
(5) "The group of five [beginning with] taking away by [simple] theft" (*theyyāvahārapañcaka*)	
(5.1) "Taking away by [simple] theft" (*theyyāvahāra*) refers to theft (a) by making a hole in a wall, etc., then taking away goods without being seen, or (2) by deceiving others by means of false weights and false coinage, etc. (Kkh 44,22–25 ; Sp —).	(a–b) no example in the Vinaya ;
(5.2) "Taking away by force" (*pasayhāvahāra*) refers to (a) overpowering others by application of force grasping their property, or (b) grasping more by application of force than the tax which is suitable for one (Kkh 44,25–45,3 ; Sp —).	(a–b) no example in the Vinaya.
(5.3) "Taking away by determination" (*parikappāvahāra*) means : the throwing outside, while standing inside the pre-determined place ; or grasping after the determination of goods or the place (Kkh 45,3–25 ; Sp —).	Vin III 46,36, but no example in the Vinaya
(5.4) "Taking away by concealment" (*paṭichannāvahāra*) taking away something by covering it (Kkh 45,26–46,13 ; Sp —).	No example in the Vinaya.

(5.5) "Taking away by changing lot markers" (*kusāvahāra*) refers to theft by moving the lot-marker to another share (Kkh 46,14–47,3 ; Sp 304,31–32 refers to the commentary in Sp 375,13*ff.*).	Vin III 58,22–24 (Pār 2.7.9).

Appendix II : Translation of the commentary on the second Pārājika from Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī 41,1–48,11[54]

⟨**41**⟩ [2. The Commentary on the Second Pārājika]

[Pārājika Two for monks : *Whatever bhikkhu should seize from a village*[55] *or from a wilderness*[56] *what is not given in a way which is counted as theft,*[57] *in such manner of taking what is not given that kings,*

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[54]This is an excerpt of the joint translation of the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī (still in progress), translated by K.R. Norman, revised by Petra Kieffer-Pülz and William Pruitt.

Numbers in pointed brackets ⟨ ⟩ refer to page numbers of the new Kkh edition ; numbers in square brackets [ ] refer to the page numbers of the old Kkh edition. The abbreviations follow those used in the *CPD, Epilegomena*.

[55]*gāma* represents any type of settlement.

[56]*arañña* represents all areas outside of settlements, rivers, oceans, and natural lakes. Therefore our translation as "wilderness" does not give the whole sense of the word. This is also true for *BD* I 73 "jungle" or *VinTexts* I 4 "wood". Where exactly the *arañña* begins is different depending on the rule and the respective definition of *gāma*.

[57]Pāt 9 "in a way which is called theft" ; *BD* I 73 "by means of theft" ; *VinTexts* I 4 "what men call 'theft'". Von Hinüber 1999 : 47, translates *theyyasaṅkhātaṃ* (Vin III 47,3–5 : *yo ... adinnaṃ theyyasaṃkhātaṃ ādiyati*) as "wer einen nicht gegebenen, als Diebsgut bezeichneten [Gegenstand] ... an sich nimmt" ("who pockets a not given [object], called stolen goods"). This would help with the problematic *theyyasaṅkhātaṃ* in various parallel references, but *theyya* is not known to us as being used in the meaning "Diebsgut" (= "das zu Stehlende") anywhere. Cf. the explanation of Kkh 42,9–17 = Sp II 302,3–12 ≠ Ps II 329,30–30,2.

having arrested a robber, would beat or would bind or would expel him,
[saying], "You are a robber, you are a fool, you are stupid, you are a
thief," the bhikkhu, seizing anything of such a nature that is not given,
also is expelled [from the community],[58] *[incurs] the loss of communal*
life[59] (Pāt 8,9–14 = Vin III 46,16–20)].

In the second [rule] (i.e. Pār 2 M), herein "*from a village or from a*
wilderness" (Pāt 8,9) means: indeed each [village, one] consisting in a
single hut, etc.,[60] whether enclosed (*parikkhitta*) or not enclosed
(*aparikkhitta*), whether [inhabited by] human beings (*samanussa*) or
[uninhabited] by human beings[61] or even every caravan which has
settled for more than four months; [each of these] is to be understood as

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[58]Translated by "entailing defeat" in Pāt (9,1.2 etc.); von Hinüber (1985: 62)
discusses the different derivations of *pārājika* (*parā* + passive of *ji* or *parā* +
aj), and shows that *pārājika* is derived from the latter and thus to be translated
as "was zur Vertreibung (aus dem Orden) gehört".

[59]*asaṃvāso;* Pāt 9 "not in communion"; *BD* II 42 "he is not in communion";
VinTexts I, 4: "he is no longer in communion"; von Hinüber 1999: 50 "wäre
des Zusammenlebens verlustig".

[60]The "etc." refers to the definition of *gāma* in the Word Analysis on Pār 2 M,
where "a village of one hut" up to "a village of four huts" are enumerated (Vin
III 46,23–24).

[61]Alternative: "[inhabited by] beings who are not human." Both possibilities are
considered in Sp II 298,27–28: **amanusso** *nāma yo sabbaso vā manussānaṃ*
abhāvena yakkhapariggahabhūto yato vā manussā kenaci kāraṇena puna pi
āgantukāmā eva apakkantā. "[**A village uninhabited**] **by human beings/**
[**inhabited by**] **beings who are not human** (Vin III 46,24) means: whichever
[village] has been totally taken possession of by demons by virtue of the total
absence of human beings, or whichever [village] the human beings leave (or:
which the human beings leave for any reason) indeed with the wish to return
again for any reason." Cf. Kkh-pṭ 35,26–36,7; Sp-ṭ II 123,26–24,5, 125,12*ff.*; Vjb
124,20*ff.*, Vmv I 170,2–5, 15–17.

a "village" (*gāma*).[62] Apart from a "village" and the "vicinity of a village" (*gāmūpacāra*),[63] the rest is called "wilderness" (*arañña*).[64]

There, in order to avoid confusion, this classification should be known:

(1) a house (*ghara*),

(2) the vicinity of a house (*gharūpacāra*),

(3) a village (*gāma*),

(4) the vicinity of a village (*gāmūpacāra*).[65]

(1) For "house" (*ghara*) means [the space] inside the place where the water falls from the eaves of the roof.[66]

(2) Moreover, whatever water for washing bowls the women throw when standing at the door, [both] the falling place of that, and the falling place of a winnowing basket or a sweeping brush thrown outside in the usual way by women standing inside the house, and the enclosure made to prevent oxen entering, by joining the two corners in the front of the house, then fixing in the middle a gate with a wooden bolt, all of this indeed means "vicinity of a house" (*gharūpacāra*).[67]

(3) [The space] inside the falling place of a clod thrown in this way — as young men showing off their strength stretching forth their arm

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[62]This whole passage repeats the definition of *gāma* as given in Vin III 46,23–27, only the *gonisādiniviṭṭho pi gāmo* is missing here.

[63]*BD* I 74 "precincts of the village". The definition of *gāmūpacāra* is given Vin III 46,27–30.

[64]Quotation from Vin III 46,30–31.

[65]The explanations in Sp of what is and what is not a village are much more detailed. The categorization given in Kkh is traced back to the Mahā-Aṭṭhakathā by Sp II 299,25ff. and taken as the standard. The relevant passage of Sp has been dealt with in Kieffer-Pülz 1992: B 13.3.1, and von Hinüber 1996: 107f.

[66]For *nibbakosa*, see Kieffer-Pülz 1992: B 7.2.2.

[67]Cf. Sp II 299,25–300,4; for the definitions of Kurundī and Mahāpaccarī, see Sp II 299,21–23; The third method refers to the vicinity around the whole house, see Vjb 125,1f.; Sp-ṭ II 124,26–27; Vmv I 170,17–22.

throw a clod of earth — by a man of medium strength standing in such a vicinity [as described in (2)] of that house, which, moreover, is the outermost house [of a village],[68] means "village" (*gāma*).

(4) [69-][The space] inside the falling place of another clod of earth [thrown] from there (i.e. from the village)[70] means "vicinity of a village" (*gāmūpacāra*).[-69] The place where the clod rolls after it has fallen is not to be taken into consideration.

(4.1) In the case of an enclosed village, however, only the enclosure (*parikkhepa*) constitutes the exact determination (*pariccheda*) of a village.[71] If [such an enclosed village] has two thresholds,[72] [the space] inside the falling of a clod [thrown by] someone standing by the innermost threshold means "vicinity of a village" (*gāmūpacāra*).[73] ⟨42⟩ For also in the Word Analysis [of the Vinaya] the meaning is to be understood only this way.[74]

(4.2) There, whatever vicinity is shown for a village which is not enclosed, by virtue of that the offence [against the rule] "entering a village at the wrong time" (Pāc 85 M[75]), etc.,[76] is to be determined.[77]

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[68]See n. 60.

[69–69]= Sp II 300,6–7.

[70]But, see Vism 72,10–11, where the second clod is also thrown from the vicinity of a house. See Kieffer-Pülz 1992: B 13.3.1, p. 317 and n. 550.

[71]Cf. Sp 300,20–21.

[72]*indakhīla*, see *DOP* s.v.; Kieffer-Pülz 1992: 312*f.*

[73]Cf. Sp 299,6–7.

[74]Vin III 46,26–30: **gāmūpacāro** *nāma parikkhittassa gāmassa indakhīle ṭhitassa majjhimassa purisassa leḍḍupāto, aparikkhittassa gāmassa gharupacāre ṭhitassa majjhimassa purisassa leḍḍupāto.* (See *BD* I 74).

[75]Pāt 78,17–20 = Vin IV 166,11–12.

[76]There exist many rules for which the exact definition of a village, etc., plays an important role; for instance *saṃvidhānasikkhāpadaṃ* (Pāc 27 M/Sgh 3 N), *uyyojanasikkhāpadaṃ* (Pāc 42 M/123 N), *theyyasatthasikkhāpadaṃ* (Pāc 66 M), *saṃvidhānasikkhāpadaṃ* (Pāc 67 M), *kuladūsakasikkhāpadaṃ* (Sgh 13 M/17 N), *sāsaṅkasikkhāpadaṃ* (Niss 29 M, Pāt 4 M), and *asaṅkaccikasikkhā-*

Thus the remainder, apart from the village and the "vicinity of a village," means "wilderness" in this rule (i.e. Pār 2 M).[78]

The [phrase] "*from the village or from the wilderness*" (Pāt 8,9), however, is only a mere wider concept."[79] But whatever house, vicinity of a house, village, or vicinity of a village is spoken of in order to show their (i.e. the village's and the wilderness's) exact determination, there arises indeed an [offence entailing] expulsion for anyone taking away from there an [object that is] the subject matter of a *pārājika* [rule].[80]

Not given (*adinnaṃ*, Pāt 8,9) means: the property of another human being.[81]

[82–]*What is counted*[83] as theft (*theyyasaṅkhātaṃ*, Pāt 8,9–10): herein [**27**] thief (*thena*) means robber (*cora*); the mental disposition of a thief

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padaṃ (Pāc 96 N). Kkh-ṇṭ (196,12–13: **vikāle gāmappavesanādīsū** ti ettha ādi-saddena asaṅkaccikāgāmappavesanaṃ saṅgaṇhāti) in explaining *ādi* refers to Pāc 96 N.

The reason for this explicit statement in Kkh is that for Sgh 3 N another definition of *gāma* and *gāmūpacāra* is valid.

[77]The definition of the *gāmūpacāra* of a village that is not enclosed as given in the Vinaya is also valid for the rule Pāc 85 M and others (e.g. Pāc 96 N, see n. 76), mentioned only by *ādi*. See also Sp II 300,31–301,2: *tato gharaṃ gharūpacaro gāmo gāmūpacāro ti esa vibhāgo saṅkīyati, asaṅkarato c' ettha vinicchayo veditabbo, vikāle gāmappavesanādīsu.* "On account of that the classification (1) house, (2) vicinity of a house (3) village [and] (4) vicinity of a village becomes confused. Here, however, the regulation (*vinicchaya*) has to be known without confusion for [the rule] 'entering a village at the wrong time' [Pāc 85 M], etc."

[78]Cf. Sp II 301,8–11. For other definitions of *arañña*, see Sp II 301,11*ff*.

[79]*desanāmattaṃ*; which means that other — not explicitly mentioned — objects, can also be subsumed under the respective term. In the present case *ghara, gharūpacāra, gāma, gāmūpacāra*, etc., are all subsumed under *gāmā*.

[80]Kkh-ṇṭ 196,20 explains it by *pādagghānakaṃ*, "[an object] worth one *pāda*".

[81]Cf. Sp II 301,24–28.

[82–82]= Sp II 302,3–12.

[83]Translated "called" in Pātimokkha.

is theft (*theyya*); the [word theft (*theyya*)] is [another] designation for "thinking of taking away". *Saṅkhā* ("counting") and *saṅkhāta* ("counted") are one in meaning. The [words *saṅkhā* and *saṅkhāta* are another] designation for "number/group", as in [the phrase] "for, the group 'diversification' has perception as its origin".[84] That "*which is counted as theft*" (*theyyasaṅkhāta*): that part [of the thoughts which] is "theft".[85] The meaning is: that single group of thoughts counted as thoughts about theft. And this accusative [is used] in the sense of an instrumental; therefore, as to the meaning [*theyyasaṅkhātaṃ*] is to be regarded as "by means of what is counted as theft" (*theyyasaṅkhātena*). And whoever takes up by means of what is counted as theft, since he has thoughts of theft, therefore to show only the meaning without taking the letter into consideration, the Word Analysis on it (= *theyya-saṅkhātaṃ*) is taught thus: "[one who] has thought[s] of theft, [one, who] has thought[s] of taking away."[86] [Thus] it is to be understood.⁻[82]

Should seize (*ādiyeyya*, Pāt 8,₁₀) means: should take by virtue of one or other of the twenty-five [types of] taking away. But those [types of] taking away [87]⁻are to be thoroughly examined putting together five groups of five. The five groups of five are:

(1) the group of five concerning various objects (*nānābhaṇḍa-pañcaka*),

(2) the group of five concerning a single object (*ekabhaṇḍa-pañcaka*),

(3) the group of five [beginning] with one's own hand (*sāhatthika-pañcaka*),

(4) the group of five [beginning with] "action preceding [the main action]" (*pubbapayogapañcaka*), and

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[84]Sn 874d.

[85]i.e. it is a *kammadhāraya* compound.

[86]Vin III 46,₃₄ (*BD* I 74).

[87–87]= Sp II 303,₃₁–304,₁.

(5)   the group of five [beginning with] "taking away by [simple] theft" (*theyyāvahārapañcaka*).⁻⁸⁷

There, the first two groups of five (1–2) are to be understood by virtue of the words uttered in the Word Analysis on this very word (i.e. on *ādiyeyya*)[, i.e.]

"(i) should seize (*ādiyeyya*),

(ii) should take (*hareyya*),

(iii) should take away (*avahareyya*),

(iv) should cause [someone] to deviate from the path he is moving along (*iriyāpathaṃ vikopeyya*),

(v) should move from [its] place (*ṭhānā cāveyya*)."⁸⁸

There, (1) "the group of five concerning various objects" (*nānā-bhaṇḍakapañcaka*) is to be regarded by virtue of animate (*saviññāṇaka*) and of inanimate (*aviññāṇaka*) [objects],⁸⁹

(2) the other [group of five] (i.e. *ekabhaṇḍapañcaka*)⁹⁰ only by virtue of animate [objects]. ⟨**43**⟩

How [is this]?

(i) ⁹¹⁻"Should seize" (*ādiyeyya*, Kkh 42,₂₃) means: [if a bhikkhu] lays [legal] claim to a pleasure park, [he commits] an offence of wrong doing. [If] he creates doubt for the owner, [he commits] a grave offence. [If] the owner, thinking, "[This] will not be mine," gives up [his legal] claim, [the bhikkhu commits] an offence entailing expulsion.

(ii) "Should take" (*hareyya*, Kkh 42,₂₃) means: [if,] while taking the goods of another, he touches the load on his head with the thought of stealing [it, he commits an offence of] wrong doing. [If] he shakes it,

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⁸⁸Vin III 46,₃₅–₃₆ (*BD* III 74).

⁸⁹Cf. Sp II 302,₂₀–₂₁.

⁹⁰Since the first two were mentioned before, *itaraṃ* must refer to the other of the two. This tallies with Sp II 302,₂₀; Vin-vn-pṭ I 52,₁₈–₂₁.

⁹¹⁻⁹¹= Sp II 302,₂₂–303,₆.

[he commits] a grave offence. [If] he puts it down on his shoulder,[92] [he commits] an [offence entailing] expulsion.

(iii) "Should take away" (*avahareyya*, Kkh 42,23) means: [if,] being spoken to with the words, "Goods have been deposited [by me]; give me [back] the goods," [a bhikkhu] says "I do not take them," [he commits an offence of] wrong doing. [If] he creates doubt for the owner, [he commits] a grave offence. [If] the owner, thinking, "This will not be mine" gives up [his legal] claim, [he commits] an [offence entailing] expulsion.

(iv) "Should cause [someone] to deviate from the path he is moving along" (*iriyāpathaṃ vikopeyya*, Kkh 42,23) means: [If, thinking] "I will lead the one taking the goods with him," he causes [the person with the goods] to pass [the original path by[93]] the first step, [he commits] a grave offence; [if] he causes [the person with the goods] to pass [the original path by] the second step, [he commits] an [offence entailing] expulsion.[94]

(v) "Should move from [its] place" (*ṭhānā cāveyya*, Kkh 42,23) means: [if] with the thought of stealing he touches property standing on [firm] ground, [he commits an offence of] wrong doing. [If] he shakes it, [he commits] a grave offence. [If] he moves it from its place, [he commits] an [offence entailing] expulsion.[−91]

Thus first of all "the group of five concerning various objects" (*nānābhaṇḍapañcaka*) is to be understood.

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[92]Since it is a load to be carried on the head, putting it down from the head is moving the goods from their place (*ṭhānā cāveti*), therewith the *actus reus* of a *pārājika* is accomplished.

[93]Regularly in other instances of Par 2 M, the first and second steps refer to the passing of the boundary of that space within which the respective object can be touched, carried around, etc., without an offence being committed in this way (Sp II 303,6–10; 359,6–7). Here, however, the transgressing by one and two steps refers to the transgression of the original path.

[94]Cf. Sp II 303,1–3.

(2) "The group of five concerning a single object" (*ekabhaṇḍa-pañcaka*) is to be known by virtue of

(i) seizing (*ādiyana*),

(ii) taking (*haraṇa*),

(iii) taking away (*avaharaṇa*),

(iv) causing [someone] to deviate from the path he is moving along (*iriyāpathavikopana*),

(v) moving from [its] place (*ṭhānacāvana*) by the means as described [above[95]] beginning with the laying legal claim[96] to a slave or animal which has an owner.[97]

(3) What about "the group of five '[beginning] with one's own hand'"? (*sāhatthikapañcaka*)

(i) with one's own hand (*sāhatthika*),

(ii) [done by] commanding [someone else] (*āṇattika*),

(iii) throwing out (*nissaggiya*),

(iv) accomplishing a legal case (*atthasādhaka*),

(v) giving up the legal claim (*dhuranikkhepa*).[98]

There (i) "with one's own hand" (*sāhatthika*) means : with his own hand he takes away the goods of another.

(ii) "[Done by] commanding [someone else]" (*āṇattika*) means : he commands another, "Take away the goods of so-and-so."[99]

(iii) "Throwing out" (*nissaggiya*) means :[100] throwing outside while standing inside the customs frontier or a [pre-]determined place.[101]

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[95]This refers to the definition of the words *ādiyeyya*, *hareyya*, etc., with respect to "the group of five concerning various objects" just given before (Kkh 43,1–16).

[96]*abhiyoga* takes up the verb *abhiyuñjati* (Kkh 43,1).

[97]This shows that the object of this group of theft is an animate being only, as declared in the beginning (Kkh 42,25–26). Cf. Sp II 303,12–15.

[98]This fits Pār 2 M, but not the word *dhuranikkhepa* as used elsewhere, where it also means "burden, responsibility".

[99]Cf. Sp II 368,21–70,23.

[100]The passage from (3) up to here corresponds to Sp II 304,10–16.

(iv) [102]–"Accomplishing a legal case"[103] (*atthasādhaka*)[104] means:
he commands another: "When you are able, then take away the goods of
so-and-so." There, ⟨**44**⟩ if the other person, without obstacle (= un-
prevented), takes it away, for the one who gives the command it is an
offence entailing expulsion at the very moment the command is
given.[¯102] Or [**28**] [if] he places sandals, etc.,[105] inevitably fit to
absorb[106] oil worth a *pāda* into an oil jar belonging to another, [he

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[101]Sp II 304,14–16; cf. Sp II 358,24–61,4.

[102-102]= Sp II 304,16–19.

[103]*CPD* s.v. *attha-sādhaka*, "accomplishing one's welfare, profitable", but with-
out references to the Vinaya literature. *DOP* does not list this compound.
There are many possible meanings of *attha*; our suggestion is "legal case" on
account of the explanations of the commentaries: Vmv I 173,17–20: *kiriyā-
siddhito puretaram eva pārājikāpattisaṅkhātaṃ atthaṃ sādhetī ti **attha-
sādhako**. atha vā attano vattamānakkhaṇe avijjamānam pi kiriyāsiddhi-
saṅkhātaṃ atthaṃ avassaṃ āpattiṃ sādhetī ti pi **atthasādhako.*** "Quite before
the completion of the activity one accomplishes a legal case counted as an
offence entailing expulsion, [this is] **accomplishing a legal case.** Or, though
at the moment, when one speaks, a legal case counted as a completed activity
does not exist, one accomplishes inevitably an offence; [this also [is]
accomplishing a legal case". The first explanation is to be found in Kkh-nṭ
200,20–21 = Sp-ṭ II 128,30–29,1.

[104]*atthasādhaka* differs from *āṇattika* insofar as the order to commit the theft is
for the time after the command, whereas in the case of *āṇattika*, command and
theft are simultaneous (Kkh-nṭ 200,25–29; Sp-ṭ II 128,16–20; Vmv I 174,1–3).

[105]Kkh-nṭ 201,17 explains that *dukūlasāṭaka* ("a hempen cloth"), *camma-
kkhaṇḍa* ("animal skins"), etc., are included in *ādi*.

[106]*pivanaka* (lit. fit to drink, can drink); so in most parallels (Sp-ṭ II 129,3–4:
telaṃ avassaṃ pivanakānaṃ upāhanādīni; Kkh-nṭ 201,20: *telapivanakaṃ
bhaṇḍaṃ*; Vin-vn-pṭ I 53,23: *pādagghanakatelapivanakam upāhanādikiñci-
vatthuṃ*). Vin-vn-pṭ has *telapivanārahaṃ* instead in another instance (I 70,23*f.*:
telapivanārahaṃ dukūlasāṭakacammakhaṇḍādikaṃ bhaṇḍaṃ). This clearly
shows that the commentaries understood *pivanaka* in this way. Compare also
Sp II 319,21–24.

commits] an offence entailing expulsion in the mere act of releasing [them] from his hand.[107]

(v) "Giving up the legal claim" (*dhuranikkhepa*) should be understood by virtue of laying legal claim to a pleasure park or of goods which have been deposited.[108] Exactly the same principle also applies to someone not giving compensations (*bhaṇḍadeyya*) for temporary [goods].[109] This is the group of five [beginning] "with one's own hand".

(4) What is "the group of five [beginning with] 'action preceding [the main action]'" (*pubbapayogapañcaka*)? It is

(i) action preceding [the main action] (*pubbapayoga*),

(ii) action together with [the main action] (*sahapayoga*),

(iii) taking away by an arrangement[110] (*saṃvidhāvahāra*),

(iv) act of appointing [the time][111] (*saṅketakamma*),

(v) act [consisting in making] a sign (*nimittakamma*).

There, (i) "action preceding [the main action]" (*pubbapayoga*) is to be known by virtue of [there being] a command.[112]

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[107]Cf. the exact parallel for the first part at Sp II 304,16–20; parallels for the later part at Sp II 319,3–7 and 319,21–24.

[108]Sp II 304,20–21 only mentions *upanikkhittabhaṇḍa*. Sp-ṭ II 129,23–25, Vmv I 174,4–6, Khuddas-nṭ 247,5–7 explain that the same principle applies to the case of laying legal claim on *ārāmas* (*ārāmābhiyuñjana*), etc., and of not giving compensation for temporary goods (*tāvakālikabhaṇḍadeyyānaṃ adāne*).

[109]Sp II 350,17 *tāvakālikagahaṇe pi tath' eva* (with the preceding lines 14–17) shows that in this case also compensation has to be paid.

[110]According to von Hinüber (1968: 117, n. 1), in the passage dealt with by him (Vin IV 64,11*f.*), *saṃvidahati* is used in the sense of "(einseitig) eine Verabredung festlegen" contrary to *saṃketa-* "gegenseitige Verabredung". As the present case shows, this is not valid at the time of the commentaries, since here *saṃvidhakamma* describes a theft with a prior mutual arrangement, whereas *saṃketa* refers to an appointment of time.

[111]*asaṃketa*, *CPD* s.v. "without appointing (a place)", see also von Hinüber 1968: 117, with n. 273. *Saṃketa* in the context of theft, however, always refers to appointing a time, as Sp II 367,23–368,14 shows.

[112]= Sp II 304,24–25.

(ii) And "action together with [the main action]" (*sahapayoga*) is to be known by virtue of moving [the object] from [its] place[113] and by virtue of taking fields, etc., in shifting the [boundary] pegs, etc.[114]

(iii) "Taking away by an arrangement" (*saṃvidhāvahāra*), means: the taking away after having arranged; after having consented: "We will take away such-and-such goods". For, when they have gone [away] after having arranged [it] in this way, when these goods have been moved from [their] place by even one of them, it is taking away (i.e. theft) for all of them.[115]

(iv) "Act of appointing [the time]" (*saṅketakamma*) means act of making aware (*sañjānana*).[116] For if, having fixed a time, such as the time of the morning meal, etc., the one spoken to [with the words:] "At such-and-such a time take away such-and-such goods", takes [them] away neither after nor before (i.e. simultaneously with) the appointed time, for the one who appoints [the time] this is "taking away" at the very moment of appointing [the time].[117]

(v) "Act [consisting in making] a sign" (*nimittakamma*) means making a sign such as blinking with the eyes, etc., in order to produce awareness. For if the one spoken to [with the words] "Take it away" takes it away neither after nor before (i.e. simultaneously with) the making of the sign, for the one who makes the sign this is "taking away" at the very moment of making the sign.[118]

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[113]This always is the main action in the case of theft.

[114]This second possibility is not mentioned in the parallel in Sp II 304,25.

[115]Sp II 304,26, refers to the Vinaya for this and the following two types of *avahāra*. However, a detailed discussion is to be found in Sp II 366,8–67,22.

[116]Cf. Sp II 367,23–24, where additionally *kālaparicchedavasena saññāṇa-karaṇan ti attho* ("the meaning is: making being aware by virtue of the exact determination of time") is stated.

[117]For a detailed discussion, see Sp II 367,23–68,14.

[118]For a detailed discussion, see Sp II 368,15–20.

This is "the group of five [beginning with] 'action preceding [the main action]'" (*pubbapayogapañcaka*).

(5) [119–]What is the "group of five [beginning with] 'taking away by theft'" (*theyyāvahārapañcaka*)? They are

   (i) taking away by [simple] theft (*theyyāvahāra*),
   (ii) taking away by force (*pasayhāvahāra*),
   (iii) taking away by [pre]determination (*parikappāvahāra*),
   (iv) taking away by concealment (*paṭichannāvahāra*),
   (v) taking away by [moving] a lot marker (*kusāvahāra*).[–119]

There, (i) whoever, having made a hole in a wall, etc., takes away [goods] without being seen, or, having deceived [others] by means of false weights and false coinage, etc., grasps [goods], for him, grasping [the goods] in this way, the "taking away" is to be known as "taking away by [simple] theft" (*theyyāvahāra*).[120]

(ii) But anyone who overpowers [others[121]] then by applying force grasps the property of others, ⟨**45**⟩ like a village robber, etc., or who grasps more than the tax [which is] suitable for him, — exactly in the manner described[122] — as king's servants, etc., do, for him, grasping in this way, the "taking away" is to be known as "taking away by force" (*pasayhāvahāra*).[123]

(iii) Grasping after [pre]determining, however, is called "taking away by [pre]determination" (*parikappāvahāra*). That is two-fold by virtue of goods and place.

There, this is "[pre]determination of goods" (*bhaṇḍaparikappa*): Someone who needs a piece of cloth, enters an inner room thinking, "If there is a piece of cloth I will grasp it. If [there is] thread I will not grasp [it]." In the darkness he grasps a sack. If there is a piece of cloth in it,

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[119] [–119]= Sp II 304,27–29.

[120]Cf. Sp II 375,19–22.

[121]Sp II 375,22 adds *pare*

[122]i.e. by force; see Sp II 375,26: *balakkārena*.

[123]Cf. Sp II 375,22–28.

there is an offence entailing expulsion in the very act of picking it up
(i.e. the sack with the cloth in it). If there is thread, [this] preserves [him
from an offence]. If he takes it outside, opens it, knows, "It is thread,"
carries it back again, [and] puts it [back, this] indeed preserves [him
from an offence]. If he knows, "It is thread," but thinks, "Whatever is
received is to be grasped," [and] goes away, he is to be treated
according to the number of steps [he takes].[124] If having put it on the
ground he grasps it [again], there is an offence entailing expulsion in
picking it up. If [he is] followed [by people] crying, "Robber, robber,"
[and] having thrown it down he runs away, [that] preserves [him from
an offence]. If the owners see it and grasp it, [that] indeed preserves
[him from an offence]. If someone else grasps it, compensation [has to
be paid]. If the owners turn back [i.e. stop following him], then he, who
after having seen [the object] himself, grasps [it thinking,] "How much
more is the object grasped by me with the perception[125] [that it is a rag
robe from a] dust heap[126] my property now;"[127] even he [has to pay]

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[124]*padavārena* is used in Sp in instances where bhikkhus with the intention of
stealing deliberately leave the space protected by a respective command. For
instance, if a bhikkhu deviates from the allowed route and goes into the
wilderness, which is not allowed (e.g Sp 323,22–23; 351,5, 28; 352,4, 13–14, etc.).
From the point of content, the expression *pāduddhāra* ("taking the feet off the
ground"; Kkh 157,21; Sp 334,22, 28; 376,19–20; 774,34–35; 775,2) seems to refer
to the same matter. Possibly the two divergent expressions result from
different texts, since *padavārena* is used in the Kurundī, one of the early
commentaries belonging to the so-called Sīhaḷaṭṭhakathā (Sp 351,5), and
pāduddhāra is used in the Mahāpaccarī, also one of the old commentaries (Sp
376,19–20). Cf. the discussion of this expression of the Mahāpaccarī in Vjb
141,21*ff.*

[125]*saññā* in such constructions mostly implies that the impression is wrong.

[126]*paṃsukūla* is allowed for bhikkhus, Vin I 280,35–37; 282,3–5.

[127]What is meant is that the owners gave up the search, i.e. the object therefore
does not have an owner. The bhikkhu now finds the object on the street, i.e. it
is a rag robe, which is allowed for him, so he thinks that taking this object

compensation indeed. There, whatever [pre]determination occurs such
as "If there is a piece of cloth, I shall grasp it", this is called "[pre]deter-
mination of property" (*bhaṇḍaparikappa*).

   "[Pre]determination of place" (*okāsaparikappa*), however, is to be
understood thus: Someone [**29**] has entered someone else's residence,
etc. Seeing some desirable goods after making an assessment along the
door of the inner room, the veranda, the entrance door of the lower
[floor of the] palace, the gateway, the foot of a tree, etc., he determines,
"If they see me here inside, I shall give it back as though having grasped
it from a desire to see it while [I was] wandering around; if they do not
see me, I shall take it." For him, taking it there is "taking away" in the
mere act of transgressing the [pre]determined assessment.[128] Thus what-
ever [pre]determination occurred in just the manner spoken of, that is
"[pre]determination of place" (*okāsaparikappa*).

   Thus the taking away of one who grasps, having [pre]determined by
virtue of both these [pre]determinations is to be known as "taking away
by [pre]determination" (*parikappāvahāra*).[129]

   (iv) Taking [something] away in covering it, however, is called
"taking away by concealment" (*paṭichannāvahāra*). It is to be under-
stood thus: Whatever bhikkhu in gardens, etc., seeing a signet ring, etc.,
belonging to others who have taken it off and put it down, ⟨**46**⟩ [think-
ing], "I will grasp it later," covers it with dust or leaves, as long as he
does not pick it up, for so long there is no "taking away" (*avahāra*). But
if the owners, searching for it and not having seen it, go off with the
mere intention, "Tomorrow we shall find out," then for him, [when]
picking it up, there is "taking away" in the act of picking it up
(*uddhāre*). One, however, grasping [it] at the very time of concealing

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   now, when it is a rag robe, makes it even more his property than before (i.e.
   when the owners had not given up their claim).

[128]i.e. the range within which the bhikkhu will return the object he has taken is
   defined by him mentally depending on where he is, terrace, lower floor of a
   palace, etc.

[129]The whole section (iii) corresponds to Sp II 375,29–77,20.

[it], with the perception that it is his own, [thinking], "This is my property," or with the perception that it is [a rag robe from] a dust heap, [thinking], "Now they have gone, these are goods thrown away," [has to pay] compensation. Even if they, having come back on the second or third day, having searched and not having seen [it], go away having given up [their] legal claim, [and] it is grasped [by him, he has to pay] compensation indeed. For him being reprimanded afterwards [by someone] knowing [about it, but] not giving it back, there is "taking away" in the giving up of the legal claim by the owners. Why? Because it was not seen by them because of his action. But whoever with the thought of stealing, not covering property of such a kind lying in such a place, [but] treading on it with his foot, pushing it into the mud or the sand, for him there is "taking away" in the mere act of pushing it in.[130]

(v) Now taking away by having moved the lot marker, however, is called "taking away by [moving the] lot marker" (*kusāvahāra*). This too is to be understood thus: If any bhikkhu has dropped [on his share] a lot marker, made of bamboo or made of palm leaf, with [his] sign on it; when robe material is being shared out, he, being desirous of taking the share of another, [which is] lying in the vicinity of his own share, [which is] less valuable, or more valuable [than his own], or of equal value, picks up the lot marker which had fallen on his own share because of his desire to drop it on the share of another, this preserves [him from an offence].[131] First of all, when it has fallen[132] on the share of another, he is preserved indeed [from an offence]. But if, when it has fallen there, he picks up the lot marker of the other one from that other one's share, there is "taking away" in the mere act of picking it up.[133]

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[130]Section (iv) corresponds to Sp II 377,21–78,8.

[131]That means that up to this point of his preparations for theft, he is still without guilt.

[132]Kkh reads *pātike*; w.r. for *pātite*?

[133]The arrangement of actions is as follows: (1) the thief picks up his own lot marker from his own share; (2) he drops it on the share of the other; (3) he picks up the lot marker of the other from the other one's share, and becomes

If at the very first he picks up the lot marker of another from that other one's share, in picking [it] up because of his desire to drop it on his own share [this] preserves [him from an offence]; also in dropping it, [this] preserves [him from an offence]. ⟨**47**⟩ [If] he picks up[134] his own lot marker from his own share, however, [this] preserves [him from an offence] only in the act of picking it up. For one who, having picked it up, drops it on another's share, there is "taking away" in the mere release from his hand.[135] This is "taking away by [moving the] lot marker" (*kusāvahāra*).[136]

Thus, the meaning has been made clear of what was said [above, i.e. (Kkh 42,₁₈–₁₉)] "'*should seize*' (*ādiyeyya*) means: should take away by virtue of one or other of the twenty-five [types of] taking away".

In such manner (*yathārūpe*, Pāt 8,₁₀) means: of such a kind.

Of taking what is not given (*adinnādāne*, Pāt 8,₁₀) means: of taking the property belonging to another which is not given.

Kings (*rājāno*, Pāt 8,₁₀): this is said with reference only to Bimbisāra. [**30**] Other [kings] whether they might or might not act like that are not authoritative.

Or would beat (*haneyyuṃ vā* Pāt 8,₁₁) means: they would strike with hands, etc., or they would cut with a weapon.

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guilty in that very moment. Thus the fourth action, dropping the other one's share on his own share, is not described any more.

[134]*uddharati*. Kkh reads *uddharato*, Sp in the parallel passage reads *uddharati*. In the preceding sentences that have the same structure *uddharati* is used throughout (Kkh 46,₁₉, ₂₁, ₂₂).

[135]This is an example for the same type of theft, but the actions are arranged the other way round: (1) the thief takes the lot marker of the other person from the other one's share; (2) he drops it on his own share; (3) he lifts his own lot marker from his share (up to this point no offence arises); (4) he drops his own lot marker on the other's share. With the release of his own lot marker from his hand the monk becomes guilty.

[136]Section (v) corresponds to Sp II 378,₉–79,6.

Or would bind (*bandheyyuṃ vā*, Pāt 8,₁₁) means: or they would bind with ropes and bonds, etc.

Or would expel (*pabbājeyyuṃ vā*, Pāt 8,₁₁) means: or they would drive [him] off.

You are a robber, you are a fool, you are stupid, you are a thief (*coro 'si, bālo 'si, mūḷho 'si, theno 'si*, Pāt 8,₁₁–₁₂): With such words they abuse [the guilty person]. In respect of the taking of what sort of things that are not given do kings act thus? In respect of [the taking of] a *pāda* or something worth a *pāda*.[137]

The bhikkhu taking anything that is not given of such a nature (*tathārūpaṃ bhikkhu adinnaṃ ādiyamāno*, Pāt 8,₁₂–₁₃) means: a bhikkhu taking away, by one "taking away" (*avahāra*) or another of the [twenty-five "types of"] taking away] described [above],[138] such goods, which are not given, as a *pāda* of an ancient *kahāpaṇa*[139] or worth a *pāda*, whether they are endowed with life or are lifeless, wherever they are placed, in the earth, etc.,[140] he is expelled [from the community]. What need to talk about anything [worth] more than that?

[141][This rule] was prescribed at Rājagaha (= 1. *provenance*) concerning Thera Dhaniya (= 2. *individual*) with respect to the subject

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[137]This value is given in the *akaraṇīya* (Vin I 96,₃₂–₃₃) preceding the formulation of Pār 2 M; the Word Analysis of Pār 2 M, however, has *māsaka* (Vin III 47,₃–₅) as well as *pāda* (Vin III 47,₁₄–₁₅), and the introductory story to Pār 2 M explains that at that time in Rājagaha one *pāda* equalled five *māsaka* (Vin III 45,₁₀–₁₁). For a discussion of all this, see above §2.1.

[138]Kkh 42,₁₈–47,₃.

[139]According to Sp II 308,₂₈–₂₉ the *pāda* is a quarter of a *kahāpaṇa* (one *kahāpaṇa* = four *pāda*), which following Kkh-ṇṭ 206,₉–₁₀, is the old *kahāpaṇa*. According to the Vinaya definition one *pāda* = five *māsaka* (Vin III 45,₁₀–₁₁), see n. 137.

[140]This refers to the various places listed and described in the Vinaya, where the goods may be placed.

[141]Here starts the classification of Pār 2 M. The number and the name of the respective classification category are given in round brackets.

matter (= 3. *subject matter*) of taking [goods] which had not been given, [i.e.] the king's [pieces of] wood. This[, i.e.] "from a village or from a wilderness" (Pāt 8,9; Kkh 41,7), is the supplementary prescription (*anupaññatti*) herein (i.e. in Pār 2 M). [The rule] is a prescription in common [for both bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs] (*sādhāraṇapaññatti*) (= 4. *prescription*). It is connected with commanding [someone else] (= 5. *command*).[142] An offence of wrong doing [arises] in respect of an action preceding [the main action] (*pubbapayoga*) beginning with going[143] in order to take[144] [goods]. In the case of touching, an offence of wrong doing [arises]. In shaking [something which is] the subject matter of an offence entailing expulsion, a grave offence [arises]. For [someone] taking [something not given], an offence of wrong doing [arises] for [something worth] a *māsaka* but less than a *māsaka*. In the case of [something worth] more than a *māsaka* or less than five *māsakas*, a grave offence [arises]. In the case of five *māsakas* or more than five *māsakas*, an offence entailing expulsion [arises].[145] Throughout, ⟨**48**⟩ the regulation is to be understood by the time of taking it, and by the region of taking it, and by the increase or decrease [in value] by

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[142] i.e. an offence against this rule can be committed by commanding someone else to steal.

[143] Sp II 310,3–314,25 describes in detail the various *pubbapayoga* and *sahapayoga* in connection with theft. The activities mentioned are taken from the casuistry given in the Vinaya (Vin III 47,27ff.). Offences resulting from *pubbapayoga* are *dukkaṭa* or *pācittiya* offences depending on the rule which is violated by the respective *pubbapayoga*. "Going" with the intention to commit the theft belongs to the *pubbapayoga*, and is qualified as a *dukkaṭa* offence in the Vinaya (Vin III 47,37; 48,22.29.36; etc.). Sp II 310,8–11 explains that a bhikkhu going to steal goods, commits a *dukkaṭa* offence with each change of body and speech, even if he does not reach the place where the goods are placed. Cf. Sp II 311,27ff.

[144] Kkh 47,22 reads *karaṇatthāya* (also the reading of Eᵉ) without any vv.ll. Kkh Bᵉ, however, reads *haraṇatthāya*, which makes much more sense here.

[145] See Vin III 52,15–20 with reference to water.

reason of use, of exchanging [the content] of a vessel, etc.[146] (= 6. [*sort of*] *offence*). There is no offence for one who thinks it is his own, in the case of taking on trust, in the case of a temporary thing, in the possession of a ghost (*peta*), in the possession of an animal, for one who thinks it is a [rag robe from a] dust heap, and for one who is insane, etc. (= 7. *non-offence*). [The offence against this rule] is a failure of virtuous conduct (*sīlavipatti*) (= 8. *failure*). These are the five constituent parts (*aṅga*) herein: (i) it belongs to others referring to another human being, (ii) the awareness that it belongs to others, (iii) it is a valuable requisite,[147] (iv) there is the intention of stealing, and (v) there is a

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[146]Sp II 305,1–308,23 discusses the five conditions (*pañca ṭhānāni*), i.e. *vatthu*, *kāla*, *desa*, *aggha*, *paribhoga*, which are to be considered in estimating the value of a stolen object (see above, 3.2), the fifth being the "use" (*paribhoga*) diminishing the value of the goods which are stolen. Kkh lists only the terms *kāla*, *desa*, and *parihīna/aparihīna*, the last being specified by *paribhoga-bhājanaparivattanādi*; *paribhoga* is clear, but the exact meaning of *bhājana* and *parivattana* is not. Perhaps they form a compound, and pick up *bhājan'-antaraparivattanenāpi* ("also by exchanging the content of a vessel (?)", Sp II 308,14), which is listed as one of the means by which the value of an object decreases. Kkh-nṭ 206,23*ff.*, explains that Kkh here gives the short version, and quotes the whole passage from Sp (II 305,1–308,23).

[147]Vin I 305,10–13 differentiates between *lahubhaṇḍa lahuparikkhāra* and *garu-bhaṇḍa garuparikkhāra*. *Lahubhaṇḍa lahuparikkhāra* are goods to be divided among the saṅgha present. *Garubhaṇḍa garuparikkhāra*, however, must not be given away or transferred and are indivisible (*avissajjika*, *avebhaṅgika*). They belong to the Saṅgha of the four directions of the past and future. Five *garubhaṇḍa* not to be transferred (*avissajjiyāni*) are listed in the Cullavagga (Vin II 170,23–35): (1) *ārāma*, *ārāmavatthu*, (2) *vihāra*, *vihāravatthu*, (3) *mañca*, *pīṭha*, *bhisi*, *bimbohana*, (4) *lohakumbhī*, *lohabhāṇaka*, *loha-vāraka*, *lohakaṭāha*, *vāsī*, *pharasu*, *kuṭhārī*, *kuddāla*, *nikhādana*, (5) *vallī*, *veḷu*, *muñjababbaja*, *tiṇa*, *mattikā*, *dārubhaṇḍa*, *mattikābhaṇḍa*. The same five categories are also defined as *avebhaṅgiya* (Vin II 171,32–38). To transfer one of these goods is to commit a grave offence (Vin II 170,25–26).

Sp explains that *garubhaṇḍa* in connection with Pār 2 M describes goods worth five *māsaka* (Sp II 484,12–14). In the context of Pār 4 M, however, Sp refers to the Cullavagga passage cited above (Sp II 484,15–25). Here in the

"taking away" by virtue of the [twenty-five "types of] taking away" described [above][148] (= 9. *constituent factor*). The [offence against this rule has the] origin (= 10. *sort of origin*) of taking what is not given (*adinnādānasamuṭṭhānaṃ*); [it originates in] activity (= 11. *activity*[149]), has acquittal because of [lacking] awareness (= 12. *awareness*), is [dependent on] intention (= 13. *intention*), [is] a fault according to common opinion (= 14. *faults*), [is a] bodily deed (= 15. *deed*), a verbal deed (= 15. *deed*), [is done with an] unwholesome thinking (= 16. *thinking*), [and involves] three feelings (= 17. *feelings*).

The commentary on the second [rule] entailing expulsion is finished.

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classification of Pār 2 M *garubhaṇḍa* must have the meaning "goods worth five *māsaka*", since only if this condition is fulfilled, do we have the third *aṅga* necessary for an offence against Pār 2 M.

[148] See Kkh 42,18–47,3.

[149] *kiriyaṃ*; Kkh 48,9 *kiriyā* with v.l. *kiriyaṃ*. The latter is the better reading, since the classification categories refer to the word *sikkhāpada*.

Pāli Grammar and Grammarians
from Buddhaghosa to Vajirabuddhi:
A Survey

I. Introduction

§ 1. Since the publication of R.O. Franke's study *Geschichte und Kritik der einheimischen Pāli-Grammatik und -Lexicographie* (*PGL*) in 1902 which constitutes the first and so far only attempt at writing an outline of the history and development of indigenous Pāli grammars, little research has been carried out in this vast and largely unexplored field.[1] When Franke wrote his monograph he did not consider historically important grammars like Vajirabuddhi's Mukhamattadīpanī (Mmd) mainly basing his study on Kaccāyana (Kacc) and Kaccāyanavutti (Kacc-v), Rūpasiddhi (Rūp), Moggallāna (Mogg), Moggallānavutti (Mogg-v), and fragments of Saddanīti (Sadd), nor did he attempt a more thorough study of the literature he chose to focus upon. Thus the limited textual basis of Franke's study sometimes made him draw conclusions which are no longer valid. Now that all important surviving grammars have been published, there is reason to make another attempt at writing a survey of the indigenous Pāli grammars in a historical perspective: first of all, Helmer Smith has published his monumental edition of Aggavaṃsa's Saddanīti which in many ways constitutes the culmination of centuries of indigenous Pāli philology. Other historically important works like Kaccāyanasuttaniddesa (Kacc-nidd) and Moggallānapañcikā (Mogg-p) have also been published as well as a substantial number of minor grammatical works together with their commentaries.[2]

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[1]For studies in various aspects of the Pāli grammatical tradition, see von Hinüber, 1987; Kahrs, 1992; Pind, 1989;"Studies in the Pāli Grammarians I", *JPTS* XIII: 33–81; Pind, 1990; Pind, 1992; Pind, 1995; Renou, 1957. This article is a revised version of one first published under the same title in *Bukkyō Kenkyū* (Buddhist Studies), 26 (1997), pp. 23–88.

[2]For details, see *CPD* Epilegomena, 5. Philology (incomplete).

Consequently, the basis for evaluating the extant Pāli grammars has been widened considerably: it is now possible to study the statements of the Pāli grammarians in a more comprehensive historical context. This is especially important for a correct evaluation of their descriptive method: as a rule they would either formulate new rules or re-formulate the rules embodied in Kacc and Kacc-v so as to improve upon their grammatical description of the many phonological, morphological, and syntactical features of the Pāli. This was done on the basis of a comprehensive collection of examples from canonical and post-canonical literature.[3] Thus the study of the Pāli grammars from a historical perspective is likely to shed light upon the transmission of the canonical and post-canonical literature.

§ 2. A substantial part of post-Kaccāyana grammatical literature is no longer extant. Thus we are only informed about important works through grammars like Mmd (see IV.3.1), Rūp, Rūp-ṭ, Mogg, Mogg-p, and Sadd which occasionally quote or discuss statements found in Mahānirutti (Mahā-nir) (see IV.2.2), Niruttipiṭaka (Nir-piṭ) (see IV.2.4), Cūḷanirutti (Cūḷ-nir) (see IV.2.5), Mañjūsā (Mañj) (see IV.2.6), Saṅgaha (Sgh) (see IV.2.7), Mahāsandhippakaraṇa (Mahā-s) (see IV.2.8), Cūḷa-sandhi (Cūḷ-s) (see IV.6.9), etc. Without these references it would have been impossible to form an idea of the history and development of Pāli grammar. Direct as well as indirect evidence indicates that these works have exerted a great influence on subsequent Pāli grammarians. Thus, for instance, Mañj affected the description of the *kāraka* system in Rūp, which in turn was used by Aggavaṃsa who copied verbatim several of the relevant paragraphs from Rūp.[4] In those circumstances — there are many other examples — it is clear that the Pāli grammars have to be studied from a historical perspective, otherwise the context of certain of their statements or discussions remains incomprehensible.

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[3]See Pind 1995.

[4]See, e.g. Sadd 714,10 (with insignificant variations in formulation) = Rūp 92,19*ff.*

§ 3. In addition to main works like Kacc, Kacc-v, Mmd, Rūp, Mogg, and Sadd, Pāli grammarians mention or quote many other treatises. Thus, for instance, Kaccāyanasuttaniddesa (Kacc-nidd) — no doubt the most important source of information on grammatical literature in the fifteenth century A.D. — quotes as many as twenty-five grammatical treatises in addition to well-known works like Nyāsa (= Mmd), Rūp, Sadd, and Mogg: 1. Akkharapadamañjūsā,[5] 2. Akkharasamūha,[6] 3. Aṭṭhakathā-atthadīpanī,[7] 4. Atthajotaka,[8] 5. Atthavinicchayavaṇṇanā,[9] 6. Attha-vyākhyāna,[10] 7. Atthavaṇṇanā,[11] 8. Kaccāyananissayappakaraṇa,[12] 9. Kārikā,[13] 10. Ṭīkāvyākhyā,[14] 11. Therapotthaka,[15] 12. (Mahā)-

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[5] See Kacc-nidd 202,14–17: *Akkharapadamañjūsāyañ ca*
  ekâkhyāto padacayo siyā vākyaṃ sakārako
  āmeṇḍitan ti viññeyyaṃ dvattikkhattum udīritaṃ
  bhaye kodhe pasaṃsāyaṃ turite kotūhalacchare
  hāse soke pasāde ca kare āmeṇḍitaṃ budho
  ti vuttaṃ; the second verse is quoted by Buddhaghosa from an unknown source in his cts.; see Pind 1989: 74–75; if the verse is part of the original work and not just quoted from the Aṭṭhakathās, the Akkharapadamañjūsā must antedate Buddhaghosa; perhaps it is an old Pāli kośa.

[6] See Kacc-nidd 155,17.

[7] See Kacc-nidd 126,17; the subject matter of this work appears to be the case system of Pāli; it is related to the Saṅgaha (see IV.2.7); Kaccāyanasāraṭīkā mentions it together with Mmd (*paramatthavinicchayo pana Aṭṭhakathādī-panīto Nyāsato ca gahetabbo*, 48,9–10) immediately after having quoted the relevant verses from Mañj (for which, see § 93) as a work dealing with the question of *paramatthavinicchaya*, presumably in the light of Mañj and the Pāli Aṭṭhakathās which occasionally quote verses defining the nature of the Two Truths, on which, see O.H. Pind, "The Pāli Verses on the Two Truths" (forthcoming).

[8] See Kacc-nidd 210,20–21.

[9] See Kacc-nidd 188,34.

[10] See Kacc-nidd 25,11 and *passim*.

[11] See Kacc-nidd 225,17–20.

[12] See Kacc-nidd 187,15–20.

[13] See Kacc-nidd 223,7.

Nirutti,[16] 13. Niruttijotaka,[17] 14. Niruttijotakavaṅṇṇanā,[18] 15. Nirutti-bījâkhyāna (= Bījâkhyāna ?),[19] 16. Nyāsaṭīkā,[20] 17. Nyāsapadīpaṭīkā,[21] 18. Nyāsappadīpappakaraṇa,[22] 19. Bālâvatāra,[23] 20. Bījâkhyā,[24] 21. Bījâkhyāna,[25] 22. Bhassakārī,[26] 23. Mañjūsāṭīkā[27] 24. Mukha-mattasāra,[28] and 25. Saṅgahakāra.[29]

§4. Among these grammatical treatises, Gandhavaṃsa only mentions Atthavyākhyāna by Cūḷavajira and Mukhamattasāra by Guṇasāgara.[30] However, the Pagan Inscription from 1442[31] A.D. mentions not only Atthavyākhyāna,[32] Kaccāyananissaya,[33] Bālâvatāra,[34] Bījâkhyā,[35] and

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[14] See Kacc-nidd 222,26.

[15] See Kacc-nidd 169,31–32.

[16] See Kacc-nidd 223,17.

[17] See Kacc-nidd 173,12.

[18] See Kacc-nidd 177,8.

[19] See Kacc-nidd 268,23.

[20] See Kacc-nidd 103,27.

[21] See Kacc-nidd 40,22.

[22] See Kacc-nidd 29,30.

[23] See Kacc-nidd 135,9.

[24] See Kacc-nidd 177,27–28.

[25] See Kacc-nidd 245,15.

[26] See Kacc-nidd 222,23.

[27] See Kacc-nidd 138,20.

[28] See Kacc-nidd 85,28–30.

[29] See Kacc-nidd 126,4–6.

[30] See Gandhavaṃsa: 60, 70 and 63, 73.

[31] List of works reproduced in M. Bode, *Pāli Literature of Burma*: 102–107.

[32] See list no. 225.

[33] See list no. 183.

[34] See list no. 143.

[35] See list no. 178: *Bījakkhyam.*

Mukhamattasāra,[36] but also other important Pāli and Sanskrit grammars.[37] Especially Atthavyākhyāna must have been an important work, because Chapaṭa either quotes from, or refers to it twenty-eight times in Kacc-nidd. Particular interest is also attached to Bījâkhyā, from which Kacc-nidd cites a verse, which has been interpolated in Kacc-v (see §64).

§5. Faced with this overwhelming number of works and the regrettable fact that virtually no research has been carried out in this vast field, it is obvious that a selection has to be made in the context of a brief survey. Since there is no hope of understanding the history and development of Pāli grammar without knowledge of the works that in one way or another shaped the tradition, it seems justified in the present case to focus primarily, although briefly, on those works that belong to the formative period of Pāli grammar, that is to say, the period that stretches from the time of composition of Buddhaghosa's Aṭṭhakathās through the complicated history of Kacc and Kacc-v to the completion of Vajirabuddhi's Mmd, presumably in the tenth century A.D. The treatment is not intended to be exhaustive.[38] The main purpose has been to shed light upon important aspects of the early history and development of indigenous Pāli grammars.

II. Grammar in the Pāli Aṭṭhakathās

II.1. Grammatical Terminology of the Aṭṭhakathās

§6. Buddhaghosa (fifth century A.D.) occasionally focuses on points of grammar in Visuddhimagga and the Aṭṭhakathās in order to explain a syntactical problem, a particular construction, or the derivation of a particular word or the like. The interesting thing about these grammatical analyses is that certain of the technical terms Buddhaghosa uses are without parallel in Sanskrit grammar. It is possible to show, how-

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[36]See list no. 151.

[37]See list nos. 138, 141–80, 210, 220, 226–27, 245, 273. 290.

[38]The author is preparing a comprehensive history of Pāli grammar to which interested readers are kindly referred when it is published.

ever, that in substance the analyses found in Visuddhimagga and the
Aṭṭhakathās presuppose Pāṇinian grammar. Consequently there is no
reason to assume with R.O. Franke[39] that these terms constitute the
vocabulary of an old Pāli grammatical system used by the compiler(s) of
the Aṭṭhakathās.[40] In fact, the rudimentary character of the vocabulary
would seem to indicate that it was established for exegetical purposes,
its nature being dictated by its relevance for the canonical exegesis and
the wish to use a distinct Pāli terminology for this purpose, rather than
with the intention of establishing a comprehensive Pāli grammatical
system.

§7. The grammatical vocabulary that is specific to the Aṭṭhakathās is
limited to (a) a peculiar phonological terminology, (b) a remarkable case
terminology, (c) a term denoting the syntactical category of adverb, (d)
terms denoting the four parts of speech, (e.a, e.b) two sets of terms
defining four types of nominals, and (f) terms denoting words,
sentences, and syllables.

   (a) Certain of the phonological terms differ from Sanskrit termin-
ology. They occur in a verse which is quoted and commented on at Sp
1399,19*ff.*[41] where the question of correct articulation of the Pāli is dis-
cussed in the context of the *kammavācā*. Among the individual technical
terms *sithila* "unaspirated", *dhanita* "aspirated", *niggahīta* "nasalized",
and *vimutta* "oral", are without parallel in Sanskrit terminology;
dīrgharassa "long and short", *garuka* "heavy" and *lahuka* "short", how-
ever, are common to Pāli and Sanskrit grammar, whereas *sambaddha*
"bound together" and *vavatthitaṃ* "separated" merely relate to the con-
nected or disjoint articulation of the words in a sentence. The term

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[39]See *PGL* : 2 ; 20.

[40]See Pind 1989 : 33*ff.*

[41]*sithilaṃ dhanitaṃ ca dīgharassaṃ | garukaṃ lahukañ ca niggahītaṃ |
   ambaddhaṃ vavatthitaṃ vimuttaṃ | dasadhā vyañjanabuddhiyā pabhedo ti* (=
   Sv 177,1–4 = Mp II 289,17–20). For a study of this interesting passage, see von
   Hinüber, 1987.

niggahīta, which denotes a nasalized vowel articulated by checking the organs of articulation (*karaṇāni*) and without opening the mouth (*avivaṭena mukhena*), has been adopted by Kacc and post-Kaccāyana grammarians as a technical term equivalent to Sanskrit *anusvāra*. The grammarians, however, differ in their interpretation of *niggahīta*. Vajirabuddhi, the author of Mmd, interprets the term as (*saraṃ*) *nissāya gayhati*, i.e., grasped by means of a vowel.[42] Buddhappiya propounds the same view, but in addition he reproduces the definition of the Aṭṭhakathā, quoting a verse at Rūp 10[43] which defines *niggahīta* in such a way as to suggest that it is a versification of the definition at Sp. In contrast to Vajirabuddhi he also refers to *sithila*, *dhvanita* and the other terms at Rūp 1 (= Kacc 1),[44] thus evidently interpreting the remarks at Kacc-v 1 about *akkharavipatti*, i.e., failure to articulate the letters correctly, in terms of the *kammavācā*, which in the final analysis may have been the *raison d'être* of Kacc 1;[45] moreover, he uses *sithila* and *dhanita* at Rūp 11.[46] Aggavaṃsa appears to be the first Pāli grammarian who has integrated all the terms into his grammar.[47]

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[42]See Mmd 17,3.

[43]See Rūp 4,26–27:

> *karaṇaṃ niggahetvāna mukhenâvivaṭena yaṃ.* |
> *vuccate niggahītan ti vuttaṃ bindu sarânugaṃ* ||

Quoted Mogg-p 9,22–23; cf. Sp 1399,30–32: *niggahītan ti yaṃ karaṇāni niggahetvā avissjjetvā avivaṭena mukhena anunāsikaṃ katvā vattabbaṃ.*

[44]See Rūp 1,12: *sithiladhanitâdiakkharavipattiyaṃ hi atthassa dunnayatā hoti.*

[45]Kacc-nidd 8,5ff. quotes three verses that connect the articulation of *niggahīta* with *kammavācā* and *ñatti*:

> *padamajjhe padante vā patiṭṭhitaṃ anussāraṃ*
> *ñattiyaṃ kammavācāyaṃ bhaṇe niggahītantaṃ vā*
> *dutiyādo makārantaṃ upajjhaggahaṇâdisu*
> *vaggantaṃ niggahītan ti yathāraham udīraye*
> *saraṇagamanadāne niggahītaṃ makārantaṃ*
> *avaggesu ṅakārassa ṅâdayo n' atthi sāsane.*

[46]Rūp 5,5: *ettha ca vaggānaṃ dutiyacatutthā dhanitā ti pi vuccanti, itare sithilā ti.*

[47]See Sadd §§ 14–21.

(b) The Pāli Aṭṭhakathās use the following set of terms to denote the individual case forms:[48] nom. *paccatta*, acc. *upayoga*, instr. *karaṇa*, dat. *sampadāna*, abl. *nissakka*, gen. *sāmi*, loc. *bhumma*, voc. *ālapana*. The term *ālapana* is the only one that has canonical status: it is used in the Vinaya[49] to denote the voc., and as such it has been adopted by the grammarians since Kacc, although they also use the term *āmantaṇa* (see §70) in the same sense. As for the remaining terms they consist mainly of terms that are either innovations based upon canonical Pāli or terms derived from Sanskrit grammatical terminology. Thus the use of *paccatta* to denote the nom. is no doubt motivated by the semantics of Pāli *paccattaṃ* (Skt *pratyātmaṃ*), evoking the idea of the nom. as denoting any given thing individually, i.e., its character as such, and thus roughly corresponding to the concept of *liṅga*. The term for the abl., *nissakka*, is a verbal noun derived from *nis* + √*sak*, "to move away" — evidently coined as a counterpart to Skt *apadāna* — and is only recorded in Pāli as a grammatical term. However, the term expressing the loc., *bhumma* (n.) < Skt *bhaumya* or *bhūmya*, the case that relates to place, is recorded both as an adjective and a noun in the Pāli canon.[50] The remaining terms are related to Sanskrit terminology: *karaṇa* (ts.) (cf. Pāṇ I 4:42), *sampadāna* < Skt *sampradāna* (cf. Pāṇ I 4:32); the use of *sāmī* < Skt *svāmin* to denote the gen. has a counterpart in the discussion in Mahā-bh on Pāṇ II 3:50, where the expression *svāmitva* is used of the gen. relation *rajñaḥ puruṣaḥ*. It is difficult to determine what motivated the use of the term for the acc., namely, *upayoga*, which means "use, utility" and hence "thing used" denoting what is useful from the perspective of the agent. There is no clear parallel in contemporary Sanskrit grammar.[51] According to Aggavaṃsa (Sadd §632) the term *ubbāhana* is used in the *sāsana* to designate the

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[48]For references, see the indexes in Sp VII, Spk III, and Mp V s.vv.

[49]See Vin III 73,33.

[50]See *PED* s.v.

[51]For the use of *upayoga* in the sense of "use, utility", see Pāṇ I 4:29 and Mahā-bh ad loc.; for the use of *upayoga* in late sources, see Kāśikā on Pāṇ I 5:1.

partitive gen. or loc. (Skt *nirdhāraṇa*), but it has not been possible to trace it to any known Aṭṭhakathā or *ṭīkā*.

(c) The origin and exact meaning of the term *bhāvanapuṃsaka*, which denotes the adverb, is obscure; the most likely suggestion is that it denotes a term in the neuter (qualifying) an action (*bhāva*), alternatively it might denote an action noun (*bhāva*) in the neuter. In the discussion at Sadd § 590, Aggavaṃsa observes that it is used in the *sāsana*, i.e., the Aṭṭhakathās, etc., as the equivalent of *kiriyāvisesana* < Skt *kriyāviṣeśana* denoting the adverb in Skt grammar.

(d) The Aṭṭhakathās divide the parts of speech (*padavibhāga*) into four categories, namely, *nāmapada*, *ākhyātapada*, *upasaggapada* and *nipātapada.* Most of them reproduce this division with minor variations in connection with the exegesis of the well-known canonical stereotype *evaṃ me sutaṃ*, etc. Thus Sv 26,9*ff.* (on D I 1,4) identifies *evaṃ* as a *nipātapada*; *me*, etc., as *nāmapada*; *paṭi* (of the pp. *paṭipanno*) as *upasaggapada*; and *hoti* as *ākhyātapada.*[52] There is reason to believe that this vocabulary belongs historically with the other terms. They occur in a similar classification of the parts of speech in Mahā-bh,[53] and may thus have been inspired by the Sanskrit grammatical tradition.

(e.a) This fourfold division of nominals is only found in Vism 209,29 from which it was copied verbatim at Sp 122,19*ff.* The four types of nominals are 1. *āvatthika*, referring to a specific state (in the existence of an entity) (< Skt *āvasthika*; cf. Buddhist Skt *avasthā*), e.g. *vaccho*, *dammo*, *balivaddo*; 2. *liṅgika*, referring to, based upon a characteristic mark (< Skt *laiṅgika*), e.g. *daṇḍī*, *chattī*, *sikhī*; 3. *nemittika*, referring to, based upon an attribute (of a person) (< *naimittika, cf. Pāli *nimitta*), e.g. *tevijjo*, *chaḷabhiñño*; 4. *adhiccasamuppanna*, spontaneous (= *yadicchika*, cf. Skt *yadṛcchika*) like proper nouns, e.g. *Sirivaḍḍhaka.* The origin of this terminology is not known. It only occurs in a discussion of the word *Bhagavat* and therefore probably originated in an exegetical

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[52]For similar analyses, see Ps I 3,1*ff.*; Spk I 4,5*ff.*; Mp I 4,4*ff.*

[53]See Mahā-bh ad Pāṇ I 1:1 (*Paśpāśāhnika*): I 3,17; Renou, *Terminologie*: 383 s.v. *ākhyāta.*

context with the intention to establish a distinct Pāli vocabulary for this
particular purpose. It would seem to combine features from Sanskrit
sources and canonical Pāli.

(e.b) The same tendency comes through in the analogous division of
names at As 390,29 quoted in Paṭis-a 306,23 ≠ Moh 110,36. The terms are
1. *sāmaññanāma*, a name given by general assent, e.g. *Mahāsammato*
(cf. D III 93,11); 2. *guṇanāma*, a name expressing an attribute, e.g.
Bhagavat; 3. *kittināma*, a name expressing honour, i.e., a proper noun
given at the birth ceremony; 4. *opapātikanāma*, original name, i.e., a
name that is unalterably the same in time and space: *purimakappe pi
cando etarahi pi cando yeva*, As 391,13. The term *guṇanāma* is analo-
gous to *na-imittikanāma* of the above list. However, except for the term
opapātikanāma, which presumably imitates Skt *autpattika*, "original"
— used, e.g. in Mīmāṃsā of the original relation (*sambandha*) between
a word and its denotation[54] — the remaining terms cannot be assigned
to any known context. Although this peculiar terminology is hardly ever
used, it seems to belong in the Aṭṭhakathā tradition because it is also
found at Spk I 95,7–8.

(f) Sp 223,22–24 quotes a passage presumably from the Mahā-
aṭṭhakathā,[55] which defines a rule of conduct (*sikkhāpada*) in terms of
the collection of words (*nāmakāya*), sentences (*padakāya*) and syllables
(*vyañjanakāya*) constituting it: *vuttam pi c' etaṃ: "sikkhāpadan* (Vin
III 21,16) *ti yo tattha nāmakāyo, padakāyo, niruttikāyo, vyañjanakāyo
ti"*. The true meaning of this terminology was clearly not understood by
Sāriputta who interprets them at Sp-ṭ II 33,23–25 as synonyms of *nāma*
with reference to Dhs § 1306.[56] The terminology stems from Buddhist
Skt literature and can be traced to Vaibhāṣika theories of language

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[54]See Oberhammer, Terminologie 2 s.v. *autpattikasambandha.*

[55]See Sp-ṭ II 33,22–23: *yo tattha nāmakāyo padakāyo ti idaṃ Mahā-aṭṭha-
    kathāyaṃ vuttan ti vadanti.*

[56]*padaniruttibyañjanāni nāmavevacanān' eva "nāmaṃ nāmakammaṃ nāma-
    niruttī" ti ādīsu viya.*

which Vasubandhu criticizes in Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.[57] It is not clear why the term *niruttikāya* (= *nāmakāya*) has been inserted in the list.[58]

II.2. Grammatical Analysis in the Aṭṭhakathās

§8. The most interesting grammatical analyses found in the Visuddhi-magga and the Aṭṭhakathās are based upon Pāṇinian grammar. Their main interest is that they identify syntactical or other features of Pāli with similar features of the Sanskrit *bhāṣā* described by Pāṇini in the Aṣṭâdhyāyī. In spite of the importance of these grammatical observations, the Pāli grammarians were slow at absorbing them. Only some of the exegetical remarks about certain uses of the cases were incorporated into the literature (see IV.2.7). However, as the grammatical tradition developed, some of the analyses were adopted by the tradition. Thus, for instance, Buddhaghosa's analysis of the syntactical constraints on the tense of the verb when constructed with the sentence complements *atthi nāma*, *kathaṃ hi nāma*, and *yatra hi nāma* are only treated by Moggallāna and Aggavaṃsa (see §13), and in both cases in a polemical context with special reference to its treatment in Buddhaghosa's Aṭṭhakathās.

§9. Other interesting discussions were not noticed by the grammarians. Thus, for instance, the analysis at Sp 211,3–5[59] of *pitāmaha* as an adj. with elided *taddhita* suffix (= *petāmaha* < Skt *paitāmaha*) presupposing Pāṇ IV 3 74 + 77: *vidyāyonisaṃbandhebhyo vuñ*,[60] was never adopted by the grammarians. Nor did the analysis of the commonly used particle

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[57]See the debate with the Vaibhāṣikas recorded by Vasubhandhu at Abhid-k-bh II 47*ff.*; see the translation by La Vallée Poussin, 1923–31, Vol. I: 238*ff.*

[58]If, in fact, we are dealing with a quotation from the Mahā-aṭṭhakathā, it sheds an interesting light on this allegedly Sinhalese Aṭṭhakathā of the Mahāvihāra.

[59]*pitāmahan ti taddhitalopaṃ katvā veditabbaṃ, petāmahan ti vā pāṭho* = Ps III 299,25–26.

[60]See Sp-ṭ II 10,5–8: *taddhitalopaṃ katvā veditabban ti ... pitāmahato āgataṃ pitāmahassa vā idaṃ* = *petāmahaṃ*.

tena hi (= *vibhattipatirūpako nipāto*) at Sp[61] find its way into the
description of the Pāli particles at Rūp and Sadd.[62] The sophisticated
grammatical analyses, e.g. at Sp 204,25–32 and Sp 480,26–81,6[63]
apparently also went unnoticed, as well as many other interesting
grammatical observations.[64]

§ 10. Buddhaghosa's analysis at Vism 216,4*ff.* of a string of derivatives
in *ika* occurring in the well-known canonical formula *svākkhāto
Bhagavatā dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opanayiko
paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhī ti*[65] is one of the few which has left its
mark on the grammatical literature. The derivation *sandiṭṭhiyā jayatī ti
sandiṭṭhiko* is based upon Pāṇ IV 4:2: *tena dīvyate khanati jayati jitam*;
the alternative derivation *sandiṭṭhaṃ arahatī ti sandiṭṭhiko* is indebted to
Pāṇ V 1:63: *tad arhati*; this is also the case with the derivations *ehi,
passa imaṃ dhamman ti evaṃ pavattaṃ ehipassavidhiṃ arahatī ti
ehipassiko* and *upanayanaṃ arahatī ti opanayiko*, whereas the analysis
of *akālika* presupposes Pāṇ V 1:108: *prakṛṣṭe ṭhañ*. Of these derivations
Buddhapiya and Moggallāna only quote those on *sandiṭṭhika* and
ehipassika at Rūp 360[66] and Mogg-v IV 29, respectively. Aggavaṃsa,
on the other hand, quotes most of the analysis at Sadd §764 (≠ Kacc
352, 353).[67]

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[61]See Sp-ṭ II 211,16–17; Skt *vibhaktisvarapratirūpaka* at Mahā-bh (ad Pāṇ VIII 3
   1): *vibhaktisvarapratirūpakāś ca nipātā bhavanti.*

[62]See the *nepātikapada* at Rūp 88,20*ff.*; Sadd 886,22*ff.*

[63]See Pind 1989: 54–56; 61–63.

[64]For an overview, see Pind 1989 and 1990.

[65]For a study of this formula, see H. Bechert, "A Metric 'varṇaka' in the Pāli
   Scriptures", in *Studies in Buddhism and Culture in Honour of Professor
   Dr. Egaku Mayeda on his Sixty-fifth Birthday*: 751–58, Tokyo 1990.

[66]Rūp 151,23–24: *saṃdiṭṭham arahatī ti saṃdiṭṭhiko, ehi passā ti imaṃ vidhiṃ
   arahatī ti ehipassiko* (i.e.) *dhammo.*

[67]See Sadd 787,15*ff.*

§ 11. Moggallāna and Aggavaṃsa are also the first grammarians to have taken notice at Mogg IV 74 and Sadd §783, respectively, of the derivation of *kammaniya*, *kammañña*. They rely presumably on the Pāli *ṭīkās* for their information, but the analysis itself presupposing Pāṇ IV 4 98: *tatra sādhu* is already found in As.[68]

§ 12. As mentioned above Buddhaghosa describes the constraints of the complements *atthi nāma*, *kathaṃ hi nāma*, and *yatra hi nāma* on the tense of the verb which almost invariably occurs in the Pāli in the future tense, when constructed with them. He deals with (a) *atthi nāma* + fut. in Sp (= Ps), and Mp, (b) *kathaṃ hi nāma* + fut. in Sp, and (c) *yatra hi nāma* + fut. in Sv, Ps, and Spk.

(a) Buddhaghosa claims in two slightly different analyses at Sp 209,13–10,1 (= Ps III 297,14ff.) and Mp III 298,18–99,3[69] that the complement *atthi nāma* is constructed with the future tense according to whether the meaning is that something is not likely to take place, or is not to be tolerated. The analysis presupposes Pāṇ III 3 (145+) 146: *kiṃkilāstyartheṣu lṛṭ*.

(b) Buddhaghosa states at Sp 288,12–15[70] that the future is used in the sense of the past in a sentence introduced by *kathaṃ hi nāma*. The analysis would seem to depend on Pāṇ III 3 143 (+ 142): *vibhāṣā kathami liṅ ca*.[71] Sāriputta's commentary, however, shows that he identified the source with Pāṇ III 3 144: *kiṃvṛtte liṅlṛṭam*.[72]

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[68] See As 151,7: *kammaññatā ti kammasādhutā* (so read).

[69] On which, see Pind 1989: 57–58; Pind 1992: 150–53.

[70] On which, see Pind 1989: 58–60.

[71] Kāś, for instance, allows on the interpretation of *vibhāṣā* the construction *kathaṃ nāma* + fut. in the commentary ad loc.: *kathaṃ nāma tatrabhavān vṛṣalaṃ yājayiṣyati*.

[72] See Sāriputta ad loc.: *saddasatthavidūhi kiṃsaddayoge anāgatavacanassa icchitattā vuttaṃ "tassa lakkhaṇaṃ saddasatthato pariyesitabban" ti* (Sp-ṭ Bᵉ 1960 II 117,14–16).

(c) Buddhaghosa addresses this complement twice in Sv, once each in Ps and Spk. In Sv 425,26*ff.*: *yatra hi nāmā ti acchariyatthe nipāto …* *anussarissatī ti idaṃ yatrā iti nipātavasena anāgatavacanaṃ*, and Ps III 327,16: *yatra hi nāma vimhayatthe nipāto*, he underlines that it is the construction with the particle *yatra hi nāma* when expressing wonder that entails future tense of the verb, whereas Sv 569,15*ff.*: *yatrasadda-yuttattā* (so read) *pan' etaṃ anāgatavasena vuttaṃ* (cf. Sv-pṭ II 219,20–22) and Spk I 209,4–5: *yatrā ti nipātayogena pana anāgatavacanaṃ kataṃ*, merely attribute the future to the particle *yatra*. These remarks can only allude to Pāṇ III 3 (+ 147: *yaccayatrayoḥ*) 150: *citrīkaraṇe ca*: "the affixes denoted *liṅ* (= optative) are used in construction with *yacca* and *yatra* also when the implied sense is wonder". In these cases, the Pāli invariably substitutes the future for Skt optative, but the syntactical constraint is the same.

§13. Moggallāna defines the syntactical constraints of these constructions at Mogg VI 3: *nāme garahā-vimhayesu*: "[the future occurs] in construction with the particle *nāma* to express reproach or wonder", quoting in the *vutti* the relevant examples from the canon.[73] It is clearly written in opposition to Buddhaghosa because in the *Pañjikā* he criticizes him, claiming that it is only the presence of the particle *nāma* as such that entails future.[74] Aggavaṃsa in turn criticizes Moggallāna's view in his own analysis of *kathaṃ hi nāma* at Sadd §893 on the grounds that it can be shown that *nāma* in itself has no restrictive force (*niyama*) on the tense of the verb. He thus appears to defend Buddhaghosa on linguistic grounds.[75] It is notable, however, that he does not deal with the other two complements.

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[73]Mogg-v VI 3 quotes in the following order: (illustrating reproach) Vin III 42,12–14; Vin III 16,5; (illustrating wonder) D II 130,33–131,3.

[74]See Mogg-p 346,26; at 346,3–15 he quotes Sp 209,13–27 ad Vin III 16,5.

[75]See Pind 1995: 295–97.

III. Kaccāyana (Kacc)

III.1 Authorship of Kacc

§ 14. Kacc undoubtedly represents the first attempt ever made at writing a Pāli grammar.[76] Its author, or rather compiler(s) (see § 17), is not known. The fact that the Sinhalese tradition claims that Kacc is composed by Buddha's disciple Mahākaccāyana is rather an indication of a fundamental uncertainty as regards its origin and authorship. This tradition can be traced back to the Apadāna-aṭṭhakathā (Ap-a), the only work among the Aṭṭhakathās and *ṭīkās* which mentions and quotes Kacc.[77] It is there claimed that Mahākaccāyana "expounded the three treatises Kaccāyanappakaraṇa, Mahānirutti-ppakaraṇa, and Netti-ppakaraṇa in the midst of the Saṅgha".[78] It is not possible to determine when this tradition originated: it is taken for granted by Vajirabuddhi (tenth century A.D.), who quotes in Mmd a well-known canonical

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[76]The only quotation from the grammar attributed to Bodhisattamahāthera at Padasādhanaṭīkā 402,29–30 (*Bhadanta-Bodhisattamahāthero "naravarava-canôpakārāni cattālīs' akkharānī" ti āha*), and the two quotations from the Māgadhisaddakalikā attributed to Sabbaguṇâkara at Padasādhanaṭīkā 396,1–8 (*vuttañ câcariya-Sabbaguṇâkarena Māgadhikasaddakalikāyaṃ "suttaṃ vyā-karaṇam ussuttâbhidhānenâdeyyattā, suttam eva vyākarṇasarīraṃ sadda-vippaṭipattiyaṃ pavattā yaṃ suttaṃ vinā agathitapuppharāsimhi viya atthâkhyāne karīyamāne yāva suttaṃ na dassitaṃ, tāvad anuppādeyaṃ vacanaṃ bhavati, tasmā kāraṇā ti attho lakkhiyalakkhaṇāni vyākaraṇaṃ añño ubhayāni samuditāni vyākaraṇaṃ nāmā ti Kaccāyano maññate iti*") and Pādasādhanaṭīkā 403,1–2 (*Sabbaguṇâkaramahāthero "siddhakkamâdādayo vaṇṇâkkharā titālisā" ti āha*), do not suggest that they are pre-Kacc grammars as assumed by Franke, *Geschichte und Kritik*, p. 2.

[77]Ap-a quotes Kacc 406 at Ap-a 102,16–24.

[78]Ap-a 491,17–21 (ad Ap 531): *thero ... puna satthu santikam eva āgato attano pubbapatthanāvasena Kaccāyana-ppakaraṇaṃ, Mahānirutti-ppakaraṇaṃ, Netti-ppakaraṇan ti pakaraṇattayaṃ saṅghamajjhe byākāsi.* In the study by James d'Alwis, *An Introduction to Kachchâyana's Grammar of the Pâli Language*, Colombo 1863, the author cites a passage from Kaccāyanavaṇṇanā (Introduction: xxii) ascribing this passage to Mp-ṭ where it is not found; nor has it been possible to trace the passage to Kacc-vaṇṇ.

statement concerning Kaccāyana in explanation of his authorship.[79] A somewhat different account is found in Kacc-nidd according to which Kacc 1: *attho akkharasaññāto* was enunciated by the Buddha on hearing a bhikkhu mispronouncing *udayabbayaṃ* as *udakabakaṃ*;[80] it is subsequently put by Kaccāyana at the beginning of his grammar. The emphasis here is on the correctness of the pronunciation of Pāli, and thus ultimately on *sandhi*, the subject matter of the first chapter.

III.2. The Title of Kacc

§15. The question of the authorship of Kacc is not the only problem surrounding the grammar; the title is also a major problem. In general the work is quoted by the grammarians as *Kaccāyana.* Vajirabuddhi claims in his discussion of the title that the grammar is called *Kaccāyana* (n.) because it is the work of Mahākaccāyana, but then he adds that the grammar is also called *Sandhikappa.* He explains this by referring to a line of the introductory verse of the *sandhi* chapter: *vakkhāmi ... susandhikappaṃ*: "I shall set forth ... the chapter on excellent *sandhi.*" The reason is, he claims, that the title of the first chapter has been transferred to the grammar as a whole. The correctness of Vajirabuddhi's remarks is confirmed by the fact that the phrase *sandhikappo niṭṭhito* is found at the end of mss,[81] whereas the title Kaccāyana is conspicuously absent. It is not possible to decide whether originally the introductory verse was an integral part of the *sandhi* chapter or whether it was added later on. However, Vajirabuddhi's remarks indicate that at least in the tradition they were considered to be

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[79]See A I 23,16–28: *etadaggaṃ ... mama sāvakānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ saṃkhittena bhāsitassa vitthārena atthaṃ vibhajantānaṃ yadidaṃ Mahākaccāyano.*

[80]For the cpd, see Dhp 113, 374; for the narrative, see Kacc-nidd 3,24ff.; this narrative offers a striking parallel to the story that is narrated in the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādin about a certain monk mispronouncing the cpd *udaya-vyayaṃ* at Dhp 113 as *udakabakaṃ*; for a discussion of the Mūlasarvāstivādin story, see GDhp, Introduction: 45ff.

[81]See Senart's ed. of Kacc and Kacc-v 338: *sandhikappo niṭṭhito.*

Kaccāyana's own, otherwise it is difficult to explain why the work as a whole came to be known as *Sandhikappa*.

III.3. The Date of Kacc

§16. It is impossible to date Kacc with any degree of certainty, first of all because there is hardly any internal evidence that would give a clue as to when the work was compiled. Since the rule at Kacc 69: *ādito ca o* stating that after *ādi o* is substituted for the locative morpheme *smiṃ*, only seems to apply to post-Buddhaghosa Pāli,[82] this rule must have been composed at a time when this Sanskritism,[83] which is recorded in the Vin-vn,[84] had been well established, presumably in the sixth–seventh centuries A.D. If it is true that Kacc presupposes the Kāsikā (seventh century A.D.) (see §28) it may have been composed in the eighth century A.D. This assumption would not seem to leave sufficient time for the comprehensive commentarial literature, namely, Kacc-v, Mahā-nir, Sudatta-nir, Nir-piṭ, Cūḷ-nir, and Mañj, to develop between the eighth and the tenth–eleventh century A.D., which is the approximate date of Mmd (see §108). Since Kacc-v sometimes misinterprets Kacc (see §52) it is reasonable to assume that it was composed at a time when the purport of certain rules was no longer clearly understood. Moreover Kacc-v presupposes the Kāsikā and thus presumably belongs to the eighth century A.D. (see §49 below). Consequently it is more likely that the approximate date of Kacc is the seventh century A.D.

III.4. Composition of Kacc

§17. According to the account of Mmd, Kacc comprises four treatises (*pakaraṇāni*): 1. *sandhippakaraṇa*, 2. *nāmappakaraṇa*, 3. *ākhyāta-ppakaraṇa*, 4. *kibbidhānappakaraṇa*, divided into twenty-three sections (*paricchedā*): five *sandhiparicchedā*, eight *nāmaparicchedā*, four *ākhyātaparicchedā*, six *kibbidhānaparicchedā*.[85] The division of the

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[82]See *CPD* s.v. *ādo.*

[83]See von Hinüber, 1986, §327.

[84]See *CPD* s.v. ādo.

[85]Mmd 5,22–24.

standard text differs slightly: it consists of four main chapters (*kappa* = *pakaraṇa*), some of which are subdivided into sections and sub-chapters. Thus the *nāmakappa* is divided into five sections (*kaṇḍa*) and three sub-chapters: *kārakakappa*, *samāsakappa*, and *taddhitakappa*.[86] This is also the case with the chapter on verbal derivatives, the *kibbidhānakappa*, of which the final section is called *uṇādikappa*. Mmd apparently presupposes the same division.[87] We must assume that this division reflects the history of transmission of Kacc. At the time when Dhammasenāpati composed his Kārikā it was customary to divide Kacc into eight chapters as appears from Kārikā 49: *sandhināmañ ca kārakaṃ, samāsataddhitâkhyātakitakañ ca uṅādikaṃ.*

§ 18. Assuming that the verse introducing the first chapter of Kacc is an integral part of it, the grammar as a whole is marked by a conspicuous lack of compositional coherence. Thus the second chapter (*nāmakappa*) has no introductory verse. This contrasts with chapters three (*ākhyāta-kappa*) and four (*kibbidhānakappa*), which are introduced by verses in different metres in the standard version of Kacc. Of these verses, Vajirabuddhi only knows those introducing chapter four: the prefatory verses of chapter three have been added later on.[88] Unlike the other chapters, chapter three concludes with a verse in which the anonymous writer asks the learned readers to judge his attempt at making a short exposition of the verb for the sake of the (Buddha's) teaching;[89] the

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[86]See, e.g. *iti nāmakappe kārakakappo chaṭṭho kaṇḍo*, Kacc 317 at Mmd 260,9; (E^e reads *iti kārakakappe* (sic) *chaṭṭho kaṇḍo*).

[87]See Mmd 265,39–40: *samatto Mukhamattadīpaniyaṃ kārakakappo chaṭṭho paricchedo.*

[88]Kacc-vaṇṇ 297,31–32: *imā gāthā hi Nyāsa-Rūpasiddhisu avaṇṇittā pacchā-paṇḍitehi ṭhapitā ti vadanti*; the interpolation must have taken place before the time of Chapaṭa (fifteenth century A.D.) since he quotes them at Kacc-nidd 200,4.

[89]   *sāsanatthaṃ samuddiṭṭhaṃ mayâkhyātaṃ samāsato ||*
          sakabuddhivisesena cintayantu vicakkhaṇā ||

verse is quoted and explained in Mmd.[90] Such haphazard composition
would indicate that Kacc is a compilation by various hands.[91]

III.5. The Number of Suttas of Kacc

§ 19. There is considerable uncertainty about the actual number of suttas
constituting Kacc. Vajirabuddhi claims that Kacc consists of 710 suttas:
suttāni ... dasâdhikāni sattasatāni honti.[92] He quotes and explains 708,
of which he considers 34 to be interpolations. According to this account,
674 suttas are supposedly genuine. He relates that "stupid persons[93]
whose minds are confused by abridgements have interpolated some
suttas here from Sudattakisivanirutti (see IV.2.3) and Mahānirutti (see
IV.2.2), thinking that this sutta (i.e. Kacc 317) is deficient". And he adds
that "they do not appear in an absolutely clean copy of the original
book".[94] In the light of this information it is somewhat surprising that he
incorporates interpolations in his account. Thirty-three suttas are inter-
polated in the *kāraka* section: three between Kacc 285 and 286, 287 and
288, and 301 and 302; twenty-nine between Kacc 317 and 318; one
between Kacc 320 and 321 (see § 68). Vajirabuddhi also considers Kacc
245 to be an interpolation.[95]

§ 20. The standard text of Kacc upon which Kacc-v comments com-
prises 675 suttas in the Sinhalese and Siamese versions, and 673 in the
Burmese version which omits Kacc 244–45 from the *nāmakappa*.[96] This

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[90]Mmd 407,18–19.

[91]It is, of course, possible that the verses were added later on; but in that case it
is difficult to understand why it was not done systematically. The unsystem-
atic way in which they are added seems to indicate that Kacc is a compilation.

[92]See Mmd 5,28–29.

[93]Namely, the interpolators (*suttapakkhepaka*), see e.g. Mmd 264,34, 265,10.

[94]Mmd 243,20–23: *evaṃ hi sūyate saṅkhepôpajanitavibbhantabuddhīhi mandehi
ūnam idan ti maññamānehi Sudattakisivanirutti-Mahāniruttito kānici suttāni
idha pakkhittānī ti. na ca tāni suparisuddhe purimapotthake sandissantī ti.*

[95]See Mmd 197,38–39: *na ... eso purimapāṭho.*

[96]Probably influenced by Vajirabuddhi, who considers Kacc 244 to be
unauthentic; see n. 83.

deviation from the other versions is no doubt reflected in Dhamma-
senāpati's account according to which there are 51 suttas in the *sandhi*
chap., 218 in the *nāma* chap., 35 in the *kāraka* chap., 28 in the *samāsa*
chap., 62 in the *taddhita* chap., 118 in the *ākhyāta* chap., 100 in the *kit*
chap., and 50 in the *uṇādi* chap.,[97] in all 672 suttas. Three suttas are
missing from the *nāmakappa*, which comprises 221 suttas in the
Sinhalese version. No doubt Kacc 244–45 had already been omitted in
those days, presumably on the basis of Vajirabuddhi's remark about
Kacc 244. We are left to speculate, however, about the identity of the
third missing sutta.

III.6. Variant Readings of Kacc

§21. There are hardly any recorded variants of individual suttas. The
readings that Mmd presupposes differ only in a few cases from the
standard text of Kacc, e.g. Kacc 356 reads: *samūhatthe kaṇ-ṇā*. Mmd
and Kacc-nidd, however, presuppose the reading *samūhatthe kaṇ-ṇā
ca*.[98] Mmd and the Burmese version omit *ca* at Kacc 436. Rūp, on the
other hand, reads *ca*.[99] In fact, the often illogical use of the conjunction
ca is a major problem for the interpretation of Kacc. One cannot exclude
the possibility that some of the problems arise from a badly transmitted
version of the original. In the case of Kacc 501 the original reading
dāssa dajjaṃ which has survived in some manuscripts and editions[100]
was changed so as to conform to Kacc-v which reads an optional *vā* into

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[97]Dhammasenāpati: (*suttagaṇanavinicchaya*) 50–52: *sandhimhi ekapaññāsaṃ |
nāmamhi dvisataṃ bhave || aṭṭhārasâdhikañ c' eva | kārake pañcatālīsaṃ ||
samāse aṭṭhavīsañ ca | dvāsaṭṭhi taddhite mataṃ || aṭṭhārasasatâkhyāte | kite
suttasataṃ bhave | uṇâdimhi ca paññāsaṃ suttaṃ etaṃ pakāsitaṃ
Kaccāyanena therena ||*

[98]See Mmd 313,26: *tipadam idaṃ*, cf. Kacc-nidd ad loc.: *cā ti samuccaye.*

[99]See Mmd 359,18: *dvipadam idaṃ* (scil. *suttaṃ*); Kacc-nidd 218,30-32: *katthaci
potthake "bhuja ... pe ... atthesu cā" ti cakārasahitam pi atthi, evaṃ sati
caggahaṇenā ti iminā sameti Rūpasiddhiyaṃ cakāro atthi; Nyāse pana n'
atthi.*

[100]See Mmd 394: *"dāssa dajjaṃ" kimatthaṃ idaṃ* (scil. *suttaṃ*).

the sutta : *dā icc etassa dhātussa sabbassa dajjâdeso hoti vā.* Both Mmd
and Rūp follow this interpretation.[101] Thus Buddhapiya has substituted
dādhātussa dajjaṃ vā (Rūp 493) for the original reading. This was later
on substituted for Kacc 501 in some manuscripts.[102] Burmese and some
Sinhalese manuscripts read *dādhātussa dajjaṃ* which clearly is an
edited version of Rūp 493.[103]

III.7. Kacc and Jinavacana

§ 22. The language which Kacc describes is, according to Kacc 50, Jina-
vacana, a term which is also used of the Buddha's sermons in Buddha-
ghosa's Aṭṭhakathās, in the essay devoted to the exegesis of the
canonical phrase *evaṃ me sutaṃ.*[104] Kacc does not refer to the language
of the Buddha as Māgadhī. This tradition, which can be traced to Vism
441,30*ff.* and Vibh-a 387,24*ff.*, is summarized by Buddhapiya in a verse in
Rūp.[105] However, grammarians before Buddhapiya may have used
Māgadha of the language of the Buddha. Thus Śrī Rāhula quotes in
Padasādhanaṭīkā two verses from Niruttisaṃvaṇṇanā (= Mañj?) stating

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[101]See Mmd 394,1*ff.* : *dā icc etassa dhātussa dajjâdeso hoti vikappenā ti
ñāpanatthaṃ. tipadaṃ* (sic) *idaṃ. maṇḍūkagativasena "havipariyāyo lo vā"*
(Kacc 490) *ti ito vāggahaṇam ihânuvattate.*

[102]See E^e and J. d'Alw. *dādhatussa dajjaṃ vā* (= Rūp 493), cf. Sadd § 1005 :
dāssa vā dajjo.

[103]This is, for example, the reading of B^eC^e2.

[104]See Sv 31,7 = Ps I 7,16 = Mp I 10,17 ; Vibh-a 388,10 : *Buddhavacana* ;
Ap 606,6 : *Jinavākya.*

[105]Quoted at Rūp 60 :

sā Māgadhī mūlabhāsā narā yāy' âdikappikā
brahmāno c' assutâlāpā sambuddhā c' âpi bhāsare.

This tradition is also reflected in an interesting Sanskrit verse which is quoted
from an unknown source in Vism-sn 1037,37–38 explaining the term *nirutti* :

niruktir māgadhī bhāṣā sā cārthān nāma saṃvṛtiḥ
keci dhvāna iti prāhur vijñaptyākārasaṃyutaḥ.

saṃvṛti = Pāli *sammuti* ; for *dhvāna* and *vijñapti*, cf. *vāgvijñapti.*

that the Jina did not propound the Dhamma except in Māgadha.[106] Moggallāna, as is well known, refers to his own grammar as *Māgadhaṃ saddalakkhaṇaṃ*.

III.8. Kacc and Writing

§23. As appears from the description at Kacc 10: *pubbaṃ adhoṭhitaṃ assaraṃ sarena viyojaye*, of how to isolate words within continuously written text, Kacc presupposes the graphic practice of writing the final consonant in a conjunct below the line. Vararuci's Prākṛtaprakāśa[107] takes the same practice for granted.

III.9. Kacc and the Letters of Pāli

§24. Kacc 2: *akkharā p' âdayo ekacattālīsaṃ*, enumerates 41 letters of the Pāli, although the rules only make use of 40 letters: Kacc does not use the letter *ḷ* (< *ḍ*) which is represented by *l*, also *ḷh* (< *ḍh*) by *lh*. Although most Kacc mss and editions are inconsistent as regards the representation of *l/ḷ* and *ḷh*, it is clear that Kacc did not count *ḷ* as a letter of Pāli, because Vajirabuddhi explicitly remarks at Mmd 10,38*ff.* that the author of the suttas (*suttakāra*) uses *l* in place of *ḷ*: *suttakāro pana tassa* (scil. *ḷakāra*) *ṭhāne lakāram eva paṭhati. dissati hi "yavamadanataralā c' âgamā"* (Kacc 35), *"dahassa do laṃ⸱* (Kacc 616) *iccevamādīsu*.[108] It is thus possible to deduce that Kacc 2 was compiled at a time when the distinction between *l* and *ḷ* was not preserved, and later on reformulated

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[106]Padasādhanaṭīkā 401,13-17:

> *dhammo Jinena Māgadhena vinā na vutto*
> *neruttikā ca Māgadhaṃ vibhajanti tasmā*
> *neruttam eva munino vacanânukulam*
> *icc ādaraṃ matimatā karaṇīyam etthā ti.*

Aggavaṃsa quotes the first verse at Sadd 924,4–5.

[107]See Prākṛtaprakāśa III 1–2: *uparilopaḥ kagaḍatadapaṣasām, adho manayām.*

[108]For other examples, see, e.g. Kacc 381: *la da-rānaṃ*; Kacc 490: *havipari-yāyo lo vā*; Kacc 591: *hantehi ho hassa lo vā adahanānaṃ*; see Sadd §§980, 1049–50; only one sutta, Kacc 267, uses *ḷ*: *bāḷhassa sādho*, which is probably a later correction to make the reading conform to later orthographic standards.

so as to correspond with the graphic practice of a later age. In those circumstances it is something of a paradox that the editors forgot to make the necessary changes to the relevant suttas so that the work as a whole would reflect the new orthography. It is an open question when this reformulation was made, but it is apparently an established fact by the time of the composition of Kacc-v. Other Pāli grammars, like Cūḷ-nir (see IV.2.5), evidently an old commentary on Kacc, and the grammar attributed to Bodhisattamahāthera,[109] state that there are forty letters in Pāli, and thus reflect the old version of Kacc.

§ 25. Since the use of *ḷ* is no longer preserved in northern India after the fourth century A.D.,[110] whereas it is retained in southern India, it is difficult to explain why it is not used in Kacc if one assumes that it is a southern Indian or Sinhalese compilation. Since Kacc like Vararuci's Prākṛtaprakāśa uses *l* to represent the phoneme *ḷ*, it is possible that Kacc is not a Sinhalese or southern Indian compilation, but that it originated elsewhere.

III.10. The Sanskrit Sources of Kacc

§ 26. It is a well-known fact that Kacc is modelled on the Kātantra, a recast of Kaumāralāta, of which approximately 215 rules are reproduced in a more or less edited form in Kacc. In addition there are almost 300 suttas (including the overlap with Kātantra) that appear to be edited versions of Pāṇini sūtras.[111] It is thus obvious that the anonymous compilator(s) of Kacc have atttempted to amalgamate Kātantra and Pāṇinian grammar. There may have been other sources. Thus one cannot exclude the possibility that Kaumāralāta, which occasionally describes Buddhist Sanskrit under the heading of *ārṣe*,[112] was known to the compilator(s) of Kacc. One also wonders why Kacc in a few cases

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[109]See n. 76.

[110]See von Hinüber, 1986, § 199.

[111]See the concordances in Kaccāyanavyākaraṇa, ed. and trsl., by L.N. Tiwari and B. Sharma, Varanasi 1962: 443*ff*.

[112]See H. Lüders, "Kātantra und Kaumāralāta", in Lüders, 1940, 546–61.

describes Prakritisms (see §39). Whatever the sources of Kacc may have been, the fact of the matter is that more than half the rules of Kacc are without obvious parallels in Sanskrit grammar, and in spite of occasional Sanskritisms, the grammar as a whole does not reflect Sanskrit usage and vocabulary.

§27. R.O. Franke has shown that several of the suttas that constitute the *kāraka* chapter presuppose Pāṇinian sūtras.[113] This tendency is pervasive. There are, however, interesting examples of innovations where rules that evidently are based on Pāṇini sūtras have been reformulated so as to include instances that are not presupposed by Pāṇini, like, for example, Kacc 324: *tathā dvande pāṇi-turiya-yogga-senaṅga-khudda-jantuka-vividha-viruddha-visabhāg'-atthâdīnañ ca*, which combines in one sutta Pāṇ II 4:2: *dvandvaś ca prāṇitūryasenāṅgānām*, 8: *kṣudra-jantavaḥ*, and 9: *yesaṃ ca virodhaḥ śāśvatikaḥ*. However, the terms *yogga* ("to be yoked") and *visabhāga* ("different") are commonly used Pāli words that have been adopted from Pāli literature to describe compounds that are specific to Pāli like *phālapācanaṃ* (Sn 77), *yuganaṅgalaṃ* (Sn 77), and *sīlapaññāṇaṃ* (M II 210), *samatha-vipassanaṃ* (A I 157,15), and *vijjācaraṇaṃ* (Sv 268).[114]

§28. It is questionable whether Franke[115] is correct in assuming that Kacc 302: *gati-buddhi-bhuja-paṭha-hara-kara-sayâdīnaṃ kārite vā*, which combines Pāṇ I 4:52+53: *gati-buddhi-pratyavasānārtha-śabda-karmākarmakānam aṇīkartā sa ṇau*, *hṛkror anyatarasyām*, would seem to be based upon the Kāśikā, on the grounds that Kacc follows the Kāśikā by substituting √*bhuj* and √*paṭh* and √*say* for the Pāṇinian *pratyavasānārtha*, *śabdakarma*, and *akarmaka*, respectively. However,

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[113]*PGL*: 17*ff.*

[114]See Kacc-v 324.

[115]See *PGL*: 17–18.

Kāś also mentions other verbs that belong to each of the three categories,[116] so it remains uncertain if, in fact, Kacc presupposes Kāś.

III.11. Technical Terms of Kacc

§ 29. Kacc uses a highly restricted number of technical terms. Some of them are evidently copied from the Pāli Aṭṭhakathās, like, for instance, *niggahīta* (see § 7 (a)) which denotes a nasalized vowel, e.g. at Kacc 8, 30, 37, 82, 379, but apparently also any given nasal, e.g. at 448, 468, 539. The phonological term *viparīta* is used at Kacc 79: *tabbiparīt' upapade byañjane ca*, 406: *tesu vuddhi-lopâgama-vikāra-viparītâdesā ca*, and 519: *kvaci dhātu-vibhatti-ppaccayānaṃ dīgha-viparītâdesa-lopâgamā ca*, to denote the phoneme *o < ava*, as well as *u < o*. According to Vajirabuddhi *viparīta* is an old technical term for *o* (< *ava*)[117] which Kacc 50: *o avassa* describes as a substitute for *ava*. On the other hand it is also used of *u < o* before conjunct consonants.[118] It is perhaps borrowed from gveda *prātiśākhya* XIV.17 where it denotes the change of *ṛ* into *i*.

§ 30. The case terminology is partly identical with the one used in the Aṭṭhakathās. Kacc uses *sampadāna* to denote the dative at 278, 295, and 313; and *sāmī* to denote the gen. at 285 and 303; *ālapana* denotes the voc. at 57, 116, 153, and 287. However, instead of *bhumma*, Kacc uses *okāsa* to denote the locative at 280: *yo 'dhāro taṃ okāsaṃ* and 304: *okāse sattamī*. This has no parallel in Sanskrit grammar and the Aṭṭhakathās and is probably an innovation. It is uncertain what might have motivated its use. It is likely, however, that it is based upon canonical usage. Thus, for instance, *okāsa* is used in the Vinaya, e.g. at

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[116]The first category comprises, in the following order, √*bhuj*, √*aś*, √*ad*, √*khād*, and √*bhakṣ*; the second, *adhi* + √*i*, √*paṭh*.

[117]Mmd 338,35: *viparīto nāma okārassa porāṇakasaññā*.

[118]See Mmd 94,11-14: *tassa avasaddassa tassa okārassa viparīto hotī ti okārassa viparīto ti ukāro idha gahito, okāro hi dīgho tasmā tassa rassabhūto ukāro viparīto, tassa ca ūkārokāro. akārâdīnam pi es' eva nayo.*

Vin I 94,9,[119] in the sense of place which is semantically parallel to the Aṭṭhakathā term *bhumma* (see §7 (b)). The remaining case terms are related to Skt: *liṅga* denotes the nom. at Kacc 286, *kamma* the acc. at Kacc 282 and 299, *karaṇa* the instr. at Kacc 281 and 288, and *apādāna* the abl. at Kacc 273.

§31. Kacc has coined a set of algebraic terms denoting inflectional classes of nominals: *jha* denotes masculine stems in *i* and *ī* (Kacc 58), *la* masculine stems in *u* and *ū* (Kacc 58); *pa* denotes fem. stems in *i*, *ī* and *u*, *ū* (Kacc 59); *gha* stands for fem. stems in *ā* (Kacc 60), and *ga* denotes voc. sg. (Kacc 57).

III.12. The Descriptive Technique of Kacc

§32. As one would expect, Kacc as a whole imitates the standard descriptive technique of the Kātantra. The substitution of an item or the final element of an item is expressed by gen. (X-nom. replaces Y-gen.), e.g. Kacc 48: *kvaci paṭi patissa* and Kacc 76: *āvass' u vā*. In a few cases substituend and substituendum are simply juxtaposed in the nom., e.g. at Kacc 44: *abbho abhi*. Phonemic or morphophonemic changes are usually expressed by means of the acc. (X-nom. replaces Y-acc.), e.g. Kacc 21: *ivaṇṇo yaṃ na vā* and Kacc 220: *sesato lopaṃ ga-si pi*. In rare cases such changes are formulated by juxtaposition of the elements in question, e.g. at Kacc 470: *ṭhā tiṭṭho*. The loc. denotes operations applying to what precedes, e.g. Kacc 24: *sare kvaci*, the abl. denotes operations that apply to what follows, e.g. Kacc 452: *gahâdito ppa-ṇhā*.

§33. Although Kacc uses the descriptive technique of the Kātantra, the logical ordering and formulation of the suttas cause numerous problems of interpretation. Very often a problem is caused by non-standard use of the conjunction *ca* or the disjunction *vā*. Thus, for instance, the use of *ca* at Kacc 20: *do dhassa ca*, is incomprehensible as the rule is without relation to Kacc 19: *sabbo can ti*. The technical use of *vā* is normally to express an option. However, at Kacc 13 *vā* is apparently used as

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[119]*amumhi okāse tiṭṭhāhi*; for other references, see *CPD* s.v. ¹*okāsa* 1.a.

equivalent with *kvaci* which occurs in the following rule. In fact, the two terms are apparently used interchangeably, thus making the exact scope of a rule difficult to interpret. For instance, the supposed option expressed by *na vā* at Kacc 21: *ivaṇṇo yaṃ na vā*, is correctly interpreted by Rūp 21 as synonymous with *kvaci*,[120] in spite of Kacc-v which takes it as "optional", which clearly makes no sense in the context of the examples. In other cases *vā* appears to have no precise value at all, such as Kacc 281: *yena vā kayirate taṃ karaṇaṃ*, which is modelled upon Kāt II 4:12: *yena kriyate tat karaṇam*, and 285: *yassa vā pariggaho taṃ sāmī*.[121] In the first case Kacc-v takes *vā* to mean "optionally" adding *yena vā passati* and *yena vā suṇāti* to *yena vā kayirate*, but ignores the *vā* of Kacc 285.

§ 34. In some cases the suttas are inconsistent in the way they refer to the Pāli roots. For instance, √*gam* is referred to in the form *gamu* (< Skt *gamḷ*, cf. Skt Dhāthup I 1013) at Kacc 503, *gami* at 478, and *gama* at 546, 588, 598; and √*dis* (< Skt *dṛś*) also occurs in the form √*dus* at Kacc 644.

III.13. Kacc and the Description of Pāli
III.13.1. The Grammatical Rules of Kacc

§ 35. Considering the modest scope of Kacc it is surprising how many linguistic features of Pāli it describes. The *sandhi* chapter deals with the main junctional features of the language, even a comparatively rare instance of *sandhi* like, e.g. the one described at Kacc 17: *yaṃ edantass' âdeso*, stating that "[in some cases] *y* is substituted for final *e*". Kacc-v illustrates this rule by quoting two canonical examples: *adhigato kho my āyaṃ dhammo* (Vin I 4,33) and *ty āhaṃ evaṃ vadeyyaṃ* (M I 13,1). Sometimes a rule appears to describe features that, quite apart from the fact that they are misunderstood, hardly ever occur. Thus Kacc 36: *kvaci o byañjane* is supposed to describe the word *atippago* at D I 178,10, which is analysed *atippag + o + C, o* being

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[120]*navāsaddo kvacisaddapariyāyo.*

[121]Senart has discussed most of the cases in his edition and translation.

interpreted as *āgama*. Kacc-v quotes *parosahassaṃ* (sic) at S I 192,30 as another example.

§ 36. Most of the nominal and pronominal paradigms as well as the various case forms of the numerals have been dealt with in the *nāma-kappa*; even forms that are comparatively rare are recorded. Thus, for instance, the gen. pl. of the numeral *ti* viz. *tiṇṇannaṃ* is described at Kacc 87: *iṇṇaṃ iṇṇannaṃ tīhi saṃkhyāhi*. Only 11 canonical instances of this form have been recorded.[122] It is therefore surprising that another rare canonical form like *tissannaṃ*, fem. pl. of *ti*, is not described. In the chapter on verbs Kacc describes most of the inflectional classes including present stems in *e* at Kacc 512 (*lopañ c' ettaṃ akāro*) and records at Kacc 501 (*dā-dhātussa dajjaṃ vā*) and 502 (*vadassa vajjaṃ*) new present stems like *dajja* and *vajja*. A rule like Kacc 472: *ñāssa jā-jana-nā*, stating that "*jā*, *jan*, and *nā* are substituted for the root *ñā*" is surprising. Kacc-v quotes the form *nāyati* as an example of the substitute root *nā*. Only two canonical examples of this form are recorded, namely, at Ja II 442,16 and Vin V 86,6.[123]

§ 37. It is remarkable that Kacc describes the Vinaya technical term *āgantuka* and its antonym *gamika* which are addressed in two consecutive rules at Kacc 571–72: *āgamā tuko*, *bhabbe ika*. The interesting point is that *gamika* (secondary < *gamin* + *ka*?) is defined in accordance with the semantic value it has in the Vinaya where it denotes a *bhikkhu* who intends to leave to go somewhere else.[124] It is semantically related to Skt *gamin* to which Pāṇ III 3:3 (*bhaviṣyati gamyādayaḥ*) ascribes the same value. Although the context indicates that Kacc 572 is to be interpreted with reference to the semantical value of *gamika*, the awkward formulation of the rule avoiding any reference to the fact that *ika* is added to *gam*, perhaps indicates that it has been copied from another

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[122]See *PTC* s.v.

[123]See the form *panāyati* at D II 21,2, 3 (= *jānāti passati nāyati vā pavattetī ti attho*, Sv 454,6), probably an eastern form from *pra* + √*jñā*.

[124]See Abh 424 *aññattha gantum icchati gamiko*; see *BHSD* s.v.

grammar in the context of which this was made clear. A possible model would be Kaumāralāta.

III.13.2. Rules Describing Forms That Are Not Instantiated

§ 38. Since the grammar to a large extent describes the language of the canon, it is somewhat of a paradox that Kacc occasionally formulates rules describing forms that are not instantiated. Thus, for instance, Kacc 42 (*go sare puthass' āgamo kvaci*) states that "in some cases the final *a* of *putha* gets the augment *g* before a vowel". The vutti quotes the example *puthag eva* which is recorded neither in the canon nor in the Aṭṭhakathās. It is difficult to believe, however, that Kacc describes occurrences that are not instantiated. Rūp quotes the following example in another context: *ariyehi puthag evâyaṃ jano*,[125] which defines the term *puthujjana* in terms that are well known from Sv, although Sv uses *puthu* for *puthag*.[126] This or similar examples may have been the *raison d'être* of this rule. The related rule Kacc 49: *puthass' u byañjane* "*u* is substituted for final *a* of *putha* before a consonant" evidently addresses forms like *puthujjana* = Skt *pṛthagjana*. Like Kacc 42 it is only understandable on the assumption that the analysis *putha(g)* or *puthu°* < Skt *pṛthag* was known to the anonymous author of the *sandhi* chapter. Instances like these leave the impression that the notion of Jinavacana covers more than just the canon. The same observation also applies to the Sanskritism *ādo* loc. of *ādi* recorded at Kacc 69. This form is not found in Buddhaghosa's Aṭṭhakathās. According to Kacc 95: *aggiss' ini*, *ini* is substituted for the final *i* of *aggi* > *aggini*. The *vutti* quotes examples that are not recorded elsewhere.

§ 39. A few rules describe Prakritisms that are not attested in the extant literature. Kacc 452: *gahâdito ppa-ṇhā* states that "after the roots *gah*, etc., follow *pp* and *ṇh*", and Kacc 491: *gahassa ghe ppe* that "*ghe* is

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[125]Rūp 106,2; cf. Sadd 703,19–21 ad §564: *visuṃputhuyoge.*

[126]See, e.g. Sv 59,29: *puthu ... ariyehi janehī ti puthujjano*; Mogg: III 69: *jane puthass' u. jane uttarapade puthussa u hoti: ariyehi puthag evāyaṃ jano ti puthujjano.*

substituted for *gah* before *pp*".[127] A similar rule is found in Vararuci's Prākṛtaprakāśa VII 58: *graher gheppaḥ*.[128] Another Prakritism is described at Kacc 503: *gamussa ghammaṃ* (= Rūp 427 ≠ Sadd § 1013)[129] teaching that √*ghamm* is substituted for √*gam*.[130] Kacc 392 formulates the rule that *cu* or *co* is optionally substituted for *catu* in composition. The vutti quotes as examples the forms *cuddasa*, *coddasa*, *catuddasa*. Although the form *cuddasa* is attested in the canon (see *PTC* s.v.) there are no examples of *coddasa*. The latter, however, is common in Prakrit.[131] It is uncertain how to interpret these isolated instances, but they indicate, together with the other examples, that the historical background of Kacc is extremely complicated.

III.13.3. Kacc and the grammatical Annotations of the Aṭṭhakathās

§ 40. Although Kacc has borrowed a couple of its case designations from the Aṭṭhakathās, there is no clear indication that the work as such is written in the tradition of the Aṭṭhakathās. On the contrary, it seems to have been written more or less independently of the commentarial literature. For instance, the peculiar sutta Kacc 20: *do dhassa ca*, "and *d* is substituted for *dh*", has apparently been composed, according to Kacc-v, with the sole intention of explaining the canonical phrase *ekaṃ idâhaṃ ... samayaṃ* at, e.g. M I 326,6, *idâhaṃ* being analysed as *idha + ahaṃ*, although Buddhaghosa interprets *idâhaṃ* at D I 91,11 as *idaṃ + ahaṃ*, claiming that *idaṃ* is a mere particle (*nipātamattaṃ*).[132] The interpretation of Kacc probably rests on a wrong identification of *idā*

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[127]Rūp 503 and 505, Sadd §§ 931 and 981, as well as Mogg V 179 (*gahassa gheppo*) mention it, without quoting instances from the literature.

[128]See Pischel § 548.

[129]Also mentioned at Mogg V 177.

[130]On this Prakritism, see Pischel § 188.

[131]See Pischel §§ 166, 439, and 443.

[132]See Sv 256,22: *idan ti nipātamattaṃ*; *ekam ahan ti attho*.

(Vedic *id* ; cf. *EWA* s.v.) with *idha* which occurs in the expression *idhâham*, e.g. at M I 12,30 and S III 2,14.

§ 41. The *kāraka* chapter is to a large extent indebted to Kātantra and Pāṇini, although there are suttas that are not to be explained on the basis of Kātantra, Pāṇini, Mahā-bh, or the Kāśikā. In general the description of the case system does not appear to be influenced by the annotations in the Aṭṭhakathās, although there are cases where there are parallels between Kacc and the Aṭṭhakathās. Thus for instance Kacc 292: *sattamyatthe ca*, "and the instr. is used in the sense of the loc." appears to have been composed exclusively with a view of explaining canonical phrases like *tena kālena* (Ap 38,2), *tena samayena* (Vin I 1,4), *tena kho pana samayena* (Vin I 15,1), as indicated by Kacc-v. This particular usage is commented upon by Buddhaghosa in a lengthy discussion at Sv 33,2*ff.*, which concludes with a quotation from the old ones (*porāṇā*) claiming that whether the reading is *tasmiṃ samaye*, *tena samayena*, or *taṃ samayaṃ*, the meaning is in each case locative (*sabbattha bhummaṃ eva attho*).[133]

§ 42. There is also a parallel between the annotations of the Aṭṭhakathās and the sutta at Kacc 309: *tatiyā-sattamīnañ ca*, stating that "the acc. is also used in the sense of the instr. and the loc." The vutti cites as illustrations of the instrumental usage of the acc.: *sace maṃ samaṇo Gotamo nâlapissati*,[134] *tvañ ca maṃ nâbhibhāsasi* (Ja VI 561,20), and as examples of the locative usage: *pubbaṇhasamayaṃ nivāsetvā* (Vin III 6,23), *ekaṃ samayaṃ Bhagavā* (D I 1,4). The syntactical analysis underlying the first two examples is obscure and, quite apart from being wrong, is not supported by the Aṭṭhakathās. As in the case with the phrase *tena samayena*, Buddhaghosa comments on the Dīgha phrase at Sv 33,2*ff.*, and he addresses the Vinaya phrase at Sp 177,8*ff.*, where he

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[133]Sv 33,31; for an analysis of this passage, see O.H. Pind 1990: 181*ff.*

[134]This quotation is based upon S I 177,27–28: *sace maṃ samaṇo Gotamo ālapissati ... no ce maṃ samaṇo Gotamo ālapissati.*

analyses *pubbaṇhasamayaṃ* as *pubbaṇhasamaye*,[135] thus supporting the interpretation of Kacc and Kacc-v. However, the alternative explanation which analyses the term as *pubbaṇhe samayaṃ* with reference to Pāṇ II 3,5: *kālādhvanor atyantasaṃyoge* is not treated in Kacc-v on Kacc 300: *kāladdhānaṃ accantasaṃyoge*. There is therefore no clear indication that Kacc presupposes the grammatical observations of the Aṭṭhakathās.

§ 43. In other cases there is no detectable connection to the Aṭṭhakathās. Thus, for instance, Kacc 312 states that the loc. is used in the sense of the instr. This rule describes according to Kacc-v constructions like (*naggā*) *hatthesu piṇḍāya caranti* (Vin I 90,11, 20; 91,1). Neither Sp nor Sp-ṭ and Vmv address this usage. Since the Aṭṭhakathās occasionally interpret the loc. in the sense of the instr.,[136] one cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that the compiler of Kacc composed this sutta with reference to this type of annotations. On the other hand, since there is no clear indication that they were known to or considered by the author(s) of Kacc-v, it is not possible to decide with any degree of certainty whether the compiler(s) of Kacc actually relied on the Aṭṭhakathās. Another sutta — Kacc 308: *kvaci dutiyā chaṭṭhīnaṃ atthe* — states that "in some cases the acc. is used in the sense of the gen." Kacc-v illustrates this rule by quoting M I 240,29: *api ssu maṃ Aggivessana tisso upamāyo*[137] *paṭibhaṃsu.* Buddhaghosa does not address this usage in Ps. Thus the general impression is that both Kacc and Kacc-v were composed independently of the Aṭṭhakathās. This conclusion would seem to be corroborated by the absence in Kacc and Kacc-v of important grammatical analyses found in the Aṭṭhakathās (cf. §§ 7–13).

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[135]So also at Spk I 246,32–33.

[136]See, e.g. Sv 669,13: *karaṇatthe vā bhummaṃ mantāya boddhabban ti mantāya bujjhitabbaṃ ñāṇena jānitabban ti attho.*

[137]M I 240,29 reads *upamā* for *upamāyo*; reading of Kacc-v confirmed by Kacc-vaṇṇ 234,23; cf. the variant *upamāyo* quoted by Trenckner at M I 550 (ad sutta 36 line 30).

IV. Post-Kaccāyana Pāli Grammars and Commentaries
IV.1. Kaccāyana-vutti (Kacc-v)
IV.1.1. The Authorship of Kacc-v

§ 44. Kacc-v is no doubt the oldest extant commentary on Kacc and therefore of particular importance for the history and development of Pāli grammar. Since post-Kacc Pāli grammarians never mention any, it is unlikely that there were other commentaries before it.[138] The Sinhalese grammarians attribute Kacc-v to Saṅghanandin, whose name occurs only in this context. It is not possible to trace this tradition further back than Saddhammasaṅgaha[139] (the end of the fourteenth century A.D.)[140] and Śrī Rahula's Padasādhanaṭīkā (fifteenth century A.D.),[141] but one cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that it is older. The Burmese tradition as reflected in Gv obviously regarded Mahākaccāyana as the author of both Kacc and Kacc-v.[142] In general

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[138] The word *mahāvutti* is not the name of an old commentary (*vutti*) on Kacc as Franke assumed (Franke 1978, 335*ff*.). It is used of Kacc 406: *tesu vuddhilopāgamavikāraviparītādesā ca*, whose scope is so wide that it can be used to explain a large number of forms that are otherwise not accounted for by any Kacc sutta. This also explains why the sutta is referred to in the instrumental form *mahāvuttinā* or *mahāvuttisuttena*, i.e., in accordance with the sutta that has a wide application, but not in the loc. as is common practice. See Rūp-san 37,16–18: *mahāvuttisuttena ... mahantesu visayesu pavattanato mahantī, mahantī vutti pavatti etissā ti mahāvutti, mahāvutti ca taṃ suttaṃ cā ti mahāvuttisuttaṃ*. Buddhapiya refers to it as *mahāvutti* (at Rūp 30, 189, 371, and Rūp-ṭ 146,18) or *mahāvuttisutta* (Rūp 34). Kacc-nidd 198,17 calls it *mahāsutta*. See also the term Mahāpadesasutta: *mahāpadesasuttehi vā sarūpassa parasarassa lopo vutto ti daṭṭhabbaṃ*, Sadd 43,26.

[139] Saddhamma-s IX 18: *Kaccāyano kato yogo Saṅghanandi pavuttikā.*

[140] Norman, *Pāli Lit.*: 179*ff*.

[141] See Padasādhanaṭīkā 395,11: *Kaccāyana-Saṅghanandi-Vimalabuddhimahātherâdihi katesu suttavuttinyāsâdīsu.*

[142] See Gv 59.

the Pāli grammarians refer to the author of Kacc-v as *vuttikāra*[143] as opposed to the *suttakāra*.

§ 45. It is questionable whether Kacc-v as a whole is composed by the same person because the *sandhi* chapter differs from the other chapters in the way it paraphrases each sutta. In contrast to the other chapters which use the verb *āpajjate* to indicate that a grammatical operation obtains, the *sandhi* chapter invariably uses *pappoti*, e.g. *lopaṃ pappoti* or *papponti* at Kacc-v 12 through 17, contrasting with *lopaṃ āpajjate* or *āpajjante*, e.g. at Kacc 220. They also differ with respect to the formulation of the contrastive sections of the exegesis of Kacc: in the *sandhi* chapter this section is invariably introduced by *kasmā*, elsewhere by *kimatthaṃ*. This difference in style seems to indicate that the commentary on the *sandhi* chapter has a different author from the rest of the work.

IV.1.2. Date of Kacc-v

§ 46. Internal evidence indicates that the compiler(s) of the *kāraka* chapter of Kacc-v must have known the Kāśikā (seventh century A.D.), which therefore is the *terminus post quem* of this part of Kacc-v. In fact, part of the commentary on Pāṇ I 4:57: *cādayo 'sattve*, which defines the particles, has absurdly been added to Kacc-v 286 as an illustration of the meaning of the nom., which is defined at Kacc 286: *liṅgatthe paṭhamā*. After quoting examples of the use of nom. like *puriso purisā eko dve*, Kacc-v continues by adding the particles *ca vā ha aha*, etc.,[144] the order of which corresponds exactly to the order in which they are quoted in Kāśikā. The inclusion of particles as instances of *liṅgattha* is incomprehensible. If one assumes that Kacc-v as a whole was finalized after the seventh century A.D., it may belong to the first half of the eighth century A.D.

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[143]See, e.g. Mogg-p 115,23; 125,19; 179,4; 180,14; 187,28.

[144]The readings that follow *ha* are uncertain; cf. Mmd 240,21: *puriso ti ādikāni tīṇi suviññeyyāni*; Mmd 240,25: *ca vêtyādīni*.

IV.1.3. The Standard Versions of Kacc-v

§ 47. The question of the authorship of Kacc-v is not crucial in the light of the fact that Mmd comments upon a version of Kacc-v which in many respects is markedly different from its present-day Sinhalese and Burmese versions (see IV.1.2). To complicate matters even more: they are mutually different. Thus the Burmese version differs from the Sinhalese not only with respect to the purely exegetical parts of the commentary, but also as regards the number, order and occasional analysis (*viggaha*, Skt *vigraha*) of the examples illustrating each rule. Even Sinhalese manuscripts differ among themselves.[145]

§ 48. The main cause of the complicated textual transmission of Kacc-v is that indigenous scholars read the text in the light of the comprehensive grammatical literature and commentarial literature devoted to the explication of Kacc and Kacc-v. In certain cases scholars would simply add a new paragraph to the explanation of any given sutta based upon the works of post-Kacc Pāli grammarians. This has given rise to numerous interpolations that were added to the text at different periods of time during its transmission. All extant versions derive from the same archetype because they all share one scribal mistake: Kacc-v 35 quotes Ja II 316,22 with the reading *vijjā* instead of *vijjāmayaṃ*.[146]

§ 49. If one compares the version of Kacc-v on which Mmd depends with the one known to Chapaṭa, the author of Kacc-nidd, it becomes abundantly clear that already by the beginning of the fifteenth century A.D. Kacc-v had become inflated by massive interpolation. Chapaṭa mentions some of the sources, but he may not have been aware of all of them. Most of the interpolations consist of far-fetched interpretations of any given *ca* of a sutta, which were added to the original text.

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[145]These problems will be addressed in a new edition of Kacc and Kacc-v in preparation.

[146]The correct reading has been preserved in Sadd 618,23.

IV.1.4. Reformulations of Kacc-v

§ 50. In a few cases Mmd quotes readings that are not found in the
standard Burmese and Sinhalese versions of Kacc-v. Thus, for instance,
in the annotations on Kacc-v 41, Mmd[147] reproduces the following
passage: *tiṇṇaṃ vyañjanānam antare ye sarūpā tesam pi ādissa lopo
hoti*: "among three consonants [constituting a consonant cluster] the
first of those that are identical is elided". In spite of the fact that this
formulation is the only one that is meaningful in the context, the
standard editions have different readings. Thus E[e] reads *tiṇṇam pi
byañjanānaṃ antare sarūpānaṃ kvaci lopo hoti.* The same passage in
C[e] (1904) reads: *ca-saddaggahaṇena tiṇṇam pi byañjanānaṃ sa-
rūpānaṃ kvaci lopo hoti*, whereas B[e] and C[e] (1898) read *tiṇṇaṃ
byañjanānaṃ antare ye sarūpā tesam pi lopo hoti.* An interesting quota-
tion from Dāṭhānāga's *Niruttisāramañjūsā* in Subhūti's Nāmamāla[148]
shows that scholars differentiated between the original and the new
reading (*purimapāṭha* and *navapāṭha*) of this passage. Except for minor
discrepancies the old one is identical with B[e] and C[e] (1898), whereas C[e]
(1904) and E[e] have adopted the new reading, except that E[e] retains
antare, thus apparently merging the old and the new one.

§ 51. Another interesting quotation which shows that the standard text
has been edited is found at Mmd 440,19–20: *"ekassa ekā hoti dasassa ca
raso hotī" ti ādim āha*, i.e., "*ekā* is substituted for *eka* and *rasa* is
substituted for *dasa*". This has been reformulated in the standard
versions of B[e] and C[e] as *ekassa ekā*[149] *hoti dasassa ca dakārassa ro
ādeso hoti*: "*ekā* is substituted for *eka* and the phoneme *r* is substituted
for the phoneme *d* of *dasa*".

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[147]Mmd 55,8–9.

[148]Quoted at Nāmamāla xiii, 11–12: *imassa ca vuttiyaṃ "ca-saddaggahaṇena
tiṇṇaṃ pi byañjanānaṃ antare ye sarūpā tesam pi lopo hotī" ti ca "ca-
saddaggahaṇena tiṇṇam pi byañjanānaṃ sarūpānaṃ kvaci lopo hotī" ti cā ti
'me dve pāṭhā bhinnā, tesu paṭhamapāṭho va purimapāṭho, dutiyapāṭho pana
navapāṭho, taṃ idāni paṭhanti.*

[149]E[e] *eko*.

IV.1.5. Kacc-v as Interpreter of Kacc

§ 52. The obscure formulation of certain rules in combination with the uncertainty caused by *sandhi* must have caused the compiler of Kacc-v many problems. In some cases it is questionable whether the interpretation reflects the intention of the original. Thus for instance Kacc-v 49 quotes both *puthujjano* (D I 3,32) and *puthubhūtaṃ* (D II 106,10) under Kacc 49 (see §42) in spite of the fact that in the cpd *puthubhūtaṃ puthu* is < Skt *pṛthu.* Another instance, according to Kacc-v 73 the sutta *gāva se* means that *āva* is substituted for the final element of *go* before the gen. sg. ending. This indicates that the scholiast interpreted *gāva* as < *go* + *āva* meaning *āva* is substituted for the vowel *o* of *go.* Although the interpretation is sensible it is syntactically difficult to defend: the sutta can only mean *gāva* occurs before the termination of the gen. sg. viz. *gāvassa.* However, this form is not recorded in the canon, only *gavassa* occurs. This would indicate that the reading *gāva* might be a sandhi form *go* + *ava* > *gāva.* On the other hand, the following suttas presuppose the morpheme *āva.* There is evidently no obvious solution to this problem. In one case it appears that the scholiasts have misinterpreted the *sandhi* form *namh' āni* at Kacc 647: *akkose namh' āni,* as *namhi* + *āni.* The suffix, however, is *ani,* cf. Pāṇ III 3 112, of which Kacc 647 is a verbatim reproduction.[150] The anonymous commentator also misinterprets Kacc 246, which has given rise to the ghost word *tudampati* (see § 87).

§ 53. Kacc-v often takes the opportunity to complement the rules of Kacc so as to enlarge their scope. In the majority of cases it is done on the interpretation of any given *ca.* For instance, Kacc 67: *no ca dv'-ādito namhi* states that the numerals *dvi,* etc., take an additional *n* (*āgama*) before the endings of gen. pl. Kacc-v adds on the interpretation of *ca* an additional *ssa,* quoting two examples, one of which is canonical: *catassannaṃ itthīnaṃ* and *tissannaṃ vedanānaṃ* (S V 21,23). There is only one recorded canonical example of the use of *catassannaṃ* at

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[150]Both Rūp and Sadd follow Kacc-v on this point.

A II 154,33. Examples like this are not uncommon and indicate the wish to improve upon Kacc so that it describes more fully recorded usage. An interesting case is the annotation on Kacc 69: *ādito o ca*. The *vuttikāra* interprets this to mean that *ṃ* and *o* are optionally substituted for the loc. morpheme of *ādi*. The substitute *ṃ* is wrongly read into the rule from Kacc 68: *am-ā pato smiṃ-smānaṃ vā*. The example *ādiṃ* is certainly not to be interpreted as loc.; the other example, *ādo*, is recorded. The interpretation may have been motivated by the concluding paragraph which, on the interpretaton of *ca*, claims that *ā*, *o*, and *ṃ* are used as substitutes for the loc. morpheme after other words;[151] the examples are *divā ca ratto ca haranti ye baliṃ* (Sn 223) and *Bārāṇasiṃ ahu*[152] *rājā* (Ja V 68,28). The last example is interesting because the recorded reading is *Bārāṇassaṃ ahū*, not the problematic *Bārāṇasiṃ ahu*[153] which would seem to stem from a different manuscript tradition. However, the underlying intention of the exegesis is clear: it aims at complementing Kacc so as to bring its description in line with recorded usage.

IV.1.6. Canonical and Non-canonical Quotations in Kacc-v

§ 54. There are close to 200 canonical quotations in Kacc-v, which shows that the commentator(s) who compiled the *vutti* took pains to illustrate the rules by means of examples taken from the Pāli canon. So far it has been possible to identify approximately 23 quotations from Dīgha, 21 from Majjhima, 13 from Saṃyutta, 10 from Aṅguttara, and 34 from Vinaya. From the Khuddaka there are, not surprisingly, 44 quotations from Dhammapada, 15 from Suttanipāta, 6 from Khuddaka-kāṭha, 20 from the Jātaka, 2 from Udāna, 3 from Itivuttaka, and 3

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[151]Kacc-v ad loc.: *ca-saddaggahaṇena aññasmā pi smiṃvacanassa ā o aṃ ādesā honti vā.*

[152]C^e1 *āhu*; B^eC^e2E^e *ahu.*

[153]Ja V 68,28 reads *Bārāṇassaṃ* (v.l. °*ṇasyaṃ*) *ahū*; cf. Sadd 204,13*ff.*; Sadd 644,5: *aññasmā ā ca*: *aññasmā saddato smiṃ-vacanassa aṃ-o-ā-ādesā honti*: ... *Bārāṇasiṃ ahū rājā* (Ja V 68,28). *vā ti kiṃ? Bārāṇasyaṃ mahārāja* (Ja II 435,14). *Bārāṇassan ti pi pāṭho.*

quotations from Apadāna. In addition, there is one quotation from Vibhaṅga, as well as a number of unidentifiable quotations from Pāli literature that must be considered lost. To these examples we may add all those instances — most of them canonical — where no context is quoted.

§55. Most of the quotations are found in the *sandhi* chapter and the *kāraka* chapter. Other illustrations occur unsystematically, which leaves the impression that they have been added more or less at random. Thus, for instance, Kacc-v 57 quotes *bhoti Kharādiye* (Ja I 160,3)[154] as an example of voc. of fem. in *ā*, but omits quoting examples to illustrate the subequent rules, although this could easily have been done.

§ 56. What is particularly interesting about these quotations is the fact that they rarely deviate from the transmitted text of the canon. When they do, it raises the interesting question of which exemplars were used by the compiler(s). Thus, for instance, the quotation from M I 240,29 at Kacc-v 308: reads *upamāyo* for *upamā* of B^{e}E^e.[155] Kacc-v 312 quotes Vin III 212,6 as an example of the use of the loc. in the sense of the direct object with the remarkable reading *bhikkhūsu* for E^e *bhikkhū*. B^e, on the other hand, reads *bhikkhūsu*, so we must conclude that this reading was actually found in some manuscripts or that B^e was edited on the basis of Kacc-v.[156]

§ 57. Some of the examples were no doubt quoted from memory, which has caused slight distortions of the original. In most cases it is possible to identify the canonical source. Thus the quotation at Kacc-v 18: *te*

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[154]B^{e}C^{e2} and v.l. at E^e *Khar°*; E^{e}C^{e1} *ghar°*, cf. Kacc-nidd 26,34–35: *bhoti gharādiye* (sic) *ti bhaginināmena ālapatī ti ekanipāte vuttaṃ*; Kacc-vaṇṇ 78,29–30: *gharādiye* (*sic*) *ti bhagini-ṃ-nāmenâlapatī ti ekanipāta-aṭṭha-kathāyaṃ* (so read for *ettha nipāta°*) *vuttaṃ*; Ja I 160,6′ reads: *Kharādiye* (B^{e}C^{e}E^e so) *ti taṃ nāmena ālapati.*

[155]Trenckner records the variant *upamāyo* and refers to Kacc-v at M I 550 (ad sutta 36 line 30).

[156]The reading is confirmed by all sources.

'nāgatā is probably based upon Vin V 221,₁₄: *te anāgatā honti*, and the source of the quotation at Kacc-v 20: *idh' eva maraṇaṃ bhavissati* would seem to be Vin III 13,₁₇: *idh' eva me maraṇaṃ bhavissati*. The two odd quotations at Kacc-v 27: *sa ve muni jātibhayaṃ adassī* and *eso dhammo padissati* are most probably distorted versions of Sn 209: *sa ve munī jātikhayantadassī* and Ja V 195,₂₁: *eso dhūmo padissati*. The grammatically impossible quotation at Kacc-v 36 *parosahassaṃ bhikkhusataṃ* is a distorted version of S I 192,₃₀*: *parosahassaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ*.[157] The original of Kacc-v 38: *ahaṃ eva nūna bālo* must be Vin IV 331,₁₄: *ahaṃ eva nūna bālā*, and the quotation *dhammaṃ vo bhikkhave desissāmi* at Kacc-v 147 is probably based upon Vin I 23,₂₅: *dhammaṃ vo desessāmi*. The quotation *sahâpi Gaggena saṅgho uposathaṃ kareyya* at Kacc-v 289 reads like a slightly edited version of Vin I 123,₂₄: *saṅgho saha vā Gaggena vinā vā Gaggena uposathaṃ kareyya*. The quotation *sace maṃ samaṇo Gotamo nâlapissati* at Kacc-v 309 is based upon S I 177,₂₇₋₂₈: *sace maṃ samaṇo Gotamo ālapissati ... no ce maṃ samaṇo Gotamo ālapissati*. In one case a wrong quotation is due to scribal error (see §47).

IV.1.7. Interpolations in Kacc-v

§58. The main source of interpolation is no doubt Mmd, from which the main part of the commentary on Kacc 330 has been taken, as well as his remarks on the interpretation of any given *ca* or the like. Another important source is Rūp, but there are also other sources, some of which cannot be identified with any degree of certainty.[158] In some cases, commentators were aware of the source of a particular interpolation and identified it. A few examples will suffice to show the character of such interpolations.

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[157]Cᵉ¹⁻²Eᵉ *bhikkhusataṃ*, Bᵉ om., so also Rūp-v; Sadd §130 substitutes *bhikkhusaṅghaṃ* (sic!); the readings *bhikkhusataṃ* and *bhikkhusaṅghaṃ* are grammatically impossible to construe.

[158]All interpolations in Kacc-v will be dealt with in a new edition of Kacc and Kacc-v in preparation.

§ 59. After the examples quoted at Kacc-v 182, C^(e1–2) (1898 and 1904) add *casaddaggahaṇena abyaggamanaso naro* (A I 130,1) *ti ādisu mana-saddato sissa okārâdeso hoti.* The source is Mmd 165,5–8. This interpretation is not in B^e (1974) or E^e, but very early on it had become part of the exegetical tradition as appears from Sadd, Kacc-nidd, and Kacc-vaṇṇ.[159]

§ 60. After the counter-example *brahmā* quoted at Kacc-v 198, C^(e1-2) as well as E^e interpolate: *uttaṃ iti bhāvaniddeso* (E^e °*ena*) *katthaci abhāvaṃ dasseti: brahmassa.* The source is Rūp 123: *uttam iti bhāva-niddeso katthaci abhāvadassanattho: brahmunā, brahmehi brahmebhi.* B^e does not contain this interpolation. However, in the paragraph that follows the counter-examples at Kacc-v 200 all versions share the same interpolation: *ārattaggahaṇena katthaci aniyamaṃ* (E^e w.r. *ni*°) *dasseti: satthussa, pitussa, mātussa, bhātussa.* The source is Rūp 159: *ārattam iti bhāvaniddesena katthaci aniyamaṃ dasseti.*

§ 61. An example from Kacc-v 277 may illustrate the extent to which the text sometimes has been altered. The concluding paragraph interpreting *ca* reads: *casaddaggahaṇena sesesv api ye mayā nôpadiṭṭhā apādānappayogikā te payogavicakkhaṇehi yojetabbā.* Mmd neither quotes nor paraphrases this paragraph, and, moreover, interprets the use of *ca* otherwise: *caggahaṇena aññathā pi pañcamīvibhattiñ ca chaṭṭhī-dutiyā-tatiyāvibhattiyo ca saṅgaṇhāti.*[160] It is presumably an interpolation made by post-Buddhapiya grammarians, although it is difficult to trace the formulation to any particular grammar. Aggavaṃsa has written

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[159] See Kacc-nidd 70,14–17: *idha caggahaṇena abyaggamanaso naro* (see supra), *Kassapassa vaco sutvā* (Ja VI 227,5*) *ti ettha sivacanassa ca aṃvacanassa ca okārâdeso hoti*; Kacc-vaṇṇ 180,4–8: *abyaggamanaso naro* (see supra), *Kassapassa vaco* (see supra) *ty ādīni caggahaṇaphalāni; tattha ca abya-ggamanasaddato simhi kate caggahaṇena siss' okāraṃ katvā sakārâgame kate rūpaṃ, Kassapassa vaco ti vacasaddato amhi kate caggahaṇena aṃvacanassa okāraṃ katvā sese kate rūpaṃ*; for the second example, see Sadd 663,27 and § 377: *aṃvacanass' o.*

[160] Mmd 218,33–34; cf. Rūp 107,7: *casaddena yathāyogaṃ dutiyā chaṭṭhī ca.*

a similar paragraph at Sadd 708,23–24, not related to the interpretation of *ca*, but to *ādi* (sic): *ādisaddena ye amhehi anupadiṭṭhā apādāna-ppayogā te payogavicakkhanehi yojetabbā.* It is possible that the source of interpolation is Kacc-nidd, which, in addition, quotes the inter-pretations of Mmd and its *ṭīkā*.[161]

§62. Kacc-v 358 is an extreme instance of interpolation. It is possible to deduce from Mmd that the version of the commentary that was known to Vajirabuddhi must have read: *tad assa ṭṭhānaṃ icc etasmiṃ atthe īya-ppaccayo hoti. madanassa ṭhānaṃ madanīyaṃ, bandhanassa ṭhā-naṃ bandhanīyaṃ, mucchanassa*[162] *ṭhānaṃ mucchanīyaṃ.*[163] *evaṃ ra-janīyaṃ, kamanīyaṃ.*[164] After the first paragraph E^e and C^{e1} interpolate: *dassanassa ṭhānaṃ dassanīyaṃ upādānassa ṭhānaṃ upādānīyaṃ*; C^{e2} *dassanīyaṃ, upādanīyaṃ*; B^e *gamaniyaṃ, dussaniyaṃ, dassaniyaṃ.* These interpolations are based upon Mmd 314,22–24: *caggahaṇena hitâdyatthe pi īya-ppaccayo hoti, tena upādānānaṃ hitā ti atthe idha caggahaṇena īya-ppaccaye kate upādānīyā ty ādīni sijjhanti.*[165]

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[161] See Kacc-nidd 103,21–29: *caggahaṇena dūrantikaddhānâdīhi sesesu atthesu ye apādānapayogikā saddappayogā mayā nôpadiṭṭhā te saddappayogā vicakkhaṇehi paṇḍitehi yathāyogaṃ nāmûpasagganipātakiriyâpadânurūpaṃ yojetabbā ti. Nyāse pana "casaddaggahaṇena aññattha pañcamī vibhatti ca chaṭṭhī-dutiyā-tatiyā-vibhattiyo ca saṃgaṇhātī" ti vuttaṃ. Nyāsaṭīkāyaṃ ca "caggahaṇena karaṇabhūtena suttâgatappayogato aññatthappayoge pañcamīvibhatti ca apādānakārake chaṭṭhī-dutiyā-tatiyā-vibhattiyo ca saṃgaṇhātī"(= Mmd-pṭ 133,28f.) ti vuttaṃ; — Kacc-vaṇṇ 218,17–22: ca-ggahaṇena sesesv api ye mayā nôpadiṭṭhā apādānasaññā ca chaṭṭhī-dutiyâdayo vibhattiyo ca kātabbā ty attho. caggahaṇen' eva saññāvidhānañ ca vidhividhānañ ca hotī ti adhippāyo.*

[162] Read *mucchanassa* with B^e and Rūp.

[163] Read *mucchanīyaṃ* with B^e and Rūp.

[164] See, e.g. *amataṃ rāgaṭṭhānīyaṃ rajanīyaṃ kamanīyaṃ madanīyaṃ bandhanīyaṃ mucchanīyan ti*, Kv 401,31ff. ≠ Kv 222,15ff. which represent the only canonical instances where all these terms are used in the neuter.

[165] See Rūp ad 366: *madanassa ṭhānaṃ madanīyo, madanīyaṃ, bandhanassa ṭhānaṃ bandhanīyaṃ, evaṃ mucchanīyaṃ, rajanīyaṃ, gamanīyaṃ,*

§ 63. Vajirabuddhi's annotation was, in turn, utilized by Aggavaṃsa at Sadd 789,29 (§ 774): *upādānâdito iyo hitatthâdisu.* However, the reading *dussaniyaṃ* of B^e would seem to be based upon Mogg-p ad Mogg IV 69.[166] finally, the vutti in E^{e}C^{e1-2} concludes with the following interpolation: *ca-saddaggahaṇena iya-ila-ppaccayā honti. rañño idaṃ ṭhānaṃ, rājiyaṃ, evaṃ rājilaṃ*; the examples quoted in this paragraph are mentioned neither at Mmd nor at Rūp or Sadd 789,27*ff.*; the paragraph stems from Cūḷ-nir as indicated by Kacc-bh-nṭ[167]: *Cūḷa-niruttyâdipakaraṇe tad assa ṭhānam īyo cā ti sutte casaddena ila-iyapaccayā hontī ti.* It thus appears that Cūḷ-nir, in contrast to Mmd, for example, interpreted *ca* so as to include the suffixes *iya* and *ila* which are not recorded in Pāli.

§ 64. In a few cases the anonymous editors of Kacc-v have copied verses from Rūp and the Bījâkhyā and inserted them in the relevant section of the vutti. Thus all versions quote the following *kārikā* from Rūp:[168]

> *yo vadeti sa kattā ti yaṃ vuttam kamman ti vuccati*
> *yo paṭiggāhako tassa sampadānaṃ vijāniyā*

It is not mentioned in Mmd, but it must have been interpolated before Chapaṭa's time because he quotes the beginning of it at Kacc-nidd

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dassanīyaṃ, upādānīyaṃ, pasādanīyaṃ. casaddena hitâdiatthe pi —
upādānānaṃ hitā upādānīyā icc ādi.

[166]*madanīyâdippasiddhiyā Kaccāyane "tad assa ṭṭhānam īyo cā" ti suttitaṃ. tam iha (evam maññate) karaṇe 'dhikaraṇe vā anīyena siddhan ti āha (madanīyan tīccādi. itisaddo vā ādyattho; tato bandhanīyaṃ mucchanīyaṃ rajanīyaṃ) kamanīyaṃ dussanīyan ti ādīni pi daṭṭhabbāni.* Kacc-vaṇṇ ad loc. interprets *dassanīyaṃ arahatthe: dassanaṃ arahati dassanīyaṃ;* cf. Kacc-nidd ad loc. quoting Mmd ad 358 and Rūp ad 366: *tattha ādiggahaṇena arahatthaṃ saṃgaṇhāti.*

[167]Kacc-bh-nṭ 168.

[168]Rūp 102,21–22.

109,1: *"yo vadeti" ādim āha.*[169] A verse from Bījâkhyā (see §§ 3–4) has been interpolated in Kacc-v 354:

> na vuḍḍhi nīlapītâdo paccaye saṇakārake
> phakāro phussasaddassa siro ti sirasaṃ vade[170]

IV.2. Post-Kaccāyana Pāli Grammars and Grammarians as Reflected in the Grammatical Literature
IV.2.1. The Question of Chronology

§65. The chronology of post-Kacc Pāli grammars, quite apart from the problems attached to Kacc-v, constitutes a serious problem which cannot be resolved satisfactorily: most of the literature is no longer extant and has to be studied on the basis of a few fragments quoted in Pāli grammars written at a later date. The following grammars are treated in the order suggested by internal evidence. Some of the works like the Saṅgaha, and the two *sandhi* treatises which Buddhapiya utilized, cannot be fitted into any relative chronology.

IV.2.2. Mahānirutti (Mahā-nir)

§66. The Mahā-nir is, like Kacc and Nir-piṭ, attributed to Buddha's disciple Mahākaccāyana (see §14). It is described in Mmd-pṭ (see §112) as a particular grammar of someone belonging to a different school (*nikāyantaravāsin*),[171] which would indicate that it differs from the school of Kacc. However, since Cūḷ-nir comments on Kacc it may not be wrong to assume that Mahā-nir also comments upon it. Within the relative chronology the work belongs to the period after Kacc-v, whose existence it seems to presuppose, and it is thus datable to the second half of the eighth century A.D.

§67. It is possible to deduce from the limited number of references to and quotations from Mahā-nir in other Pāli grammars that the treatise

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[169]It is also quoted at Kacc-vaṇṇ 220,32–33.

[170]Quoted and identified at Kacc-nidd 175,21–23.

[171]Mmd-pṭ 168,6: *Sudattakisivanirutti-Mahāniruttī ti nikāyantaravāsīnaṃ byā-karaṇavisesāni.*

was composed in the form of suttas and a prose commentary accompanied by *kārikās*.

§68. Vajirabuddhi identifies Mahā-nir and Sudattakisivanirutti as two sources of interpolations made in Kacc (see §18). The interpolated suttas show a marked dependence on Pāṇini. In a few cases they depend on the Kātantra, and a couple of suttas seem to presuppose knowledge of Kacc-v (see §69). Since it is not possible to distinguish between suttas from Mahā-nir and Sudattakisivanirutti they are quoted and identified in the context of Mahā-nir. All of the them except sutta 33 are interpolated in the *kāraka* section. As indicated by Mmd they must have been accompanied by a prose commentary:

1. *tesaṃ param ubhayappattimhi* (Mmd 237,14), cf. Kāt II 4:16[172]

2. *sesā kammakaraṇasampadānâpadānasāyādiniddesesu* (242,38), cf. Kāt II 4:19[173]

3. *gatyatthe ca* (251,37), cf. Pāṇ I 4:52

4. *tatiyāya ca dutiyā* (260,14), cf. Pāṇ II 3:31

5. *sar'-isvādīnaṃ kammani chaṭṭhī* (260,21), cf. Pāṇ II 3:52

6. *karotissa patiyatne* (260,28), cf. Kāt II 4:39 < Pāṇ II 3:53

7. *kattukammānaṃ kiti* (260,33), cf. Pāṇ II 3:65

8. *yajassa karaṇo* (Mmd 261,3), Pāṇ II 3:63

9. *na tiṭṭhâdisu* (261,8), cf. Pāṇ II 3:69

10. *āhutikāladdhānesu dutiyā tatiyā ca* (261,19), cf. Pāṇ II 3:3+5

11. *kimalamatthe chaṭṭhī catutthī ca* (261,34)

12. *kattur icchitatamaṃ kammaṃ* (262,7), cf. Pāṇ I 4:49

13. *yutte cânicchite* (262,17), cf. Pāṇ I 4:50

14. *upânvajjhâvassa* (262,22), Pāṇ I 4:48

15. *antarâdīhi yutte* (262,32), cf. Pāṇ II 3:4

16. *abhitoparotomhi* (262,37), cf. Mahā-bh ad Pāṇ II 3:2, Cand II 1:52

17. *tappānâcāratthe* (263,3)

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[172]See Mmd 238,19: *na ... eso purimo pāṭho.*

[173]See Mmd 243,12: *na c' etaṃ porāṇakasuttaṃ.*

18. *hetuppayoge chaṭṭhītatiyā ca* (263,7), cf. Pāṇ II 3:26

19. *sādhunipuṇayutte sattamī* (263,12), cf. Pāṇ II 3:43

20. *gottanāmajātisippavayesu tatiyā* (263,17), cf. Kacc 294

21. *ubhayappatte kammani* (263,21), cf. Pāṇ II 3:66

22. *katassa ca vattamāne* (263,29), cf. Pāṇ II 3:67

23. *tulyupamāṇe tatiyā ca* (263,34), cf. Pāṇ II 3:72

24. *gahâdīnaṃ kammani sattamī* (264,3)

25. *karaṇatthe bhikkhâcāre* (264,8)

26. *pañcamiyā yutte* (264,14)

27. *ūnapuṇṇehi dutiyā tatiyā ca* (264,19), cf. Pāṇ II 1:31

28. *vupāssa ca* (264,26)

29. *kammatthe paṭhamā* (264,31)

30. *ākhyātôpayoge pañcamī* (265,1), cf. Pāṇ I 4:29

31. *jātyākhyāyaṃ bahuvacanam ekasmiṃ kvaci* (265,7), cf. Pāṇ I 2:58

32. *attani garusu ca kvaci* (265,27), cf. Pāṇ I 2:59

33. *siyāliṅgassa ca* (285,14).[174]

§69. Aggavaṃsa has based a number of paragraphs in Sadd on these suttas, incorporating the relevant examples into them: sutta 8 is utilized for Sadd §636, sutta 11 for Sadd §638, sutta 20 for Sadd §604, sutta 23 for Sadd §638, sutta 31 for Sadd §670, and sutta 32 for Sadd §670. Some of them are particularly interesting because they describe uses of the cases in Pāli which are also dealt with by the Saṅgahakāra (see IV.2.7). Thus the examples that illustrate 24: "the locative in construction with √*gah*, etc., is used in the sense of the acc.", namely (*Bodhisattassa*) *muddhani ... cumbitvā* (Ja VI 291,2–3, and (*purisassa*) *nānābāhāsu gahetvā* (M I 365,19), are also quoted in Mmd as illustrations of the view of the Saṅgahakāra.[175] Neither Kacc nor Kacc-v describes this usage. However, the examples that illustrate 25: "[the locative] is used in the sense of the instrument in the context of begging

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[174]Cf. *n' edaṃ porāṇakaṃ*, Mmd 285,15.

[175]Mmd 255,16.

for alms", viz. *naggā hatthesu piṇḍāya caranti* (Vin I 90,20), *samaṇā pattesu piṇḍāya caranti* (…), are quoted at Kacc-v 312. Sutta 29: "the nominative is used in the sense of the accusative" is based upon a peculiar analysis of the well-known canonical phrase *yena bhagavā ten' upasaṅkami.* According to this, *Bhagavā* is used in the acc. because the underlying sentence structure is assumed to be *yattha Bhagavantaṃ adakkhi.*[176] This analysis is not supported by the Aṭṭhakathās.

§70. Buddhapiya concludes the *kāraka* chapter of Rūp by quoting a verse from Mahā-nir summarising the case terminology of the Aṭṭhakathās:

> *paccattam upayogañ ca, karaṇaṃ sampadāniyaṃ.*
> *nissakkaṃ sāmivacanaṃ, bhummâlapanam aṭṭhaman ti.*[177]

Aggavaṃsa quotes it as a summary (*uddāna*) of a prose passage propounding the Niruttilakkhaṇa, i.e., the definition (of the cases) of the (Mahā)nirutti. This indicates that already at the time of the composition of Mahā-nir, grammarians attempted to integrate the terminology and grammatical tradition of the Aṭṭhakathās into their grammars. It is remarkable that the Niruttilakkhaṇa substitutes *āmantaṇa* "the act of addressing, inviting" (Skt *āmantraṇa*[178]) for *ālapana.*[179] The same term is used to denote the voc. in Rūp, presumably because it was used in Buddhapiya's main sources Mahā-nir, Cūḷ-nir, and Mañj.[180] It may have been introduced from the Kātantra.[181]

§71. According to Aggavaṃsa Mahā-nir differs from Kacc with respect to the definition of the tense (*kāla*) of the verb which is described as

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[176]Mmd 264,34.

[177]See Rūp 116,20–21; identified as coming from Mahā-nir at Rūp-ṭ 127,24.

[178]See Pāṇ III 3:161.

[179]See *CPD* s.v. *āmantaṇa*.

[180]See the verse quoted at Rūp 93,16–18 from Mañj defining the voc. in terms of *āmantaṇa*; (see §94).

[181]*āmantraṇa* is used by the Kātantra II 4:18 to denote the voc.

sixfold as opposed to Kacc where it is defined as fourfold.[182] Both Mmd and Rūp quote a verse from Mahā-nir defining the nature of the verb:

> *yan tikālaṃ tipurisaṃ kriyāvāci tikārakaṃ*
> *atiliṅgaṃ dvivacanaṃ tad ākhyātan ti vuccati.*[183]

§72. Gv 70 mentions an abridgement of Mahā-nir called *Mahānirutti-saṅkhepa* about which nothing is known.

IV.2.3. Sudattakisivanirutti (Sudatta-nir)

§73. Mmd is the only Pāli grammar that mentions this treatise. Nothing is known about it except that certain scholars copied suttas from it and interpolated them in Kacc. Like Mahā-nir, the author of Mmd-pṭ considers it a particular grammar by someone belonging to a different school (see §66). It cannot be excluded, however, that it is a commentary on Kacc. Perhaps it is composed at the time of Mahā-nir.

§74. Formally it consisted of suttas and a commentary. Since it is not possible to separate the suttas of Sudatta-nir from those that have been copied from Mahā-nir, they have been treated together (see §68).

IV.2.4. Niruttipiṭaka (Nir-piṭ)

§75. The Nir-piṭ is, like Mahā-nir, attributed to Mahākaccāyana.[184] The way in which the work is quoted or referred to in grammars like Mogg and Sadd would indicate that it is composed after Mahā-nir. It is not possible to determine whether it is based upon Kacc or related to Kacc. Presumably it emulates Kacc and Kacc-v like Mahā-nir. One may tentatively date it to the first half of the ninth century A.D.

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[182]Sadd 50,23–31: *nanu Kaccāyane ganthe | kālo vutto catubbidho || ... || tathā hi chabbidho kālo | Niruttimhi pakāsito: || atītânāgato paccu|ppanno āṇatti-m-eva ca || parikappo ca kālassa | atipattī ti chabbidho*; cf. Sadd 56,3–58,2.

[183]The verse is identified at Rūp-san 298,29; cf. Sadd 50,20: *"yan tikālan" ti vuttam ācariyehi*, occurring in the context of a discussion of the views expressed in the Nirutti, i.e., Mahā-nir.

[184]See Sadd 168,34ff.: *Niruttipiṭakaṃ nāma pabhinnapaṭisambhidena mahā-khīṇâsavena Mahākaccāyanena katan ti loke pasiddhaṃ.*

§76. It appears from the quotations in Sadd and Mogg that Nir-piṭ was composed in prose and *kārikās*.

§77. Like Cūḷ-nir (see IV.2.5), Nir-piṭ must have listed paradigms for all Pāli nominals because Aggavaṃsa often contrasts the various nominal and adjectival paradigms established in Nir-piṭ with those of Cūḷ-nir and Kacc.[185] Thus, for instance, he mentions in the discussion of the paradigm of the present participle *gacchaṃ · gacchanto*, etc., that the Nir-piṭ claims that such forms as *mahanto*, etc., exclusively are used as nom. and voc. pl., and, moreover, that the Nir-piṭ establishes this after quoting a *gāthā* summarizing a series of such participles in the nom. sg.: *mahaṃ bhavaṃ caraṃ tiṭṭhaṃ*.[186] A similar *gāthā* is quoted in Rūp.[187] It is likely that Nir-piṭ contained such verses enumerating a series of words belonging to a particular inflectional category. This is also the case with Rūp, which may have utilized Nir-piṭ for this purpose.

§78. In his discussion of the pronominal inflection, Moggallāna claims that Nir-piṭ authorizes the inflectional endings *ā*, *e*, and *āya* in abl., loc., and dat., respectively, except in the case of the pronominal stems *ta*, *eta*, and *ima*.[188] However, Mogg maintains that this exception is meaning-

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[185]For a list of references, see Sadd 1010 5.0.1 Niruttipiṭaka.

[186]Sadd 168,*3ff.*: *Niruttipiṭake paccattâlapanaṭṭhāne mahanto bhavanto caranto ti ādīnaṃ bahuvacanattam eva kathitaṃ na ekavacanattaṃ, tathā hi tattha "mahaṃ bhavaṃ caraṃ tiṭṭhan" ti gāthaṃ vatvā mahaṃ tiṭṭhati mahanto tiṭṭhantī ti ca bho mahā bhavanto mahanto ti ca bhavaṃ tiṭṭhati bhavanto tiṭṭhantī ti ca ādi vuttaṃ.*

[187]Sadd 37,26–27.

[188]See Mogg-p 82,*19ff.*: *Niruttipiṭake hi ta-eta-ima-vajjitānaṃ sabbâdīnaṃ ṭā-ṭe-āyā dassitā va āgame ca ya-saddassa catutthiyā ta-saddassa ca sattamiyaṃ ādeso dissati.* — The discussion in Sadd indicates that Cūḷ-nir did not make such exceptions; for Aggavaṃsa's sceptical remarks on this problem, see Sadd 267,19, 27–30; 652,1–4.

less as it is contradicted by the canon, which he proves by quoting relevant examples.[189]

§79. Aggavaṃsa quotes a couple of interesting passages from Nir-piṭ. One of them is the definition of the *dvandva* compound,[190] which he must have used when reformulating Kacc 331 at Sadd §709. The author of Nir-piṭ must have utilized Pāṇinian grammar for the description of the various types of *dvandva* compounds because Moggallāna reproduces at Mogg-v III 19 his definition showing dependence on Pāṇ II 4:2 foll. and Mahā-bh ad loc.[191]

§80. It is possible to deduce from another quotation in Sadd[192] that Nir-piṭ like Cūḷ-nir contained a chapter on the Pāli *nipātas*: *vuttaṃ hi Niruttipiṭake Nipātapadaparicchede*: *"tuṃ iti catutthiyā"* ti.[193] Rūp follows Nir-piṭ in this regard.[194] Sadd has also preserved the def. of the verb: *vuttaṃ h' etaṃ Niruttipiṭake "kiriyālakkhaṇaṃ ākhyātikaṃ aliṅgabhedaṃ"*, which is related to the verse which both Mmd and Rūp quote from Mahā-nir (see §71).[195]

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[189]See Mogg-v II.46: *asmā lokā paramhā ca ubhayā dhaṃsate naro* (= D III 184,25*); *tyāhaṃ mante paratthaddho* (Ja VI 182,1*); *yāy' eva kho pan' atthāya āgaccheyyātho, tam ev' atthaṃ sādhukaṃ manasikareyyātho* (= D I 90,19–20).

[190]Sadd 767,20–68,3: *Niruttipiṭake c'etaṃ vuttaṃ*: *"kathaṃ dvando bhavati: dvando nāma dvinnaṃ padānaṃ ekavibhattikānaṃ nānāliṅgānaṃ pubbapadam appakkharaṃ uttarapadaṃ tulyaṃ vā bahvakkharaṃ vā ekatthasamodhānaṃ gacchatī ti dvando"* ti.

[191]*tatrâyaṃ visayavibhāgo Niruttipiṇakāgato*: *pāṇi-turiya-yogga-senaṅgānaṃ, niccaverīnaṃ, saṅkhyāparimāṇasaññānaṃ, khuddakajantukāmaṃ, pacanacaṇḍālānaṃ, caraṇasādhāraṇānaṃ, ekajjhāyanapāvacanānaṃ, liṅgavisesānaṃ, vividhaviruddhānaṃ, disānaṃ, nadīnaṃ niccaṃ samāhārekatthaṃ bhavati.*

[192]Sadd 310,8–10.

[193]Quoted Sadd 894,3.

[194]Rūp 89,16: *tave-tuṃ-paccayantā catutthiyā.*

[195]Op. cit. 26,2–6.

§81. It appears from another passage that Nir-piṭ defines the term *nirutti* in accordance with its canonical definition: *Niruttipiṭake pana "saṃkhā samaññā paññatti vohāro nāmaṃ nāmakammaṃ nāmadheyyaṃ nirutti vyañjanaṃ abhilāpo* (= Nidd I 127,12–14; Dhs §1306; As 390,13–91,20)" *ti imehi dasahi vuttā dhammajāti nirutti nāma.*[196]

IV.2.5. Cūḷanirutti (Cūḷ-nir)

§82. The Burmese and Sinhalese grammarians attribute Cūḷ-nir to Yamakamahāthera.[197] The treatise appears to be lost, but it is possible to form an idea of its nature through quotations and references to it in Mogg-p and Sadd. (Abhinava)-Cūḷanirutti which is still extant in manuscripts is apparently based upon Cūḷ-nir and may thus give an idea of its character.[198] Cūḷ-nir was probably composed after Nir-piṭ (see §75) and may thus belong the second half of the ninth century A.D.

§83. It appears from the few identifiable quotations found scattered in post-Kaccāyana grammatical literature that Cūḷ-nir is a commentary on Kacc. Together with its commentary (*vaṇṇanā*), the Mañjūsā (see IV.2.6), it is undoubtedly one of the most influential post-Kaccāyana Pāli grammars. Aggavaṃsa often refers to it together with Kacc and Nir-piṭ in the Padamālā,[199] when discussing the nominal, pronominal, or other paradigms of the Pāli, occasionally contrasting its paradigms with those of Kacc and Nir-piṭ.

§84. It is somewhat confusing that quotations from it are often ascribed to the Nirutti, but it is possible to deduce from the information contained in later lit. that they must stem from Cūḷ-nir. Most of them are *kārikā*s. Vijitāvī quotes in Kacc-vaṇṇ a verse from the Nirutti (= Cūḷ-nir) interpreting Kacc 14 followed by a few examples:

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[196]See Sadd 911,23–26.

[197]See Sadd *passim*; Pada-sādh-ṭ: 395,10.

[198]See Nāmamāla xxiv: *porāṇehi kataṃ gandhaṃ Cūḷaniruttan ti saññitaṃ.*

[199]For references, see Sadd 1010: 5.0.2 Cullanirutti.

> *vuttañ ca Niruttiyaṃ*
>> *pubbavikāro aparo vikāro duvidho mato*
>> *kvaci ty ādinā suttenā vikāro aparo mato.*
> *tatth' eva luttasaddena pubbavikāro vidhīyate iselayo munelayo*
> *rathesabho ti ādisu.*[200]

Aggavaṃsa has based Sadd §35 on this interpretation and copied the examples.[201] Vijitāvī also quotes a verse from the Nirutti interpreting Kacc 35. The verse adds on the interpretation of *ca* sixteen additional consonantal *āgamas* to the eight defined at Kacc 35:[202]

>> *yavamadâdisuttena ṭṭhabyañjana-m-āgamo*
>> *casaddena pana sesā catuvīsati byañjanā.*[203]

These *āgamas* are rejected as not instantiated in the Pāli.[204] Although post-Kaccāyana grammarians regard them as fictions, we find them quoted in Saddasāratthajālinī 270.

§85. Moggallāna refers several times to Cūḷ-nir in Mogg-p. Thus his remark that the *sandhi* form *yatha-r-iva < yathā eva* is found in the section on particles (*nipāta*) in the Cūḷ-nir,[205] shows that, like Nir-piṭ, the work devoted a chapter to the description of the particles. This

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[200]Kacc-vaṇṇ 30,9–12; Kacc-nidd on Kacc 14 quotes at 10,30–31 this verse:

> *lutte ti punuccāraṇena asavaṇṇaṃ paralope*
> *munelayo iselayo rathesabho ti ādisū ti.*

This is probably a verse from Cūḷ-nir: it is paraphrased in the prose passage explicating the verse at Kacc-vaṇṇ 30,9–12.

[201]Sadd 613,26*ff.* (≠ Kacc 16): *sare pubbo: parasare lutte pubbo saro kvaci asavaṇṇaṃ pappoti: munelayo rathesabho, sotthi — muni + ālayo, rathi + usabho su + itthī ti chedo.*

[202]See Kacc-vaṇṇ: 53,18–23.

[203]See Kacc-bh-nṭ 36,27: … *Cūḷaniruttiyañ … casaddena catuvīsati byañjana-āgamā honti.*

[204]See Kacc-vaṇṇ 53: *udāharaṇāni pana atthikehi Niruttiyaṃ oloketabbāni, mayaṃ pana pāḷi-aṭṭhakathāpāṭhass' eva abhāvato na uddharāma.*

[205]Kacc-vaṇṇ 23,13–14: *yathā eva > yatha-r-iva Niruttiyaṃ nipātamajjhe pāṭhā.*

tradition is followed by Rūp which quotes the same *sandhi* form in the chapter on particles,[206] as well as later grammarians like Sadd and Pay, both of which are dependent on Rūp.

§86. Moggallāna mentions at Mogg-v II 52 the following two forms of voc. sg. of *kaññā*: *bhoti kaññe · bhoti kaññā*. He justifies the form *kaññā* by referring to the fact that it is mentioned in the Nirutti (= Cūḷ-nir) although it is not described in Kacc.[207] There is no reason to doubt that Nirutti in this case = Cūḷ-nir because Aggavaṃsa quotes the same forms in Sadd referring to Cūḷ-nir.[208]

§87. In another context he criticizes the author of Kacc-v for permitting the unwarranted Sanskritism *sugandhi*, pointing out that it is found neither in the canon nor in the Nirutti.[209] Moreover, he observes that the ghost word *tudampati* is not found as an example in the Nirutti, as is the case with Kacc-v 246 and other commentaries.[210] In one case he has formulated his description of the suffixes *la* and *iya* at Mogg IV 58: *tena datte l'-iyā*, with reference to their definition in the Nirutti. In the discussion of this sutta at Mogg-p he quotes a fairly long passage from

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[206]See Kacc-vaṇṇ 90,14.

[207]Mogg-p 87,16–18: *yadi pi kaññā ti rūpam idaṃ na niddiṭṭhaṃ Kaccānena tathā pi Niruttiyaṃ niddiṭṭhattā etthā pi saṅgahitaṃ tathā brahmā ti.*

[208]Mogg-p 197,18.

[209]Mogg-p 180,14–19: *Kaccāyanavuttikārena "kvaci samāsantagatānaṃ akāranto" (= Kacc 339) ettha kāraggahaṇena sugandhi duggandhi pūtigandhi surabhigandhī ti ye te payogā sakkatânusārena sādhitā na te payogā idha sādhitā ti dassento āha sugandhī ccādi iti-saddo ādyattho payogo "na dissatī" ti āgame Niruttiyaṃ na dissati.*

[210]See Mogg-p 187,26–28: *yam pana Kaccāyanavutti-ādisu tudampatī ti udāharan ti nâyam payogo āgame Niruttiyañ ca tādisassa payogassâsambhavato (ad Mogg-v ad Mogg III 70 (= 74)).*

the Nirutti which is related to Mahā-bh on Pāṇ V 3:83 (cf. Kāś ad loc.).[211]

§88. Both Rūp[212] and Sadd[213] quote a prose passage from Cūḷ-nir defining the nature of the verb: *kālakārakapurisaparidīpikaṃ kriyā-lakkhaṇam ākhyātikaṃ*.[214] Sadd quotes another passage concerning the pronominal forms *te-me*, *tava-mam*, *tuyhaṃ-mayhaṃ*.[215]

§89. As mentioned above (see §63), unknown scholars have inter-polated a passage in Kacc-v 358 based upon Cūḷ-nir.

IV.2.6. Mañjūsā (Mañj)

§90. Sinhalese grammarians attribute the commentary on Cūḷ-nir, Cūḷa-niruttivaṇṇanā or Mañj, to a certain Patañjali. Gv 60, on the other hand, attributes it to an old ācariya (*pubbâcariya*). The Mañj was known to Vajirabuddhi, who apparently elaborates the views of Patañjali concern-ing the reality of the *kāraka*s in an interesting digression on Kacc 283 (see §93).[216] It is thus reasonable to assume that Mañj was written in the ninth century A.D. It is regretable that this interesting work appears to be lost[217] because it has exerted a major influence on most Pāli gram-marians who quote from it. In contrast to the majority of other Pāli

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[211]Mogg-p 225,₃₁*ff.*: *iha tu Niruttiyaṃ "kathaṃ kattukaraṇatthe bhavati?: devehi datto > devadatto devadattiko deviyo devalo; brahmunā datto > brahmadatto, brahmadattiko, brahmiyo, brahmalo; sivena datto > sivadatto, sivadattiko, siviyo, sivalo; nāgehi datto > nāgadatto, nāgadattiko, nāgiyo, nāgalo ti sāmaññena vuttattā avisesena vuttaṃ.*

[212]Rūp 171,₉–₁₀.

[213]Sadd 20,₂₂–₂₃.

[214]Quotation identified at Rūp-ṭ 179,₁₄.

[215]Sadd 292,₄–₆: *Cūḷaniruttiyaṃ hi Yamakamahātherena catutthī-chaṭṭhīnaṃ anaññarūpattaṃ vuttaṃ: "catutthī-chaṭṭhīnaṃ sabbattha aññaṃ, tatiyā-pañcamīnaṃ bahuvacanañ cā ti.*

[216]Mmd 231,₁₈*ff.*

[217]Mañj is mentioned in the Pagan inscription; see the list no. 226 in Bode: *PLB*: 107.

grammars, the Mañj is influenced by contemporary philosophy of language and apparently also by Buddhist philosophy.[218]

§91. The extant fragments show that Mañj was composed in the form of *kārikā*s accompanied by explicating prose.

§92. Buddhapiya quotes several verses from the Mañj. Most of them occur in the chapter of Rūp devoted to the description of the *kāraka*s. They show that Patañjali to some extent has based his description of Pāli's case grammar on Bhartṛhari's Trikaṇḍī (TK). In fact, some of the verses are almost verbatim reproductions of the TK. Thus, for instance, the verse defining the *apādāna kāraka* is a version of TK III 7:136, except that it substitutes *anumeyavisayañ ca* for *apekṣitakriyaṃ ceti* of TK:

> niddiṭṭhavisayaṃ kiñci upāttavisayaṃ tathā
> anumeyavisayañ cā ti apādānan tidhā mataṃ.[219]

Other verses substitute semantically equivalent Pāli terms for the terms used by Bhartṛhari, like, for instance, the verse defining the *sampadāna kāraka*, which is based upon VP III 7: 129:

> anirākaraṇârādhanabbhanuññavasen' idha
> sampadānaṃ tidhā vuttaṃ rukkhayācakabhikkhavo.[220]

§93. In the commentary on Rūp 288 (= Kacc 284) Buddhapiya quotes two verses stating that the domain of words is defined by convention (*vohāravisaya*) and is without ultimate reality (*nekantaparamatthika*); the denotation of a word is something imagined (*buddhisaṃkappita*) and thus also the syntactic relation, which therefore only has an imaginary existence (*vijjamāno va*).[221] This argument is closely related to the ideas

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[218]This seems obvious on a prima facie reading of the passage on *vohāra* (Buddh. Skt *vyavahāra*), quoted at Rūp 98,15; see below, §93.

[219]Rūp-v 104,34–35; quoted from Mañjūsā according to Rūp-ṭ 110,5.

[220]See Rūp 100,33–34; quoted Mog-p 55,19–20; according to Mog-pd 64,9 and Rūp-sn (170(=174),21 = Mañj.

[221]Rūp 98,15–18:

which Bhartṛhari propounds in the introductory section of *Sādhanasamuddeśa* TK III 7:1*ff.* The assumption of a connection between Mañj and this part of the TK is corroborated by the parallel section of Mmd 231,18*ff.* which evidently elaborates on ideas expressed in Mañj. In this excursus Vajirabuddhi uses the terms *satti* (Skt *śakti*) and *vyatti* (Skt *vyakti*) according to Bhartṛhari.[222]

§94. Apart from these examples, Buddhapiya quotes verses defining (1) the voc. (*āmantaṇa*),[223] (2) the syntactical concepts of *kamma*,[224] (3) *karaṇa*,[225] (4) *kattā, kammakattā, hetukattā*,[226] (5) *sambandha*,[227]

> *vohāravisayo saddo nekantaparamatthiko*
> *buddhisaṃkappito attho tass' attho ti pavuccati*
> *buddhiyā gahitattā hi saṃyogo jāyate iti*
> *saṃyogo vijjamāno va kattā bhavati jātiyā*

[222]See, e.g. VP III 7:1*ff.*

[223]Rūp 93,16–18:

> *saddenâbhimukhīkāro vijjamānassa vatthuno*
> *āmantaṇaṃ vidhātabbe n' atthi rājā bhavêti tan ti*

Identified at Rūp-ṭ 92,1.

[224]Rūp 94,8–9:

> *nibbattivikatippattibhedena tividhaṃ mataṃ.*
> *kattukriyâbhigammaṃ taṃ sukha'-ṅgāraṃ nivesanan ti.*

This verse is not identified as coming from Mañj; but its dependence on VP III 7:45 is obvious: *nivārtyaṃ ca vikāryaṃ ca prāpyaṃ ceti tridhā matam.*

[225]Rūp 97,3–4:

> *yassa sabbavisesena kriyāsaṃsiddhihetutā*
> *sambhāvīyati taṃ vuttaṃ karaṇaṃ nāma kārakan ti*

Identified at Rūp-ṭ 99,8; cf. VP III 7:93*ff.*

[226]Rūp 98,1–4:

> *attappadhāno kiriyaṃ yo nibbatteti kārako.*
> *appayutto payutto vā sa kattā ti pavuccati.*
> *hetukattā ti kathito kattuno yo payojako.*
> *kammakattā ti sukaro kammabhūto kathīyate ti.*

Identified at Rūp-ṭ 101,19; Rūp-sn 165(=170),36.

and (6) the morphologico-semantical concept of *samāsa*.[228] In addition he quotes a verse defining the two types of negation *pariyudāsa* and *pasajjapaṭisedha*.[229]

§95. There are two prose passages from Mañj quoted in Sadd. The first deals with the vocative *bho* which is correctly described as being used with nouns in the voc. sg. and pl.[230] The other is a long passage discussing the concept of *liṅga* which is indebted to Mahā-bh II 195,25*ff.*[231] Thus the verse that is part of this quotation is a Pāli version of a *kārikā*

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[227]Rūp 110,7–10:

> *kriyākārakasañjāto assêdambhāvahetuko*
> *sambandho nāma so attho, tattha chaṭṭhī vidhīyate.*
> *pāratantyaṃ hi sambandho tattha chaṭṭhī bhave tito*
> *upādhiṭṭhānā gamito na visesyâdito tito ti.*

Identified at Rūp-sn 191,14.

[228]Rūp 118,1–2:

> *samāso padasaṅkhepo, padappaccayasaṃhitaṃ.*
> *taddhitaṃ nāma hot' evaṃ viññeyyaṃ tesam antaran ti*

Identified at Rūp-sn 208,32.

[229]Rūp 124,31–32:

> *pasajjappaṭisedhassa lakkhaṇaṃ vatthunatthitā*
> *vatthuto aññatra vutti pariyudāsalakkhaṇan ti*

Identified at Rūp-sn 226,34.

[230]Sadd 171,10–14: *tathā hi Niruttimañjūsāyaṃ vuttaṃ: "bho t' idaṃ āmantaṇatthe nipāto, so na kevalaṃ ekavacanam eva hoti atha kho bahu-vacanam pi hotī ti bho purisā ti bahuvacanappayogo ti gahito, bhavanto t' idaṃ pana bahuvacanam eva hotī ti purisā puna vuttan" ti.*

[231]See Sadd 221,25*ff.*: *tathā hi ayaṃ Niruttimañjūsāyaṃ vutto: "kiṃ pan' etaṃ liṅgaṃ nāma: keci tāva vadanti:*

> *thanakesavatī itthī, massuvā puriso siyā,*
> *ubhinnam antaraṃ etaṃ itarôbhayamuttako ti*

... apare vadanti: na liṅgaṃ nāma paramatthato kiñci atthi, lokasaṃketarūḷho pana vohāro liṅgaṃ nāma ti etc.

found in Mahā-bh II 196,4–5.[232] Vajirabuddhi quotes it in Mmd; he may
have taken it from Mañj.[233]

IV.2.7. Saṅgaha (Sgh)

§96. The author of this treatise is referred to as the Saṅgahakāra (both in
the sg. and pl.), perhaps in imitation of the name Saṅgrahakāra known
from Sanskrit grammar. The Sgh is only known from a few quotations
in Vajirabuddhi's Mmd and Chapaṭa's Kacc-nidd. It is not possible to
date the work with any degree of certainty. However, it must have been
composed before the tenth century A.D., which is the approximate date
of Mmd, and after Kacc-v, which it appears to know, thus perhaps
between the eighth and tenth centuries A.D.

§97. The quotations show that the treatise is composed in the form of
*kārikā*s with an explicating prose commentary. Since they are confined
to the *kāraka* chapter of Mmd and Kacc-nidd, there is reason to believe
that the treatise is exclusively devoted to the description of Pāli's case
syntax.

§98. Vajirabuddhi quotes in Mmd four prose passages from the
Saṅgaha.[234] With the exception of the third one, the quotations are each

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[232] *stanakeśavatī strī syāl lomaśaḥ puruṣaḥ smṛtaḥ |*
     ubhayor antaraṃ yac ca tadabhave napuṃsakam ||

[233]Mmd 239,13–14.

[234]See 1. Mmd 240,28–29: (ad Kacc 285: *liṅgatthe paṭhamā*) *Saṅgahakāro pana*
    "liṅgakattukammakaraṇasampadānasāmibhummadisāyogaālapanesu
    paṭhamā hotī" ti āha; 2. Mmd 243,34–38.: *Saṅgahakāro pana "karaṇakattu-*
    kammapañcamīsattamyatthe nipātappayoge paṭikkhepe paccatte kucchitatthe
    itthambhūte kiriyâpavagge pubbasadisasamānūnakalahanipuṇamissaka-
    sakhīlâdiyoge hetvatthe kāladdhāne visesane maṇḍitussake tatiyā hotī" ti
    āha; 3. Mmd 249,9–11: *Saṅgahakāro pana "kammatthe tatiyācaṭṭhīsattam-*
    yatthe c' enayoge catutthyatthe kāladdhānam accantasaṃyoge kammava-
    canīyayutte ca dutiyā hotī" ti āha; 4. Mmd 255,5–8: *Saṅgahakāro pana*
    "bhummatthe sāmissarâdhipatidāyādasakkhipatibhūpasutakusalesu
    niddhāranânādarakammakaraṇanimittasampadānâpadānapaccattopā-

followed by a large number of illustrative examples compiled by the Saṅgahakāra. Chapaṭa reproduces the second prose passage at Kacc-nidd 126,30–34 but in addition he quotes a verse whose subject matter is identical with the one formulated in the first prose passage quoted at Mmd 240,28–29.[235]

§99. The majority of the examples are quoted from unidentifiable post-canonical Pāli literature. However, there are also a number of interesting canonical quotations. In a few cases Mmd reproduces canonical quotations which are found in Kacc-v in a slightly edited version. Thus, for instance the Vinaya quotation at Kacc-v 312: *hatthesu piṇḍāya caranti* (Vin I 90,11) is quoted as *naggā hatthesu piṇḍāya caranti* (Vin I 90,20).[236] The quotations show that the case terminology of the Saṅgaha is influenced by the terminology of the Aṭṭhakathās, which he must have utilized. Thus, for instance, he quotes D I 63,22–23: *idam pi 'ssa hoti sīlasmin ti* as an example of the use of the loc. in the sense of the nom. Since Buddhaghosa mentions in Sv that the Mahâṭṭhakathā interprets the loc. as the nom. (*paccattavacanatthe ... etaṃ bhummaṃ*),[237] the interpretation is no doubt indebted to Sv.

§100. There are other examples of the Saṅgahakāra's use of the Pāli commentaries. For instance, he quotes Vin I 103,11: *āvikatā hi 'ssa phāsu hoti*, as an example of the use of the nom. in the sense of the instr. (*sic*). The exegesis that justifies this amazing statement is found in Kkh 26,25f.: *āvikatā ti āvikatāya, pakāsitāyā ti attho; alajjitā ti ādisu viya*

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dhyadhikissaravacanamaṇḍitussukkakālabhāvesu *sattamī vibhatti hotī*" *ti āha.*

[235]Kacc-nidd 126,4–6: *vuttañ ca Saṅgahakārehi:*

   liṅgatthe kattukammatthe karaṇe sampadāniye
   nissakke sāmibhummatthe disatthâlapane tathā

[236]Rūp 114,31 has the same reading, but Sadd 727,21 reproduces the reading of Kacc-v.

[237]Rūp 182,16*ff.*

idam pi karaṇatthe paccattavacanaṃ.[238] The interpretation of D II
230,2: *ajjhāsayaṃ ādibrahmacariyaṃ* in the sense of the instr. is based
upon the gloss on this construction at Sv: *karaṇatthe pacatta-
vacanaṃ.*[239] It is thus clear that the Saṅgahakāra attempted to integrate
the grammatical annotations of the Aṭṭhakathās into his own work.

§ 101. Aggavaṃsa composed Sadd § 559: *paṭhamatthe tatiyā-sattamiyo*,
and § 660: *tatiyatthe paṭhamā*, with particular regard to the above
interpretation of D I 63,22–23 and D II 230,2. Though it cannot be
excluded that he knew the Sgh, it is more likely that he copied the
description from Mmd, of which he was a careful reader.

IV.2.8. Mahāsandhi (Mahā-s)

§ 102. Mahā-s is only referred to once in Buddhapiya's Rūp-ṭ.[240] In the
remarks on the introductory verse of Rūp he mentions that he utilized
the *sandhi* treatises, i.e., Mahā-s and Cūḷ-s (see IV.2.9).[241]

§ 103. The discussion in Rūp-ṭ of the views expressed in Mahā-s shows
that it was a revised version of the *sandhi* chapter of Kacc.

§ 104. It appears from Rūp-ṭ that the author has interpolated a restrictive
tu in Kacc 29: *vagge ghosâghosānaṃ tatiyapaṭhamā*, so as to exclude
the unwanted consequence of the imprecise formulation of the sutta that
the voiced nasals belonging to each of the five groups (*vagga*) receive
the third letter in the group of sonants as doubling. Buddhapiya rejects
this interpolation on the grounds that since the *ṭhāne* of Kacc 28 is the
governing rule (*adhikāra*) such a problem does not arise.[242]

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[238]Rūp 17,4–5.

[239]Rūp 658,13.

[240]Rūp 25,15–18.

[241]Rūp-ṭ 4,1: *ādisaddena* (scil. of *Kaccāyanavaṇṇanâdiṃ* of the introductory
verse) *sandhiniruttippakaraṇâdikaṃ.*

[242]See Rūp-ṭ 25,15–18: *yaṃ pana Mahāsandhippakaraṇe "vagge ghosâgho-
sānaṃ tatiyapaṭhamā"* (= Kacc 29) *ti vaggapañcamānaṃ tatiyadvebhāva-*

IV.2.9. Cūḷasandhi (Cūḷ-s)

§ 105.   This anonymous treatise on *sandhi* is, like Mahāsandhi, only known from a couple of quotations in Rūp-ṭ. Like Mahā-s Buddhapiya utilised it for the elaborate *sandhi* chapter of Rūp.

§ 106. Like Mahā-s the work appears to be an edited version of Kacc.

§ 107. The discussion recorded in Rūp-ṭ[243] shows that the author reformulated Kacc 11 so as to read *assaraṃ byañjanaṃ parakkharaṃ naye*, excluding the word *yutte* on the grounds that the phoneme *ṃ* (*niggahīta*) is not a consonant. The other quotation states that "when a preceding [vowel] is elided, a following *i* and *u* become *e* and *o*, respectively".[244] This statement has probably been part of the elaboration of Kacc 14. Buddhapiya quotes it to justify his formulation of the comment on Rūp 16 (= Kacc 14).[245]

IV.3. Extant Post-Kaccāyana Grammars and Commentaries
IV.3.1. Mukahamattadīpanī (Mmd)

§ 108. Mmd or *Nyāsa*, also called *Kaccāyanavuttivaṇṇanā*,[246] is the oldest extant commentary on Kacc and Kacc-v. It is attributed to Vajirabuddhi[247] or Vimalabuddhi who is also claimed to have composed

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ppasaṅgato nivattanatthaṃ tu-saddapakkhepanaṃ kataṃ, taṃ niratthakam eva ṭhānâdhikārato ca tannivattiyā siddhattā ti.

[243] *Cūḷasandhiyaṃ   niggahītassa   byañjanasaññāya   avihitattā   "assaraṃ byañjanaṃ parakkharaṃ naye"* (≠ Kacc 11) *ti sutte yuttaggahaṇam akatan ti veditabbaṃ.*

[244] Rūp-ṭ 24,17–20: *Cūḷasandhiyam pi "pubbalope paro ikāro ekāraṃ ukāro okāran" ti ca vuttaṃ.*

[245] Rūp 7,13–14: *ivaṇṇabhūto ukārabhūto ca paro saro asarūpe pubbassare lutte kvaci asavaṇṇaṃ pappoti.*

[246] See Mogg-p 6,30: *vuttaṃ Kaccāyanavuttivaṇṇanāyaṃ* (= Nyāsa, i.e., Mukhamattadīpanī, Mogg-pd 18,31).

[247] Aggavaṃsa uses the name Vajirabuddhi in preference to Vimalabuddhi, e.g. at Sadd 210,4.

a *ṭīkā* on Abhidhammâvatāra.[248] The date of Vajirabuddhi cannot be
fixed with absolute certainty as Mmd contains no colophon containing a
clue as to when it was composed. The work itself presupposes
knowledge of Pāli grammars that are no longer extant. Vajirabuddhi
mentions Sudattakisivanirutti (see IV.2.3) and Mahānirutti (see IV.2.2)
from which he quotes a number of suttas interpolated in Kacc (see §68),
and he quotes from the work of the Saṅgahakāra (see IV.2.7). Internal
evidence shows that he knows Patañjali's Mañjūsā (see IV.2.6). Since
he quotes from an Abhidharma treatise ascribed to the *ṭīkākāra*,[249]
whom the Mmd-pṭ[250] identifies with Ānanda, the *Mūlaṭīkākāra*, who is
traditionally placed in the eighth or ninth century A.D. (see *DPPN* s.v.
11. Ānanda), he is to be placed between the *Mūlaṭīkākāra* and Buddha-
piya who refers to *Kaccāyanavaṇṇanā* (= Nyāsa) in the introductory
verse of Rūp[251] and several times in Rūp-ṭ. Rūp was written before
Mogg and Mogg-p (second half of the twelfth century A.D.) because
Mogg-p 6,23–24 quotes Rūp 3,25–26: *kvaci saṃyogapubbā, ekārôkārā
rassā iva vuccante. yathā*: *ettha*, *seyyo*, *ottho*, *sotthi*. Mmd was thus
probably composed in the tenth–eleventh centuries A.D. Because of its
thoroughness Mmd has exerted a powerful influence on most Pāli
grammars written in the tradition of Kacc.

§109. Vajirabuddhi is a meticulous exegete of Kacc and Kacc-v, almost
to the point of being pedantic. The general structure of each paragraph is
that he first quotes and paraphrases each sutta, isolating and counting
the number of words (*pada*) that constitute it, a practice that was imi-
tated by Chapaṭa and Vijitāvī in Kacc-nidd and Kacc-vaṇṇ, respectively.
Then he comments on its interpretation in Kacc-v, carefully noticing if
the author himself is going to add a paragraph on the interpretation of
any given *ca* or the like of Kacc. It is thus possible to deduce that if any

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[248]See SVD 1223.

[249]Mmd 273,31.

[250]Mmd-pṭ 197,26.

[251]See Rūp-ṭ 3,28: *Kaccāyabyākaraṇañ ca tabbaṇṇanābhūtaṃ Nyāsaṃ*.

such paragraph is not mentioned, it has most probably been interpolated at a later date. Finally, Vajirabuddhi comments on the examples and counterexamples illustrating the sutta in question. In some cases he quotes short passages from Kacc-v, some of which differ from the transmitted versions (see IV.1.4). In addition, he makes an effort to distinguish between original and interpolated suttas in Kacc (see § 18). It is thus clear that Mmd is an invaluable source of information on the actual text of Kacc and Kacc-v at the time of the composition of Mmd.

§ 110. Mmd is in many ways an exegetical tour de force, whose main intention is to show how the individual suttas of Kacc and the explanations of the vutti in the final analysis can be derived by applying relevant rules from Kacc to the problem under discussion. Thus, for instance, in his comment on Kacc-v 44: *abhi icc etassa sare pare abbhâdeso hoti*: "*abbh* is substituted for *abhi* before a following vowel", he explains that since the use of the word *sare* from Kacc 42 applies by way of recurrence (*anuvattana* = Skt *anuvṛtti*) and since the use of the word *ādesa* (substitute) is enunciated in the nominative, the substituend *abhi* is to be stated in the genitive, as the *vuttikāra* does. But then he continues by explaining that it is possible to take *abhi* as a genitive with elided genitive suffix on the interpretation of Kacc 221 (+ 220) stating that prefixes do not have any case markers.[252] This, however, is an extreme case of commentarial ingenuity. On the other hand, Vajirabuddhi's exegetical practice shows that he regards Kacc as a synchronous system of rules from which it is possible to pick any rule that can be used to explain any given form.

§ 111. Usually Vajirabuddhi makes use of well-known exegetical devices, which he defines in connection with the exegesis of Kacc-v 48: *pati etassa sare vā byañjane vā pare kvaci paṭi ādeso hoti*: "before a following vowel or consonant *paṭi* is sometimes substituted for *pati*". Since the interpretation *sare vā byañjane vā* is not warranted by Kacc

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[252]Mmd 56,24–26: *sareggahaṇassânuvattanato ādesaggahaṇassa paṭhamāya niddiṭṭhattā abhissā ti vattabbe abhisaddaṃ* (so read) *chaṭṭhiṃ katvā.*

48 which only states that in some cases *paṭi* is substituted for *pati*, Vajirabuddhi takes the opportunity of explaining how certain governing rules either apply in the manner of a jumping frog (*maṇḍūkagatika*, cf. Skt *maṇḍūkagati*), i.e., from a preceding rule to the rule in question, or in the manner of the lion's gait (*sīhagatika*, cf. Skt *siṃhâvalokitanyāya*), i.e., from the immediately preceding rule to the rule in question. This makes it possible to explain the interpretation of the vuttikāra with reference to Kacc 42: *go sare* etc. (*maṇḍūkagativasena*), and Kacc 49 *puthass' u byañjane* (*sīhagativasena*).[253] It is, of course, questionable if this analysis represents the actual intention of the *vuttikāra*, but it illustrates the tendency of Mmd to exhaust every possibility of explaining Kacc-v as consistently based upon Kacc.

IV.3.2. Mmd Commentaries and Grammars based upon Mmd

§ 112. When Chapaṭa wrote Kacc-nidd, presumably in the first half of the fifteenth century A.D., several works related to Mmd were in circulation. Thus he quotes two passages from Nyāsaṭīkā, which are identical with passages in Mmd-pṭ,[254] as well as Nyāsappadīpappakaraṇa,[255] and Nyāsappadīpaṭīkā,[256] of which a fragment is still extant.[257]

§ 113. Gv 63 attributes a Mahāṭīkā on Mmd to Vimalabuddhi (= Vajira-buddhi) which may be identical with Mmd-pṭ. Nothing is known about the authors of the other two works. Since they antedate Kacc-nidd, they may have been composed in the twelfth century A.D.

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[253]See Mmd 59,25*ff.*

[254]Kacc-nidd 103,27*f.*: *Nyāsaṭīkāyaṃ ca "caggahaṇena karaṇabhūtena suttâgatappayogato aññatthappayoge pañcamīvibhatti ca apādānakārake chaṭṭhī-dutiyā-tatiyā-vibhattiyo ca saṃgaṇhātī"* (= Mmd-pṭ 133,28*f.*) *ti vuttaṃ*; Kacc-nidd 234,10: *ayaṃ ghaṭâdigaṇo adhikāragaṇo ti attho* (= Mmd-pṭ 253,8–9) *ti Nyāsaṭīkāyaṃ vutto* (reading *ghaṭâdidhātugaṇo*).

[255]Kacc-nidd 29,30.

[256]Kacc-nidd 40,22–25.

[257]Fausbøll, "Cat. Mand. MSS", no. 153, *JPTS* IV (1896), p. 48.

§ 114. Mukhamattasāra,[258] "The Essence of Mmd", is attributed to Guṇasāgara who is also credited with a *ṭīkā* on his work.[259] It may have been composed in the beginning of the thirteenth century A.D.[260] Chapaṭa quotes two verses from Mukhamattasāra[261] which he notices are composed under the influence of Vimalabuddhi,[262] as well as a prose passage.[263] A late work like Vijitāvī's Kaccāyanavaṇṇanā (Kacc-vaṇṇ) (sixteenth century A.D.) is to a large extent an abbreviated recast of Mmd and should therefore be included among the grammars written in the tradition of Mmd.

O.H. Pind

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[258]Mentioned in the Pagan Inscription as no. 151 ; see *PLB* : 105.

[259]Gv 63.

[260]Bode, *PLB* : 25.

[261]Kacc-nidd 31,11–14.

[262]Kacc-nidd 31,15 : *Vimalabuddhi-ācariyâdhippāyavasena vuttaṃ.*

[263]Kacc-nidd 85,28*f.*

ABBREVIATIONS

abl.	ablative
BHSD	*Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*
chap.	chapter
CPD	*A Critical Dictionary of Pāli*
ÉVP	*Études védiques et paninéennes*
EWA	Manfred Mayhofer, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindoarischen*, Heidelberg, 1986–2001.
GDhp	*The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, ed. John Brough, London, 1962.
inst.	instrumental
loc.	locative
nom.	nominative
PGL	see Franke 1902 under References
PED	*Pali–English Dictionary*
PTC	*Pāli Tipiṭakam Concordance*
StII	*Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik*
ts.	tatsama
voc.	vocative
VP III	Vākyapadīya
w.r.	wrong reading

ABBREVIATIONS OF GRAMMATICAL TEXTS

Abbreviations of other texts follow *CPD* Epilegomena

Abhid-k-bh	Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya
Cūḷ-nir	Cūḷanirutti
Cūḷ-s	Cūḷasandhi
Gv	Gandhavaṃsa
Kacc	Kaccāyana
Kacc-nidd	Kaccāyanasuttaniddesa
Kacc-v	Kaccāyanavutti
Kacc-vaṇṇ	Kaccāyanavaṇṇanā
Kāś	Jayāditya and Vāmana, Kāśikā-vṛtti
Mahā-bh	Patañjali, (Vyākaraṇa-)Mahābhāṣya
Mahā-nir	Mahānirutti
Mahā-s	Mahāsandhippakaraṇa
Mañj	Mañjūsā
Mogg	Moggallāna
Mogg-p	Moggallānapañcikā
Mogg-v	Moggallānavutti
Mmd	Mukhamattadīpanī
Mmd-pṭ	Mukhamattadīpanī-purāṇaṭīkā
Nir-piṭ	Niruttipiṭaka
Pāṇ	Pāṇini
Rūp	Rūpasiddhi
Rūp-ṭ	Rūpasiddhiṭīkā
Sadd	Saddanīti
Saddhamma-s	Saddhammasaṅgaha
Sudatta-nir	Sudattakisivanirutti
Sgh	Saṅgaha
TK	Trikaṇḍī
VP	Vākyapadīya

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Kern and the Study of Indian Buddhism[*]

With a Speculative Note on the Ceylonese Dhammarucikas

Isaline Blew Horner was born March 30, 1896, the very year of the publication of Johan Hendrik Caspar Kern's *Manual of Indian Buddhism* in Georg Bühler's series Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde; as far as I know, however, these two facts are entirely unrelated, and Miss Horner did not develop her interest in Buddhism, apparently, until 1921, during a trip through Sri Lanka, Burma and India, this coming some four years after the death of Kern, who was born April 6, 1833, and died July 4, 1917.

The name of Hendrik Kern is certainly well known still today, a century after his floruit, primarily through his *Manual*, which is still being reprinted, and through his *editio princeps* of the Lotus Sutra in Sanskrit, edited between 1908–1912 with Bunyiu Nanjio and usually simply termed "Kern–Nanjio". Moreover, his 1884 English translation of the same text, prepared for Max Müller's Sacred Books of the East, is still the only version in English rendered from Sanskrit (or, as we used to say, "the original Sanskrit"). This is surely more than enough to establish Kern's position as one of the leading figures in the Western study of Indian — one might rather say these days, South Asian — Buddhism. But Kern also published extensive remarks on the Pāli language, both his 1886 "Bijdrage tot de verklaring van eenige woorden in Pāli-geschriften voorkomende", or "Contribution to the Explanation of Some Words Occurring in Pāli Writings", and his 1916 "Toevoegselen op 't woordenboek van Childers", "Supplements to the dictionary of Childers", two major studies à propos the pioneering dictionary of Pāli published between 1872 and 1875 by Robert Cæsar Childers. The latter of these supplements at least is certainly referred to many times in the

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[*]This article is a revised version of the paper read as the thirteenth I.B. Horner Memorial Lecture, delivered in London on 18 September 2009 at the annual general meeting of the Pali Text Society.

Pali Text Society's *Pāli–English Dictionary*, although not always approvingly. In addition, Kern published several studies on Aśokan inscriptions in 1873, 1876, and 1880,[1] and the *editio princeps* of the Jātakamālā of Āryaśūra, published in 1891 as the very first volume of the Harvard Oriental Series. This edition, incidentally, is still spoken of highly by Albrecht Hanisch in his recent philological notes on the poem.[2]

The tome that was, at least at the time of its publication, considered Kern's masterwork, however, is relatively little known today, that being his massive *Geschiedenis van het Buddhisme in Indië* or "History of Buddhism in India", published in two volumes in Haarlem in 1881– 1883.[3] A translation under Kern's supervision was begun by Georges François Guillaume Jean Jacques Collins in French in 1881 in the *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, continued by Charles Michel, but given up after part one.[4] Both volumes were translated virtually immediately into German by Hermann Jacobi in 1882–1884 as *Der Buddhismus und seine Geschichte in Indien* (where Hendrik becomes Heinrich). The complete work was later translated into French by Gédéon Busken Huet in 1901–1903 as *Histoire du bouddhisme dans l'Inde* and published in the important series Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliothèque d'Etudes. These volumes have never appeared in English. Kern's shorter *Manual*, it is interesting to note, was translated into Japanese as early as 1914 by

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[1]For the convenience of most readers, it might be best to cite the abbreviated English translations of the Dutch contributions, namely Kern 1874b, 1876, 1877. Originally in English was Kern 1880. Regarding the first listed item, see also A. Barth's review from 1874, reprinted in Barth, 1917: 126–39.

[2]Hanisch, 2005: I.xxiv ff.

[3]It appears that the first volume of the work was actually first published in 1881 by A. C. Kruseman in Haarlem, but my copy is rather printed in Haarlem by Tjeenk Willink in 1882 and 1884.

[4]"Histoire du Bouddhisme dans l'Inde", *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 4 (1881): 149–65, 5 (1882): 49–88, 145–226, by Collins, continued from p. 34 of the last installment by Michel, 7 (1883): 17–62.

Tachibana Shundō 立花俊道 as *Bukkyō Taikō* 佛教大綱, an effort assisted by the very same Nanjio Bunyiu (Nanjō Bunyū 南条文雄) mentioned above; they received assistance with technical vocabulary from none other than the young Otto Rosenberg, in his early twenties and at that time a student in Japan. It would be interesting to investigate just what sort of an impact Kern's work had in those early days on Japanese Buddhist Studies, and a scholar with good access to Japanese libraries should undertake such a study. Finally, it is important to mention that Kern devoted considerable attention to Khmer and Javanese sources, especially inscriptions, contributing *inter alia* to the study of Buddhist–Śaiva syncretism, though these studies stand outside the scope of the discussion here.[5]

In the following, I offer a few remarks on Kern and his contributions to the study of South Asian Buddhism, followed by an experiment in what might be called the tradition of Kern. First, however, I confess a failure in what I had hoped to be able to achieve. Kern was Professor in Leiden University. Being myself now in Leiden, I hoped that it would be possible to discover among the papers of Kern what I thought must

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[5] In this respect however it might be helpful to draw attention to a paper translated by Louis de la Vallée Poussin into French, "Sur l'Invocation d'une Inscription bouddhique de Battambang", *Le Muséon* (new series) 7 (1906): 46–66. This (and its Dutch original, which appeared in 1899) was overlooked by Johannes Bronkhorst, "Hendrik Kern and the Body of the Buddha", *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques* 63/1 (2009): 7–27, although this in no way affects his argument. Kern's article devotes considerable attention to a verse which reads: *namo stu paramārthāya vyomakalpāya yo dadhau | dharmma-sambhogi-nirmmāṇa-kāyā*[ṃs] *trailokyamuktaye*, "Hommage à la suprême vérité, semblable à l'espace vide, qui pour délivrer le triple monde, a pris un Dharmakāya, un Sambhogikāya, un Nirmāṇakāya!" It must be confessed that Kern's understanding of the theory in question is a bit odd, to say the least. Two other studies of inscriptions have been translated into English by Uli Kozok and Eric van Reijn, "The Sanskrit-Inscription of King Āditya-warman at Kubu Rajo (Minangkabau; ±1300 Śāka)", and "The Inscription Commemorating the Consecration of the Amoghapāśa Statue of Padang Candi (Central Sumatra); 1269 Śāka", both to be found at http://ulikozok.com/.

exist somewhere, namely the correspondence between Kern and Nanjō which led to their joint edition of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*. For these two scholars, though they never met,[6] managed, as many did before the age of jets and email, nevertheless to bring to fruition a major scholarly project using the resources of the post. Most unfortunately, whatever records of this correspondence once existed are no more. From Kern's side, Hanna 't Hart, who researched Kern some years ago, wrote to me as follows:[7]

> The story of Kern's papers (and books) is a sad one. I was told that one of his sons was working for Martinus Nijhoff, antiquarian booksellers in the Hague. As the papers were supposed to be of no antiquarian value at the time, he is said to have chucked them away. He was just keen on selling the books. In this way, from Kern's own collections no books and no letters came to any public collection.… The scanty bit that is at the Kern Institute was collected by Prof. [Jean Philippe] Vogel when he started the institute in the 1920s. I remember having read letters by Vogel to colleagues, begging for Kern's letters. In this way he was lucky to have received Kern's letters that Caland kept carefully; of course, Caland's side of the correspondence is also gone. This was the situation I found out while working on my article on Kern's life.

The Japanese side of the situation is equally sad. Robert Rhodes of Ōtani University wrote to me that "Nanjō was born in Gifu but married into the Nanjō family temple in Fukui.… Apparently, while he was

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[6]Nanjō was in England from 1876 until 1884. Although he, accompanying Max Müller, attended the fifth International Congress of Orientalists held in 1881 in Berlin, Kern did not. See the *Verhandlungen des fünften International Orientalisten-Congresses gehalten zu Berlin im September 1881* (Berlin: A. Asher & Co. Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1881): I.8 (for Dutch participants, where Kern's name does not appear) and 10 (where we find "Bunyiu Nanjio, aus Japan, derzeit in Oxford, England"). The fact is made completely clear since in his recollections, *Kaikyūroku* 懷舊録 (Tokyo: Daiyūkaku shobō 大雄閣書房, 1927): 346 (reprinted in the Tōyō Bunko series 東洋文庫 359 [Tokyo: Heibonsha 平凡社, 1979: 291]), Nanjō expresses his regret that he and Kern never met.

[7]Email 10 Feb. 2010. See 't Hart 1989.

alive, Nanjō took all of the documents that were at the temple to Tokyo".[8] This unfortunately took place not very long before 1923, and Nanjō himself died in 1927. We must conclude, then, that all Nanjō's papers were destroyed in the disastrous Kanto earthquake of 1923, as likewise no papers are to be found in Ōtani University in Kyoto, where Nanjō taught and was president for many years. In the absence of other materials, whatever we may say about Kern and his working methods must be derived from the internal evidence of his publications themselves.

Let us turn, then, to Kern and the study of South Asian Buddhism in general, that is, Kern and the Buddhism of India and Sri Lanka. I think it important to concentrate on what we might still learn from Kern, rather than emphasizing only his impact in his time, or on the other hand in registering those instances in which, from our self-defined "superior" point of view today, we see he went wrong. For while he did go wrong here and there — and I suspect that the pioneers probably went wrong, percentage-wise, quite a bit less than many of their modern critics — there is also still much to learn from Kern.

Not all would necessarily agree. Speaking in a context broader than simply his Buddhist studies, Hanna 't Hart wrote that "Kern's importance in the fields he chose to work in goes far beyond the small number of his books still used today. It is clear that his real importance lies in his own time and in the stage scholarship had reached then".[9] Although her considerations take account of Kern's contributions not only to Indian Studies but also to Dutch language and dialects, Indo-European, Malay-Polynesian, and ancient Java, I find them too pessimistic. For even setting aside entirely his Buddhist studies, Kern edited and translated an important astronomical text, the Bṛhatsaṃhitā of Varāhamihira,[10] edited the astrological work Āryabhaṭīya,[11] and pub-

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[8]Email 17 Sept. 2009.

[9]See note 7 above.

[10]Kern 1865. His translation is 1870–1875. He edited another work of the same author as well, 1868–1878.

lished numerous pioneering and still important works on Kawi or Old Javanese, works which continue to be used, and even standard, today. I believe, therefore, that it is not quite justified to speak of Kern as being of mere historical significance.

I will not go into detail about what Kern had to say about Pāli. But of course, it would not do to ignore it entirely. For, from very early on, Kern was concerned with the nature of Pāli and its historical situation, and the relation between the language of Aśoka, the language of the Pāli scriptures, and what he calls in Dutch the "basterd-Sanskrit" of the northern Buddhists, what we dryly term "hybrid Sanskrit". He wrote in 1873:[12] "For those persons who wrote in hybrid Sanskrit and in Pāli, neither was any longer living. They wrote in a largely artificial language (*kunstmatige taal*), which was no longer subject to the beneficial check of the spoken language. Only this explains how so many incomprehensible words and forms appear in Pāli and hybrid Sanskrit, mistakes of such a type as learned people can commit, but which never appear in the wildest folk-language." Kern considers it impossible that Pāli is Māgadhī, that is, that Pāli is the oldest form of Buddhist language.

He continued to be interested in this issue, and once again in the introduction to his English translation of the Lotus Sutra in 1884, Kern was concerned about problems of language. Perhaps surprisingly, given that he is prefacing a translation of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, he devotes a number of pages of his introduction instead to parallels between the Lalitavistara and the Pāli Mahāvagga. These parallels he cites, he says, "to prove that the material of a Mahāvaipulya Sūtra is partly as old as that of any other sacred book of the Buddhists".[13] At the same time, when Kern turns to the Lotus in his introduction, he asserts the following:[14]

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[11]Kern 1874a.

[12]Kern 1873: 14–15.

[13]Kern 1884: xiv.

[14]p. xix.

> The Gāthās of the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka are nowhere very brilliant, but in some chapters they are so excessively clumsy and mechanically put together that involuntarily we are led to the assumption of their having been made by persons to whom the old dialect was no longer familiar.

While perhaps not for the same reasons, I agree with Kern here, and moreover, I think this scenario is likely to be the case not only for the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka but likewise for at least some other earlier Mahā-yāna scriptures, such as the Kāśyapaparivarta. In my yet unpublished lecture presented in Kyoto at the World Sanskrit Conference in 2009, I argued that the verses of the Kāśyapaparivarta, which are demonstrably later than its prose, were composed by an author to whom, as Kern has put it, "the old dialect was no longer familiar". Given that the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is undoubtedly the most studied of Mahāyāna sūtras — although I would quickly say, from the point of view of Indian Buddhism, certainly not the most representative or important — it is a bit sobering to find that we must also agree with the following assessment offered by Kern in 1884:[15]

> At present we are far from the ultimate end which critical research has to reach; we are not able to assign to each part of our Sūtra its proper place in the development of Buddhist literature. We may feel that compositions from different times have been collected into a not very harmonious whole; we may even be able to prove that some passages are as decidedly ancient as others are modern, but any attempt to analyse the compound and lay bare its component parts would seem to be premature. Under these circumstances the inquiry after the date of the work resolves itself into the question at what time the book received its present shape.

Many scholars today would not characterize their obsession as one of determining the exact date of a work. Still, one contemporary trend is very much concerned with seeking to understand the origins and development of Mahāyāna sūtra literature, and this is precisely what Kern too was thinking about. It is, from this point of view, not neces-

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[15] p. xx.

sarily encouraging to find that we have not made perhaps quite as much
progress since his day as we might like to expect.

   After translating the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka on the basis of two
Nepalese manuscripts in 1884, in the years 1908–1912 Kern published
an edition of the text, still the standard. He did not, of course, do this
alone, and he has been rather harshly criticized for the way in which he
edited the Sanskrit provided largely by his co-editor. In particular, he
has been taken to task for adding to the edition prepared by Nanjō on
the basis of six Nepalese manuscripts readings from what is now
generally known as the Kashgar manuscript (which Kern called 'O').
J.W. de Jong referred to the result as "neither flesh nor fish".[16] In speak-
ing of this some ten years ago, Tilmann Vetter credits Willy Baruch in a
publication of 1938 with "discover[ing] that variant readings had often
been ignored or inaccurately referred to".[17] This is one thing, and one
certainly expects from any editor that he or she reads and reports the
sources correctly. But this is not what de Jong was talking about. In fact,
as early as 1916, Rudolf Hoernle pointed out in an editorial note to
Heinrich Lüders's edition of Central Asian fragments of the sūtra in his
Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature Found in Eastern Turkestan
that "the Bibliotheca Buddhica print does not present a pure Nepalese
text, but incorporates a number of Eastern Turkestani readings".[18] If this
were so, if the edition really conflated distinct recensions, this would
indeed be problematic. But the matter appears to be a bit more complex.
In this regard, Vetter's discovery on the basis of his careful analysis is
very important. According to Vetter:[19]

> Kern does in fact keep apart the two recensions.… [I]n Kern's footnotes
> normally all passages are ignored that are characteristic of the Kashgar
> manuscript as described by himself in an Additional Note to Nanjio's

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[16]de Jong 1997: 54 [originally in *The Eastern Buddhist* 7/2 (1974): 55].

[17]Vetter 1999: 10, referring to Baruch 1938: 7–12.

[18]In his note to Lüders 1916: 143–44.

[19]pp. 11–12.

Preface.… In the footnotes only those Kashgar readings appear that are close alternatives of a word in the text. And in the text itself only those Kashgar readings have been adopted that seemed to be the original or only correct ones. Such adoptions — and Kern's sporadic emendations — can always be questioned, but this is not mixing up recensions. They depend on the assumption that transmission can create readings nobody had intended, especially when reciting and copying a text without understanding came to prevail. Such readings should be removed from any edition that pretends to establish an early state of a text.

Vetter's point is that if one accepts the idea of an archetype or hyparchetype lying behind diverse sources, it is not only possible for an editor, but indeed the editor's basic responsibility, in line with Classical text-critical ideas, to establish as far as possible the original from which the witnesses, due to the vagaries of scribes, have wandered. Kern certainly held the idea, as did every text critic in his day, that the goal of an editor was the establishment of *the original* text. Therefore, Vetter's observations here are very important, and resonate well with what we know of Kern's general approach also from his study of Pāli, the Lalita-vistara and Aśokan inscriptions. Kern was very concerned to make sense of the interplay of Sanskrit, Pāli and what he along with others sometimes called the Gāthā dialect (although I still prefer his Dutch "basterd-Sanskrit"). More careful attention would have to be given the matter than is possible here to establish how Kern's editorial choices in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka edition fit in with what he has to say elsewhere about Buddhist Middle Indic. But I think one thing should be clear: Kern did not thoughtlessly "correct", which is to say *conflate*, the Nepalese text prepared by Nanjō with readings from the Kashagar manuscript. Rather, it appears that, having thought carefully about the forms underlying the variants available to him, he strove to establish something as close as possible to what he considered to be *the original* Indic shape of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. Or at least he did so within reason, for I have not mentioned his idea that the sūtra originally consisted entirely of verses, and needless to say, he did not dare to prune the prose from the received text. This idea of a purely verse core (or

kern!) today would find few adherents, and Kern's reasons for believing this seem to me not entirely solid. Still, not only in his day, but even today, it is not an idea that should be considered, prima facie, ridiculous, and the question of just how Mahāyāna sūtras developed remains every bit as open today as it was in Kern's time.

The other major work Kern contributed to the study of Indian Buddhism from a textual point of view is his edition of Āryaśūra's Jātakamālā. While recent work on this text by, most notably, Peter Khoroche[20] and Albrecht Hanisch finds numerous instances in which Kern's text can be corrected and improved, there is no denying that he took a sometimes difficult text and on the basis of often not very good manuscript evidence produced an edition which has served well for many years. It is worth noting that for decades the standard translation of the text was that of Kern's student and successor Jacob Samuel Speyer.[21] Finally, I leave aside here, as outside the scope of this discussion, consideration of Kern's contributions to Buddhist and Buddho-Śaiva inscriptions and other Southeast Asian and Javanese matters, which should be discussed by specialists.

Instead, as promised, or threatened, in addition to this brief consideration of the work of Kern, I would also attempt a bit of speculation in his tradition. In his monumental *History of Indian Buddhism*, Kern sometimes gave wing to ideas or associations that might seem a bit more impressionistic than solidly grounded. Some of these ideas were no doubt far over the top, but I am not convinced that *all* are worthy of the rubbish heap. Some indeed demonstrate a willingness to imaginatively engage the materials that is rather rare today among textual scholars (and rather too rife among those without firsthand familiarity with primary sources, one might add). In this spirit,

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[20]Khoroche 1987.

[21]First published as a series of articles, 1893–1894, followed in revised form by a book in 1895, volume I of the series Sacred Books of the Buddhists. This text thus inaugurated both the Harvard Oriental Series and the Sacred Books of the Buddhists.

in the following I dare to offer a few thoughts on the topic of the Dhammarucikas of Ceylon, touched upon several times by Kern, albeit in passing, and mostly on the basis, it seems, of a single remark by George Turnour in the preface to his edition and translation of the *Mahāvaṃsa*.[22] In this context, Kern refers to the origins of the schismatic Dhammarucikas, though without offering any speculations. Since, however, elsewhere he shows himself willing to interpret, for instance, the significance of names, I take inspiration from that model in the following. To quote a relevant example, in speaking of the schismatic Mahādeva (to be introduced below), Kern wrote:[23]

> Although the legend that we have just summarized may be far from clear, it is nevertheless known however that Mahādeva and Bhadra are names of Śiva who, in his capacity as the god of Time, may be called the Genie of destruction…. When one considers the diversity of the nature of Śiva, one is not astonished that the southern Mahādeva plays an entirely different role from that of the heretic master.

It is in this spirit of, one might say, somewhat free association that I offer the following remarks.

A number of Ceylonese sources speak of a sect called Dhamma-rucika, the historical existence of which cannot be doubted.[24] Likewise, its identification with the "heterodox" Abhayagiri-vihāra, opponents of the "orthodox" Mahāvihāra, is well established.[25] These two, the Mahā-vihāra and Abhayagiri-vihāra, are the major sub-schools of Ceylonese Theravāda, and traditionally strongly opposed each other. Ultimately, the Mahāvihāra prevailed, and consequently most Ceylonese Buddhist history transmitted until today reflects the Mahāvihāra standpoint. The

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[22]Turnour 1836: ci–cii. See Kern 1881–1883: II.337, 375.

[23]Kern 1881–1883: II.292–93.

[24]It is mentioned, for instance, not only in the Mahāvaṃsa and Cūlavaṃsa, but in tenth–eleventh-century inscriptions as well, as noted by Adikaram 1946: 94 and Gunawardana 1979: 17.

[25]On the Abhayagirivāsins, see Bareau 1955: 241–43, and now from another perspective the critical remarks in Crosby 1999.

Dhammarucikas were said to be followers of a Vajjiputta sect teacher named Dhammaruci, hence their name. While the historicity of the Abhayagiri–Mahāvihāra schism, the first in Ceylonese Buddhism, is certain, any possible actual role or historically factual connection therein of a monk called Dhammaruci is of less interest than the fact that later (Mahāvihāra) Ceylonese tradition explicitly connects objectionable and schismatic doctrines with an individual of precisely this name.[26] It is upon this point that I wish to concentrate by exploring several facets of the relation between Dhammaruci and the Abhayagiri–Mahāvihāra schism. In particular, I would like to propose an *affective connection* with narratives of the so-called fundamental schism in the Buddhist Church, that between the Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas.

This schism, as is well known, is blamed by the Sarvāstivādin *Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣā on a nasty monk named Mahādeva, one of several with the same name referred to by Kern, who after committing three of the five sins of immediate retribution, killing his father and mother and an arhat, entered the monastic community, and eventually set forth five heretical theses critical of the status of an arhat, the *pañca-vastūni*. Pāli sources also are aware of a schism, but relate it instead to ten points upheld by the Vajjiputta sect monks, the same group to which Dhammaruci is said to have belonged.[27] We also recall here that the

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[26] Obeyesekere 1990: 174–80, 186 studies the Sinhala king Kāśyapa I, a supporter of the Dhammarucikas (Mahāvaṃsa 39.15; Cūḷavaṃsa trans. i.44), who had arranged the murder of his own father Dhūtasena (Mahāvaṃsa 38.105; Cūḷavaṃsa trans. i.40). However, Obeyesekere's reason for associating the two notices ("it is probably no accident that Kāśyapa supported the Dharmaruci sect, a Buddhist school influenced by Mahāyāna, possessing a more liberal soteriology and perhaps a path of atonement through penance") cannot be accepted, above all since we really know next to nothing about Dhammarucika ideas in general, not to mention their soteriology in particular.

[27] There are of course a number of studies of these ten points, but what is relevant here is their attribution in the sources to the Vajjiputtakas; see Cullavagga xii.1.1.

schismatic followers of the Buddha's nemesis Devadatta are called Vajjiputtakā in the Pāli Vinaya.[28]

Despite the confidence with which some writers approach the topic, we do not know much factual about the Dhammarucikas, and it is only in somewhat later Ceylonese sources that we get certain details. Thus, while the perhaps fifth-century Mahāvaṃsa knows the Dhammarucika school,[29] it is only its commentary the Mahāvaṃsa-ṭīkā, which may date three or four centuries later,[30] that identifies these Dhammarucikas with the Abhayagiri monks in an explicit fashion.[31] Likewise, the story of the founding of the schismatic Abhayagiri order in the Mahāvaṃsa itself does not mention the Dhammarucika.[32]

Our most detailed source for the Dhammarucikas is a late fourteenth- or early fifteenth-century work in Singhalese, the Nikāya-saṃgrahawa (Compendium of the Sects), the reliability of which is often in question.[33] This source, however, whether historically reliable or not, certainly reflects some orthodox Mahāvihārin ideas of the period

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The evil of the Vajjiputtakas is detailed in the Dīpavaṃsa vv. 30–38 (Oldenberg 1879). The text goes on in v. 39 to say explicitly that many later schismatic groups (*bhinnavādā*) arose from the results of that early split, namely from the Mahāsāṃghika order.

[28]Cullavagga vii.4.1. Non-Ceylonese sources tend to associate a monk named Vātsīputra — the Sanskrit equivalent of Pāli Vajjiputta — with activities two hundred years after the death of the Buddha, and in their accounting sixty-three years after the split which led to the creation of the Mahāsāṃghika. (The phonological relation between the Pāli and Sanskrit forms is problematic, since Pāli Vajji° should reflect Sanskrit Vṛji. I do not know that the problem has been satisfactorily addressed.)

[29]At v. 13.

[30]See von Hinüber 1996: §188, p. 92.

[31]Malalasekera 1935: 175.26: *Dhammarucikā ti ime Abhayagirivāsino bhikkhū.*

[32]At xxxiii.97. See Malalasekera 1935: 676.24, ad xxxvii.3–4.

[33]See Mori 1999: 11–12.

in which it was composed.[34] Since I am less interested in "history" than in perceptions of the past, the evidence of the Nikāyasaṃgrahawa cannot be ignored. This text says the following:[35]

> Then, the Great-Elder (*mahāthera*) Tissa, who was [first] living in Kemgalle and [later] had accepted the Bhagiri (/Abhayagiri) monastery [as a gift from King Vaṭṭa-gāmaṇī-abhaya], was [heard to be] having close association with lay-families [which is inappropriate for a monk]. Thereupon the pious monks of the "Great-Monastery" assembled and were imposing the legal act [of the punishment] of banishing (*pabbājaniya-karmmaya*: *sic*) him [practically speaking, expelling him from the community until he mends his ways] when one of his pupils, who was in the assembly, by name Mahadāliyā-tissa, obstructed them, saying "Please do not treat our venerable Great-Elder in this way." But then the monks pronounced the legal act [of the punishment] of suspension [depriving him of his right to associate with the community as a whole, until he makes amends] (*utkṣepaniya-karmmaya*: *sic*) on him for complying with/following the wrong-doer/doing.
>
>   He then, burning with anger, left the Theriya fraternity (*nikāya*) taking about five hundred monks with him, and lived at the Abhayagiri monastery. While he was staying there, the disciples of the Master Dharmaruci of the Vajjiputra fraternity mentioned before, who came to this country from Pallarārāma in India, approached him; [consequently] he took to their doctrine/belief and joined them (in their community), and settled down as the Master Dharmaruci. Since that period those who belonged to Abhayagiri came to be known as the Dharmaruci fraternity.
>
>   Thus a fraternity called Dharmaruci that broke away from the Theriya fraternity was [eventually] established in Bhagiri monastery in the fifteenth

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[34]For examples of the use of this source see Ayerton 1924: 15–17, Malalasekera 1938: i.1147–48, and so on repeatedly in later studies. Systematic comparisons of some passages in the Nikāyasaṅgrahawa with the Dīpa-, Mahā- and Cūla-vaṃsas are found in Mori 1999: 11–33. Note that most scholars (myself included) make use of the English translation of Fernando 1908; perhaps a fresh examination of the Sinhala original would not be without profit (see the next note).

[35]Fernando 1908: 11–12. The translation has been emended in light of the original Sinhala text by Dr. Mudagamuwe Maithrimurthi of the University of Heidelberg. I am deeply grateful for his assistance.

year of the reign Vaḷagamabhā and 454 years after the demise of the Buddha.…

    In the days of this king [Vyavahāratissa, 752 years after the demise of the Buddha] the residents of [the monastery of] Abhayagiri with the name of Dharmaruci accepted the Vaitulya Piṭaka, which was called Vaitulya by certain non-Buddhist Brahmins who had assumed the garb of monks for the purpose of destroying the Buddhist Teaching/Order (*śāsana*), had composed it in the times of the above-mentioned Great-king Dharmāśoka, and had proclaimed it as the "teachings of the Buddha". Thereupon the monks of the Theriya fraternity compared it with the "doctrine and discipline" (*dharma-vinaya*) [of the Buddha] and rejected the teaching of the Vaitulya as being opposed to the [true] teaching [of the Buddha].

The text goes on to offer several other examples of the continued evil influences of the Dhammarucikas, including a reference to "sinful, evil-practicing priests of the … Dharmaruçi … who by their evil practices stain the purity of the Buddhist religion …".[36]

I cannot pretend that I can solve the historical problem of the real identity of these Dhammarucikas, nor can I clearly trace their antecedents. What I can do, however, is offer a scenario which suggests that the name may have carried with it nuances and implications which made it an apt label for schismatics.

The name Dhammaruci, or its Sanskrit equivalent Dharmaruci, appears in a rather wide variety of Buddhist literature, even in Theravāda Sri Lanka. The Pāli Apadāna (Stories) contains the story of a Dhammaruci, who in a past life was a rather unpleasant fellow:[37]

> tadāhaṃ māṇavo āsiṃ Megho nāma susikkhito |
> sutvā vyākaraṇaṃ seṭṭhaṃ Sumedhassa mahāmune |
> saṃvissattho[38] bhavitvāna Sumedhe karuṇāsaye |
> pabbajantaṃ ca taṃ vīraṃ sah' eva anuppabbajiṃ |
> saṃvuto pāṭimokkhasmiṃ indriyesu ca pañcasu |
> suddhājīvo sato vīro Jinasāsanakārako |

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[36]Fernando 1908: 22.

[37]For details see Appendix I: The Apadāna.

[38]This word is Sanskrit *saṃviśvasta*, on which see Edgerton 1953, s.v.

evaṃ viharamāno 'haṃ pāpamittena kenaci |
niyojito anācāre sumaggā paridhaṃsito |
vitakkavasiko hutvā sāsanato apakkamiṃ |
pacchā tena kumittena payutto mātughātanaṃ |
akariṃ anantariyaṃ ca ghātayiṃ duṭṭhamānaso |
tato cuto Mahāvīciṃ upapanno sudāruṇaṃ |
vinipātagato santo saṃsariṃ dukkhito ciraṃ |
na puno addasaṃ vīraṃ Sumedhaṃ narapuṅgavaṃ |
asmiṃ kappe samuddamhi maccho āsiṃ timiṅgalo |
disvāhaṃ sāgare nāvaṃ gocarattham upāgamiṃ |
disvā maṃ vāṇijā bhītā buddhaseṭṭhaṃ anussaruṃ |
Gotamo ti mahāghosaṃ sutvā tehi udīritaṃ |
pubbasaññaṃ saritvāna tato kālaṅkato ahaṃ |
Sāvatthiyaṃ kule iddhe jāto brāhmaṇajātiyaṃ |
āsiṃ dhammaruci nāma sabbapāpajigucchako |
disvāhaṃ lokapajjotaṃ jātiyā sattavassiko |
Mahājetavanaṃ gantvā pabbajiṃ anagāriyaṃ |
upemi buddhaṃ tikkhattuṃ rattiyā divasassa ca |
tadā disvā muni āha ciraṃ Dhammarucī ti maṃ |

At that time I was a well-learned young Brahmin by the name of Megha. Hearing the best of prophecies made to Sumedha the great sage, I placed my trust in Sumedha, that abode of compassion; and when that hero renounced the world, I renounced along with him. Restrained in the Pāṭimokkha and in the five senses, living purely I was a hero, mindful, acting according to the teachings of the Victor. Living thus I was incited by a certain bad friend into misconduct, and I lost the good path. Being under the influence of dubious reasoning, I left the order. Later, due to that bad friend I brought about the murder of my mother. I committed a sin of immediate retribution, and I carried out a murder with evil intentions. Having died, I went and was born in the great Avīci hell, where I stayed for a long while. And being fallen into evil destinies, I transmigrated in pain for a long time. I did not see the hero Sumedha again, that bull among men.

In this æon I was a fish in the sea, Timiṅgala. Seeing a boat on the ocean, I approached it in search of food. Seeing me, the merchants were fearful, and they mindfully called upon (*anu√smar*) the best of Buddhas. Hearing the great cry "Gotama!" they shouted, and remembering my former inclinations, I died. I was born as a brahmin in a wealthy household in Sāvatthī. I was called Dhammaruci and was one who hated all evil. Seeing the lamp of the world [the Buddha] at the age of seven, I went to the great

Jetavana and renounced the world into the homeless state. I approached the Buddha during the three times of the day and of the night, and each time he saw me the Sage said to me: "It's been a long time, Dhammaruci."

This story, although sparse on details, is closely related not only to a parallel in the Mahāvastu, but to other accounts of an individual named Dharmaruci, chief among them the Dharmarucy-avadāna in the Divyāvadāna. In these other sources we learn that the crimes of this Dharmaruci include the murder of both his parents and of an arhat. I have argued in detail in a recent book that this story, and perhaps particularly the version preserved in the Divyāvadāna, served as the prototype for the Mahāvibhāṣā's story of the Œdipal Mahādeva, held responsible by the Sarvāstivādins for the schism between the Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas.[39] Although it is not possible to detail all the evidence here, there is in my opinion a direct link between the story of an evil Dharmaruci and the schismatic Mahādeva blamed for the rupture which split the Buddha's previously unitary saṃgha.

The Mahāvibhāṣā, I have suggested, did not simply invent the tale of sex and violence which it tells, albeit briefly, about its anti-hero. Instead, it borrowed an already existing story. The direct source of the Mahāvibhāṣā can probably never be known,[40] but I have argued that its archetype either was, or looked very similar to, the story of Dharmaruci, told in or alluded to in many places. But of course, it is not Dharmaruci who is the schismatic, but Mahādeva.

As has been shown very clearly, the name Mahādeva is to be associated historically not with the schism between the Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas but rather with a later intra-Mahāsāṃghika schism which gave rise to the sub-sect of the Caityaśailas. The story was only later conflated by Sthavira authors with accounts of the fundamental Mahāsāṃghika–Sthavira schism, some authors preserving the older version. For the Indian Buddhist doxographer Vasumitra, for instance, Mahā-

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[39]Silk 2008, esp. chapter 12.

[40]See Silk, forthcoming.

deva is responsible for the emergence of the three sub-sects of the
Caityakas, Aparaśailas and Uttaraśailas,[41] for the Tibetan historian of
Indian Buddhism Tāranātha the Caityakas and Pūrvaśailas are followers
of Mahādeva,[42] and for the Theravāda Kathāvatthu commentary the
Five Theses (without mention of any Mahādeva) are connected with
other sub-sects of the Mahāsāṃghikas, the Pubbaseliyas and the Apara-
seliyas, who are likewise Andhakas, those from Āndhra.[43] Therefore,
the origins of the story of the schismatic Mahādeva are connected with a
southerly tradition, very probably located in the region of Āndhra. We
should remember this when we return to the Dhammarucikas.

   While I have been talking about a confusion of schisms, one
between Sthaviras and Mahāsāṃghikas and another within the Mahā-
sāṃghika itself, it is also important to recognize the existence of
multiple Mahādevas, as noted by Kern. In addition to the Mahādeva we
know from the Mahāvibhāṣā of the Sarvāstivāda tradition, according to
Ceylonese "historical" accounts such as the Dīpavaṃsa (Lineage [of
Buddhism] on the Island [of Ceylon]) and Mahāvaṃsa (Great
Lineage),[44] Mahādeva was the name of the monk who gave ordination
to Mahinda, the missionary who went on to proselytize Ceylon in the
third century BCE and alleged to have been the son of the emperor
Aśoka.[45] According to these accounts, Mahādeva himself was sent to

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[41]See T. 2032: 18a17–20; T. 2033: 20b2–4; T. 2031: 15b1–4. See Lamotte
    1956: 157.

[42]See Schiefner 1868: 208.4–5, and Tāranātha 1985: 217a4: *mchod rten pa
    dang shar gyi ri pa yang sde gcig cing | de ni kun tu rgyu lha chen po zhes bya
    ba'i slob ma'o ||*. A translation is found in Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya 1980:
    341.

[43]See Lamotte 1956: 158, and in more detail Aung and Rhys Davids 1915: xliii,
    111, with reference to the commentary on Kathāvatthu II.1–6.

[44]Dīpavaṃsa: VIII.5, trans. p. 159; Mahāvaṃsa: XII.3, 29, trans. pp. 82, 84;
    Samantapāsādikā in Jayawickrama 1962: 59 (§66), trans. p. 184.

[45]For some considerations concerning the legends surrounding Mahinda, see
    Yamazaki 1982, although not all his conclusions are to be accepted.

proselytize in Mahisamaṇḍala, a place almost certainly to be identified with Āndhra.[46] Whether or not this legend has anything of the historical about it, the tradition of an association of this missionary Mahādeva with Āndhra is, once again, noteworthy.[47]

In the context of identifying the name Mahādeva with the south, we should also notice a most peculiar passage, cast in the form of a prediction or prophecy, in the *Śāriputraparipṛcchā (Questions of Śāriputra), a text extant only in Chinese and generally considered to belong to the Mahāsāṃghika school:[48]

> As for the Mahāsāṃghika school, two hundred years after my death, as a result of differences of opinion there will arise the Vyavahāra school, Lokottara school, Kukkula school, Bahuśrutaka school, and Prajñaptivāda school. Three hundred years [after my death], as a result of differences in doctrine there will, in addition to these five schools, also arise a Mahādeva school, *Cetāla school, and *Uttari school, and in this fashion these multiple groups will continue on for a long time to come.

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[46]Despite alternative theories, the point has been strongly argued by Yamazaki 1979: 138–41, and see Demiéville 1951: 265, n. 1. Cp. Lamotte 1958: 311–12.

[47]See Yamazaki 1979: 138–143 and 1982.

[48]*Shelifuwen jing* 舍利弗問經 (*Śāriputraparipṛcchā), T. 1465 (XXIV) 900c6–11 : 摩訶僧祇部。我滅度時，二百年中，因於異論，生起：峭婆訶羅部・盧迦尉多羅部・拘拘羅部・婆收婁多柯部・鉢軷若帝婆耶那部。三百年中，因諸異學，於此五部，復生：摩訶提婆部・質多羅部・末多利部。 如是眾多久後流傳. For the ascription to the Mahāsāṃghikas, see for instance Ōno Hōdō 大野法道 in Ono 1932–1935: 4.376a, and Sasaki 1998: 25 (and on the association Demiéville 1951: 269n.). According to Hirakawa 1970: 270–271, there is little question that the text is a genuine translation of an Indian original. I do not well understand the suggestion of Bareau 1955: 17 that the text, while a Mahāsāṃghika work, belongs to the Kashmira tradition ("Le Çâriputrapariprcchâsûtra est un ouvrage d'origine mahâsânghika, mais qui appartient bien à la tradition cachemirienne …"), a conclusion which he appears to draw solely on the basis of the similarity of the text's enumeration with that in the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra*.

It is reasonably clear that *Cetāla here should be understood as equivalent to Caityaka, and that *Uttari is the same as Uttaraśaila. This suggests that in this context the "Mahādeva school" should be understood as equivalent to either Pūrvaśaila,[49] or Aparaśaila, assuming that this account may be forced into a structure parallel to that derived from what other sources tell us of the organization of these sub-sects of the Mahāsāṃghika.[50] It is remarkable to find here, in what seems to be a Mahāsāṃghika text, what can hardly be other than an explicit identification of one of the Andhaka sects with (some) Mahādeva.[51]

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[49]See Bareau 1955: 19, and Tsukamoto 1980: 242n5; also Lamotte 1958: 310, 588.

[50]See Appendix II.·

[51]Although a careful consideration of the entire text of the *Śāriputraparipṛcchā is, in the very first place, a sine qua non for further research, even if the Mahāsāṃghika identification of the scripture can be maintained, and even if the reliability of the translation can be determined, one might then object that the use by a Mahāsāṃghika author of such an appellation, on the one hand, is difficult to harmonize with the hypothesis of an intentional calumnious application of the story of Mahādeva to the Mahāsāṃghikas on the other. However, even setting aside the questionable legitimacy of connecting this schismatic monk Mahādeva with the missionary Mahādeva of Aśokan times, and accepting the identification of the *Śāriputraparipṛcchā's Mahādeva with that of our stories, it would nevertheless in no way necessarily contradict our suggestions for there to have actually been, within some Andhaka community, an individual monk named Mahādeva who set forth Mahāsāṃghika ideas, perhaps even the very Five Theses. These ideas, in this intra-Mahāsāṃghika context, may not have been at all objectionable to the authors of the *Śāriputraparipṛcchā. We might even imagine that it may have been in response to precisely this acceptance, and the danger they were felt to pose, that opponents of these ideas attached to the (in this scenario, real) name Mahādeva the (quite fictitious) caluminous tale of incest and murder we now know. In this case, the *Śāriputraparipṛcchā would preserve a trace of the original setting of this locally influential figure, direct and unprejudiced reference to whom has apparently been otherwise lost.

The southern connections of Mahādeva and his tale are provocative, and given the association between matricide and the figure of Dhammaruci in the Apadāna, not to mention the broader associations in closely related literature, bring us back to the linkage between the name Dhammaruci and accusations of heresy in Ceylonese Buddhist history. Is it not possible that critics of the Abhayagiri calumniated adherents of the latter by attaching to them a name notoriously associated with improper behavior? As attractive as this might seem, not all the evidence supports such a hypothesis.

Ceylonese epigraphical sources record the name Dhammaruci Nikāya, clearly in contexts favorable to this group, making certain the actual existence of an order by that name.[52] Thus, it is impossible to suppose that the Mahāvihāran opponents of the Abhayagiri-vihāra merely attached to their enemies the intentionally caluminous name "Dhammarucika", but that they called themselves something different. It may well be that Kern, after all, is right to suggest that the name Dhammarucika is to be understood literally, at least as a self-designation, indicating "those who take pleasure in the Teaching".[53] Is it consequently impossible to imagine that the opponents of these Dhammarucikas nevertheless in some fashion intended to evoke, in their attacks, some of the calumnious mythology associating the name Dhammaruci with misconduct or even heresy, if not with evil itself?

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[52]The most reliable observations in this regard may be those in Gunawardana 1979; see his index, s.v. Dhammaruci.

[53]Kern 1881–1883: II.337n5; Bareau 1955: 242, and see Gunawardana 1979: 16. Of course, the name Dharmaruci is also used in an entirely positive way; for instance, it was the original monastic name of the monk who later became, and is better known as, Bodhiruci, the great Zhou/Tang (late seventh- / early eighth-century) translator and compiler of the Mahāratnakūṭa collection. Although often transcribed in Chinese, when translated the name is rendered Faxi 法希 or Fale 法樂, meaning "desirous of the Dharma" and "taking pleasure in the Dharma", respectively. Another earlier (sixth-century) Dharmaruci (also Faxi) is mentioned in the Xu Gaoseng zhuan 續高僧傳 (T. 2060 [L] 429b29–c1) as translator of an Indian astronomical text.

The intricate connections among the name Dharmaruci, the Vajji-puttakas, the Mahāsāṃghikas, Mahādeva and Āndhra suggest an environment in which such an association, affective rather than con-crete, was indeed possible. Even if the materials are not sufficient to convince a skeptic, it must remain a remarkable coincidence that Ceylonese Buddhist traditions of the Mahāvihāra *happen* to attribute immoral behaviors to those, the Dhammarucikas, who share a name with a well-known Œdipal criminal, Dharmaruci, whose story is so intimately linked with the schismatic par excellence, Mahādeva.

I began by alluding to the synchronicity of the publication of Kern's *Manual of Indian Buddhism* and the birth of Miss Horner in 1896. While I accept, with some regret, the conclusion that there is nothing at all to be made of the co-occurrence of this pair of events, I wonder if the lives of the two giants might nevertheless help us to understand something of what we should expect of ourselves. While one can hardly imagine I. B. Horner making the kind of argument — if one can even call it that — that I offer here, I flatter myself to think that Kern may have found it agreeable. Both Hendrik Kern and I. B. Horner were clearly concerned to determine the meanings of texts, to discover the thoughts and beliefs of those who lived long ago, and committed to doing so through rigorous philological method. They belonged respect-ively to different ages, and those ages are again different from our own. Part of our task must be to determine what we can and must take from them, and where we must move forward on our own. Both are neces-sary, I think : to learn and adopt and to learn and reject. I would suggest, although it is far too facile a summation, that we must adopt both the models of philological rigor and sobriety of judgment, and those of playful and creative, even daring, imagination, if we are to aspire to follow in their footsteps.

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Appendix I: The Apadāna

For the text of the Apadāna story cited and translated above see Müller 1895, esp. 169, and in detail in 1896. The Dhammaruci story is found in the Apadāna as number 486 in the Pali Text Society edition, in Kashyap 1959 as number 489 = 49.9 = verses 164–89 (pp. 66–67). The printed texts of the Apadāna are famously bad. I have consulted the PTS edition (edited by Mary Lilley 1927: 429–431); Kashyap 1959; Müller 1896: 55–56; and the Burmese Sixth Council Edition, Dhammagiri-Pāli-Ganthamālā 58 (Dhammagiri, Igatpuri: Vipassana Research Institute, 1998). I translate what I consider to be a reliable text, but have not taken into account the multiple variants, which may or may not actually reflect real manuscript traditions. A partial translation of this episode is found in Lamotte 1944–1980: i.411–12, and a complete version in Matsumura 2010. I am grateful to the latter which allowed me to correct several errors in my translation. The later Apadāna commentary Visuddhajanavilāsinī also refers to the tale; see Godakumbura 1954: 489.1–14, and the slightly different readings in Dhammagiri-Pāli-Ganthamālā 65 (Dhammagiri, Igatpuri: Vipassana Research Institute, 1998): 209–10.

I omit the beginning of the Apadāna text, which runs:

> yadā Dīpaṅkarao buddho Sumedhaṃ vyākari jino |
> aparimeyye* ito kappe ayaṃ buddho bhavissati |
> imassa janikā mātā Māyā nāma bhavissati |
> pitā Suddhodano nāma ayaṃ hessati Gotamo |
> padhānaṃ padahitvāna katvā dukkarakārikaṃ |
> assatthamūle sambuddho bujjhissati mahāyaso |
> Upatisso Kolito ca aggā hessanti sāvakā |
> Ānando nāma nāmena upaṭṭhissat' imaṃ jinaṃ |
> Khemā Uppalavaṇṇā ca aggā hessanti sāvikā |
> Citto Āḷavako c' eva aggā hessant' upāsakā |
> Khujjuttarā Nandamātā aggā hessant' upāsikā |
> bodhi imassa vīrassa assattho ti pavuccati |
> idaṃ sutvāna vacanaṃ asamassa mahesino |
> āmoditā naramarū namassanti katañjalī |

*This form is often found in the Apadāna, and in the Buddhavaṃsa, in this set phrase. However, it is unmetrical, and should perhaps be read *appameyye*. Given the metrical factors, perhaps *CPD* is wrong to say s.v. *aparimeyya* that it is equivalent to Sanskrit *aparimeya*; probably it is equivalent to *aprameya*.

APPENDIX II: MAHĀSĀṂGHIKA SUBDIVISIONS

The identification of the names of three subdivisions of the Mahāsāṃghika sect: *móhētípó-bù* 摩訶提婆部, *zhíduōluó-bù* 質多羅部, and *mòduōlì-bù* 末多利部, in the *Śāriputraparipṛcchā* has occasioned some discussion. The best consideration seems to me now to be that of Tsukamoto 1985: 59–60, in particular with regard to his comments on the last item.

The first name can without hesitation be identified as Mahādeva, although the significance of it here is not completely clear. The second name likewise is relatively clear. Phonetically *zhíduōluó* 質多羅部 may be reconstructed (after Schuessler 2009) as *tśjet-tâ-lâ*. Tsukamoto has drawn attention to the Prakrit adjectival suffix *-āla* (Pischel 1900: § 595), which is probably involved here. Tsukamoto suggested *tśjet-tâ-lâ* = **cetira < cetia < cetiya*, equivalent to Sanskrit *caitya*. But we may have to do with something closer to **cettāla*. In the end Tsukamoto's **Cetāla may be accepted provisionally.

Regarding the third item, *mòduōlì* 末多利部, Bareau (1955: 17, 19) had understood it as Matarīya, which he identified with hesitation with Uttaraśaila. Lamotte (1958: 310) had in one place taken it without note as Uttaraśaila, and elsewhere (p. 588) as Matara, but identified with the same Uttaraśailas. While neither Matarīya nor Matara are otherwise attested, both of these ideas were at first followed uncritically by Tsukamoto (1980: 242n5; 422, 438; 464), without further consideration, although the connection between the transcription and the Indic name remained unexplained. In Middle Chinese the characters yield *mwât-tâ-li*, which for long seemed obscure. In 1985, however, Tsukamoto made the excellent suggestion that the apparent and anomalous initial *m-* is to be understood as a sandhi consonant inserted in the sequence **cetāla-m-uttariya*, but evidently not understood as such by the Chinese translators (here, rather "transcribers"). Therefore, in the sequence which appears as *mwât-tâ-li* the actual initial of the final term must be not *m-*, but rather the labial *wâ*. Thus we arrive at a transcription reconstructible as something like **uttari*, to which **Uttari(ya)* may well correspond, an easy equivalent for the otherwise attested Uttara-śaila, to be taken in the sense of "the northerners", equivalent to "those who dwell on the northern mountain". Therefore, while the identifications of earlier scholars such as Bareau and Lamotte may be accepted, a convincing rationale for the identification of the transcription may at last be provided.

It hardly needs stating that, despite these proposals, the first task to be undertaken here in order to try to confirm (or refute) these ideas is a comprehensive study of all transcriptions in the *Śāriputraparipṛcchā*, with the aim of attempting to determine something of the possible phonological system behind

them. For the present, however, I remain largely satisfied with the creative suggestions of Tsukamoto in this regard.

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Two Letters from Ledi Sayadaw to Mrs Rhys Davids

The following letters, translated from the Burmese, are in the Pali Text Society archives. Ledi Sayadaw provided an explanation in Pāli of the Yamaka which was published with the second volume of that text. His explanation was abridged and translated by Mrs Rhys Davids with help from S.Z. Aung and published in *JPTS* VII (1913–1914), pp. 115–64, together with a list of additions and corrections for the Pāli original (*JPTS* VII (1913–1914), pp. 165–69). Another text by Ledi Sayadaw, this time on the Paṭṭhāna, was translated by S.Z. Aung, edited by Mrs Rhys-Davids, and published in *JPTS* VII (1915–1916), pp. 21–53. The two letters now published were written in 1914 and 1917 in response to various questions from Mrs Rhys Davids about technical points of Abhidhamma. Mrs Rhys-Davids seems to have thought the contents of at least one of the letters was included in the first of these two publications. A handwritten note on the letters says, "Published in *JPTS* 1913–14, & can therefore be destroyed. 21.5.41." But a second note by Miss Horner questions this: "Verify I.B.H. Doesn't seem to have been published. 29.10.42."

<div align="right">Erik Braun and William Pruitt</div>

1. Ledi Sayadaw's Answers to the Five Questions of the "London Pāli Devī"

Prefatory Remarks

The most venerable Ledi Sayadaw, the well-known eminent writer of Buddhist philosophy in Burma, has entrusted me with his answers in Burmese to the questions by the London Devī [Mrs Rhys Davids] to be translated into English. Before I set my pen to the task I pondered whether I should undertake the work at all or not. Because it is essential that a translator should not only have skill in the art of turning the idioms of one language into those of another, but that he should also have made a wide and careful study of the subject so as to be competent to expand what is over compressed, to condense what is verbose, and to substitute direct statements for indirect allusions. Without possessing much of these qualifications, my translation will not only be less

intelligible and attractive than the original, but also lower our Venerable Sayadaw's high position. Though I do not feel equal to the task which ought to be handed to an abler writer, I have made up my mind to venture to make a literal rendering to the best of my ability so as to convey the essence of the original. I must also confess that I have not done it very well, even to my satisfaction. But this translation will, I hope, give some light to the London Devī who is not acquainted with the Burmese language. With regard to the lay reader who has no preliminary knowledge of the *Compendium*, the translation will, I am sure, not be of much interest. In conclusion, I must not conceal the fact that I am greatly indebted to U Shwe Zan Aung's *Compendium of Philosophy* without which I would never have been able to undertake this work. I therefore have great pleasure in frankly acknowledging it.

U Nyana
Patamagyaw
Masoyein Taik
Mandalay West
8 July 1914

Namo tassa Bhagavato Arahato Sammāsambuddhassa.

Q. 1. On page 42 of my *Compendium of Philosophy* it says the mental element of perception (*saññā*) has the function of memorizing. This mental element of perception and the perceived object expired together with the previous thought and its concomitants before the succeeding thought comes into existence. Further, it also concisely says that by the energies of the four different relations of contiguity (*anantara*), immediate contiguity (*samanantara*), absence (*natthi*), and abeyance (*vigata*), the mental element of perception among the mental states that takes part in the memory process in the image reproduced is able to recognize the original object with all its marks which was observed by its predecessors. So please give full details to facilitate a better understanding of the subject.

A. 1. Perception has the function of recognizing. That is to say, when the image is revived, it can discern the original object with its marks and

name. Now, as it is said that both the subject and object are not the same for any consecutive moments in life, it comes about that the previous thought and its mental concomitants together with their object must have expired long ago before the new object and the new subject come into existence. Hence we could conclude that the new mental states would not be capable of recognizing the original object which their predecessors had observed. If they are not capable of recognizing it, then would memory be possible? Would the function of perception be in any way advantageous in recognizing the previous object? The consequence would be that there would be no man in this world who even knows his own name. This, I understand, is the purport of the inquiry.

Some people who adhere to the soul theory would answer the question thus: It is due to the power of *attan* (the inward self or the immortal soul) that past objects are recognized by the present subjects. Though the mental states and objects are always changing, *attan* does not change. It is one and the same on all occasions. So it becomes the standing witness and renders possible the recognition of the past object. In this way, through the main element of their soul theory, they also prove the existence of the immutable soul or self which, according to their view, is entirely separate from the body and the mind of beings.

On the other hand, those who deny the existence of such a soul will answer differently in the following way: The possibility of memory is not due to the power of a permanent self (*attan*) but is due to the energies of four relations (*paccayas*, i.e. *anantara* (contiguity), *samanantara* (immediate contiguity), *natthi* (absence), and *vigata* (abeyance)). By the relationship of contiguity (*anantara-paccaya*) it also comprises the relation of contiguous sufficing condition or *an-antarūpanissaya-paccaya*, which is one of two kinds of strong dependence (*upanissaya-paccaya*). Besides these mentioned, the possibility of memory can also be ascertained by the energy of the relation of natural sufficing condition (*pakatūpanissaya*), which is the other kind of strong dependence (*upanissaya-paccaya*). The way in which one mental state

is related to the next through the energy of each of these two kinds of *upanissaya-paccaya* has been explained in my recent work entitled *Paṭṭhānuddesadīpanī* (*Compendium of the Great Treatise*).[1] So we will here only point out the difference between the two.

The relation of the contiguous sufficing condition (*anantarūpanissaya*) has the power to transmit all the potentialities of each expired mental state to its immediate successor, and thus each successor inherits from its predecessor all the potentialities which continue over a long period of time. As for the relation of the natural sufficing condition (*pakatūpanissaya*), it has the power to transmit all the potentialities of one expired mental state to the newly arising one which is not its immediate successor but one arisen after a considerable length of time. During the present time, the objects which were seen, heard, smelt, tasted, touched, or thought of many years ago, are reflected upon the mind's door under favourable circumstances, even though it may be after a hundred years' interval. Thus the newly arising perception (*saññā*) is able to recognize what its predecessors observed before, and so these creatures are able to remember what they have seen, heard, smelt, etc. Devas, Sakkas, Brahmās, and those whose birth is apparitional, remember their former existences. And also among men, some who are gifted with knowledge of former existences (*jātissara-ñāṇā*) remember their former existences. Thus, among the many innumerable objects which were experienced before, if one be either seen, heard, or met with hereafter, all those objects would be simultaneously recognized by the mind. For example, when a man who is born and brought up in England comes to Burma and arrives at Rangoon, he at once notices many things manufactured in England as soon as he sees each of them. So each of the mental elements of

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[1] "The Buddhist Philosophy of Relations", *The Manuals of Buddhism* (Rangoon, Burma: Union Buddha Sāsana Council, 1965), pp. 47–49. A third type of sufficing condition is given in that manual: objective sufficing condition (*ārammaṇūpanissaya*), in which the dominant object is the main basis for subjects. Ed.

perception which is included in each past consciousness has the energy of the relation of the natural sufficing condition, and each of the mental elements of perception which takes part in the memory process with all its heritage of the past has the conditioned effect of the relation of natural sufficing condition. The relations of absence and abeyance are here also mentioned in order to answer the questions: How can the expired perception (*saññā*) and its object render service to the newly arising perception?

There is a strong belief that a person who first observed an object and the one who recognizes it must be one and the same person. Having this belief in mind, one is likely to put the question thus: It is said in the philosophy of Buddhism that no subject can be the same for any two consecutive moments in life. Then, how can memory be possible for a person to recognize an object similar to a previously observed object if he is a different being from the one who at first cognized the object?

With regard to this question we will answer from another point of view. It is in the ultimate sense that it is said that no subject can be the same for any two consecutive moments. But according to conventional truth, we would admit that the expired perception and its successor belong to one and the same person. So the two expressions are not in conflict as each is to be understood as being confined to its own type of truth. Here it is explained by means of both ultimate and conventional truths.

The answer made by those who believe in the soul theory is not as difficult to understand as the answer made by those who deny the existence of such a soul, for the former deals with the view that the world has already adhered to, and the latter deals with the verification of things in the ultimate sense, with the transmitting force of the two relations, with the swiftness of the thinking faculty of consciousness, and with the marvellous extensiveness of consciousness — all of which can only be understood by the highly intelligent.

Here ends the answer to the first question.

Q. 2. When the psychic faculty of consciousness comes into play, that is to say, when consciousness is conscious of an object, how many relations are applicable?

A. 2. The state of thinking of an object is simple consciousness. It arises through the very subtle material organs which are generated by our past deeds, either good or bad. Though these materials are generally known as sensitive organs, they merely act as bases for the formation of consciousness, and sensations are entirely lacking in them. They play so important a part that they are universally taken for the senses. But they are really nothing but bases for the formation of senses. The bases are comparable to mothers, consciousness to offspring, and concomitants to grandchildren. Among the six bases, the first five are not so essential as the last because the first five are like the bark of a tree or worthless stones, and the sixth is like the heartwood of a tree or precious stones. Therefore, consciousness that is the offspring of the first five organs is not powerful and cannot give birth to many concomitants. But consciousness which is the offspring of the heart basis is powerful and can give birth to many concomitants. In the non-material world (*arūpa-loka*), where there is no material quality to act as a basis, the states of consciousness are also said to be the offspring of bases, for they are generated by the energy of a meditating or cultured mind which has a basis in the lower region of the world. Thus we may answer that the state of thinking about an object rises through very subtle materials or bases.

Let us now turn to a different answer: As we understand the existence of the fire element (*tejo-dhātu*) by its ever-changing characteristic marks of heat and cold, so also we understand the existence of a conscious state of consciousness by its ever-changing characteristic marks of rising and decaying. Therefore it is not necessary to inquire about which original cause this conscious state owes its existence to. But since the existence of states is impossible without some relation or cause, the above question may be posed. There are many different ways to think of objects, such as thinking about or knowing an object of sight

or sound or smell, etc. So we must ask ask, "Why are these faculties of consciousness or thinking of an object different from one another, and how is each related to its object?" Posing the question this way makes it possible to look for an answer.

Thinking of an object of sight, sound, smell, taste, or touch arises respectively from the five sensitive organs or bases, namely: the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the body, which are termed material phenomena originating in volitional acts (*kammaja-rūpa*). Thanks to the presence of these five organs, thinking of objects presented to each organ is associated with separate characteristics for each one. As for thinking of the object of thought (the sixth type of thought), that can also arise in the non-material world (*arūpaloka*) where there is no material basis, so it needs no classification by way of basis.

There are many sensitive materials in the world of matter which can receive sensuous impressions or images of objects, but these materials do not have the faculty of thought which the mind possesses, for mind alone is conscious of the impression taken. For example, the best optical lenses of a telescope might receive light from a distance, but it is surely not conscious of the impression made by the light for it has no faculty of thinking.

Thinking of an object is pure consciousness, which is classified into six types according to the different kinds of object, namely: consciousness of sight, of sound, of smell, of taste, of touch, and of thought (thought here means an object of thought (*dhammārammaṇa*)). Of these, for the formation or arising of consciousness of sight, there must be at least four fundamental sources: the sensitive organ of the eye (*cakkhu-vatthu*), the object of sight (*rūpārammaṇa*), light (*āloka*), and attention (*manasikāra*). Note that *manasikāra* is of three different kinds depending on whether it is associated with the object, the sense procedure, or the apperception (*ārammaṇa-paṭipādaka-manasikāra*, *vīthi-paṭipādaka-manasikāra*, and *javana-paṭipādaka-manasikāra*). (1) The first kind is synonymous with the mental property of attention (*manasikāra-cetasika*), which is not meant here. The last two are

respectively synonymous with the two classes of thought: (2) thought turning to the impressions at the five doors (*pañca-dvārāvajjana-citta*) and (3) thought turning to impressions at the mind door (*mano-dvārāvajjana-citta*). The attention (*manasikāra*) spoken of here means the former of the two. All four of these are related to consciousness of sight in the following way: The sensitive organ of the eye is related to it by way of basic antecedence (*vatthu-purejāta*). The object of sight is related to it by way of objective antecedent (*ārammaṇa-purejāta*) ("the pre-existence of the object"). The light of fire, the sun, or the moon is related to it by way of natural sufficing condition (*pakatūpanissaya*). And the attention which is consciousness turning to the impressions at the five doors is related to it by way of contiguity (*anantara*). These are the fundamental sources for the formation or arising of sight which does not arise when any one of them is lacking because each of them plays an important part.

As for the formation of the consciousness of sound, there also must be four fundamental sources: (1) sensitive organ of ear (*sota-vatthu*), (2) object of sound (*saddārammaṇa*), (3) space (*ākāsa*), and (4) attention (*manasikāra*). Among these four sources, the sensitive organ of ear is related to it by way of basic antecedence. The object of sound is related to it by way of objective antecedence. Space between the original sound and the sensitive organ of ear is related to it by way of the natural sufficing condition. Attention (*manasikāra*), which is also synonymous here with the impressions at the five doors (*pañca-dvārāvajjana*), is related to it by way of contiguity.

Four sources are also necessary for the formation of consciousness of smell: (1) the sensitive organ of the nose (*ghāna-vatthu*), (2) the object of smell (*gandhārammaṇa*), (3) air or motion in its ultimate sense (*vāta*), and (4) attention, as above (*manasikāra*). Of these, the sensitive organ of the nose is related to it by way of basic antecedence. The object of smell is related to it by way of objective antecedence. Motion is related to it by way of natural sufficing condition. And attention is related to it by way of contiguity.

Four sources are also indispensable in the formation of consciousness of taste : (1) the sensitive organ of the tongue (*jivhā-vatthu*), (2) the object of taste (*rasārammaṇa*), (3) liquid, here it means moisture of the tongue (*āpa*), and (4) attention, as above (*manasikāra*). Of these, the sensitive organ of tongue is related to it by way of basic antecedence, the object of taste is related to it by way of objective antecedence, liquid is related to it by way of natural sufficing condition, and attention is related to it by way of contiguity.

Consciousness of touch must also have four fundamental forces for its formation : (1) the sensitive organ of body (*kāya-vatthu*), (2) the object of touch (*phoṭṭhabbārammaṇa*), (3) extension or the hardness of the element of extension which forms the basis of the sensitive material of body (*paṭhavī*), and (4) (attention, as above (*manasikāra*). Of these, the sensitive organ of the body is related to it by way of basic antecedence. The object of touch is related to it by way of objective antecedent. Extension is related to it by way of natural sufficing condition, and the attention is related to it by way of contiguity.

Finally we come to consciousness of thought, which also must possess the following fundamental sources for its formation : (1) the thought basis (*hadaya-vatthu*), (2) life continuum (*bhavaṅga*), (3) the object of thought — here, in particular, this object should comprise all the six kinds of objects (*dhammārammaṇa*), and (4) attention, which here means the last of the three mentioned above (*manasikāra*). Of these four, the thought basis is related to it by way of basic antecedence. All the expired life-continuums are related to it by way of natural sufficing condition. The object of thought is related to it by way of objective antecedence, and attention is related to it by way of contiguity. These sources, which I have mentioned above, are explained in the commentary.

If it is explained according to the law of relations in *Conditional Relations* (Paṭṭhāna), consciousness of sight owes its existence to the eighteen relations. Which are these eighteen ? From the twenty-four relations, if we exclude five conditions (*hetu* (condition), *adhipati*

(dominance), *pacchājāta* (consequence), *āsevana* (succession), *jhāna* (no synonym in English), and *magga* (means)), we get eighteen conditions. Consciousness of sound, smell, taste, and touch owe their existence to those eighteen relations. But consciousness of thought owes its existence to twenty-three relations, putting to one side the condition of consequence (*pacchājāta*).

Here ends the answer to the second question.

Q. 3. If a preceding volition (*cetanā*) determines the activity of the succeeding volition, how would you decide based on the law of relations: Is the existence of the mind of a being free (*adhimutti*) or not? A. 3. In the definition *cetetī ti cetanā*, volition is so-called not because of its determining the succeeding volition but because of its determining its own concomitant properties. It is also the same for volition in the relationships of volitional acts (*kamma*). However, we may say that a preceeding volition is related to the succeeding volition by way of contiguity.

As regards the word *adhimutti* we need to deal with it separately from *cetanā*. The word *adhimutti*, which you render as "free will", does not mean that the will is absolutely unrelated. But it means that while it is interested in one object, a state of mind has no attachment to another object.

There are two kinds of *adhimutti*: inferior intention (*hīnādhimutti*) and superior intention (*paṇītādhimutti*). The states of mind of some beings are freely interested in worldly objects as they do not know the disadvantages of worldly pleasures and the evil consequences of corruption. They cannot discriminate between good and evil. So their states of mind have no inclination towards the good, and at the same time they have lost mindfulness and repentance. Such a state is called inferior intention (*hīnādhimutti*). Those who lead their life taking the lives of others live an unrepentant life, for they do not realize that they are living a life of impurity and consequently no such thought occurs because it would persuade them that they should abandon such types of livelihood and search some other means of right livelihood. Such is also

the state of mind which we call inferior intention (*hīnādhimutti*). Similarly, the same holds true for the state of mind of those who lead their life taking what is not given, indulging in unchastity, etc.

On the other hand superior intention (*paṇītādhimutti*) means the state of mind that is freely interested in a good object. The state of mind of one who is interested in inferior things is liable to change into a state of mind interested in good objects under favourable circumstances, such as associating with the wise and the good (*sappurisupanissaya*) and hearing the true doctrine of the wise (*saddhammasavana*). The volition which is intent on doing bad actions suddenly inclines towards the superior intention (*paṇītādhimutti*) when it associates with mindfulness and repentance. Everyone knows that when the object is removed, the mind changes direcion. Associating with the wise, hearing the true doctrine of the wise, and reasoning (*yonisomanasikāra*) are the means by which one can set one's own mind in the right course of associating with good things, and can withdraw from the wrong course of indulging in bad things. Reasoning (*yonisomanasikāra*) here means reasoning by which one can transfer the state of one's own mind from being inferior (*hīna*) to being superior (*paṇīta*).

Here ends the answer to the third question.

Q. 4. How many relations take part in the impact between the objects and the organs of sentience (*pasādarūpas*)?

A. 4. As the commentary mentions, three relations are applicable when the impact takes place between the objects of sense and the organs of sentience: (1) the relation of objective antecedence (*ārammaṇa-pure-jāta*), (2) the relation of basic antecedence (*vatthu-purejāta*), and (3) the relation of natural sufficing condition (*pakatūpanissaya*).

The organ of visual sentience (*cakkhuvatthu*), a visible object (*rūpārammaṇa*), and light (*āloka*) are the three requisites for forming an impact on the eye. For the other organs, the requisites have been mentioned in the second answer, but in each case *manasikāra* should be omitted.

The presence of the organ of visual sentience with its property of reflecting power, the presence of the visual object within the sensory range, and the presence of light, shedding its rays over that visible object are clearly capable of producing an image of the visible object on the retina or the sentient surface. Owing to the reflection of the image, or in other words, by the impingement of the two physical factors, the current of the stream of thought is interrupted or is perturbed and vibrates for two moments. Then the process of thought which comprises consciousness, turning to an impression at one of the five sense doors (*pañca-dvārāvajjana-citta*), etc., such as that shown in the process of the door of the eye, comes into play.

Of the factors mentioned above, light with its faculty of shedding rays on the visible object may sometimes be left out because the retina can reflect the image of the object which may be disposed in a dark room if the optic nerves are very strong. The structures of the optic nerves of Devas, Sakkas, and Brahmās are so powerful that their retina can reflect the image of an object by penetrating forests, mountains, earth, and water which may come between them and the object. The power of the retina in reflecting the image of the object beyond the sensory range becomes by degrees stronger for those celestial beings or for those whose birth is apparitional, according to the grade of their special power (*iddhi*). If the light and the optic nerves of the retina are extremely powerful, everything that comes between the object and the eye is so transparent that it seems nothing has been interposed. It is also the same for the various types of impact on the other sensual organs by the sensible objects.

With regard to the impact with the six different kinds of objects and the mind-door process, a great deal needs to be said about that. However, something has already been said in the first question in dealing with the difference between the two relations. In the Atthasālinī, the commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, the learned commentator mentioned six favourable circumstances by means of which objects may enter the avenue of the door of the mind. These six are (1) a previous

external intuition (*diṭṭhato*), (2) an association with a previous external intuition (*diṭṭhasambandhato*), (3) information (*sutato*), (4) an association with (*sutasambandhato*), (5) experience other than (1) and (3) (*viññātato*), and lastly (6) an association with (5) (*viññāta-sam-bandhato*). *Diṭṭha* here means the five kinds of objects of sense which previously once entered the avenue of the five-door process of thought. *Diṭṭhasambandha* means the past, present, and future objects of the five senses associated with the above. The following is an example to help with understanding this: A man who has seen a bullock in his own country has the image of the bullock reflected upon the door of his mind at the moment he hears the sound of the word "bullock", which may mean the bullock of the past experience or of a future experience in another country.

Having previously appeared at the five doors, sensory objects are easily reflected upon the door of the mind. Had these objects been apperceived with approval they generally enter the avenue of the door of the mind so often that there is hardly any way to forget and remove them. If the apperception was associated with an excess of hate, revenge, grief, mourning for the loss of beloved wife, children and relations, or despair at the loss of properties, and associated with the fire of worry which burns every moment that there is reflection on what was wrongly done, these objects appear to the door of the mind so clearly that one is unable to forget them or to remove them.

Why are they so strongly attached to the door of the mind? Because the relation of natural condition (*pakatūpanissaya*) here plays an important part. The stronger the objects were associated, the more instantaneously they are reflected at will, though they might be of objects encountered many years ago, for the mind is always bending toward these objects, even as a fish which is taken out of water struggles every moment to get back into the water or even as moths are always striving to enter the flame of a fire burning at night. Even while asleep those objects are watching the life continuum or the stream of being to perturb it at any possible moment they may arise. So no other vision is

seen, even in a dream, except what has been previously experienced.
Now no cause should be searched for other than what has been shown in
connection with the reflection of objects upon the mind. By simply
unveiling the face of the process of thought, these ideas distinctly
appear upon the mind.

Then what is meant by unveiling the face of thought? For instance,
when a man is fast asleep and perceives some frightful things in his
dream, he tries to unveil the face of thought so as to wake up, but all in
vain. After some while, however, as soon as the face of thought
becomes unveiled, the man wakes up and knows that what he perceived
was only a dream, and all thoughts of fear disappear. The unveiling of
the face here represents the rising of an apperception during the process
of thought at the door of the mind. The exertion to unveil the face is like
the perturbed state of the life continuum and the arising of conscious-
ness turning to impressions at the door of the mind. Of the two classes
of consciousness of the life continuum and mind-door apprehension, the
latter is perturbed by the new object, which it is capable of cognizing.
As to the former, though it is in the same way perturbed by the new
object, it is not capable of cognizing the new object, but it cognizes its
usual object.

Phrased logically, the perturbed state, or the vibration of the life
continuum, should be expressed as the anxiety to give up the old object
in order to grasp the new one. The presentation of the new object means
the entry of the impressions of the new object into the door of the mind.
Thus the new object seems to be pressing forward and occupying the
place of the door of the mind's object, and so mind-door consciousness
falls into a state of hardship as it can neither grasp that new object nor
give up one of the three kinds of its usual objects, which are comprised
of the past efficient action (*kamma*), the symbol of the past action
(*kamma-nimitta*), and the sign of the tendencies (*gati-nimitta*), which
are determined by the force of the past action. Here pressing forward
means the entry of the impressions of what had been seen before. Let us
make this clearer. A man is always capable of perceiving all the things

in his house or things within the reach of his eyes. But while he is sleeping or thinking of something else, he cannot perceive them. Though he does not perceive them, they are not removed away from his presence, and he does not forget, either entirely or temporarily. These objects are always waiting for him to turn his attention to them and are close at hand ready to serve. So when he wakes up, or when he withdraws his attention from something else, he can at once direct his mind toward them and perceive them at will.

Just before sunrise, first the appearance of the aurora is noticed, and then the globe of the sun is seen a little later. Similarly, before the reproduction of the images of the past objects that had been seen a hundred year ago, in the procedure of the process of thought, the indiscriminate impressions of these objects are first reflected upon the door of the mind because the light of not forgetting is supported by the energy of the relation of the sufficing condition. Here, the light does not mean the light of knowledge, but that of perception (*saññā*). This perception disappears and fades away either suddenly or after a considerable length of time. In some cases it remains for the whole term of the object's life. It suffices now to have a fair knowledge of past and future objects by following what has been shown above.

Almost without exception, any and every object is capable of being reflected upon the door of the mind, whether it is real or imaginary. On account of the marvellous faculty of consciousness, initial application (*vitakka*) and the wide spread of the faculties of greed (*lobha*), hate (*dosa*), dullness (*moha*), perplexity (*vicikicchā*), distraction (*uddhacca*), conceit (*māna*), error (*diṭṭhi*), faith (*saddhā*), reason (*paññā*), etc., objects that are real or imaginary, existing or non-existent, are capable of being reflected upon the door of the mind without limit. From the above, it is clear that the representation of objects is a very easy, natural process.

Here ends the answer to the fourth question.

Q. 5. How many relations are applicable when a new feeling (*vedanā*) re-enjoys an old one?

A. 5. When we say that a new feeling enjoys the old one again, we mean to say that we are enjoying it inwardly by recollecting all the worldly pleasures that we once enjoyed with relish. We also mean that we are always delightfully expressing our joys throughout an unlimited length of time. It is by the energy of the relation of a natural sufficing condition that past pleasurable objects and craving (*taṇhā*) have an effect upon the newly arising feeling and craving. In order not to forget previous objects, feeling and craving are also related to the new lustful feeling, lustful apperception, and to their concomitants in the process of the door of the mind by way of object. Being dominated by where the attention is placed, they are also related to by way of objective dominance (*ārammaṇadhipati*) and objective sufficing condition (*ārammaṇūpa-nissaya*). Only the relations of fundamental importance have been shown, but those relations within the scope of easy investigation are left to the inquirer to apply accordingly as they relate in this matter.

Here ends the answer to the fifth question.

2. Ledi Sayadaw's supplement to the answers for the questions on memory and will (1917)

(Translated by Maung Myo, B.A., Myook, under training, Myaungmya).

1. Objective change is concealed by continuity, resulting in the illusion of identity produced thereby. This may be added to my previous answer to the memory question. This makes it look as if memory is the direct result of hallucination, which is akin to ignorance. It may then be contended that the Buddhas and Arahants, who are entirely free from illusions and hallucinations, would be forgetful of the past. This objection may be met by answering that wisdom presupposes a knowledge of hallucinations and illusions which it transcends. It is on account of their wisdom that they are capable of recognizing past objects as the same in the conventional sense, though not in the philosophical sense.

11. Such Pali terms, as *adhimutti*, *vimutti*, *adhimokkha*, and *vimokkha* denote different degrees of emancipation. Emancipation is either partial or total.

Partial emancipation means freedom from inimical influences. It does not, however, imply freedom from the influences of the productive and supportive *kammas* which are by no means prejudicial to one's interest.

Total emancipation means absolute freedom from all causes or conditions and all relations. *Nibbāna* is the only state that is absolutely free and unrelated in this way. All others are only partially free.

The controversy between free will and determinism in the West is due to a want of a thorough knowledge of the twenty-four modes of relation treated of in the Paṭṭhāna. When these are thoroughly understood, the free-will controversy will disappear naturally. Those who are ignorant of happening by way of causation and of the twenty-four modes of relation look upon the past *kamma* as the only cause that determines our present volitions and actions. But those who understand them are quite convinced that there are innumerable causes, conditions, and influences at work besides past *kamma*. As soon as this knowledge is widespread the controversy will become a thing of the past.

As regards the various points raised in your [S.Z.A.'s] letter concerning my previous answer, I will answer one by one.

First, according to Buddhism, mind and will are conditioned, by *kamma*, mind, climate, or food, and are related in various ways. Hence they cannot of themselves change from bad to good, or vice versa without some influence or other operating from outside.

Second, as our will is partially free, we may be well disposed towards good conduct, either permanently or temporarily, on coming in contact with good associates and on hearing good advice.

Third, the Buddha taught in the Paṭṭhāna that the immoral may be succeeded by the moral.

Fourth, the argument that, if will is free, it is not determined, may be met by the theory of partial freedom as expounded above.

Fifth, a person can only be well disposed towards good when his will has been favourably determined by his past volitions in at least two modes of relations (by way of contiguity and sufficing conditions). But because he is free from what is bad, his will may be said to be also free. Hence our moral approbation (as a moral free agent).

In your illustration of a marionette performance, the puppet, of course, does not deserve praise as acquiring merit. Nevertheless, praise is due to it for the life-like movements executed by the string-puller.

Sixth, determination is not opposed to the theory of free will in Buddhism.

Seventh, it is obvious from the above remarks that the theory of free will is consistent with the belief in the law of *kamma*.

Eighth, in the story of Kākavaliya, the offer of the rice gruel to the Arahant on waking from complete trance was determined not only by his past *kamma* but also by good associations and good advice, well disposing the hero of the story to a good course of conduct in that life. Hence he deserves our moral approbation. The view that if he was under the influence of past *kamma*, he could not possibly help offering such a gift to the Arahant under those favourable conditions is erroneous, just as the theory of past deeds as sufficient causes is.

The three principal theories of predeterminism, creation, and chance are fully expounded in the *Tika-nipāta* of the first book of the Anguttara-nikāya.[2]

Of these, the first, fatalism, consists in believing that one's happiness or misery, prosperity or adversity, good or bad character are pre-determined by one's *kamma* in a past existence.

The second consists in believing that happiness or misery, etc., is created by the fiat of God. The third is the view that they cannot be traced to any cause but occur in a fortuitous manner. In this *nikāya* the Buddha examined these theories in detail. As a Bodhisatta, in the birth stories of Mahābodhi,[3] the stories in the Mahānipāta,[4] and the birth story

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[2] A I 101–300.

[3] Ja no. 528.

of Bhūridatta,[5] he examined these views. The reproach "like the lifeless puppet" is consistent with the Buddha's spirit of inquiry and scrutiny.

As I am now engaged in writing a new treatise on *vipassanā*,[6] I cannot now explain the main points of the Buddha's criticism. But if more information is required, the details of the Western controversy between determinism on the one hand and free will on the other should be presented to me.

The essential point to be borne in mind is that past *kamma* is the main cause and the basic principle of all that takes place in any one existence. Hence special importance is attached to it. It must not, however, be taken that past *kamma* alone brings about happiness, etc. The fact that there are many other causes of what happens, as dealt with in the Paṭṭhāna, may be understood from the example of a tree. The soil, water, etc., are required in addition to a seed. I will repeat a discourse which I preached in Pazundaung some time ago. By the sentence "The King comes" we understand that not only the king but his retinue also comes. This mode of speech is known as the suggestive mode of speech. The following three statements are suggestive:

1. The growth of trees depends upon the seeds.
2. The prosperity of men results from the meritorious deeds performed in their previous existences.
3. All beings, men, gods and Brahmās can attain the four noble paths and their fruition and *nibbāna* only through their past perfections.

In saying that trees grow from seeds, we must bear in mind that they cannot do so without the soil and the water. Only with the help of the soil and the water can seeds produce trees. In the same way, when we say prosperity depends upon past *kamma*, we must understand that it is only the main cause of it. Virtue is like the earth; concentration and

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[4]Ja section 22.

[5]Ja no. 543.

[6]This no doubt refers to his *Vipassanā-dīpanī*, written in 1915.

wisdom are comparable to rain water; and past *kamma* corresponds to the seed. Again, rice plants depend on the early rains, middle rains, and late rains for their growth. Virtue may be likened to the early rains, concentration of the mind to the middle rains, but wisdom recalls the final rains.

In the parable Buddhists are cultivators. They cannot attain the fourth path and fruition and *nibbāna* through their past *kamma* alone. They must also observe the precepts, practise concentration, and acquire wisdom.

In the ranks of Buddhists themselves, there are many who hold the extreme view that *kamma* is the only sufficient cause. These erroneous views cannot be dispelled without a knowledge of the *Paṭicca-samuppāda-naya* and the *Paṭṭhāna-naya*. For a detailed examination of them, the reader is referred to the *Sammādiṭṭhi-dīpanī*[7] which was written by us in Pāli some time ago.

Ledi Sayadaw's Answers to the Five Paṭṭhāna Questions Posed by Mrs. Rhys Davids

Q. 1. *Paṭiccavāre;* page 21, lines 19, 21, 23:[8] *khandhe* […] *vippayutta-paccayā*; this is not a complete sentence. What is omitted? What is the other term in the relation, thus *khandhe paṭicca ... ? … uppajjati vippayuttapaccayā*?

A. 1. In the above question, the sentence should be completed thus: *khandhe paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ uppajjati vippayuttapaccayā*. Here, it being a *paṭiccavāra*, we at once know that the verb *paṭicca* must be inserted as soon as we see the object *khandhe*. The words *cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ, kaṭattārūpaṃ upādā-rūpaṃ* are the subjects of the preceding sentence in the text and they

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[7]Translated from Pāli into Burmese by Ledi Paṇḍita U Maung Gyi, translated into English by the editors of *The Light of the Dhamma,* "The Manual of Right Views", *Manuals of Buddhism*, 1965, pp. 69–100.

[8]References seem to be to a Burmese edition of the Tikapaṭṭhāna. See Tikap 82,29, 33, 36.

should be inserted here as well. As regards to the verb *uppajjati*, it is evident that it must also be put here as the principal verb, as it is contained in the hypothetical exposition (*uddesapāḷi*) *abyākataṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca abyākato dhammo uppajjati vippayutta-paccayā.*

Yutti or evidence : In the expositions of the Paṭṭhāna relations, there are three main points to be carefully noted, i.e.,

    i.   the *paccayadhamma* : the relating thing,
    ii. the *paccayuppannadhamma* : the related thing,
    iii. the *paccaya-satti-visesa* : the specific function of the relation or better the specific relation.

Here the *paccayadhamma* is indicated with the object *khandhe* ; the *paccayuppannadhamma* with the subjects *cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ, kaṭattārūpaṃ, upādārūpaṃ* ; and the *paccayasattivisesa* with the instrumental case *vippayuttapaccayā*. Hence, in order to cope with the hypothetical exposition, every demonstrative sentence (*niddesa-vākya*) should have these three main facts in full, and they should be carefully noted in every relation.

As regards the question, "What is the other term in the relation thus *khandhe paṭicca ... ? ... uppajjati vippayuttapaccayā*?", if there are three facts, namely, 1. *paccayadhamma,* 2. *paccayuppannadhamma,* 3. *paccayasattivisesa*, in full, it may safely be said that the sense is quite clear with its own existing words and no other term is needed to make the sense clearer. But the adopting of more appropriate expressions suitable to a particular person or a country, other than those in the text, would conduct the student most beneficially and readily to the object of his search. Such incomplete expressions as *khandhe vippayuttapaccayā, vatthuṃ purejātapaccayā,* etc., are only met with in the species of *purejāta* and *vippayutta*. The inscription of the Paṭṭhāna text now found in the papers and the palm leaves is not the verbatim exposition of the Buddha, but it is to be believed that it exists only as the first Sinhalese inscribers of the Buddhist canon arranged it. If we were to change the sentence *khandhe paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ uppajjati vippayuttapaccayā* into another term, we would,

with reference to its hypothetical exposition, change *khandhe* into *kusale khandhe, akusale khandhe, vipākābyākate kiriyābyākate khandhe*, etc., or *kusale dhamme, akusale dhamme*, etc.; *paṭicca* into *nissāya, amuñcitvā, avinābhāvi hutvā*, etc.; and *cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ* into *kusala-cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ, akusala-cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ, kiriyābyākata-cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ, vipākābyākatacittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ, kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ.* Here, in order to show that only the derivatives are needed and not the four great essentials by the words *cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ*, since the *mahābhūtāni* are *paccayadhammas*; (see the sentence beginning *mahā-bhūte paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ*[9]), the word *upādārūpaṃ* is added to each. It is an easy thing to use different expressions if one grasps fully the meaning of the original sentence, otherwise it may be difficult to do so. The meaning of the word *paṭicca* should be understood as in *putto mātaraṃ paṭicca uppajjati*; *aggi kaṭṭhaṃ paṭicca uppajjati*; *divā āloko sūriyaṃ paṭicca uppajjati*; etc.

Here ends the answer to the first question.

Q. 2. *Paccayavāre*; page 5, lines 5, 14, 16.[10] *vatthuṃ purejātapaccayā* …, here again the sentence is incomplete. How would the full sentence be written?

A. 2. In this question and in the incomplete sentence *vatthuṃ purejāta-paccayā*, the object *vatthuṃ* indicates the *paccayadhamma*, and the instrumental case *purejātapaccayā* indicates the *paccayasattivisesa*. Therefore we at once know that the subject to indicate the *paccayuppannadhamma* and the predicate to complete the sentence are wanting. And whereas the hypothetical exposition *kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paccayā kusalo dhammo uppajjati purejātapaccayā* and the demonstrative exposition *kusalaṃ ekaṃ khandaṃ paccayā tayo khandhā; … pe … dve khandhe paccayā dve khandhā* are clearly set

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[9]Tikap 83,1.

[10]Tikap 115,4f., 14, 18.

forth, we have no doubt in supplying the incomplete sentence with the subject *khandhā* and the predicate *uppajjanti.* The complete sentence will then run as: *khandhā vatthuṃ paccayā uppajjanti purejātapaccayā.* It should be paraphrased with reference to the preceding sentence thus: *khandhā cattāro kusalā vā akusalā vā vipākakiriyābyākatā vā khandhā vatthuṃ hadayavatthurūpaṃ paccayā paccayaṃ katvā kāraṇaṃ katvā purejātapaccayā hadayavatthuno purejātapaccayasattivisesena uppajjanti pātu bhavanti.*

Here ends the answer to the second question.

Q. 3. *Pañhāvāre*: page 227, lines 11, 12, *anantarūpanissayo, pakatūpa-nissayo*;[11] *pakatūpanissayo*: here as sometimes elsewhere, out of the two of the three subdivisions of *upanissayapaccayo* (*ārammaṇūpa-nissayo* being the third) only the third is taken in the specific relation referred to. I would ask: What are we to conclude with respect to the second *anantarūpanissayo*? This is stated with *pakatūpanissayo,* but no use is made of it. Why is it stated?

A. 3. Here in the text, in the aforesaid page and line, the hypothetical sentence runs as follows: *adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttassa dhammassa upanissaya-paccayena paccayo*. It assumes that the state accompanied by painful feeling is the *paccayuppannadhamma*, and *upanissaya* is the *paccaya-sattivisesa*. Now, the tactile cognition and the twin consciousness rooted in hate which are accompanied by painful feeling, being never conscious of an object pleasurably cannot obtain the *ārammaṇādhi-patipaccaya,* that is, they do not become the *paccayuppannadhamma* of it. And *ārammaṇūpanissaya* is synonymous with *ārammaṇādhipati*. Therefore the *ārammaṇūpanissayapaccayo* is not mentioned in the text.

As regards the two *paccayas*, *anantarūpanissaya* and *pakatūpa-nissaya*, the former is synonymous with the ordinary *anantarapaccaya*. Therefore the exposition of the *anantarūpanissaya* must be the same with those of the *anantara* and *samanantara* whose expositions have

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[11]Tikap 165,4.

already been mentioned in the text below (see page 222, line 28).[12] For this reason it is not necessary to mention them again along with the *pakatūpanissaya.* But if we are to reproduce it here in the form of *anantarūpanissaya* it will runs as follows: *adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttassa dhammassa upanissayapaccayena paccayo. āvajjanaṃ dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ upanissayapaccayena paccayo.* Here the "turning towards the five doors" is the *paccaya-dhamma* and the four mental aggregates of tactile cognition accompanied by painful feeling are the *paccayuppannadhamma*; and the determining consciousness or the *voṭṭhabbana-citta* in the sense-door-process or the mind-door cognition in the mind-door process is the *paccayadhamma* and the four mental aggregates of apperceptions rooted in hatred are the *paccayuppanna-dhamma.*

Here ends the answer to the third question.

Q. 4. *Sukhāya vedanāya* ... p. 234, line 10[13] ... *pe* ... Here should come the *Paccanīyaṃ*, but there is here no *na-hetu* nor any other *na-*. What is the right title for this section (down to p. 235, line 3[14])? What is its object?

A. 4. Here, although we do not see any *na-*, we may no doubt assign the title *Paccanīya-naya* to this section. For this section is indicative of or is intended to enumerate the contents of *nava* expressed in the *Paccanīya-saṅkhyāvāra* as *na-hetuyā nava*, *nārammaṇe nava*, etc., which we will meet with at the end of this section p. 235, line 3. This type of exposition is also met with on pages 130, 131,[15] and there called the *Paccanīyuddhāra.* This is a preliminary enumeration of what is obtainable in the *Paccanīyavāra.* The obtainable *nava* are, to wit, 1. *sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo sukhāya vedanāya sam-*

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[12]Tikap 326,5*f.*

[13]Tikap 327,2*f.*

[14]Tikap 327,5.

[15]Tikap 190*f.*

payuttassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo, sahajāta-paccayena paccayo, upanissayapaccayena paccayo, kammapaccayena paccayo. 2. *sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo, ... pe ...*, etc., (down to page 235, line 3). In this statement there is something to be more especially understood. It is the concise statement reducing the twenty-one *paccayas* obtainable in the *Vedanā-tika* into four, viz, *ārammaṇa, sahajāta, upanissaya* and *kamma*. And the twenty-one *paccayas* obtainable are those other than the *purejāta, pacchājāta,* and *vippayutta*. In this *Vedanā-tika*, both the *paccaya-dhamma* and the *paccayuppanna-dhamma* are only the mental aggregates accompanied by feeling. Those of *pūrejāta* are materials and mentals respectively; those of *pacchājāta* are mentals and materials respectively; and those of *vippayutta* are materials and mentals and vice versa respectively. Therefore these three *paccayas* are excluded in the *Vedanā-tika*.

How the twenty-one *paccayas* come under the heads of the said four *paccayas* is as follows: By the expression *ārammaṇapaccayena* we get one *paccaya*, that is mere *ārammaṇa*. By the expression *sahajāta-paccayena* we get, excluding the *vippayutta* out of the fifteen species of *sahajāta*, another fourteen *paccayas*, viz, *hetu, adhipati, sahajāta, añña-m-añña, nissaya, kamma* (only *sahajāta-kamma* is meant), *vipāka, āhāra, indriya, jhāna, magga, sampayutta, atthi,* and *avigata*. By the expression *upanissaya*, we get another six, that is to say, *anantara, samanantara, upanissaya, āsevanā, natthi,* and *vigata*. Now we have altogether twenty-one. By the expression *kammapaccayena* we get another one, that is *nānākkhaṇika-kamma* alone, *sahajāta-kamma* being taken in the *sahajāta*. But this last one should not be taken separately, for the name *kamma* has already been mentioned in the *sahajāta*. Thus it reduces the twenty-one *paccayas* that are obtainable in the *Vedanā-tika* into four as we see in the nine themes, in the *Paccanīyuddhāra*. And with reference to these nine themes or sentences, *na-hetuyā nava, nārammaṇe nava*, etc., are set forth. It means that in the *paccanīya* of *hetu* nine themes and their expositions are obtained. How? *sukhāya*

vedanāya sampayutto dhammo sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttassa dhammassa na-hetu-paccayena paccayo, ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo. sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttena cittena dānaṃ datvā, sīlaṃ samādiyitvā, uposathakammaṃ katvā, sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttena cittena taṃ paccavekkhati assādeti abhinandati, taṃ ārabbha sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto rāgo uppajjati diṭṭhi uppajjati.

In a similar manner it should be shown in full of all the themes and their expositions not connected with the *hetupaccaya*, that is, distributing severally the twenty *paccayas* with the exception of *hetu*. We do not deal with them here fully lest it should become too lengthy. In this book of Paṭṭhāna, the first chapter, *Paccayaniddesavāra*, and the *Pañhāvāra-vibhaṅga* are the most important ones, and the expositions contained in these chapters alone should be taken as the original verbatim exposition of the Buddha himself; others, i.e. *Pucchā-vāra, Saṅkhyā-vāra, Ghaṭanā-vāra, Paccanīya-vāra*, etc., are those of the *Mahātheras* who are exceptionally versed in the doctrine of the Abhidhamma. Only those who have thoroughly studied and understood the analytical expositions of the contents (*mātikā*) of the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, i.e., *Tika-padas* and *Duka-padas*, as well as the *paccayadhammas* and the *paccayuppanna-dhammas* of the twenty-four relations can walk their way through these *vāras,* otherwise they will feel like they are wanderers in some unknown region, groping their way without any success. However, if the student has understood well only what is said in the *Paccayaniddesa* and the *Pañhāvāra* of the *Tika-* and *Duka-padas*, though he is not able to acquire the knowledge of all the *vāras*, he may be said to have acquainted himself with the *Paṭṭhāna.*

Here ends the answer to the fourth question.

Q.5. What exactly is meant by … *tīṇi* … in the abbreviation used in the printed edition, for example, on page 266, line 4,[16] and lower again? Does it refer to the *eko khandho ... tayo ... dve*? or to any three

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[16]See Tikap 328. E^e does not include the word *tīṇi*. Ed.

propositions concerning dhamma … *āhārapaccayena paccayo*, etc., etc.?

A.5. In this question *tīṇi* refers to any three propositions concerning dhamma. On page 266, line 4, the *tīṇi* refers to the following three propositions: 1. *vipākadhammadhammo vipākadhammadhammassa āhārapaccayena paccayo. vipākadhammadhammā āhārā sampayutta-kānaṃ khandhānaṃ āhārapaccayena paccayo.* 2. *vipākadhamma-dhammo nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammassa āhārapaccayena paccayo. vipākadhammadhammā āhārā cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ āhārapaccayena paccayo.* 3. *vipākadhammadhammo vipākadhamma-dhammassa ca nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammassa ca āhāra-paccayena paccayo. vipākadhammadhammā āhārā sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānānañ ca rūpānaṃ āhārapaccayena paccayo.* Here *vipākadhammadhammā* are moral and immoral states that have effectual properties. *Nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammā* are *kriyācitta, rūpa,* and *nibbāna.* Thus we have three propositions in the *āhārapaccaya,* as *vipākadhammadhamma* causally relates either to itself or to *cittajarūpa* or to both. Wherever numerals are met with it is to be understood that they refer to the propositions which should be con-structed according to the relation concerned and with reference to the *dhammas* of *Tika-* and *Duka-padas.*

Here ends the answer to the fifth question.

In Buddhism the teaching of the Buddha is of two kinds, viz, teaching regarding the person (*puggalādhiṭṭhāna-desanā*), and teaching regarding the subject (*dhammādhiṭṭhāna-desanā*). Almost all of the Suttanta discourses which are delivered regardless of the subject but suitable to the hearer and, as far as his knowledge is concerned in respect of gaining the Paths, belong to the former, and all the Abhi-dhammical expositions which are propounded to all their intents and purposes and in many ways as much as can be obtained, regardless of the hearer or the extent of his knowledge in gaining the Paths, belong to the latter. Therefore those who wish to gain the Paths in this present life should search out from the many Suttanta discourses such as *Nidāna-*

vāra-saṃyutta, Khandhavāra-saṃyutta, Saḷāyatana-saṃyutta, etc., the discourse most suitable to their taste, and from these, acquiring the knowledge of how to discriminate the mental and material qualities as to their relation by way of cause and effect, and also gaining the methods of how to proceed with the exercises of insight, should work out their salvation. The discourse on the *Paṭiccasamuppāda* is capable of gaining the knowledge of cause and effect, and is also efficient for gaining the Paths. The exposition of the *Paṭṭhāna-naya* being a *dhammādhiṭṭhāna-desanā* is beyond the extent of the knowledge of the hearers. It is most advantageous to the Ariyan disciples in promoting the growth of the *paṭisambhidā* knowledge. But the study of the philosophy of the Abhidhamma to a learned *puthujjana* ["ordinary person"] in this life is not without any effect, for his knowledge of the Paths and Fruitions, which he shall receive from future Buddhas will be decorated with the knowledge of *paṭisambhidā*. The philosophy of Abhidhamma in Buddhism is the recreation-ground for intellectual minds. It gives delight to scientific men of other religions. It can also resist the inter-ference of foreign religions. Those who are well trained in it cannot be tempted by any other religion. On these accounts I have written a book called *Paramattha-saṅkhepa* (a rhythmical Burmese translation of the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*), which even the girls can learn easily in four or five months. I have also written a book called *Sadda-saṅkhepa* in rhythmical form which also helps a beginner learn Pāḷi in five or six months. A rhythmical book entitled *Vinaya-saṅkhepa*, for the bhikkhus, has also been written, and it helps the bhikkhus to know easily all the rules and duties of a bhikkhu in two months' time. I have also written many other books called *dīpanīs* in plain Burmese on many subjects which I thought important in Buddhism for the general public and these spread all over Burma.

Ledi Sayadaw

5th Waning Kasôn, 1279 B.E. (1917 A.D.)

An Index to *JPTS* Volumes IX–XXXI

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