

1 Introduction

Abstract This chapter provides an outline of the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ system in the context of the larger ‘patriotic education’ campaign in China as its most outstanding, continuous, and widespread ingredient. It addresses the main concerns, namely patriotism and nationalism, national and local identities, tourism, and citizen formation, and discusses the approach and materials used. A quick tour through the book concludes the chapter. Three appendices provide 1) an overview over the listings of the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ in terms of time and geographical scope, 2) an example of an upgrading process of a site, and 3) examples of further site listings and labels encountered during fieldwork to contextualise the ‘patriotic education showcase base’ labelling.

One of the most striking aspects in present-day Chinese education is the broad and long-term ‘patriotic education’ (*aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu* 爱国主义教育) campaign. Although the aim of patriotism in education is per se not new in China, the concerted action for ‘patriotic education’ ever since the 1980s and 1990s has outgrown any former dimensions, becoming the most long-standing campaign in the whole history of the PRC (People’s Republic of China),¹ well and alive to this day. While Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, China’s paramount leader of the 1980s, steered the country away from the Maoist hyper-revolutionary path culminating in the Cultural Revolution (conventionally dated 1966–1976), he acknowledged the particular value of teaching patriotism to Chinese youth.² The critical year of 1989 which saw the Tiananmen protests and the beginning demise of Communist rule in Eastern Europe seemed, however, to teach the authorities that the effort of the 1980s urgently needed reinforcement. Thus, Deng’s protégé and successor Jiang Zemin 江泽民 would become the one to decidedly drive up the campaign in the 1990s, defining its contours, and broadening its application. According to the ‘patriotic education’ campaign’s official promoters, it was designed to counter corruption by ‘capitalist forces’, and to achieve a strong identification of the populace with the Chinese

1 For research on the general ‘patriotic education’ campaign, see, above all, Zhao (1998), Kinoshita (2007), and Wang (2008 and 2012).

2 Deng’s role in the ‘patriotic education’ campaign, while often not fully appreciated, has been duly pointed out by Kinoshita (2007).

state.³ For this, the campaign became also outstanding in terms of the breadth of tools it applied, including not only school textbooks, but since the mid-1990s also increasingly films, songs, and physical places, the so-called ‘bases’, which are spread all over China. Whereas school textbooks are addressing youth as the primary target group of the campaign, the other tools go beyond this segment of society and clearly aim at the populace at large. Thus, ‘patriotic education’ was and is to be not only relevant for socialising the coming generation, but also for a long-term formation of the PRC citizen as such. In other words, the campaign was designed for the whole Chinese society.

In this context of broadening the scope and target groups of ‘patriotic education’ in China, the so-called ‘patriotic education bases’ (*aiguozhuyi jiaoyu jidi* 爱国主义教育基地) play a decisive role. They dot the landscape and are a physical crystallisation, reflected in the term ‘bases’ (*jidi* 基地),⁴ where various campaign tools can be physically ‘anchored’ and joined together: school classes may visit the places as a form of ‘outdoor education’, sing patriotic songs, and pledge their patriotism on spot, visit museums, and watch patriotic films. Grown-ups may include such places in a travel itinerary of either organised group outings or individual tourism. Some declared ‘patriotic education bases’ were picked and upgraded as ‘national patriotic education showcase bases’ (*quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi* 全国爱国主义教育示范基地),⁵ a label introduced in 1997 as the highest administrative level,⁶ which was added in the context of the Hong Kong handover,⁷ a peak of nationalist

3 See former deputy head of the CCP Central Committee’s Propaganda department Liu Yunshan 刘云山 in his general preface to the series on the (first) 100 ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ as a benchmark publication in this regard (cf. below). Liu Yunshan also cited Deng Xiaoping’s propagation of patriotic education to this avail. See, e.g., in Xie (1998: 1).

4 The term ‘base’ (*jidi*) is applied broadly as the foundational (or central) physical place for some activity to anchor it. It is not identical with the usual Chinese term for the Communist ‘base areas’ during Republican times, *genjudi* 根据地.

5 Sometimes the translation ‘demonstration base’ is used for *shifan jidi*. I opt for ‘showcase base’ as this is to my mind the most literal and apt translation. Kinoshita (2007) translates *shifan* into Japanese as *moderu* (model) which in Chinese would be usually *mofan* 模范, though. In any case, these sites are officially acknowledged as displaying ‘best practice’ examples of sites of national importance, which is captured well in the word ‘showcase’.

6 It seems that existing work on the patriotic education campaign largely ignores the fact that the label ‘patriotic education bases’ existed already earlier before the sites might have been upgraded to a ‘national showcase base’ level. At times, the pre-upgrading label appears at the entrance of single sites next to the upgraded ‘showcases bases’ plaques.

7 That the ‘showcase bases’ list was added in the context of the Hong Kong handover is stated by Liu Yunshan in his general preface to the series on the (first) 100 patriotic education showcase bases. (Preface, p. 3, contained in every booklet of this series, e.g., in Xie 1998). As mentioned, ‘patriotic

fervour in the PRC, others were newly designed as such. As pointed out when the second list of such ‘national showcase bases’ was promulgated (in 2001), the addition of *shifan* 示范 (showcase) to the label intended to stress that these sites had an outstanding function of providing a benchmark for other sites, showcasing how one made the ‘patriotically’ best of a site or an exhibition with various technical means, adding activities and other endeavours to involve the addressees actively. This should go in tandem with publications and filmic presentations (see below) to help turn the topic of patriotic education in general into society’s ‘main melody’, and to conform to the official programme for the ‘building up of civic morality’ (*gongmin daode jianshe* 公民道德建设) with such ‘bases’.⁸ That the Chinese state sees these ‘bases’ as a tool of particular importance is corroborated by the fact that whereas there is just one list of 100 patriotic films and 100 patriotic songs and 100 patriotic books (for primary through senior secondary pupils) that were chosen in the 1990s, the originally equally 100 national-level ‘showcase bases’ have been the only tool to be continually expanded by additional lists, covering 356 sites on four lists by the end of the Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 era. After a hiatus of several years, further lists came out in the Xi Jinping 习近平 era, bespeaking the fact that the tool is still seen as valuable. One of the driving factors behind this expansion ever since the first list of 1997 is obviously the desire to take in more and more places in the vast territory of China and have them ‘appropriated’ by the Chinese state to be ‘patriotically’ inscribed for the nation, even if geographically not very homogeneously spread (see appendix 1 for a table, according to province).⁹

education bases’ had been there already earlier, but at this point in time, the upgraded national-level ‘showcase bases’ were officially proclaimed.

8 Cf. then-deputy head of the Propaganda Department Liu Peng’s 刘鹏 preface in *Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu xuanjiaoju / Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe* (2002: 2–4). Liu mentioned specifically the publishers *Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe*, *Zhongguo shaoer chubanshe*, and *Zhongguo ditu chubanshe* with books, illustrated volumes, and maps, as well as the CCTV film clips (see below) then produced for the second list sites, as ‘coordinated’ outlets for propagating the ‘bases’.

9 One might note that although the first list of 1997 covered all provinces and autonomous regions – if very unequally, the next lists already skipped some, i.e., the second list omitted Tibet, Ningxia and Qinghai, the third again Tibet as well as Shaanxi and Gansu, whereas the fourth skipped Guangxi. That way, at the end of the Hu Jintao era, ‘peripheral’ minority areas, namely Tibet, Qinghai and Ningxia remained the least covered with 4 sites each, Xinjiang and Hainan counted 5, and Inner Mongolia 6. Equally strongly minority-inhabited Guangxi arrived at 7, Yunnan and Guizhou at 8. Top-scoring, in turn, were Jiangsu and Hunan with 19, and provinces with 18 (Beijing, Hebei, Sichuan) or 17 sites (Liaoning, Shandong, Hubei). On this basis, the Xi Jinping 习近平-era lists proceeded after a hiatus of 8 years, driving the imbalance even further, tellingly by 2021 ending up with Beijing far at the top with 42 sites (Hunan and Jiangsu as the next with only 33 and 31), while Hainan (7), Ningxia and Qinghai (8), and Inner Mongolia and Tibet (9) remained at the lower end.

The fact that the number of patriotic education sites and its most high-ranking form, the ‘national patriotic education showcase bases’ which we will focus upon in this book, is continuously growing shows that the patriotic education campaign and the ‘bases’ are still very much part of the agenda to this day. They are also included in the latest addition to the general ‘patriotic education’ campaign: the ‘Patriotic Education Law of the PRC’ which went into effect on January 1, 2024. Here, the ‘patriotic education bases’ are explicitly named as an important venue for patriotic education, to serve not only for pupils but for the Chinese citizen at large.¹⁰ Key to the presentation in the Xi Jinping era is, that the ‘showcase bases’ should help ‘tell the story well’ (*jianghao gushi* 讲好故事) regarding China, the Party, and the Xi Jinping-era ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era’, as the recent nomination list of 2021 put it.¹¹ (One should note the term ‘story’, not ‘history’!) This agenda, in fact, led to some remarkable new listings which beyond the numerous museums or revolutionary memorials represented before, also by now include the new Beijing Daxing 大兴 International Airport, opened in 2019 (and ‘patriotically listed’ in 2021). Fittingly, the airport also opened a permanent exhibition on its role as a ‘showcase base’ in 2023, celebrating its own construction as a showcase for present-day China to conform to Xi Jinping’s call to strengthen the nation via transportation infrastructure.¹² A further thing to note is that in spite of the nominal use for ‘education’ of these sites, the promulgating entity of the ‘showcase bases’ is *not* the Ministry of Education (*jiaoyubu* 教育部), but the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) Central Committee’s Propaganda Department (*zhongxuanbu* 中宣部).¹³ This, again, bespeaks the fact that the target group is the Chinese citizen who is to be ‘educated’, rather than the more narrow group of pupils only.

However, besides the incentives of the central authorities, ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ are a potent factor in tourism as well, and as such are also of economic interest to localities. In fact, one of the newer declared aims of the campaign is to use ‘patriotic education’ as a means for economic development of

Interestingly, sensitive Xinjiang was moved by 6 nominations in 2021 alone ahead to 15 in total. (See the table in appendix 1.)

10 See the text of the ‘Patriotic Education Law of the PRC’ (*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu fa* 2023), especially articles 16, 26, 34.

11 ‘Zhongxuanbu xin mingming yi pi quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi’ (2021).

12 See ‘Beijing Daxing guoji jichang quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi jiben zhanchen zhengshi kaizhan’ (8 August 2023).

13 I do not follow the Chinese official switch in English translation from Propaganda Department to Publicity Department since the Chinese name did not change. Similarly, I do not follow the Chinese official switch from calling the CCP now CPC in English, since the CCP used itself ‘CCP’ historically, which is deliberately ignored.

underdeveloped areas. From the local perspective, besides the economic gains expected from tourism, ‘patriotic education’ can also serve to define local contributions to the national ‘cause’, and thus provide prestige or ‘symbolic capital’ (in the sense of Bourdieu [1984]) as well. In other words, not only the central authorities have a stake in ‘patriotic education bases’, but also provinces or even smaller local entities. Provinces (alternatively autonomous regions or municipalities, being on the same administrative level and in the following subsumed for convenience) are in fact a mid-level broker in this relationship between the local and the national. This can be seen, for example, in the organisation of the respective national lists of ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ which group all these places by province.¹⁴ Thus, these sites contemporaneously function as a kind of local identity marker while ‘serving the nation’ per definition. Furthermore, beyond the establishment of the national-level lists, provincial and sub-provincial levels drew up lists of places, too, and thus the number of ‘patriotic education bases’ labelled on some administrative level is, in fact, enormous.¹⁵ These local lists, in turn, also prepared for future upgrading possibilities (similar to, e.g., the cultural heritage system in China)¹⁶ when higher-ranking lists were assembled. (For an example of such an upgrading process, see appendix 2.) This means that the process was fed into from above as well as from below. However, beyond the vertical there were also horizontal development possibilities, i.e., more assigning entities could join in on the same administrative level for labelling (and thus acknowledging and appropriating) a site.¹⁷ And in parallel to these ‘patriotic’ listings, other labelling systems were assigned as well (see below and appendix 3).

14 In fact, it seems that already the first list (of 1997) was based on a selection from proposals each province had been called to hand in. See Chen (2010: 9–10). Since every province was to be represented on that first list (if not evenly) and probably lobbied for its sites, this might also explain why the number of 100 sites was not strictly applied, resulting in de facto 103 nominations.

15 Wang (2012: 107) already counted almost 2000 county-level sites in the 5 provinces or centrally administrated municipalities of Beijing, Hebei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Anhui alone, and this process has been going on.

16 The basic regulations for the cultural heritage system in the PRC were spelt out in 1960 to go into effect in 1961, proposing an administratively bottom-up procedure for nominations of ‘cultural relics’ in a hierarchical system. After the large-scale destruction of cultural heritage during the Cultural Revolution, the earlier regulations were enlarged and advanced to codified law status in 1982, adding a stronger centralising top-down note to the graded nominations. See ‘Wenwu baohu guanli zanzheng tiaoli’ (1961) and ‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wenwu baohufa’ (1982). The administratively hierarchical nominations of ‘patriotic education bases’ basically follow the same pattern.

17 Different entities could label ‘patriotic education bases’, e.g. on a national level, the Urumqi ‘revolutionary martyrs’ cemetery’ was declared as a ‘patriotic education base’ in 1995 by the Minzhengbu 民政部 (Ministry of Civil Affairs), earning one year later the *same* title from the State Education Commission (Guojia jiaoyu weiyuanhui 国家教育委员会) together with, again, the

In terms of consumption, the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ are, however, also part of some kind of tourism. Visits are organised by, e.g., the workplace as a ‘training’,¹⁸ or by schools for ‘education’, or they are undertaken in the form of a private travel by interested individuals. Thus, they take part in a commoditisation of these places and have to consider also tourist expectations for economic reasons. In sum, ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ are clearly situated between the national, the local, and the touristic, and they address not only pupils, but also cadres,¹⁹ cadets, and the Chinese citizen at large.

Exploring patriotism and nationalism, citizen formation, national and local identities, and forms of touristic consumption

‘Patriotism’ as a term harks back to ancient Greek *patriotes* used for people who did not belong to a *polis*, connoting their local origin (and originally, in fact, kinship).²⁰ Up to the 17th century AD, a ‘patriot’ simply was understood as someone who ‘loved his native place’. Only subsequently the term came to mean ‘love of one’s country’ (which is the meaning conveyed by the Chinese *aiguo* 爱国 of today), being logically connected to the rise of nation-states. In Europe the evaluation of the term was ambivalent: it wavered between a ‘patriot’ being characterised by ‘public spiritedness’ (positive) on the one hand, or rather by exclusivist ‘nationalism’ (negative) on the other.²¹ The application of ‘patriotism’ to history has been seen as

Minzhengbu, as well as the Ministry of Culture (Wenhuaabu 文化部), the Cultural Relics Department (Wenwubu 文物部), the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League (Gongqingtuan zhongyang 共青团中央), and the General Political Department of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) (Jiefangjun zong zhengzhibu 解放军总政治部). This is an example of horizontal development. In 1997 it would become a ‘showcase base’ finally, i.e., in a vertical upgrade. Cf. Xie (1998: 18).

18 There are, e.g., places designed for people working in specific sectors who would then pay group visits to the sites for ‘education’, usually connected to historical ‘red’ precedents in their field which shall be emulated in the light of this ‘history’.

19 Cadres, including young student cadres, are routinely sent on such training travels, usually to ‘red sites’ connected to revolutionary history, which also create stronger personal bonds among the participants. Cf. Doyon (2023: 62)

20 Etymologically speaking, the Greek term *patria* from which *patriotes* is derived, implied (patri-lineal) descent.

21 See the historical overview of the term ‘Patriotismus’ by Busch / Dierse (1989); and by Dietz (2020).

especially problematic.²² In more recent times, distinctions between types of ‘patriotism’ have been proposed to salvage some form of it, e.g., ‘blind’ vs ‘constructive’ patriotism, or ‘blind’ vs ‘symbolic’, or ‘active’ vs ‘passive’ forms.²³ For the PRC context, however, the Soviet Union’s less ambivalent stance was decisive. Though Lenin is usually cited (tellingly out of context) in PRC documents with his very general phrase: ‘Patriotism is one of the most deeply ingrained sentiments, inculcated by the existence of separate fatherlands for hundreds and thousands of years’,²⁴ he was in fact *no* advocate of it himself, and rather cautious to promote it, balancing it with the need for socialist internationalism. But things changed under Stalin: with him, ‘patriotism’ was declared to be the embodiment of all virtues (a definition by Stalin during World War II, fighting the ‘Great Patriotic War’ – notably linking it by this term also to the 1812 ‘patriotic war’ against Napoleon’s invasion of Russia),²⁵ and thus it is obvious that from this perspective patriotism must be ‘good’ and not simply ‘nationalist’.²⁶ In fact, Chinese leaders like Deng Xiaoping and, above all, Jiang Zemin who was the key promoter of the ‘patriotic education’ campaign in the 1990s, tirelessly declared (in fact variegating and twisting Mao!)²⁷ that ‘patriotism’ is *not* ‘narrow nationalism’ (*xiaai de minzuzhuyi* 狭隘的民族主义) – and thus is not directed ‘against’ others. (A subtext to this stress is, according to Zhao (2004), the agenda to discourage any potential ethnic ‘narrow’ interpretation in multi-ethnic China.) The Chinese case furthermore indirectly contributed – in a reversal of direction – to present-day post-Soviet Russian patriotic education which

22 One may only recall Goethe’s oft-cited dictum: ‘Der Patriotismus verdirbt die Geschichte’ (patriotism ruins history) (1817) (Goethe talking with Friedrich Wilhelm Riemer, a teacher in Weimar and for some time Goethe’s secretary) to characterise historiography of the Jews, Greeks, and Romans, up to the Germans of his time, as partisan, distorting their own histories as much as those of others. Cf. Deibel / Gundelfinger (1907): 199.

23 Cf. the brief summary by Sanina (2017: 21–22).

24 Lenin (1918). One needs to recall here the fact that the First World War had been waged also on the Tsarist side with plenty of patriotic/nationalist rhetoric, and Lenin’s choice to strike a deal with the German enemy had been heavily attacked as ‘unpatriotic’ by his opponents. (This context is, of course, not mentioned in China where the phrase is just cited out of any context as a ‘proof’ that Lenin already was pro-patriotism.)

25 The Russian term for both wars, translated as ‘patriotic’ in English, is in fact derived from ‘fatherland’ (*otechestvo*), thus close to the original Greek term *patria* implying (patrilineal) descent.

26 Cf. also Sanina (2017: 68) who points out that Stalin’s definition of ‘socialism in a single country’ was the precondition for this shift in the Soviet Union’s concept of ‘patriotism’. For the tensions between Marxist internationalism and ‘patriotism’ in the after all multi-ethnic Soviet Union, as played out over the WW II memory, see Brunstedt (2021).

27 Mao had defined the CCP’s internationalism as opposing ‘both narrow nationalism and narrow patriotism’ (Mao: ‘In memory of Norman Bethune’ [1939], in: [Mao] 1965: 337), thus qualifying also patriotism with the negative adjective ‘narrow’ and paralleling both concepts!

was reinstalled after a brief hiatus in the wake of the end of the Soviet Union.²⁸ Outside observers, however, often tend to interpret Chinese ‘patriotism’ as a fig-leaf term for ‘nationalism’.²⁹

Admittedly, also in the West there have been several scholars arguing for the need to distinguish between (positive) patriotism and (negative) nationalism (e.g., Viroli 1995, or Primoratz / Pavkocić 2007). Here the argument is mostly on ‘patriotism’ being loyalty to the polity (ideally the *res publica*) and not to primordial ties like ‘blood’, ancestry etc. (that are often considered typical ingredients of – ethnic – ‘nationalism’). This (‘pro-patriotism’) argument, though, is drawn from the Western republican tradition, from ancient history over the Renaissance to the modern republic, for some authors culminating in (or rather having to be restricted to) a ‘constitutional patriotism’ (*Verfassungspatriotismus* – a term coined by Dolf Sternberger but highlighted by Habermas [1986]) which is predicated on the individually acknowledged ‘moral value’ of the polity (and thus may turn against it if the latter develops in a ‘morally problematic’ direction). In other words: patriotism may at times require the individual to oppose the state if the latter does not any longer ‘deserve’ loyalty.

This conception does not work well with non-democratic regimes including the Chinese Communist state and its citizens where the ‘moral validity’ of the polity cannot be freely decided upon and acknowledged by the individual citizen as in the ‘patriotism-defending’ authors’ ideal-type *res publica*, although one might argue that the language of ‘patriotism’ may be used (and historically has been used) also in authoritarian regimes by oppositional forces precisely as a legitimation for opposition (Guo 2004). Furthermore, as Poole (2007: 129–132) noted, a neat bifurcation of polity and culture, and in parallel of patriotism and nationalism, is in general problematic, as is the clear-cut distinction between state and nation, since it is the modern nation-state that claims loyalty of its citizens, trying to build up a ‘national identity’ (beyond potentially dividing birth and ancestry, especially in a multi-ethnic state like China) via history and culture, claiming the monopoly to define the latter in content.

Therefore, this is not to deny that the top-down use of patriotism or nationalism has not been and cannot be challenged by alternative visions of state and nation,³⁰

28 For more on Soviet and post-Soviet Russian patriotic education in a sociological perspective, see Sanina (2017).

29 See, e.g., Zhao (2004) who defines it as state-led nationalism (see also Zhao 1998: 290); Rose (2000) or Guo (2004) call it ‘state nationalism’ etc.

30 As Guo (2004) and Gries (2004) have argued, there is also a ‘bottom-up’ challenge of nationalists/patriots not affiliated with the state to this top-down claim to ‘name the nation’ in content, either

precisely using the possible theoretical bifurcation of patriotism and nationalism and of state and nation for legitimation of divergence or outright opposition. But it is to stress that the Chinese party-state aims at conflating and monopolising all of these categories, presenting itself as an ideal polity for China *and* as guarantor of the ‘Chinese’ nation.

The issue of ‘patriotism’ became virulent in China in the early 1980s after the Party had officially come to terms with the Cultural Revolution by its verdict on it as a great mistake in its 1981 resolution on Party history.³¹ Since this could invite criticism, the key task was to avoid letting discontent grow into a criticism of the socialist system as such, especially as the new possibility to get into contact with the West during the new ‘Reform and Opening’ policies initiated by Deng Xiaoping since 1978 easily fed admiration for an alternative ‘capitalist’ way of life into that discontent. Therefore, the Party tried to ‘correct’ any ‘false’ interpretations of patriotism – either in ‘leftist’ (i.e. Cultural Revolution style) or ‘rightist’ (anti-socialist) ways – and enumerated shortly before the said resolution also a host of historical figures which embodied the ‘greatness’ of China, refuting various possible criticisms against the system or against ‘loving China’ as it is.³² And soon after, the need to link up ‘patriotism’ and education was stressed even more since it seemed to be mostly young people who felt alienated. The Tiananmen protests of 1989 were seen as a concrete sign of this alienation.³³ Thus, more education about ‘heroes’ and about the achievements of socialist construction should counter the impression that problems were generated by the system as such. And in the context of the ongoing talks during the 1980s over Hong Kong’s future, the pending integration of Chinese having grown up outside the mainland and its system became a further key issue.³⁴

framing it as ‘cultural nationalism’ vs. ‘state nationalism’ (Guo) or as popular/‘new’ nationalism vs. the official one (Gries).

31 Cf. ‘Guanyu jianguo yilai dang de ruogan lishi wenti de jueyi’ (1981), published in *Renmin ribao* on 1 July. For an English translation by the Wilson Center, see: ‘Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China’, (n.d.).

32 The highly interesting listings as a window on the perceived ‘gist’ of Chinese culture would deserve more space. Suffice it to say here that it included philosophers and poets, statesmen and rebels, generals and strategists, scientists and intellectuals of various times. It was especially pointed out that there are several minority representatives included. This meant, however, also historical figures like the great 7th century Tibetan king Songtsen Gampo and even Genghis Khan, i.e., figures of one-time rivalling empires, re-configured in hindsight as models for Chinese ‘patriotism’ (!) since the PRC includes today Tibet and Inner Mongolia in her territory. See ‘Aiguozhuyi shi jianshe shehuizhuyi de juda jingshen liliang’ (1981).

33 There has been established an interesting geographical relationship between the length of protests and the number of (urban) patriotic education sites: cf. Liu / Ma (2018).

34 See ‘Guanyu jiaqiang aiguozhuyi xuanchuan jiaoyu de yijian’ (1983).

In any case, in the Chinese state's perspective, 'patriotism' is designed to bind Chinese citizens also emotionally to the Chinese nation-state and to ideally elicit dedication to the greater 'cause' via learning to be proud of 'Chinese' (of which the definition is not uncontested) civilisation and contemporary (socialist) achievements, or via 'remembering shame' regarding the 'humiliation' China went through since the Opium Wars of the mid-19th century.³⁵ Though 'patriotic education' is aimed at the Chinese populace, i.e. is inwardly oriented, the fact that 'foreign aggression' and 'Chinese resistance' make up much of it explains why it is easily perceived as 'nationalist' in practice. Indeed, one of the problems of neatly separating 'patriotism' from 'nationalism' as the Chinese government, as noted above, tries to rhetorically do (not casually qualifying nationalism with the adjective 'narrow')³⁶ lies in the fact that the definition of 'Self' cannot do without delineating the 'Other': either internally (depending on the context, these might be certain minorities, 'class enemies', or else) or externally. And for forging a 'national identity',³⁷ which is the primary goal in the state's agenda with the 'patriotic education' campaign, the 'Other' must be primarily set externally.

This education is, however, extending beyond the school context in a form of life-long learning to form the desired Chinese citizen in society at large. Therefore, I use the more general term 'citizen formation', and for the formal school context, 'citizen education'. 'Citizenship education', in turn, as the most common term in Western societies, implies that the individual is supposed to acquire a status and

35 Cf. Callahan (2010): the 'pessoptimist nation'. Besides the 'Western aggression' starting with the Opium Wars, Japan is the usual other 'aggressor' that inflicted suffering on the 'victim' China. (For a non-mainstream view on taking the Chinese victim narrative as not only strategic, see Suzuki 2007).

36 One may recall here the fact that the term *minzuzhuyi* 民族主义 for 'nationalism' with its strong ethnic element (*minzu* 民族) is potentially dividing in a multi-ethnic state as is the PRC. Furthermore, the qualification of 'narrow' has a famous antecedent in vocal intellectual Liang Qichao's 梁启超 distinction between 'great' (*da* 大) and 'small' (*xiao* 小) nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century to argue against the anti-Manchu revolutionaries and their efforts to ground 'nationalism' in a distinction between the (alien) ruling Manchus and the Han Chinese, calling their 'nationalism' only 'small'. After the establishment of the Republic, Sun Yat-sen and later Chiang Kai-shek would be quick to point out that 'nationalism' now comprised also the 'minorities' – and thus a substantial part of territory which should go on to belong to 'China'. (Cf., e.g., Leibold 2006). The PRC followed up on this argumentation.

37 For the concept of 'national identity', Guo (2004: 10) has proposed in his work on Chinese cultural nationalism to refer to psychoanalyst Erik Erikson's work on individual identity. Collective identity, of which 'national identity' is but a subcategory, is, however, a multi-layered concept and played out in various contexts horizontally as well as vertically. For a recent political studies take on a multi-level territorialised understanding of collective identity in the case of Europe, see Kuhn / Nicoli (2020).

certain agency as the outcome of formal education (which democratic societies need for actively participating adult citizens), while the terms ‘citizen education’ and ‘citizen formation’ put the accent on the state’s continuous moulding of citizens in school and beyond, which is closer to what is at stake in the Chinese case. For forming the desired Chinese citizen, the young generation is of course the first and major target, and thus already in school, Chinese ‘patriotism’ is explicitly to be fostered not only in the field of outright citizen education which comes under different names,³⁸ including politics, morals, or ideology, depending on the time and on the level of schooling, but also in history classes, and in the subject of geography. Beyond normal school classes, outdoor activities, including social service and military training, are applied rather early to educate children to serve the larger society and be moulded into ‘responsible’ citizens. This was not only to counter tendencies perceived like those of the ‘me generation’ (as the ‘post-1980s’ generation would be called later) being only preoccupied with personal well-being,³⁹ but was already addressing the problems with the previous, more ‘politicised’ ‘generation’ of the 1980s, culminating in the Tiananmen protests of 1989. Deng Xiaoping had voiced the ‘lesson’ to be drawn in front of the very military commanders he had ordered to forcefully and bloodily suppress the student-led Tiananmen protests: Chinese youth lacked ‘ideological and political education’.⁴⁰ This call was taken up by Jiang Zemin in his well-known ‘public letter’ of 1991 on education, which is tellingly treated as on the level of a curriculum in normative power (!), in which he specified that this meant for education to put more stress on China’s modern history and on China’s ‘national conditions’ (for the term, see below).⁴¹ In that context, he also advocated to use the ‘revolutionary martyrs’ and their history to show above all to Chinese youth that their living-standard of today has come at a high price. They therefore needed to learn to be grateful to those paving the way for them – a conception that corroborates the impression that ‘patriotism’ in China is understood as an

38 For a brief overview of the historical development of ‘citizenship education’ in the PRC, see Xu (2022). For a more extensive treatment, see Kennedy / Fairbrother / Zhao (2014).

39 Cf. Rosen (2009) and Hansen / Svarverud (2010).

40 Deng Xiaoping: ‘Address to officers at the rank of general and above in command of the troops enforcing martial law in Beijing’ (9 June 1989): ‘I have told foreign guests that during the last ten years our biggest mistake was made in the field of education, primarily in ideological and political education—not just of students but of the people in general.’ (See the ‘official’ English edition of the third volume of Deng’s works, [Deng Xiaoping] 1994, p. 297.) For the released Chinese version of the speech, see [Deng Xiaoping] (1993), vol. 3, pp. 302–308.

41 The letter, dated to March but printed on *Renmin ribao* on 1 June, 1991 (i.e., shortly before the Tiananmen Massacre’s second anniversary) is notably part of the collection of Chinese History *curricula* of the 20th century (Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo 2001: 607–608).

‘extension of filial duty’.⁴² In fact, the one-child policy introduced under Deng Xiaoping also heightened the need in a society ageing as a result to highlight ‘traditional’ values like ‘filial’ behaviour with its inherent hierarchical obligation, which should then feed into ‘loyalty’ to the nation, also from that side. Jiang Zemin thus stressed he wanted to have this kind of education all through, from kindergarten to university, pointing out to children and students how China was bullied since the Opium War but finally chose socialism and the CCP to lead the country out of crisis. This should serve for Chinese youth to feel proud and assured of their Chinese identity to counter currents to adore and follow ‘the West’, while not falling prey to ‘leftist’ (i.e. Deng Xiaoping-critical) currents either.⁴³ In terms of ‘national conditions’, Jiang specified this meant to teach youth more positively about China’s great cultural tradition (which gave some room to pre-Communist China), while acknowledging China’s special ‘population’ problem which demanded a strict policy to curb population growth (i.e. the one-child policy) since otherwise economic development would be hampered (which should solicit support for those recent policies). On the other hand, Jiang Zemin argued in a veiled reference to the 1989 ‘turmoil’, those who favoured Western-style parliamentarism did not understand China’s historical situation, nor that capitalism is based on exploitation. Therefore, Jiang requested in his ‘public letter’, all this should be properly reflected in the textbooks (Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo 2001: 607–608).

In consequence, Chinese youth was to be educated with more patriotism and discipline, increasing beyond the theoretical political-ideological lessons also military training which was as such obligatory already in the mid-1980s (Genevaz 2019: 458). Both the political-ideological and the military aspects have been reported as not very popular with students, especially on the university level which was the major target at first, where students perceived it as a form of punishment, since the reinforcement of these measures was introduced after the 1989 ‘turmoil’ (Rosen 1993). Rather than the outright ‘partification’ (*danghua* 党化) of higher education envisaged at the time (Hayhoe 1993), more indirect means like activities which have more of a leisure character, including visiting sites as a group experience, which were stepped up in the following years, were judged as having more potential to be better received. Here, tourism and ideological training are

42 Cf. Kwak / Matsuda (2015: 2). In the enlarged form of ‘gratitude education’, this is also applied to and has been recently stepped up for inner-Chinese migrants. See Wan and Vickers (2024).

43 One may note that at the time there were contestations among the CCP leading figures of how to react after the momentous events of 1989 and the dissolution of the Communist bloc in Eastern Europe. While Deng Xiaoping still wanted to continue his economic ‘reform and opening’ policies, his ‘leftist’ critics attacked him. Deng, though, won out, and Jiang sustained his line.

merged while internal group cohesion is strengthened. This was also extended down to secondary and even primary education, as Jiang Zemin had called for, and the Communist youth organisations, i.e., the Young Pioneers for children aged 6–14, and the Communist Youth League thereafter for those aged 14–28, functioned as important transmission belts.

However, beyond the inculcation of a national identity, also regional and local identities come into play, as both are de facto reflected in the ‘patriotic education bases’. Whereas the national part is of obvious primary importance in leading visitors of those bases to acknowledge their being ‘Chinese’, whether out of pride (e.g., with sites focusing on the ‘greatness’ of Chinese civilisation) or out of ‘humiliation’ (with sites focusing on Chinese victimisation), the fact that the bases are assigned to the province encourages a second reading and use (in the sense of de Certeau [1984]) of them as also an acknowledgement of this locality’s particularity. In fact, one of the driving forces behind the addition of further national-level sites after the 1997 first list of ‘100’ ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ was the dissatisfaction with the perceived ‘privileging’ of Beijing and Shanghai at the expense of more ‘remote’ areas. By expanding, e.g., on the memorialisation of ‘martyrs’ to the Communist cause, one could also honour the (possibly rather remote) places where they were born even if their main activities might have been in cities in the East of China. Also, by integrating some geographically ‘remote’ places of cultural ‘achievements’, one could take in areas with hardly any important contribution to the Communist revolution to counter local feelings of being neglected in the national scheme. Furthermore, the aim of using the bases also for school outings and ‘hands-on’ activities required some places also in ‘remote’ areas for local children to visit, and these were then augmented by provincial-level or county-level sites.

In taking in such less ‘obvious’ sites, there seem, however, to be further considerations at work as only selected possible sites were chosen. Looking, e.g., at Tibet which – together with Qinghai, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang – is a region where it seems difficult to designate or set up ‘patriotic’ sites, ‘cultural achievements’ is obviously not enough for a site to be picked. Although the Potala (the Dalai Lama’s winter palace) in Lhasa, later joined by the Jokhang Temple and the Norbulingka (the Dalai Lama’s summer palace), was inscribed, following the PRC’s application, on the UNESCO list of world heritage,⁴⁴ and is also acknowledged as a ‘top site’ of

44 In the UNESCO listing, the official description provided by the responsible nation (here the PRC) introduces the heritage site as: ‘The Potala Palace, winter palace of the Dalai Lama since the 7th century’. See UNESCO [2001]. This is evidently absurd since, needless to say, the institution of a ‘Dalai Lama’ would be created only hundreds of years later, with the Potala serving the function of his ‘winter palace’ yet later, but it is – as we will see also in chapter 2.3 with the Great Wall – a

China in purely touristic terms, e.g. being integrated in Shenzhen's theme park 'Splendid China' (Jinxiu Zhonghua 锦绣中华) showing China's top tourist sites *en miniature*, in this sense defining 'China' for the tourist, the 'patriotic' value of such a site is dubious.⁴⁵ Rather, it points to a decidedly 'Tibetan', not '(Han)-Chinese' identity and thus was not considered for the 'patriotic' lists,⁴⁶ where Tibet figures only poorly.⁴⁷ Dunhuang's 敦煌 Mogao 莫高 caves in Gansu are, in turn, 'safely' historical and may be treated as a place showing 'Chinese artistic genius' with their famous wall-paintings and statues – side-lining their Buddhist-religious aspects with no more monks residing there, as much as their multi-cultural character. This shows that the desire to expand the 'patriotic' sites geographically had to be carefully weighed against possible 'localist-ethnic' (or religious) counter-readings not feeding into the state's aims.

Finally, the 'patriotic education bases' with their connections to national and local identities have the potential to channel the growing inner-Chinese tourism into a form of political-cultural travel,⁴⁸ thus moving away from an only tourist 'gaze' (Urry 1990) to involve themselves with the sites visited more deeply, depending on the group or individual as more in form of a 'pilgrimage' (often using the term *xunli* 巡礼 associated with religious practice),⁴⁹ or as more in form of a happening,

sobering example of the lack of monitoring of such international organisations which simply put disclaimers on their websites, shifting content responsibility to the respective country to which the site 'belongs'. After all, a long nomination procedure had been undergone before the international listing, and the site had been also enlarged from the listing of the Potala in 1994 over time to include the Jokhang (added in 2000) and then the Norbulingka (added in 2001).

45 This theme park, Jinxiu Zhonghua 锦绣中华, presents roughly eighty top sites all over China, loosely grouped according to provinces. Built together with this theme park is an open-air museum of minorities' housings, thus giving credit to China's multi-ethnic population which figures only marginally in the miniature top tourist sites. The UNESCO-approved Potala, e.g., is the only top site in Tibet included (as I observed during a visit in 2016).

46 Incidentally, when addressing these sites in school textbooks, care is taken to stress the historical dominance of the Chinese emperor vs Tibet. See, e.g., the textbook of the elective history course in senior secondary school on cultural heritage by Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo et al. (2007), pp. 67–71.

47 In the lists before 2021, Tibet figured with just two PRC 'martyrs' cemeteries' (needless to say, rather ambivalent places for the local population), a site of 'resistance' against the British in 1904, and the usual official regional museum, i.e., the Tibet museum.

48 For a comparative development in the post-war Soviet Union under Stalin, see Gorsuch (2003): domestic tourism was to serve and reinforce Soviet patriotic identity. (See also chapter 6 of the present book.)

49 There is a growing body of literature on the relation of tourism and pilgrimage. Cf., e.g., Timothy / Olsen (2006). One may note that the PRC nationalist-patriotic agenda often leads to religiously-tinged wording, like revolutionary sites being termed 'sacred' etc. Therefore, I translate *xunli* throughout as 'pilgrimage', since the religious reference of the chosen wording is not accidental,

leading to a reinforced ‘national identity’.⁵⁰ History, civilisation, and culture thus become part of leisure activities as one sort of entertainment, while the state tries to use this to ‘market’ its own reading of these places.⁵¹ Especially with the heavily political ‘red tourism’ (*hongse liyou* 红色旅游), i.e. travel to CCP-related sites,⁵² it is notable that these sites are often combined in packaged tours with ‘green’ (natural beauty) sightseeing spots so as to offer a more varied programme to the travelling target groups which first receive some ideological ‘training’ and then may relax in nature.⁵³

A term that is not yet used to my knowledge in Chinese conceptions of tourism is ‘dark tourism’ though it pertains to some of the ‘patriotic education bases’ in practice, i.e. those focused on atrocities, notably by the Japanese in the 1930s/1940s or by the GMD (Guomindang 国民党 or Nationalist Party) against CCP ‘heroes’ (massacre sites, concentration camps, or prisons: see chapter 3.2 of the present book).⁵⁴ This might be explained by the ‘negative’ association of the term ‘dark’, since the main aim in these Chinese sites is to show that the displayed atrocities in the end led to more ‘patriotic’ determination of resistance and self-esteem. Even though one might doubt that visitors in China only get out of these sites what they are assumed to carry away with, i.e., a reinforced identity as a ‘Chinese’ and a resolve to resist any encroachments on China and her people in the future,⁵⁵ the official reading of these sites is rather ‘red’ than ‘dark’, since the latter would be detrimental to bolstering (positive) ‘patriotism’.

though it might be understood by many Chinese citizens touring the famous places rather as devoid of religious overtones in practice.

50 See Frew / White (2011) for the junction of national identity and tourism.

51 Tourism and state-led nationalism / patriotism are of course also coupled in other countries of the world. See, e.g., Pretes (2003) for an analysis of different sites in South Dakota.

52 For ‘red tourism’, see, e.g., Rioux (2007), Zhang (2008), Takayama (2012), Lin (2023). To some degree, ‘red tourism’ picks up on the Cultural Revolution precedent of the ‘great linkup’ (*da chuan-lian* 大串联) (1966–1967) when young Red Guards travelled around the country to ‘sacred’ sites of the revolution. For some examples of ‘red sites’, cf. in the present book chapter 3.3, several cases in chapter 4, and chapter 5.3.

53 Cf. also Rioux (2006).

54 In English, there have been first attempts to apply the concept also to Chinese places. See Du / Littlejohn / Lennon (2013).

55 Interestingly, Du / Littlejohn / Lennon (2013: 53–55) empirically tested with Chinese visitors of the Nanjing Massacre memorial that many did not pick up the message of resistance at all but rather carried away the message of national humiliation. Therefore, some also rejected the call for peace and Sino–Japanese friendship in the future (which is a usual addendum to exhibitions at these sites of Japanese atrocities in China – cf. chapter 3.2 of the present book). This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that ‘education’ at these places is effective in instilling feelings of victimisation whereas the ‘politically correct’ diplomatic addendum is perceived as artificial and unconvincing.

Patriotic education: the campaign and the bases

Officially, the aims of ‘patriotic education’ were spelled out in several documents.⁵⁶ The most important for the 1990s when the scope of the campaign was significantly broadened after the suppression of the Tiananmen protests of 1989, was the ‘Implementation outline for patriotic education’ of 1994, later officially translated as ‘Action plan for patriotic education’ (2006).⁵⁷ Here patriotism is presented as a ‘glorious tradition’ and ‘common spiritual component of all our country’s nationalities’ (‘Action plan’ 2006: 7), thus defining it from the outset as of importance to all ethnic groups living in the PRC. In fact, the major goals are defined as ‘to inspire the national spirit; promote national cohesion; foster national pride [...] and concentrate the patriotic sentiment of the masses toward the great cause of developing socialism with Chinese characteristics [...]’ (‘Action plan’ 2006: 8). This clearly shows that patriotism here is equated with CCP politics, not the *patria* per se, and thus sustains Suisheng Zhao’s claim that the ‘patriotic education campaign’ is (in Charles Tilly’s terms) ‘state-led nationalism’ (Zhao 1998). Internally, the scope is set as ‘patriotic education theory, teaching materials, systems, *and bases*’ (emphasis added, G.M.) that should form ‘the main theme of society’, whereas it is declared as ‘definitely not narrow nationalism’ to the outside. To avoid any possible misunderstanding, the plan declares outright: ‘In contemporary China, patriotism is essentially identical to socialism’ (‘Action plan’ 2006: 8) – a dictum by Jiang Zemin (cf. Zhao 1998: 296). Thus, by implication, only pre-Communist history could be ‘patriotic’ on its purely own terms – though the reading of pre-modern history has to conform to official (CCP) interpretations (as laid down in the officially approved history textbooks) no less.

To achieve these goals, a host of ‘materials’ is to be used for ‘patriotic education’, including even natural landscape. The ‘materials’ are to prove the civilising and historical achievements of the past, resistance against foreign aggression, and most notably the historical ‘accomplishments of the CCP’. Target group of the campaign is primarily youth, though ‘all people’ should be educated as well (‘Action plan’ 2006: 11). In short, ‘patriotic education’ is a form of more general citizen formation. For doing this, all kinds of activities and media should be utilised: besides theoretical and practical ‘education’ measures, also TV (television), cinema,

56 For a brief overview on some key documents of the campaign since the 1980s in politics and school before the mid-1990s, see Kinoshita (2007: 114–125).

57 For an English translation, see ‘Action Plan’ (2006). For the Chinese original, see ‘Aiguozhuyi jiaoyu shishi gangyao’ (1994, 6 September).

music, drama etc. are to be applied to reach all sorts of people ('Action plan' 2006: 12).

In this context, the 'patriotic education bases', our main concern in the present book, are set which are defined in the 'Action plan' as 'museums, memorial halls, martyrs' memorials, revolutionary war campaign and battle memorials, protected cultural and historical sites, important scenic spots, important development projects', to be identified by the propaganda departments on all levels of the Party organisations. ('Action plan' 2006: 12–13).⁵⁸ (We will encounter several examples for these categories in the present book's following chapters.) Clearly, the broadening of the bases beyond pure CCP sites which are nowadays sites for 'red tourism', to include also 'natural landmarks, sites of antiquity and culture, and scenic spots' that 'can inspire in people a love for the motherland's magnificent landscapes and long history and culture' ('Action plan' 2006: 13) pays heed to the fact that not everybody might get hooked on exclusively propagandistic contents. To ensure that all kinds of citizens will be taken in, the media are required to contribute to make 'patriotic education' the 'main theme in society', e.g., prescribing such content for prime-time TV, or calling for organisations to carry out pertaining activities during public holidays: 'festival activities should not only entertain and bring joy to the masses, but should also provide them with patriotic education', the plan states ('Action plan' 2006: 14–15). By stressing the 'sacredness' of national symbols like the emblem, the flag or the anthem at every possible occasion, a further identification of the citizens with their country shall be achieved, whereas the national and local reverence of 'models' in personal conduct (patriots, heroes, 'martyrs', labour models etc.) should serve for building up a 'morally educated' citizenry.⁵⁹ Although this all aims at the citizens in the PRC, the potential of 'patriotism' to forge closer ties with Chinese living abroad is addressed by asking for books and other media to be produced also for those target groups ('Action plan' 2006: 15–18).

To ensure that these plans were also implemented, the 'Action plan' of 1994 prescribed that the propaganda departments at every level had to draw up detailed plans and were held responsible for the outcome. In fact, in the following years, pertaining activities soared in all kinds of fields, including the setting up of a first list of national-level 'patriotic education showcase bases' which came out in 1997 (with '100' – actually 103 sites), followed by a second (2001 with 100 sites), third

58 Though the English translation uses here the term 'publicity departments' – following present-day PRC practice, I retain, as noted above, the more literal translation 'propaganda department' since the Chinese term did not change though the translation term was 'adjusted' when realising the 'negative' ring of 'propaganda' in English.

59 For several examples, see chapter 5 of the present book.

(2005 with 66 sites) and fourth list (2009 with 87 sites) with which the system was temporarily halted until 2017.

Looking at the development of official documents which concerned specifically the ‘patriotic education bases’, an important step was in 2004 when ten government ministries and party departments issued another decisive document: ‘Opinions on strengthening and improving the work of patriotic education bases’ (Guanyu jiaqiang he gaijin aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu jidi gongzuo de yijian 关于加强和改进爱国主义教育基地工作的意见). Here, a stress was laid on making the sites more ‘accessible’ in content and form to attract more visitors (which might be interpreted as a need to invigorate these sites), including the suggestion to open them for free. Ideologically, the bases were to step up efforts in forging the ‘national spirit’ (*minzu jingshen* 民族精神), provide education in ‘thought and morality’ for the youth (*sixiang daode* 思想道德) to help achieve the common goal of a ‘well-off society’ (*xiaokang shehui* 小康社会).⁶⁰

For the more specific group of ‘red tourism’ destinations among the ‘bases’, a further plan was set up for development until 2010 with 12 key red tourism zones specified,⁶¹ some 30 suggested tours,⁶² and about 100 ‘classic’ areas, which was also to boost the economy of (often remote) ‘old revolutionary areas’ (which had successfully complained with the authorities for neglect and need of funds for

60 See ‘Zhongxuanbu deng shi bumen tichu gaijin aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu jidi gongzuo’ (2004, October 3).

61 The twelve were in loose chronological fashion: 1. The area of Shanghai and Zhejiang with the topic of the founding of the CCP; 2. Mao’s birthplace Shaoshan in Hunan, Jinggangshan and Ruijing in Jiangxi and the topic of the cradle of the revolution; 3. The area around Baise in Guangxi (where Deng Xiaoping had been active in the late 1920s to manage a Communist uprising); 4. Zunyi in Guizhou as a turning point on the Long March; 5. Western Sichuan for the toughest part during the latter; 6. The Yan’an area in Shaanxi as the ‘holy land of the revolution’; 7. Manchuria for ‘resistance’ history; 8. The Anhui–Jiangsu–Shandong area where with the Huai–Hai Campaign the Civil War against the GMD went through a turning point; 9. The Hubei–Henan–Anhui area which contributed a lot of important military staff to the PLA and finished off the GMD; 10. The Taihang area in Shanxi and Hebei where decisive battles were fought during the Anti-Japanese War; 11. The eastern Sichuan area with a former Chinese soviet and around the GMD-stronghold Chongqing where Communists were persecuted shortly before the final victory of the Communists; and 12. Beijing and Tianjin as the places where the CCP finally triumphed and established the PRC. It might be noted that but for the Long March-connected sites the whole of Western China is absent from this list (as is Inner Mongolia and strikingly the Southeastern coast including Guangdong which has a lot of revolutionary history to credit.)

62 Some suggestions for tours in these 12 areas were made, e.g., in Tian (2005); Li (2007), and the highly official Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu xuanchuan jiaoyuju (2009), though not precisely 30.

making their sites more attractive).⁶³ This setup was enlarged subsequently in the following plan (2011–2015) to 18 zones with 180 tours.⁶⁴

Notably, after the transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping in 2012/13, the nomination of ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ in lists was halted at first (which according to the previous four-year rhythm should have come out in 2013, i.e., just after Xi Jinping took office, suggesting there was some insecurity how things would move on at this point). When in 2017 a new list with ‘41’ (42)⁶⁵ sites was finally proclaimed (interestingly without naming any site for the formerly privileged Beijing), the total was declared to have arrived at 428. This, however, means that in between 31 sites must have been added without an officially declared ‘list’. In fact, a nomination of a single site was mentioned in the press in the first years of the Xi Jinping era: ‘People’s Daily’ (*Renmin ribao* 人民日报) announced one individual site in 2014 as newly labelled, which also heralded the new accent Xi Jinping’s era came with, being a (further) memorial site dedicated to Lei Feng 雷锋, the quintessential Communist (see chapter 5.3 of the present book), this time in Liaoyang 辽阳.⁶⁶ When the first Xi-era list was proclaimed in 2017, the new guiding spirit became apparent, explicitly focusing on the history from the founding of the CCP (1921) to the victory in the ‘War of Liberation’, i.e. the Civil War (1949), with a particular accent on the Long March (1934–1936) (‘Zhongxuanbu xin mingming’ 2017). That the institution of ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ was taken very seriously also in the Xi Jinping era is additionally highlighted by the fact that the ‘428’ national sites labelled by 2017 (in fact 398, which appear on lists 1 to 5 – see appendix 1) were published as an official summary in a new large book series of 22

63 ‘Zhong-ban, guo-ban yinfa “2004-2010 nian quanguo hongse lüyou fazhan guihua gangyao”’ (2005, 23 February). See also Takayama (2012: 115–116), though Takayama unfortunately has several errors in the table and map provided. For some examples of such sites, cf. especially chapter 3.3 of the present book.

64 See Zhao (2021: 234).

65 The official number given is 41, however, a count of the sites (cf. appendix 1) renders 42.

66 ‘Liaoyang Lei Feng jinianguan chengwei quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu jidi’ (2014). (Although the title does not include ‘showcase’, the text calls it that way as nominated at 3 March 2014 by the Propaganda Department.) One may note that this site was subsequently not taken up in any list, was therefore not even appearing in the *Fengbei* collection in 22 volumes of 2019 – see below – which updated the whole ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ system to the Xi Jinping era, including also the list of 2017, and does not appear in the most recent overview of sites on the CCTV website (‘Quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi’ 2021). It is, however, simply integrated in the new 40-min. instalment on the major Lei Feng sites listed – which is the culminating last instalment no. 40 of the recent ‘documentary’ series on the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’, ‘Xin huo xiang chuan: Quanguo aiguo zhu jiaoyu shifan jidi xunli’ (2019–2022). See also below.

volumes, grouped according to provinces, which came out in 2019, called *Fengbei* 丰碑 (monuments) and addressed to the Chinese citizen at large.⁶⁷

After the (fifth) list of 2017, which did not officially continue the list numbering, thus taking some distance from the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras' sequenced list 1 to 4, a further list was promulgated already after two years, in 2019, adding 39 sites, which shifted the balance back to less 'equality' in province coverage, figuring almost a third, i.e. 11, new sites for Beijing alone. (At this point, the official total given again exceeds this by 6 sites that would have been nominated in between not covered by the list.) The basic aim of the new list of 2019 was declared to contribute to the proliferation of a sense of 'mission' (*shiming* 使命), heightening the willingness among Chinese citizens and youth in particular to work for a strong country, repaying it its due, furthering self-assertion regarding the socialist way with Chinese characteristics, regarding theory, regarding 'the system', and regarding culture, to consolidate the 'new' trajectory and fight for the 'new' era ('Zhongxuanbu xin mingming' 2019). In short, the key terms all reflect the stamp of the Xi Jinping era. In fact, this new list was preceded by a general call to step up the role of the 'national patriotic education showcase bases', by this making clear that patriotic education was not only to be continued in the 'new era', but to be even stressed more than before, and especially the 'showcase bases' ('Zhongxuanbu yinfa tongzhi' 2019). To redefine the general 'patriotic education' campaign for Xi's so-called 'new era', an updated 'action plan' (or more literally: an implementation outline) was therefore published soon after as well to replace the original one of 1994, bearing the stamp of Jiang Zemin. By now, it is even suggested to start with 'patriotic education' right away from birth (!) (section 5), not leaving out anyone or any field or any media, especially pointing to the new social media, to inculcate the message into the Chinese citizens' minds (*jin tounao* 进头脑) (section 15), warning, above all, of 'historical nihilism' (i.e., of historical interpretations not in accordance with the official line) (sections 11 and 26), and infusing all terms typical of the Xi era (Chinese dream, red genes etc.)⁶⁸ in the new framing. Lei Feng is tellingly the one single figure named as an ideal model (sections 18 and 33), which underlines once more his special status in the 'new era'. Tourism is also included as something that needs to be infused with 'patriotic

67 Interestingly, here the 2017 new list was explicitly called the 'fifth' list. See the general preface (p. 1) in this book series: *Fengbei* (2019). The writing-style is meant to be easily accessible also for youth, but the whole is explicitly naming cadres, the military, and the broad public as the intended readership as well. (See the preface, p. 2)

68 Interestingly, the new 'implementation outline' of 2019 also mentions 'cultural genes' (section 12) which even 'biologise' 'Chineseness', and they mention also 'cultural nihilism' (section 12) beyond the 'historical' as something to be opposed.

education’ (section 25), pointing out the Chinese holidays and memorial days as well as the international ones for using them as occasions to conduct ‘patriotic’ activities (sections 23 and 24),⁶⁹ but also handing out the warning that ‘law’ will be enforced to make sure national symbols and ‘martyrs’ will be respected,⁷⁰ while no historical revisionism will be tolerated (section 31). Mere ‘formalism’ and ‘bureaucratism’ should, however, be absolutely avoided (section 34), since people should feel genuinely ‘touched’. In this context, the ‘patriotic education bases’ were also to serve (sections 21 and 22) (‘Zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan’ 2019). Again, already two years later, in 2021, the next ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ list with further 112 (officially ‘111’) sites was proclaimed, of which 13 went to Beijing alone, while this list at least considered all provinces again and listed the Shanghai site of the first Party congress (at its 100th anniversary) as an ‘enlarged site’ additionally. This means that of 2021, the total of the national-level lists is 549 sites, while the overall figure (i.e., arguably including also those individually nominated) is given as 585 (‘Zhongxuanbu xin mingming’ 2021). Notably, as mentioned, the lists under Xi Jinping did not go on with the numbering as lists no. 5 to 7 but changed their title to ‘new batch’ more neutrally, thus enforcing agency without being bound by the previous examples of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras. The more thematic dedications of the Xi-era lists, however, underline that the use of the pre-Communist past is toned down, while revolutionary history is stepped up. This is in line with the ‘presentist’ thrust of Xi’s ‘four histories’ (*sishi* 四史) concept advocated since 2020 and formally introduced into education in 2021 at the 100th anniversary of the CCP’s official founding, intending the history of the CCP (i.e., since 1921), of ‘New China’ (i.e., since 1949), of the Reform and Opening period (i.e., since 1978), and finally of the development of socialism (which provides some larger outlook in a *longue durée* and in a more international perspective of the history of socialist thought into which the ‘Chinese way’ should be integrated as a new stage of development).⁷¹ This way, the pre-Communist

69 One may note that the new calendar of memorial days includes not only a ‘martyrs’ day’, but also the ‘National Memorial Day for the Nanjing Massacre Victims’. (Cf. chapter 3.2 for the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall as a ‘patriotic education showcase base’.)

70 While, e.g., the ‘flag law’ has been introduced already early in the Jiang Zemin era, the Xi Jinping-era addendum to this kind of laws was the 2018 law against ridiculing military personnel, ‘martyrs’ and heroes. (Cf. also chapter 4.1 on the Korean War Memorial Hall and ‘martyr’ Qiu Shaoyun 邱少云.)

71 See also Kawashima (2021) on the history politics of the Xi Jinping era. Interestingly, the international ‘development of socialist thought’ is counted as starting from Thomas More’s book *Utopia*, published in 1516! (Cf. Kawashima 2021: 59). That way, socialism has ‘500’ years of history.

Chinese past as such has largely lost its relevance which figured somewhat more in the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras' lists.

Following the original 'action plan' of 1994 and the proclamation of the first list of 'patriotic education showcase bases' in 1997, the promotion of these sites was also sustained by CCTV (China Central Television) which produced short TV film clips in 1998 on the sites of the first list (1997) which had been published, as mentioned, at roughly the time of the Hong Kong hand-over, a high-time of patriotism in China. These programmes, bringing the single 'bases' into Chinese homes via TV, also encouraging Chinese citizens to visit those sites as tourists, were later expanded in four-year intervals to cover also the sites of the second (2001) and third list (2005), amounting to 269 film clips in late 2006,⁷² running the series *Ai wo Zhonghua* 爱我中华 (Love our China).⁷³ Interestingly, the comments of the panelists during a roundtable discussion held at the occasion of the finishing of the 269 film clips showed not only that some film scripts had to be 'modified' many times, but also that the final categorisation of the clips according to provinces was not the only option considered. Instead, a categorisation according to topic or type had been considered as well. In the end, however, obviously the conformity with the ordering structure of the promulgated lists prevailed. Finally, an interesting point to be noted is that besides the touristic characterisation of sites as 'red' (*hongse* 红色) or 'green' (*lüse* 绿色), also one as 'ancient' (*guse* 古色) was introduced.⁷⁴

At times, some sites were additionally broadcasted as thematically grouped, e.g. to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Long March, the finished *Ai wo Zhonghua* film clips of thirty sites pertaining to this topic were broadcasted in October of 2006 in sequence to visually retell this saga – and stimulate 'red tourism' to these sites.⁷⁵ In 2009 in the context of the 60th anniversary of the PRC's

72 See Luo (2006, 29 December).

73 This collection of film clips on sites of lists 1 to 3 were also published as a DVD collection (*Ai wo Zhonghua*, published in 2008 by Xuexi yinxiang chubanshe 学习音像出版社) and this has been used in the present book. Only for sites of later lists, website versions (in the meantime partly defunct – see below) have been used.

74 The roundtable discussion was published on the following day, again in *Guangming ribao*: 'Ai wo Zhonghua, qiang wo Zhonghua' (30 December 2006). The expression *guse*, implying a visual impression, is also used in textbooks, e.g., in the senior secondary elective history course on world cultural heritage, there paralleled with *guxiang* 古香 (lit.: smell of the past), i.e., evoking the feel of antiquity via various physical senses. (Cf. Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo et al. 2007: pp. 102–105.)

75 'Ai wo Zhonghua: quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi xunli' (2006). For ten days, three video clips a day were broadcasted together, making up a programme of 30 minutes, roughly following the Long March route. This also further stimulated 'Long March tours' in the tourist sector in China. For a Western, slightly earlier 'reliving' of the Long March published in the commemoration year of

founding and after the decision on the fourth list, CNTV (China Network Television) finally set up a website (today defunct) called *Wo de zuguo* 我的祖国 (our ancestral land),⁷⁶ presenting all 356 sites nominated until the end of Hu Jintao's era with ten minutes film clips (taking the 269 *Ai wo Zhonghua* clips over and adding newer clips to cover also the sites of the fourth list). As in the lists, the 'patriotic education bases' were grouped on the website according to the provinces (significantly – and different from the four national lists – symbolically integrating here Hong Kong and Macau and even Taiwan, though all listed as with yet '0 sites'),⁷⁷ adding some further information, and thus stimulating tourists to visit.

However, this was not the only visual take on the sites. From the side of educational TV, provided by the 'National Centre for Educational Technology' (NCET, in Chinese called Zhongyang dianhua jiaoyu guan 中央电化教育馆) there was an alternative collection of (slightly longer) video clips on '100 patriotic education bases' (de facto only 58), chosen by the Ministry of Education in this case, assembled in 2006 from earlier productions – mostly based on the first list,⁷⁸ published under the title *Zhonghua hun* 中华魂 (Soul of China) and recommended for primary to junior secondary school under the label of 'national conditions education' (*guoqing jiaoyu* 国情教育).⁷⁹ The latter collection, however, did not stress the location and had consequently no categorisation into provinces but rather focused on the educational (national) content. One may note that the label 'national conditions' for education had been strongly promoted by Jiang Zemin as well (though he did not invent it). In fact, the term is hard to translate, since the character *qing* 情 can be understood in various ways: as situation, condition, but also more

2006, see Jocelyn / McEwen (2006). They had walked the whole tour in 2002–2003 to test the 'myth' built around the Long March experience by the CCP and ever since organise such tours for tourists. In 2011 with the 90th anniversary of the CCPs founding, red tourism tours and Long March tours in particular peaked in China. See Qian (9 June 2011).

76 The website could be found at: <http://zuguo.cntv.cn/>. It was taken off in the early Xi Jinping-era.

77 This listing here clearly suggests claims to these regions for 'patriotic education' – if in the future.

78 The focus of *Zhonghua hun* is very much on revolutionary history and mainly skips ancient sites of the first list. See *Zhonghua hun* (2006). (By the way, these alleged 'alternative 100' do not correspond to the alternative list of 100 sites, set up in 1998 by the Central Party School. For a brief discussion of the latter, see Billeter 2007: 282–286). The video clips reused here seem to have been mainly produced by provincial educational TV stations since the mid-1990s. One may note that sometimes sites differ from the first list, e.g., for the topic of the Korean War (1950–1953), the first list (1997) has the Korean War museum in Dandong (cf. below chapter 4.1), while *Zhonghua hun* presents the Korean War martyrs' cemetery in Shenyang (both Liaoning Province) which is listed only on the second list (2001).

79 For the latter series, the publisher's description could be found on the (by now defunct) website <http://www.cetav.com.cn/cpzjtjy/37.jhtml>.

emotionally as feeling. In a sense, it is ideal to represent the merger of knowledge and emotion so central to ‘patriotic education’ (cf. also chapter 6 of the present book): one should know more about this unique China in history and in the present, understand its special circumstances (and why it needs to follow its own way, not simply copying other countries and their systems), but also feel personally attached and responsible.

While the CNTV website with the sites of the Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao eras was taken down in the early Xi Jinping era, CCTV has set up a new website in the meantime which covers all sites of all the lists (interestingly not including the arguably extra labelled sites in between and beyond the lists) up to 2021.⁸⁰ The ordering is as before according to province (which also guarantees easily assignable responsibilities in the established administrative structure), only that by now the ‘new’ ones listed in the Xi Jinping era in 2017, 2019, and 2021, are usually put ahead, to only then cite the other formerly listed ones (which were sometimes still represented by the former *Ai wo Zhonghua* film clips produced since the late 1990s on the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao era lists 1 to 4, while the new sites are in a varying format, assembled from different TV programmes with varying length, and the older *Ai wo Zhonghua* film clips being substituted one after the other to also bring the older lists into an ‘updated’ format).⁸¹ That way, Xi Jinping appears now in these newly added ones on top, while the older ones had been dominated by his predecessors Jiang Zemin and – to a lesser degree – Hu Jintao. And on 28 December of 2022, a new collection of 40 instalments à 40 minutes of ‘documentaries’ was released on the ‘national defence and military affairs’ video channel (underlining the strong military underpinning in the whole ‘patriotic education’) which picked up ‘topics’ with either one or several connected ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ sites, concentrating, however, only on those on ‘revolutionary history’, more precisely from the founding of the CCP to the archetypical Communist Lei Feng (cf. chapter 5.3 of the present book), at the end showing Xi Jinping who defines the sites and what should be learnt from them.⁸²

80 The new website is: *Quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi* (2021).

81 This, again, bespeaks the fact that the Xi Jinping era sites are not to follow seamlessly the former format. But this assembly of presentations of the newly listed sites, from short news items of local TV stations to longer presentations in former programmes of various formats and styles, leaves a rather careless hodgepodge impression. This is extended increasingly also to the sites of lists 1 to 4, mostly in the form of TV news programmes or taken from educational TV. A major push for creating new ‘entries’ was apparently the 100th ‘birthday’ of the CCP in 2021.

82 The ‘documentary’ series, as it is called on the Ministry of Defence’s website (Jiang / Hao 2023), is titled ‘Xin huo xiang chuan’ or ‘the torch flame is handed on’. See ‘Xin huo xiang chuan: Quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi xunli’ (2019–2022). The image of the torch handed on clearly evokes

The declared aim of the new online collection, as stated on the Ministry of Defence's website, is by now to tell 'moving stories' (note again: stories, not history) that exemplify total dedication to the Communist cause.⁸³ The non- (or pre-)Communist sites which played at least a role in the Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao era lists thus fade out of sight, and the 'story' of China is standardised, which fits into the general thrust in the Xi Jinping era to curb even minimal variegation in historical narratives. Thus, history education in school, which, though bound by curricular guidelines, had formerly at least allowed for several textbooks to coexist since the 1980s,⁸⁴ is by now replaced by just one authoritative textbook version to be used in schools around China in a move back, and once more produced by the former monopolist, Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe 人民教育出版社 (People's Education Press).

In terms of media, beyond television, the book market sustained the effort to popularise the 'patriotic education showcase bases' as well: already in the 1990s, e.g., several book series came out.⁸⁵ The Propaganda Department 'encouraged' some publishers explicitly, most importantly including Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe 中国大百科全书出版社 (Chinese encyclopaedia press) which put out a whole series with one booklet for each site of the first list of 1997 (and started covering the second list of 2001 as well), explicitly aiming at young readers, reprinted in the 2000s, and tellingly republishing it in 2012 at the very end of the Hu Jintao era with a more lavish layout (though by then without colour pages). This demonstrates that the campaign was well alive at that time and that this series, the largest project of all, remained the benchmark production, put on the stacks of school libraries, defining the official reading of the single bases to be handed to the next generation of Chinese citizens. (We will therefore use this for the discussion of first list sites along with the filmic renderings mentioned above when turning to single cases in the following chapters.) Other publishers which were invited and published comprehensive volumes, namely on the sites of the first list, included Changzheng chubanshe 长征出版社 (Long March press), Zhongguo shaonian ertong chubanshe 中国少年儿童出版社 (Chinese youth and children's press) (which published photo volumes and several volumes with stories), Xuexi chubanshe 学习出版社 (Study press) (which also went on to cover the following lists with one volume per list) and

the ideological context this phrase usually comes with. Incidentally, in 2015, a three-months-long 'torch relay' was the main feature in 'red tourism' of that year. (Cf. Zhao 2021: 234). Needless to say, this also evokes the Olympic fire imaginary.

83 Cf. Jiang / Hao (2023).

84 For an overview of history textbook versions before the Xi Jinping era, see Su (2011) and Li (2011).

85 Cf. He / Guo (2000: 27) and Billeter (2007: 243, 282).

(Zhongguo) Ditu chubanshe (中国)地图出版社 (SinoMaps press) (bringing out maps of the sites of every list with short descriptions, ideal for tourists preparing to travel to the sites on their own).⁸⁶ The choice of these publishers who dutifully printed the ‘official’ policy statements connected to the single lists as an introduction,⁸⁷ suggests that the first and foremost target for the campaign were Chinese youth, and secondarily adult tourists. Later reprints show that these publishing projects are of ongoing relevance, even keeping the original setup in those cases where de facto changes in the sites had occurred (!) which bespeaks the binding power of the original decisions on the lists.⁸⁸ This holds true even for the new summary of 2019, when the officially assigned publisher (notably of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe 中国文史出版社 (Chinese Literature and History Press), presented the state up to the 2017 list, i.e., updating the whole to the Xi Jinping era with the mentioned 22-volumes *Fengbei* series, structured according to provinces,⁸⁹ with a chapter dedicated to every listed site up to then, following (implicitly) the listings’ sequence from the list 1 sites onwards. This new summary, explicitly directed at youth, but also cadres and the military, also notes that the key sites (here notably all ‘red’ ones) are those showing the ‘red traces’ (*hongse zuji* 红色足迹) of Xi Jinping, thus underlining once more the shift towards CCP-related sites in the overall system of ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ henceforth.⁹⁰

However, also other publishers not officially assigned quickly picked up the topic of the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’,⁹¹ either encouraged by local

86 Liu Yunshan from the Propaganda Department mentions the involvement of the named publishers. See his statement in the context of the proclamation of the first 100 list used also as general preface to the series on the 100 patriotic education showcase bases published by Zhongguo dabaikeshu chubanshe, e.g., in Xie (1998: 6). (This statement also takes the lead in other publications enlisted by the Propaganda Department.) This shows that these publishers were officially invited.

87 This meant, above all, the statements of the deputy head or head of the Propaganda Department.

88 Interestingly, in spite of the fact that some sites had undergone changes in the meantime, most notably the merger of the earlier two separately listed Beijing sites of the Museum of Chinese History (no. 2 on the first list) and the Museum of the Chinese Revolution (no. 3 on the first list) into the new National Museum of China in 2011, the reprints stick to the original sites as listed. See, e.g., the map volumes of Zhongguo ditu chubanshe: although in the case of the no. 1 site of all, i.e., Tiananmen Square, the 2013 reprint of the 1999 volume on the first ‘100 patriotic education showcase bases’ names the new ‘National Museum’ as adjacent to the Square (*Baige aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi ditu ji* 2013: 3), the two older museums of Chinese History and of the Chinese Revolution remain as the no. 2 and no. 3 sites without mentioning their merger into the new ‘national’ one!

89 Some volumes combine two provinces or cover the ‘autonomous regions’ together.

90 Cf. the ‘preface’ reprinted in every volume of the *Fengbei* series.

91 This is nothing rare in the PRC ‘mediascape’. E.g., in the case of representing foreign history in Chinese media which created a hype in 2006/2007 with the TV documentary series *Daguo jueqi* 大

propaganda departments, or simply on their own, like Shantou daxue chubanshe 汕头大学出版社 (Shantou university press) very early on, Hongqi chubanshe 红旗出版社 (Red Flag press), Jiangxi jiaoyu chubanshe 江西教育出版社 (Jiangxi educational press), Shaanxi renmin chubanshe 陕西人民出版社 (Shaanxi people's press), or Jilin wenshi chubanshe 吉林文史出版社 (Jilin culture and history press) (later Jilin chuban jituan 吉林出版集团 – Jilin publishing trust – which even started a series on single sites as well in 2012).⁹² Still others focused on one or more provinces and their sites.⁹³ And especially in the 2000s, additional series on the sub-category of 'red tourism sites' added to the whole campaign.⁹⁴ Thus, beyond the orchestrated attempts focussing on youth, there was a broadening of addressees to society at large.

Additionally, other large publication projects partly intersected, e.g., the museums which had been called upon to provide easy access, tried to specifically approach youth via a series 'Taking you to the museum' (*Dai ni zoujin bowuguan* 带你走进博物馆). Several of the museums represented in the series are also labelled 'patriotic education showcase bases', and the series as such is designed, as can be seen from the series' endorsement of 2004 at its launch by the head of the National Cultural Heritage Administration printed in every volume at the beginning, explicitly as a 'second classroom' for 'minors' (*weichengnian ren* 未成年人 – an alternative label vis-à-vis the usual 'youth', stressing their being 'future adults') to 'acquire knowledge and cultivate sentiments'.⁹⁵ The authorship remains with the local

国崛起, this topic was quickly picked up by various publishers beyond the officially assigned ones. See Müller (2013, chapter 2).

92 Jilin chuban jituan also came out with a volume explaining the 'gist' of each single list. Cf. Chen (2010).

93 E.g., Tuanjie chubanshe 团结出版社 (Unity press) started a 10 volumes series in 2013 on sites in the provinces, always covering several provinces close to each other together. See, e.g., Yang (2013) on Jiangsu and Zhejiang. In other cases, local publishers came out with books on their own province's sites. See, e.g., Hu (2015) on Shanxi by Shanxi renmin chubanshe 山西人民出版社 (Shanxi people's press).

94 For the latter, see, e.g., also the series on 'famous red cities' (*hongse mingcheng* 红色名城) which was published in 2005 by Zhongguo luyou chubanshe 中国旅游出版社 ('China Travel & Tourism Press') (e.g., Wang 2006, or Xiangtan luyouju 2006). But also Party publishers and editors joined in. See, e.g., on the national level: Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi / Guojia luyouju (2014); or on a more local level, e.g., Zhonggong Hangzhou-shi zhishu jiguan gongzuo weiyuanhui et al. (2016).

95 See, e.g., the volume on the Anhui Provincial Museum (Anhui-sheng bowuguan 2009), p. 2 (for the museum itself, see chapter 2.2 of the present book), but also a 'red site' like the 'Iron Man Wang Jinxi memorial hall' (Tieren Wang Jinxi jinianguan 2010) (see chapter 5.3 of the present book) is covered by this 'museum series' thus endorsed.

museum representatives, though. This means that various agents involve themselves on the ground to bolster (or use) the campaign.

Furthermore, one should also note that apart from the listing as ‘patriotic showcase education bases’, single sites were also simultaneously included in other, similarly graded lists. (Cf. appendix 3 for a sample of various labels). Beyond labels directed at the education of youth, there are also ‘bases’ for education in national defence (*guofang jiaoyu jidi* 国防教育基地) established since 2007,⁹⁶ once more directed also at the Chinese citizen at large. In fact, a very eye-catching role is the involvement of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) in this whole system of ‘bases’. Thus, typically, in the filmic renderings of the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ mentioned above and integrated in the discussion of single sites in the following chapters, one can observe pupils as well as cadets visit the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ sites on guided tours. Another notable group (who the normal tourist will unlikely encounter),⁹⁷ though not evident as such in the plaques, but disclosed by the filmic renderings (and in a few cases mentioned in the ‘patriotic’ written materials) addressing a domestic Chinese audience, is prisoners (of various types) who are taken to some of the sites to ‘better’ themselves via ideological training, demonstrating to the domestic audience that the state has not given up on them but invests in re-education of ‘culprits’.⁹⁸

More specialised alternative graded ‘education bases’ listings represented by plaques on-site include, e.g., ‘Party character education bases’ (*dangxing jiaoyu jidi* 党性教育基地),⁹⁹ or the one to provide edification against corruption and for

96 In fact, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted a law in 2001 on National Defence Education which spelled out the criteria for national defence education bases (article 23 and 28). The official English version of the 2001 law can be accessed via the web archive: *Law of the People’s Republic of China on National Defense Education (Order of the President No. 52) (2001)*. For discussions of national defence education, see Hughes (2017), Genevaz (2019), and Naftali (2020). The law itself has undergone revisions in the meantime.

97 This also shows that it is important for evaluating the sites to move beyond an approach based on personal on-site visits only, to also take in various materials designed for the domestic audience through time.

98 This, incidentally, was already on the GMD’s mind in Republican times, reflected indirectly in the prison and ‘concentration camp’ sites discussed in chapter 3.2 of the present book.

99 The oft-used translation ‘Party spirit’ is not exactly literal, though taken up by Western researchers as well. Cf. Pieke (2018: 711, 721) who discusses the term and states that *dangxing* is, in turn, the Chinese translation for Lenin’s ‘party-mindedness’; this is apparently based on Sorace (2016: 45) who however adds the Russian original ‘partiinost’. This Russian term (party + the suffix ‘ness’), though, makes clear that the Chinese *xing* is used similarly as the suffix ‘ness’, i.e., in the sense of ‘character’, ‘typical quality’, and is a faithful translation from Russian. Furthermore, there is the concept of *jingshen* 精神 which is (rather straightforward) ‘spirit’ in translation (which Pieke opts to render as ‘essence’, given the need to distinguish it from *xing*, which seems a bit forced; a back

thriftiness, addressing, above all, cadres, or the one for learning about the Chinese ‘national conditions’ (*guoqing jiaoyu jidi* 国情教育基地), not the least designed for Hong Kong and Macau youth (who are seen as particularly in need of politically correct education to understand their ‘motherland’ China better). ‘Red education bases’ (*hongse jiaoyu jidi* 红色教育基地) is a further label used, if not as a full-blown system. It, however, shows that the idea of physical ‘bases’ for ‘learning’ is rather broadly applied.¹⁰⁰ And one may note that not only are those assignments often graded from local up to national level, depending on the assigning entity, but also sometimes they are explicitly for specific target groups. These may, in turn, not only be types of people (e.g., pupils or cadres or the military), but also specific institutions who have set up fixed relationships with sites. E.g., some universities may have contracted a site as ‘their’ ‘patriotic education base’, sending regularly students over to be ‘trained’. These labels, always proudly exhibited at the sites themselves with plaques (see fig. 1.1), thus also provide some clues as to the sites’ intended use.



Fig. 1.1 Part of the display of label plaques at a purely ‘ideological’ site: the memorial for cadre Kong Fansen (Liaocheng) (photograph by the author, 2017) (for Kong Fansen, see chapter 5.3)

Beyond the ‘educational’ field, there are, of course, also other graded labels for sites, including the tourist AAAA (5A) down to A classification, where predictably revolutionary sites figure more rarely, while pre-modern cultural as well as natural

translation of ‘essence’ would rather lead to *cui* 粹 or *jing* 精 at best). Therefore, I prefer to translate *dangxing* more literally, reserving ‘spirit’ for *jingshen*.

100 It is paralleled to a much lesser extent by the term ‘point’ (*dian* 点) (sometimes also, if covering a larger area, *qu* 区). Cf. appendix 3 for some examples.

sites are outstanding. Thus, in a sense, the ‘patriotic’ sites complement the touristic one, only in some instances of pre-modern ‘patriotic’ sites overlapping in category (see fig. 1.2). And the cultural and natural heritage system has its graded labels of ‘protected units’ (*baohu danwei* 保护单位) as well. Thus, the labelling of the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ is to be seen in this larger system of graded different labels of sites (cf. appendix 3) which are also proudly displayed side by side at every single site, sometimes called rows ‘of honour’ (*rongyu* 荣誉) (and come with a fixed set of requirements respectively, configuring also the site’s envisioned use).



Fig. 1.2 Display of labels and chronology of listings at a top tourist and historical site: the home of Confucius (Qufu) (photograph by the author, 2015) (for the Confucius site, see chapter 5.1)

In terms of categories according to which one may group the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’, one suggestion in ‘patriotic education’ materials, looking at the *contents* of ‘patriotism’ as mirrored in the lists of ‘patriotic education showcase bases’, based on the first ‘100 bases’ list, has been to distinguish sites of ‘historical culture’, ‘national righteousness’, ‘revolutionary wars’ and ‘outstanding personalities’.¹⁰¹ Liu Yunshan 刘云山 from the Propaganda Department, however, whose preface adorns every single booklet of the benchmark *Zhongguo dabaike quanshu* series on the single sites of the first list, provided the ‘official’ understanding and picked out from the first ‘100’ list as categories: 1) places which were foundational for Chinese civilisation, enumerating the Neolithic site Hemudu 河姆渡 (cf. chapter 2.1), the legendary tomb of Huangdi 黄帝 (the Yellow Emperor) (cf. chapter 3.1),

101 Fang (1999), ending up with these roughly equally numerous single categories.

the Mogao caves in Dunhuang (cf. chapter 2.3), and the Great Wall near Beijing as prime examples: this is notable in so far as neither Palaeolithic Peking Man nor Neolithic Banpo 半坡 (which are textbook staples – see chapter 2.1) are cited, but the more ‘problematic’ Hemudu, and it covers the only ‘religious’ site on the first list: Dunhuang; 2) places of modern history remembering China’s being bullied by foreigners and her resistance, enumerating the museum of the Opium War (in Humen 虎门, Dongguan; see chapter 4.3), the site of the signing of the Nanjing Treaty at the end of the Opium War, the destroyed Old Summer Palace in Beijing, the memorial of Lin Zexu 林则徐 (in Fuzhou; see chapter 5.1) as the ‘hero’ of the Opium War, and the memorial for the villagers of Sanyuanli 三元里 (Guangzhou) who resisted the British in the Opium War as the most exemplary: this is notable in so far as all these places highlight conflicts with the West (mainly the British) and none with Japan, although numerically those latter ones are far more numerous on the list; 3) places of the Communist revolution, naming the site of the First Party Congress in Shanghai, the Jinggangshan 井冈山 base area (see chapter 3.3), the memorial hall of the anti-Japanese war of resistance (Beijing), the Geleshan 歌乐山 ‘Red Crag’ memorial hall in Chongqing (see chapter 3.2), and the Yan’an 延安 revolutionary base area (see chapter 3.3) as representative: this less surprising selection covers, however, also the anti-Japanese war, but remarkably *only* as part of the Communist revolution; 4) the sites of contemporary history which show the building-up of New China (i.e. the PRC) like the Fushun 抚顺 memorial of Lei Feng 雷锋 (who stands for Communist morality in general and the army more specifically; see chapter 5.3), the memorial for ‘iron man’ Wang Jinxi 王进喜 (who stands for total dedication of a labourer to open up the Daqing 大庆 oil field; see chapter 5.3), the Liaocheng 聊城 one for model cadre Kong Fansen 孔繁森 (who served the minority areas, namely Tibet; see chapter 5.3),¹⁰² and the Red Flag Canal (in Henan; see chapter 2.3) as an engineering project showing how socialism worked to create a new China to be proud of.¹⁰³ By this, Liu Yunshan de facto established a ‘core group’ among the sites of the first list.

102 One may note that often Jiao Yulu 焦裕禄, a cadre serving tirelessly up to his death by cancer in Henan in 1964, is taken up as the most important model cadre in general. He had been hailed in the Mao era, and is so again in the era of Xi Jinping who is said to have a special emotional bond to this model. Kong Fansen, however, has the ‘advantage’ of covering the minority issue, while Jiao Yulu served in ‘China proper’, and he is a post-Mao ‘hero’. This likely endeared him to Jiang Zemin and especially Hu Jintao who had served in Tibet himself.

103 See Liu Yunshan’s preface to the series on the (first) 100 patriotic education showcase bases published by Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe (but also printed by other officially enlisted publishers like Zhongguo ditu chubanshe). See, e.g., in Xie (1998: 3–4).

Other categorisations proposed simply stayed with the provinces or grouped sites chronologically according to the site ‘content’ (which made obvious the strong leaning towards modern times in these whole listings of ‘patriotic education showcase bases’).¹⁰⁴ Interestingly, in terms of content, the second to fourth lists almost exclusively added revolutionary sites and some on 19th century victimisation, thus augmenting the presentist thrust of the whole endeavour. In fact, the ‘official’ statement of the deputy head of the Propaganda Department at the time the second list was published (2001), Liu Peng 刘鹏, declared that by then the contribution of the CCP was to be central for the further listings.¹⁰⁵ Earlier sites were consequently hardly chosen.¹⁰⁶ That way, older times were integrated only marginally or indirectly, mainly by provincial museums by then increasingly listed, and also ‘science’ was only marginally considered.¹⁰⁷ And Liu Yunshan, when head of the Propaganda Department, stressed in 2004 as the listings for the third round were underway, that the main task was at this point to broaden access to existing museums, memorials, revolutionary sites and martyrs’ cemeteries, suggesting to design also movable exhibitions or online versions besides intensifying ‘red tourism’, by this explicitly linking ‘patriotic education bases’ and ‘red tourism sites’.¹⁰⁸ Thus, unsurprisingly, with the fourth list (2009), half of the sites were

104 This alternative grouping was proposed by He (1997: editor’s preface), interestingly moving backward from the present, arguing for a more ‘pedagogical’ approach to start with what is closer to modern youth. However, in obvious deference to the dominating provincial grouping, a provincial ordering index is included.

105 See his preface in *Di er pi baige aiguozhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi dituji* (2013 [2002]: n.p.). Liu established here as a core group: the memorial park of Li Dazhao 李大钊 (executed 1927) and the Heilongjiang memorial of Ma Jun 马骏 (executed 1928) for the early ‘martyrs’; the memorials of the site of the August Seventh conference (1927), the Autumn Harvest Uprising (1927) and the Baise 百色 Uprising (1929) (for the latter, see below chapter 4.2) for the period of ‘land revolution’; the relics of the Pingxingguan 平型关 Battle (September 1937) and the Jiaozhuanghu 焦庄户 tunnel warfare for the period of the Second Sino–Japanese War; the Tianjin–Beijing Campaign (late 1948 to early 1949) memorial (see below chapter 4.3) and the Shuangdui 双堆 martyrs’ cemetery of the Huai–Hai Campaign (late 1948 to early 1949) for the Civil War period; and the memorial for the key political couple Zhou Enlai 周恩来 and Deng Yingchao 邓颖超, the one of general Peng Dehuai 彭德怀, and the one of general Ye Jianying 叶剑英 for the establishment of the PRC.

106 Notable exceptions include the memorial for Tang poet Li Bai in Sichuan (list 4) and the one of 17th century intellectual Gu Yanwu in Jiangsu (list 3).

107 One ‘scientific’ pre-modern figure covered is Li Shizhen 李时珍 and his role in Ming medicine and botany (list 1). The engineering ‘wisdom’ of the old Dujiangyan weir or the modern Red Flag Canal (both list 1) could be counted into this category as well (for both see below chapter 2.3). Other cases are science museums and the very notable case of the former nuclear testing site in Qinghai praising China’s first atomic and hydrogen bombs (list 3).

108 See the speech of Liu Yunshan of 2004, printed as a preface to the third list-related publication *Di san pi quanguo aiguozhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi xunli* (2009: 1–6).

dedicated to the Long March, the Second Sino–Japanese War, and the Civil War, whereas the other half covered ‘cultural’ topics, mostly in the form of museums.¹⁰⁹ The original basic idea to only provide one listing per figure was also not strictly followed as some key Communist figures ‘reappeared’.¹¹⁰ However, all in all, the dominating categorisation remained the administrative one according to province. And in general, most publications concentrated on the first list, whereas the further lists were less received.¹¹¹ After the hiatus in the early Xi Jinping era, in 2017 the promulgation of lists was continued, as mentioned, now heavily focused on the Party, and only partly paying attention to breadth in geographical coverage.

In terms of categorisation of sites, non-print media like CCTV also came forward with suggestions, proposing the following on the CCTV website of 2008 on the TV film clip series *Ai wo Zhonghua* which in its ranking also reveals the order of importance in this ‘official’ point of view in an updated version vis-à-vis Liu Yunshan, covering the lists up to then: great personalities in history, holy places of the revolution (the biggest group), revolutionary martyrs (the second largest group), never forget history (i.e. sites of victimisation), Chinese civilisation.¹¹² This clearly betrays the primary importance of revolutionary figures and places as also most ‘great personalities in history’ are, in fact, Communists or their sympathisers.¹¹³ The ‘never forget history’ sites, in turn, mostly focus on Chinese victimisation by the Western powers or Japan, however always adding the politically correct ending that although this is ‘never to be forgotten’, it should not lead to continuous hatred.¹¹⁴

109 See Chen Xiuling (2010: 107). Interestingly, the official guide to the fourth list sites (*Di si pi quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi xunli* (2009)) simply reprinted Liu Yunshan’s speech of 2004, i.e., provided nothing specific about the criteria for the fourth list.

110 One example is the Communist ‘model’ new personality, Lei Feng, who is honoured on the first list with his memorial and tomb in Fushun (Liaoning Province), and again on the fourth with his memorial in Hunan where he came from (cf. chapter 5.3).

111 The series of Jilin chuban jituan, published in Changchun in 2012, crosses the lists, with a strong leaning to those sites placed in Manchuria, i.e., close to home. Ditu chubanshe also published maps of the second and third list, and others started with some coverage of sites on list 2.

112 This could be found on the (by now defunct) website: ‘Ai wo Zhonghua – Quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi xunli’ (2008b).

113 Browsing through the category of ‘historically outstanding people’, one notes only few non-Communists, basically Republican-era figures considered close to the Communists like Lu Xun etc. Notable is the integration here of two mythological figures as ‘historical’: Huangdi (the Yellow Emperor) (see chapter 3.1) and the Great Yu! Only the equally mythical Yandi (see chapter 3.1), the purported half-brother of Huangdi, remains in the category of ‘Chinese civilisation’. As for real ‘historical figures’ there are only few from earlier times through the 19th century, notably Confucius (see chapter 5.1), Zheng Chenggong (see chapter 5.1), Gu Yanwu, and Lin Zexu (see chapter 5.1).

114 The short explanations on every section could be found on the (by now defunct) website: ‘Ai wo Zhonghua – Quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi xunli’ (2008b). Interestingly, there was one

Nevertheless, this clearly reflects the call by Jiang Zemin and others to use the history of ‘shame and humiliation’ to further patriotism.¹¹⁵ The last section on ‘Chinese civilisation’ is tellingly short, mostly covering museums, as those few historical figures that are deemed patriotically important (e.g. Confucius; see chapter 5.1) have been shifted to the first section on ‘great personalities in history’.

In contrast to these Chinese official categorisation proposals, another categorisation has been proposed by Western-based scholar Zheng Wang in his work on the ‘patriotic education’ campaign and its implications for Sino–US relations (Wang 2012: 105–106). For him, the patriotic education bases fell into the categories: external conflicts, civil wars, myths, and heroes, noting that the great majority of the first official national ‘100’ bases are dedicated to conflicts, namely external ones with the Japanese and internal ones with the GMD. This, obviously, gives a quite different, more ‘aggressive’ impression, though here the basis is only the first list.

After studying the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ system – which up to now has hardly been treated specifically – in more detail,¹¹⁶ one could think of other categorisations, e.g., grouping them into topics loosely following the chronology of site ‘contents’: mythology, pre-history, pre-modern history, Westerners and China, the Japanese and China, Sun Yat-sen and the 1911 Republican revolution, CCP figures, revolutionary and Party places, wars and battles, and CCP *vs* GMD places. Obviously, this would mean occasional overlaps, e.g., in the case of ‘wars and battles’ which might intersect with other categories. However, the category ‘wars and battles’ comprises sites which have much in common in the way they are organised so that it seems sensible to mark them as a category of its own (and this category is also particularly suited for comparative approaches as it is to be found in many

site in this section which is not directed against ‘foreign aggression’ but nature: the site of the great Tangshan earthquake of 1976.

115 On the use of the trope of humiliation history, see Callahan (2010) and Wang (2012).

116 Up to now, there have been only studies on some single sites, though usually not in the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ context. Billeter’s (2007) French-language study on the Yellow Emperor (whose ‘mausoleum’ is a ‘showcase base’ – cf. chapter 3.1 of the present book) at least includes a convenient brief overview of the first national list of 100, in fact 103, ‘patriotic education bases’ in his chapter 6 (see also the appendix) together with a discussion of alternative lists that at times rivalled this list. The more recent book of Denton (2014) focuses on museums, covering some examples of museums of pre-modern history, of the Chinese revolution, of dead heroes, of the military, of Japanese imperialism, of exemplary leaders, of literature, of ethnic minorities and of urban planning. In this context he also addresses ‘red tourism’ sites, though only occasionally hinting at the ‘patriotic education’ context. A recent article (Liu 2018) addresses the ‘patriotic education bases’ as such, but only considers the urban sites and correlates them with the intensity of the 1989 protests at the given cities. This is interesting in itself, but seen from the system, while there is a geographical ordering of the sites, this is, as mentioned, according to province, but there is no urban–rural divide *per se* in the system.

countries around the globe). Similarly, ‘Party places’ might intersect with other categories, but again the way the sites are organised suggests a grouping together and distinction from other sites where, e.g., a CCP ‘hero’ is central.

This book opts to follow an approach which not only looks into site *contents*, however. Billeter (2007: 254-255), considering the first list, has already proposed to distinguish between monuments, historical sites, museums, and cemeteries. Taking this idea of considering the *types* of the bases, which decides much about the way *how* things are presented, further, I propose to look at the basic structuring element in each type: there are ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ focused on materiality and objects (including excavations, regional museums, or iconic constructions and landscape transformations); on locality and places (including fictive ones, commemorative ones, or settings of important steps in the Party’s history); on more elusive things not easily localised like ‘site contents’ physically unavailable since either beyond the national border, thus requiring stand-in representation, or recording former actions rather than something ‘stationary’ (e.g. uprising, strikes, guerrilla activities, or wars and battles); or on outstanding people (i.e. different types of role models: ‘traditional’ ones, non-Communist modern ones, and above all Communist ones, including Party leaders). Via this structure, I intend to get beyond the *what* to consider also the *how* of presentation, to offer a more holistic view on the system of the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ and its evolution through time. I will thus look at the specific *modes* exemplified by the sites, largely drawing on the first ‘100’ list, but also taking up some cases from further lists to acknowledge the system’s development over time, looking into the contextualisation of materiality, the marketing of locality, representation of the elusive, and the presenting and at the same time presencing of individual agents, as means to educate Chinese ‘patriotic’ citizens.

A comment on the approach and materials used

Looking into the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’, this book, while focusing on specific case studies for the single modes, keeps several research areas in mind: on the one hand, memory *vs* history is reflected in these ‘bases’. Here, Pierre Nora and his concept of *lieux de mémoire* is of obvious relevance.¹¹⁷ More generally, studies

117 Nora has elucidated this concept in his multi-volume work on French sites. In the English-speaking academia, the short English-language article on *lieux de mémoire* between memory and history (Nora 1989) has been most widely received, popularising the concept more generally.

on memory culture provide some background.¹¹⁸ Lowenthal, in turn, adds to perspectives on the uses the past (which he famously once termed a ‘foreign country’) is put to via heritagisation.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, Bourdieu and de Certeau provide inspiration with theories of social practice since the ‘bases’ are, as will become clear, also social ‘fields’ and performative places, where ‘strategies’ of state-mandated behaviour meet ‘tactics’ of tourist consumption.¹²⁰ Museum studies, in turn, have discussed the function of museums also for citizen formation,¹²¹ and they serve for analysing ways of display. Given that there is a close link to history in the sites considered in the present book, the convenient check-list of eight key questions by Thiemeyer (2010: 84–89), specialised on history museums and drawing on classical source criticism, is useful to keep in mind when discussing exhibitions and their context: 1. Who is the author (of a museum or exhibition)? 2. What is the position of the author? 3. Who is the addressee? 4. When, where and how did it come into being? 5. What is the aim of it? 6. What are the key terms / issues? 7. Which format is used? 8. How is the formal setup? However, beyond this positive check-list, there is of course also the crucial question of what is avoided, i.e., is not addressed, be it in terms of content, or in terms of political, financial, institutional etc. background. Furthermore, it is important to pay attention to the way in which things are narrated, presented, and framed. Here, insights from literary studies on narrativity and genre, not the least the concepts of intertextuality (Kristeva 1980) and paratexts (Genette 1997) (with ‘text’ understood here in the broadest sense) relevant for the presented narratives in and beyond exhibition spaces and their mutual interconnectedness are helpful, as is, most importantly, sociologist Goffman’s concept of ‘frame’ (Goffman 1974). This serves to analyse the way how things are narrated and presented, and how perception is guided by ‘framing’ in exhibitions as well as in written or audio-visual sources, which make up the materials used for the present book. Studies on performativity in and of museums, in turn, take the museum as a

118 Jan Assmann’s 1992 German-language book on ‘cultural memory’ became very influential for differentiating between forms of memory, namely for ‘collective memory’ distinguishing between ‘communicative memory’ and the long-term ‘cultural memory’. This key book was followed by various publications by himself and his wife Aleida Assmann, connecting memory studies to cultural studies more broadly, and to (especially German) history politics more specifically. See also Erll / Nünning (2008) and Erll / Rigney (2012) on ‘memory culture’ and its various medial forms. One needs, however, to count in that most of these studies implicitly assume a societal and political setting which is rather different from the one in which Chinese ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ operate in.

119 See Lowenthal (1986) and Lowenthal (1996).

120 See Certeau (1984), and for Bourdieu’s take on social practice, first published in French in 1972, the reworked English edition of 1977.

121 For the educational role of museums, see, e.g., Hooper-Greenhill (2007).

‘stage’ (another Goffman-inspired approach),¹²² and look at both the museum curators’ intentions as well as at the visitors. In the words of art educator Garoian (2001: 235), this leads to question as: ‘What is the relationship between museums, their cultural artifacts, and performance? Who performs the museum? Whose memory and cultural history is being performed?’ The visitors, in fact, ‘read’ an exhibition not only through text, but also through the latter’s relation to artefacts or objects more generally, and through the objects’ setting in space.¹²³ And they might well ask to which degree it is ‘their’ cultural history that is performed there, which links back to the issue of identity. But visitors are a variant group who bring their own experience and expectations to a place. Beyond the pupils and similar types of guided visitors, tourists who opt for visiting a place in their leisure time need to be taken into account as well. At this point, tourism literature helps distinguish between different types of tourists,¹²⁴ has explored how tourists interact with the visited places, and how sites try to appeal to expectations or generate interest in the first place. Not the least, there has been also some attention to the issue of tourism’s role for national identity building.¹²⁵ Particularly pertinent as a background to some case studies in the present book are the subfields of ‘dark tourism’ and ‘battlefield tourism’,¹²⁶ as well as ‘heritage tourism’,¹²⁷ which includes tourism to sites of cultural pride, but also to those of ‘dissonant heritage’.¹²⁸

For the more practical and China-related aspects, this study can build upon work on nationalism in China,¹²⁹ on the educational system,¹³⁰ and its relation to citizen

122 See Goffman (1959), suggesting that people ‘act’, behaving differently in different settings on stage, or backstage.

123 Cf. Buschmann (2010) for the application of narrative theory to museum analysis.

124 Regarding the typology of tourists, Cohen (1972) has been often cited, though not all of his types are equally relevant for the Chinese case, while a general distinction between organised groups (the ‘institutionalised form’) and individual tourists is important to maintain.

125 A classic in tourism studies, focusing on the interaction of tourists with the places they visit, is Urry’s work on the tourist ‘gaze’, first published in 1990 and subsequently updated, integrating in the third edition (coauthored by Larsen) also the performative side of tourism (Urry / Larsen 2011) which renders it closer to the issues at stake in the present book. For a general overview on tourism studies, see Jamal / Robinson (2009). For a collection of contributions regarding tourism and national identity, see the volume edited by Frew / White (2011).

126 For ‘dark tourism’, see, e.g., Sharpley / Stone (2009), White / Frew (2013), Hooper / Lennon (2017), and Stone (2018). For battlefield tourism, see, e.g., Ryan (2007) and Baldwin / Sharpley (2009).

127 For an overview of the field, see Park (2014).

128 The term ‘dissonant heritage’ has been popularised by Tunbridge / Ashworth (1994). Other similar terms have been proposed as well, including ‘difficult heritage’ (Macdonald 2009) etc.

129 For influential English-language studies in this field, see, e.g., Gries (2004), Guo (2004), Zhao (2004); Callahan (2010), Wang (2012). In the context of International Relations Studies, Gustafsson (2014), e.g., sees recent Chinese ‘nationalism’ and ‘patriotism’ as overlapping. Dessen’s edited

education.¹³¹ Research on layered territorialised identities in China from the local and regional to the national is a further relevant area,¹³² and studies on tourism and heritage in China are an increasingly rich and relevant field, too.¹³³ Work on Chinese museums, in turn, is of particular interest as several sites are, in fact, museums.¹³⁴ A crucial issue for the present book is to pay attention to what kind of history views are provided to the Chinese citizen in the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ looked at and how this is done.¹³⁵ Usually, extant studies on single sites focus on a given moment, often the point when the researcher visited it to then analyse an exhibition. However, most importantly, one needs to be aware that exhibitions are nothing fixed, especially in China where political winds may change rather abruptly. Therefore, where possible, I try to historicise *the sites themselves* in the ongoing ‘patriotic education campaign’, which is facilitated when materials of different stages during the campaign can be confronted with each other as well as with the time of personal visit. This provides a more complex and layered approach. I also provide the year photos (the number of which had to be restricted to only 30 for the whole book) were taken, which unfortunately is often not done in academic publications, though this is a crucial information, given the changes sites and exhibitions may undergo.

volume (2014), in turn, combines the issue of nationalism with Chinese views on history and their political implications.

130 More recent influential studies in the field of Chinese education have been Kipnis (2011), Hansen (2015), Vickers / Zeng (2017).

131 Cf. Kennedy / Fairbrother / Zhao (2014), and the China-related parts of Vickers / Kumar (2015).

132 See Moser (1985) and Oakes (2000) from a geographer’s perspective, Goodman (1995) and Fitzgerald (2002) from a historian’s one, and Oakes / Schein (2006) that include an anthropological one.

133 To name but a few book-length works: on Chinese tourism more generally, see, e.g., Oakes (1998), Nyíri (2006), Ryan / Gu (2009), Huang / Chen (2021). For Chinese heritage tourism, see, e.g., Yan (2017), Zhang (2020).

134 See the book-length English-language works treating Chinese museums under various aspects, from those presenting, above all, a collection of samples like the guides by Clifford / Giangrande / White (2009) or Li / Luo (2010), to those focusing on the recent museum-building boom and its architectural dimension like Jacobson (2014), to those discussing museum history and conceptions in China like Lu (2014), to museologist analyses of display modes like Varutti (2014) (if without a background in the Chinese language). Most importantly for the present book, Denton (2014) looks at museums ‘exhibiting the past’, Ho (2018) on those ‘curating revolution’. See also the article by Vickers (2007) on museums and nationalism in China.

135 For an example of how historiographical changes were reflected in one museum (and incidentally a ‘patriotic education showcase base’ as well, not discussed in detail in the present book), see Rana Mitter on the case of the Beijing War of Resistance Museum (Mitter 2000).

Basically, most materials used are set in the first 20-odd years of the ‘showcase base’ system, i.e., covering the time-frame 1997 to 2019. In general, personal on-site observation is contrasted with the official materials which for the cases of the first list (1997) include single booklets on each individual site (written shortly after the first list had appeared), reprinted over the 2000s, and reprinted with a new layout in 2012,¹³⁶ i.e. the above-named benchmark series of Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe which provide the official narrative of the Jiang Zemin era also shared through the Hu Jintao era, though assigned to local authors who in some cases use the occasion to fill in local perspectives. For sites on the second list (2001), there are the official descriptions in the 4-volumes collection of the propaganda and education bureau of the CCP Central Committee’s propaganda department (*Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu xuanjiaojū / Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe* 2002) directed at cadres, the Chinese citizen at large, but especially at youth. The two further lists 3 and 4 (2005 and 2009) of the Hu Jintao era were covered in the publications compiled once more by the propaganda and education bureau, then published with the ‘educational’ press, Xuexi chubanshe (*Di san pi quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi xunli* 2009, and *Di si pi quanguo aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi xunli* 2009). To the above written narratives, visual materials are added, namely the educational videos (on some sites of the first list) of the *Zhonghua hun* DVD collection (published in 2006 and designed for classroom use),¹³⁷ and the TV film clips (the *Ai wo Zhonghua* collection published also as DVDs in 2008 which will be the cited version in this book in the cases of list 1 to list 3 sites covered there, while the fourth list sites were available only on the CNTV website which was taken off in the early Xi Jinping era, as mentioned above), aiming at the general domestic public. Finally, again in print format, the newest province-specific 22-volume collection (*Fengbei* 2019) which provides updated official descriptions of the sites on lists 1 to 4, adding also the fifth list sites, i.e. the 2017 nominations, are used which bring the respective presentation up to the Xi Jinping era, aiming at cadres, the military, youth, and the Chinese citizen in general, disclosing also the shifts historical narratives had to consider according to the new agenda.¹³⁸ To the above materials, which are systematically applied to each case study, locally available materials are added, where possible, which reflect how

136 For consistency, I have cited the original late 1990s versions throughout, but have counter-checked with the 2012 versions I could get hold of.

137 There is, as noted above, one case of the second list covered there, the (Shenyang) Martyrs’ Cemetery for the Korean War, and the collection assembles videos produced mostly in the late 1990s.

138 Some of the alternative publications mentioned above when discussing the campaign have also been integrated, but not as systematically as the material mentioned here. For the respective target groups, see the prefaces of the single publications.

the local site tries to present itself to the visiting tourist. Given the limited space, the challenge was to choose among the many sites, and here an attempt has been made to somewhat balance out regional (and to some extent temporal) representation beyond the content type considerations. This, however, also necessitates the reminder and *caveat* that the different types presented in this book are not evenly distributed in practice, as hinted at above, but some types are more common than others. To facilitate orientation for the reader, a vague chronological sequence has been applied among the case studies of the single types in terms of site contents, which also hopefully helps to delineate more clearly how the ‘patriotic’ narrative of China’s past evolved, which the Chinese citizens are supposed to embrace.

One word should be also added about the outstanding book of Denton (2014), a scholar coming from the field of Chinese modern literature and film, to also profile for the reader the particularities of the present book. At first glance, regarding the choice of sites to be treated, there are a few overlaps: Denton’s book which appeared when the present book project was already underway, has a somewhat different focus, namely on various types of museums, though understood broadly to encompass also memorials, ‘martyrs’ cemeteries’, and ‘red tourism’ sites. There is, however, no systematic link to education and the uses these sites are made to serve, and the sites treated rather serve to illustrate the singular museum types. The present book starts from the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ system. It is not geared towards museums as such (of which only some are ‘patriotic education showcase bases’, and reversely, not all ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ are museums), but asks what kind of sites (museums or not) are labelled in this evolving system, how they relate to citizen formation, and how they are situated between nationalism, local identities, and tourism. Furthermore, and most importantly, as to site descriptions, it historicises the exhibition narratives since on-site observations are, to stress once more, by nature just one spotlight at a given time, by systematically relying on the materials produced in the ‘patriotic education’ context since the respective site’s listing. In this sense, this book not only draws on my former work on various aspects of modern Chinese history in terms of content, but methodologically also links up with my earlier work on Chinese historical documentary series reflecting global rise (and fall) of nations (Müller 2013), which also disclosed the multi-medial concerted action on TV, the book market, and museum exhibitions to reinforce a certain historical reading, in that case of foreign (post-1500), Chinese (post-1840), and particularly Soviet history that had been (at least partly) taught in Chinese school history already. My previous work on Chinese history textbooks (Müller 2011, Müller 2013[2008], Müller 2014, Müller 2018), in turn, also serves for linking up the textbook knowledge Chinese citizens learnt in school with the reinforcement by outdoor education as is provided by the ‘patriotic

education showcase bases'. Finally, my previous work on cultural heritage, namely with cemeteries (Müller 2020, Müller 2022), also helped me realise the fruitfulness of historicising narratives on specific sites themselves and of close on-site observation, held against the written (and visual) materials. I therefore hope that this book will provide the reader with a fairly systematic understanding of the modes and workings of China's 'patriotic education' in terms of such 'showcase bases', which address not only pupils but also the grown-up Chinese citizen, as a civil tourist or a military cadet, or even as a political cadre (and sometimes as a prisoner to be 're-educated'), how this whole system evolved since at least 1997 when the first list of sites was promulgated, and how it is embedded in the larger structure of using such sites as 'training' tools for specific agendas and target groups through time, typically referring to a specific framing of history. In comparative perspective, especially a look to the (former) Soviet Union is helpful to highlight the commonalities but also the specific traits in the Chinese 'patriotic education bases' which are addressed more in the concluding remarks (chapter 6).

In theory, the concept of 'patriotic education bases' could also do without a connection to history: one could very well imagine, e.g., a modern scientific place serving as such (say, Cape Canaveral), or a very particular landscape (say, the Grand Canyon for the US). In fact, the 2021 listing of the new Daxing Airport, mentioned above, under Xi Jinping points into this direction to move away from history and heritage to the present. However, in China the sites chosen up to now were almost all connected *de facto* to history in some form – even if as history of science with some museums¹³⁹ – including, of course, Party history. This, turned around, means that the state obviously perceives the need to appeal to some kind of history to elicit patriotism. This is also understandable, as the used definition of 'patriotism', as presented above, is not only 'love of one's place of origin' (which in a multi-ethnic China could also be potentially divisive) but equated with Chinese civilisational (including more recent socialist) 'achievements' in the past to instil confidence into

139 Although the first list of 1997 does not cover science – but for the historic case of Li Shizhen 李时珍, the Ming times physician and herbalist whose memorial is cited, the second list of 2001 and the later ones do integrate some science-focused museums on aviation, on the navy, on technology, and on nature or natural history. Only the Qinghai site of the construction of China's first atomic weapons on the third list is not a normal 'science museum', though the accent is still clearly on the historical significance: the site is no more in operation but has been turned into a museum. Probably this integration of some science sites was a reaction to an alternative list of '100 patriotic education sites' set up by the Central Party School in 1998 which had more of such sites in, even covering two modern non-museum sites with the Gezhouba 葛洲坝 dam in Hubei and the geothermal power plant in Tibet. (See Billeter 2007: 283, note 157.) Interestingly, the latter were not taken up in the successive official 'national' lists, only the museums which by way of exhibition retain control over interpretation and in this sense are also more didactic, i.e., 'educational'.

the future of a socialist China. That way, also China shares in the ‘cult of heritage’ by using the ‘spoils of history’ (Lowenthal 1996). The following chapters will therefore also serve for providing insights into the recent normative Chinese historiography which the Chinese citizen is supposed to embrace, its changes over time as reflected in the respective framings of narratives on the singular sites, their context and background, but also the problems and inconsistencies connected to them, which sometimes open up possibilities for divergent readings even from the inside.

Quick tour through the book

Given the pluriform modes under which the ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ operate, the following chapter (chapter 2) starts the discussion with concrete examples focusing on materiality, i.e., sites that are playing up and constructing identity by relying on material objects. However, since ‘objects’ never simply ‘speak for themselves’, they can be used for a ‘national’ reading or for precisely the opposite: as defining the local. Thus, contextualisation decides upon the level of identity affixed to them: national, regional, or local, or a layered combination of them. Examples discussed in this category include excavations which are materially connected to their geographical location and therewith easily convey a ‘local’ reading, but also museums which display movable objects, e.g., as art history, on a national or regional level. In the latter case, the object is in tendency disconnected from its place of origin and shown as a ‘Chinese’ object, or as an object defining the regional (e.g., provincial) identity alternatively. Contextualisation and framing decide. Other examples include buildings or landscape transformations which are by necessity physically tied to their location but have been built for a supra-local goal (the Great Wall, e.g.) and have been later invested with an ‘iconic’ meaning to represent Chineseness (e.g. the Mogao caves in Dunhuang which could be easily also read as showing a decidedly ‘multi-cultural’ face, not the least since the site was registered also as part of the transnational ‘Silk Road’ with UNESCO in 2014, but also historically as a place where many cultures, languages, and religions met). Engineering constructions, in turn, like the ancient Dujiangyan 都江堰 irrigation system or the socialist Red Flag Canal, while clearly serving the locality and region they are placed in, have also come to stand as symbols for ‘Chinese’ hydraulic creativity. In discussing those examples, the tension between local, regional, and national readings and how this is marketed for educational as well as tourist aims respectively is analysed.

Chapter 3, in turn, concentrates on locality, i.e., sites where the very physical place is of primary importance. This category covers also purely fictive places like the purported ‘mausolea’ (*ling* 陵) of the mythical ancestors of ‘the Chinese’: there is nothing ‘original’ in a material sense like an excavation (as in the preceding chapter) to be seen, but the sites have lived through legend in these cases, leading to a historically established and in that sense ‘materialised’ site, assuming those mythical figures were connected to the very places (which in turn can be made to physically serve political ends of celebrating and performing a ‘patriotic’ ‘Chineseness’ at large, taking in also Taiwanese or Overseas Chinese). Further ‘places’ considered in this chapter are those of historical commemoration and mourning, including places of atrocities and victimisation (typically by the Japanese against the Chinese), of ‘martyrdom’ of heroes with prisons and execution grounds or ‘concentration camps’ (typically with the GMD in the perpetrator role against the Communists), and the tombs and cemeteries of such ‘martyrs’ (who were killed either by warlords or the GMD). Finally, the ‘Party places’ localise and make tangible key points in the Party’s history (according to its contemporary reading), to be experienced on spot by the visiting pupil or tourist to heighten their patriotism and acceptance of the current official narrative on history. In this category of sites, the physical location promises tangibility and thus ‘authenticity’, by this framing the ‘patriotic’ experience of the Chinese citizen as learner or tourist.

Next, in chapter 4, we turn to sites which refer to more elusive issues not easily pinpointed at one given place (like those sites discussed in the preceding chapter 3). This includes, as one subcategory, ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ dedicated to events or groups of people that transcend mainland China’s borders and thus necessitate physical representation by stand-in museums like ‘bases’ dealing with Taiwan, the Overseas Chinese, or the Korean War. A further subcategory are sites which are elusive in the sense that they record instances of some former more or less ‘spontaneous’ action, be it revolutionary uprisings, strikes, or guerrilla activities, which were dynamic and fluid, and thus hard to pin down in a static ‘base’ concept. This holds also true for the final subcategory, the war and battle sites. These sites, recording former action in wartime, are to evoke scenes of organised fighting which evolved in that very area in the past, and their larger historical impact, though physical remains are often elusive or in need of interpretation. The ‘bases’ thus try to provide a narrative (and often also sensory) framing for the visitors to convince them of the official historical reading. In all of the cases in this chapter, the ‘bases’ function as some sort of surrogate or physical anchor for the visitor, even if they cannot provide much tangible experience of their topic per se. Narration and its framing is thus the main theme of this chapter which is employed to make the ‘patriotic’ message plausible. This is its obvious task in the

‘patriotic education’ scheme, though the narratives need to struggle with the limits the evasive nature of site contents entails for effectively reaching out to the intended audience.

The subsequent chapter (chapter 5) focuses on sites for individual agents, be they ‘traditional’ role models in the educational or military or moral-political field, modern non-Communist ones, or outstanding Communists, including Party leaders, as embodiments of (socialist) values. The respective sites are authenticated via their connection to the very individual, typically their place of birth as their ‘former home’ (*guju* 故居), occasionally also other places where they did decisive things, or their tombs. However, these sites are often also used to show how these important individuals were shaped by the locality and its customs and thus provide a good occasion for the local to share in the glory of that respective figure, arguing the locality and its customs somehow contributed to the latter’s outstanding achievements. These figures’ ‘patriotic’ value as role models is invigorated by presenting them at ‘their’ places which also presences them at the same time via the ‘authenticity’ provided by the respective local context, rendering them also individual and distinct. They, or rather the values they embody, thus become more accessible to the visitors for emulation, be they pupils, other guided Chinese citizen groups, or individual tourists.

The concluding remarks, finally, reflect on the different aspects that surfaced when studying the Chinese ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ explored in more detail in the various case studies. They look at the different types of sites, the role emotions and knowledge are to play in the education for ‘patriotism’, and consider the different agents involved in the whole system. While it is the question how effective different modes applied by such sites are in providing what they are assumed to provide, namely a more intense identification of domestic citizens with ‘China’, the different actors involved in the system and their respective perspectives and agendas imply also the possibility of divergent readings. To situate the whole in a larger context, a final brief comparative look to the Soviet model (and beyond) will also help clarify historical relationships as well as structural similarities and differences, to explore whether there is something specifically ‘Chinese’ in the PRC’s ‘patriotic education showcase bases’ system.

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Appendix 1

Number of national-level patriotic education showcase bases according to province/ autonomous region / municipality as appearing on lists

Province / autonomous region / municipality	List 1 1997	List 2 2001	List 3 2005	List 4 2009	List 5 2017	List 6 2019	List 7 2021	Total
Beijing	9	5	1	3	0	11	13	42
Tianjin	1	4	1	2	0	0	2	10
Hebei	6	5	4	3	0	1	2	21
Shanxi	3	5	4	3	0	1	1	17
Inner Mon- golia	1	1	1	3	1	0	2	9
Liaoning	5	5	4	3	0	0	4	21
Jilin	1	3	2	3	0	0	2	11
Heilongjiang	4	2	2	4	0	1	3	16
Shanghai	4	4	1	2	0	0	3+1 enl.	14
Jiangsu	7	4	5	3	0	4	8	31
Zhejiang	5	3	1	3	1	1	4	18
Anhui	1	4	1	3	3	0	2	14
Fujian	5	5	2	3	3	1	3	22
Jiangxi	4	5	2	3	2	2	3	21
Shandong	4	5	4	4	0	1	3	21
Henan	3	2	4	2	2	4	5	22
Hubei	5	3	5	4	4	1	3	25
Hunan	3	7	5	4	3	2	9	33

Number of national-level patriotic education showcase bases (*continued*)

Province / autonomous region / municipality	List 1 1997	List 2 2001	List 3 2005	List 4 2009	List 5 2017	List 6 2019	List 7 2021	Total
Guangdong	4	3	3	2	0	1	4	17
Guangxi	2	3	2	0	0	3	2	12
Hainan	1	2	1	1	0	0	2	7
Sichuan	5	7	2	4	5	0	2	25
Chongqing	3	3	1	2	0	1	2	12
Yunnan	1	1	3	3	0	1	2	11
Guizhou	1	2	2	3	6	2	2	18
Tibet	2	0	0	2	0	0	5	9
Shaanxi	7	1	0	3	6	0	2	19
Ningxia	1	0	1	2	1	1	2	8
Gansu	3	5	0	5	2	0	6	21
Qinghai	1	0	1	2	1	0	3	8
Xinjiang	1	1	1	2	2	0	6	15
Total	103	100	66	87	42	39	112	549

Source: *Renmin ribao* 人民日报 (People's Daily) 11 June 1997, p. 3; 12 June 2001, p. 4; 21 November 2005, p. 2; 22 May 2009, p. 8; 30 March 2017, p. 6; 17 September 2019, p. 5; 20 June 2021, p. 4.

Appendix 2

Example of a site's upgrading process inside the patriotic education system: Hohhot (Inner Mongolia): Inner Mongolia Revolutionary Martyrs' Cemetery (opened in 1980)

Label	Assigning entity	Year	Level
Aiguozhuyi jiaoyu jidi 爱国主义教育基地 (Patriotic education base)	Nei Menggu zizhiqu jingshen wenming weiyuanhui 内蒙古自治区精神文明委员会 (Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region spiritual civilisation committee) <i>and</i> Nei Menggu zizhiqu dangwei xuanchuanbu 内蒙古自治区党委宣传部 (Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Party Committee Propaganda Department)	n.d.	Regional
Quanguo aiguozhuyi jiaoyu jidi 全国爱国主义教育基地 (National patriotic education base)	Zhonghua renmin gongheguo minzhengbu 中华人民共和国民政部 (PRC Ministry of Civil Affairs)	1995	National
Quanguo aiguozhuyi jiaoyu shifan jidi 全国爱国主义教育示范基地 (National patriotic education showcase base)	Zhonggong zhongyang xuanchuanbu 中共中央宣传部 (CCP Central Committee Propaganda Department)	2005	National

Source: Official plaques on-site (seen 2016)

Appendix 3

Sample (non-exhaustive) list of further labels for educational bases and some parallel labels by various assigning entities (often on various hierarchical levels, from local to national)

Types of bases (<i>jidi</i> 基地)	Other labels
Quanguo qingshaonian jiaoyu jidi (target group: pupils) 全国青少年教育基地 (National youth education base)	Guojia yiji bowuguan (for museums) 国家一级博物馆 (National first-class museum)
Zhongxiaoxue aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu jidi (target group: primary and secondary school pupils) 中小学爱国主义教育基地 (Patriotic education base for primary and secondary schools)	Bowuguan xuehui tuanti huiyuan danwei 博物馆学会团体会员单位 (Unit of members of the Museum Association)
Zhongxuesheng suzhi tuozhan jiaoyu jidi (target group: secondary school pupils) 中学生素质拓展教育基地 (Quality development education base for secondary school students)	(Zhongdian) wenwu baohu danwei (a cultural heritage label) (重点)文物保护单位 ((Key) cultural relics protection unit)
Guojia daxuesheng wenhua suzhi jiaoyu jidi (target group: university students) 国家大学生文化素质教育基地 (National university students cultural quality education base)	Xiaowai daketang (for universities, e.g.) 校外大课堂 (Great off-campus classroom)
Guanxin xiayidai jiaoyu (shifan) jidi 关心下一代教育(示范)基地 (Care for the next generation education (showcase) base)	Weichengnian ren sixiang daode jianshe xianjin danwei (target group: youth) 未成年人思想道德建设先进单位 (Advanced unit for ideological and moral edification of minors)
Guofang jiaoyu (shifan) jidi (target group: pupils and cadets) 国防教育(示范)基地 (National defence education (showcase) base)	Weichengnian ren shehui ketang (target group: youth) 未成年人社会课堂 (Social classroom for minors)

Sample list of further labels (*continued*)

Types of bases (<i>jidi</i> 基地)	Other labels
Lixiang xinnian jiaoyu jidi 理想信念教育基地 (Ideals and conviction education base)	Xianjin danwei 先进单位 (Advanced unit) (for various contents)
Geming chuantong jiaoyu jidi 革命传统教育基地 (Revolutionary tradition education base)	Wenming danwei 文明单位 (civilised unit)
Deyu jidi (of various entities) 德育基地 (Moral education base)	Guojia dengji luyouqu (dian) 国家等级旅游区(点) (‘National Tourist Attraction’) (max. 5A)
Quanguo kepu jiaoyu jidi 全国科普教育基地 (National science popularisation education base)	Quanguo gongye luyou shifandian (target group: industries) 全国工业旅游示范点 (National industrial tourism showcase site)
Shehui kexue puji jiaoyu jidi 社会科学普及教育基地 (Social science popularisation education base)	Guojia shuili fengjingqu (for canals) 国家水利风景区 (National irrigation works scenic area)
(Zhonggong) dangshi jiaoyu jidi (中共)党史教育基地 ((CCP) party history education base)	Quanguo hongse luyou jingdian jingqu 全国红色旅游经典景区 (National red tourism classic scenic area)
Qingnian ganbu xuexi jiaoyu jidi (target group: young cadres) 青年干部学习教育基地 (Learning and education base for young cadres)	Guojia dizhi gongyuan (for geographical sites) 国家地质公园 (National geopark)
Dangxing jiaoyu jidi (target group: cadres) 党性教育基地 (Party spirit education base)	Guojia zhongdian fengjing mingshengqu (for ‘green’ tourist sites) 国家重点风景名胜 (National key scenic and sightseeing area)

Sample list of further labels (*continued*)

Types of bases (<i>jidi</i> 基地)	Other labels
Dangyuan jiaoyu jidi (target group: cadres) 党员教育基地 (Party member education base)	Wenhua shengtai luyou mudidi (touristic sites) 文化生态旅游目的地 (Cultural and ecological tourism destination)
Quanguo fanfu changlian jiaoyu jidi (target group: cadres) 全国反腐倡廉教育基地 (National anti-corruption education base)	Huayuanshi danwei (for ecological set-up) 花园式单位 (Garden-style unit)
Quanguo lian Zheng jiaoyu (shifan) jidi (target group: cadres) 全国廉政教育(示范)基地 (National integrity education (showcase) base)	Quanguo wenhua gongzuo xianjin jiti 全国文化工作先进集体 (National advanced collective of cultural work)
Sixiang zhengzhi lilunke shijian jiaoxue jidi (of various entities) 思想政治理论课实践教学基地 (Practical teaching base for ideological and political theory class)	Wenming fuwu shifandian 文明服务示范点 (Civilised service showcase site)
Shehui shijian jidi (of various entities) 社会实践基地 (Social practice base)	Gongren xianfenghao (target group: workers) 工人先锋号 (Worker pioneer label)
Renwen shehui kexue puji jidi 人文社会科学普及基地 (Humanities and Social Sciences popularisation base)	Qingnian wenminghao (target group: youth) 青年文明号 (Youth civilisation label)
Keyan jiaoxue jidi 科研教学基地 (Scientific research and teaching base)	Zhian mofan danwei 治安模范单位 (Public security model unit)
Sheke puji xuanchuan jidi 社科普及宣传基地 (Social science popularisation and propagation base)	Weisheng hongqi danwei 卫生红旗单位 (Red Flag hygiene unit)

Sample list of further labels (*continued*)

Types of bases (<i>jidi</i> 基地)	Other labels
<p>Xianjin sheke jidi 先进社科基地 (Advanced social science base)</p>	<p>Xingfeng jianshe shifan chuangkou (for minority areas) 行风建设示范窗口 (Showcase window for behaviour edification)</p>
<p>Gongwuyuan tese shijian jiaoyu jidi (target group: officials) 公务员特色实践教育基地 (Civil servants specific practical education base)</p>	
<p>Zhiye jiaoyu deyu gongzuo jidi (target group: vocational school pupils) 职业教育德育工作基地 (Moral education work base for vocational education)</p>	
<p>Qiyе jingshen jiaoyu jidi (target group: enterprises) 企业精神教育基地 (Enterprise spirit education base)</p>	
<p>Quanguo jianshe xitong aiguozhuyi jiaoyu jidi (target group: construction sector) 全国建设系统爱国主义教育基地 (National construction system patriotic education bases)</p>	
<p>Quanguo liangshi xitong aiguozhuyi jiaoyu jidi 全国粮食系统爱国主义教育基地 (National food system patriotic education base)</p>	
<p>Quanguo jiancha jiguan ganjing aiguozhuyi jiaoyu jidi 全国检察机关干警爱国主义教育基地 (National procuratorial organs cadres and policemen patriotic education base)</p>	
<p>Quanguo minzu tuanjie (jinbu) jiaoyu jidi (for minority issues) 全国民族团结(进步)教育基地 (National unity of nationalities (advancement) education base)</p>	

Sample list of further labels (*continued*)

Types of bases (<i>jidi</i> 基地)	Other labels
Dangwai daibiao renshi, tongyi zhanxian ganbu aiguo zhuyi jiaoyu jidi (for United Front work) 党外代表人士，统一战线干部爱国主义教育基地 (Non-Party representatives and united front cadres patriotic education base)	
Haixia liang'an jiaoliu jidi (for cross-Strait issues) 海峡两岸交流基地 (Cross-Strait exchange base)	

Source: Official plaques encountered at various patriotic education sites

