Pekings neue Tibet-Politik

Abstract

Since the spring of 1980 radical reforms have been developing in the Autonomous Region of Tibet, providing a strengthening of self-government, the temporary exemption from paying contributions to the State, a more flexible economic and financial policy, the revival of culture and science as well as the extensive replacement of Han cadres by Tibetians. The planned alterations are to serve as a model for the development of other Autonomous Regions. With the revision of the hitherto existing Tibet policy which can be simplified to the familiar phrases "Tibet for the Tibetians", "Demaoisation", "Decentralization" and "the tightening of security", the Central Committee of the K. C. T. pursued a number of very different aims. On the one hand the reformers had in view the assimilation of the economy of the Autonomous Region to the guiding principles already in force in remaining China, the ousting of the adherents of the cultural-revolutionary Left from one of its last strongholds, and the improvement of relations between Han and the Tibetians. This becomes clear from the economic, administrative and cultural-political definitions of the Central Committee's resolutions and from the fall of Jen Jung. Hence it is also clear from this who is behind the readjustment campaign: the pragmatic faction of the party headed by Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Hu Yao-pang. On the other hand the reform aims at the return of the Dalai Lama (and with him many professionally-qualified refugees), the improvement of military security and the elimination of a factor of disturbance in Communist China's foreign policy. The unsatisfactory (not only from Peking's point of view) almost untenable conditions in the Autonomous Region, the evident failure of the limited trial periods in 1978/79 and the more favourable situation within the party after the 5th Plenum of the Eleventh C. C. P. Central Committee and the 14th Session of the Standing Committee of the V. National People's Congress were the decisive elements for the introduction of the May Reform. At this stage it is not yet possible to make a reliable prognosis regarding the prospects of success. The greatest progress so far has undoubtedly been that in the cultural sphere, but also in the economic sphere there are now unmistakably certain improvements. Nevertheless, the Peking Government has taken a two-fold risk. The withdrawal of the Han cadres will only take place to the extent planned if it is possible to induce skilled and trained refugees to return, as only an insufficient number of natives can be educated in this short space of time of two to three years, laid down by the Government itself. The return of people now living in exile is not only dependent on such things as religious liberty and the strengthening of private initiative, but above all on the reaction of the Dalai Lama. He knows, however, how earnestly the Chinese wish for his return, and he is, without any doubt, aware of his favourable negotiating position. Peking's willingness to make concessions is, however, restricted by the system, and for this reason an agreement is not yet within sight. Besides, it is not certain whether the fall of Jen Jung, the hitherto "strong man" in Lhasa, suffices alone to guarantee the realization of the new Tibet policy. Yet the success of these attempts at reform will depend not least on the observance of the reformer's guidelines by the middle and lower cadres in the party and in administration, and on their not sabotaging them in practice. But even a large scale purge would not have been wholly unquestionable, as it would have brought about dangerous unrest.