Strategische Irrtümer: Eine kritische betrachtung der dominierenden Ansätze zur Gestaltung der Sicherheitsordnung in Ostasien

Abstract

This article holds the hypothesis that the four major contending strategic conceptions (the Realpolitik, the neoliberalism, the neoinstitutionalism, and the psychological approach) for shaping of the regional security in Pacific Asia after the Cold War are partly wrong calculated: They are either driven by illusion or based on wrong premise. It argues that valid strategy could be only developed if the following four questions could be answered: (1) How much "balance of power" does East Asia actually need to keep the stability in the region? (2) To what extent could the Asian democratic countries contribute to preventing war in East Asia? (3) What is the strongest motive for East Asian countries to collaborate at the international level? And (4) How to identify the influence of the Pacific "strategic culture" on misperceptions and conflicts in East Asia?