Saemaul Undong: The "Modernization" of Rural Poverty in South-Korea

Abstract

This article deals with the 'New Village Movement' in South-Korea which has been projected as a development model by the governmental planners and hence is earmarked for 'export' to other Asian countries also ridden by difficulties in rural development. The purpose of this study is to research deeper into the mechanisms and the tangible goal-achievement of the Saemaul Movement and to contrast this program of government-controlled rural development with other local development strategies like those of the Korean Catholic Farmers' Association. After the goals of the Saemaul Movement are stated according to official sources, the author embarks on a description and analysis of the actual Saemaul performance, like the "cementation" of the country side, the village road improvement scheme, rural electrification, the introduction of high-yielding seed varieties, village leaders training Programms and last not least - the general process of 'beautification of the villages'. However, as the analysis attempts to explain, most of the goals were not achieved and the urban-rural disparities were not bridged by Saemaul Undong but further aggravated. Farmers, except some richer middle landowners, were further indebted and suffered from slowly rising rice-procurement prices paid to them by the government which were in sharp contrast to rapidly rising costs of farm-inputs like fertilizers, seeds and machines. Further, the study tries to explain the so-called 'dilemma of the South-Korean peasantry' and attempts to explore deeper into the actual impact of 'Saemaulisation'. The alternative to the central government's programs for accelerated rural development is suggested by various church organizations under which the poorer peasants have started to organize against the mechanisms of labour-absorption, declining subsistence farming and 'internal eolonislism' in general. Little wonder that a large number of farmers consider Saemaul Undong, and especially the 'voluntary labour'-programs, as a kind of medieval corvde. Also, the government proved not to be able to contain expanding landlordism and the expropriation of small farmholders. In addition, the Park-regime was not able to overcome the dissatisfaction of the majority of rural dwellers whose living conditions as a whole have gradually worsened. In regard to future aspects of South-Korean rural policies, it can be safely assumed that Saemaul Undong has failed in reaching its main targets and therefore the transfer of this 'model' to other concerned countries can not be recommended. The New Village Movement has sharpened up the contradictions in the country where it was originally invented and constitutes just another 'Green Revolution'-type of program which has contributed little to solve the main problems of the rural sector. Hence, it's impact should be seen more in the sense of a 'counter-reform' than of overall progress as far as the satisfaction of the most basic needs of the poorer half of the South-Korean population is concerned.